It's Your Husband Stupid!

I find it ironic that shortly after I mentioned our loss in Viet Nam based on negative and less than factual reporting, Arthur Herman, writing in the Wall Street Journal today, had an op ed piece "the Lies Of Tet" validating what I had previously written. I urge you read his article in the Feb. 6, issue of the Journal, and then question both is it analogous to what some candidates are demanding vis a vis Iraq and what about the aftermath. Herman reminds us of the millions killed as a result of our vacating our winning strategy because we left Cambodia to the taking.

John Podhoretz, my May 4, 4PM speaker, explains why McCain is not embraced as his record would suggest he should be. (See 1 below.)

Kamran Bokhari discusses the jihadist insurgency in Pakistan. He does not believe Pakistan's military will fracture. The military holds the key to Pakistan stability, are very disciplined and know their own well being is related to their ability to keep Pakistan stable and Islamic. The military has no civilian authority to answer to, controls the nation's treasury and has amassed exceptional wealth.

Bokhari goes into a lengthy discussion of the historical, geographical, structural and ethnic considerations facing the military, which to date, has not been able to govern effectively because of rising jihadist activity among other reasons. An interesting discussion and well worth reading. (See 2 below.)

Hamas threatens more attacks. Spring will be the next chapter in this ongoing saga. (See 3 below.)

Austria's FM visits Israel. Meanwhile, Austria remains a critical weak link in the matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions and stronger sanctions against Iran. The threat of war is in direct relationship to Europe's unwillingness to deal with the problem of Iran. The latter begets the former. (See 4 and 4a below.)

Starbucks is injurious to one's freedom in Jeddah. (See 5 below.)

I am not a political pundit by any means. I simply have an interest in politics and am willing to express my opinions. It would appear we are witnessing the end of the Reagan Era that held the Republican Party together. Its demise began when Bush 1 caved and the downslide escalated as a result of the mistakes his son has made in Iraq. These mistakes allowed the anti-war crowd to resurface in the guise of the Sen. Kerry.

Out of control,spending and an unwillingness to corral it, also put another nail in the Gipper's philosophical grip on the party.

The last straw is the matter of our border-less borders and illegal immigration.

9/11 gave GW a reprieve for a while but his lack of understanding of the culture confronting him in Iraq, the resistance on the part of historical allies to join in the fray and a host of incompetent appointments and misguided strategies breathed life into, otherwise moribund Democrats. To date, their candidates offer nothing convincing or sensible but the voters desire to "throw the rascals out," partly accomplished in the mid-term elections, is forcing Republicans to look inward. As they do they have yet to discover what they are seeking.

Because Republicans have not figured out what they philosophically stand for anymore
it is not likely they will feel comfortable with any candidate eventually selected by their dispirited members. There are too many fork wielders, each seeking to establish themselves as the dominant ones, jabbing at the carrion that was once Reaganism. That is not say, should the Democrats select Hillary, the Republicans cannot hold the White House. It simply means their task is more formidable and their lack of cohesiveness and a singular message is a significant dis-enabler.

So, Republicans have apparently backed themselves into a McCain corner or maybe the other way around. Were he younger, less testy and had a clear and convincing economic message he would be a formidable candidate and he may still prove to be one. However, it is not the most encouraging sign when a candidate's feisty mother tells you to hold your nose and vote for her son.

Well, I did what she urged but I cast my vote for Romney, knowing fully I was throwing it away. Had I been willing to ignore myself, when I looked in the mirror, I would have voted for Hillary believing she would make the weakest adversary.

After Super Tuesday, there is nothing super about Hillary's armor. Jim VandeHie and Mike Allen cite 5 reasons why this is so and I would add another - its your husband stupid! (See 6 below.)

Dick

1) Why They Hate McCain
By John Podhoretz

The snowballing anger among conservative opinion leaders toward John McCain — an anger that is not mirrored among Republican rank-and-file, whose approval-disapproval rating for McCain is 72-19, according to the Pew Poll, fifteen points higher than Mitt Romney’s in both categories — suggests they are confusing ideological convictions with political tactics, and infusing a disagreement on how to approach problems with a moral edge it does not deserve.

Whatever John McCain is, he is not a liberal. But he disappoints conservatives because, astonishingly enough, he lacks the Right’s partisan combativeness — which seems surprising, given his background as a warrior and his stiff-necked heroism in staring down his North Vietnamese torturer-jailers. He may be a military man through and through, but he is not a team player, to put it mildly. In partisan terms, he often seems determined not to march in lockstep simply because others expect it of him. That’s why, among other things, he has been so wildly incompetent at using his own perfect pro-life record iin the House and Senate to his own benefit in seeking support from Republicans who share his anti-abortion views. Such a thing would require him to fall in line, and McCain does not fall in line.

