Now What?

Buy America - Rebuild America.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The West blithely fed a docile Panda and allowed it to turn into a dangerous and restless bully. Now what?

Containing China Will Be Complicated

Expect Beijing to grow more assertive as the West rethinks its economic attachments after the coronavirus.

By Elbridge Colby and A. Wess Mitchell

The Covid-19 pandemic has convinced many that the U.S. must fundamentally change its policy toward China. Shifting course is necessary, but it won’t be achieved with a few policy tweaks. That’s because the pandemic’s political and economic effects are bringing about a more assertive Chinese grand strategy.

Beijing has steered China’s rise with relative ease since the mid-1990s. Enabled by the West’s open arms, China has grown its economy, armed itself and expanded its influence around the world without significant interference from a countervailing coalition. It has grown rich and strong with the West’s permission. China’s rise has been welcomed rather than balanced, let alone contained.

Given the wide berth afforded by the West, all China had to do was keep growing and eventually it would become so powerful that it could achieve regional hegemony in Asia before establishing itself as a superpower. The cliché that China is mostly an economic and political challenge to the U.S. was correct, but only superficially. Beijing was cruising to global domination and had no good reason to pick a fight.

Covid-19, in addition to killing more than 250,000 and throwing millions out of work, has accelerated the looming showdown between China and those countries that fear its hegemony. Western countries and U.S. partners in Asia have begun focusing on the need to reduce their dependence on supply chains running through China. This economic breakup will make it hard for Beijing to maintain the tremendous growth rates of the past generation. Even before the pandemic, many governments were beginning to scrutinize trade arrangements with China that had enabled Beijing to dictate the terms of access to its market in circumvention of established international trade rules. Those historical countervailing coalitions will now assemble to check and curb China’s enormous power, the nature of which Beijing has vividly put on display in the crisis.

Beijing can no longer prudently assume a glide path to dominance in the postpandemic world. Where it once had a strong incentive to bide its time, Beijing will now see a need for action to ensure continued economic growth, which underpins the Communist Party’s legitimacy and underwrites China’s bid for regional hegemony. To secure this hegemony in Asia, Beijing will need to short-circuit or, if necessary, pry apart any coalition—formal or informal—that forms to check its aspiration.

This is a consequential moment and China’s leaders have critical choices to make. History is replete with examples of rising powers that grew more aggressive after losing the ability to glide to dominance. In the early 20th century, a newly unified Germany initially pursued a path of economic growth and expanded influence, only to embark on an arms race that created the conditions for World War I. The signs are ominous that China may choose a similar path today.

The best way for an established power like the U.S. to meet a challenge from a rising, ambitious state like China is to demonstrate as quickly as possible the inadvisability of doing what Germany did. This means jettisoning the old policy of hoping growth and enmeshment will turn China into a country that plays by established rules. Rather, the U.S. should align with countries that share its interests in Asia, Europe and beyond. A unified front will make China think twice about taking the German path.

The U.S. must reduce its economic exposure to China by addressing the vulnerabilities that have accumulated in important U.S. industries, artificial intelligence and the defense supply chain. But America can’t go it alone. The current turn in Chinese behavior suggests that policy makers in Washington should pursue a grand strategy centered on maritime and aerospace power, alliances and expanded commerce. This will check Chinese strength and give Beijing incentives to tame its more destabilizing trade and military tendencies.

Many of the components of such a strategy are in place or in progress. One is the development of a stronger force posture in the Western Pacific to dissuade Chinese aggression toward Taiwan or other U.S. allies. This requires a credible forward defense, as outlined in the National Defense Strategy, built on the ability of countries like Japan, Australia, Taiwan, India, and Vietnam to blunt any Chinese aggression.

But a revised U.S. grand strategy must also include a different approach to alliances in Europe. European allies’ resistance to de facto Chinese colonization in Eastern Europe and Beijing’s commercial-technological inroads in Western Europe is a de minimis requirement. Ultimately, Europeans need to be able to handle more of their own defense—with abiding American support—while Washington turns its attention to the Pacific. An expanded commitment to free trade among free countries will make the turn away from China-heavy supply chains an easier adjustment and ensure the West remains competitive in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence.

Prioritizing the central threat posed by China means America’s postpandemic grand strategy will need to be attuned to opportunities for downshift or détente elsewhere. In the Middle East, an economy-of-force strategy should be implemented featuring a lighter, smaller and cheaper U.S. military footprint. Europe should focus the bulk of its efforts on ensuring the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastern flank.

The U.S. and its allies can’t protect their interests without confronting China. But confrontation will change Beijing’s incentives, making it more likely to assert itself sooner rather than later. Great-power competition may have lain dormant during the era of unfettered globalization, but the pandemic has brought it roaring back. The West must recognize that it will either pay now or pay later to contain China. Paying now is likely to produce a more tolerable bill.

Mr. Colby served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development, 2017-18. Mr. Mitchell served as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, 2017-19. They are principals of the Marathon Initiative.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++