Monday, July 18, 2016

Abbas and Dahlan. Sharia Law Is On Its Way. French Jews Continue to Leave! Trump's Wife Charming, Rudy a Stem-Winder.

Cop Killers and Hillary's Patronizing Talk At The NAACP.
This from a dear and very long time friend and fellow memo reader in response to what I wrote about  my daughter calling attention to my mistake regarding Martial "Marshall" Law: "My wife, mother-in-law, and I were together in the car one summer evening. As we passed a karate school’s store front complete with mirrored walls and students in their pajama suits, my mother-in-law piped up from the back seat, “Well, my goodness! A marital arts studio!”

That was back in the 1970’s, gentler times. J--"
My friend Toameh discusses the Abbas-Dahlan relationship. (See 1 below.)

Fred Maroun, tells his own what they refuse to hear. (See 1a below.)
Harsh assessment of our divide and rule train wreck of a president. (See 2 below.)
I have warned for over a year that Sharia Law is coming our way.  Sharia law is a tribal and brutal method by which people are judged.. One day, if not stopped, our own children and grandchildren will be subject to its dictates.

Again call me nuts.
A message from Cliff May's organization: Foundation For Defense of Democracies. (See 3 below.)
Another large number of French Jews leave for Israel.

I suspect, in the next ten years, half of the Jews in France will leave if they have the wherewithal.  I also believe various Jewish Agencies will assist those who want to leave but cannot afford to do so and thus, they too will also be able to leave.

When people leave their homes and move somewhere else, of their own volition, history and sociology generally records they are very likely to become productive citizens. This explains Israel's success.

When a nation floods itself with the enslaved and those who do not come of their own volition the results do not generally follow this pattern. This helps explain some of our racial problems. (See 4 below.)
Lessons learned by Israel from Lebanon's War. Dr. Lerner takes Israel's Military Intelligence Members to task.

Apparently The Winograd Commission Report has been taken to heart and improvements have been noted.(See 5 below.)

Meanwhile, yesterday a drone was sent from Syria to test Israeli time response and reaction. Israel launched two rockets and other hardware but failed to bring down the drone.  Not good. (See 5a below.)
They look rather pitiful in my eyes:
The First night of the RNC went off well. Trump's wife was charming and Rudy was a stem-winder.


