Obama's speech was well delivered and full of self ingratiating spin. It also still leaves all the questions before the address unanswered and , in many ways, was a contradiction and dissonant.. Obama's incompetence and inability to tell the truth has given Putin undeserved credibility and increased Russia's power and presence in The Middle East
If Obama had a son he actually would look like a light black Pinocchio (See 1a below.)
George Friedman sees Putin in a different light. Time will tell (See 1b below.)
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You have heard about how agencies spend all their money at year end for fear their funding will be cut? Click on: "Bankrupting America has created a video series entitled, "The Government," parodying The Office, that takes place in the federal Department of Every Bureaucratic Transaction (DEBT), where the bosses are hounding the employees to make sure they have no money left in their budget accounts."
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What a difference a letter can make. (See 2 below.)
Our inability to win wars we engage in is a function of many things gone wrong primarily among which appear to me to be:
a) McArthur's over reach in N Korea
b) Viet Nam and the anti-authoriity psychosis that came afterwards
c) Allowing PC'ism to introduce itself into our ability to execute war
d) The politicization of the battlefield and the crippling of decision making by the military.
e) Allowing the press and media to become embedded with the troops and the impact their slanted reporting has on the public as they over report casualties, tragedies of war etc.
f) More importantly, even when we win illusive wars because of our superior military capability we lose the post war because of the incompetency of our diplomats and political appointees etc..
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What conclusions should be reached from Israeli- Palestinian relations post Oslo? (See 3 below.)
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Dick
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1) Syria and Obama: Part II
By Thomas Sowell
Chickens are coming home to roost for Barack Obama, both at home and overseas.
When he first entered the White house, to worldwide acclaim, and backed by huge majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, he could do whatever he wanted -- and could do no wrong, in the eyes of the mainstream media.
People believed whatever he said, whether about how he would cut the federal deficit in half during his first term or how people could keep their current insurance and their current doctor under ObamaCare, which would also insure millions more people and yet somehow lower the costs at the same time. If he could have done these things, it is hard to know what he could have done for an encore. Walking on water would have been an anticlimax. Of course he did none of these things.
The Obama administration added more to the national debt in his first term than President Bush had in both his terms put together. As for ObamaCare, which has not yet fully taken effect, health care costs have already gone up, and many people's hours of work have already gone down, as employers seek to escape the huge costs of ObamaCare by hiring part-time workers, who are exempt. As for foreign policy, President Obama began by betraying a pre-existing American commitment to allies in Eastern Europe, to supply them with an anti-missile defense system. These nations had risked the wrath of Russia by allying themselves with the United States, but Obama blithely talked about pressing the "reset button," as he flew off to Moscow to try to cut a deal with the Russians behind their back.
His boorish behavior toward one of our oldest and most important allies (Britain) and his insulting behavior toward the Prime Minister of our staunchest ally in the Middle East (Israel) were more of the same. Meanwhile, Obama fawned over the rulers of other nations, bowing deeply from the waist before the king of Saudi Arabia and the emperor of Japan, in a gesture of subservience that no other President of the United States had ever stooped to. But the adoring media never asked the most obvious question: "What kind of man is this, who feels a need to lower his own country?" President Obama was caught by a microphone that he did not know was on, telling Russian President Medvedev to assure "Vladimir" that he could be more "flexible" with him after he was past the 2012 elections, and was no longer constrained by the American voters.
Far from getting Putin's respect, he deservedly earned Putin's contempt. When Obama's new Secretary of State, John Kerry, went to Moscow for the first time in that official capacity, Putin kept him waiting for hours before bothering to see him. At home, when Republicans in Congress tried to suggest some changes in the ObamaCare legislation, back when it was being rushed through Congress too fast for the Congressmen to read it, Obama's response was to remind the Republicans that he had won the election. Now these and other chickens are coming home to roost.
Today, President Obama needs Republican votes in Congress to get a majority that will put Congress on record as backing his planned military actions against Syria. And he is by no means certain to get all the Democrats' votes. Obama also wants international political cover for his planned military action against Syria. But our old ally, Britain, failed to give us even political backing, much less troops. British Prime Minister David Cameron lost the vote on that issue in Parliament -- the first time a British Prime Minister has lost such a vote in Parliament since the 18th century. Some other nations have given us verbal support -- and only verbal support. When it comes to actual military action, some of the Europeans will fight to the last American.