These are not words of praise, merely of description. The truth is that this flinty individualism has a profoundly self-destructive aspect to it. He has made his own pathway to the top of his party extremely difficult because he does not wish to play the game the way it needs to be played. He offends people he need not offend, and acts in ways that are considered disrespectful by people who only need him to show them a little kavod. If he becomes the nominee of the GOP, he will be required to mend fences he need not have broken down in the first place.

But his opponents are engaging in a terrible mistake as well. McCain likes to make common cause with politicians across the aisle from him. They can’t stand this. They prefer someone who fights Democrats to someone who makes deals with Democrats. Fair enough. But this is a difference of degree, not of essence. McCain is a deal-maker. Perhaps, having engaged with a real enemy who broke his arms and tortured him and sought to destroy him body and mind and soul, he doesn’t see an enemy when he sees a Democrat but rather just another American whose ideas on many things differ from his but with whom he might share some common ground.

McCain would, there is no question, be a lousy leader of an ideological movement. But the Republican party is not an ideological movement. It is a political vehicle for the American right-of-center. Those who confuse the Republican party with the conservative movement are indulging in a fantasy — that there is purity in politics and that there is something immoral about ideological impurity.

2) The Jihadist Insurgency InPakistan
By Kamran Bokhari

The increasing crisis of governance in Pakistan over the past several months has triggered many queries from Stratfor readers, most wanting to know how events will ultimately play out. Would a collapse of the Musharraf regime lead to a jihadist takeover? How safe are the country’s nuclear weapons? What are the security implications for Afghanistan? Topmost among the questions is whether Pakistan will remain a viable state.

Globally, there are fears that the collapse of the current regime could lead to an implosion of the state itself, with grave repercussions on regional and international security. Pakistanis themselves are very much concerned about a disaster of national proportions, particularly if the Feb. 18 elections go awry.

Although there are conflicting theories on what will happen in and to Pakistan, most have one thing in common. They focus on the end result, seeing the unfolding events as moving in a straight line from Point A to Point B. They deem Point B — the collapse of Pakistan — to be an unavoidable outcome of the prevailing conditions in the country. Such predictions, however, do not account for the many arrestors and other variables that will influence the chain of events.

Though there are many, many reasons for concern in Pakistan, state breakdown is not one of them. Such an extreme outcome would require the fracturing of the military and/or the army’s loss of control over the core of the country — neither of which is about to happen. That said, the periphery of the country, especially the northwestern border regions, could become an increasing challenge to the writ of the state.

We have said on many occasions that Islamabad is unlikely to restore stability and security any time soon, largely because of structural issues. In other words, the existing situation is likely to persist for some time — and could even deteriorate further. This raises the question: How bad can things get?

The answer lies in the institutional cohesiveness of Pakistan’s military establishment and the geographical structure of the country.
The Army

Stratfor recently pointed out that the army — rather than any particular military general — is the force that holds the state together. Therefore, the collapse of the state would come about only if the military establishment were to fracture. For several reasons, this is extremely unlikely.

Pakistan’s army is a highly disciplined organization made up of roughly half a million personnel. This force usually is led by at least two four-star generals — the chief of the army staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The leadership also consists of nine corps commanders and several other principal staff officers — all three-star generals. Beneath these approximately 30 lieutenant generals are about 150 two-star generals and some 450 one-star generals.

Moreover, and unlike in the Arab world, the Pakistani army has largely remained free of coups from within. The generals know their personal well-being is only as good as their collective ability to function as a unified and disciplined force — one that can guarantee the security of the state. The generals, particularly the top commanders, form a very cohesive body bound together by individual, corporate and national interests.

It is extremely rare for an ideologue, especially one with Islamist leanings, to make it into the senior ranks. In contrast with its Turkish counterpart, the Pakistani military sees itself as the protector of the state’s Islamic identity, which leaves very little room for the officer corps to be attracted to radical Islamist prescriptions. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that jihadism — despite the presence of jihadist sympathizers within the junior and mid-level ranks — will cause fissures within the army.

In the absence of strong civilian institutions, the army also sees itself as the guardian of the republic. Because of the imbalance in civil-military relations — there is virtually no civilian oversight over the military — the army exercises nearly complete control over the nation’s treasury. Having directly ruled Pakistan for some 33 years of the country’s 60-year existence, the army has become a huge corporation with massive financial holdings.