  • Who is supplying Mohamed Dahlan with money? The United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is their cash that has enabled Palestinians in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to purchase weapons and buy loyalty for Dahlan in preparation for the post-Abbas era — especially disgruntled young Fatah activists in the West Bank who feel that Abbas and the PA leadership have turned their backs on them.
  • This power struggle will not end with the departure of Mahmoud Abbas. The next Palestinian president will surely be one of Abbas's current loyalists. This in itself will drive Dahlan and his ilk to continue railing against the old guard.
Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas faces a real threat; its name is Mohamed Dahlan.
Abbas has become obsessed with Dahlan, according to insiders. The PA president, they report, spends hours each day discussing ways to deal with the man and his supporters. And, it is rumored, Abbas's nights are not much better.
Backed by at least three Arab countries, Dahlan, a former Palestinian security commander from the Gaza Strip, seems to have unofficially joined the battle for succession in the PA.
The 54-year-old Dahlan, young enough to be Abbas's son, continues to deny any ambition to succeed Mahmoud Abbas as president of the PA. Yet Dahlan's continued efforts to establish bases of power in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip belie his claims.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (left) and Mohamed Dahlan (right), a former Fatah security commander, have, for the past five years, been at each other's throats. The two were once close allies and had worked together to undermine the former PA president, Yasser Arafat.
(Image sources: U.S. State Dept., M. Dahlan Office)
Abbas's top aides talk about the cash that Dahlan has lavished on many Palestinians, thereby winning their support. Any Palestinian activist whose request for financial aid is turned down by Abbas's office can always turn to Dahlan, who is not inclined to disappoint those who seek his help.
Who is supplying Dahlan with money? The United Arab Emirates. It is their cash that has enabled Palestinians in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to purchase weapons and buy loyalty for Dahlan in preparation for the post-Abbas era.
Unsurprisingly, Abbas and the PA leadership are less than enthusiastic about this turn of events. Since 2011, they have taken a series of measures to stop Dahlan, but to no avail.
First, Abbas ordered his security forces to raid Dahlan's home in Ramallah and confiscate documents and equipment. Second, the Fatah Central Committee, a body dominated by Abbas loyalists, voted in favor of expelling Dahlan from its ranks. Third, the PA, at the behest of Abbas, filed charges in absentia against Dahlan, accusing him of financial corruption and embezzlement.
As part of a smear campaign, Abbas and the PA have claimed that Dahlan is a murderer who has Palestinian blood on his hands. They have also been saying that Dahlan stole hundreds of millions of dollars and is in collusion with the Palestinians' enemies.
Still, Dahlan appears to be far from vanishing from the Palestinian political scene. In fact, the campaign against him seems to have increased Dahlan's resolve to continue and even step up his efforts to bring down Abbas and his veteran loyalists in the Palestinian Authority.
So what is fueling Dahlan's success? Abbas and some of his top aides point a finger at the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the wealthy Gulf country that has been harboring and funding Dahlan for the past five years. Dahlan's ties with the ruling family in the UAE are so strong that he has been appointed as a “special advisor” to Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Forces. Palestinian Authority officials in Ramallah call Dahlan the “spoiled lad” of Sheikh Al Nahyan.
United Arab Emirates money has helped Dahlan and his supporters buy loyalty among Palestinians, especially disgruntled young Fatah activists in the West Bank who feel that Abbas and the PA leadership have turned their backs on them.
But while the influential Gulf country provides Dahlan with shelter and funds, two other Arab countries — Egypt and Jordan — grant him a certain degree of legitimacy and a platform for his public activities, including those directed against Abbas and some of his top advisors and aides in Ramallah. Dahlan maintains a close friendship with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, with whom he has met a number of times in Cairo over the past two years. Recently, Dahlan visited Amman and met with several Jordanians and Palestinians, much to the dismay of Abbas and the Palestinian Authority leadership.
Dahlan's close ties with the Egyptians and Jordanians are the force driving the tensions that have erupted between Abbas and both Sisi and Jordan's King Abdullah.
According to Palestinian sources in Ramallah, Abbas has expressed outrage over the way the Egyptians and Jordanians have openly embraced and endorsed the man he considers his greatest threat. Upon learning of Dahlan's visit to Jordan, Abbas refrained from meeting with government officials in Amman (where he has a private house) on his way to visit other countries. (Abbas routinely travels around the world through Jordan). Abbas was particularly enraged when he learned that King Abdullah had given Dahlan and his family members Jordanian citizenship.
Dahlan's visit to Jordan last April is believed to be in the context of his effort to establish bases of power among Palestinians living in the kingdom. According to some reports, Dahlan has already succeeded in rallying dozens of Palestinians from refugee camps in Jordan behind him.
“Dahlan is President Abbas's worst nightmare,” remarked a senior Palestinian official in Ramallah who has been closely following the complicated ties between the two men over the past two decades. “You can be fired or punished in various ways if the president suspects that you are in touch with Dahlan.”
Dahlan founded and headed the Palestinian Preventive Security Force in the Gaza Strip shortly after the signing of the Oslo Accords. After the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, he became one of Abbas's closest confidants, later appointed by Abbas as National Security Advisor to the Palestinian Authority leadership. In 2006, he was elected as a Fatah member of the Palestinian Legislative Council for the Khan Yunis district in the southern Gaza Strip.
How Abbas and Dahlan came to be at one another's throats is food for speculation. Some Palestinians believe that the ill-will between the two is purely personal, and began when Dahlan was overheard belittling Abbas's two sons, Yasser and Tareq. Others say that Abbas decided to get rid of Dahlan because he suspected that Dahlan was plotting to stage a coup against him.
Then again, 81-year-old Abbas is highly suspicious of Palestinians such as Dahlan who have too much ambition and charisma. Abbas is also very overprotective of his family, particularly his two sons. Other Palestinian officials, such as Salam Fayyad and Yasser Abed Rabbo, who have dared to challenge Abbas in various ways have found themselves stripped of power and money. Abbas's campaign against his critics has been notably successful so far, with the exception, of course, of Dahlan. Those officials who continue to live in the West Bank now keep their mouths shut. Dahlan, of course, does not.
Based in Abu Dhabi, Dahlan is beyond Abbas's long arm. Dahlan's close ties with the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and, to some degree, Jordan, has given him immunity against Abbas, who is keen to pacify these three important Arab countries. Besides, Abbas is well aware that he is surrounded by too many wolves, and that opening a new front with Dahlan and his friends/patrons in the Arab countries could put him over the edge.
Buoyed by impressive political and financial aid, Dahlan pulls no punches when it comes to Abbas.
Last year, Dahlan chose a Jordanian online newspaper to launch a scathing attack on his former boss. In the eyes of some Palestinian political analysts, Dahlan's platform was far from random. They argue that the online newspaper could not have published Dahlan's statements had it not received permission from the highest echelons in the royal palace in Amman. Some Jordanian writers and journalists have in the past been imprisoned for insulting some Arab leaders or countries. Not in this case, where Dahlan made the charges against Abbas.
So what did Dahlan share in the interview with the Ammon News website, which described him as a charismatic leader and the number one enemy of Abbas?
Dahlan accused Abbas of “hiding” $600 million following the death of Yasser Arafat. According to Dahlan, former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad gave Abbas a total of $1.4 billion, but when Abbas was asked about the sum he claimed he had only received $800 million. He accused Abbas's sons of corruption, claiming their fortune was estimated at over $300 million. He also reminded that Abbas was no longer a legitimate president because his term in office had expired in January 2009.
“What kind of a president is this who lives in Amman and rules in Ramallah?” Dahlan asked in the interview. “Abbas's problem is that when the he sits with me he doesn't feel he's a president. No one respects him, not in Palestine and not abroad.”
Abbas's aides have dismissed the charges as “lies and fabrications,” saying they are in the context of Dahlan's ongoing effort to undermine the Palestinian Authority leadership and “serve the agenda of regional powers and foreign parties.”
Sources close to Abbas have also claimed that the Jordanian news website that gave Dahlan a platform for his attacks on the PA was on the payroll of Dahlan's patrons in the United Arab Emirates. They also claim that Dahlan has similarly used UAE funds to purchase a popular Egyptian online newspaper.
The rivalry between Abbas and Dahlan is emblematic of the power struggle between the old guard and young guard in Fatah, the largest Palestinian faction that dominates the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
This is a power struggle that has been raging for the past three decades. Dahlan is a representative of the young guard, whose members are strongly opposed to the continued hegemony and monopoly of the old guard over the decision-making process. Dahlan and the young guard are mostly from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, grassroots leaders who have long been complaining that they have been marginalized by the veteran leaders of the Palestinians who came from Lebanon and Tunisia after the signing of the Oslo Accords and who continue to block the emergence of new and younger leaders.
This power struggle will not end with Abbas's departure. The next Palestinian president will surely be one of Abbas's current loyalists. This in itself will drive Dahlan and his ilk to continue railing against the old guard. Dahlan's ghost will continue to haunt not only any future Palestinian president, but also Abbas in his grave.
Who, then, one might ask, will step up and lead the Palestinians away from the edge of their own abyss? For now, it does not seem that there is a Palestinian leader who has the power or credentials to stop the deterioration.
Khaled Abu Toameh, an award-winning journalist, is based in Jerusalem.

1a)The Gatestone Institute
The Arabs' Historic Mistakes in Their Interactions with Israel
  • We Arabs managed our relationship with Israel atrociously, but the worst of all is the ongoing situation of the Palestinians. Our worst mistake was in not accepting the United Nations partition plan of 1947.
  • Perhaps one should not launch wars if one is not prepared for the results of possibly losing them.
  • The Jews are not keeping the Arabs in camps, we are.
  • Jordan integrated some refugees, but not all. We could have proven that we Arabs are a great and noble people, but instead we showed the world, as we continue to do, that our hatred towards each other and towards Jews is far greater than any concept of purported Arab solidarity.
This is part one of a two-part series. The second part will examine what we Arabs can do differently today.

In the current state of the relationship between the Arab world and Israel, we see a patchwork of hostility, tense peace, limited cooperation, calm, and violence. We Arabs managed our relationship with Israel atrociously, but the worst of all is the ongoing situation of the Palestinians.

The Original Mistake

Our first mistake lasted centuries, and occurred well before Israel's declaration of independence in May 1948. It consisted of not recognizing Jews as equals.

