Needs no comment from me
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Rep. Schiff now wants to investigate Trump to see if he is wearing clean shorts.
I understand Rep Schiff, who is the rankest, slimiest of partisans, has no concern about the impact his proposed contrived investigations have because he hates Trump and wants his party to regain power at any cost. I have no doubt Schiff can conjure up some dirt to smear Trump and I also have no doubt Schiff could not withstand a comparable investigation. Every institution in America has run afoul of something and I am sure no American is without fault.
To investigate and harass Trump for things he did when he was a businessman, not running for president, sets a dangerous precedence and sends a signal to anyone considering public service why pay the price? The 2016 campaign was the place for revealing "stuff" and it did. Trump won. Mueller will issue his report one day. That should be enough.
When we attack/investigate our presidents, as Schiff plans, it has an impact beyond our country. It weakens their ability to negotiate, to project strength. When you lust for power all such thoughts are put aside.
I always believed what Democrats have engaged in would eventually boomerang. After The Bork Trials, I wrote a memo entitled "Bork and The Liberal Stork." ( My message was the egg laid would hatch something Democrats would later regret.) Bork was followed by the shameful Thomas tragedy and then came Kavanaugh. Now "black shoe polish faces," are popping up all over Virginia and Democrats are dancing as firecrackers explode all round.
Americans are a forgiving people, a fair minded people and we eventually abhor piling on per the likes of "Shifty" Schiff. Slime has a way of ultimately poisoning the slimer.
Democrats seem never to have learned: "you reap what you sow." They are handling it in their usual hypocritical and evasive manner. Furthermore, the reach of the past no longer knows any bounds. "Compassionate" Democrats have created a world of zero tolerance. and they will eventually rue the day and may well choke on their appetite for gorging themselves in pursuit of power. (See 1 below.)
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Casio has proposed some remarkable government freebies and wants to totally eliminate energy gulping vehicles. We will pay for it by walking to work and going back to using hoes. This "Maduro Maiden" is the new face of the Democrat Party. Go Girl!!!!
When political parties fail, as our two have been, it is easy for those who do not appreciate and/or understand the fragility of our republic to embrace the siren appeal of socialism which can become a Trojan Horse. There is not an announced person running for the Democrat nomination, who is worth consideration. Their accomplishments are inauspicious, their ideas are bizarre and their reasons for wanting to be president are questionable.
And:
Finally, "Up Chuck" told us, before he even heard Trump's address, it would all be lies. Based on these op ed's below it would appear he needs to wipe egg, not shoe polish, off his face.However, a black heart is permanent.
But then, politicians are seldom held accountable for what they say. Oh, I forgot, unless they are Republicans and say: "Read My Lips" and " Mexico Will Pay For The Wall." etc. (See 2, 2a and 2b below.)
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Tectonic shifts in the Middle East. (See 3 below.)
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Our governing body recommends we become our own city. I have agreed all along. (See 4 below.)
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Dick
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1) Top Dem Facing Staffing Issues Due To Personality
Sen Klobuchar, a more Centrist Democrat dark horse candidate for 2020, is facing significant difficulties hiring due to her alleged toxic personality. The Washington Examiner reports:
Sen. Amy Klobuchar’s alleged mistreatment of staff threatened to derail her speculated White House bid before it had even begun, according to a report.At least three potential top campaign aides withdrew their names from consideration because of the reputation that preceded the Minnesota Democrat, who is set to officially launch her run for the party’s presidential nomination on Sunday in Minneapolis, and the work environment she cultivates for her team, according to the Huffington Post.The report is at odds with Klobuchar’s efforts to tease her candidacy by touting the importance of Midwestern values in federal politics. The three-term senator, who won her 2018 re-election by a landslide margin of 24 percentage points, titled her 2015 book, The Senator Next Door: A Memoir from the Heartland.The allegations leveled against Klobuchar include making staffers cry over being late, habitually having their work products described as “the worst,” sharing criticism in group emails, and tasking them with personal errands in violation of Senate ethics rules. She has previously struggled to fill her chief of staff role.
Klobuchar’s chances were already slim, now it looks like her chances might have completely evaporated.
2)
The Longest Day for Trump’s Adversaries
His State of the Union address dramatically advanced his case for re-election in 2020.
By Lance Morrow
I am speaking of perceptions—of how the unusual Mr. Trump plays in the public mind. To call the speech a masterpiece will strike his enemies as preposterous. On the other hand, progressives are sometimes unreliable judges of the country’s moods. Think of November 2016.
On Tuesday Mr. Trump enlarged the public’s idea of himself and his presidency, and in proportion diminished his enemies. That was his most effective stroke on Tuesday night: to make the left seem to be lost in irrelevant obsessions and guilty of misinterpreting—falsifying—America and its values.
The speech sought to annul, or at least soften, the left’s radical critique of American history, which has been the theme of elites since the 1960s, and to define Mr. Trump not as a chief of yahoos but a leader of a thoughtful, broadly respectable patriotism. It’s wishful thinking to hope that the speech might help to break the cycle of mutual contempt that has so demoralized the country.