Finally, Barack Obama will try to drum up support from the American people whom he has lied to and deceived, time and time again. On Tuesday night, will he be able to rekindle the old magic again with his rhetoric? Or have those chickens come home to roost as well? Will President Obama be able to convince the people of the urgency of what he wants to do, when he has already delayed so long that the Assad regime has had ample time to hide the chemical weapons and otherwise prepare to minimize whatever Obama does?
1a) U.S. Credibility
Our esteemed president, on the road to the G-20 meeting in St.Petersburg, issued the following remarkable piece of rhetoric - " First of all, I didn't set a red line. The world set a red line when governments representing 98% of the world's population said the use of chemical weapons are abhorrent and passed a treaty forbidding their use even when countries are at war. Congress set a red line when it ratified that treaty. Congress set a red line when it indicated that - in a piece of legislation titled the Syrian Accountability Act - some of the horrendous things that are happening on the ground there needed to answered for. Point number two, my credibility is not on the line.
The international community's credibility is on the line. And America and Congress's credibility is on the line because we give lip service to the notion that these international norms are important". ( Note that the credibility of America and its president are totally separate in his mind.) Now, that's a whopper even for the Great Obfuscator.
The fact is on August 20, 2012, Obama stated "We have been very clear to the Assad regime-but also to other players on the ground - that a redline for us is (if) we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons being moved around or being utilized. That would change my calculus". Now, I recognize this was in the end phase of his re-election campaign ( wherein lying is par for the course), that it wasn't a particularly articulate or specific statement, but, it was a line in the sand, nonetheless.
And just to add some bravado, he then continued with "And the President of the United States doesn't bluff, and I'm the President of the United States". However, before we proceed to his "changed calculus", let's look at his calculus to date. In the early days of the Syrian revolution, the secular Free Syrian Army, appealed the West for support. Obama responded with "Assad must go", but refused to provide any military hardware to the pro-western, non-sectarian forces then leading the revolt. Iran and Russia, in support of Assad, poured in weaponry and foreign troops ( Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guard) unabated.
The Saudis and other Gulf states were appalled by US inaction in the face of the Iranian expansion, and countered with foreign troops (unfortunately mostly Sunni fanatics affiliated with Al Qaeda) equipment and monies for the rebels. Thus, the whole situation devolved into a proxy-war between the Iranian-led Shia and the Saudi-led Sunni, and is now totally out of control of any western influence. To date, 100,000 people have been killed ( with conventional weapons), and 2 million people have become refugees. And Obama's calculus apparently allowed it all, as long as no one used chemical weapons.
Now, because of his ridiculous stance, he's holding a leaky bag. Somebody has definitely used chemical weapons, and he's compelled to do something. Ironically, he's even screwing up this phase. Obama, of all people, could have easily stalled until the UN Weapons Inspectors provided their report. If it failed to positively identify Assad as the perpetrator ( a finding the Russians will vehemently influence and support), he would have been off the hook, and continued his present talk-talk calculus. Instead the Artful Dodger pulled a GWB and circumvented the UN. God knows why, given his admiration and trust in the organization. In any case, he started beating a puny war-drum ( just a few shots across the bow), and hoped to build a coaltion of the willing. Most everybody, except UK's Cameron and France's Hollande, shunned his appeals.
Worse, Cameron badly miscalculated by enrolling the parliament, which told him to pound sand. Exit the UK. In turn, Hollande's parliament is making similar noises to its UK counter-part. The leaky bag was getting messier by the moment, and things didn't look promising for the G-20 meeting. But then, BHO, never one to accept his own incompetency, had a Eureka "search and re-apply" moment. He emulated Cameron by requesting a non-binding authorization for a military strike from Congress. If it turned him down, he'd be off the hook and pull back. If they approved, he'd shift the blame for a meaningless exercise ( which, if implemented, it is bound to be according to all experts). In either case, he'd once again escape responsibility and accountability.
