Egypt and Stuxnet - Hold The Key To This Century?

There is always more than one way to 'skin a cat' as the saying goes and the same for looking at Obama.

One could argue he has been brilliant in getting his extreme 'Far Left' agenda passed but at a price that has yet to be determined and which could unravel many of those accomplishments.

The other approach could be that Obama is doomed to fail because, though he crammed through a lot of legislation during a difficult period, by ignoring voters and being actually arrogant, in the process, he has ruined any opportunity for accomplishing much going forward.

Another trite saying is 'the truth lies in the middle.' Events beyond Obama's control, as with most presidents, will have more to do with how history will record Obama's success or failure than matters under his own control.

Events are unfolding which, in my opinion, will shape this century.
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Perhaps the biggest could be a nuclear explosion brought about by Stuxnet according to Russian warnings. (See 1 below.)
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Has Mubarak begun discussions which will lead to his own demise?

Does Egypt's army hold the key? (See 2 below.)
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Will this be the way of all flesh? (See 3 below)
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Four other assessments of what the Egyptian riots portend. (See 4 - 4c below.)
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Should what is happening in Egypt cause China's leader's angst?

Playing with fire can result in severe burns. (See 5 below.)
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Meanwhile, US troops continue to die in Afghanistan while the media and news folks are chasing another story. Does anyone in the current administration care? (See 6 below.)
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The issue of our dependency upon foreign oil is being resurrected by what is happening in The Middle East prove, once again, The Far Left are on the wrong side of both our own security and history.
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Dick
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1)Stuxnet returns to Bushehr reactor. Russia warns of nuclear explosion

Iran'satomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi said on Jan. 29 that the Bushehr nuclear power plant would be connected to the national grid on April 9. He "forgot" about Tehran's promise to fully activate its first nuclear reactor Tuesday, Jan. 25.

Intelligence and Moscow sources reveal that on that day, Iran's hand on the switch was held back at the last minute by Sergei Kiriyenko, chief of Rosatom (the Russian national nuclear energy commission which oversaw the reactor's construction. He came hurrying over to warn Tehran that Stuxnet was back and switching the reactor on could trigger a calamitous nuclear explosion that could cost a million Iranian lives and devastate neighboring populations. He complained to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that the Iranian nuclear and engineering staff were ignoring the presence of the malworm and must be stopped.

Kiriyenko told the Iranian president that the Russian engineers employed at the reactor notified Moscow that Stuxnet was again attacking the Bushehr systems after apparently taking a rest from its first onslaught last June. There was no telling which systems had been infected, because a key feature of the virus is that the systems' screens show they are working normally when in fact they have been fatally disarmed. Activating the reactor in these circumstances could cause an explosion far more powerful than the disaster at the Russian reactor at Chernobyl, Ukraine in April 1986, which released 400 times more radioactive material than the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

The impression the Rosatom chief had gained from his staff at Bushehr was that the Iranian teams had been ordered to activate the reactor at any price to prove that the Islamic Republic had beaten Stuxnet. This concern overrode security. The consequences of ignoring this fearful hazard, said Kiriyenko, were unthinkable and would destroy the revolutionary Islamic regime in Tehran in their wake.

Kirienko began worrying when he heard the Iranian nuclear commission's spokesman Hamid Khadem-Qaemi claim on Jan. 17 that Bushehr had not been affected by Stuxnet.
Our Iranian sources report that, after seeing the Russian official off, Ahmadinejad ordered the reactor to stay shut down.

This week, Salehi, who is also Iran's foreign minister, hinted at the cause of the delay when he said: "The reactor has started its operation and the next step is to reach critical phase which will happen by the end of Bahman (February 20) in presence of Russians. We have said before that due to some tests, we may have to face delays but these delays are around a week or two." He added, "We aim at launching Bushehr nuclear reactor safely not to merely launch it."

In Jerusalem, Maj-Gen. Aviv Kohavi, the new head of IDF military intelligence - MI, who appeared before the Knesset Security and Foreign Affairs Committee for his first briefing on Jan. 25 said Bushehr could be quickly converted from producing electricity for civilian use to a military reactor and incorporated into Iran's weapons program.

The next day, Jan. 26, Moscow took the unusual step of demanding a NATO investigation into last year's computer attack on the Russian-built nuclear reactor in Iran.

Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, said: T"his virus, which is very toxic, very dangerous, could have very serious implications," he said, describing the virus's impact as being like "explosive mines".

"These 'mines' could lead to a new Chernobyl," he said.
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2)Mubarak to talk with opposition as 250,000 protesters gather in Cairo
Egypt president instructs new PM to start talks with opposition parties about their demands; army officers promise not to hurt protesters in Tuesday's massive demonstration.
By Anshel Pfeffer, Avi Issacharoff and Reuters

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has instructed his government to begin talks with the opposition parties who support the mass anti-government protests across the country, the pan-Arab satellite network Al-Arabiya reported on Monday.

Mubarak told his new prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, to start talking to the opposition and find out their specific demands.

On Monday afternoon, more than 250,000 protesters have gathered again in Cairo's Tahrir Square, as well as in main centers in other Egyptian cities.

Protesters called for an indefinite general strike and said they are planning a "million man march" on Tuesday in order to mark one week since the start of the anti-government protests in the country.


Egyptian military officers and soldiers promised Monday that they will not hurt any of the protesters in Tuesday's "million man march".

An officer in Egypt's Signal Corps, who identified as Major Ahmed, said he was responsible for the deployment of troops in Cairo's center and that the army will not touch the Egyptian people.

