I repeat what I have said all along. I am voting for Jack Kingston, Dr, Bob Johnson (see 1 and 1a below.) and Jolene Byrne. Hope you do likewise.
Jack, because he has served his district well, is a Conservative and deserves a higher office so Georgia's best interests are protected. We need the Savannah Port Development to move forward, we need our military beefed up and we need a voice against Obama's acts that have been declared beyond his constitutional responsibility.!
Bob, because he understands medicine being a doctor, the military because he served 26 years in the Rangers and Army, veteran needs and he is very pro protecting our dollar and cutting government down to size. He will also be a powerful voice against Obama.
Bob will follow in Jack's shoes who gave excellent service to residents in our Congressional District.
Jolene, because she is an educator, a mother, a reasoned but tough young lady. Our children deserve better than what they are receiving and we need someone who can bring unity to a racially divided school board that appears unwilling or incapable of doing what is best for our children.
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Americans are justifiably upset with the mess Obama helped create on our borders.
Stop and think if every fifty illegal immigrants was a rocket coming from Guatemala, Honduras or Mexico would we tolerate it? Would we be happy if Israel or The U.N told America to use restraint?
Netanyahu sets the record straight. (See 2 below.)
Nolan Finley gets it because he lives in Detroit. Nolan understands a disaster when he see it. (See 2a below.)
Martin Sherman also understands what I have said all along - Olso Accords were a disaster waiting to happen. (See 2b below.)
Even the Dutch are coming to their senses and now they have a number of citizens shot down by a missile launched by those under Russia supervisions and training. (See 2c below.)
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My friend, Avi, updates us on sanctions and how everything GW instituted has pretty much gone by the boards. (See 3 below.)
Saturday, Obama extended Iran four more months to negotiate while they continue their nuclear program and rewarded Iran by opening our sanction coffers by another 2 plus billion.
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Eric Holder continues to wear that chip on his shoulder and thinks many Americans maintain a racial bias. It is inconceivable for him to comprehend his and Obama's incompetence, lying and contempt for our laws have anything to do with the public's opinion and poll ratings.
Well even David Letterman is beginning to get it (See 4 below.)
===
George Friedman and his Gaza update. (See 5 and 5a below.)
When I hear the Fox Reporter, Ruddy, reporting from Gaza and using the phrase "day whatever) I cringe. It is as if only Israel is given a time line but then I came across this article and it only serves to buttress what I have believed would ultimately be the case.
It is as if Dr. Lerner reads either my mind, my memos or both. (See 5b below.)
===
Dick
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1)Dear Dick,
Yesterday, I traveled around the District with Philip Blumel, President of U.S. Term Limits. We hosted forums in Savannah and Brunswick to talk with citizens in Georgia's First Congressional District about term limits--and the response was overwhelming.
Seventy-five percent of Americans support term limits, and the citizens in this District are no exception. I support term limits to get professional politicians like Buddy Carter out of office before they can do any more harm. The pledge I personally signed on to and will adhere to is the U.S. Term Limits pledge of 3 two-year terms.
It's been 130 days since I delivered a U.S. Term Limits Pledge in the hopes that Buddy Carter would sign it. So far he has not. Buddy Carter has taken the liberal position and refused to sign the pledge or back any plan for term limits, and most telling, he refuses to abide by term limits for himself. That's why we need true conservatives in Congress, and voters in this District agree. If you believe in term limits and support candidates like me who have agreed to term limit themselves, donate $250, $200, $150, $100, $75, $50, $25.
Thank you,
Bob Johnson
Candidate for Congress
Thank you,
Bob Johnson
Candidate for Congress
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2)Netanyahu finally speaks his mind
Does Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu really support a two-state solution, or is his rhetoric to this effect disingenuous? Did he genuinely seek an accommodation with the Palestinians during the nine months of US-brokered negotiations that collapsed in April, or was he just stringing the Americans and the Palestinians along, while his heart is truly with the settlement enterprise?
From The Detroit News: http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140713/OPINION01/307130004#ixzz37OwML4NJ
#10. I vote Democrat because I love the fact that I can now marry whatever I
want. I've decided to marry my German Shepherd.
#9. I vote Democrat because I believe oil companies' profits of 4% on a
gallon of gas are obscene, but the government taxing the same gallon at 15%
isn't.
#8. I vote Democrat because I believe the government will do a better job of
spending the money I earn than I would.
#7. I vote Democrat because Freedom of Speech is fine as long as nobody is
offended by it.
#6. I vote Democrat because I'm way too irresponsible to own a gun, and I
know that my local police are all I need to protect me from murderers and
thieves. I am also thankful that we have a 911 service that get police to
your home in order to identify your body after a home invasion.
#5. I vote Democrat because I'm not concerned about millions of babies being
aborted so long as we keep all death row inmates alive and comfy.
#4. I vote Democrat because I think illegal aliens have a right to free
health care, education, and Social Security benefits, and we should take
away Social Security from those who paid into it.
#3. I vote Democrat because I believe that businesses should not be allowed
to make profits for themselves. They need to break even and give the rest
away to the government for redistribution as the Democrat Party sees fit.
2)Netanyahu finally speaks his mind
At his Friday, June 11, press conference, the prime minister ruled out full Palestinian sovereignty, derided the US approach to Israeli security, and set out his Middle East overview with unprecedented candor. His remarks were not widely reported; they should be
Does Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu really support a two-state solution, or is his rhetoric to this effect disingenuous? Did he genuinely seek an accommodation with the Palestinians during the nine months of US-brokered negotiations that collapsed in April, or was he just stringing the Americans and the Palestinians along, while his heart is truly with the settlement enterprise?
2a) Column: This time, let Israel finish job
From The Detroit News: http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140713/OPINION01/307130004#ixzz37OwML4NJ
The play-by-play for Israeli-Palestinian eruptions is so well-worn that it’s become formulaic.