I'm frankly ambivelant regarding the Congressional vote. My emotional reaction was to give him approval to act, and let him embarrass himself. However, on second thought, maybe it's better to get this whole sorry mess out on the table for all to see, and, in the absence of a coherent strategy ( which he's doesn't have), tell the Commander-in-Chief to go back to the drawing board. In the meantime, BHO had a disasterous experience in St.Petersburg. The vast majority of his G-20 peers simply ignored him, and refused to be pulled into his quagmire ( much to the delight of Mr. Putin). Some kindly suggested that he might be well served to await the UN report before acting. While BHO described Putin as the disinterested kid sitting in back of the classroom, he was told be his peers to go sit in the corner for being dopey. Not a pretty sight for the leader of a formerly great superpower.
However, it is an unmittigated success for one who's quest is to diminsh the geo-political role and influence of the US. How this will all turn out remains to be seen. My bet is that the UN report will fail to positively identify Assad as the culprit, and thus render this entire incident as a "tempest in a tea pot". If by some miracle, the reverse is true, then BHO may yet be able to pull victory out of the jaws of defeat. In either case, his conduct of this whole affair has further diminished the already heavily damaged position of the US on the world stage. Despite his self-serving blather, Obama's credibility, and by inference that of the US, is near zero. As a consequence, we have entered the era of global anarchy, in which our adversaries call the tune.
That's indeed transformational!
1b) Syria, America and Putin's Bluff
By George Friedman
In recent weeks I've written about U.S. President Barack Obama's bluff on Syria and the tightrope he is now walking on military intervention. There is another bluff going on that has to be understood, this one from Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Putin is bluffing that Russia has emerged as a major world power. In reality, Russia is merely a regional power, but mainly because its periphery is in shambles. He has tried to project a strength that that he doesn't have, and he has done it well. For him, Syria poses a problem because the United States is about to call his bluff, and he is not holding strong cards. To understand his game we need to start with the recent G-20 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia.
Putin and Obama held a 20-minute meeting there that appeared to be cold and inconclusive. The United States seems to be committed to some undefined military action in Syria, and the Russians are vehemently opposed. The tensions showcased at the G-20 between Washington and Moscow rekindled memories of the Cold War, a time when Russia was a global power. And that is precisely the mood Putin wanted to create. That's where Putin's bluff begins.
A Humbled Global Power
The United States and Russia have had tense relations for quite a while. Early in the Obama administration, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton showed up in Moscow carrying a box with a red button, calling it the reset button. She said that it was meant to symbolize the desire for restarting U.S.-Russian relations. The gesture had little impact, and relations have deteriorated since then. With China focused on its domestic issues and with Europe in disarray, the United States and Russia are the two major -- if not comparable -- global players, and the deterioration in relations can be significant. We need to understand what is going on here before we think about Syria.
Twenty years ago, the United States had little interest in relations with Russia, and certainly not with resetting them. The Soviet Union had collapsed, the Russian Federation was in ruins and it was not taken seriously by the United States -- or anywhere else for that matter. The Russians recall this period with bitterness. In their view, under the guise of teaching the Russians how to create a constitutional democracy and fostering human rights, the United States and Europe had engaged in exploitative business practices and supported non-governmental organizations that wanted to destabilize Russia.
The breaking point came during the Kosovo crisis. Slobodan Milosevic, leader of what was left of Yugoslavia, was a Russian ally. Russia had a historic relationship with Serbia, and it did not want to see Serbia dismembered, with Kosovo made independent.
There were three reasons for this. First, the Russians denied that there was a massacre of Albanians in Kosovo. There had been a massacre by Serbians in Bosnia; the evidence of a massacre in Kosovo was not clear and is still far from clear. Second, the Russians did not want European borders to change. There had been a general agreement that forced changes in borders should not happen in Europe, given its history, and the Russians were concerned that restive parts of the Russian Federation, from Chechnya to Karelia to Pacific Russia, might use the forced separation of Serbia and Kosovo as a precedent for dismembering Russia. In fact, they suspected that was the point of Kosovo. Third, and most important, they felt that an attack without U.N. approval and without Russian support should not be undertaken both under international law and out of respect for Russia.
President Bill Clinton and some NATO allies went to war nevertheless. After two months of airstrikes that achieved little, they reached out to the Russians to help settle the conflict. The Russian emissary reached an agreement that accepted the informal separation of Kosovo from Serbia but would deploy Russian peacekeepers along with the U.S. and European ones, their mission being to protect the Serbians in Kosovo. The cease-fire was called, but the part about Russian peacekeepers was never fully implemented.