While these interests are a reason for the army’s historical opposition to democratic forces, they also play a major role in ensuring the cohesiveness of the institution. Consequently, there is no danger of the state collapsing. By extension, it is highly unlikely that the country’s nuclear assets (which are under the control of the military through an elaborate multilayered institutional mechanism) would fall into the wrong hands.

Although a collapse of the state is unlikely, the military is having a hard time running the country. This is not simply because of political instability, which is hardwired into Pakistan’s hybrid political system, but rather because of the unprecedented jihadist insurgency.

While civilian forces (political parties, civil society groups, the media and the legal community) are pushing for democratic rule, jihadists are staging guerrilla-style attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the rural Pashtun districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Moreover, they are mounting a campaign of suicide bombings in major urban centers. The military does not have the bandwidth to deal with political unrest and militancy simultaneously — a situation that is being fully exploited by the jihadists. The likely outcome of this trend is the state’s relative loss of control over the areas in the northwestern periphery.
Geography and Demography

From a strictly geopolitical point of view, Pakistan’s core is the area around the Indus River, which runs from the Karakoram/Western Himalayan/Pamir/Hindu Kush mountain ranges in the North to the Arabian Sea in the South. Most areas of the provinces of Punjab and Sindh lie east of the Indus. The bulk of the population is in this area, as is the country’s agricultural and industrial base — not to mention most of the transportation infrastructure. The fact that seven of the army’s nine corps are stationed in the region (six of them in Punjab) speaks volumes about its status as the core of the country.

In contrast, the vast majority of the areas in the NWFP, FATA, Balochistan province, the Federally Administered Northern Areas and Pakistani-administered Kashmir are sparsely populated mountainous regions — and clearly the country’s periphery. Moreover, their rough terrain has rendered them natural buffers, shielding the core of the country.

In our 2008 Annual Forecast for South Asia, we said the country’s Pashtun areas could become ungovernable this year, and there already are signs that the process is under way. Pakistani Taliban supported by al Qaeda have seized control of many parts of the FATA and are asserting themselves in the districts of NWFP adjacent to the tribal areas.

While Islamism and jihadism can be found across the country, the bulk of this phenomenon is limited to the Pashtun areas — the tribal areas, the eastern districts of NWFP and the northwestern corridor of Balochistan province. Unlike the vast majority of Pakistanis, the Pashtuns are disproportionately an ultra-conservative lot (both religiously and culturally), and hence are disproportionately more susceptible to radical Islamist and jihadist impulses. It is quite telling that in the last elections, in 2002, this is roughly the same area in which the Islamist alliance, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), won the bulk of its seats in the national legislature. In addition to maintaining a large parliamentary bloc, the MMA ran the provincial government in NWFP and was the main partner with the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League in the coalition government in Balochistan.

Social structures and local culture, therefore, allow these areas to become the natural habitat of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Because of the local support base, the jihadists have been able not only to operate in these parts, but to take them over — and even to project themselves into the more settled areas of the NWFP. In addition to this advantage by default, security operations, which are viewed by many within the country as being done at the behest of the United States, have increasingly alienated the local population.

Given the local culture of retribution, the Pashtun militants have responded to civilian deaths during counterinsurgency operations by increasingly adopting suicide bombings as a means of fighting back. (It was not too long ago that the phenomenon of suicide bombings was alien to the local culture). The war in Afghanistan and its spillover effect on the border regions of Pakistan have created conditions in the area that have given al Qaeda and the Taliban a new lease on life.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Resentment first toward Islamabad’s pro-U.S. policies and then the security crackdown that began in early 2004 to root out foreign fighters has developed into a general uprising of sorts. A younger, far more militant generation of Pashtuns enamored of al Qaeda and the Taliban has usurped power from the old tribal maliks. Not only has the government failed to achieve its objective of driving a wedge between foreign fighters and their local hosts, it has strengthened the militants’ hand.

One of the problems is the government’s haphazard approach of alternating military operations with peace deals. Moreover, when the government has conducted security operations, it not only has failed to weaken the militancy, it has caused civilian casualties and/or forced local people to flee their homes, leading to a disruption of life. When peace agreements are made, they have not secured local cooperation against Taliban and al Qaeda elements. The lack of a coherent policy on how to deal with the jihadists has caused the ground situation to go from bad to worse. At the same time, on the external front, Islamabad has come under even more U.S. pressure to act against the militants, the effects of which further complicate matters on the ground.

On a tactical level, while the Pakistani army has a history of supporting insurgencies, it is ill-equipped to fight them. Even worse, despite the deployment of some 100,000 soldiers in the region, the bulk of security operations have involved paramilitary forces such as the Frontier Corps, which is mostly made up of locals who have little incentive to fight their brethren. Furthermore, Pakistan’s intelligence capabilities already are compromised because of militant penetration of the agencies.