(313)222-2064
Follow Nolan Finley at detroitnews.com/finley, on Twitter at nolanfinleydn, on Facebook at nolanfinleydetnews and watch him at 7:30 p.m. Thursdays on “MiWeek” on Detroit Public TV, Channel 56.
2b)
|
| The ultimate test of this agreement will be a test of blood. If it becomes clear that [Palestinians] cannot overcome terror, this will be a temporary accord and... we will have no choice but to abrogate it. And if there is no choice, the IDF will return to the places it is about to leave in the upcoming months. – Yossi Beilin on the Oslo Accords Everything is reversible. – Yitzhak Rabin on the Oslo Accords Truth be told, I found it difficult to write my column this week. I spent hours staring at my laptop’s keyboard, unable to compose a single sentence, feeling waves of anger, frustration and disbelief wash over me as the news of the bombardment of the country came streaming through the television set beside me. Depressing déjà vu It was not that there was a dearth of topics to write about. There was a surplus of issues that could be subject matter for a column relating to the events of the last few days. For example: • The “original sin” of Oslo, that made the perverse – and previously scorned – notion of Palestinian statehood the center-piece of Israeli policy, which opened the flood gates of terror across the country, and eventually precipitated the current situation in Gaza; • The continuous poor judgment by the Israeli leadership over the last two decades as to developments in Gaza and how they should be dealt with; • The debilitating distortions and ridiculous restrictions imposed on the formulation and conduct of Israeli policy regarding Gaza by the diktats of political correctness; • The imbecilic idea of abandoning Gaza unilaterally, thus providing the Palestinian- Arab terror organizations a territorial platform in which they could plan operations and prepare infrastructure, and from which they could launch countless attacks against Israeli civilian population centers. • The ineffectual, albeit pyrotechnically spectacular, methods adopted by the IDF to deal with these attacks and destroy the infrastructures that facilitate them, which have allowed the terror organizations to develop operational capabilities that would have been inconceivable only a few years ago. Yes, I could have written on any one of these topics – but every time I set out to put pen to paper (or rather fingers to keyboard), I realized that I had already written about it, in some detail, in the past – and a depressing sense of déjà vu descended upon me, sapping any will to explain the obvious and warn of the inevitable once again. Cataloging the obvious, the inevitable and the imbecilic Over the last three years, since I began writing the Into the Fray series, I have published numerous columns dealing with the situation in Gaza, prescribing how it ought to be dealt with, and cautioning about the consequences if these caveats were not heeded. Regrettably, although Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon have both personally informed me that they read my column, there is little indication that its prognoses and prescriptions have had any affect on policy decisions – despite the fact that they have, in large measure, been vindicated by developments. I should, therefore, like to share with readers my sense of frustration, disappointment and disillusionment, and list the columns I have written on Gaza, together with their dates of publication, and the accompanying sub headlines, which convey the essence of their content and the issues they address: • “The white flag over Gaza...”: “Political correctness has precluded the pursuit of strategic imperatives; Israel can no longer credibly deter terrorists.” (08/25/2011). • “Predicting Gaza: Rabin, Sharon, the Knesset and... well, me”: “The nation’s leaders have proved bereft of foresight – or hindsight for that matter. Can a dangerous ‘trust deficit’ be avoided?” (03/22/2012) • “Aargh!!!”: “Despite the deadly display of hi-tech pyro-technics by the IDF, the depressing sense of déjà vu conveyed by the events unfolding in Gaza comprise a devastating indictment of Israel’s past and present political leadership.” (11/15/2012). • “Israel 2012: Tactical brilliance, strategic imbecility”: “If the current government does not have the diplomatic competence to create the conditions necessary to provide security for its citizens, it should admit it.” (11/22/2012) • “Israel’s infuriating impotence”: “Last week’s Gaza cease-fire proved the government incapable of delivering the goods militarily; this week’s UN vote proves it cannot deliver the goods diplomatically.”(11/29/2012) • “Cry havoc! and let slip the dogs of war”: “By adhering to a policy of avoiding confrontations which Israel can win, the government risks leading it into one in which it might lose. It is time for a bold new offensive – before we are overtaken by events.” (07/03/2014) Defies both reality and logic A quick reading of these sub-headlines provides a broad synopsis of what has happened, and – equally important – what has not happened, in Israel’s exchanges with the terrorist enclave in the south. It is a synopsis that compels one to a lamentable but indisputable conclusion: Israel’s policy toward Gaza defies both logic and reality. Indeed, in many ways, it is a policy that constitutes a grave violation of the social contract between government and the electorate, by which the former is obligated to provide the latter with protection of life, limb and property. The current round of fighting is the third in the last five-and-half years. In all cases, the initiative has largely been with the terror organizations that decide when to engage in combat and when to desist from it. In neither of the two previous campaigns (Cast Lead, 2008/9 and Pillar of Defense, 2012) was the mighty IDF able to force the lightly armed Hamas to cease its fire – despite the heavy damage inflicted on it. Instead of the fighting ending with a Hamas surrender, and an admission of defeat, the organization could claim – not without justification – that it had achieved strategic victory. Indeed, what is becoming increasingly clear is that the stated aims of the current campaign, Protective Edge, make it, at best, an exercise in recurring futility – if not one that is largely counter-productive – likely not only to be unable to prevent a future round of fighting, but worse, to ensure our adversaries will begin it with enhanced capabilities. ‘Restoring calm’ as dereliction of duty The fault in Israel’s declared intentions that it will “answer calm with calm” and that its objective is limited to “restoring calm to the South” is two-fold. First, by offering to cease fire if Hamas ceases fire, Israel surrenders the initiative to its adversaries and forgoes even the theoretical possibility of defeating them. Whenever Hamas feels it has absorbed, or inflicted, sufficient damage, it can initiate a truce, secure in the knowledge that it can control the cost of its aggression, and ensure it will never be excessive. Second, the mere “restoration of calm” is an irrational if not counterproductive operational aim. For the periods of inter- bella calm have been consistently used by the Palestinian terror groups to enhance their capabilities – as dramatically illustrated this week. After