"We are with the people, and they love us. We will never hurt the people," he said. When asked what orders the military received from the government, he said: "We don't know what is going on with the government."

Egyptian protesters were camped out in central Cairo on Monday and vowed to stay until they had toppled President Hosni Mubarak, whose fate appeared to hang on the military as pressure mounted from the street and abroad.

"The army has to choose between Egypt and Mubarak," read one banner in Cairo's Tahrir Square, where demonstrators shared food with soldiers sent to restore order after violent protests shook Mubarak's 30-year rule to its core.

By dawn, some hardy demonstrators were still camped in the Square, which was covered in early morning mist. They had already begun chants of "Down, Down, Mubarak".

Six days of unrest have killed more than 100 people but the two sides have reached a stalemate. Protesters refuse to go, while the army is not moving them. The longer protesters stay unchallenged, the more untenable Mubarak's position seems.

Protesters in Tahrir Square - epicenter of the earthquake that has sent shudders through the Middle East and among global investors - have dismissed Mubarak's appointment of military men as his vice president and prime minister.

His promises of economic reform to address public anger at rising prices, unemployment and the huge gap between rich and poor have failed to halt their broader calls for a political sweep out of Mubarak and his associates.

Protesters have called for a general strike on Monday and what they bill as a "protest of the millions" march on Tuesday, to press their demands for democracy which could spell the end for the military establishment which has run post-colonial Egypt since the 1950s.

The United States, an ally which has poured billions of dollars of aid into Egypt since Mubarak came to power, stopped just short of saying openly that it wanted him out. Officials including President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke about "an orderly transition".

A senior U.S. administration official, who declined to be identified, said the feeling among Obama's national security aides was that Mubarak's time had passed, but it was up to Egyptians to determine what happens next.

Mubarak, a former air force chief, has turned to his military commanders, meeting them on Sunday. They seem to hold his future in their hands. Egypt's defence minister spoke by phone to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Sunday.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and highest-ranking U.S. military officer, praised the "professionalism" of Egypt's armed forces as its troops refrained from a crackdown on protesters. Egypt receives about $1.3 billion a year in U.S. military aid.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3)Radical political religion will soon shape the Mideast
The parties will be myriad and fragmented, colorless and disappointing, left-wing and right-wing - and all of them hostile to Israel, of course.
By Ron Leshem

When the time comes for genuine elections in Egypt, the country's future will be determined not by university graduates in Cairo but by 70 million villagers. And also, for example, by the one million people living in the City of the Dead, the cemetery in northern Cairo. They will vote for the Muslim Brotherhood because no liberal party can give them the rapid change desperately longed for by the masses, who suffer from shortages of flour, clean drinking water, jobs and housing.

The parties will be myriad and fragmented, colorless and disappointing, left-wing and right-wing - and all of them hostile to Israel, of course. An unstable, rudderless transition period, a parliamentary democracy in the Turkish model, if not the Iranian, will give rise to a religious regime that within a few years will presumably be in control of the best-trained and best-equipped army in the Middle East.

Many urban, educated city dwellers will calmly accept the will of the people, seeing it as an alternative to the futile, fawning pursuit of the culturally hollow West, which gave birth to exploitative dictatorships. The people love Islam - the culture, the tradition. The proponents of sane and secular freedom will wake up too late, just like the socialists and liberals who took to the streets to bring down the Shah of Iran, only to be hanged in the city squares when the transition government in Tehran was replaced with darkness.

Those who believe that the fear of losing the U.S. lifeline will rein in this process underestimate the Egyptian people. Radical, political religion is what will shape the Middle East in the coming decades.

Even in states where a tiny, tired minority rules over an oppressed majority, like Syria, the alternative's day will come. Freedom, in our secular interpretation of the concept, will not easily represent an alternative. The Gaza Strip is already in the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, which took the election decisively, and Lebanon will be controlled by Hezbollah. Islam is the solution, according to the slogan of the movement that was born in Egypt 90 years ago.

The masses in the dictatorships are losing their dread of the regime. For them, the new and relevant "leader," who rules and stirs the spirits, is freedom of information and of technology, the most effective manipulators of which and often its big winners are the fundamentalists. That is the case with the Al Jazeera television network, which is controlled by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood but which cynically benefits from the support of international human rights organizations, which see it as battling for freedom of expression in the Arab world.

The world does not necessarily move forward; it generally goes in circles. And progress does not necessarily lead to advancement. In late 1970s in Iran, too, it was audio cassettes of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's sermons that spread the revolutionary message. It is entirely possible that within a decade or two Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the West Bank will be part of the axis of political Islam.

In two decades or so, more than half of Israeli youth will be either Arab or ultra-Orthodox Jews. Most of the Arabs will presumably support the Islamic Movement. The Haredim, for their part, will join the workforce, even high-tech, but their support for political religion and for a justice system ruled by Jewish law will not change. People can become accustomed to anything, and we too, presumably, will gradually get used to religious edicts and a changing reality. Many of us, members of the productive, liberal public, will give up and flee in desperation. Others will remain optimistic. Or skeptical.
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4)INSS Insight by Shmuel Even: The Uprising in Egypt: An Initial Assessment

In any case, a weakened Egypt preoccupied with internal affairs portends
poorly for the pragmatic camp supporting the political process and
encourages the radical camp, intent on Israel’s destruction.