In addition to these structural problems, the Musharraf government’s battle for political survival over the past year has further prevented the government from focusing on the jihadist problem. The only time it acted with any semblance of resolve is when it sent the army to regain control of the Red Mosque in the summer of 2007. However, that action was tantamount to pouring more fuel on the militant fire.

President Pervez Musharraf, by stepping down as army chief and becoming a civilian president, did not resolve his survival issues. In fact, it has led to a bifurcation of power, with Musharraf sharing authority with his successor in the military Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. While Musharraf remains preoccupied with making it through the coming election, Kayani is increasingly taking charge of the fight against jihadism. The assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto further complicated the regime’s struggle to remain in power, leaving very little bandwidth for dealing with the jihadists.
What Lies Ahead

With the army’s successful retaking of the district of Swat from militants loyal to Mullah Fazlullah, Kayani has demonstrated his abilities as a military leader. Despite this tactical victory, however, the situation is far from stable. From a strategic point of view, Kayani’s plans to deal with the insurgency depend heavily on the outcome of the Feb. 18 elections (if indeed they are held). The hope is that the political turmoil can be brought back within acceptable parameters so the army can focus on fighting jihadists.

That would be an ideal situation for the army, because the prevailing view is that the military needs public support in order to be successful in combating religious extremism and terrorism. Such public support can only be secured when an elected government comprising the various political stakeholders is in charge. The assumption is that the policies of such a government would be easier to implement and that if the army has to use a combination of force and negotiations with the militants, it will have the public’s backing instead of criticism.

But the problem is that there is an utter lack of national consensus on what needs to be done to defeat the forces of jihadism, beyond the simplistic view that the emphasis should be on dialogue and force should be used sparingly. Most people believe the situation has deteriorated because the Musharraf regime was more concerned with meeting U.S. demands than with finding solutions that took into consideration the realities on the ground. Islamabad knows it cannot avoid the use of force in dealing with the militants, but because of public opposition to such action, it fears that doing so could make the situation even worse.

Moreover, regardless of the election outcome (assuming the process is not derailed over cries of foul play), the prospects for a national policy on dealing with the Islamist militancy are slim. Circumstances will require that the new government be a coalition — thus it will be inherently weak. This, along with the deteriorating ground reality, will leave the army with no choice but to adopt a tough approach — one it has been avoiding for the most part.

Having led the country’s premier intelligence directorate, Inter-Services Intelligence, Kayani is all too aware of the need to overhaul the country’s intelligence system and root out militant sympathizers. This is the principal way to reduce the jihadists’ ability to stage attacks in the core areas of the country, where they have limited support structure. While this lengthy process continues, the army will try to contain the jihadist phenomenon on the western periphery along the border with Afghanistan.

The Pakistani government also needs to address the problems it has created for itself by distinguishing between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” Taliban. Islamabad continues to support the Taliban in Afghanistan while it is at war with the Pakistani Taliban. Given the strong ties between the two militant groups, Islamabad cannot hope to work with those on the other side of the border while it confronts those in its own territory.

Further complicating matters for Islamabad is the U.S. move to engage in overt military action on Pakistani soil in an effort to root out transnational jihadist elements. The Pakistanis need U.S. assistance in fighting the jihadist menace, but such assistance comes at a high political cost on the domestic front. The ambiguity in the Pakistani position could allow the Taliban and al Qaeda to thrive.

What this ultimately means is that the Pashtun areas could experience a long-term insurgency, resulting in some of these areas being placed under direct military rule. With the militants already trying to create their own “Islamic” emirate in the tribal areas, the insurgency has the potential to transform into a separatist struggle. Historically, the Pakistani army tried to defeat Pashtun ethnic nationalism by promoting Islamism — a policy that obviously has backfired miserably.
The Bottom Line

The good news for the Pakistanis — and others interested in maintaining the status quo — is that the ongoing jihadist insurgency and the political turmoil are unlikely to lead to the collapse of the state. The structure of the state and the nature of Pakistani society is such that radical Islamists, though a significant force, are unlikely to take over the country.

On the other hand, until the army successfully cleans up its intelligence system, suicide bombings are likely to continue across the country. Much more significant, the Pashtun areas along the Afghan border will be ungovernable. Pashtun jihadists and their transnational allies on both sides of the Durand Line will continue to provide mutual benefit until Pakistan and NATO can meaningfully coordinate their efforts.

Imposing a military solution is not an option for the Pakistanis or for the West. Negotiations with the Taliban in the short term are not a viable alternative either. Therefore, a long-term insurgency, which is confined to the Pashtun areas on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, is perhaps the best outcome that can be expected at this time.

