GW's Legacy - War Looming! Defining Obama!

GW will soon be leaving office and a legacy, I am sure, that is less than he hoped to leave and, for that matter, myself as well.

N. Korea has been taken off his "evil" list based on new N Korean promises the likes of which they have broken enumerable times before. Iran continues on its merry way towards nuclear weaponry. Israel and the Palestinians remain at odds and Annapolis is just another meeting gone awry. The Middle East remains a powder keg waiting to explode and explode it will. Putin thumps his bare chest and Russia has Europe kowtowing because of their energy dependency.

NATO remains a figment of one's imagination and U.N. sponsored forces sit in Lebanon and other places twiddling their thumbs as Hezballah and other terrorist groups thumb their noses.

Domestically speaking, our economy has seen better days. GW leaves with several more trillions added to the bar bill that will burden future generations and banks may soon own more houses than families. GW touched the third rail but quickly retreated when his idea to modify Social Security was challenged and attacked.

He did warn Congress about Madams Fannie and Freddie, but no one wanted to listen because the economy was humming. This is the same humming economy Obama now reminds everyone was a disaster. (Why can't McCain mention that little fact?)

History will record GW did more for African Africans than any president and he appointed more ethnics, women and those of color to high office and positions than any other previous president but no one cares because he became tagged, tarred and feathered as the "unlawful president"- the one who stole Florida from the "chad pickers."

GW, as I have oft stated, was the first president to treat Arabs as adults and told them they would be treated as such if they measured up to the challenge. Some did some did not.

He leaves a very divided nation still arguing over how to fight terrorism and radical Islamism and whether we even should because defeat is still an option for many on the left. The fact that we have not sustained an attack since 9/11, drowned in Katrina's water swirling around New Orleans. The voices of his two Supreme Court appointments will also be drowned out should Obama become our next president.

On the education front GW turned schools into testing factories and left reasoning at the door so I am not sure our children are any better off or educated. It turns out our nation's youth also continued to gain weight over the last eight years while GW kept himself pretty trim but he became oh so much grayer. What a toll the office takes on those who occupy it. You cease being a human and become a punching bag.

Iraq is struggling towards becoming a functioning country respectful of its diverse population but our troops remain to insure this fact. Petreaus' 'Surge' worked and he will now try and modify it to suit conditions in Afghanistan, if that is possible. But Petraeus might be serving a president who has different views about winning, terrorism, radical Islamists etc. Historically speaking, liberals are willing to live in the gutter when politics and winning office is involved but they are less likely to rise to the occasion when it comes to maintaining a strong defense or engaging in war. Such is beneath elitists and intellectuals. Sitting around a conference table, confronting one's adversary in futile debate and then caving seems more to their liking. We have a few wars to prove this fact.

GW let Britain, France and Germany negotiate with Iran and they did for six useless years. Meanwhile Iran kept moving persistently towards developing nuclear weapons lying and obfuscating all the while. GW took a lot of heat for not negotiating directly so he did and you know what - Iran kept their nuclear program going forward ,lying and obfuscating. Should Obama become president he will try a new approach - he might serve food during more useless negotiations.

All of the above is reflected in GW's very low approval ratings but he still remains 50% above the esteem in which Americans hold Congress. How can that be since Congress is controlled by Democrats? Have voters given more power to the office of the Presidency than our Founding Fathers intended and excluded Congress in their calculation? Or, is the President simply an easier more convenient target being one lonely soul whereas Congress and Senators are many? Yes, 'the buck stops here' as Truman liked to say but Congress can do a lot of buck passing on its own - that is partially why Congress created a Federal Reserve System - so they could spend with abandon and let the Fed mop up the mess.

Dodd, Schumer, Frank, Pelosi and Reid are also busy passing the buck with respect to Madams Fannie and Freddie. Is that why we continue to elect these dolts?

World trade has expanded and though we are not as loved as when Lovable Bill was banging around the Oval Office, once Germany and France dumped their former leaders we moved up on Europe's dandelion fickle chart. If Obama becomes president we should blow off the chart for a while but then historical jealousies will resume. Our sub-prime adventure has ensnared Europe and that might make them very testy down the road. Europe will soon become a basket case due to demographics and its future as a westernized continent remains debatable.

More commentary from a State Representative regarding John Lewis. (See 1 below.)

More powerful medicine being prescribed for the market. At the very least a rally seems at hand.(See 2 below)

Gaza Palestinians and, maybe even Syria, are itching for a fight. (See 3 below.)

Israel may not have a choice when it comes to Iran. (See 4 below.)

Jerry Kane comes up with the correct word to define Obama. (See 5 below.)

Is a Labor-Kadima deal brewing? (See 6 below.)

Will falling markets produce falling rockets? Herb Keinon does an analysis. (See 7 below.)

More threats to freedom from that pillar of democracy - The U.N.? (See 8 below.)

Dismiss Iran's Revolutionary Guards at your peril according to Michael Rubin. (See 9 below.)

Dick

1)I read today Congressman John Lewis’ lament against John McCain and the tone of this year’s campaign. My first thought is, “Congressman, there you go again.”



I have deep respect for John Lewis. His gallantry on the Edmund Pettus Bridge and his tireless efforts throughout the Civil Rights era places him in the Pantheon of great Americans in my book. However, in the last few years he seems to have descended from this lofty perch and begun spending more time clanging shrill cymbals of partisan – and needlessly racially divisive -- nonsense. Two years ago, he warned African American voters in Atlanta that if they elected a Republican as Chairman of the Fulton County Commission we would return to the days of Bull Conner and fire hoses. (For which he was subsequently shamed into apologizing.) Now, he claims that the campaign of Senator McCain echoes the long ago rhetoric of Governor Wallace. Is there a trend here?



These are serious times which require leaders to be closely scrutinized and the Democratic nominee is no exception. Does Senator Obama possess a warm common “I feel your pain” touch or a cold “I know better than you poor saps who cling to your guns and religion” elitism? Do Senator Obama’s See-No-Evil blind eye relationships with Weathermen Bill Ayers, Pastor Jeremiah Wright, Convicted felon and financial supporter Tony Rezko, ACORN, the Chicago political machine, and the Democratic Party’s liberal base reflect a weakness on his part to stand up to friends and supporters when it is not convenient for him to do so -- even when they are wrong? Will this elitism and weakness take us back to the era of suffocating regulations, anti growth taxation, and big government that even Bill Clinton promised was over? Senator McCain is right to raise these questions and should make no apologies for doing so.



