OBAMA : Paid Big Salary Yet Still Learning on The Job!

Mubarak's phone message: "Sorry I'm not home to take your call. At the tone
please state your bad news."

El Baradei's mother: "Is one Nobel Prize so much to ask from a child
after all I've done?"
---
What is happening in Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt would suggest that solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem would calm the Arab street has been a ruse based on a false premise all along.

If Obama allows a UN vote against Israel, in the mistaken belief, it will pacify Arabs he will be the first president to allow such and it will prove just another mis-step on the part of a very naive president who is drawing a big salary yet still LOTJ. (See 1 below.)

The article below provides some insight into how to negotiate with Arabs and why it is so difficult for the Western mind to comprehend.

This is one of the best articles I have read on the subject and a must for every non-Arab living in the Middle East, or anyone who wants to understand the intricacies of the Arab way of negotiating. It is also an answer to all those who cannot understand why Israel cannot achieve peace.

In fact it also provides a road map , to use that trite phrase, for Republicans in negotiating with Obama. (See 2 below.)
---
What is happening in Egypt is not the fault of this administration but initially Obama and Hillary got off on the wrong foot in commenting about our support for Mubarak.

Any region whose nations are run by dictators, kings etc. is an anachronism considering we are in the 21st century. That said, there is no guarantee, particularly among the Arabs,that change will result in a move towards something resembling a democratic society. GW attempted it in Iraq and it has yet to happen and now with what is going on, the entire region could go up in in flames.

Certainly the Saudis must be trembling and the Iranian Ayatollahs licking their lips.(See 3 below.)
---
For those who care this PJTV.Com discussion about Libertarians and Conservatives might prove interesting. It addresses many questions and issues and it appears they can come together when there is a strong galvanizing issue but they have philosophical variance and that is a fact of life.


Click on PJTV.Com: "A Two Faced Tea Party: Can Social Conservatives and Libertarians Get Along?

A study shows that the Tea Party movement is split down the middle when it comes to social issues. Half want the Tea Party to focus on social issues, the other half doesn't. Hear more as David Kirby visits The Bottom Line to discuss the two faced nature of the Tea Party."
---
Gotta love military time! (See 4 below.)
---
Who is El Baradei - one thought. You decide is Baradei a stooge? Time will tell. (See 5 below.)
---
Dick
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)President Barack Obama is about to withhold the US veto from a Palestinian-Arab motion due to be tabled at the UN Security Council condemning Israel for its settlement policy in the West Bank and Jerusalem, DEBKAfile's Washington sources report. If he does, he will be the first US president to let an anti-Israel motion go through the Security Council and building on the West Bank and even in the forty-year old suburbs of East Jerusalem would become illegal and set the US on a collision course with the Netanyahu government. Jerusalem would see this step as encouraging the Palestinians and hostile Arab states to continue to use the UN Security Council to undermine Israel's legitimacy and recognize a unilateral Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders without negotiations.
Washington's latest proposal to work on security arrangements first and so ease the path to a deal on borders would be negated by its UN veto because a motion against settlements would a priori dictate eventual borders between the Palestinian state and Israel.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2)"How to Bargain with Arabs"
By Professor Moshe Sharon



Everybody says that his donkey is a horse.

There is no tax on words.

(Two Arab proverbs)


On December 24th 1977, at the very beginning of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt in Ismailia , I had the opportunity to have a short discussion with Muhammad Anwar Sadat the president of Egypt . "Tell your Prime Minister," he said, "that this is a bazaar; the merchandise is expensive." I told my Prime Minister but he failed to abide by the rules of the bazaar. The failure was not unique to him alone. It is the failure of all the Israeli governments and the media.

On March 4, 1994, I published an article in the Jerusalem Post called "Novices in Negotiations." The occasion was the conclusion of the "Cairo Agreement." A short time later, Yasser Arafat, proved yet again that his signature was not worth the ink of his pen, let alone the paper to which it was affixed, and his word was worth even less. Then, as in every subsequent agreement Israel was taken aback when her concessions had become the basis for fresh Arab demands.