3) Hamas: Additional suicide attacks on Israel to come
By Mijal Grinberg


Hamas' representative in Iran, Dr. Abu Osama Abd al-Moti, said on Wednesday that the militant group's armed wing has renewed its suicide bombings inside Israel, and that Israel should expect additional bombings.

Hamas claimed responsibility for its first suicide attack since 2004 on Monday, after a bombing in the southern town of Dimona on Monday, which killed one woman.

"For more than a year, we stopped [attacks] but the Zionist enemy continued in its aggression and degraded the ceasefire on the part of the resistance. The message of the operation in Dimona is that Izz al-Din al-Qassam [Hamas' military wing] declared the renewal of suicide operations, and the enemy should expect additional operations."

Earlier on Wednesday, a Qassam rocket fired from the Gaza Strip struck Kibbutz Be'eri in the western Negev, lightly wounding two young girls. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

The girls, aged two and 12, were wounded by shrapnel from the rocket, which struck a playground. The "Red Color" rocket alert system did not go off before the strike. They were taken to Soroka Medical Center in Be'er Sheva.

An 83-year-old woman was asleep in her home next to the site of the strike. The impact of the rocket shattered her window, with the shards falling on her body. She was not hurt.

Later Wednesday evening, an Israel Air Force strike wounded three Palestinian militants in the northern Gaza Strip as they tried to launch Qassams into Israel, Hamas and medical officials said.

An Israel Defense Forces spokesman confirmed the strike on Palestinian gunmen near the northern Gaza town of Beit Hanoun.

Earlier, four civilians were wounded by two air strikes on an unoccupied metal workshop and a caravan located outside a Hamas security position, the officials said.

The spokesman said the army carried out two attacks on a weapons depot and a weapons manufacturing facility in the central Gaza Strip.

Soon after, another rocket directly struck a house in the western Negev town of Sderot, sending several people into shock. That rocket was the eighth to be fired by Palestinian militants from Gaza on Wednesday. Earlier, Hamas said it had fired a total of 31 rockets into Israel since Tuesday, when the Israel Defense Forces killed nine Hamas militants in two separate operations.

In response, government spokesman Mark Regev said, "These rockets are being fired indiscriminately into civilian population centers. We are obliged as a government to take the necessary steps to protect our people and we will continue to do so. Those extremists shooting rockets are a legitimate target and we will act surgically to strike against hardcore terrorist cells."

Hamas wounded six Israeli civilians and knocked out power in parts of the rocket-scarred southern town of Sderot with a barrage of rockets fired at border communities Tuesday.

Lawmakers in Gaza canceled a session of the Hamas-dominated legislature on Wednesday, fearing an Israeli attack. A day earlier, a senior member of Olmert's Kadima party urged Israel to assassinate Hamas' political leaders.

Gaza militants said the Israel Air Force responded to the rocket salvos with several missile strikes on Gaza overnight, but the military confirmed striking only once at militants who had just launched rockets. Hamas said four of its men were moderately wounded.

Israel indicated that it would not let up in its attacks.

"We need to understand there is a war in the south," Vice Premier Haim Ramon told Israel Radio. "The war against Hamas has to be fought on all fronts."

"Israel will continue to use the economic weapon against the Gaza Strip," said Ramon, a close confidant of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, whose statements often reflect the prime minister's thinking.

Israel cut off virtually all shipments into Gaza three weeks ago, following a surge in Qassam rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip against southern Israel.

On Wednesday, Abbas condemned the militants' rocket fire, but urged Israel to let supplies into Gaza.

"These rockets that are being fired at Israel must stop. It's pointless," he said at a news conference with Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik. "At the same time, Israel should not use these rockets as a pretext for collective punishment on Palestinians in Gaza. Israel must always allow humanitarian supplies and other needs to be provided to Gaza."

Israel insists on an end to violence before it implements any peace agreement, but Abbas has had no control over Gaza since Hamas seized control there last June. Monday's bombers came from the West Bank, not Gaza, giving greater weight to Israel's demand that Abbas take stronger action against militants in the West Bank, too.

4) Stop fueling Iran


Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik was here this week on her third visit in her current post. The visit was no doubt a friendly one. As our Foreign Ministry gushed, it was "a symbol of the improvement in relations between the two countries in recent years."


Yet there is a major fly in the ointment. Austria, according to diplomats, is among the "weakest links" in the international campaign to sanction Teheran. The major item on Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's agenda with Plassnik was a €22 billion deal between Austria's state-owned gas company OMV and Iran that was signed last April.