As documented by a leading American scholar of Jewish history in the Muslim world, Mark R. Cohen, during that era, "Jews shared with other non-Muslims the status of dhimmis [non-Muslims who have to pay protection money and follow separate debasing laws to be tolerated in Muslim-controlled areas] ... New houses of worship were not to be built and old ones could not be repaired. They were to act humbly in the presence of Muslims. In their liturgical practice they had to honor the preeminence of Islam. They were further required to differentiate themselves from Muslims by their clothing and by eschewing symbols of honor. Other restrictions excluded them from positions of authority in Muslim government".

On March 1, 1944, while the Nazis were massacring six million Jews, and well before Israel declared independence, Haj Amin al-Husseini, then Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, declared on Radio Berlin, "Arabs, rise as one man and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you."

If we had not made this mistake, we might have benefited in two ways.

Jews would likely have remained in the Muslim Middle East in greater numbers, and they would have advanced the Middle Eastern civilization rather than the civilizations of the places to which they fled, most notably Europe and later the United States.

Secondly, if Jews felt secure and accepted in the Middle East among Arabs, they may not have felt the need to create an independent state, which would have saved us from our subsequent mistakes.

The Worst Mistake

Our second and worst mistake was in not accepting the United Nations partition plan of 1947. UN resolution 181 provided the legal basis for a Jewish state and an Arab state sharing what used to be British-controlled Mandatory Palestine.

As reported by the BBC, that resolution provided for:

"A Jewish State covering 56.47% of Mandatory Palestine (excluding Jerusalem) with a population of 498,000 Jews and 325,000 Arabs; An Arab State covering 43.53% of Mandatory Palestine (excluding Jerusalem), with 807,000 Arab inhabitants and 10,000 Jewish inhabitants; An international trusteeship regime in Jerusalem, where the population was 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs."

Although the land allocated to the Jewish state was slightly larger than the land allocated to the Arab state, much of the Jewish part was total desert, the Negev and Arava, with the fertile land allocated to the Arabs. The plan was also to the Arabs' advantage for two other reasons:

  • The Jewish state had only a bare majority of Jews, which would have given the Arabs almost as much influence as the Jews in running the Jewish state, but the Arab state was almost purely Arab, providing no political advantage to Jews within it.

  • Each proposed state consisted of three more-or-less disconnected pieces, resulting in strong geographic interdependence between the two states. If the two states were on friendly terms, they would likely have worked in many ways as a single federation. In that federation, Arabs would have had a strong majority.

Instead of accepting that gift of a plan when we still could, we Arabs decided that we could not accept a Jewish state, period. In May 1948, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, announced, regarding the proposed new Jewish part of the partition: that, "This will be a war of extermination, a momentous massacre, which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." We initiated a war intended to eradicate the new state in its infancy, but we lost, and the result of our mistake was a much stronger Jewish state:

  • The Jewish majority of the Jewish state grew dramatically due to the exchange of populations that occurred, with many Arabs fleeing the war in Israel and many Jews fleeing a hostile Arab world to join the new state.

  • The Jews acquired additional land during the war we launched, resulting in armistice lines (today called the green lines or pre-1967 lines), which gave Israel a portion of the land previously allocated to the Arab state. The Jewish state also acquired much better contiguity, while the Arab portions became divided into two parts (Gaza and the West Bank) separated by almost 50 kilometers.

Perhaps one should not launch wars if one is not prepared for the results of possibly losing them.
In May 1948, Azzam Pasha (right), the General Secretary of the Arab League, announced, regarding the proposed new Jewish part of the partition: that, "This will be a war of extermination, a momentous massacre, which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades."

More Wars and More Mistakes

After the War of Independence (the name that the Jews give to the war of 1947/1948), Israel was for all practical purposes confined to the land within the green lines. Israel had no authority or claim over Gaza and the West Bank. We Arabs had two options if we had chosen to make peace with Israel at that time:

  • We could have incorporated Gaza into Egypt, and the West Bank into Jordan, providing the Palestinians with citizenship in one of two relatively strong Arab countries, both numerically and geographically stronger than Israel.

  • We could have created a new state in Gaza and the West Bank.

Instead, we chose to continue the hostilities with Israel. In the spring of 1967, we formed a coalition to attack Israel. On May 20, 1967, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad stated, "The time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation." On May 27, 1967, Egypt's President Abdul Nasser declared, "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel". In June, it took Israel only six days to defeat us and humiliate us in front of the world. In that war, we lost much more land, including Gaza and the West Bank.

After the war of 1967 (which Jews call the Six-Day War), Israel offered us land for peace, thereby offering us a chance to recover from the mistake of the Six-Day War. We responded with the Khartoum Resolutions, stating, "No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel".
Not having learned from 1967, we formed yet another coalition in October 1973 and tried again to destroy Israel. We achieved some gains, but then the tide turned and we lost again. After this third humiliating defeat, our coalition against Israel broke up, and Egypt and Jordan even decided to make peace with Israel.

The rest of us remained stubbornly opposed to Israel's very existence, even Syria which, like Egypt and Jordan, had lost land to Israel during the Six-Day War. Today Israel still holds that territory, and there is no real prospect for that land ever going back to Syria; Israel's Prime Minister recently declared that, "Israel will never leave the Golan Heights".

The Tragedy of the Palestinians

The most reprehensible and the most tragic of our mistakes is the way that we Arabs have treated Palestinians since Israel's declaration of independence.

The Jews of Israel welcomed Jewish refugees from Arab and other Muslim lands into the Israeli fold, regardless of the cost or the difficulty in integrating people with very different backgrounds. Israel eagerly integrated refugees from far-away lands,including EthiopiaIndiaMoroccoBrazilIranUkraine, and Russia. By doing so, they demonstrated the powerful bond that binds Jews to each other. At the same time, we had the opportunity similarly to show the bond that binds Arabs together, but instead of welcoming Arab refugees from the 1947/48 war, we confined them to camps with severe restrictions on their daily lives.
In Lebanon, as reported by Amnesty International, "Palestinians continue to suffer discrimination and marginalization in the labor market which contribute to high levels of unemployment, low wages and poor working conditions. While the Lebanese authorities recently lifted a ban on 50 of the 70 jobs restricted to them, Palestinians continue to face obstacles in actually finding employment in them. The lack of adequate employment prospects leads a high drop-out rate for Palestinian schoolchildren who also have limited access to public secondary education. The resultant poverty is exacerbated by restrictions placed on their access to social services".

Yet, Lebanon and Syria could not integrate refugees that previously lived a few kilometers away from the country's borders and who shared with the country's people almost identical cultures, languages, and religions. Jordan integrated some refugees but not all. We could have proven that we Arabs are a great and noble people, but instead we showed the world, as we continue to do, that our hatred towards each other and towards Jews is far greater than any concept of purported Arab solidarity. Shamefully to us, seven decades after the Palestinian refugees fled Israel, their descendants are still considered refugees.