all, when Israel left Gaza (2005), the range of the Palestinian rockets was barely 5 km., and the explosive charge they carried about 5 kg., Now their missiles have a range of over 100 km. and warheads of around 100 kg. When Israel left Gaza, only the sparse population in its immediate proximity was threatened by missiles. Now well over 5 million Israelis, well beyond Tel Aviv, are menaced by them. There is little reason to believe that once Hamas deigns to cease fire, the ensuing calm will not be exploited to achieve further advances/improvements in its ordnance and infrastructures. No, “restoring calm” will just not cut it. If that is what the Israeli leadership is striving for, it is coming pretty close to dereliction of duty. The strategic dangers of restraint Indeed, restraint is not a prudent policy, reflecting judicious cool-headedness. Quite the opposite, it is a policy of evasion, of refusal to recognize reality and of avoiding current confrontations, which can be won (admittedly as a significant cost), while risking later confrontations, which may not be possible to win (at any cost). The damage inflicted on Hamas in 2008/9 and 2012 (and on Hezbollah in 2006) has not broken, or even perceptibly reduced, their will to fight as the defeat in WWII did with Germany and Japan. At best, it has forced Hamas to regroup, rearm and redeploy. Clearly then, the damage inflicted on it by the air force and other “standoff” weapon systems, while admittedly grave, is damage it is prepared to absorb, rather than forgo its hostile intentions toward Israel. Inevitably, if the enemy’s will to fight cannot be diminished, his ability to do so must be eliminated. This cannot be done by standoff weaponry. It requires boots on the ground, physical control of the enemy territory, infrastructure and installations. Adhering to restraint and refraining from a policy of imposing surrender and inflicting acknowledged defeat on Hamas is far from cost-free. To the contrary, the costs involved in persisting with a policy of restraint are more than likely to outstrip those of the more assertive alternative. The perils of restraint are myriad: On the operational-security level, they afford Hamas, and its more radical spin-offs, the opportunity to improve performance of weaponry and to: • Tighten their counter-intelligence to constrict information on targets; • Improve concealment and hardening of targets, which certainly seems to have been largely accomplished already, with Hamas being able to fire continuous heavy barrages of missiles, despite ferocious air attacks; • Progress toward the establishment of an air defense system to curtail the present largely unrestricted freedom of action of the IAF; • Develop multiple warheads for their rockets (activated by simple spring-release mechanisms already proposed on Pakistani and Chinese sites) and/or coordinate attacks with Hezbollah in the north in order to overwhelm Israel’s anti- missile defenses. On the civilian level, the prospect of an unending recurrence of missile attacks on towns and villages is likely to result in depopulation of the more vulnerable areas, initially in the South. But with increased range of the enemy rockets, other areas, also afflicted by repeated bombardments, may find their populations denuded. Moreover now that restraint has managed to bring central Israel (including Greater Tel Aviv) into Hamas’s rocket range, the threat of frequent large-scale disruptions of the socioeconomic routine is likely to have enormous ramifications. The short periods of calm that might have been bearable in the South will not be tolerated in the Center. Unless a radical and permanent – or at least long-term – solution can be devised, large-scale flight of businesses and population is not an implausible prospect, which advocates of restraint must seriously ponder – and address. Needed: Another kind of Iron Dome The events of the last few days lead to an unpalatable but unavoidable conclusion: Israel can no longer enable its citizens to “live normal lives” without retaking Gaza. Restraint and “proportionality” have so degraded its deterrence that it is no longer able to dissuade its enemies from attacking it almost at will. Israel must therefore destroy their ability to do so by seizing – and holding – the areas from which those attacks are launched. This will of course involve contending with severe international censure, but this too is a topic I have addressed in several columns – see for example: “If I were prime minister...“: “The first order of business would be to devise and deploy a political ‘Iron Dome’ to protect Israel from the incoming barrages of delegitimization and demonization…” (10/31/2013). Of course, the difficulties involved in administering a remedy deserves a discussion entirely separate from diagnosing what that remedy should be, and must be therefore deferred for a later occasion. What is, however, vital to grasp is that although rejecting a policy of restraint is a path fraught with great difficulty, the difficultly cannot obviate the necessity. Martin Sherman (www.martinsherman.org) is the founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies. (www.strategic- israel.org)www.martinsherman.net |
2c)
The Netherlands, where six per cent of
This gives a whole new meaning to the
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3)
Only two weeks after the attacks of September 11th, President George W. Bush addressed the media in the White House Rose Garden and declared "war" on terrorism financing. "Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations," he told reporters.[1] "Today, we are asking the world to stop payment." A few weeks later, the Treasury Department—the agency that would become the weapon of choice of the White House in this new economic conflict—boasted in a press release, "The same talent pool and expertise that brought down Al Capone will now be dedicated to investigating Usama bin Laden and his terrorist network."[2]
Unfortunately, more than a decade after these pronouncements, it is obvious that the war on terror financing and money laundering has stalled. This is clear even through the lens of the government's own bottom-line metrics: assets seized and forfeited, successful investigations and prosecutions, and effective sanctions. In fact, the situation has gotten considerably worse of late, as political considerations have progressively displaced or rolled back serious work that has been done to date on draining the financial "swamp" in which terrorists and terror-supporting regimes operate.
Borderless banking and blood money
Money laundering and terrorism financing are global scourges. Those who engage in them constantly adapt their techniques, while law enforcement and intelligence agencies try to catch up. Combating these two species of crime is a complex challenge, due largely to the diversity of methods used.
Both techniques exploit vulnerabilities in the financial system to disguise the movement of funds. Money launderers make their money illegally and try to "clean" it to conceal its origins. Terror financiers make their money legally or illegally and attempt to conceal both its origin and its intended use. In essence, money launderers convert dirty money into clean money, while terror financiers take clean money and make it dirty by funding violent acts.