As a sign of how far off the reservation this deal is, another weak link, Germany, has criticized Austria. German Chancellor Andrea Merkel reportedly chastised Austria for setting a bad precedent by seeking to develop Iran's oil sector.

Coming from Germany, however, this is close to the pot calling the kettle black. Germany is Iran's largest European trading partner and has been the most resistant to tightening sanctions among the pivotal EU-3 - the UK, France and Germany.

On the one hand, Merkel wrote in Handelsblatt on December 27, "It remains in the vital interest of the entire international community to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, if necessary by intensifying sanctions." But the German Ambassador to Iran told Iranian Press TV that the "German Embassy is trying to... improve economic ties between the private sectors of the two countries." Further, the ambassador admitted that German exports to Iran have not been affected by UN sanctions because they pass through the Dubai free-trade zone.

Berlin's criticism of Vienna could equally be levelled at itself. As Yves Pallade, director of the Foreign Affairs Network of B'nai B'rith Europe, put it, "If the special relationship with Israel... counts for anything, this is the time for the Federal Republic to set an example... by enacting comprehensive and if need be even unilateral sanctions and slashing all export credit guarantees."

Germany is hardly alone in Europe. In January 2007, Shell, a Dutch company, joined with Repsol, from Spain, in signing a preliminary deal to develop Iran's South Pars oil field. The project would allow Iran to liquefy 8 million tons of natural gas a year and, according to Iran, is valued at $10b.

In the same month last year, the Norwegian company Statoil began talks with China's National Petroleum Corp on a $3.6b. Iranian natural gas project.

All such deals put these companies at risk of being sanctioned by the US under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), which could apply to any company investing over $20 million directly into Iran's oil sector in any given year.

Given France's recent leadership on the Iran sanctions issue, it is ironic that the firm that arguably has violated ISA most consistently is Total, France's oil company. In 1997 and 1999, after ISA became law, Total signed multi-billion dollar deals with Iran. Indeed, in each of the years since 1996, Total has made investments in Iran (excluding South Pars) in excess of $20m. Further, the company has reported to US regulators that it expects to invest significantly more than $20m. per year in Iran in the foreseeable future.

As critical as such investments are for Iran, they are minuscule in relation to European economies. A full 40 percent of Iran's trade is with Europe, while only 1% of Europe's trade is with Iran. Even Total, as of 2006, reported that its operations in Iran produced only 1% of its total worldwide production.

Iran, and the radical Islamist movement it spearheads, pose the greatest totalitarian threat to international peace and security since the defeats of Soviet communism and Nazi fascism. As in the 1930s, we are at the point when the threat is growing, but can still be stopped by imposing draconian diplomatic and economic sanctions, without military force.

Europe's foot-dragging on sanctions is leading inevitably to military action, war, a nuclear Iran, or some combination of the exact scenarios that European leaders claim they want to avoid. The refusal to impose small economic costs now will result in a major economic costs - both through rising terrorism and oil prices - to European economies later, not to mention growing loss of life, freedom and security in the world.

Though Europe is acting blindly to its own self-interest, let alone Israel's, our government should make clear that any nation that fails to take minimal effective steps to confront the Iranian threat cannot be considered a friend of the Jewish state.

4a) Iran Testing Advance Centrifuge



Iran is testing an advanced centrifuge at its Natanz nuclear facility, diplomats in Vienna said Wednesday. The new centrifuge would help Iran boost its speed of uranium enrichment.


Iran had 3,000 P-1 centrifuges - an old type of centrifuge - operating by November, but Reuters quoted diplomats tracking Iran's dossier as saying that it had started mechanical tests, without nuclear material inside, of a more efficient model at Natanz.

"The Iranians have begun to run in the advanced model. It's not yet known what stage the testing has reached or exactly how many there are, although it appears to be several dozen," said a Western diplomat with access to intelligence.

Reuters reported that a senior diplomat familiar with the International Atomic Energy Agency's file on Iran confirmed that it recently began testing centrifuges based on a "P-2" design, able to enrich uranium 2-3 times as fast as the P-1.

The diplomat did not elaborate but said that the details would come out in a report IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei would deliver to the Vienna-based agency's Board of Governors and the UN Security Council later this month.

It was unclear how successful Iran's tests of the new centrifuge had been.

5) Saudi Businesswoman Lands in Riyadh Jail – For Having Coffee with Male Colleague at Starbucks

In his February 5, 2008 column in the Saudi English-language daily Arab News, Saudi journalist Raid Qusti relates what happens when a woman has a cup of coffee with a male colleague at a Starbucks. [1]

Qusti has written numerous columns in favor of expanding women's rights, educational reform, and modernization, and is often critical of Islamism. [2]

The following is Qusti's column, titled "Coffee with Colleague Lands Woman in Trouble."