Russia felt it deserved more deference on Kosovo, but it couldn't have expected much more given its weak geopolitical position at the time. However, the incident served as a catalyst for Russia's leadership to try to halt the country's decline and regain its respect. Kosovo was one of the many reasons that Vladimir Putin became president, and with him, the full power of the intelligence services he rose from were restored to their former pre-eminence.
Western Encroachment
The United States has supported, financially and otherwise, the proliferation of human rights groups in the former Soviet Union. When many former Soviet countries experienced revolutions in the 1990s that created governments that were somewhat more democratic but certainly more pro-Western and pro-American, Russia saw the West closing in. The turning point came in Ukraine, where the Orange Revolution generated what seemed to Putin a pro-Western government in 2004. Ukraine was the one country that, if it joined NATO, would make Russia indefensible and would control many of its pipelines to Europe.
In Putin's view, the non-governmental organizations helped engineer this, and he claimed that U.S. and British intelligence services funded those organizations. To Putin, the actions in Ukraine indicated that the United States in particular was committed to extending the collapse of the Soviet Union to a collapse of the Russian Federation. Kosovo was an insult from his point of view. The Orange Revolution was an attack on basic Russian interests.
Putin began a process of suppressing all dissent in Russia, both from foreign-supported non-governmental organizations and from purely domestic groups. He saw Russia as under attack, and he saw these groups as subversive organizations. There was an argument to be made for this. But the truth was that Russia was returning to its historical roots as an authoritarian government, with the state controlling the direction of the economy and where dissent is treated as if it were meant to destroy the state. Even though much of this reaction could be understood given the failures and disasters since 1991, it created a conflict with the United States. The United States kept pressing on the human rights issue, and the Russians became more repressive in response.
Then came the second act of Kosovo. In 2008, the Europeans decided to make Kosovo fully independent. The Russians asked that this not happen and said that the change had little practical meaning anyway. From the Russian point of view, there was no reason to taunt Russia with this action. The Europeans were indifferent.
The Russians found an opportunity to respond to the slight later that year in Georgia. Precisely how the Russo-Georgian war began is another story, but it resulted in Russian tanks entering a U.S. client state, defeating its army and remaining there until they were ready to leave. With the Americans bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, no intervention was possible. The Russians took this as an opportunity to deliver two messages to Kiev and other former Soviet states. First, Russia, conventional wisdom aside, could and would use military power when it chose. Second, he invited Ukraine and other countries to consider what an American guarantee meant.
U.S.-Russian relations never really recovered. From the U.S. point of view, the Russo-Georgia war was naked aggression. From the Russian point of view, it was simply the Russian version of Kosovo, in fact gentler in that it left Georgia proper intact. The United States became more cautious in funding non-governmental organizations. The Russians became more repressive by the year in their treatment of dissident groups.
Since 2008, Putin has attempted to create a sense that Russia has returned to its former historic power. It maintains global relations with left-wing powers such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Cuba. Of course, technically Russia is not left wing, and if it is, it is a weird leftism given its numerous oligarchs who still prosper. And in fact there is little that Russia can do for any of those countries, beyond promising energy investments and weapon transfers that only occasionally materialize. Still, it gives Russia a sense of global power.
In fact, Russia remains a shadow of what the Soviet Union was. Its economy is heavily focused on energy exports and depends on high prices it cannot control. Outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, life remains hard and life expectancy short. Militarily, it cannot possibly match the United States. But at this moment in history, with the United States withdrawing from deep involvement in the Muslim world, and with the Europeans in institutional disarray, it exerts a level of power in excess of its real capacity. The Russians have been playing their own bluff, and this bluff helps domestically by creating a sense that, despite its problems, Russia has returned to greatness.
In this game, taking on and besting the United States at something, regardless of its importance, is critical. The Snowden matter was perfect for the Russians. Whether they were involved in the Snowden affair from the beginning or entered later is unimportant. It has created two important impressions. The first is that Russia is still capable of wounding the United States -- a view held among those who believe the Russians set the affair in motion, and a view quietly and informally encouraged by those who saw this as a Russian intelligence coup even though they publicly and heartily denied it.