The web has teemed for the past few years with comparisons of Mr. Trump to Hitler, warnings that Trumpism was the start of a new Reich. Mr. Trump installed two Jewish guests in the House gallery—Herman Zeitchik, who went ashore at Normandy in 1944, and Joshua Kaufman, whom Mr. Zeitchik helped liberate from Dachau the following year. The television picture of those two old Jewish men might have come from the epilogue to “Schindler’s List.” Mr. Trump beamed upon them from the podium as if, like Prospero, he had conjured this sweet denouement out of thin air.
The president twice mentioned the mass shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, and he proudly took credit for moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. If Hitler was history’s supreme anti-Semite, Mr. Trump did a fair job of presenting himself as the opposite.
The president played a sly game of trapping his antagonists into applauding when they would have wished to sit on their hands or jeer. The white-clad vestal brigade of new Democratic congresswomen, including that one from Michigan who’d proclaimed her intention to “impeach the m—f—,” were seen turning to one another in confusion and trying to decide whether they would look worse applauding or sitting still.
Mr. Trump manipulated the theatrics inherent in the State of the Union, including the TV cameras’ restless and vigilant reaction shots, to his advantage. As he promised that America would never become a socialist country, the camera focused on the glowering self-described socialist Sen. Bernie Sanders, who looked like a grumpy old man out of Dostoevsky.
Mr. Trump turned things upside down. Portrayed by the left as a lawless president, he insisted on the rule of law, especially regarding immigration. Condemned as a racist, he defused the issue, to a degree, by embracing prisoners’ rights and condemning discrimination in the justice system.
The speech was an eccentric symphony of interwoven themes by which Mr. Trump moved to relegitimize his presidency, associating it with the grand sweep of American history and American values.
He appealed for a closer reading of the country’s terms and conditions, as if to insist that this is not exactly “a nation of immigrants,” and still less a nation of illegal immigrants. It is a nation of citizens who are former aliens or descendants of immigrants—who came to America legally and learned the language of the country, in which the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Gettysburg Address and Emancipation Proclamation are written. It is a nation of immigrants who have been expected to embrace American civic responsibility as a condition of American freedom.
Metaphysically, the American language is money—the shared idiom, the common denominator, the national theme and genius that overrides all others. Mr. Trump, a man of money, advanced his strongest argument early on in his speech, when he conjured the flourishing state of the economy, a revival (a religious term as well as an economic one) that carries with it the most reliable possibilities of American hope, unity and inclusion. Immigrants are drawn, first of all, by the promise of American money—that is, the freedom to seek it. Freedom and money are the keys to everything.
Mr. Trump said as much. It was his premise. He may be a spectacular oddity in American politics, but he was entirely traditional as he made the essential, paradoxical connection between American money and American virtue—the linkage of opportunity, freedom and possibility.
Mr. Morrow, a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, is a former essayist for Time.
2a)
Obstruction of Justice? Careful What You Wish For, Lawmakers
If it was criminal to fire Comey, consider the implications for judges and members of Congress.
By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey
Democrats have attacked Attorney General-designate William Barr for a memo in which he argued against a legal theory some claim could support prosecuting President Trump for obstruction of justice. Mr. Barr argued that an exercise of the president’s constitutional authority—for instance, firing James Comey as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation—cannot be construed as obstruction even if prosecutors believe he did so for improper reasons.
At his confirmation hearings, Mr. Barr rightly stood his ground. Critics should consider the implications of the motive-driven obstruction theory with respect not only to the president but also to the other branches of government. It has the potential to impair Congress, the judiciary and state governments as well.
The Constitution vests all executive power in the president, including decisions about high-level personnel, investigations, prosecutions and pardons. Human motives are rarely pure, and bad motives are often in the eye of the beholder. Presidents inevitably have self-interested objectives when exercising their authority—enhancing their political position, for example.
If the personal motivations behind every lawful official act could potentially be grounds for criminal charges, then presidents—and their subordinates, “from the Attorney General down to the most junior line prosecutor,” as Mr. Barr put it in his memo—might shirk supervisory authority over a wide variety of cases. Law enforcement would operate on an autopilot, with extreme harshness as the default approach. The result, as Hamilton put it in Federalist No. 70, would be “a feeble executive,” which “implies a feeble execution of the government” and produces “bad government.”
Nothing would stop prosecutors from applying such a theory to lawmakers and judges. Suppose a congressional committee investigates a matter also under investigation by the FBI. If prosecutors think the motive is political—and politics is Congress’s lifeblood—that could be considered obstruction.
Mr. Trump’s critics claim any presidential action to eliminate special counsel Robert Mueller’s funding would be obstruction, even if otherwise consistent with federal appropriations law. It would follow that congressional decisions to reduce or eliminate appropriations for public corruption investigations, which frequently target members of Congress, could also be prosecuted.