In Middle Eastern bazaar diplomacy, agreements are kept not because they are signed but because they are imposed. Besides, in the bazaar of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the two sides are not discussing the same merchandise. The Israelis wish to acquire peace based on the Arab-Muslim acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state. The objective of the Arabs is to annihilate the Jewish state, replace it with an Arab state, and get rid of the Jews.

To achieve their goal, the Arabs took to the battlefield and to the bazaar diplomacy. The most important rule in the bazaar is that if the vendor knows that you desire to purchase a certain piece of merchandize, he will raise its price. The merchandise in question is "peace" and the Arabs give the impression that they actually have this merchandise and inflate its price, when in truth they do not have it at all.

This is the wisdom of the bazaar: if you are clever enough, you can sell nothing at a price. The Arabs sell words, they sign agreements, and they trade with vague promises, but are sure to receive generous down payments from eager buyers. In the bazaar only a foolish buyer pays for something he has never seen.

There is another rule in the market as well as across the negotiating table: the side that first presents his terms is bound to lose; the other side builds his next move, using the open cards of his opponent, as the starting point.

In all its negotiations with the Palestinian Arabs, Israel has always rushed to offer its plans, and was surprised to discover that after an agreement had been "concluded," it had become the basis for further demands.

Most amazing is the reaction in such cases. Israeli politicians, "experts" and the media eagerly provide "explanations" for the Arabs' behaviour. One of the most popular explanations is that these or other Arab pronouncements are "for internal use," as if "internal use" does not count. Other explanations invoke "the Arab sensitivity to symbols," "honour," "matters of emotion" and other more patronising sayings of this nature. Does Israel possess no "sensitivities" or does it have no honour? What does all this have to do with political encounters?

It is therefore essential, as the late President Sadat advised, to learn the rules of the oriental bazaar before venturing into the arena of bazaar diplomacy. The most important of all the rules is the Roman saying: "If you want peace -- prepare for war." Never come to the negotiating table from a position of weakness. Your adversary should always know that you are strong and ready for war, even more than you are ready for peace.

In the present situation in the Middle East, and in the foreseeable future, "peace" is nothing more than an empty word. Israel should stop speaking about "peace" and delete the word "peace" from its vocabulary, together with such phrases as "the price of peace" or "territory for peace." For a hundred years the Jews have been begging the Arabs to sell them peace, ready to pay any price. They have received nothing, because the Arabs have no peace to sell, but the Jews have still paid dearly. It must be said, in all fairness, that the Arabs have not made a secret of the fact that what they meant by the word "peace" was nothing more than a limited ceasefire for a limited period.

Since this is the situation, Israel should openly declare that peace does not exist as an option in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that it has decided to create a new state of affairs in the Middle East, compelling the Arab side to ask for peace; and pay for it. Unlike the Arabs, Israel has this merchandize for sale.

From now on Israel should be the side demanding payment for peace. If the Arabs want peace, Israel should fix its price in real terms. The Arabs will pay if they reach the conclusion that Israel is so strong that they cannot destroy it. Because of this, Israel ’s deterrent power is essential.

Therefore, if anyone asks Israel for plans, the answer should be: no "plans," no "suggestions," no "constructive ideas;" in fact, no negotiations at all. If the Arab side wants to negotiate, let it present its plans and its "ideas." If and when it does, the first Israeli reaction should always be "unacceptable! Come with better ones." If and when the time comes for serious negotiations, once the Arabs have lost all hope of annihilating the Jewish state, here are ten rules for bargaining in the Middle Eastern bazaar:

• Never be the first to suggest anything to the other side. Never show any eagerness "to conclude a deal." Let the opponent present his suggestions first.

• Always reject; disagree. Use the phrase: "Not meeting the minimum demands," and walk away, even a hundred times. A tough customer gets good prices.