The second impression was that the United States was being hypocritical. The United States had often accused the Russians of violating human rights, but with Snowden, the Russians were in a position where they protected the man who had revealed what many saw as a massive violation of human rights. It humiliated the Americans in terms of their own lax security and furthermore weakened the ability of the United States to reproach Russia for human rights violations.
Obama was furious with Russia's involvement in the Snowden case and canceled a summit with Putin. But now that the United States is considering a strike on the Syrian regime following its suspected use of chemical weapons, Washington may be in a position to deal a setback to a Russia client state, and by extension, Moscow itself.
The Syria Question
The al Assad regime's relations with Russia go back to 1970, when Hafez al Assad, current President Bashar al Assad's father, staged a coup and aligned Syria with the Soviet Union. In the illusion of global power that Putin needs to create, the fall of al Assad would undermine his strategy tremendously unless the United States was drawn into yet another prolonged and expensive conflict in the Middle East. In the past, the U.S. distraction with Iraq and Afghanistan served Russia's interests. But the United States is not very likely to get as deeply involved in Syria as it did in those countries. Obama might bring down the regime and create a Sunni government of unknown beliefs, or he may opt for a casual cruise missile attack. But this will not turn into Iraq unless Obama loses control completely.
This could cause Russia to suffer a humiliation similar to the one it dealt the United States in 2008 with Georgia. The United States will demonstrate that Russia's concerns are of no account and that Russia has no counters if and when the United States decides to act.
The impact inside Russia will be interesting. There is some evidence of weakness in Putin's position. His greatest strength has been to create the illusion of Russia as an emerging global power. This will deal that a blow, and how it resonates through the Russian system is unclear. But in any event, it could change the view of Russia being on the offensive and the United States being on the defensive.
Putin made this a core issue for him. I don't think he expected the Europeans to take the position that al Assad had used chemical weapons. He thought he had more pull than that. He didn't. The Europeans may not fly missions but they are not in a position to morally condemn those who do. That means that Putin's bluff is in danger.
History will not turn on this event, and Putin's future, let alone Russia's, does not depend on his ability to protect Russia's Syrian ally. Syria just isn't that important. There are many reasons that the United States might not wish to engage in Syria. But if we are to understand the U.S.-Russian crisis over Syria, it makes sense to consider the crisis within in the arc of recent history from Kosovo in 1999 to Georgia in 2008 to where we are today.
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2)Americans are War-Wary, not Weary
By Shoshana Bryen
President Obama and supporters of an American strike on Syria have characterized negative American public opinion as "war-weariness." They are trying to overcome it with exhortations about America's special responsibility, or America's credibility, or the president's credibility, or the terribleness of the fighting there. The public isn't buying it, and thus far, neither is much of Congress.
Americans are not "war-weary" because most are neither at war nor related to people at war. They are, however, wary of war in Syria because a) Syria, although a rotten dictatorship, has not attacked the United States; b) the Obama administration has not laid out a military plan with achievable objectives; c) they don't trust the government to carry out a strike that will have a salutary effect on the situation; and d) they believe a strike may carry consequences to the U.S. that would require further military action and further potential casualties.
In all these, they are correct.
Germany occupied Holland in March 1940. After four years of war, in the winter of 1944-45, there was a short but severe famine; average caloric intake dropped from 1,500 to 700 calories/day, and people ate tulip bulbs and bark. The most ferocious part of the London Blitz spanned September 1940 through May 1941, killing 40,000 civilians and seriously injuring another 46,000; more than a million homes were destroyed or damaged -- and the war still had four years to go. By VE Day, 62,000 British civilians had died. More than ten million Soviet civilians died too, as did six million Jews of various nationalities, 700,000 German civilians, 5.7 million Poles, and 140,000 Greeks. An estimated 48 million soldiers and civilians in total died -- along with the corresponding destruction of homes, family and social networks, businesses, and a way of life.
Even Americans, relatively insulated on the North American continent, lived through the deployment of 16 million fathers, sons, and brothers (in a relatively small population of 136 million people), 400,000 of whom did not return, and many hundreds of thousands returned less than whole. Rationing, shortages, and blackouts on the coasts added to their stress.