The worst part of the way we have treated Palestinian refugees is that even within the West Bank and Gaza, there remains to this day a distinction between Palestinian refugees and native Palestinians. In those lands, according to the year 2010 numbers provided by Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet at McGill University, 37% of Palestinians within the West Bank and Gaza live in camps! Gaza has eight Palestinian refugee camps, and the West bank has nineteen. The Jews are not keeping the Arabs in camps, we are. Palestinian President Mahmood Abbas claims a state on those lands, but we can hardly expect him to be taken seriously when he leaves the Palestinian refugees under his authority in camps and cannot even integrate them with other Palestinians. The ridiculousness of the situation is rivaled only by its callousness.

Where We Are Now

Because of our own mistakes, our relationship with Israel today is a failure. The only strength in our economies is oil, a perishable resource and, with fracking, diminishing in value. We have not done nearly enough to prepare for the future when we will need inventiveness and productivity. According to Foreign Policy Magazine, "Although Arab governments have long recognized the need to shift away from an excessive dependence on hydrocarbons, they have had little success in doing so. ... Even the United Arab Emirates' economy, one of the most diversified in the Gulf, is highly dependent on oil exports".

Business Insider rated Israel in 2015 as the world's third most innovative country. Countries from all over the world take advantage of Israel's creativity, including countries as remote and as advanced as Japan. Yet we snub Israel, an innovation powerhouse that happens to be at our borders.
We also fail to take advantage of Israel's military genius to help us fight new and devastating enemies such as ISIS.

Worst of all, one of our own people, the Palestinians, are dispersed -- divided, disillusioned, and utterly incapable of reviving the national project that we kidnapped from under their feet in 1948 and that we have since disfigured beyond recognition.

To say that we must change our approach towards Israel is an understatement. There are fundamental changes that we ourselves must make, and we must find the courage and moral fortitude to make them.

The Jews are not keeping the Arabs in camps, we are.

Fred Maroun, an  Arab based in Canada, has authored op-eds for New Canadian 
By Jeffrey T. Brown

The president is near the end of an eight year train wreck presidency, the result of which is that every social issue is more divisive, more unsolvable, and more dishonestly framed than ever before.  It is no secret that he has done nothing for the black community, whose unemployment and crime rates are rising every day, while he demonizes police and lauds racist activists who condone assassination and lawlessness.  Hillary Clinton has promised to be Barack Obama in a pantsuit, which means the downward trend will continue as the Democrat practice of “Promise Everything, Deliver Nothing, Blame Others” goes on in perpetuity.
The black community allows itself to be played this way each and every election cycle, and reliably elects progressive politicians who care more about the profitability of corruption than about their lives or hardships.  Indeed, we know that the majority of these individuals live in Democrat controlled cities and states, where Democrat policies ensure that nothing changes for the better, but will often change for the worse if given minimal time.  Somehow, the dots remain unconnected.   Nevertheless, the party can’t afford to allow the black community to consider other options, including the message of success and advancement via the content of one’s character and work ethic.  The party motto ought to be “Strength Through Failure”.

Thankfully for the Democrats, there are groups like Black Lives Matter, the New Black Panthers, and every organization that preaches Black Liberation Theory or Theology.  Trinity United Church comes to mind, but the Dallas racist didn’t need a church when he had so many other pan-African hate groups to follow.  History tells us that nothing stirs the supposedly big hearts and closed minds of leftists like race-based radical hate groups. 
It is no longer chic for the party to support the old Klan, which was entirely peopled by Democrats in its heyday, and was used as an enforcement tool by the local Democrats to keep people in their predetermined social places.  Fortunately for the Democrats, there is a new Klan on the block: Black Lives Matter.  It’s still populated by Democrats and is still prepared to use violence and assassination to keep people in their social slots.  Ironically, the old Klan and the new Klan are both devices to keep blacks in their predetermined places, just exactly where the Democrat party wants them.  The self-inflicted damage being done to the image of black Americans by this group is incalculable, and is ensuring that restoring trust is now generations away, if it happens at all.  It is not lost on whites that there is racial hatred toward them for merely existing, hardly a starting point for dialogue.  Lies and hatred don’t presage a healing process.

In a country of 340 Million people, we periodically see stories on the news about a police shooting, sometimes a couple within a short period, usually of a suspect who we end up finding out was far from random, far from peaceful, and far from innocent.  Of course, we don’t find that out until well after the left has framed the narrative with lies about the reasons for the confrontation or the risks to the police.  Given the extent to which such events, as unfortunate as they are when erroneous, serve the left’s agenda it is safe to conclude that we would hear about more of them if there were more of them.  That so much is made of the ones that do occur is testament to the fact that they are not a daily occurrence, as the progressives would have us believe.  If such events were as common as they claim, we would hear about them every day, all day, non-stop, and there would be in inexhaustible supply of them.

Needless to say, we already know that.  We all live in the same country as the propagandists.  If they had evidence of rampant and systemic murder by police, they would do anything to publish it.  When such evidence does not exist, however, it becomes necessary to lie.  This is a tactic of other leftist special interest groups, as well.  There are countless stories of activists for gay rights, or women’s rights, or race frauds, who fabricate stories of abuse, violence, gang rape, etc. because there are so few truthful examples of these events occurring in a country the activists hate for the bigotry it continually fails to demonstrate.  Sometimes it’s a Tawanna Brawley scam, other times a slur on a cake from Whole Foods, and yet other times it’s college gang rapes that never happened.  If the systemic hatred and violence was so common, the elaborate frauds would be needless overkill.

We also know that elitist progressives are nothing if not master liars and puppeteers.  They have spent years tailoring and refining their manipulation of the black communities, inflaming their resentment, bitterness and hopelessness by reminding them of how little progress they have been able to make, without reminding them that the Democrats have led them for decades to this dead end and made sure they stayed there.  You will never hear the Democrat mayor or governor of a blue city or state admit that they have been so busy nurturing and feeding their own corruption that they simply never got around to bothering to try to make things better.  You will certainly never hear them remind their dependents that black men and women occupy the highest offices of the country, proving systemic racism has long since been defeated, and the fault lies elsewhere.  Something must be done to distract them, to prevent them from pausing long enough to think, to discourage them from any critical thinking whatsoever, hopefully while enraging them.  They must be played.