President Mubarak is currently facing the biggest challenge to his regime
since taking office close to thirty years ago. On January
28, after several days of violent demonstrations throughout Egypt,
the 82-year old Mubarak called on the army to quell the unrest, announcing
he “would not allow anything to threaten the peace, law, and future of the
country.” On January 29, Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman, head of Egyptian
intelligence, to the post of vice president, and charged Ahmed Shafiq, a
former Egyptian air force commander and the new prime minister, with the
task of forming a new government to undertake reforms and calm the masses.
At the time of this writing, the crisis is in full force and definitive
outcomes cannot be predicted.

The Crisis

Egypt has a population of 81 million; the annual growth rate of the
population is estimated at 2 percent, and the GDP is $6,200 (in terms of
buying power). The economic situation of the weaker classes, government
corruption, and the encouragement the population drew from the uprising in
Tunisia underlay the spontaneous eruption of the protests. While those close
to the Egyptian regime enjoy a lavish lifestyle, the weaker classes stagger
under the burden of the most basic subsistence and the middle class is
disappearing. Unemployment stands at close to 10 percent and the price of
basic foods is skyrocketing – in part because of the steep rise in food
prices worldwide, which despite the subsidies for basics goods has
affected prices on the local market. This phenomenon is also a
fundamental reason for the waves of protest in Tunisia, Yemen, and Algeria.

The standard of living of the lower class in Egypt is particularly low, at
the level of basic existence, because the average income is much lower than
the international average and because the country lacks advanced mechanisms
of social welfare available in developed nations. As a result of
urbanization, more than two-thirds of the Egyptian population work in
services, trade, and industry, and unlike in the past, have no access to
sources of food in the rural areas.

The protests are popular in nature and do not seem to be directed by the
Islamic opposition (although the protests were joined by Islamic elements).
The lack of a central organization responsible for the events makes it
difficult for the regime to identify targets to suppress. Opposition
leaders, such as Mohamed ElBaradei who sees himself as a candidate in this
year's presidential elections, have joined the protests, but they are not
directing the protesters. Thus far the army has deployed at key locations in
the cities but has not reined in the masses. At this point it seems that
military forces are concerned with protecting government edifices rather
than taking significant action to restore public order.

Mubarak’s difficulties are compounded by American pressure. On January 26
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: “We support the universal
rights of the Egyptian people including the rights to freedom of
expression, association, and assembly. And we urge the Egyptian authorities
not to prevent peaceful protests or block communications, including on
social media sites.” On January 28 President Obama made statements to the
same effect. The administration’s reserved stance towards the Egyptian
regime's self-defense efforts are reminiscent of the Carter administration's
attitude to the fall of the shah in Iran on the eve of the Islamic
Revolution in 1979; it is liable to affect the standing of the United States
among similar regimes in the region.

As in Tunisia, there has been widespread use of social media resources such
as Twitter and Facebook. Activists use the net not only for propaganda
purposes and reports on regime violence but also to recruit participants,
organize protests, and direct events. Therefore, the regime blocked access
to the internet and disrupted some mobile communications. An additional
challenge for the regime is the extensive presence of foreign media
broadcasting directly from the scene, which makes it hard for the regime to
act aggressively toward the protesters.

Historical Precedents

Mubarak is well aware of the risks of a shaky economy to internal stability.
In the so- called “Bread Riots” in January 1977, sparked by the steep
increase in prices of basic foods following the government’s attempt to cut
back on subsidies, 50 people were killed and some 600 were injured.
Then-Vice President Mubarak acted to quell the unrest but after three days,
the regime abandoned this attempt. In February 1986, riots were started by
soldiers from the central security units in Cairo and quickly spread to
other areas in Egypt. The Egyptian press reported that the riots rose from
the economic situation and the gap between a rich minority and a poor
majority, and that the riots were started by particularly embittered
soldiers who were joined by poor civilians. The rioters, who aimed their
fury at economic targets – stores, banks, and so on – were ultimately
stopped by the army.

Despite the similarity, it seems that the current crisis in Egypt is already
larger than those events, which the regime managed to suppress.

What Lies Ahead

The question of how deep the crisis will go and what the outcomes will be
depends on the ability of the protesters or the opposition to translate the
protest into a political force opposing the president’s power and the
apparatus at his disposal. The position of the generals is likely to be very
influential, as was evident in the deposal of Tunisian President Ben Ali. It
is not clear if there are any cracks in the military’s support for the
regime, but there seems to be no willingness on the military’s part to
confront the demonstrators. How much the military will be willing to act to
ensure the continuation of Mubarak’s regime is a critical question.

The outcome of the riots may not necessarily be connected to what or who
ignited them, rather to whatever power structure is created and those who
succeed in leveraging it for their own benefit. In such a power structure,
the Islamic opposition is liable to expand its influence. At the same time,
even if the regime succeeds in suppressing the uprising, it seems that Egypt
will not be able to go back to what it was and that the Mubarak regime will
end this year, one way or another.

Even if Mubarak remains in power, it seems that he will have to abandon his
attempt to crown his son Gamal as president in the 2011 presidential
elections. This will spell the end of a move seen by many Egyptians as an
attempt to restore the monarchy through the back door, as Hafez Asad did in
Syria by appointing his son Bashar as his successor. And should the crisis
expand, the regime leaders are likely to urge Mubarak to retire early and
appoint a temporary president to serve until the elections, thereby
preserving the regime, albeit in a different composition.

Alternatively, Egypt is liable to find itself in a period of instability,
highly undesirable by all sides. Under certain circumstances, undermining
the current power bases may generate an extremist Islamic regime, in part
because of the organizational capabilities of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.

The shockwaves of the events in Egypt and Tunisia may well spill over to
other Middle Eastern countries, as many of them suffer from similar
syndromes. The concern that the riots in Egypt will spread to other Arab
states caused the price of oil to spike by 4.5 percent already on January
28.