That said, campaign supporters can go over the top and it is important for candidates to make sure everyone keeps things in perspective. Last Thursday, I attended the Perry, GA U.S. Senate debate. The Jim Martin campaign and its union surrogates organized busses from Atlanta to bring in supporters. These Democratic Party activists repeatedly screamed slurs at Senator Saxby Chambliss -- while he was trying to speak -- which included, “Liar,” “Draft Dodger,” “Crook,” and “Warmonger.” I have yet to hear Jim Martin, Congressman Lewis, or any other Democratic leader rebuke this kind of hysteria expressed by their supporters. Contrast this silence to Senator McCain’s rebuke this weekend of his supporters who had gone too far.



This is a tough campaign and it ought to be given what is at stake. Hard questions need to be asked of both parties in terms of policies and character. While doing so, I expect my Republican Party to follow the lead of our national standard bearer and make sure we keep things in perspective. My question to Congressman Lewis – and for that matter Jim Martin and Barrack Obama – is this, “We’ll you do the same?” So far, your silence is deafening.


State Representative Edward Lindsey (R-Atlanta)

2) U.S. Stock Futures Gain on Bank Plan, Comments by Fed's Fisher
By Eric Martin and Jeff Kearns

Oct. 13 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. equity futures gained after the worst week for stocks in 75 years, boosted by the government's plan to buy stakes in banks and a Federal Reserve official's pledge to ``consider every option'' for restoring confidence.

The statement by Dallas Fed president Richard W. Fisher came as European leaders agreed to guarantee deposits and use government money to prevent lenders from collapsing. Concern frozen credit markets will spur a global recession sent the S&P 500 to the lowest level since the start of the Iraq War last week and has erased $25 trillion for world stock markets in 2008.

Standard & Poor's 500 Index futures expiring in December added 31.7 points, or 3.6 percent, to 922.7 as of 10:19 a.m. in Tokyo after the index slid 18 percent last week, its worst drop since 1933. Asian stocks rallied, the euro climbed the most in three weeks against the dollar and yen, and crude increased.

``The measures that they've said they're going to take are important,'' said Quincy Krosby, who helps manage about $380 billion as chief investment strategist at the Hartford in Hartford, Connecticut. ``When we say stabilize the financial system, we're talking about money flowing, banks lending. That's what the market is waiting for.''

The Dow Jones Industrial Average posted its steepest decline since it expanded to 30 stocks in 1928 last week, dropping 1874.19 points to 8,451.19. Benchmark indexes from London to Tokyo to Sao Paulo lost more than 20 percent as investors shrugged off an unprecedented coordinated effort by central banks led by the Fed to lower borrowing costs.

Negative Growth

Fisher, warning the U.S. faces a period of negative growth, said the Fed will consider all policy options necessary to stabilize markets and limit damage to the economy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said a day earlier that pumping government funds into banks is a priority.

``We can and we will restore order to the credit markets,'' Fisher said during a panel discussion sponsored by the Institute of International Finance in Washington. He didn't offer details on what options may be under consideration.

The Fed is facing increasing evidence that the U.S. is close to or already in a recession. Labor Department figures showed Oct. 3 that payrolls fell by 159,000 in September, the biggest drop in five years. The unemployment rate held at 6.1 percent, up from 5 percent as recently as April.

At a summit chaired by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, leaders of the 15 countries using the euro pledged to guarantee new bank debt issuance until the end of 2009; seek permission to shore up banks by buying preferred shares; and get commitments to recapitalize any ``systemically'' critical banks in distress.

`Concerted Effort'

Billionaire investor George Soros said the European agreement is a ``positive'' step that may help stabilize global financial markets.

``In the last 72 hours, I think the European governments got religion and realized that this is a serious problem,'' Soros said today in Washington. ``People are looking for some leadership and finally they are getting it,'' suggesting there's ``a good chance'' the worst investor panic is over.

The S&P 500's eight-day losing streak is its longest since 1996. This week's declines pushed both the S&P 500 and Dow down more than 40 percent from their peaks last October. The S&P 500 ended the week trading for 17 times reported earnings of its companies, the cheapest valuation in more than a year.

A gauge of banks and insurers in the S&P 500 fell 22 percent last week to the lowest since December 1996. Morgan Stanley plunged 60 percent to $9.68 as Moody's Investors Service said it may reduce the U.S. investment bank's credit rating on concern the financial crisis threatens earnings and investor confidence. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. dropped 31 percent to $88.80.

New Terms

Morgan Stanley is in talks with Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. about altering terms of the Japanese bank's pending $9 billion infusion into the Wall Street firm, said a person familiar with the matter.

Mitsubishi, Japan's biggest lender, agreed on Sept. 29 to pay $6 billion for Morgan Stanley convertible preferred shares and $3 billion for common stock at $25.25 apiece. Now the companies are discussing eliminating the common stock portion and using preferred stock instead, said the person, who declined to be named because the talks are private and the terms may change.

Exxon tumbled 20 percent to $62.36 last week and led energy producers to a 25 percent drop, the steepest decline among 10 industries in the S&P 500. Oil fell 17 percent to $77.70 a barrel on speculation the financial crisis will reduce demand.

Commodities Tumble

The Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index of 19 commodities had the biggest drop since at least 1956 on Oct. 10. The CRB fell 20.64 to 289.89, the lowest since Jan. 18, 2007. The index has slumped 39 percent from a record on July 3 and declined 20 percent in the past two weeks.

Copper futures for December delivery fell 26.15 cents, or 11 percent, last week to settle at $2.1445 a pound on the Comex division of the New York Mercantile Exchange. Copper dropped 20 percent last week, the most since 1988, when data begins.

Credit and recession concerns overshadowed unprecedented coordinated interest-rate cuts by the world's largest banks. The Federal Reserve reduced its benchmark interest rate by 0.5 percentage point to 1.5 percent. The European Central Bank lowered its key lending rate by half a point to 3.75 percent.

The benchmark index for U.S. stock options surged 55 percent to 69.95 and closed at a record each day. The VIX, as the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index is known, measures the cost of using options as insurance against declines in the S&P 500. It averaged 59.43 this week, almost triple the 22.39 average in its 18-year history.

3) Gaza Palestinians plant anti-tank IED trap on Israeli side of border

Military sources report Israel military scouts uncovered a high-powered anti-tank IED trap near Kissufim on the Israeli side of the Gaza border Sunday, Oct. 12. It was composed of four large interlinked devices rigged to blow up in sequence.