So, here we go again.  An election is coming up, and the Democrats can’t afford for their minority captives to stray.  What better way to ensure allegiance than to fabricate a false narrative of wholesale murder, support it with infuriating lies and half-truths that will eventually be dispelled too late to make a difference, and step back while the inevitable violence escalates?  The president can claim to support police because he mouths words to that effect, while actually throwing his entire support behind the radicals, whose leaders he entertains at the White House, and whose actions he enables by faulting the police for his loyalists’ violence and murder.  He can claim to have the cops’ backs, while elevating Al Sharpton, and holding planning conferences with professional agitators, protestors and anarchists, as he has done throughout his presidency, whether during the “Occupy” phase, or the Ferguson phase, or now. 

Of course, those emotional votes are paid for with the innocent lives of Honest to God American patriots.  The president is coldly unconcerned that the upheaval and violence he condones brings with it the loss of selfless American men and women who do more in one day to serve their country and the president’s voters than this president has done in his entire life.  They risk their lives, and their families’ futures, while the president risks being exposed as nothing more than the radical community organizer and race profiteer he never stopped being.  If the president did nothing for a day, the world would be a better place.  If the police did nothing for a day, it would take years to catalogue all the crimes that would be done by those who will vote for the Democrat party candidates this fall.  At the hands of this president’s voters, more police will die to irreparably change America.  It is a price the president is prepared to have others pay.
A year ago, the Obama administration made a gamble, striking a nuclear accord with Tehran that it hoped would transform its behavior, leading to a thaw in bilateral relations and a more stable Middle East. In the administration’s telling, the agreement would help loosen hardliners’ grip on power in favor of more moderate forces. Now, one year after the nuclear deal, the sad truth is unavoidable: the very opposite has occurred, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to consolidate his hold over Iranian politics.
Those in Washington charmed by the hope of a new Iran believed that its parliamentary elections this year, the first after the nuclear deal, would turn the tables on Khamenei and strengthen the hand of the relatively more pragmatic president Hassan Rouhani. However, when Ali Larijani and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati were selected speaker of parliament and chairman of the Assembly of Experts respectively, this optimism quickly morphed into disappointment.
These same optimists should have known that in the Islamic Republic, the ballot box cannot deliver substantive change. In the past, the regime reacted to popular discontent with violence, undermining any chance for reform. But since 2009, when the regime nearly lost control of popular protests against fraudulent presidential elections, it has conducted its political maneuverings with heightened sophistication.
This year’s ballots for parliament and the Assembly of Experts are a prime example. The regime confronted an inconvenient choice: either let reformists sweep back into power or face a repetition of the 2009 unrest. It cleverly chose a third course, disqualifying the most inconvenient candidates for both bodies in advance of voting.
Western commentators cheered the relative electoral success of groups loosely linked to Rouhani without realizing that the only way they could even field candidates was by coopting hardliners to their own ticket. When viewed in that light, the results become a clear disappointment for those who believed change was possible in Tehran through the ballot box.
Instead, the government took further measures to ensure that future elections are effectively meaningless. First, it strengthened the Guardian Council - which vets all political candidates and laws for ideological purity - by granting it the ability to disqualify sitting parliamentarians. Half of the Council’s members are chosen by the supreme leader, and the other half chosen by the leader’s appointed judiciary chief, so bolstering its power effectively ensured that parliament will fall into line with the leader’s diktats. Soon after the elections, the Council used this new power to disqualify a newly elected member of the pro-Rouhani coalition because her hijab was deemed insufficiently modest.
Both Rouhani and parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani challenged her disqualification, but to no avail. Instead, Khamenei seized the opportunity to test a newly created body, the Supreme Council for Dispute Resolution, bypassing the Expediency Council - the institution that for decades has resolved conflicts between the Guardian Council and parliament. The Expediency Council is headed by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the relatively pragmatic politician and ex-president who is a Khamenei rival. Predictably, the new council affirmed the decision to disqualify the MP. In one fell swoop, Khamenei weakened his adversaries and neutralized parliament - one of the two elected branches of government that, as a semi-democratic state organ, could theoretically act as a vehicle for peaceful reform.
Time and again, Khamenei has modified Iran’s political system to strengthen his own power. In theory, he welcomes the public’s participation in elections. In practice, he manipulates the system to forestall any effort at substantive change. His latest maneuvers illustrate an uncomfortable but unavoidable fact: after the nuclear deal, even more than before, the Islamic Republic remains firmly in the hands of the hardliners.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is an Associate Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow. Follow them on Twitter @SGhasseminejad and @eottolenghi 
Over 200 French Jews to Immigrate to Israel Wednesday Aboard Largest French Aliyah Flight of the Summer

The Jewish Agency for Israel - Ministry of Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption

JERUSALEM, ISRAEL – More than 200 French Jews will arrive in Israel this
Wednesday (July 20) aboard a special Aliyah (immigration) flight organized
by The Jewish Agency for Israel in partnership with the Ministry of Aliyah
and Immigrant Absorption and Keren Hayesod-UIA. Upon their arrival at
Ben-Gurion Airport, they will be greeted by Chairman of the Executive of The
Jewish Agency for Israel Natan Sharansky, Minister of Aliyah and Immigrant
Absorption Sofa Landver, Minister of the Interior Aryeh Machlouf Deri, and
Chairman of Keren Hayesod-UIA Eliezer (Moodi) Sandberg.

This is the largest Aliyah flight from France set to land in Israel this
summer. Half of the new immigrants are teenagers, children, and toddlers who
will join the Israeli education system at the end of the summer vacation.
The immigrants also include several families in which three
generations—grandparents, parents, and children—will be making Aliyah
together. The majority of the immigrants will make their homes in Netanya,
Raanana, Jerusalem, and Ashdod. The flight was planned months ago, without
any connection to recent events in France.

Chairman of the Executive of The Jewish Agency for Israel Natan Sharansky
said: “French Jews who immigrate to Israel are coming out of choice: they
have a whole world of opportunities before them, and they are choosing to
come to Israel. Their choice is demonstrates that Israel affords a sense of
Jewish identity and attachment to those Jews who wish to take an active part
in the Jewish story. We must do everything we can to ease their
professional, educational, and personal integration into Israeli society and
ensure that they feel at home from the moment they first set foot on our
homeland’s soil.”

Minister of Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption Sofa Landver said: “In light of
the difficult weekend in Nice, I wish to welcome the immigrants from France
who chose to immigrate to Israel now. French Aliyah strengthens Israel, and
the Government of Israel works tirelessly to ease their absorption – the
Ministry of Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption will continue to work to remove
obstacles to employment and create new opportunities for young immigrants
from France, to illustrate to them that Israel is their home.”