The Israeli Context

For now, the crisis has no Israeli connection and Israel has not been
mentioned in the recent clashes. Nonetheless, Israel has excellent reason to
follow developments closely, in light of its interest in maintaining
the peace agreement, its growing dependence on Egyptian gas, and the
ramifications for regional stability (e.g., a radical change in Egypt is
liable to generate a dramatic change in the Middle East balance of power).

In any case, a weakened Egypt preoccupied with internal affairs portends
poorly for the pragmatic camp supporting the political process and
encourages the radical camp, intent on Israel’s destruction. Even if the
regime succeeds in suppressing the uprising, Egypt is in for a year of
difficult political challenges that threaten its stability. In the current
crisis, Israel has neither the capability nor a reason to intervene, and
Israeli senior figures would do well to demonstrate restraint. Still, the
possibility that Egypt might pursue a new direction is no longer
theoretical and Israel must consider the implications of the various
possible scenarios.

4a)The Egypt Crisis in a Global Context
By George Friedman of Stratfor

It is not at all clear what will happen in the Egyptian revolution. It is not a surprise that this is happening. Hosni Mubarak has been president for more than a quarter of a century, ever since the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He is old and has been ill. No one expected him to live much longer, and his apparent plan, which was that he would be replaced by his son, Gamal, was not going to happen even though it was a possibility a year ago. There was no one, save his closest business associates, who wanted to see Mubarak's succession plans happen. As his father weakened, Gamal's succession became even less likely. Mubarak's failure to design a credible succession plan guaranteed instability on his death. Since everyone knew that there would be instability on his death, there were obviously those who saw little advantage to acting before he died. Who these people were and what they wanted is the issue.

Let's begin by considering the regime. In 1952, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a military coup that displaced the Egyptian monarchy, civilian officers in the military, and British influence in Egypt. Nasser created a government based on military power as the major stabilizing and progressive force in Egypt. His revolution was secular and socialist. In short, it was a statist regime dominated by the military. On Nasser's death, Anwar Sadat replaced him. On Sadat's assassination, Hosni Mubarak replaced him. Both of these men came from the military as Nasser did. However their foreign policy might have differed from Nasser's, the regime remained intact.

MUBARAK'S OPPONENTS
The demands for Mubarak's resignation come from many quarters, including from members of the regime — particularly the military — who regard Mubarak's unwillingness to permit them to dictate the succession as endangering the regime. For some of them, the demonstrations represent both a threat and opportunity. Obviously, the demonstrations might get out of hand and destroy the regime. On the other hand, the demonstrations might be enough to force Mubarak to resign, allow a replacement — for example, Omar Suleiman, the head of intelligence who Mubarak recently appointed vice president — and thereby save the regime. This is not to say that they fomented the demonstrations, but some must have seen the demonstrations as an opportunity.

This is particularly the case in the sense that the demonstrators are deeply divided among themselves and thus far do not appear to have been able to generate the type of mass movement that toppled the Shah of Iran's regime in 1979. More important, the demonstrators are clearly united in opposing Mubarak as an individual, and to a large extent united in opposing the regime. Beyond that, there is a deep divide in the opposition.

Western media has read the uprising as a demand for Western-style liberal democracy. Many certainly are demanding that. What is not clear is that this is moving Egypt's peasants, workers and merchant class to rise en masse. Their interests have far more to do with the state of the Egyptian economy than with the principles of liberal democracy. As in Iran in 2009, the democratic revolution, if focused on democrats, cannot triumph unless it generates broader support.

The other element in this uprising is the Muslim Brotherhood. The consensus of most observers is that the Muslim Brotherhood at this point is no longer a radical movement and is too weak to influence the revolution. This may be possible, but it is not obvious. The Muslim Brotherhood has many strands, many of which have been quiet under Mubarak's repression. It is not clear who will emerge if Mubarak falls. It is certainly not clear that they are weaker than the democratic demonstrators. It is a mistake to confuse the Muslim Brotherhood's caution with weakness. Another way to look at them is that they have bided their time and toned down their real views, waiting for the kind of moment provided by Mubarak's succession. I would suspect that the Muslim Brotherhood has more potential influence among the Egyptian masses than the Western-oriented demonstrators or Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is emerging as their leader.

There is, of course, the usual discussion of what U.S. President Barack Obama's view is, or what the Europeans think, or what the Iranians are up to. All of them undoubtedly have thoughts and even plans. In my view, trying to shape the political dynamics of a country like Egypt from Iran or the United States is futile, and believing that what is happening in Egypt is the result of their conspiracies is nonsense. A lot of people care what is happening there, and a lot of people are saying all sorts of things and even spending money on spies and Twitter. Egypt's regime can be influenced in this way, but a revolution really doesn't depend on what the European Union or Tehran says.

There are four outcomes possible. First, the regime might survive. Mubarak might stabilize the situation, or more likely, another senior military official would replace him after a decent interval. Another possibility under the scenario of the regime's survival is that there may be a coup of the colonels. A second possibility is that the demonstrators might force elections in which ElBaradei or someone like him could be elected and Egypt might overthrow the statist model built by Nasser and proceed on the path of democracy. The third possibility is that the demonstrators force elections, which the Muslim Brotherhood could win and move forward with an Islamist-oriented agenda. The fourth possibility is that Egypt will sink into political chaos. The most likely path to this would be elections that result in political gridlock in which a viable candidate cannot be elected. If I were forced to choose, I would bet on the regime stabilizing itself and Mubarak leaving because of the relative weakness and division of the demonstrators. But that's a guess and not a forecast.

GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Whatever happens matters a great deal to Egyptians. But only some of these outcomes are significant to the world. Among radical Islamists, the prospect of a radicalized Egypt represents a new lease on life. For Iran, such an outcome would be less pleasing. Iran is now the emerging center of radical Islamism; it would not welcome competition from Egypt, though it may be content with an Islamist Egypt that acts as an Iranian ally (something that would not be easy to ensure).

For the United States, an Islamist Egypt would be a strategic catastrophe. Egypt is the center of gravity in the Arab world. This would not only change the dynamic of the Arab world, it would reverse U.S. strategy since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Sadat's decision to reverse his alliance with the Soviets and form an alliance with the United States undermined the Soviet position in the Mediterranean and in the Arab world and strengthened the United States immeasurably. The support of Egyptian intelligence after 9/11 was critical in blocking and undermining al Qaeda. Were Egypt to stop that cooperation or become hostile, the U.S. strategy would be severely undermined.

The great loser would be Israel. Israel's national security has rested on its treaty with Egypt, signed by Menachem Begin with much criticism by the Israeli right. The demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula not only protected Israel's southern front, it meant that the survival of Israel was no longer at stake. Israel fought three wars (1948, 1967 and 1973) where its very existence was at issue. The threat was always from Egypt, and without Egypt in the mix, no coalition of powers could threaten Israel (excluding the now-distant possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons). In all of the wars Israel fought after its treaty with Egypt (the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon) Israeli interests, but not survival, were at stake.

If Egypt were to abrogate the Camp David Accords and over time reconstruct its military into an effective force, the existential threat to Israel that existed before the treaty was signed would re-emerge. This would not happen quickly, but Israel would have to deal with two realities. The first is that the Israeli military is not nearly large enough or strong enough to occupy and control Egypt. The second is that the development of Egypt's military would impose substantial costs on Israel and limit its room for maneuver.

There is thus a scenario that would potentially strengthen the radical Islamists while putting the United States, Israel, and potentially even Iran at a disadvantage, all for different reasons. That scenario emerges only if two things happen. First, the Muslim Brotherhood must become a dominant political force in Egypt. Second, they must turn out to be more radical than most observers currently believe they are — or they must, with power, evolve into something more radical.

If the advocates for democracy win, and if they elect someone like ElBaradei, it is unlikely that this scenario would take place. The pro-Western democratic faction is primarily concerned with domestic issues, are themselves secular and would not want to return to the wartime state prior to Camp David, because that would simply strengthen the military. If they win power, the geopolitical arrangements would remain unchanged.

Similarly, the geopolitical arrangements would remain in place if the military regime retained power — save for one scenario. If it was decided that the regime's unpopularity could be mitigated by assuming a more anti-Western and anti-Israeli policy — in other words, if the regime decided to play the Islamist card, the situation could evolve as a Muslim Brotherhood government would. Indeed, as hard as it is to imagine, there could be an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood designed to stabilize the regime. Stranger things have happened.

When we look at the political dynamic of Egypt, and try to imagine its connection to the international system, we can see that there are several scenarios under which certain political outcomes would have profound effects on the way the world works. That should not be surprising. When Egypt was a pro-Soviet Nasserite state, the world was a very different place than it had been before Nasser. When Sadat changed his foreign policy the world changed with it. If Sadat's foreign policy changes, the world changes again. Egypt is one of those countries whose internal politics matter to more than its own citizens.

Most of the outcomes I envision leave Egypt pretty much where it is. But not all. The situation is, as they say, in doubt, and the outcome is not trivial.

4b)How -- and why -- the Muslim Brotherhood's Egyptian strategy is succeeding
By Jeffrey Fleishman

The medical students marched and sweated in protest.

"The fear is broken," yelled Bahaa Mohammed. "We want freedom."

"And Islam," said his friend. "We need Islam."

"Yes," said Mohammed, hushing the young man. "But first freedom and the will of the people."

The exchange in the streets of Cairo between the students, both members of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, is a telling glimpse into the Arab world's largest Islamic organization as it joins other opposition groups seeking to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak. The Brotherhood is muting its religious message.

The organization's strategy became more apparent Sunday when it announced support for opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed ElBaradei as a transitional president if the Mubarak government is toppled. The move was recognition that ElBaradei, a secularist with Western democratic principles, is the most potent symbol for change in a nation desperate for fresh voices.

Founded in 1928 by a teacher in the Nile Delta, the Muslim Brotherhood has had a history of bloodshed and intrigue in a nation where many have embraced its form of Islam while the government has labeled it a terrorist threat. Its radical wing was accused of attempting to assassinate President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, and it has long supported Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

"The Muslim Brotherhood has always been a concern for secular and even religiously devoted Egyptians because of fear that their Islamic ideology could damage the country's image and hurt tourism," said Emad Gad, a political analyst.

"The revolution does not belong to any one group," said Esam Shosha, a movement member. "We are one country. It's not just about the Brotherhood, at least not now; it's about all Egyptians."

Whether that attitude survives in a post-Mubarak era is uncertain, but it suggests that after a week of uprisings the Brotherhood understands the emerging dynamics of Egypt. The organization, which runs religious and social programs across the country, believes that backing ElBaradei for now is the best chance to further its political ambitions.

"They don't want to appear as if they're using this revolt to seize power," said Wahid Abdul Magid, an analyst at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. "What they want is free and fair elections to allow them to take power transparently. This would show their real popularity in the Egyptian street."