The Speech or Debate Clause, which protects lawmakers from prosecution for most of their official actions, would offer no shield. The argument would not be that the relevant members said or did the wrong thing, but that their motives were corrupt. Bribery is a crime, but under this theory lawmakers could be prosecuted for casting a vote without accepting any illicit payment, merely because it benefits their political allies or constituents. The dangerous reach of such arguments is why the Supreme Court has required evidence in corruption cases of an actual quid pro quo—an offer of an illicit payment or benefit in exchange for official action—not merely an improper motive.
Federal judges would likewise be vulnerable to prosecution based on their personal motivations in reaching decisions. The proper method of interpreting the Constitution is a matter of fierce legal and political debates, waged largely in judicial confirmation proceedings. Under the motive-based obstruction theory, a judge might face criminal charges because a prosecutor thinks his rulings were influenced by his political, ideological or religious beliefs. If an official’s motives can transform lawful actions into crimes, then presidents—or junior prosecutors—would be able to investigate judges whose decisions they dislike. The mere possibility would destroy judicial independence.
Nor is there any reason to limit the motive-based obstruction theory to the federal government. State governors, lawmakers and judges also have wide-ranging constitutional authority. Discerning their motivations would become a fair game for prosecutors.
Historical practice does not support obstruction charges based on an exercise of lawful constitutional powers. As the Supreme Court has said for centuries, and reaffirmed in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning (2014), “the longstanding ‘practice of the government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’ ” Novel assertions of governmental power must be viewed with considerable skepticism.
Preventing corruption doesn’t require the motive-driven obstruction theory. Prosecutors and other officials have plenty of existing tools to deal with corruption, including laws against bribery and nepotism as well as statutes governing conflicts of interest and recusal. These legal strictures are vigorously enforced at both federal and state levels.
If the motive-based obstruction theory prevails, criminal investigations of alleged obstruction by government officials at all levels, and in all institutions, would eventually become routine. That would impair the government’s ability to function and destroy the separation of powers by shifting vast authority to federal investigators and prosecutors and shielding them from political accountability.
Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. They served in the White House Counsel’s Office and Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
2b) Trump Is Serious About
Diplomacy With North Korea
Before President Trump announced in Tuesday’s State of the Union address that he would hold another summit this month with Kim Jong Un, he indulged in a bit of braggadocio: “If I had not been elected president of the United States,” he said, “we would right now, in my opinion, be in a major war with North Korea.”
This approach compares favorably with the one the Obama administration took toward Iran, never demanding an end to nuclear programs and settling for a deal that came nowhere close. When Mr. Trump ditched the Iran deal before engaging North Korea, he signaled his commitment to stricter terms in his talks with Mr. Kim. Mr. Trump’s critics assume the administration will settle for cosmetic changes rather than denuclearization, but its actions and its unified message lay down a very different marker.Diplomacy With North Korea
His special envoy makes clear the administration’s priority is depriving the regime of nuclear weapons.
By Tod Lindberg
Before President Trump announced in Tuesday’s State of the Union address that he would hold another summit this month with Kim Jong Un, he indulged in a bit of braggadocio: “If I had not been elected president of the United States,” he said, “we would right now, in my opinion, be in a major war with North Korea.”
That may sound strange coming from a president whose engagement with North Korea began with insults and threats, with Messrs. Kim and Trump calling each other “dotard” and “Little Rocket Man.” But Mr. Trump’s alternative history aside, his administration has indeed pursued serious diplomacy with North Korea, taking a novel approach that will shape the bilateral relationship far into the future.
The new tack was made clear in a detailed speech given at Stanford last week by Stephen E. Biegun, the U.S. special envoy to North Korea. Mr. Biegun firmly reiterated the administration’s objective: “the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea.” Of course that’s easier stated than accomplished, but the administration has set a standard, and has exposed itself to harsh criticism if it tries to deliver anything less.
Mr. Biegun’s speech also made clear that, although America’s policy objective in North Korea is large, it is also limited: the elimination of the nuclear threat, not the transformation of North Korea. “It is an understatement to say that our two systems are very different,” Mr. Biegun said. “We have dramatically different views on individual rights and on human rights.”
The North Korean government is truly monstrous, but the most dangerous problem it poses comes from its nuclear-weapons programs, and U.S. diplomacy must concentrate there. Mr. Kim has it clear that his motive for pursuing nuclear weapons is security, and the Trump administration would bolster his sense of insecurity by pressing for internal transformation. To Mr. Kim, that would sound like a case for regime change.
Mr. Biegun was even more blunt in the question-and-answer period after his speech. “I don’t mince my words when I say that [Mr. Trump] is unconstrained by the assumptions of his predecessors,” he said. “President Trump is ready to end this war. It is over. It is done. We are not going to invade North Korea. We are not seeking to topple the North Korean regime.” Disapproval of North Korea is not a policy, and the expression of disapproval is not diplomacy.
The special envoy also made clear that the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea is personal. He described negotiations as “top down”—the product of commitments Messrs. Trump and Kim personally make to each other. Usually political leaders meet only after subordinates have ironed out details.
President Trump’s diplomacy is in some ways more 19th-century than 21st. He has shed President Obama’s view that history has a “right side,” which America’s rivals will eventually seek to join. Mr. Obama’s Iran deal was premised on Tehran’s voluntarily abandoning its radicalism and deciding to join the peaceful, modern world. The Trump administration makes no such assumption about North Korea’s eventual benevolence.