The French Jewish community is the largest in Europe and the second-largest
in the world outside of Israel, numbering just under half a million Jews.
French Jewish immigration to Israel has surged since the year 2012, breaking
records for Aliyah from France and from Western countries more generally.
2014 marked the first time in Israel’s history that over 1% of a Western
Jewish community made Aliyah in a single year, an achievement repeated in
2015, with the arrival of some 7,800 immigrants from France – the most ever.
In total, nearly 10% of the French Jewish community has immigrated to Israel
since the year 2000, half in the past five years alone. In response to this
unprecedented demand from French Jews, The Jewish Agency and the Ministry of
Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption have developed a special plan to facilitate
Aliyah from France and ease French Jewish immigrants’ integration into
Israeli society. The plan includes efforts to deepen young French Jews’
Jewish identity, bring them to experience Israel on a variety of programs,
provide French Jews with comprehensive Aliyah information and counseling,
remove barriers to employment, and increase the number of Jewish Agency
shlichim (representatives) in France.

French Aliyah statistics:
2012: 1,900
2013: 3,300
2014: 7,200
2015: 7,800
The Lessons of Israeli Military Intelligence from Second Lebanon War
[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: It would have been nice to reflect on the
significance that the greatest achievement of the War - Operation Specific
Gravity - was thanks to the insistence of civilian DM Amir Peretz who
overruled all the brass who thought he was an idiot for ordering that the
IAF destroy the Fajr Rockets before they could be repositioned by
Hezbollah. The brass wanted to start by pounding Lebanese infrastructure.

As for learning lessons. Were all the lessons learned?

Let's not forget the painful shocker from the Gaza war years later: Israeli
intelligence knew about the Hamas tunnels into Israel but were clueless as
to what Hamas could do with the tunnels.

One can lose sleep wondering if the folks responsible for intelligence have
taken the necessary steps not to be clueless next time.

Frankly speaking, the reason it is a source of concern is that the otherwise
intelligent senior people who have said that remark about having been
clueless about what Hamas could do with the tunnels never seemed to indicate
that this was an admission of a profound failure.

And if they didn't appreciate that it was a profound failure does this mean
that military intelligence continues to be a contradiction in terms?]

The Lessons of Israeli Military Intelligence
The upheaval caused by the Second Lebanon War definitely led to the on-going
"intelligence revolution" the IDF Intelligence Directorate has been
undergoing since 2006
Gideon Mitshnik

Two different incidents that took place during the first day of the Second
Lebanon War reflected, to a considerable extent, the story of the military
intelligence in that war. In the first incident, IDF intelligence had failed
to provide a concrete alert regarding Hezbollah's intended abduction attack
on the morning of July 12 and IDF failed to prevent that attack. Conversely,
the second incident involved the "Night of the Fajr Rockets" and the success
of Operation Specific Gravity in which IAF destroyed dozens of Fajr
medium-range rocket launchers. These rockets had been concealed in houses
and were a part of one of Hezbollah's top secret projects. The successful
elimination of those rocket launchers was made possible by exceptional
intelligence achievements and deep penetration. This accomplishment led to
distress among the ranks of Hezbollah, as thorough backtracking and
self-examination were required in order to attempt and understand how
Israeli intelligence had managed to penetrate to such depths.

In an informal conversation with one of the members of the Winograd
Commission during the preparation of this article, he stated: "The problem
with the War did not concern the intelligence aspect." This is a substantial
statement, as the intelligence balance during the Second Lebanon War was
indeed mixed and complex and could not be defined in terms of success or
failure, but rather as a collection of numerous failures in various
activities alongside significant success stories. To make things even more
complex, gaps and even tensions and differences between some intelligence
elements and senior officers of the IDF General Staff were clearly evident.

The Winograd Commission of Inquiry for the Second Lebanon War addressed, in
its overt report (and with even more detail in its classified report)
numerous deficiencies of the military intelligence, regarding the over-all
preparations in the period prior to the War as well as regarding the actual
intelligence work during the War, mainly with regard to the performance
aspect. In the preface to the chapter on intelligence in the overt report,
the Commission stated: "All in all, the intelligence effort was successful
with regard to several highly important fields. Some of the intelligence
accomplishments were particularly impressive. However, on the day of
reckoning – as predictable as it was – gaps became visible with regard to
the intelligence information and capabilities, along with deficiencies in
the conduct of the intelligence elements opposite the elements they were
intended to serve, within the supreme political and military echelons and
among the combat elements."

And to quell any remaining doubts, the Commission positioned the part played
by the intelligence in that War in context and to scale: "As important as
they are, the deficiencies associated with military intelligence matters –
with the exception of the target intelligence category – did not directly
influence the results of the War."

The Primary Failure – Field Intelligence

The prevailing concept since the War is that the primary
intelligence-related failures occurred in the context of tactical
intelligence and the preparations of the intelligence elements of IDF
Northern Command and, naturally, the failure of the IDF Navy and Navy
Intelligence in the absence of an alert regarding the possibility of attacks
against Navy vessels using the C-802 shore-to-ship missile. But the report
by the Winograd Commission that focused on military intelligence (and hardly
addressed the Mossad and other intelligence agencies) made no concessions
and an in-depth review of that report yields criticism as well as problems
and failures along the entire length of the intelligence front, including
the strategic level.

The report refers to two distinct periods: the intelligence preparations
between the year 2000 and the outbreak of the War, and the performance of
the military intelligence during the war. With regard to the aspect of
"Operational Intelligence" (strategic intelligence) as per the Commission's
definition, "The accomplishments of the intelligence analysis activity at
the General Staff and Northern Command in the period prior to the war were
substantial." In this context, they noted, with a kind of commendation:
"There was full and correct understanding of the implications… regarding the
essence of the threat Hezbollah had presented opposite Israel, including the
issue of its diversified capabilities in the field of launching
surface-to-surface rockets…" On the other hand, referring to the interface
between the intelligence and the political-defense echelon and the
decision-making process during the War, the Commission had some criticism
that referred mainly to the gap between the potential and the actual ability
of the intelligence to influence the decision makers and the actual
occurrences: "Apparently, one area where the intelligence community had a
more substantial ability to influence the War was in the context of the
decision-making process on July 12 and the first few days thereafter,
including the first few days of the War. This time, more than at any other
time, when the professional echelons of the IDF Intelligence Directorate had
the key to cracking the enemy's riddle, they failed to exploit it opposite
the military and political leaders. While the intelligence concept was
generally correct, failures occurred in the process of submitting it to the
leaders. In essence, it was a time-consuming process that had numerous
partners and implications. As stated, some of those 'missed opportunities'
were not to be found exclusively in the courtyard of the intelligence, but
some of them were definitely in that courtyard."