• Don't rush to come up with counter-offers. There will always be time for that. Let the other side make amendments under the pressure of your total "disappointment." Patience is the name of the game: "haste is from Satan!"

• Have your own plan ready in full, as detailed as possible, with the red lines completely defined. However, never show this or any other plan to a third party. It will reach your opponent quicker than you think. Weigh the other side’s suggestions against this plan.

• Never change your detailed plan to meet the other side "half way." Remember, there is no "half way." The other side also has a master plan. Be ready to quit negotiations when you encounter stubbornness on the other side.

• Never leave things unclear. Always avoid "creative phrasing" and "creative ideas" which are exactly what your Arab opponent wants. Remember the Arabs are masters of language. Playing with words is the Arab national sport. As in the market, so also at the negotiating table, always talk dollars and cents.

• Always bear in mind that the other side will try to outsmart you by presenting major issues as unimportant details. Regard every detail as a vitally important issue. Never postpone any problem "for a later occasion." If you do so, you will lose; remember that your opponent is always looking for a reason to avoid honouring agreements.

• Emotion belongs neither in the marketplace nor at the negotiating table. Friendly words as well as outbursts of anger, holding hands, kissing, touching cheeks, and embracing should not be interpreted as representing policy.

• Beware of popular beliefs about the Arabs and the Middle East -- "Arab honour" for example. Remember, you have honour too, but this has nothing to do with the issues under negotiation. Never do or say anything because somebody has told you that it is "the custom." If the Arab side finds out that you are playing the anthropologist he will take advantage of it.

• Always remember that the goal of all negotiations is to make a profit. You should aim at making the highest profit in real terms. Remember that every gain is an asset for the future, because there is always going to be "another round."

The Arabs have been practising negotiation tactics for more than 1300 years. They are the masters of words, and a mine of endless patience. In contrast, Israelis (and Westerners in general) want quick "results." In this part of the world there are no quick results, the hasty one always loses.

Moshe Sharon is Professor of Islamic History at the Hebrew University


3)Rebellion in the Land of the Pharaohs

A man who places himself at the helm for three decades inevitably becomes the target of all the realm's discontents.
By FOUAD AJAMI

'When Ramses II was over eighty he celebrated his rejuvenation at the feast of Set, repeating it yearly until he was ninety and more, and displaying his power of rejuvenation to the Gods above in the Obelisks he regularly erected as a memorial, which the aged Pharaoh decorated with electrum at the top so that their brightness should pour over lands of Egypt when the sun was mirrored in them."

This is from a classic account of this ancient and ordered land, "The Nile in Egypt," by Emil Ludwig (1937). Hosni Mubarak, the military officer who became Pharaoh in his own right, is well over 80. His is the third-longest reign since Ramses, who ruled for 67 years. The second-longest had belonged to a remarkable soldier of fortune, Muhammad Ali, an Albanian by birth and the creator of modern Egypt, who conquered the country in the opening years of the 19th century and ruled for five decades. His dynasty was to govern Egypt until the middle years of the 20th century.

In the received image of it, Egypt is the most stable of nations, a place of continuity on the banks of a sanguine river. Egyptians, the chronicles tell us, never killed their pharaohs. Anwar al-Sadat had been the first. But this received image conceals a good deal of tumult. The submission to the will of Gods and rulers has been punctured by ferocious rebellions.

From Ludwig again: "Once the fellahin (the peasants) and the workers of Egypt revolted against their masters; once their resentment burst out: a revolution dispossessed the rich men and the priests of Egypt of their power." One such revolution at the end of the Old Kingdom raged intermittently for two centuries (2350B.C. to 2150 B.C.).

In more recent times, in 1952, the Egyptians rose in rebellion and set much of modern Cairo to the torch, which would lead to the fall of the monarchy. The agile Sadat faced a big revolt of his own in 1977 when he attempted to reduce the subsidies on bread and sugar and cooking gas. It is said that he had been ready to quit this country in the face of that upheaval.