The question is whether the organization's religious agenda fits easily into an Egypt that is more tolerant and susceptible to Western-style liberalism and hip TV preachers. The Brotherhood's beliefs are moderate when compared with many of the world's more militant Muslim organizations. But it rejects the idea that a woman or a Christian could be president of a Muslim country, and would tilt the nation's laws toward stricter Islamic codes. And it would certainly ban alcohol and topless beaches at the resort of Sharm el Sheik.

Estimated to have 600,000 members, many of them educated and middle class, the Brotherhood said it rejected violence decades ago. Its social and health programs have filled gaps in the state's failing public services in this nation of 80 million people. During the 30 years under Mubarak's rule, thousands of its members have been arrested. It has been further weakened by internal divisions over its role between religion and politics.

In 2005, after then-President George W. Bush urged Mubarak to allow freer elections, the Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats in parliament. The result worried Washington and Cairo that Islamic parties were on the rise across the region. The Egyptian government responded by purging the organization, culminating in Brotherhood's defeat in last year's legislative elections, widely regarded as rigged by the ruling party.

The organization, politically isolated, debated strategies. Then in mid-December, the Tunisian uprising started, which forced President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from office this month. A similar fervor ignited in Egypt, and the Brotherhood, careful not to officially endorse street protests for fear of another crackdown on its leaders, urged its young members into the streets alongside secular groups such as the April 6 movement.

It also asked its young rank and file to keep diaries of their thoughts on the gathering revolt. Their involvement in Tuesday's protest drew accusations from Mubarak's security forces that the Brotherhood was instigating violence and sedition. But by Friday, the organization, calculating that the president was vulnerable, sent thousands of its young and old members marching through Cairo, Suez and other cities.

"It was a revolution that started with young people with no political agenda. It was important for the Brotherhood to send its youth," said group member Shosha, whose cell phone holds videos of Egyptians who were beaten and shot during protests. "Our young members are probably more educated and more knowledgeable in demonstrations and how to handle police tactics."

Mohammed Bedeir, a 23-year-old member, said: "We've been told to take part in the protest to pile the pressure on the regime. We've been telling the soldiers in the streets, don't side with the government or at least don't attack us. We're asking them to stay in the middle and let us demonstrate."

What surprised the Brotherhood and other traditional opposition groups was a protest movement without slogans, news releases and position papers. It came from the people, students and middle class at first, then swelling across economic and social lines. It has forced the organization to recalibrate its message in a world where the old boundaries have shifted.

That may not be easy.

"A Christian Copt or a woman cannot be president of a Muslim nation," said Shosha, a broad-shouldered man, who sat in the Brotherhood's headquarters in Cairo watching the protests on TV. "This is a religious point, not a political one. But it will be the Muslim leader's role to protect the rights of Copts and women."

Shosha said he was 12 when he befriended older Brotherhood members at a neighborhood mosque. Their message was to suffuse all aspects of life — job, family, politics — with Islam.

"Then I grew up and entered university, and I started thinking if the Brotherhood only wanted power it wouldn't have lasted so long after all the state oppression against it since 1950s," said Shosha, 31. "It's still here doing the work of G0d."

4c)U.S. secretly preparing for post-Mubarak era
By Paul Richter and Peter Nicholas


Even as the Obama administration maintained its cautious approach to the crisis in Egypt, suggesting that President Hosni Mubarak might be able to remain in power if he acts quickly on reforms, a former senior administration official said the White House also is preparing for a post-Mubarak era.

The Obama administration is trying to deliver a consistent public message on the fast-moving events in Egypt, dispatching Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton for a round of Sunday talk show appearances. Clinton hewed to the administration's talking points, pleading for restraint by Egyptian authorities and the protesters, while prodding the Mubarak government.

But although U.S. officials have publicly encouraged "managed change" under the entrenched Egyptian leader, the former senior adviser said that as early as Wednesday the administration recognized it could not try to save the Mubarak regime at all costs.

"They don't want to push Mubarak over the cliff, but they understand that the Mubarak era is over and that the only way Mubarak could be saved now is by a ruthless suppression of the population, which would probably set the stage for a much more radical revolution down the road," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity so he could be more candid on sensitive diplomatic matters.

The former adviser said he had discussed the crisis with ex-colleagues still in the administration.

"They recognized that change was coming and they needed to be on the right side of history and not trying to keep Mubarak in power against all odds."

Obama tried to push Egypt in a pro-democratic direction soon after coming to power in 2009. In a much-publicized speech in Cairo, a city now engulfed in protests, Obama proclaimed that governments must reflect "the will of the people."

Having delivered such a speech, Obama is hard-pressed now to throw his support behind a repressive ruler at the expense of crowds clamoring for democratic rights.

Yet how the United States handles Mubarak is a tricky calculation for the administration, as he has been helpful on a range of issues important to Washington, such as fighting terrorism, Arab-Israeli peace talks and containing Iran.

Middle East allies are closely watching the American response to the crisis. If Obama summarily dumps an ally of three decades, other Middle East leaders might get antsy, wondering whether he would do the same to them should protests erupt on their streets, the former administration official said.

"It's a very difficult balance to be struck. Mubarak is, after all, a friend of the United States for the last 30 years," he said. "A lot of our allies in the region — the Saudis, Jordanians and Kuwaitis — will be particularly nervous if it looks like the U.S. is doing in one of their friends. The administration understands this.

"But the most important thing they understand is that they have to get in front of this and not behind it."