Only in recent years has the international community begun to realize the enormity of the problem, and to call for establishment of comprehensive AML/CFT regimes (anti-money-laundering/combating the financing of terrorism). At the center of these efforts lie three goals: (1) protecting the integrity of the international financial system; (2) identifying, disrupting and dismantling the financial networks that underpin international criminal and terrorist organizations, and; (3) making it more difficult for criminals and terrorists to profit from their crimes.
It is an axiom within the U.S. law enforcement and intelligence communities that the key to disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations is to "follow the money." The same is true with terrorism. After the September 11th attacks, officials in the United States and elsewhere came to realize that effectively fighting terrorism financing and money laundering might be one of the best ways to prevent future catastrophic incidents. Unfortunately, many governments have had a difficult time converting this understanding into action.
This is not to say that no progress has been made. Over the past 15 years, a few nations have banded together to create a blueprint for fighting the phenomenon, but many jurisdictions—particularly in the Middle East—refuse to implement it. As a result, they lack the basic controls to ensure that the international financial sector is not exploited by criminals, terrorists and their support networks.
Just as the financial system has become global, so too has the threat posed by tainted money. In confronting this threat, the system is only as strong as its weakest link—or as U.S. Treasury official Daniel Glaser has put it, "laxity in just a few jurisdictions undermines the efforts made by the rest."[3] Yet most Middle Eastern countries have still not taken even the most basic steps: criminalizing money laundering and terrorism financing, instituting controls in their formal and informal financial sectors, curbing the smuggling of cash, preventing abuse in the trade sector and safeguarding the charitable sector.
The time-tested ways of moving money and disguising its origin are still effective, though each method has vulnerabilities. Criminals and terrorists conduct billions of dollars in transactions each year through four principal means: the formal financial sector (e.g., banks), the informal financial sector (e.g., hawala, a simple broker system based on trust), the trade system (e.g., commodities) and cash smuggling. In recent years, terrorists and their supporters have also perfected the abuse of charities using all of these methods.
The International Monetary Fund has estimated that money laundering accounts for 3–5 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP). According to the World Bank, global GDP was approximately $72.3 trillion in 2007, which would place international money laundering somewhere between $2.17 and $3.61 trillion per year—in other words, potentially larger than the U.S. budget![4] Similarly, the amount of money available to terrorists, while impossible to calculate precisely, is clearly in the billions, if not trillions.
As a new generation of public servants develop the skills necessary to contribute to the war on terrorism financing, the proven tactic of following the money will become more central than ever. At the same time, this task is also becoming increasingly complex due to the skill and ability of adversaries to avoid traditional financial countermeasures. Law enforcement and intelligence officials must learn to understand the sometimes-obscure methodologies employed by terrorist organizations to raise, transfer, and store money—whether these activities stem from al-Qaeda, rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea, or members of Hezbollah, Hamas or a host of other like-minded organizations.
Building a response
The governments that are most serious about cracking down on illicit actors who hide the movement of their money have taken the lead, creating international organizations whose sole mandate is to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. The most important of these organizations is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), established by members of the G-7 in 1989. Over the years, FATF has issued a set of standards on effective AML/CFT efforts and created a framework to assess the compliance of individual countries. Although the organization has limited membership and no enforcement capabilities, it has been surprisingly effective on certain fronts.
FATF's principal contribution has been its often-updated "International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation," also known as the "40 Recommendations." Typically called "the international standard" for AML/CFT efforts, these recommendations were issued to serve as a comprehensive framework for preventing the movement of illicit money. The standard rests on three principles. First, countries must improve their national infrastructure to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Next, each country's banking and other institutions must set up procedures to identify clients, detect suspicious transactions and develop secure and modern transaction protocols. Finally, countries must strive to improve international cooperation by collecting, analyzing and sharing AML/CFT information at the administrative and judicial levels. This includes sharing information on international currency flows and developing mutual judicial-assistance programs in order to investigate, freeze and confiscate illicit funds.
FATF's official policy is to blacklist countries that fail to comply with the international standard or refuse to have their financial system evaluated. This blacklist is published on the organization's website, and FATF urges member states to send the list to their financial institutions and law enforcement agencies so they can take appropriate action. Although there is no enforcement mechanism for the blacklist, it has been remarkably effective in changing the behavior of designated countries. For example, many financial institutions and other good corporate citizens are reluctant to do business with or in countries that are shunned by FATF. Moreover, blacklisted countries that refuse to take remedial action have at times lost significant international investment as a result. In fact, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have sometimes chosen to downgrade a blacklisted country's credit rating—a significant punishment in today's interconnected financial world.
For its part, the United States has done a relatively good job on the AML/CFT front—but not perfect by any means. The U.S. was one of the first countries to criminalize money laundering and terrorism financing, and it has lodged a high number of prosecutions and successful convictions. In addition, it has taken steps to inform the private sector about designated terrorist organizations and rogue regimes. Persons found to be doing business with such entities face heavy fines and jail time.
The United States does lead the pack when it comes to its sanctions regime. It has the most robust targeted economic sanctions programs in the world. Since shortly after the September 11 attacks, the Treasury Department has maintained a blacklist of suspected terrorism financiers. As of January 2009, the U.S. government had used Executive Order 13224 to designate 518 individuals and entities for activities related to terrorism and terror financing. The designees include members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations.
Still, inaction by some on remedial steps—from criminalizing money laundering to instituting controls in their formal and informal financial sectors—continues to threaten the security of all nations. Perhaps even more pernicious, however, is the fact that, all too often, politics has the effect of driving policy. The war on terror finance is no exception, and over time political priorities have diluted the effectiveness of America's effort to drain the financial "swamp" in which terrorists operated. Here, changing Western policy toward Iran is perhaps the clearest case in point.