After two atomic bombs, the earth itself could reasonably be said to have been "war-weary" by 1945.
The American part of the Vietnam War ran 11 years, from 1964-1975. During that time, 2,215,000 men were drafted into a military that totaled 8,744,000 from a pool of approximately 27 million over the years. Of those, 3.4 million went to Southeast Asia; most draftees went once. Young men spent years worried about their draft status and the arbitrariness of selection. More than 58,000 Americans were killed and 303,644 wounded in the war. The Vietnam War looms very large in American thinking, because it was fought as a political matter as well as a military operation. Riots in American cities, the decision of President Johnson not to run in 1968, running college battles between draft-dodgers vs. inductees, and violence at the 1968 Democratic Convention all contributed to the sense that the country was fraying. Vietnam colored race relations as well as political relations, although, contrary to Rep. Charlie Rangel, who still insists that poor African-American men were the disproportionate victims of the war, 86% of the U.S. casualties were Caucasian, 12.5% were African American, and 1.2% "other."
"War-weary" could have applied to Americans by the end of 1974.
The draft is long ago and far away; the All Volunteer Force (AVF) was instituted in 1974. Today's military is 74.6% white, 17.8% black, and 7.6% Hispanic; more than 92% graduated high school, and 89.3% of officers have a Bachelor's Degree or higher. And all of them chose to be there. Approximately 2.3 million service members served in Iraq and Afghanistan; nearly half of them had more than one deployment. In a country of 380 million people, it is a small percentage. Across the country, 6,668 families have buried their fallen sons and daughters, and there are more than 32,000 families caring for the long-term physically and emotionally wounded.
They are weary.
Other Americans are rightly wary.
The president received a resounding "no" from the United Nations, in which he had originally placed sole legitimacy for American military operations abroad. At the G-20 summit, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon repeated his admonition that war in Syria without U.N. approval would violate international law. America's best friends and worst adversaries -- the British, Russians, and Chinese, respectively -- are opposed. Liberal Democrats and Libertarian Republicans are united in opposition. And over the weekend, a damning story by Reuters noted that the U.S. has been unable to provide a chain of command within the Syrian government for the attack, and American and allied sources said, "As more information has been collected and analyzed, early theories about the attack have largely been dismissed."
Americans can be convinced to do great things, including great military and humanitarian things. But they remain unconvinced that this particular thing -- a limited strike against Syrian assets -- will have the positive outcome the president promises without the negative outcome they fear.
3) Oslo 20 Years Later: Lessons Learned?
By Jonathan Tobin
If there is a disconnect between the myths about Palestinian intentions on the part of Americans (including many Jews) and the cynicism about the subject on the part of the overwhelming majority of Israelis it is because the latter have been paying attention to events in the last 20 years while the former have clung to their ill-informed illusions
I noted the upcoming 20th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords this week. Though the agreement has been a disaster for Israel, I speculated that though these results were eminently predictable—and were by critics of the Labor government that negotiated and signed the accords on the White House Lawn on September 13, 1993—it might have been inevitable that sooner or later Israel would test the intentions of the Palestinians. The question now is whether the Israelis and their American allies are prepared to draw the appropriate conclusions from the experiment.
What happened in the 1990s as the post-Oslo euphoria first receded and was then replaced by the horror of the terror war called the Second Intifada was the gradual realization that Western illusions about Palestinian nationalism were misplaced. Though Arafat signaled at the time that he viewed Oslo as merely a diplomatic ruse intended to help continue the conflict on more advantageous terms rather than a permanent peace, this was something that was largely ignored by those pushing the peace process. Though there is no going back to the pre-Oslo world, as Secretary of State John Kerry's attempt to revive peace talks continues those who are calling for pressure on Israel to make concessions to Arafat's successor need to wake up and stop making the same mistakes.
First among them is to stop pretending that the Palestinian leadership has embraced the cause of peace. The fact remains that Palestinian nationalism was born in the 20th century as a reaction to Zionism and the effort to reverse the verdict of history on 1948 remains their focus today. Until that changes, Israeli leaders and their American allies must understand that a conclusion to the conflict is not in the cards.