Finally, Mr. Biegun’s speech was refreshingly honest about the possibility that this effort may not succeed. “It is a cliché to say that failure is not an option,” he noted. “I have intentionally not focused on the many ways that this could all fail. As the diplomatic record of the past 25 years shows, they are too numerous to count.”
What happens then? “We need to have contingencies if the diplomatic process fails, which we do,” Mr. Biegun said without elaborating. But in addition to the carrot of “a bright future for the Korean people” in exchange for denuclearization, the U.S. has always has sticks ready as well.
Mr. Lindberg is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
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3)
3)
Analysis: The Middle East’s tectonic shifts
By SETH J. FRANTZMAN
There is a tendency to view the Middle East as largely unchanging, now that the chaos unleashed after the Arab Spring appears to have dissipated. It’s the status quo – again. Gaza is still Gaza. Iraq is Iraq. Egypt is Egypt. But that analysis ignores the tectonic shifts which have taken place in the last few decades.
Regimes may appear the same, but in fact, the instability of recent years has had major effects. The region is now at a crossroads no less important than during the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire 100 years ago.
From old leaders to a younger generation
For starters, to understand the changes let us look back 20 years. Who was in charge in 1999?
In Iraq it was Saddam Hussein, born in Tikrit in 1937 and president since 1979. In Saudi Arabia it was King Fahd, born in 1921 and reigning since 1982, as he would do until 2005. In Libya it was Muammar Gaddafi, who was born 1942 and came to power in 1961. In Egypt it was Hosni Mubarak, born in 1928 and in power since 1981.
In Syria it was Hafez Assad, born in 1930 and ruling since 1971. In Yemen, the long-serving Ali Abdullah Saleh, born in 1947, had come to power in 1958. Mohammed Khatami, the supposed reformer, was in Tehran. He had been born in 1943 and had been in charge since 1997, where he would stay until 2005.
In Turkey, Mesut Yilmaz was prime minister, about to be succeeded by Bulent Ecevit. In Lebanon around this time, Rafic Hariri, born in 1944, had been prime minister, taking a hiatus from 1998 to 2000. King Hussein was the monarch of Jordan. Born in 1935, he began his reign in 1952. Let’s not forget Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was born 1936 and rose to power in 1989.
In neighboring Algeria it was Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was born in 1937 and came to power in April 1999. Among regional monarchies, Mohammed VI of Morocco, born in 1929, came to power in 1999, after Hassan II, who served since 1961, died. Lest we forget, the emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who was born in 1952, had been in power since 1995, and would remain until his death 2013. And Yasser Arafat was president of the Palestinian National Authority, a post he held since 1994. He was born in 1929.
Listing all these leaders who dominated in the late 1990s, one gets a sense of who they were, and the worldviews they held. They were products primarily of the 1930s and 1940s. Most were born in the region’s colonial era. Their worldview was shaped by the rise of Arab nationalism and the Cold War. Some had played a formative role in putting down the first Islamist rebellions in the region, such as the battles in Egypt and Syria in the 1980s.
With the exception of Turkey or Iran, which are different than the rest of the Arab Middle East in history and politics, these regimes fit several clear patterns. They were aging dictators who were past their peak, in monarchies and a few hybrid regimes, such as Lebanon. This was an era of big politics and big men. Israel was an outsider in the region in many ways.
Then things began to change. Saddam was overthrown by the 2003 US invasion. Arafat, Fahd, Assad and King Hussein died. Hariri was assassinated. Eventually, Saddam would be hanged, Gaddafi raped to death, and Saleh assassinated and his body chucked onto a truck. Mubarak and Ali would abdicate, as would Hamad al-Thani. Today, leaders in the region are younger, even if some of them take after their parents or the systems that produced them.
Many of these men were born in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of them are much younger, such as Emir Tamim in Qatar, who was born in 1980. Mohammed Bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, was born in 1985. Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s long-serving prime minister, was born in 1970. The leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government are also of a younger generation, as is the king of Morocco. There are a few exceptions, such the President Hassan Rouhani in Iran and Sultan Qaboos in Oman.
Generally, this generation of leaders grew up in the shadow of American hegemony. The Cold War was ending or had already ended. They also dealt with the ramifications of the Gulf War, when many Arab regimes joined the Americans to oust Saddam from Kuwait. They have also had to look askance at an American hegemony led by US leaders who appear to change policies every four or eight years. That means they watched as George H.W. Bush preached a “New World Order” and as Clinton pushed for humanitarian intervention. They wondered about George W. Bush’s calls for democratization, and then were skeptical when calls for elections led to the rise of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority.
From US New World Order to withdrawal
As the Bush years turned to the Obama years, the region wondered whether Obama’s Cairo speech represented a new era. Others were concerned about the US push for the Iran deal and how that would play out. The US shifted its focus from opposing Assad to opposing ISIS. Disillusionment in Egypt led to claims that the US was supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Libya became a chaos. Yemen, too. Syria fueled extremism across the region. And some 50,000 or more foreign extremists flooded in to support ISIS. This was unprecedented.