Ceding the advantage with Iran
Iran has consistently failed to declare sensitive uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Until Iran and the United States began direct diplomatic negotiations in November 2013, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic viewed sanctions as the last peaceful means by which to bring the Iranian government's nuclear effort into conformance with international demands.
According to the White House briefing on the agreement reached that month, Iran will be offered about $7 billion in sanctions relief, including access to $4.2 billion in frozen oil revenue.[5] But while most policymakers have focused on the relatively small amount of money this supposedly represents, it is actually the renewed banking and business infrastructure that requires attention. It took years to implement an effective sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic—and that effort is now eroding quickly, despite U.S. claims to the contrary.[6] Should Iran decide to drag out the negotiations or leave them altogether, reinstituting sanctions would be extremely challenging.
That Iran came to the nuclear negotiating table at all is a testament to the success of multilateral sanctions. Over the course of the last decade, an increasingly robust international sanctions regime has targeted the Islamic Republic's oil exports and banking operations. All told, over 80 financial institutions around the world, including major international banks, cut off ties or significantly reduced their relationship with it, which greatly curtailed Iran's ability to transact global business. This ultimately led to a devalued rial, major disruptions in foreign trade and deepening inflation within the Islamic Republic. Just as significantly, sanctions applied by the U.S. and its allies forced Iran into deepening international isolation, both economically and diplomatically. Many attribute the ascendency of current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned on a platform that promised improved economic conditions, to these efforts.
This effectiveness was the result, in large measure, of extensive targeting of Iran's banking system by Western nations—chief among them the United States. On September 8, 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Bank Saderat, one of the largest Iranian-owned banks, for "facilitating Iran's transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hizballah and other terrorist organizations each year."[7] The Treasury alleged that from 2001 to 2006, Saderat transferred $50 million to Hezbollah alone, which was then funneled to other terrorist organizations throughout the region.[8]
Beginning on December 23, 2006, with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, which imposed sanctions on Iran, the UN ordered member states to cease all business dealings with a major state-owned Iranian institution, Bank Sepah, and its affiliates. It also urged governments to "exercise vigilance" in relation to two other Iranian financial institutions, Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. All three financial institutions have now been formally designated by the U.S. government, which prohibits U.S. banks from doing business with them.
Bank Sepah was designated by the U.S. Treasury on January 9, 2007, for providing financial services to companies involved in Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile activities. The UN and the U.S. government claim that the companies in question—the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG) —are key players in Iran's ballistic missile program. Sepah also provided services to the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), the parent company of these two entities. All three companies were designated by the U.S. government on June 29, 2005, for their support for Iran's missile program. According to the Treasury, Bank Sepah processed and arranged financing for dozens of multimillion-dollar deals and used a range of deceptive practices to avoid detection, such as asking other institutions to remove its name from transactions.
In October 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department also designated Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank, for providing services to other banks and firms involved in the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, including UN-designated entities such as Bank Sepah and its missile clients. According to Treasury, after Sepah's designation under UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (which was adopted on March 24, 2007, and extended existing sanctions on Iran), Melli took special measures to avoid being identified in transactions. Treasury has also disclosed that Melli facilitated the purchase of sensitive materials for Iran's nuclear and missile programs by "opening letters of credit and maintaining accounts."[9]
In addition, according to the Treasury, from 2002 to 2006 the Iranian government used Bank Melli to send at least $100 million to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a special unit of Iran's IRGC whose mission is to organize, train, equip and finance Islamist movements around the globe. "When handling transactions on behalf of the IRGC, Melli employed deceptive banking practices to obscure its involvement from the international banking system," the Treasury noted, including requesting that its name be removed from financial transactions.[10]
In total, the U.S. government has designated twenty of Iran's thirty banks for their role in proliferating weapons of mass destruction or facilitating terrorism, according to the Specially Designated Nationals List of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.[11] Treasury's Financial Crime Enforcement Network has blacklisted all thirty Iranian banks for engaging in money laundering and abusing the international financial sector.
The sanctions regime instituted against Iran by the international community over the course of the last decade, while not perfect, was comprehensive and punishing. Since 2005, the United States in particular instituted over a dozen pieces of legislation meant to hamper Iran's ability to march towards nuclearization.[12] Measures included: shutting the Islamic Republic out of the global financial sector—including banks and international financial organizations such as SWIFT; constraining their ability to tap the international energy sector; circumscribe movement of humans rights violators and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), and; sectioning entities that provide goods and services to Iran's energy, shipbuilding, shipping, metal and port sectors.
But the sanctions regime against Iran is now in danger of unraveling. By rolling back sanctions as a result of the November 2013 interim deal (formally known as the Joint Plan of Action), Tehran has been given an opportunity to reinvigorate its economic and diplomatic ties with the rest of the world, and Western countries have eagerly exploited the opening to do business with Iran. Re-legitimizing business as usual before Iran makes any significant concessions on its nuclear program not only sends the wrong message, but impairs the West's ability to negotiate effectively.
The politicization of CTF/AML
To be sure, eradicating illicit finance and associated criminal activity completely is impossible. What is not, however, is improving the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence communities to follow the money. This effort, more than perhaps any other, is instrumental to victory in the struggle against contemporary terrorism, for a very simple reason: cutting off illicit finance deprives terrorist organizations of their lifeblood.
America's experiences since September 11th should hammer home the point that there are no easy fixes to terror financing. Quite simply, terrorists and criminals use a variety of methodologies, often commingling their illicit money with legitimate funds. The efforts expended by the United States and its partners have not been as smart or efficient as they need to be to keep up with the shifting patterns of illicit finance.