The Commission further ruled and found the IDF Intelligence Directorate
responsible for another failure: despite the fact that a new Prime Minister
and a new Defense Minister had taken office, no specific discussion focusing
on the Lebanese sector and enabling a presentation of the entire range of
threats and implications was ever conducted. The Winograd Commission ruled
that "A sharp transition was made to a lower state of familiarity, which was
not thoroughly complemented until the breakout of the War," and that "The
intelligence insights regarding Hezbollah and their implications as far as
Israel was concerned were not discussed in a thorough and serious manner
between the Prime Minister and Defense Minister and the intelligence

The primary failure involved the various activities of the field
intelligence. Regarding the tactical intelligence, the Commission's report
states: "At the tactical level – the picture regarding the ground forces was
characterized by lapses and gaps. The assimilation of the intelligence by
the operational units was deficient… Some of the information was partial in
its contents, or not sufficiently detailed." The report stated further: "At
the operative and tactical levels as well as at the cultural-ethical level,
the intelligence picture was not so good, revealing substantial and even
crucial gaps."

The Difference between Knowledge and Awareness

The opening incident of the Second Lebanon War at Report Line 105 – the
ambush and abduction of two IDF soldiers – constitutes an example of the
failure of the tactical level intelligence. Without getting into the
internal investigations conducted after the War or the question of whether
or not advance information had been available but was not reported in time,
the intelligence failed, in this case, to identify the complex preparations
for the operation by Hezbollah, which consisted of numerous stages, involved
numerous forces and took place within arm's reach of our own forces. That
failure had also been indicated in the operational analyses regarding the
combat operations of the IDF 36th Division even before the Winograd
Commission was appointed.

The criticism leveled against the field intelligence and regarding
substantial deficiencies in the way it conducted its activities and in the
way other elements conducted themselves opposite it (for example, the
failure to deliver materials prior to and during the War, the fact that
intelligence aids had been left at the emergency storage depots) was not
only reflected in the Winograd Commission's report but was also raised by
the field echelon. It was alleged that in many instances relevant
intelligence was not reported to the company and platoon level.
Additionally, numerous allegations were made that in the Second Lebanon War,
the war fighters on the ground experienced the same problem the IDF
war fighters had experienced during the Yom-Kippur War: the intelligence
elements up to a certain level were thoroughly familiar with Hezbollah's
anti-tank, surveillance and artillery capabilities, but the forces on the
ground were taken by surprise, which once again highlights the difference
between knowledge and awareness.

In this context, Major (res.) Amir Dahan, a judge in civilian life as well
as in IDF and a deputy commander of a reconnaissance company in his
secondary capacity, stated in an article he published in the periodical
"Ma'arachot" after the War, that one phenomenon encountered again during the
War involved the fact that excellent intelligence had been available at the
brigade and battalion level, but that intelligence almost never reached the
company and platoon level and the individual troopers, and the intelligence
that they did receive was faulty. Other commanders supported that allegation
and confirmed "We did not have intelligence," while also claiming that they
only learned about Hezbollah's "nature reserves" when they actually ran into
them. Major Dahan suggested that a layout of "intelligence squads" be
established within the reserve companies, to provide a solution for the
intelligence gaps.

Brigadier-General (res.) Yuval Halamish, who served as the IDF Chief
Intelligence Officer during the Second Lebanon War, has addressed this issue
in detail last week, stressing that "The intelligence had a very good
understanding of Hezbollah's deployment, their strategic missile layouts and
operational doctrine," but conversely, "The intelligence picture regarding
the deployment of the short-range Katyusha rocket layout was mediocre to
weak," and admitted that one of the primary problems of the intelligence
prior to and during the War was the performance and capabilities of the
field intelligence elements.

A New Generation that Knew Nothing about Lebanon

The most prominent manifestation of the failure in the tactical intelligence
field was the dramatic way in which Hezbollah's "nature reserves" surprised
the IDF warfighters. The statements made by Halamish clearly reflect the
severity of the gap between the knowledge of the facts and the assimilation
thereof at the field level, as the Winograd Commission also noted: "The
intelligence was fully aware and familiar with the 'nature reserve' issue.
We may have not been familiar with all of the locations, we did not always
have in-depth details of what was actually happening in each village, but
the general picture was well known. Moreover, IDF had even built a model of
a 'nature reserve', for training the various units. Much to my regret, owing
to (budget) cuts and the activity in the territories, only a handful (of
units) actually trained there. Additionally, the quality of Hezbollah's
camouflage was very high, so it was very difficult to practically impossible
to spot those complexes from the air within the dense woods. As a result,
units that reached the gateway to a 'nature reserve' on foot sometimes stood
over a (Hezbollah) position and still could not identify it, even from the

This is the point where the story of the "closely-guarded material" comes
into the picture. Whereas the information regarding the "nature reserves"
had been obtained from highly sensitive sources, the information about those
"reserves" and about Hezbollah's deployment in the rural areas was treated
as "closely guarded" material that was only revealed to the superior echelon
and waited under lock and key for the day of reckoning. Every brigade had
its own "closely guarded" aids that were to be disseminated to the forces
when the time has come. This, as Halamish explains, was where the major
disruption occurred: "The primary mistake was that as soon as the decision
to go to war had been made, the material should have been opened
immediately, disseminated and assimilated among the commanders on the
ground, but this was never done." According to him, today the pendulum has
swung to the opposite extreme: "Too much information is currently being
reported to the lower echelons, despite classification problems."

In this context, Halamish lists and refers to other aspects of the field
intelligence: "Poor quality information systems at the field level that
compromised the ability to report information in real time. Emergency aids
and materials, some of the aids were not current and some of the
intelligence officers had left their emergency kits at the emergency storage
depots." In this context, intelligence officers who operated in the sector
of IDF Northern Command reported "A severe problem with aids that were
unsuitable for the various types of maneuvering, not current, not delivered
to everyone, not enough for everyone and so on."