It is hard to know with precision when Hosni Mubarak, the son of middle peasantry, lost the warrant of his people. It had started out well for this most cautious of men. He had been there on the reviewing stand on Oct. 6, 1981 when a small band of young men from the army struck down Sadat as the flamboyant ruler was reviewing his troops and celebrating the eighth anniversary of the October War of 1973.


The new man had risen by grace of his predecessor's will. He had had no political past. The people of Egypt had not known of him. He was the antidote to two great and ambitious figures—Nasser and Sadat. His promise was modesty. He would tranquilize the realm after three decades of tumult and wars and heartbreaking bids to re-make the country.

A deceased friend of mine, an army general of Mr. Mubarak's class and generation, spoke of the man with familiarity: He was a civil servant with the rank of president, he said of his fellow officer. Mr. Mubarak put the word out that he would serve two six-year terms and be gone. But the appetite grew with the eating. The humble officer would undergo a transformation. A presidency-for-life announced itself. And in an astounding change, where Nasser and Sadat feared the will and the changing moods of their countrymen, Mr. Mubarak grew imperious and dismissive.

Egypt bent to his will. A country with a vibrant parliamentary tradition in the 1920s and 1930s became a sterile tyranny. A land that had opened onto Europe in the course of the 19th century, that had given rise to professional syndicates and associations, to an independent judiciary, was brought low.

There has always been an Egyptian pride in their country—even as Egypt tried and failed to modernize, even as its Sisyphean struggle broke its heart and engendered a deep sense of disappointment—and Mr. Mubarak came to offend that sense of national pride.

In the annals of Muslim dynasties and kingdoms, wives and children have figured prominently in the undoing of rulers. An ambitious wife, Suzanne, with haughty manners, and a taste for wealth and power (a variation on the hairdresser Leila Trabelsi, the wife of the deposed Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali) and a favored son who, by all indications, was preparing to inherit his father's power, deepened the estrangement between Mr. Mubarak and his people.


Egypt had been the trendsetter in Arab politics, in its self-image the place where all things modern in Arab life—the cinema, radio, women's emancipation, parliamentary life, mass politics, forced industrialization—had begun. The sight of Tunisians, hitherto a marginal people in the Arab consciousness, taking to the streets and deposing their tyrant, both shamed and emboldened the Egyptians. They had wearied of the large prison that Mr. Mubarak had constructed for them. A man who places himself at the helm for three decades inevitably, and justly, becomes the target of all the discontents in the realm.

Revolts of this kind are always a gamble on the unknown. At bottom, they are an attempt at self-purification, a society wishes to be done with the stain of submission to a dictator's transgressions. Amid the tumult, what is so clear today is the hatred felt for the ruler and his immediate family. Reigns like Mr. Mubarak's devour the green and the dry, as a favored Arab expression has it. The sycophants come to the fore and steal what they can. Those with heart and character and pride are hauled off to prison, or banished to the outer margins of public life.

Mr. Mubarak has been merciless with his critics. For this isolated, aging man of the barracks, dissent is always treason. There remains, of course, the Muslim Brotherhood. It was in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood was born in the late 1920s. The Brotherhood has been the alibi and the bogeyman with which Hosni Mubarak frightened the middle class at home and the donors abroad in Washington and Europe, who prop his regime out of fear that Egypt would come apart and the zealots would triumph.

In one of the novels by the late Egyptian novelist and Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz, a pharaoh is told by his lovely mistress Rabudis of rumors of pending rebellion, of popular disaffection. "And they say the priests are a powerful group with control over the hearts and the minds of the people." But he smiles and answers. "But I am the stronger." "What of the anger of the people my lord," she asks? "It will calm down when they see me on my chariot." We shall see if and how this modern-day pharaoh copes with a people determined to be rid of him.

Mr. Ajami is a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4)No Sex Since 1955

A crusty old Marine Sergeant Major found himself at a gala event hosted by a local liberal arts college. There was no shortage of extremely young idealistic ladies in attendance, one of whom approached the Sergeant Major for conversation.