An Electricity Outage in the Office

"A Saudi mother of three, who works as a business partner and financial consultant for a reputable company in Jeddah, didn't expect a trip to the capital to open the company's new branch office to get her thrown behind bars by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.

"Yara, a petite 40-year-old woman, was in tears yesterday after she narrated to Arab News her encounter with a commission member that ended in high drama.

"Yara, who has been married for 27 years, said she spent several hours in the women's section of Riyadh's Malaz Prison, was strip-searched, ordered to sign a confession that she was in a state of khulwa (a state of seclusion with an unrelated man) and for hours prevented from contacting her husband in Jeddah.

"Her crime? Having a cup of coffee with a colleague in a Starbucks.

"Yara said she arrived in the capital yesterday morning from Jeddah to check on the company's new office.

"'The minute I came into the office my colleagues told me that we have an issue with the electricity company and that we do not have power but that it would be back on in half an hour,' she said."

In Trouble with the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice

"As they were waiting, they decided to go to the ground floor of the building to have a cup of coffee in the family section of Starbucks. Family sections are the only places where men and women can sit together in establishments in Saudi Arabia. Officially, these sections are for families only, but in practical terms these sections - usually in international chains like Starbucks - become the only places where unrelated men and women can be comfortable that they won't be harassed by commission members.

"But yesterday Yara and her colleague found themselves in trouble with the commission. One moment they were sitting together discussing brand equity and sovereign wealth funds; the next moment she found herself in commission custody.

"Shortly after they took their coffee and Yara opened her laptop, a member of the commission approached the two and demanded the man step outside.

"Then (the commission member) came to me and said: 'You need to come with us. This man is not a relative,' she said."

"I Am the Government" - You Must Come With Us

"When she told the commission member that she wanted to contact her husband by phone, he refused.

"'I am the government,' Yara quoted him as saying. He then ordered her to come with him.

"Yara described how the commission member had to wave a taxi down to begin the hours-long process of punishing the woman for having a cup of coffee in a public place with a colleague. When she hesitated about entering the taxi, she said the commission member threatened her.

"'I am the government and you have to get in,' she said, recounting the words of the commission member.

"Inside the taxi, Yara said the commission member snatched her phone from her as she tried to call her husband. She told Arab News that even the cab driver felt uneasy but, knowing the power of the commission in Riyadh, refrained from interfering.

"Eventually the cab approached a GMC Suburban, the vehicle of choice for the commission members, parked in front of one of the commission centers. Yara pleaded with the cab driver not to leave her.

"'I was begging him to stay with me,' she said. But the taxi driver was ordered to move on and Yara found herself locked in the back of the GMC.

"Time passed, she said. Commission members came and went. She said they preached to her about the grave sin she had committed.

"'Your husband is no good,'" she said, recounting the words of the commission members. "He should not have let you do this."

"She said she was admonished for traveling alone. The commission members told her that her colleague admitted that they always went out together. (Later, she learned that her colleague, a Syrian national, was also arrested. He still remains in detention.)

"'I told (the commission member) that I am a good Muslim, a mother of three, and a God-fearing person who would never do shameful things,' she told Arab News in tears."

The Sign Said "Malaz Prison"

"Last year, the Interior Ministry issued a ruling that the commission cannot detain people and must hand them over to the police.

"Yara said that she was handed a confession.

"'He told me I needed to fingerprint this paper stating that I got my mobile phone and bag back,' she said. 'When I told him my phone was still confiscated, he threatened me: 'Just do it!'"

"She said that she fingerprinted the paper under duress.

"'I had no other choice... I was scared for my life... I was afraid that they would abuse me or do something to me,'" she said, as she broke down in tears again.

"Then another person got into the GMC and switched on the engine.

"'The next thing I saw from the window was that we were approaching a place with a sign written on the outside: Malaz Prison,' she said.

"Inside the prison, Yara recounts being taken to a cell with a one-way mirror. On the other side was a sheikh.

The Sheikh Started Writing a Report

"'I could not see him because there was a dark window,' she said, adding that each time she paused he would reprimand her, telling her what she did was wrong.' He kept on telling me this is not allowed.'

"Yara told the sheikh that her husband knew where she was and what she was doing. He then started writing a report. Another pre-written confession was fingerprinted, she said. She pleaded with prison authorities to contact her husband."

Husband Pulls Strings for Her Release

"'They would not let me contact my husband,' she said. 'I told them... please... my husband will have a heart attack if he does not know what has happened to me.'

"She was not given a phone to call her husband. She was not given access to a lawyer. 'They stripped me,' she said. 'They checked that I had nothing with me and threw me in the cell with all the others.'