Through it all, old alliances were shattered and friendships tested. Qatar was isolated by its former Gulf friends and enjoyed warmer relations with Turkey. Iranian-supported militias rose in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. These groups gained from the war on ISIS and emerged with unprecedented strength and armaments. The Houthis even came close to taking the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
From the chaos, new alliance systems emerged. The bedrock southern Middle Eastern states, led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, form one system; Qatar and Turkey form, another; and Iran and its allies, a third. The US is at a historic crossroads in its attempt to withdraw – again – from the region.
In a way this would be the third major withdrawal since the 1990s. Bush Sr. had reduced the US footprint. Obama also did. And so has Trump. A resurgent Russia has filled some of those gaps, but not all of them. Regional frameworks, such as the Arab League, have proven weak in addressing the region’s needs. And there is no longer consensus in the region regarding opposition to Israel, or even the workability of any peace plan. Old initiatives, such as the Saudi plan of the early 2000s, appear moribund.
Strong states defeat independent political groups
The last several years since 2011 have seen the rise of a plethora of political groups seeking to carve out spaces in various weak or unstable states. This has included some of the Kurdish movements that sought independence and autonomy. It has also included a long list of Sunni groups, many of them trending toward extremism. The remains of this can be found in Idlib where Hayat Tahrir al-Sham dominates, and Eastern Syria where the Syrian Democratic Forces are strongest. Other groups like the Houthis in Yemen, or Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, shape the politics of their countries.
Is the Sunni-Shia conflict over?
An unprecedented rancor of Sunni-Shia infighting has dominated politics in some countries. Ethnic struggles have emerged in others. But much of that is now being shoehorned back into the state structure. The fantasies of rewriting the Sykes-Picot European borders of the region that were drawn 100 years ago are no more. Now state structures have returned. But they have returned in a different way.
Arab Gulf states have taken a lead in foreign policy, launching a war in Yemen that began in 2015 to confront the Houthis. Egypt is playing a role in Libya. Regional security frameworks are emerging. This was evident at a meeting at the Dead Sea in late January, when representatives of Egypt, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan gathered. Proxies and militias still exist. Turkey has an unprecedented role in Iraq and Syria, and appears set to keep its soldiers in its two southern neighbors. The question now is whether the sectarian conflicts are being reduced and returning to power politics. The Gulf states are patching things up with Syria, for instance.
Defeating ISIS and the new alliance systems
As the last stronghold of ISIS is liberated in the Euphrates valley the Middle East finds itself transformed and at a turning point. The last decade, dominated by the Syrian civil war, has presented a struggle between extremist forces that have sought to exploit weak states and ungoverned spaces, and existing regional and global powers whose agenda is to come out of the recent conflicts positioned to dominate the region.
This is a unique time in the Middle East that presents complex challenges for policy-makers. The region is now increasingly influenced by two rising alliance systems. Iran and its proxies and clients in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen represent one system, while Turkey and Qatar, as well as their partners in northern Syria, Libya, Sudan and elsewhere, represent another.
The traditional US allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, Egypt, and the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, now face this changed environment and are seeking out policies that will best prepare them for the next phase.
Examples include the reopening of embassies in Syria, the Iran-Israel tensions in Syria, and the complexity of managing the US withdrawal from Syria.
Despite US fatigue in dealing with Syria and Iraq, what comes next in the Middle East is of importance, because the Syrian civil war and the chaos it fed across the region has had major implications for Western powers. It has fueled a growing connection between Iran, Russia and Turkey as they have sought to agree to a post-conflict Syria absent a US role. The way in which countries have responded to the destabilizing extremism that led to the rise of ISIS is also important, because the region may be turning a corner in confronting the jihadist networks that flourished from the 1980s to 2014 and underpinned ISIS.
New totalitarianism
One of the responses among US allies and adversaries has been to increase crackdowns on dissent. Another response has been that some polities, such as the Palestinian Authority, appear to prefer the status quo over any experiments with new elections that might open the door to groups such as Hamas. This also appears to be the case in Iraq and Lebanon where, to governing elites, the status quo appears preferable to the chaos of Yemen and Libya.
The region is also witnessing the decline in any experiments to create new state structures, such as the decline of the independence of the Syrian rebels in northern Syria, and the likely decline of the autonomy of the Syrian Democratic Forces and groups linked to it in eastern Syria. This decline dovetails with the new authoritarianism. States fear chaos, instability and irredentist or extremist movements. Strong governments are seen as the best remedy to weak states where extremism has thrived. Controlling religious messages is seen as preferable to a free-for-all.
Is this a ‘New Middle East’?
Is this a “New Middle East” on par with the changes that took place 100 years ago with those wrought by the fall of the Ottoman Empire? Or is this merely a return to the ancient regime that dominated before 2010, and which was destabilized by democratization attempts and the wars sparked by Saddam Hussein in the 1990s? Are we seeing the eclipse of the ability of jihadist extremist groups to destabilize countries? Will Turkey, Russia and Iran be the main beneficiaries at the expense of Western powers and their allies?