A fifth bomb just inside Gaza was located to detonate when Israeli reinforcements and emergency teams came up to tend to the casualties from the first series of explosions.

The IDF command believes the hand behind the bomb trap was the Iranian-backed Jihad Islami. It was intended to provoke a military clash with Israel forces chasing the bombers into Gaza that would shatter the ceasefire that has been more or less in place since June 20.

According to intelligence sources, Jihad Islami has determined to torpedo the truce in order to derail the Hamas-Fatah fence-mending talks taking place in Cairo under Egypt’s aegis. Jihad may even have contracted the Dorghmush clan, which is at daggers drawn with Hamas, to set up the bomb trap.

Middle East sources report Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas failed Sunday to persuade Syrian president Bashar Assad to bring his influence to bear on Hamas leaders to be more accommodating in the Cairo talks. Assad shrugged off Abbas’ appeal and extended a frigid welcome to his Palestinian visitor.

4) Israel doesn't have much time to attack Iran
By Edward Bernard Glick

It was in October 2005 that the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, first said that the "Zionist regime" must "be wiped off the face of the Earth." And it was in April 2006 that he called Israel a "fake regime" that "cannot logically continue to live."

In the years that have since passed, the man who favors a second Holocaust and denies the occurrence of the first one has repeated these genocidal statements almost daily. These are also the years in which Iran's nuclear weapons program has proceeded exponentially. It is a program that endangers the very existence of the Jewish state.

Thanks to David Ben Gurion, Israel's founding prime minister and first minister of defense, and President Shimon Peres, the last surviving member of the Israeli Old Guard, Israel has a nuclear arsenal. Michael Karpin, the author of "The Bomb in the Basement," calls Israel's nuclear arsenal the "absolute deterrent." But the truth is that Israel can only deter Iran if Iran has the wisdom and the sanity to be deterred.

One often hears the argument that if Iran can live with an Israeli nuclear bomb, why can't Israel live with an Iranian bomb? The answer is that no Israeli leader threatens to eradicate Iran.

Since world public opinion will blame the Israelis for whatever they do preemptively to save themselves, they might as well do what's needed and what works. Israel must, with or without American help, strike first and strike successfully. It must take out not only Iran's nuclear weaponry, but its delivery systems and its command and control centers because it is always better for Jews to be alive and condemned, than dead and eulogized.

An Israeli attack upon Iran will be condemned by the Arabs, the Muslims, the anti-Semites, the anti-Zionists, the anti-Americans, the appeasers, the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, the Pope, the Quakers, and the postmodernist "war-can-never-be-an-option-in-the-twenty-first-century" crowd in academia and elsewhere.

But much of the criticism will be phony. In 1981, when Israel destroyed Saddam Hussein's French-built Osirak reactor, located 18 miles south of Baghdad, the Saudi students in my Middle East politics class at Temple University condemned Israel roundly. But the next day, they all came to my office and asked me to tell my secretary to leave. They then insisted that I close the door. Only when he was assured of complete privacy, did the leader of the group say to me: "Thank God that the Israelis bombed Iraq yesterday. For only God knows when that crazy Iraqi would have used a nuclear bomb against Saudi Arabia, with which he contests the leadership of the Arab world?"

When I asked him why he and his compatriots didn't say so in class, he answered: "We were afraid to. At the least, our fellowships from ARAMCO (the Arab-American Oil Company) would have been revoked. And at the most, we would have been ordered home to be imprisoned or killed."

At the news conference at which he announced Israel's destruction of the Iraqi reactor, the late Prime Minister Menachem Begin said that ‘'despite all the condemnations which were heaped on Israel for the last 24 hours, Israel has nothing to apologize for. In simple logic, we decided to act now, before it is too late. We shall defend our people with all the means at our disposal." He added that "Israel will not tolerate any nuclear weapons in the region."

Does Israel's present prime minister have the guts to emulate Menachem Begin, and to emulate him right now? Does the Israel Defense Force have the skill to do to Iran today what it did to Iraq a quarter of a century ago? Is Israel willing to use tactical nuclear weapons if it concludes that conventional weapons won't do the job? And does Israel realize that if Democratic Sen. Barak Obama wins the American presidency next month, it may never have the chance to take out its mortal foe?

There are uncertainties. But one thing is certain, however: Neither Israel's friends, nor my former Saudi students, nor Israel's other foes will ever publicly thank it for taking out the Mad Mullahs of Teheran.

5) The Exact Word
By Jerry A. Kane

What is the right word for Obama. He once told us "words matter."

In his commentary "The Real Obama," Thomas Sowell rightly points out the importance of using exact words to communicate effectively. Sowell argues that Senator Barack Obama's critics are making a strategic mistake when they use the word associate to describe the Senator's ties to William Ayers, the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, and Father Michael Pfleger. According to Sowell, the word ally is the more appropriate word to describe Obama's connection to these people. Obama is not guilty by association; his guilt is through alliance. He is aligned to leftist radicals in that he shares in their fierce opposition to the ideas of a free market, individual liberty, and religious freedom, which are America's founding principles.

Sowell is right; ally is the more accurate term for Obama's relationship with these people. The one thread that binds them is their radical, leftist politics. Obama has been called the most liberal Senator in the U.S. Senate by right-of-center commentators and radio talk show hosts; but again the word choice problem crops up. Obama's politics are not liberal; his politics match those of Saul Alinsky and the leftist radicals of the 1960s.

Obama's radical leftist politics explain his political and theological ties with such radical and revolutionary pastors the likes of Wright and Pfleger, who incidentally are part of a nexus along with Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan that aligns black-liberation theology with black Muslim nationalism. Stanley Kurtz connects the dots of this unholy trinity in his National Review article "Left in Church: Deep inside the Wright Trumpet."

Black-Liberation Theology is a type of Marxist Liberation Theology that promotes an Afrocentric social gospel. Inspired by Black Muslim nationalism, James Cone combined Marxism with black religion and a black Gospel and created Black-Liberation Theology. Cone's theology is designed to liberate African-Americans from the economic slavery of the white man's free market system and to build a completely new society. Cone is Wright's mentor, and Cone credits Wright for lifting his theology from his books and making it work in Wright's Trinity United Church of Christ. Cone's theology is the core doctrine and his books are required reading in the church Obama attended for 20 years.