Meanwhile, Yara's husband Hatim, an executive director of a prominent company, was in Jeddah when he received a phone call. 'My friend contacted me and told me that the commission had captured my wife," he said.

He booked the next flight to Riyadh and, after some strings were pulled, Yara was out of jail.

"'I look at this as if she had been kidnapped by thugs,' said Hatim. 'There's really nothing else to it... I know this has nothing to do with the country, but these [people] are thugs. Unfortunately, they told her that they are "the government" so she could not resist.'

"[Yara's] Syrian colleague was still in custody when Arab News went to press. He is a senior financial analyst, who is described by acquaintances as a devout Muslim whose mother teaches Koran recitation to children."


[1] Arab News (Saudi Arabia), February 5, 2008. The text has been lightly edited for style.

[2] For more by Qusti, see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 183, "A Saudi National Dialogue on Women's Rights and Obligations," June 23, 2004, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA18304 ; MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 720, "Recent Articles by Saudi Liberal Writer Raid Qusti on the Need to Reevaluate Saudi Education and Religious Restrictions on Saudi Women," May 21, 2004, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP72004 ; MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 665, "The Writings of Liberal Saudi Journalist Raid Qusti," February 20, 2004, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP66504 ; MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 505, "Saudi Press: Initial Reactions to the Riyadh Bombings," May 165, 2003, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP50503.

6) Five reasons Hillary should be worried
By: Jim VandeHei and Mike Allen


Hillary Clinton survived a Super Tuesday scare. But there are five big reasons the former first lady should be spooked by the current trajectory of the campaign.

Longtime Clinton friends say she recognizes the peril in careening between near-death primary night experiences and small-bore victories.

Although the friends did not have details, they believe she may go ahead with the campaign shake-up she had been planning just before her surprise victory in New Hampshire.

Her team is girding for trench warfare, telling reporters that the nomination will not be decided until at least the Pennsylvania primary on April 22, if then.

Clinton aides told reporters on a conference call today that the Democratic Party’s complex delegate allocation rules mean that neither candidate is likely to take a sizable lead in the foreseeable future.

While Clinton’s campaign gloated about having the most total delegates for the cycle so far, her staff nevertheless recognizes that Super Tuesday was no triumph. Here’s why:

1. She lost the delegate derby. Pure and simple, this is a war to win delegates, one that might not be decided until this summer’s Democratic convention.

And when the smoke cleared this morning, it appeared that Barack Obama had ended up with slightly more delegates in the 22 states.

Obama’s campaign says the senator finished ahead by 14 delegates.

With results still coming in, Clinton’s campaign says the candidates finished within five or six delegates of each other. Either way, Super Tuesday was essentially a draw.

Clinton may still hold the edge overall, but Obama is closing in rapidly.

2. She essentially tied Obama in the popular vote. Each won just over 7.3 million votes, a level of parity that was unthinkable as recently as a few weeks ago.

At the time, national polls showed Clinton with a commanding lead — in some cases, by 10 points or more. That dominance is now gone.

One reason is that polls and primary results reveal that the more voters get to know Obama, the more they seem to like him.

This is especially troubling for Clinton since the schedule slows dramatically now and a full month will pass before the next big-state showdown.

All of this allows candidates ample time to introduce themselves to voters in each state — which plays to Obama’s core strengths.

3. She lost more states. Obama carried 14 states, six more than Clinton, and showed appeal in every geographical region.

His win in bellwether Missouri was impressive by nearly every measure, marked by victories among men and women, secular and churchgoing voters, and urban and suburban voters.

4. She lost the January cash war. Money chases momentum, so Obama crushing’s 2-to-1 fundraising victory last month is revealing.

He raised more than $31 million; Clinton raised less than $14 million. The implication is hard to ignore: Democratic activists and donors are flocking to Obama at a pace that could have a profound effect on the race going forward.

5. The calendar is her enemy. Now that more than half the states have weighed in, there is a fairly predictable formula for determining who is most likely to win the upcoming contests.

In caucus states, Obama’s organizational strength shines: He has won seven of eight. Up next are three more caucus states, Washington, Nebraska and Maine.

Obama also runs tremendously well in states with large African-American populations, another promising sign since next Tuesday’s three primaries are in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia — all of which have significant percentages of black voters.

Then comes another caucus state, Hawaii, where Obama is viewed as a native son.

The bottom line is that it figures to be another month before Clinton hits a stretch of states — places like Ohio and Pennsylvania — where she will be strongly favored to win.

So it couldn’t be any clearer as to why the supposedly inevitable candidacy is anything but — even when she’s supposedly winning.