All of these questions will be answered in coming years. The tensions between Israel and Iran will continue, and Israel will likely continue to make inroads among some Gulf states, where recent official visits have broken decades of silence. A complex series of challenges exist. And many of them will be addressed without US leadership in the region. This is a major change from the last decades, in which US policy was at the center of the decisions being made locally. Even if the US decides to increase its role, its reputation has been forever changed by zigzagging policies. It would be difficult to change that perception.
At the same time, the region must invest in recovering from the wars of the last decade and the harm done to infrastructure. Whereas the Gulf States have made major strides, many of the largest Arab states, such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt face uphill challenges. Meanwhile, countries on the periphery, such as Iran and Turkey, appear to have emerged much stronger from the last decades of instability. They will seek to dominate the region alongside the rising Russian influence.
Regimes may appear the same, but in fact, the instability of recent years has had major effects. The region is now at a crossroads no less important than during the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire 100 years ago.
From old leaders to a younger generation
For starters, to understand the changes let us look back 20 years. Who was in charge in 1999?
In Iraq it was Saddam Hussein, born in Tikrit in 1937 and president since 1979. In Saudi Arabia it was King Fahd, born in 1921 and reigning since 1982, as he would do until 2005. In Libya it was Muammar Gaddafi, who was born 1942 and came to power in 1961. In Egypt it was Hosni Mubarak, born in 1928 and in power since 1981.
In Syria it was Hafez Assad, born in 1930 and ruling since 1971. In Yemen, the long-serving Ali Abdullah Saleh, born in 1947, had come to power in 1958. Mohammed Khatami, the supposed reformer, was in Tehran. He had been born in 1943 and had been in charge since 1997, where he would stay until 2005.
In Turkey, Mesut Yilmaz was prime minister, about to be succeeded by Bulent Ecevit. In Lebanon around this time, Rafic Hariri, born in 1944, had been prime minister, taking a hiatus from 1998 to 2000. King Hussein was the monarch of Jordan. Born in 1935, he began his reign in 1952. Let’s not forget Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was born 1936 and rose to power in 1989.
In neighboring Algeria it was Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was born in 1937 and came to power in April 1999. Among regional monarchies, Mohammed VI of Morocco, born in 1929, came to power in 1999, after Hassan II, who served since 1961, died. Lest we forget, the emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who was born in 1952, had been in power since 1995, and would remain until his death 2013. And Yasser Arafat was president of the Palestinian National Authority, a post he held since 1994. He was born in 1929.
Listing all these leaders who dominated in the late 1990s, one gets a sense of who they were, and the worldviews they held. They were products primarily of the 1930s and 1940s. Most were born in the region’s colonial era. Their worldview was shaped by the rise of Arab nationalism and the Cold War. Some had played a formative role in putting down the first Islamist rebellions in the region, such as the battles in Egypt and Syria in the 1980s.
With the exception of Turkey or Iran, which are different than the rest of the Arab Middle East in history and politics, these regimes fit several clear patterns. They were aging dictators who were past their peak, in monarchies and a few hybrid regimes, such as Lebanon. This was an era of big politics and big men. Israel was an outsider in the region in many ways.
Then things began to change. Saddam was overthrown by the 2003 US invasion. Arafat, Fahd, Assad and King Hussein died. Hariri was assassinated. Eventually, Saddam would be hanged, Gaddafi raped to death, and Saleh assassinated and his body chucked onto a truck. Mubarak and Ali would abdicate, as would Hamad al-Thani. Today, leaders in the region are younger, even if some of them take after their parents or the systems that produced them.
Many of these men were born in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of them are much younger, such as Emir Tamim in Qatar, who was born in 1980. Mohammed Bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, was born in 1985. Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s long-serving prime minister, was born in 1970. The leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government are also of a younger generation, as is the king of Morocco. There are a few exceptions, such the President Hassan Rouhani in Iran and Sultan Qaboos in Oman.
Generally, this generation of leaders grew up in the shadow of American hegemony. The Cold War was ending or had already ended. They also dealt with the ramifications of the Gulf War, when many Arab regimes joined the Americans to oust Saddam from Kuwait. They have also had to look askance at an American hegemony led by US leaders who appear to change policies every four or eight years. That means they watched as George H.W. Bush preached a “New World Order” and as Clinton pushed for humanitarian intervention. They wondered about George W. Bush’s calls for democratization, and then were skeptical when calls for elections led to the rise of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority.
From US New World Order to withdrawal
As the Bush years turned to the Obama years, the region wondered whether Obama’s Cairo speech represented a new era. Others were concerned about the US push for the Iran deal and how that would play out. The US shifted its focus from opposing Assad to opposing ISIS. Disillusionment in Egypt led to claims that the US was supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Libya became a chaos. Yemen, too. Syria fueled extremism across the region. And some 50,000 or more foreign extremists flooded in to support ISIS. This was unprecedented.