Cone's theology proposes that the black Jesus (Wright's church believes and teaches Christ was black) will give black Americans the ability to do away with the white man's greed and free market system and replace them with a black value system. In addition, Cone writes "black theology will accept only the love of God which participates in the destruction of the white enemy" and that being black means "committed to destroying everything this country loves and adores." Obama has said that black liberation theology is sensible, has called Wright his mentor, has said that Wright has given him the best education he ever had, and throughout his campaign has declared America's institutions as broken and in need of fixing. For a more comprehensive look at Black-Liberation Theology, read "Obama: Stealth Socialist?" by Investor's Business Daily.

Obama's radical leftist politics are so meshed with his socialist religion that it's difficult to know where one leaves off and the other begins. For example, in a 1998 radio interview, Obama discusses how certain portions of the African American community are not doing very well with crime, education, and employment, and he recognizes his fate is tied with theirs. He goes on to suggest that his "individual salvation is not going to come about without a collective salvation for the country." He further states, "Unfortunately, I think that recognition requires we make sacrifices and this country has not always been willing to make the sacrifices that are necessary to bring about a new day and a new age."

On the stump, Obama divines the time has come "to perfect this nation." Not long ago, I brushed such statements aside, without a second thought. When Hillary playfully mocked Obama's remarks, "a light will shine through that window, a beam of light will come down upon you, you will experience an epiphany ... and you will suddenly realize that you must go to the polls and vote for Obama," it never occurred to me to take such remarks seriously. When the Obama Sith, Chris Matthews, said, "This is bigger than Kennedy....This is the New Testament," I just figured he was caught up in the exuberance of the moment. And when Halle Berry said that she'd "collect paper cups off the ground to make his pathway clear"; or Eve Konstantine said he is "our collective representation of our purest hopes, our highest visions and our deepest knowings," I unthinkingly whisked them away as so much sophomoric giddiness and bizarre tripe.

Now, that the antenna is up and the red flags are waving, I am astounded when I reconsider that Bill Rush of the New York Times actually believes Obama's election to the U.S. Senate, "was divinely ordered....God's plan"; that Oprah Winfrey thinks his "tongue dipped in the unvarnished truth"; that Gerald Campbell sees him radiate "truth and goodness"; that Gary Hart deems him not to be "operating on the same plane as ordinary politicians"; and that Deepak Chopra considers him "A quantum leap in American consciousness."

It's apparent that Obama not only believes his individual salvation depends on collective salvation, but he also desires to bring about a new day and age. Maybe next time Charlie Gibson will ask the hubris question of Obama.

On second thought, hubris is not the exact word, megalomania is more appropriate.

6) Kadima-Labor coalition deal expected overnight
By GIL HOFFMAN

Kadima leader Tzipi Livni was expected to complete an important step en route to forming a new government overnight Sunday night, with a deal anticipated between Kadima and its largest coalition partner, Labor.

Kadima, Labor hope to finalize coalition before Sukkot

The head of Kadima's negotiating team, MK Tzahi Hanegbi, engaged in late-night shuttle diplomacy for the second night in a row between Livni's home in Tel Aviv's Ramat Hahayil neighborhood and Labor chairman Ehud Barak's penthouse in the city's Akirov Towers.

"Tonight's the night," Hanegbi told The Jerusalem Post. "If there is no agreement tonight, there won't be a deal at all."

Hanegbi said it was possible that Livni and Barak would meet early Monday morning to finalize the agreement.


According to a draft proposal submitted by Kadima to Labor on Sunday, Barak will not receive any of what he demanded when the coalition-building process began three weeks ago.

Barak will not receive nearly equal footing with Livni at the head of the government, he won't head Israel's negotiating team with Syria, Justice Minister Daniel Friedmann will keep his position, and the framework of the 2009 state budget won't be expanded.

Instead, Barak will be promoted from deputy prime minister to the new title of "senior deputy prime minister." He will be involved in the negotiations with Damascus and will be able to prevent issues from being raised in the security cabinet. Labor will be able to prevent the advancement of Friedmann's judicial reforms and a limited sum will be allocated to two of Labor's pet causes, raising senior citizens' benefits and lowering college tuition.

Nevertheless, Barak instructed the members of his coalition-negotiating team to reach a deal with Kadima on Sunday night before he leaves on Monday for a three-day vacation in the Galilee.

"We are acting with an open mind and a willing soul to reach an agreement on a new government," Barak told Labor ministers Sunday morning. "The good of the public requires a stable government for the long-term that will be able to deal determinedly with the national challenges facing us on every issue, especially the economic crisis."

Livni showed a similar commitment to wrap up a deal in private conversations with Kadima and Labor politicians. She reportedly warned Barak privately that if an agreement were not reached before the Succot holiday began on Monday evening, she would seriously consider initiating early elections.

"The good of the public requires a quick resolution," Livni said in a speech to the Kadima council at the party's Petah Tikva headquarters. "I'm leading the coalition-building in my way: quietly, without political spins, dramas and mutual recriminations, so that everyone will end up being satisfied."

Livni called on Likud chairman Binyamin Netanyahu to join her government due to the international economic crisis. She warned him that his voters would object to the Likud remaining in the opposition while Israel was facing so many challenges.

"Forming a government as wide as possible is the right thing to do," Livni said. "The public won't forgive whoever decides to violate unity, not join the government and cause an election at such a time."

Likud faction chairman Gideon Sa'ar accused Livni of trying to take advantage of the economic crisis for political gain.

"Instead of speaking in the name of the public, Livni should request the trust of the public via general elections," Sa'ar said. "Holding on for another few months with a collapsing coalition will not help the country face the economic and security challenges ahead."

Following an agreement with Labor, Livni is expected to try to work out a coalition deal with the Pensioners' Party, Meretz and Shas.

She received a boost when three MKs who broke off from the Pensioners' Party announced that they were on the way back into the coalition via a parliamentary cooperation deal with Labor.

The most difficult party for Livni to reach a deal with is expected to be Shas. Ten days ago, Kadima negotiators offered Shas NIS 400 million for child welfare allotments that would be called a family grant, but Shas rejected the offer and asked for more money. No negotiations have been held with the party since then.

Shas has also expressed opposition to Meretz joining the government.

Shas officials said they were ready to initiate an election if Livni did not give into their demands.

"I spoke to Livni today, but there has been no progress and certainly not any breakthrough," Shas chairman Eli Yishai said.