One of the explanations Halamish offered regarding the circumstances of the
field level intelligence, with regard to commanders as well as intelligence
officers, was that "IDF had been busy in the territories in the years prior
to the War. A new generation had grown, made up of young commanders and
intelligence officers who knew nothing about Lebanon, and in my estimate the
general feeling was that after the pullout from Lebanon tranquility was
restored to the area, the abduction in October 2000 notwithstanding. The
commanders and intelligence officers thought they were coming to an
operation. Some of them had arrived directly from the Judea and Samaria
sector and when they reported to the area, their first question was 'where
is the ISA man?' They did not know what a POW interrogator was and why he
should be with them in Lebanon. Some of them had even left those
interrogators in Israeli territory and did not assign them to the combat

At the same time, Halamish maintains – and this is also backed by the
Winograd Commission: "I think the problem with the War had nothing to do
with the intelligence aspect. The problem was the lack of operational
decision-making as to what we wanted to accomplish and what the objective
was. The operational plans changed every day and units were shifted from one
sector to another with no logic whatsoever." He goes as far as pointing to a
conceptual problem at the supreme command level and to the gaps between IDF
Northern Command and the General Staff: "The IDF Chief of Staff thought
Hezbollah could be eliminated from the air only, and consequently he was not
enthusiastic about committing the ground forces, although he had been
authorized to do so by the political echelon." At the same time, gaps were
forming between IDF Northern Command HQ in Safed and the General Staff in
Tel-Aviv: "IDF Northern Command and the General Staff regarded different
objectives for the operation, and that was where a substantial part of the
problems was created."

Analyzing and Implementing the Lessons

Halamish remained in his position as IDF Chief Intelligence Officer until
2009, and along with Major-General Amos Yadlin, head of the IDF Intelligence
Directorate, was in charge of the debriefing/analysis and lesson drawing
process (a process further encouraged and supported by the subsequent heads
of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, Major-General Aviv Kochavi and
Major-General Hertzi Halevi). Numerous debriefing and analysis teams were
established within the IDF Intelligence Directorate in those days and one of
the primary conclusions they reached was that conceptual, organizational and
operational changes should be introduced with regard to the "connection"
between all of the layouts of the Intelligence Directorate and the field
intelligence elements. One of the primary lessons was to "bring home", back
to the Intelligence Directorate, the field intelligence officers from the
Chief Field Intelligence HQ, established in 2000: "My primary lesson from
the War, which is further supported by my tenure as Chief Field Intelligence
Officer, was that the intelligence cannot be divided between the Chief Field
Intelligence Officer and Chief Intelligence Officer. Accordingly,
immediately after the War had ended, we initiated the process of returning
the field intelligence back to the IDF Intelligence Directorate (a process
completed in 2009-2010, G.M.), and I think it proved itself in the various
operations in the Gaza Strip. Since then, there is one element that handles
intelligence from the ground up and from top to bottom – and that is the IDF
Intelligence Directorate."

Halamish testified that in the context of the lesson drawing and
implementation process, most of the lessons derived from the Second Lebanon
War were learned and implemented, and the intelligence even benefited from a
budgetary priority that enabled it to implement the changes: most of the
lessons were addressed and implemented as far back as during Operation Cast
Lead and the period thereafter and during Operation Pillar of Defense, down
to the brigade level, for example – in the form of teams of the imagery
interpretation and charting unit, as well as technical teams and
representatives of such intelligence gathering elements as the SigInt and
HumInt units. These teams can now link and operate with the brigades.
Additionally, a significant improvement has been noted in the cooperation
between the intelligence officers at the various levels and the intelligence
gathering layouts. A current infrastructure of intelligence aids was
prepared subject to quality standards and on a scale that would ensure it is
sufficient for all of the forces. A marked improvement has been noted with
regard to the collection capabilities at all levels. The process of
disseminating high-classification information to the forces on the ground
has been expanded and consolidated, and state-of-the-art information systems
were developed and deployed. In addition, Halamish noted that pursuant to
the Second Lebanon War, the quality of the field intelligence officers
improved and in recent years they have been performing better than before.
Most of them had graduated from analysis positions at the IDF Intelligence
Directorate's Analysis Division and/or at the regional commands, and,
possibly the crowning achievement of the entire process: "A better
connection has formed between the intelligence and fire elements, and even
as far back as during Operation Cast Lead, the Intelligence Directorate was
highly praised at all levels."

Gideon Mitchnik served as Intelligence Assistant to the Military Secretary
of the Minister of Defense during the Second Lebanon War

Syrian-Launched UAV Evades Israeli Air Defenses

Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News

TEL AVIV, Israel — An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from Syria managed
Sunday to penetrate Israeli airspace and evade two Patriot anti-air
interceptors and possibly an F-16-launched air-to-air missile, sources here

An Israeli military spokesman insisted Israel Air Force air defenders
detected the UAV prior to its violation of Israeli airspace on Sunday
afternoon in the area of the Golan Heights. According to a July 17
statement, the Air Force continued to track the target in Israeli skies, yet
failed to down the intruder, despite three intercept attempts.

“The aircraft was detected prior to entering the nation’s territory and was
fully tracked by the Israel Air Force,” noted a July 17 statement. “From the
initial investigation, it was found that three intercept attempts took place
as per procedure. No hit of the target was identified.”

An Israeli military spokesman said the specific type of UAV is still being
investigated, as are circumstances of the unsuccessful intercept attempts.

Tal Inbar of the Fisher Institute for Strategic Air and Space Studies said
Sunday’s event demonstrates the fact that Israel cannot hermetically seal
its skies from enemy intrusions. “Today’s event was a glimpse of things to
come in the event of a major conflict,” Inbar told Defense News.

“In future conflicts, it will be a huge challenge for even the most advanced
air defenses to discriminate from all the types of vehicles that will fill
the skies.

“When the skies will be full of incoming rockets, missiles and air breathing
threats — and when our own Iron Dome and David’s Sling interceptors will be
saturating the skies — it’s hard to imagine the Israel Air Force allocating
manned aircraft to shoot down incoming UAVs,” Inbar said.

Responsibility for defending Israel’s skies from aircraft and UAVs is shared
by F-16 air defense fighters and Wing 168, the ground-based node of the
service’s extensively integrated air defense network that operates upgraded
Patriot PAC-2 interceptors.

Prior to 2014, ground-based Patriots had historically been junior partner to
IAF fighters in their joint intercept mission against air-breathing threats.
But in the summer of 2014, Wing 168’s Patriot force blasted three unmanned
intruders out of the sky; two from Gaza and one near the Syrian border, not
far from Sunday’s incident. 

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