Through it all, old alliances were shattered and friendships tested. Qatar was isolated by its former Gulf friends and enjoyed warmer relations with Turkey. Iranian-supported militias rose in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. These groups gained from the war on ISIS and emerged with unprecedented strength and armaments. The Houthis even came close to taking the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
From the chaos, new alliance systems emerged. The bedrock southern Middle Eastern states, led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, form one system; Qatar and Turkey form, another; and Iran and its allies, a third. The US is at a historic crossroads in its attempt to withdraw – again – from the region.
In a way this would be the third major withdrawal since the 1990s. Bush Sr. had reduced the US footprint. Obama also did. And so has Trump. A resurgent Russia has filled some of those gaps, but not all of them. Regional frameworks, such as the Arab League, have proven weak in addressing the region’s needs. And there is no longer consensus in the region regarding opposition to Israel, or even the workability of any peace plan. Old initiatives, such as the Saudi plan of the early 2000s, appear moribund.
Strong states defeat independent political groups
The last several years since 2011 have seen the rise of a plethora of political groups seeking to carve out spaces in various weak or unstable states. This has included some of the Kurdish movements that sought independence and autonomy. It has also included a long list of Sunni groups, many of them trending toward extremism. The remains of this can be found in Idlib where Hayat Tahrir al-Sham dominates, and Eastern Syria where the Syrian Democratic Forces are strongest. Other groups like the Houthis in Yemen, or Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, shape the politics of their countries.
Is the Sunni-Shia conflict over?
An unprecedented rancor of Sunni-Shia infighting has dominated politics in some countries. Ethnic struggles have emerged in others. But much of that is now being shoehorned back into the state structure. The fantasies of rewriting the Sykes-Picot European borders of the region that were drawn 100 years ago are no more. Now state structures have returned. But they have returned in a different way.
Arab Gulf states have taken a lead in foreign policy, launching a war in Yemen that began in 2015 to confront the Houthis. Egypt is playing a role in Libya. Regional security frameworks are emerging. This was evident at a meeting at the Dead Sea in late January, when representatives of Egypt, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan gathered. Proxies and militias still exist. Turkey has an unprecedented role in Iraq and Syria, and appears set to keep its soldiers in its two southern neighbors. The question now is whether the sectarian conflicts are being reduced and returning to power politics. The Gulf states are patching things up with Syria, for instance.
Defeating ISIS and the new alliance systems
As the last stronghold of ISIS is liberated in the Euphrates valley the Middle East finds itself transformed and at a turning point. The last decade, dominated by the Syrian civil war, has presented a struggle between extremist forces that have sought to exploit weak states and ungoverned spaces, and existing regional and global powers whose agenda is to come out of the recent conflicts positioned to dominate the region.
This is a unique time in the Middle East that presents complex challenges for policy-makers. The region is now increasingly influenced by two rising alliance systems. Iran and its proxies and clients in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen represent one system, while Turkey and Qatar, as well as their partners in northern Syria, Libya, Sudan and elsewhere, represent another.
The traditional US allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, Egypt, and the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, now face this changed environment and are seeking out policies that will best prepare them for the next phase.
Examples include the reopening of embassies in Syria, the Iran-Israel tensions in Syria, and the complexity of managing the US withdrawal from Syria.
Despite US fatigue in dealing with Syria and Iraq, what comes next in the Middle East is of importance, because the Syrian civil war and the chaos it fed across the region has had major implications for Western powers. It has fueled a growing connection between Iran, Russia and Turkey as they have sought to agree to a post-conflict Syria absent a US role. The way in which countries have responded to the destabilizing extremism that led to the rise of ISIS is also important, because the region may be turning a corner in confronting the jihadist networks that flourished from the 1980s to 2014 and underpinned ISIS.
New totalitarianism
One of the responses among US allies and adversaries has been to increase crackdowns on dissent. Another response has been that some polities, such as the Palestinian Authority, appear to prefer the status quo over any experiments with new elections that might open the door to groups such as Hamas. This also appears to be the case in Iraq and Lebanon where, to governing elites, the status quo appears preferable to the chaos of Yemen and Libya.
The region is also witnessing the decline in any experiments to create new state structures, such as the decline of the independence of the Syrian rebels in northern Syria, and the likely decline of the autonomy of the Syrian Democratic Forces and groups linked to it in eastern Syria. This decline dovetails with the new authoritarianism. States fear chaos, instability and irredentist or extremist movements. Strong governments are seen as the best remedy to weak states where extremism has thrived. Controlling religious messages is seen as preferable to a free-for-all.
Is this a ‘New Middle East’?
Is this a “New Middle East” on par with the changes that took place 100 years ago with those wrought by the fall of the Ottoman Empire? Or is this merely a return to the ancient regime that dominated before 2010, and which was destabilized by democratization attempts and the wars sparked by Saddam Hussein in the 1990s? Are we seeing the eclipse of the ability of jihadist extremist groups to destabilize countries? Will Turkey, Russia and Iran be the main beneficiaries at the expense of Western powers and their allies?
All of these questions will be answered in coming years. The tensions between Israel and Iran will continue, and Israel will likely continue to make inroads among some Gulf states, where recent official visits have broken decades of silence. A complex series of challenges exist. And many of them will be addressed without US leadership in the region. This is a major change from the last decades, in which US policy was at the center of the decisions being made locally. Even if the US decides to increase its role, its reputation has been forever changed by zigzagging policies. It would be difficult to change that perception.