Today, however, the United States gives little indication that it understands this reality. To the contrary, over the past year, the Obama administration has unwittingly rolled back almost a decade's worth of financial measures intended to curb state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran. In return for the Islamic Republic's agreement to limit certain aspects of its nuclear activities to gain "modest" relief from crippling international sanctions, the United States is enabling Tehran to reestablish broken diplomatic ties and reinvigorate a stagnant economy. Iran, for its part, has been making a full-court press in the banking and energy sectors, conducting business in Europe, Asia and its seven direct neighbors (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan).
Worse still, Iran's rehabilitation has bred no small measure of contagion. Today, "frenemy" countries have become increasingly emboldened to test the appetite of the United States and its allies to fight rogue finance.
One such state is Turkey. Although itself no stranger to terrorist attacks, the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Edogan has become a notable supporter of terrorism financiers. One prominent example is Saudi businessman Yasin al-Qadi, who has been designated an al-Qaeda financier on the UN's 1267 list, the U.S. Treasury Department's Specially Designated Global Terrorist list and the European Union's "Consolidated list of persons, groups, and entities subject to EU financial sanctions." Mr. Erdogan has publicly defended Qadi[13]--demonstrating a disturbing laissez faireattitude toward support for radical causes that has continued to this day. (More recently, Ankara has similarly problematic attitude toward radical elements taking part in the fighting against the Assad government in neighboring Syria as well; according to an October 2013 Human Rights Watch report, "Many foreign fighters operating in northern Syria gain access to Syria via Turkey, from which they also smuggle their weapons, obtain money and other supplies, and sometimes retreat to for medical treatment."[14]) Largely as a result of these deformities, the FATF has placed Turkey on its list of jurisdictions of concern—a designation that speaks volumes about how Turkey, which has worked diligently to be seen as both a global power and a model of emulation in the Middle East, is anything but when it comes to terrorism financing.
Another bad actor is the Gulf state of Qatar. Four years ago, the U.S. State Department called Qatar's counter-terrorism regime one of the worst in the region.[15] In addition, the Treasury Department has blacklisted several Qatari nationals for their links to al-Qaeda. Most recently, Abd al-Rahman bin 'Umayr Nu'aymi, described by the Treasury Department as "a Qatar-based terrorist financier and facilitator," was designated for his role as a financier who "provided money and material support and conveyed communications to al Qaeda and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen."[16]Qatar also remains one of the last key patrons of Hamas, the terrorist organization that rules in the Gaza Strip, and it has provided the group with aid to the tune of about $100 million annually. Additionally, Qatar has hosted Hamas leader Khaled Mishaal for the better part of the last 15 years.
For these countries, and others, the stalling of America's war on terror finance has allowed them to skirt the fundamental choice outlined by President Bush back in 2001: to decide, in both political and economic terms, whether they are with us or with the terrorists. That this situation prevails more than a dozen years after the attacks of September 11th demonstrates just how far we have yet to go in combatting the practices that serve as the lifeblood of contemporary terrorism.
[1] David Sanger and Joseph Kahn, "Bush Freezes Assets Linked to Terror Network," New York Times, September 25, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/25/international/25CAPI.html.
[2] As cited in John Crewdson and Cam Simpson, "U.S. Zeroing in on Terror's Money Trail," Chicago Tribune, September 5, 2002, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-09-05/news/0209050263_1_al-qaeda-treasury-undersecretary-jimmy-gurule-money-trail.
[3] Daniel L. Glaser, remarks before the Latvian Commercial Banker's Association Conference on "The Fight Against Money Laundering and Financial Crimes," Riga, Latvia, September 14, 2005, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2717.aspx.
[4] Statistics derived from U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, March 2008,http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100917.pdf.
[5] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on First Step Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Program," November 24, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/24/background-briefing-senior-administration-officials-first-step-agreement
[6] "US: Partial Sanctions Relief 'Economically Insignificant' for Iran," Times of Israel, November 26, 2013,http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-partial-sanctions-relief-economically-insignificant-for-iran-economy/.
[7] U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Cuts Iran's Bank Sadarat Off From U.S. Financial System," September 8, 2006, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp87.aspx.
[8] Ibid.
[9] U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Bank Melli Front Company in New
York City," December 17, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
hp1330.aspx.
[10] U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism," October 25, 2007, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp644.aspx.
[11] The list is available online at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.
[12] For a comprehensive list of these steps, see Ari Kattan, "Fact Sheet: Iran Sanctions," Center for Arms Control an Non-Proliferation, March 2013, http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_iran_sanctions/.
[13] "The Al-Qadi Affair," Forbes, January 24, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/24/turkey-yasin-al-qadi-biz-cz_rm_0124alqadi.html.
[14] Semih Idiz, "Pressure Mounts on Turkey Over Radical Groups in Syria," Al-Monitor, October 15, 2013,http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/turkey-must-control-jihadists-entering-syria.html.
[15] Scott Shane and Andrew W. Lehren, "Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy," New York Times, November 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
[16] U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen," December 18, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx.
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4) LETTERMAN'S TOP 10 REASONS TO VOTE DEMOCRAT
#10. I vote Democrat because I love the fact that I can now marry whatever I
want. I've decided to marry my German Shepherd.
#9. I vote Democrat because I believe oil companies' profits of 4% on a
gallon of gas are obscene, but the government taxing the same gallon at 15%
isn't.
#8. I vote Democrat because I believe the government will do a better job of
spending the money I earn than I would.
#7. I vote Democrat because Freedom of Speech is fine as long as nobody is
offended by it.
#6. I vote Democrat because I'm way too irresponsible to own a gun, and I
know that my local police are all I need to protect me from murderers and
thieves. I am also thankful that we have a 911 service that get police to
your home in order to identify your body after a home invasion.
#5. I vote Democrat because I'm not concerned about millions of babies being
aborted so long as we keep all death row inmates alive and comfy.
#4. I vote Democrat because I think illegal aliens have a right to free
health care, education, and Social Security benefits, and we should take
away Social Security from those who paid into it.
#3. I vote Democrat because I believe that businesses should not be allowed
to make profits for themselves. They need to break even and give the rest
away to the government for redistribution as the Democrat Party sees fit.