Obama administration officials have been careful not to abandon Mubarak in public statements, but they also have not aligned themselves with him, instead saying Egyptians should decide their own fate through competitive elections.

"The determination of Egypt will be done by the people of Egypt," White House chief of staff William Daley said on CBS' "Face the Nation."

Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press," Clinton said, "I want the Egyptian people to have the chance to chart a new future. It needs to be an orderly, peaceful transition to real democracy, not faux democracy."

But Obama administration officials also do not want to see Mubarak's power preserved through a crackdown by the Egyptian military, a message U.S. military leaders reiterated to their Egyptian counterparts over the weekend.

Obama is keeping up with events through regular staff briefings and close consultation with allies in the region. On Saturday, he spoke to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the White House said.

In the course of those conversations, Obama urged "an orderly transition to a government that is responsive to the aspirations of the Egyptian people," the White House said in a prepared statement.

A current Obama administration official, also speaking on condition of anonymity, said that one thing is certain: Mubarak can no longer preside over an authoritarian government.

Even if Mubarak is able to withstand the protests, he can't continue the leadership style he had before the protests erupted, the official said.

But powerful voices inside Egypt insist that Mubarak must go. Mohamed ElBaradei, the opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner who has joined the protesters, said in an interview Sunday that Mubarak can't be trusted to usher in new freedoms.

"The American government cannot ask the Egyptian people to believe that a dictator who has been in power for 30 years would be the one to implement democracy," ElBaradei told "Face the Nation."
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5)Egypt Is the Next Tunisia. What Is the Next Egypt?
By GORDON G. CHANG

“The new wave of color revolutions has broken through Tunisia and swept into Egypt this year,” states The Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party newspaper, in an editorial released today. “Western-style democracy appears to be spreading, yet the affected countries are not comparable with Western society—these new revolutions are more controversial than those that happened in East Europe after the Cold War.”

Now that Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution has inspired Egyptians, autocrats in the region nervously watch for signs of unrest in their own countries. Most observers assume that the next Egypt is Yemen, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia. Yet as the Global Times editorial indicates, Middle Eastern despots are not the only ones worried. Beijing’s leaders are concerned that 1.3 billion enraged souls will rise up and tear down the People’s Republic of China.

China’s communists have every right to be concerned. In a world connected by optic fiber, revolutionary fervor not only crosses from one country to the next but from one continent to another. That is undoubtedly the reason why Chinese netizens cannot search the characters for “Egypt” on some Mainland sites and the authorities are censoring news of the distant upheaval. Beijing’s officials know that every resentment felt by Tunisians and Egyptians is shared by those they rule.

So it’s not surprising the Chinese are closely watching the streets of Cairo and Alexandria. China’s netizens, for example, cannot stop talking about the lone Egyptian who stood in front of an armored car last week. “Must see!” Tweeted human rights lawyer Teng Bao yesterday. “Egypt’s Tiananmen movement, a warrior blocks a military vehicle!”

Is there a connection between the events in North Africa and Asia? Like the Tunisians and Egyptians, the Chinese are losing their fear of dictators. “Many people on the Chinese blogosphere and netizens believe that the future road that China takes is like Tunisia,” remarked Chinese blogger “Twokeqi,” in a session arranged by the American embassy in Beijing. He and other Chinese netizens were peppering two American officials—Jeffrey Bader and Ben Rhodes—who were connected by a video link as they sat in the White House basement. “Does the U.S. government also think so and does the U.S. government have a strategy if this happens?”

Neither Bader nor Rhodes would answer either of Twokeqi’s direct questions. Rhodes, for his part, rambled on about Washington’s human rights policies and Bader talked about the American civil war and slavery in the South, so it is obvious that the pair were afraid of offending Beijing’s officials. Yet China’s citizens—or at least some of them—are not so concerned about the tender feelings of the Communist Party elite.

That’s a dangerous moment for autocrats, even if they dwell thousands of miles from the pyramids. When a people begin to ignore authoritarians, political transformations occur. The Chinese, for instance, don’t take to the streets when they are angry notes New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. They do so when they think they can get away with it. “China has always operated to some degree on fear, and that fear is now eroding,” he wrote in 2003.

Since 2003, the year after Hu Jintao became China’s supremo, Beijing’s top leaders have done their best to make their political system more repressive, but they are nonetheless losing their ability to intimidate. As a result, Chinese bloggers, like Twokeqi, are willing to say and write some of the most subversive things. Twokeqi, for instance, need not call for multi-party elections or even freedom of speech to undermine the state. All he needs to do is to point to events in North Africa and declare those trends will one day affect China.

Societies change—or “tip” to use a phrase popularized by Malcolm Gladwell—because, at some point, enough people think the same way. At this point, not everyone believes they can send Hu Jintao packing, like the Tunisians did with Ben Ali. Authoritarian governments, as we know by now, always look invincible until a week before their leaders leave for the airport.

But Beijing’s lame attempts to suppress “Egypt” on the net—and the admission that “democracy” is spreading—make Chinese officials look fearful as well as inept. Because they are also making themselves appear obtuse and desperate, they are opening the door to “discontinuous political change” in the year that will mark the centennial of the first Chinese revolution in history.

Twice in their past—in 1911 and 1949—China’s people opted for radical political change. After the unexpected events in Tunisia and Egypt—and after more than sixty years of Communist Party misrule at home—we could see the third Chinese revolution this year.
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6)The US is moving on from Afghanistan, but its troops are still dying thereUS admiration for its soldiers may be deep and widespread, but interest in what they are doing is shallow and fleeting

Most of the stories told about Benjamin Moore, 23, at his funeral started in a bar and ended in a laugh. Invited to testify about his life from the pews, friend, relative, colleague and neighbour alike described a boisterous, gregarious, energetic young man they'd known in the small New Jersey town of Bordentown since he was born. "I'll love him 'til I go," his granny said. "If I could go today and bring him back, I would."