7) Analysis: The failing markets' impact on diplomacy
By HERB KEINON


With the global financial hurricane still raging, it is clear to all that everyone and everything is going to get wet. The real question is how wet.

Take, for instance, the Israeli economy. No doubt we will all be affected by Wall Street's storm, as will nearly every country in the world. No doubt a deep recession is around the bend, and we will feel it - maybe less than folks in the US, certainly less than those in Iceland, but feel it we will.

In Jerusalem, however, where concerns are primarily existential and not merely economic, another question is asked: How will all this impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and what will it do to the diplomatic process?

And even though we are in the midst of the tempest and it is too early to predict all the consequences, it is obvious that the financial crisis will have an impact on international relations, on the balance of power, on new alliances. Some have said we are now witnessing the seminal event of the young century, and that the ripple effects will be felt far and wide.

First of all, the crisis is already having an impact on the diplomatic process by having an impact on the domestic political process, both in Israel and in the US.

In Israel, the global financial meltdown will make it easier for new Kadima chairwoman Tzipi Livni to form a government. Granted, Shas and, to a lesser degree, the Labor Party are kicking and howling on their way into a Kadima-led government, but in the final analysis, they will both likely join, using as an explanation to their respective voters the need to "act responsibly" and ensure a stable government at this economically volatile time.

The crisis is also having a dramatic impact on the US presidential election, with Barack Obama opening a 9-percent lead over John McCain in the polls, a gap the pundits explain is due primarily to the economic situation. And the conventional wisdom is that an Obama administration would take a much more activist approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than a McCain administration.

Well, at least on paper. In reality, an Obama government is likely to be so tied down dealing with the economic crisis that even if the new president and his team of veteran Oslo Accord hands would like to dive right into the Middle East conflict, the attention both of the administration and of the American public will be otherwise engaged. With banks collapsing, stocks falling, and the real estate market a shambles, it seems unlikely an Obama team - or, for that matter, a McCain team if things should reverse themselves in the next four weeks - will have a lot of attention or energy left for the Middle East conflict.

And they would not be alone. If Livni does indeed succeed in putting together a government, its top priorities will no longer be the Palestinian track, or even the Syrian track, but rather the economic track.

The disappearance of trillions of dollars worldwide will also make it difficult for the international community to pay for an Israeli-Palestinian, or Israeli-Syrian, agreement, even if they miraculously appear. Who would pay for the tens of billions of dollars worth of new early warning systems Israel would have to set up following deep withdrawals from the West Bank and Jordan Valley, or a complete withdrawal - as the Syrians are demanding - from the Golan Heights?

Who would pay compensation to Palestinian refugees if an agreement were reached that would deny them a "right of return" to pre-1967 Israel, but would recognize their right to compensation? Who would pay for the Palestinian security services or fund the infrastructure if a Palestinian state were agreed upon?

The US? After this month, forget about it.

Europe, the oft-looked-to Middle East payer? Hard to believe that, considering their devastated economies, Europe will be anywhere nearly as generous to the Palestinians in the future as they have been in the past.

The Persian Gulf states? Even in the best of times, it was difficult to get those countries to do more than pledge money to the the Palestinian Authority. But now, with oil revenue at nearly half what it was a few months ago and the stock markets in the Arab countries slipping badly along with the rest of the world's markets, don't expect them to step up and fill in the gaps for the Palestinians.

In addition, with the governments of the world now preoccupied with their own economies and the resulting domestic fallout, the importance of solving the Israeli-Palestinian issues right now will likely fade. That fading interest could have negative consequences of its own, because the Palestinians will struggle to make sure their issue does not recede, that it stays front-and-center on the agenda. And if history is any indication, the way the Palestinians keep their cause on the international radar screen is not through letters to the editor or civil disobedience, but through terrorism and other violence.

And that's how falling stocks on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange could lead to falling rockets on Sderot.


8) Lawful Islamism's Greatest Attack Yet:The OIC Resolution Against Defaming Religion
By Supna Zaidi


Have you seen the little old lady who passes out Jehovah's Witness literature in your neighborhood? Some people stop and show interest. Others roll their eyes, and keep walking. But, would you ever expect anyone to threaten her? Call her a racist, and try to get her arrested?

Islamists would. And that is exactly what happened to two English Christian ministers who had the nerve to proselytize on a street corner in a predominantly Muslim immigrant area in the UK in 2007.

Such freedom of speech violations won't be an anomaly if the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which has a permanent delegation to the United Nations, succeeds in passing a UN resolution against "Defamation of Religion" Noboby in a western country will be able to discuss the socio-political consequences of Muslim immigration, for fear of being labeled "Islamophobic" and slapped with a fine, or even jail time.

Islamists are increasingly using lawful Islamism, or non-violent and legal strategies to spread Sharia, (Islamic law) in the West, encroaching on non-Muslim life everyday. Other examples include:

1. Sharia Finance;
2. Islam in public schools;
3. Violations of basic hygiene policy by Muslim medical staff;
4. Workplace violations in the name of religious freedom;
5. Censorship of literature.

Under the banner of "religious freedom," Islamists attack the very fabric of democracy in favor of Islam in the public sphere. The above examples are not examples of pluralism, but a violation of the separation of church and state doctrine meant to keep people of all faiths, or no faith, equal under the law. Liberals have forgotten that secularism is not a free-for-all, but has boundaries in order to remain meaningful.

Freedom of speech has already been attacked repeatedly. Islamists tried to censor criticism of Islamist terrorism when the Muhammad cartoons were published in Jyllens-Posten in 2005. Strangely enough, the "cartoon intifada" arose 5 months after their original printing, but only weeks before the UNHCR was due to consider the OIC's resolution on "Combating Defamation of Religion."

Such a coincidence caused the National Secular Society to state in its Memorandum (Section E, point 2) to the UK Parliament that,

the Danish cartoon crisis was manufactured… to exploit sensitivities around racial discrimination and to promote (or even exaggerate) the notion of "Islamophobia" in order to restrict possibilities for open discussion or criticism of Islam….measures calling for legislation banning "defamation of religion" - …. aims to remove religion, especially Islam, from public scrutiny and public debate.

If any religion is to be integrated into the daily social, economic and political life of a nation, it must open the door for evaluation of its goals and application. Otherwise, OIC nations will be able to govern unilaterally without respect to international law. Consider the following precedent.

Saudi Arabia ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 2000, with reservations, stating, "In case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the Convention."