#2. I vote Democrat because I believe liberal judges need to rewrite the
Constitution every few days to suit fringe kooks who would never get their
agendas past the voters.
.And the #1 reason I vote Democrat is because I think it's better to pay
$billions for oil to people who hate us, but not drill our own because it
might upset some endangered beetle, gopher or fish here in America. We don't
care about the beetles, gophers or fish in those other countries.
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The current confrontation in Gaza began July 12 after three Israeli teenagers disappeared in the West Bank the month before. Israel announced the disappearance June 13, shortly thereafter placing blame on Hamas for the kidnappings. On June 14, Hamas fired three rockets into the Hof Ashkelon region. This was followed by Israeli attacks on Palestinians in the Jerusalem region. On July 8, the Israelis announced Operation Protective Edge and began calling up reservists. Hamas launched a longer-range rocket at Tel Aviv. Israel then increased its airstrikes against targets in Gaza.
At this point, it would appear that Israel has deployed sufficient force to be ready to conduct an incursion into Gaza. However, Israel has not done so yet. The conflict has consisted of airstrikes and some special operations forces raids by Israel and rocket launches by Hamas against targets in Israel.
From a purely military standpoint, the issue has been Hamas's search for a deterrent to Israeli operations against Gaza. Operation Cast Lead in late 2008 and early 2009 disrupted Gaza deeply, and Hamas found itself without any options beyond attempts to impose high casualties on Israeli forces. But the size of the casualties in Cast Lead did not prove a deterrent.
Hamas augmented its short-range rocket arsenal with much longer-range rockets. The latest generation of rockets it has acquired can reach the population center of Israel: the triangle of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. However, these are rockets, not missiles. That means they have no guidance system, and their point of impact once launched is a matter of chance. Given these limits, Hamas hoped having a large number of rockets of different ranges would create the risk of substantial Israeli civilian casualties, and that that risk would deter Israel from action against Gaza.
The threat posed by the rockets was in fact substantial. According to senior Israeli Air Force officers quoted on the subject, Israel lacked intelligence on precisely where the rockets were stored and all the sites from which they might be launched. Gaza is honeycombed with a complex of tunnels, many quite deep. This limits intelligence. It also limits the ability of Israeli airborne munitions from penetrating to their storage area and destroying them.
The Israeli objective is to destroy Hamas' rocket capacity. Israel ideally would like to do this from the air, but while some can be destroyed from the air, and from special operations, it appears the Israelis lack the ability to eliminate the threat. The only solution would be a large-scale assault on Gaza designed to occupy it such that a full-scale search for the weapons and their destruction on the ground would be possible.
Hamas has been firing rockets to convince the Israelis that they have enough to increase casualties in the triangle if they choose to. The Israelis must in fact assume that an assault on Gaza would in its earliest stages result in a massive barrage, especially since Hamas would be in a "use-it-or-lose-it" position. Hamas hopes this will deter an Israeli attack.
Thus far, Israel has restrained its attack beyond airstrikes. The extent to which the fear of massed rocketry was the constraining factor is not clear. Certainly, the Israelis are concerned that Hamas is better prepared for an attack than it was during Cast Lead, and that its ability to use anti-tank missiles against Israel's Merkava tanks and improvised explosive devices against infantry has evolved. Moreover, the occupation of Gaza would be costly and complex. It would take perhaps weeks to search for rockets and in that time, Israeli casualties would mount. When the political consequences, particularly in Europe, of such an attack were added to this calculus, the ground component of Protective Edge was put off.
As mentioned, a major issue for the Israelis is the intelligence factor. It is said that Iran provided Hamas with these rockets via smuggling routes through Sudan. It is hard to imagine the route these weapons would take such that Israeli (and American) intelligence would not detect them on their thousand-plus mile transit, and that they would move into Gaza in spite of Israeli and Egyptian hostile watchfulness. Even if Iran didn't provide the weapons, and someone else did, the same question would arise.
The failure of the Israelis to detect and interdict the movement of rockets or rocket parts has an immediate effect on the confidence with which senior Israeli commanders and political leaders calculate their course. Therefore, to this point, there has been a stalemate, with what we assume is a small fraction of Hamas' rockets being fired, and limited operations against Gaza. The ground operation is being held in check for now.
While there have been a few public attempts to mediate between Hamas and Israel, most of these efforts have been lackluster, and the condemnations of violence and calls for peace have been more perfunctory than usual. Rather than leaving Egypt as the principle mediator, Turkey and Qatar have also weighed into the cease-fire discussion. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry also reportedly contacted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday, offering assistance in mediating a truce. Meanwhile, high-ranking diplomats from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany discussed truce efforts on the sidelines of talks on Iran, and Israel’s government has began mulling a plan to offer development aid in exchange for a demilitarization of Gaza.
There is good reason for the slow pace of these cease-fire efforts, however. As evidenced by Hamas' ability to replenish its rocket supply through routes traversing Sinai, Israel cannot rely exclusively on Egypt to uphold a cease-fire agreement -- nor does it trust Qatar and Turkey to do so. Instead, Israel is attempting to place responsibility for cease-fire enforcement on its main external patron, the United States. Of equal importance, Hamas shares a deep distrust of the current regime in Egypt, given Hamas' past links to the Muslim Brotherhood, whose brief reign in Egypt ended with a military coup. As these negotiations move slowly forward, Israel's focus is on trying to degrade Hamas' military capabilities enough to compensate for the weaknesses implicit in any cease-fire agreement. But tackling the problem primarily through the air has limits, and Israel's questionable confidence in its own intelligence is what has prevented a ground incursion so far.