Throughout the 1990s as Oslo unraveled, American diplomats and even some Israeli politicians persisted in ignoring not only Palestinian violations of the accords but the campaign of incitement and hate against the Jewish state that was orchestrated by the Palestinian Authority in their media and the educational system they were given control of by the treaty signed on the White House Lawn. Turning a blind eye toward Arafat's support for terrorism did not enhance the chances of peace. Doing so merely convinced the Palestinians they would pay no price for their intransigence and set the stage for the war of terrorist attrition that put an end to the illusion of Oslo. Repeating that error today as the incitement continues will only replicate those bloody results.
They must also stop buying into the myth that Israeli settlements remain the obstacle to peace. Both Oslo and the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza (not to mention the peace treaty with Egypt) have proved that Israeli governments are prepared to give up territory including the uprooting of longstanding Jewish communities.
But doing so merely encouraged the Palestinians to believe that they could oust every settlement, if not the Jewish state itself, if they only hung tough.
Rather than negotiate a compromise solution in good faith, they remain trapped in the idea that the Jewish presence on the land is the problem rather than face up to the need to abandon the century-old war on Zionism.
Prior to Oslo, both Americans and some Israeli leaders fundamentally misread Palestinian political culture. The late Yitzhak Rabin thought Arafat would be so eager for a state that he would fight Hamas without the hindrances of concern for human rights and legal niceties that hampered Israeli counter-terrorist strategies. That was a mistake since it not only wrongly attributed a desire for peace to Arafat but also underestimated the hold that a desire for Israel's destruction had on both the people of the territories and the descendants of the 1948 refugees. Secretary Kerry seems locked in the same misapprehensions about Mahmoud Abbas and the current PA, fueled in no small measures by the same tactic of Palestinians saying one thing about peace to Western diplomats and media and something different to their own people.
So long as American diplomats remain focused on talks with Palestinian leaders who lack the will or the ability to negotiate a permanent end to the conflict rather than on the culture that makes such intransigence inevitable, we are doomed to both a cycle of Palestinian-initiated violence and diplomatic frustration.
If there is a disconnect between the myths about Palestinian intentions on the part of Americans (including many Jews) and the cynicism about the subject on the part of the overwhelming majority of Israelis it is because the latter have been paying attention to events in the last 20 years while the former have clung to their ill-informed illusions. That realistic attitude is a sign of sanity in an Israeli political system that often seems lacking in rationality. But Israelis need to understand something else that has happened since Oslo.
Israel has spent most of the last 20 years continually making concessions to the Palestinians starting with the Oslo empowerment of Arafat and climaxing in the Gaza withdrawal. But it has received scant credit from a world. The irony is that rather than these retreats (as well as a variety of other measures including the release of terrorist murderers such as the one that was extracted from the Netanyahu government in order to give Kerry the negotiations he craved) being rightly interpreted as a sign that Israel wanted peace and was willing to offer generous terms, they were viewed by most of the world as a sign of a guilty conscience.
While many Israeli diplomats have believed that arguing for Jewish rights to the West Bank and even Jerusalem was counterproductive, a dispute between a party that only talked of its security rather than its rights is one that is bound to be lost.
This has fed a trend in which Israel's delegitimization has increased since Oslo rather than diminishing. After Arafat turned down an independent state in almost all of the West Bank, Gaza, and part of Jerusalem, some Israelis thought their negative image would change. They were wrong. Palestinian intransigence, repeated twice more as they rejected even more generous offers in the years that followed, has not harmed their image or strengthened sympathy for Israel.
If that tide is to be stemmed, let alone reversed, it will require Israelis and their friends to stop playing defense about territorial disputes.
They must cease merely discussing their desire for peace (genuine though it is) and begin again asserting the justice of their cause.
Should a sea change in Palestinian culture ever occur allowing a new generation of pragmatic leaders to make peace, they will find Israelis willing to deal. But until that happens, both Americans and Israelis would do well to lower their expectations. That is especially true for leaders like Kerry who seemed to have learned nothing from recent history. The euphoria about peace that followed the signing of the Oslo Accords was a trap that led to years of unnecessary bloodshed. In the years that follow this anniversary the test of statecraft in the Middle East will be in avoiding the pattern of self-deception that not only led to Oslo but also worsened its consequences.
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