Thus, Saudi Arabia confirms that it will only offer lip service to human rights by signing documents like the CEDAW charter. It will not actually improve the status of women, because it is a theocracy, and every move a woman makes is governed by Islamic law. CEDAW can do nothing for them. Moreover, if the Defamation of Religion resolution is passed, all human rights activists will feel even greater censorship, since protests from abroad will be construed as racism.

Consider the "Qatif girl" case. A Saudi girl was gang-raped in 2005 and blamed for it, since she was in the presence of unrelated men when it happened. Her attorney lost his license for challenging the Saudi courts. Only after generating global media pressure did the situation change in her favor. The king pardoned her and the attorney got his license reinstated. In a post- Defamation of Religion world, the attorney would have been trapped, unable to help the girl and disbarred if he dared to challenge Saudi Islamic law.

Lastly, the OIC resolution must fail because it is patently hypocritical. While professing great sensitivity toward religion, OIC members ironically regularly fail to show any respect for other faiths:

*

Saudi Arabia continues to use bigoted textbooks, and export them to American Islamic schools despite promises to change.
*

Iran sponsored a Holocaust cartoon contest in retaliation for the Danish cartoons of Muhammad in 2005. Yet, Jews had nothing to do with the Jyllands-Posten newspaper.
*

Pakistan's blasphemy laws attack Christians as a pretext for personal disputes.

The Defamation of Religion resolution is a free pass for Islamists to continue denigrating other religions and minorities through lawful Islamism. It ties the hands of any politician that questions the spread of Islamism in the West, and prevents critical evaluation of the treatment of women and minorities in Muslim societies.

Liberal and conservative citizens of the West must work together to prevent this resolution from passing in the UN.

9) Iran's Revolutionary Guards - A Rogue Outfit?
By Michael Rubin


There is a tendency in Western capitals to dismiss adversarial Iranian behavior as the work of rogue regime factions, which are not representative of Tehran's true intentions. Following a Baghdad press conference providing evidence of Iranian weapons shipments to Iraq,[1] U.S. officials raised doubts about Iran's actual culpability. The weapons shipments do "not translate to that the Iranian government per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this," Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted the next day.[2] On February 14, 2007, President George W. Bush said, "What we don't know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran ordered the Qods Force to do what they did."[3] Likewise, when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized fifteen British sailors patrolling a waterway between Iran and Iraq, commentators suggested that responsibility may rest more with freelancing commanders than the Iranian government.[4] Identifying the true decision-makers in the Islamic Republic is essential not only for accountability but also to ensure that any Western diplomatic outreach is targeted at those who have the power to affect regime behavior. Unfortunately, as U.S. officials again debate negotiations with the Islamic Republic, they simultaneously embrace Iranian reformists and dismiss pariah behavior as the actions of isolated rogue elements. Such an assessment is backwards, though. The IRGC represents the core of the Iranian state, and Iran's reformists are those who, by acting on their own without either state support or any ability to deliver on promises are, in the Iranian context, the true rogue elements.
A Convoluted Power Structure

The Islamic Republic's overlapping and sometimes parallel power structures often confound Iranians, let alone outside observers. Since revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1989 death, Western officials have often focused their hopes for engagement and their anger at Iranian behavior on the president. Whether Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's advocacy of market reforms, Mohammad Khatami's call for a "dialogue of civilizations," or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial, the Iranian president frequently makes headlines in the West. Such attention is deceptive. Iranian presidents appoint cabinets but remain subservient to the Council of Guardians and the Expediency Discernment Council. Revolutionary foundations, which together may control more than half the state budget,[5] operate outside the purview of Iran's executive structure. The judiciary is also a power center, able to wield immense influence beyond even the confines of the court system.

Over all these, however, the "supreme leader" (rahbar) has ultimate control. Khomeini was the first supreme leader, but upon his death, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei assumed the role. Article 107 of the Islamic Republic's 1979 constitution defines the responsibilities of the leader: "He is to exercise governance and all the responsibilities arising therefrom."[6] Article 110 makes the supreme leader "supreme commander of the armed forces" with the power to appoint and dismiss the chief of the general staff and the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In addition, the supreme leader forms the Supreme National Defense Council and appoints the supreme commanders of the army, navy, and air force. He also appoints the heads of the judiciary, the president of state radio and television, the editor of Kayhan daily, executives to oversee editors of nominally independent newspapers,[7] and Friday prayer leaders who act as his de facto representatives on a provincial or town level. Unofficially, myriad vigilante groups also enable the supreme leader and his followers to enforce domestic discipline outside constitutional parameters.[8]

On a day-to-day basis, the supreme leader exerts control through the Office of the Supreme Leader and a system of handpicked representatives who act as his commissars. Very little is known about the internal functioning of this office, but it probably controls at least 2,000 clerical commissars who permeate every bureaucracy and power center inside Iran and, quite possibly, a few Iranian embassies and cultural centers outside the Islamic Republic's borders. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's network of representatives allows him to manage the structure and trajectory of state policy without controlling every lever of power.[9] Should any political or policy problem arise, Khamenei's network warns him long before the news would reach his level through the formal hierarchy of power. Khamenei can, therefore, maintain control through veto.

If Khamenei's will is supreme, the IRGC is his Praetorian Guard. It emerged in the wake of the Islamic Revolution as a privileged counterpoint to the Iranian army, which the first supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, distrusted. Throughout the twentieth century, the Iranian army was subordinate to the person of the shah rather than acting as an institution charged with defending the state. Especially after the challenge from and, eventually, the coup against Mohammad Musaddiq, the shah became dependent upon the army to maintain his rule. He placed family members in key commands and lavished patronage upon senior officers to buy their loyalty. Junior officers and enlisted men felt no such loyalty, however, and as the tide turned ahead of Khomeini's return, many defected to the revolutionary mobs. Upon seizing power, Khomeini may have needed the army to ensure order and national defense, but he never trusted it. At best, he felt the army was comprised of opportunists who joined the revolutionary forces to save their own lives. At worst, he believed they had been loyal to the shah even if they did not choose to fight for him.[10] As Khomeini purged what remained of the senior officer corps,[11] he formed the Revolutionary Guards as the ideological guardians of his new theocracy and a trusted counterbalance to the army.[12]

The IRGC's structure suggests the organization adheres closely to the Islamic Republic's values and goals, if not outright to regime command and control. Initially, Khomeini incorporated the IRGC into the cabinet. Mohsen Rezai served as the group's first and only minister and continued his command after Khomeini made the IRGC a wholly separate entity. Throughout its existence, the IRGC has had remarkably stable leadership. Rezai helped stabilize the country after Khomeini's death and ensured a smooth transition to Khamenei's rule. Only on September 9, 1997, did the supreme leader relieve Rezai of command and, even then, in a manner to provide institutional stability, appointing Rezai's deputy, Yahya Rahim Safavi, as the IRGC's new commander in chief. Safavi, in turn, commanded the IRGC for a decade until September 1, 2007, when Khamenei replaced him with Mohammad Ali Ja'fari, the former director of the IRGC's Strategic Studies Center. In neither case did the leadership transition signal disgrace for the retired chief. Today, Rezai is secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council while Safavi serves as armed forces and security advisor in the Office of the Supreme Leader.
Are the Revolutionary Guards Rogues?