"Excuse me, Sergeant Major, but you seem to be a very serious man. Is something bothering you?"

"Negative, ma'am. Just serious by nature."

The young lady looked at his awards and decorations and said, "It looks like you have seen a lot of action."

"Yes, ma'am, a lot of action."

The young lady, tiring of trying to start up a conversation, said, "You know, you should lighten up. Relax and enjoy yourself."

The Sergeant Major just stared at her in his serious manner.

Finally the young lady said, "You know, I hope you don't take this the wrong way, but when is the last time you had sex?"

"1955, ma'am."

"Well, there you are. No wonder you're so serious. You really need to chill out! I mean, no sex since 1955! She took his hand and led him to a private room where she proceeded to "relax" him several times.

Afterwards, panting for breath, she leaned against his bare chest and said, "Wow, you sure didn't forget much since 1955."

The Sergeant Major said in his serious voice, after glancing at his watch, "I hope not; it's now only 2130."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5)A review of overnight news accounts suggests that Israeli officials and Jewish leaders abroad are deeply concerned about the prospect of Mohammed ElBarade succeeding Hosni Mubarak as Egypt's leader.

"Israel called on the United States and a number of European countries over the weekend to curb their criticism of President Mubarak to preserve stability in the region," the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported.

"Jerusalem seeks to convince its allies that it is in the West's interest to maintain the stability of the Egyptian regime. The diplomatic measures came after statements in Western capitals implying that the US and European Union supported Mubarak's ouster," Haaretz added.

Israel and Egypt have had a peace treaty for three decades and though not a perfect peace, the absence of military tension between the two countries has benefited the region and the world. Egypt also receives large amounts of aid from the US.


Meanwhile, Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice-president of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and a top American Jewish leader, "called Mohammed ElBaradei, the opposition leader emerging from the Egyptian ferment, a 'stooge for Iran.'" Hoenlein's group addresses foreign policy issues on behalf of many of America's major Jewish organizations.


"Hoenlein accused ElBaradei of covering up Iran's true nuclear weaponization capacities while he directed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog," JTA added.

According to JTA, Hoenlein, in a recorded interview, said of ElBaradei, "He is a stooge for Iran, and I don't use the term lightly....He fronted for them, he distorted the reports."

"ElBaradei, who directed the IAEA from 1997-2009, returned to Egypt after his third term ended. He was soon touted as a possible challenger to the 30-year autocracy led by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak," JTA explained. "He has emerged, since protests were launched last week, as a consensus candidate of various opposition groups for transitional leader."

According to the New York Times, "ElBaradei criticized the Obama administration, as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered the message via Sunday news programs in Washington that Mubarak should create an 'orderly transition' to a more politically open Egypt, while she refrained from calling on him to resign." This approach, ElBaradei said, "was 'a failed policy' eroding American credibility," the Times added.

The Jerusalem Post reported Monday that "a leading Muslim Brotherhood official told The Associated Press that the fundamentalist movement wants to form a committee of opposition groups along with Nobel laureate and leading reform advocate Mohammad ElBaradei as a way of uniting the disparate groups calling for Mubarak's ouster."

"The outlawed Muslim Brotherhood is Egypt's largest opposition movement, and wants to form an Islamist state in the most populous Arab nation," the Post added.



STATEMENTS ON ISRAEL

Statements ElBaradei has made the past few years regarding Israel, the region's only stable democracy, have raised concerns as well.


In 2010, according to the Israeli news service Ynet, ElBaradei maintained that violence was the only path open to the Palestinians, because "the Israeli occupation only understands the language of violence." This comment came despite Israel's continued attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians based on compromise and mutual respect.

And, in 2009, according to news reports, ElBaradei, at a joint press conference with Iran's Atomic Energy Organization chief Ali Akbar Salehi in Tehran, said, "Israel is the number one threat to the Middle East given the nuclear arms it possesses."


The outcome of the current situation remains uncertain, and what implications it will have for the US and Israel are unclear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------