At the same time, the region must invest in recovering from the wars of the last decade and the harm done to infrastructure. Whereas the Gulf States have made major strides, many of the largest Arab states, such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt face uphill challenges. Meanwhile, countries on the periphery, such as Iran and Turkey, appear to have emerged much stronger from the last decades of instability. They will seek to dominate the region alongside the rising Russian influence.
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4)RESOLUTION OF THE LANDINGS ASSOCIATION, INC.SUPPORTING THE MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION OF SKIDAWAY ISLANDIn execution of its Strategic Plan, The Landings Association, Inc. began exploring incorporation by commissioning a 2016-17 Feasibility Study from Georgia State University’s Andrew Young School Center for State and Local Finance. The Study concluded that a City of Skidaway Island would be financially feasible.
Five Study Committees of island residents with subject matter expertise then conducted extensive analysis, including vetting the Andrew Young report, and also concluded that a City of Skidaway Island would be financially feasible. Complete details from the Study Committees were shared with the community, and the community expressed clear support to secure the right to vote on the matter of incorporation.
After considering all materials and weighing the potential pros and cons to the Association and its members, the Board concludes incorporation is in the best interest of the Association and its members and recommends a “Yes” vote. The most compelling reasons for incorporation are the following:
- IMPROVED REPRESENTATION. A government directly accountable to island residents is more responsive to our needs, represents our interests, and works for the benefit of Skidaway Island residents.
- Local Control. Incorporation provides direct island control of decisions that impact us…decisions currently made by County Commissioners, a majority of whom do not live in or represent residents of the Special Service District but decide on our service levels, rates of taxation, and fees.
- Replaces layer of government. Incorporation would transfer the off-island decision making for County Special Service District functions to the City. On-island services would be administered by our own City Council – people we have elected.
- TAXATION AND FEE EQUITY. Revenue to run the City would come from taxes and fees that residents already pay, but from which they do not receive the full benefit. More of these tax dollars and fees would be returned to the island for local services, providing a more equitable share of these dollars.
- Lower Millage Rate. Residents would enjoy lower millage rates (4.13 vs. 4.99) for the same or better service levels, while also no longer paying the $85/year dry trash fee. The millage rate would be capped and would require a non-binding referendum before City Council could raise it.
- Local Revenue Streams Stay on Island. The island would receive a proportionate share of fees and taxes paid by residents that currently go to the County and the cities. Those include the following annual estimates: Local Option Sales Tax ($1.9 million), Franchise Fees ($466,000), Insurance ($450,000), and Other ($140,000). Those alone total almost $3 million/year that would be spent directly on island needs.
- LOCAL CONTROL OF GOVERNANCE. Self-governance of the island provides the ability to establish service levels and priorities that better meet island needs and provides greater citizen participation in decisions.
- Land Use (zoning), Planning, and Development. The City can adopt ordinances to require public hearings on development proposals (unlike with Indigo Hall/Thrive) and standards requiring traffic studies and adequate landscape buffers for appropriate development.
- Improved Service Levels. Timely maintenance, repair, and replacement of City streets (unlike the long-delayed McWhorter Drive repaving) and rights-of-way, including mowing and traffic signs, rapid police response to emergencies and accidents, on-schedule yard waste collection, and on-island building and construction permitting services would be established. The Landings Association would save an estimated $144,000 per year on such services (mowing and right-of-way maintenance outside the gates and off-duty police inside the gates), as the projected City budget includes such services.
- Emergency Management. In the event of a major emergency, the City would respond promptly to address health and safety needs of residents, including storm debris removal from yards, unlike Chatham County which waited six weeks after Hurricane Mathew to begin debris removal in the gated communities. The City could be reimbursed by FEMA and the State for up to 95% of the cleanup cost. In addition, the island would have an equal vote as other cities at the CEMA Policy Command Group during planning and management of emergency events.
- CONTROL OUR OWN DESTINY: No matter what the future holds, incorporation gives island residents a stronger voice in any future governmental reorganization.
For these and other reasons, the Board of Directors of The Landings Association, Inc. hereby resolves and recommends that Landings residents who are Skidaway Island registered voters vote “yes” to incorporate the City of Skidaway Island.
- We Decide. As a City, residents would have a much stronger voice, since cities can opt in or out of any future proposed absorption of Skidaway Island into another entity.
LeeAnn Williams, President
Hank Policinski, Vice President
Diane Thompson, Treasurer
Kathleen Field, Secretary
Blake Caldwell, Director
John Holmquist, Director
Jim Morgan, Director
Jim Rich, Director
Jim Van Epps, Director
Rick Cunningham, Ex-Officio
The Landings Association periodically will send you an email to help keep you informed. If you wish to discontinue receiving these types of emails, you may opt out by clickingThis message has been sent as a service of The Landings Association,
The Landings Association © 2018. All rights reserved.600 Landings Way South
Savannah, GA 31411
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