Grown men choked on their memories, under the gaze of swollen, reddened eyes, as they remembered a "snot-nosed kid" and a fidget who'd become a volunteer firefighter before enlisting in the military. Shortly before Benjamin left for Afghanistan, he sent a message to his cousin that began: "I'm about to go into another country where they hate me for everything I stand for." Now he was back in a flag-draped box, killed by roadside bomb with two other soldiers in Ghazni province.

The church was packed to capacity and at least a couple of hundred waited outside. The procession to the cemetery began with firetruck horns and was lined with well-wishers. He went under the ground with several military medals and the posthumous titles of chief of Hope Hose fire company and the "honorary mayor" of Bordentown.

There is a reverence for the military in the US on a scale rarely seen anywhere else in the west that transcends political affiliation and pervades popular culture. On aeroplanes the flight attendant will announce if there are soldiers on board to great applause. When I attended a recording of The Daily Show, John Stewart made a special point before the show of thanking the servicemen in the audience.

But while the admiration for those who serve and die may be deep and widespread, interest in what they are doing and why they are doing it is shallow and fleeting. During November's midterm elections it barely came up. In September just 3% thought Afghanistan was one of the most important problems facing the country. When Pew surveyed public interest in the war over an 18-week period last year, fewer than one in 10 said it was the top news story they were following in any given week, including the week Stanley McChrystal – the four-star general commanding troops in Afghanistan, was fired. The country, it seems has moved on. The trouble is the troops are still there.

"The burden for this war is being carried by such a small slither of society," explains Professor Christopher Gelpi, who specialises in public opinion and foreign policy at Duke University. "Unless you know someone in this war, live near an army base or know of someone who has died, then it is possible for the public to ignore it. People are very disconnected from it."

And when they do pay attention, they do not like what they see. Polls in December reveal that 63% oppose the war, 56% think it is going badly (with 21% believing it is going very badly), and 60% believing it was not worth fighting. Indeed opposition to the war is now on a par with Iraq.

This statistical data chimes with Gelpi's qualitative findings about people's attitudes towards the war. In a study he conducted in last spring, he found that people know very little about the war but "view it through the filter of Iraq". "Those who have made up their minds about Iraq," he concludes in the paper, The Two-Front Homefront, "appear to extrapolate these views to Afghanistan and are reluctant to attend to new information on the conflict."

But while that popular elision is understandable – no sooner had the war in Afghanistan been launched than the war in Iraq was being touted – it is problematic. Afghanistan is not Iraq. Indeed, in many ways, the lessons from Afghanistan are more profound, ingrained and urgent. Globally speaking, opposing the war in Iraq was not even remotely contentious. Significant majorities in almost every country, with the exception of the US, were against it. Before it was inept it was already illegal, and before it was illegal it was already illogical. It was wrong on its own terms, and its own terms were rooted in a lie.

But there were relatively few lies told in the selling of the Afghanistan war. This, remember, was the "smart war." Both George Bush's war and Barack Obama's war. A war supported by Nelson Mandela, Muhammad Ali and Susan Sontag. A "war of necessity", which had the backing of almost the entire political class on both sides of the Atlantic.

A war only a single national politician in the US dared oppose. In her speech to the House of Representatives on 14 September 2001, after which she received numerous death threats, Barbara Lee warned: "We are not dealing with a conventional war. We cannot respond in a conventional manner. I do not want to see this spiral out of control … If we rush to launch a counterattack, we run too great a risk that women, children and other non-combatants will be caught in the crossfire … Finally, we must be careful not to embark on an open-ended war with neither an exit strategy nor a focused target. We cannot repeat past mistakes."

This, in no small part, is why it has not become an electoral issue This was a bipartisan effort – and all the worse for it. When it was launched, many claimed parentage; in its failure, it is an orphan. "It's not become a political issue because the Republicans are more supportive of the war than Obama is," explains Gelpi. "So all he has to worry about is a rebellion from his left." The potential for such a rebellion certainly exists. But its likely potency, at this stage, remains suspect.

But to engage with what went wrong would demand a sharp reckoning with why so many thought it would was right to begin with. The country would have to interrogate its militaristic reflexes and proclivities, and face the fact that while there were few good or certain options after 9/11 (ranging from the diplomatic to containment) this was one of the worst – and the others were never seriously considered.


For as the principal retaliatory response to the terror attacks of 9/11, it has failed. It hasn't brought liberty, democracy or stability. It has killed untold thousands of civilians: untold because they are regarded as expendable. And not only has it not captured the perpetrators of the terror attack, there are far more acts of terrorism globally today than there were in 2001, in no small part because of the chaos wrought by the war on terror.

Back at the Trinity United Methodist church in Bordentown, the minister ended the service with the hymn Let There Be Peace on Earth and Let It Begin With Me.

Elsewhere in the country, small communities like this weep every week without respite as bodies from a global conflict return to become a local tragedy without, apparently, altering the national mood. Like a stone thrown into a pond the ripples go only so far and then fade away.

Back in 1971, during the Vietnam war, John Kerry famously testified before the Senate foreign relations committee. He put the question: "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?" Forty years later, the answer appears to be that you simply stop paying attention to their deaths.

It seems American soldiers are not so much dying for their country, but because of it.
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