During the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, the White House and State Department have often treated the IRGC as a loose cannon in the Iranian system, if not a rogue element. The IRGC's evolution and role, however, suggest that the group has seldom engaged in activities not sanctioned by the Iranian leadership.

Initially, the Guards functioned to ensure internal security only, but Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's 1980 invasion of Iran pushed the organization into national defense.[13] The Iran-Iraq war transformed the IRGC into a multifaceted organization. The Iranian leadership invested massively in the organization as the Islamic Republic fought for its very existence, and the IRGC resultantly developed not only traditional defense capabilities but also embraced its mission to enforce revolutionary values at home and export them abroad.

For this latter responsibility, the Office of Liberation Movements played a key role. Charged with supporting revolutionary movements abroad, the office was, until 1982, part of the Revolutionary Guards and helped catalyze the rise of Shi‘i terrorist and revolutionary movements in Lebanon.[14] Led by Mehdi Hashemi, a well-connected revolutionary, the office continued after its separation from the IRGC as an independent entity coordinating not only operations in Lebanon but also aid to the Afghan mujahideen. While the office had lost its official status—giving the Iranian leadership plausible deniability from its activities—it based itself in Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri's office in Qom and so, clearly, enjoyed state sanction: Montazeri at the time was Khomeini's deputy.[15]

As Iranian casualties at the front increased, Tehran's diplomatic priorities shifted. Khomeini sought to reach out to the Gulf Cooperation Council states, which were financing Iraq's war machine, as well as other adversaries, including the United States. Hashemi, however, did not believe the Islamic Republic should compromise its revolutionary principles. In 1986, he allegedly sent Iranian operatives disguised as pilgrims to the hajj in Mecca. Saudi authorities arrested more than one hundred Iranian pilgrims, many of whom had arms and explosives.[16] Soon after, Hashemi allegedly orchestrated the kidnapping of Syria's chargé d'affaires in Tehran.[17] On November 3, 1986, by coincidence the day before the anniversary of both Khomeini's 1963 arrest and the 1979 U.S. embassy seizure, Ash Shira‘a, a pro-Syrian Lebanese magazine, broke news of the secret contacts between U.S. and Iranian officials that would come to be called the Iran-Contra affair.[18]

Hashemi and the Office of Liberation Movements had become a liability. What had once been sanctioned had now become a rogue operation. On October 12, 1986, the Iranian government arrested Hashemi and his followers; he was executed at dawn on September 28, 1987, by a firing squad at Tehran's Evin prison.[19]

The Mehdi Hashemi affair is instructive: It demonstrated that while the Iranian leadership holds revolutionary values closely, it is also pragmatic and chooses when and when not to export them. Hashemi had crossed a line; when sanctioned activities became rogue operations, the Iranian leadership reacted swiftly and without mercy. By comparison, then, Tehran's failure to act in a like manner to constrain other instances of revolutionary export suggest that such violence, incitement, and support for insurgency have the supreme leader's support.

From the ashes of the Office of Liberation Movements rose the Qods Force, an elite corps of several thousand soldiers within the IRGC charged with export of the revolution and liquidation of opponents, both inside and outside the Islamic Republic. The supreme leader personally appoints the head of the Qods Force, making him, in effect, the equal of the IRGC head.[20]

While some Western diplomats and intelligence analysts—indeed, President Bush himself—have questioned whether the Qods Force is a rogue operation, there is little doubt that the group enjoys the support of the Islamic Republic's leadership. The chief aim of the Qods Force is the export of revolution. Across the Islamic Republic's political spectrum, officials see this as an unalterable pillar of regime policy, any questioning of which merits a harsh response. In a May 3, 2008 speech at the University of Gilan, former president Khatami addressed not whether the Islamic Republic should export revolution, but how. He asked,

What did the Imam [Khomeini] want, and what was his purpose of exporting the revolution? [Did he wish that] we should export revolution by means of gunpowder or groups sabotaging other countries? … He [Khomeini] meant to establish a role model here, which means people should see that in this society, the economy, science, and dignity of man are respected … This was the most important way of exporting the revolution.[21]

By proposing that Tehran should expand its influence more by soft power than by insurgency, Khatami tacitly acknowledged that the sponsorship of militias, insurgency, and terrorism enjoys state sanction and does not constitute rogue behavior.

The reaction of various Iranian officials to Khatami's speech underlines such a conclusion. Seventy-seven members of parliament demanded the Intelligence Ministry investigate the former president for his comments.[22] Iranian officials disapproved of Khatami's acknowledgment of activities for which the Islamic Republic tries to maintain plausible deniability. Tehran might use proxy groups and assassination squads to strike at enemies and liquidate dissidents, but it does not wish to be held accountable for such actions on the international stage.

As the controversy over Khatami's remarks faded, Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the powerful judiciary chief, enunciated Tehran's continued commitment to exporting the revolution. Speaking to armed forces in Iran's northwestern Kordestan province, he said, "Know your worth since today we are in a position that you are the hope of Islamic national and Islamic liberation movements."[23]
From Buenos Aires to Berlin

The Iranian debate about exporting the revolution is not theoretical and limited only to theological seminaries or political speeches. In the Islamic Republic's first twenty-nine years, regime officials have assassinated more than 160 regime opponents outside Iran's borders.[24] While many of these killings occurred in the tumultuous years after the revolution as hit squads tracked down the shah's chief aides and revolutionary defectors, assassinations of dissidents have continued through, at least, the 1990s. While in many cases the perpetrators escaped or evidence was inconclusive, in the aftermath of several high-profile attacks, investigations uncovered official regime involvement.