The problem for Israel in any cease-fire is that it would keep the current status quo in place. Hamas would retain its rockets, and might be able to attain more advanced models. Israel was not able to stop the influx of this load, so Israel can't be confident that it can stop the next. A cease-fire is a victory for Hamas because they have retained their rocket force and have the potential to increase it. But for Israel, if it assumes that it cannot absorb the cost of rooting out all of the rockets (assuming that is possible) then a cease-fire brings it some political benefits without having to take too many risks.
At this moment, we know for certain that Israel is bombing Gaza and has amassed a force sufficient to initiate ground operations but has not done so. Hamas has not fired a saturation attack, assuming it could, but has forced Israel to assume that such an attack is possible, and that its Iron Dome defensive system would be overwhelmed by the numbers. The next move is Israel's. We can assume there are those in the Israeli command authority arguing that the Gaza rockets will be fired at some point, and must be eliminated now, and others arguing that without better intelligence the likelihood of casualties and of triggering a saturation launch is too high.
We have no idea who will win the argument, if there is one, but right now, Israel is holding.
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| Two soldiers were killed and two were injured in a firefight with a Hamas terrorist squad that entered Israel via a cross-border tunnel from the central Gaza Strip on Saturday morning. The incident occurred in Eshkol. Nine terrorists were heading towards an Israeli community, and encountered an IDF patrol, a senior military source said. One of the injured is a senior officer. An exchange of fire ensued. One terrorist was shot dead in the gun battle and the remainder fled back into Gaza through the tunnel. The air force launched a subsequent air strikes on members of the cell in Gaza, apparently killing several of its members. The squad of terrorists who were dressed in IDF uniforms, were armed with automatic weapons, RPGs, syringes, sedatives and handcuffs. The IDF believes they planned to kidnap an Israeli and go on a killing spree in a community. The IDF said an attempt to murder Israeli civilians was thwarted. The soldiers were later named as Sgt. Adar Barsano, 20, of Nahariya and Maj. Amotz Greenberg, 45, of Hod HaSharon. "Unfortunately, we are in reality where this can happen," the senior army source said, commenting on the battle. Throughout the operation thus far, two IDF officers have been seriously injured, three officers and a soldier are in moderate condition, and an officer and five soldiers have been lightly injured in a number of armed clashes with terrorists in Gaza. Large ground forces from the Paratroopers, Nahal, and Givati infantry brigades are working with the Armored Corps, the Engineering Corps, the Maglan special operation unit that works behind enemy lines, and other elite units. Paratroopers encountered a terrorist in Gaza who emerged from a tunnel entrance and opened fire at soldiers on Saturday evening. The paratroopers returned fire, shooting the gunman dead. Thirty four terror tunnels in Gaza and five additional cross-border attack tunnels have been discovered and destroyed by the army. Seventy Palestinian combatants have been killed - 20 of them on Saturday. Thirteen terrorists have been arrested and are being questioned in Israel. The IDF struck more than 450 targets from the air, sea, and land throughout the weekend. On Friday, soldiers came under gun and mortar attack, and returned fire. The air force struck a mortar launching cell that targeted ground forces in Gaza. In the afternoon, a Palestinian armed with five grenades approached soldiers and requested medical attention, pretending to be unwell. When the army dispatched a medic, he attempted to hurl a grenade at soldiers. Soldiers opened fire, shooting and killing the attacker. An IDF tank activated its Windshield protection system when an anti-tank missile was fired at it. Army sources said Hamas and Islamic Jihad have placed gunmen in the homes of civilians who evacuated their homes in northern Gaza. The IDF suffered its first casualty in Operation Protective Edge at 4 am on Friday, as the army commenced its ground offensive into Gaza. Two more soldiers were lightly wounded. Twenty-year-old Sergeant First Class Eitan Barak from Herzliya was killed in Gaza, under still unclear circumstances. The IDF is investigating the incident to ascertain whether Barak was hit by friendly fire or by terrorists. Barak was promoted posthumously from the rank of sergeant on Friday. IDF units seized positions in northern, central and southern Gaza, and traded fire with terror organizations overnight between Thursday and Friday, following the launch of a ground offensive, a senior military source said Friday morning. One unit was the target of a failed bomb attack. The IDF said it expected armed clashes to increase after sunup. "The units are at their designated place. We expect significant friction to begin after first light," the military source said on Friday. Fourteen armed Palestinian combatants were killed in the first night of the ground offensive. "We are focusing on three efforts. The first is continued air strikes. The second is the taking over of [tunnel] targets [by ground units]. The last is preparing the next stage of this operation," the source said. Ground Forces are focusing on destroying Hamas's extensive tunnel network. In their first few hours in Gaza, they were engaged by gunmen, and returned fire. In some cases, bombs were set off near the approaching military forces. The source described the resistance encountered by the IDF as "low," adding that the massive wave of fire launched by artillery and air strikes before the entrance of ground units help ensure that Hamas "kept its head down." "Hamas was surprised by the patience of the Israeli public, and by the performance of Iron Dome," the source said. "It took Hamas years to plan the tunnel attack on Kibbutz Sufa," the source added, referring to an attempt on Thursday by Hamas to send 13 heavily armed terrorists to the kibbutz to go on a killing spree, before being spotted and targeted with an air strike by the IDF. The air force hit 103 targets overnight between Thursday and Friday, including 20 underground rocket launchers, and 6 terrorist headquarters. Since the start of the operation, the IAF struck 2,150 targets, including 1,160 underground launchers, 200 command and control centers, nine training camps, and 43 Hamas regime buildings. The IAF also struck rocket launching squads as they were preparing to fire into Israel, the source added. Hamas responded with rocket fire on several Israeli areas. In some cases overnight, the IAF struck areas used to fire on Israel immediately, as well as with artillery. "We are directing our firepower at operatives, tunnels, and infrastructure," the source explained. The IDF has been authorized by the cabinet to call up a further 18,000 reservists, opening the door to planning the next stage in the operation, the source said. Meanwhile, he added, "very large intelligence capabilities are being activated, and new targets are being acquired." 5b)
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