On July 13, 1989, gunmen assassinated Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), along with a KDPI representative in Europe and an Iraqi Kurdish mediator as the three met with an Iranian delegation in a Vienna apartment. The Iranian delegation reported the shooting to the police but denied any responsibility. After taking statements, the Austrian police released the Iranian government representatives present in the apartment at the time of the assassination, Mohammad Ja'fari Sahraroudi, Iranian Kordestan provincial governor Mostafa Ajoudi, and Amir Bozorgian.

Only in subsequent days did questions about the Iranians' statements arise. Oswald Kessler, the head of the Austrian Special Anti-Terrorism Unit, noted that there had been no forced entry into the apartment, two of the victims were shot as they sat, and that each victim had received a coup de grâce to ensure death. He concluded that the murders were an intelligence operation. Subsequent forensic evidence supported Kessler's conclusions; shots had been fired from the position of the Iranian delegation and not from the door. Shell casing positions also suggested the Iranian delegation's complicity.[25] Three months after their deportation, Austrian police issued warrants for the three Iranians, but Tehran refused to extradite any of the wanted men. In sharp contrast to the manner in which the regime treated Hashemi in the wake of his 1986 rogue operations, the IRGC promoted Sahraroudi to brigadier-general and appointed him to head the Qods Force Intelligence Directory.[26]

The Ghassemlou affair was not the last Iranian operation against Kurdish dissidents in Europe. On September 17, 1992, shortly after the German government began its critical dialogue with Iranian leaders in order to end Tehran's isolation, two Iranian hit men assisted by four Lebanese Hezbollah operatives murdered three KDPI leaders and a supporter at the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin. While one of the gunmen, Abdol-Rahman Banihashemi, and a getaway driver fled the country, German police arrested Hezbollah operative Abbas Hossein Rhayel—the other gunman—and several accomplices. The subsequent trial lasted more than three years, heard 176 witnesses, and gained access to intelligence files. On April 10, 1997, the court found Rhayel and Kazem Darrabi, an Iranian intelligence agent, guilty of murder and two other Lebanese as accessories to murder. The court also concluded that a Special Affairs Committee, headed by the supreme leader and including Rafsanjani, former intelligence minister Ali Fallahian, and former Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, had ordered the hit and that Fallahian had put Banihashemi in charge of organizing the operation.[27] Fallahian may have rejected the verdict, but shortly before the assassination, he had bragged on state television about the Intelligence Ministry's success "dealing vital blows" to the Kurdish opposition outside Iran.[28]

As instructive as the case was about state sponsorship of terrorism, so, too, was the aftermath. The next day, approximately 1,000 Ansar-e Hezbollah activists gathered in front of the German embassy in Tehran. Hossein Allah-Karam, the head of the hard-line vigilante group, warned, "One of our followers will strap a bomb to himself and blow up the embassy if Germany continues its accusations and hostile attitude against our leaders."[29] Three days later, a group of 250 students clashed with police in front of the embassy. The students issued a statement warning, "If ever the guide [Khamenei] orders us, we will wage a holy war against the infidels … We are conquerors of spy nests [a reference to the U.S. embassy]."[30] Iranian authorities promised to protect the embassy. German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel noted wryly, "Since suicide commandos only seem to act on orders from the government … we will take the Iranian government at its word."[31]

Kazem Darrabi (in cap), sentenced to life imprisonment for murder by a German court, was released after serving fifteen years. Here, he arrives in Tehran to a hero's welcome, December 11, 2007. He had been convicted of involvement in the murder of three leaders of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party (KDPI) and their translator in Berlin. The German government freed Darrabi as part of its effort to engage Tehran.
Despite his life sentence, Berlin freed Darrabi on December 11, 2007, as part of its effort to engage Tehran. He immediately flew to Tehran where he was greeted by Ali Bagheri, the acting head of the Iranian foreign ministry's European affairs department, and received a hero's welcome.[32]

The allegations of top-level regime involvement in terrorism again surfaced after a July 18, 1994 suicide truck bomb attack leveled the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), the Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, killing eighty-five people and wounding almost twice as many. While terrorists had also attacked the Israeli embassy in the Argentine capital two years before, investigations kicked in after the 1994 attack. After years of inconsistent Argentine attention to the investigation, Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral found guilty and issued an arrest warrant on November 9, 2006, for Rafsanjani, Velayati, Fallahian, the IRGC's Mohsen Rezai, IRGC officer Ahmad Reza Asgari, who served as third secretary of the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires, and Qods Force commander Ahmad Vahidi, subsequently Iran's deputy minister of defense for procurement.[33] Crucial to the case was Ahmad Rezai, son of Mohsen Rezai, who defected to the United States in February 1998. He acknowledged that "the attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires was planned in Tehran" and said that then-president Rafsanjani had decided to order the attack after an August 14, 1993 meeting in Mashhad at which Ahmad Rezai was present.[34] The Iranian government continues to deny the charges,[35] but after conducting an investigation of its own, Interpol found them credible enough to publish "red notices" for five of the implicated Iranians.[36]
Rogue Actions in Iraq?

The U.S. military commitment in Iraq has made the question of rogue Iranian behavior literally a matter of life and death for U.S. servicemen and a topic of intense discussion among diplomats and policymakers. In 2003, as Operation Iraqi Freedom neared, Western diplomats scrambled to win an Iranian pledge of noninterference. British foreign secretary Jack Straw elicited such a promise from Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, and Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, repeated this pledge to Zalmay Khalilzad, who supervised the Iraq portfolio on the National Security Council.[37] Even if Kharrazi and Zarif were sincere in their pledge, however, Iran's diplomacy was a diversion.

On September 9, 2002, Khamenei convened the Supreme National Security Council in Tehran, which concluded, "It is necessary to adopt an active policy in order to prevent long-term and short-term dangers to Iran."[38] Soon after Saddam's fall, the IRGC, with the acquiescence of the Islamic Republic's leadership, moved to infiltrate Iraq with thousands of fighters, militiamen, and Qods Force personnel replete with radio transmitters, money, pamphlets, and supplies.[39] Seized Iranian intelligence documents corroborate such IRGC movements.[40] IRGC officers also helped organize Shi‘i firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr's militia.[41] The very size and scope of such activities, as well as their continuity, suggest that Iranian involvement in Iraq was state-sanctioned and not the result of rogue operators; the latter involve small cells, not large scale deployments.

It was not long before the White House acknowledged concerns about the infiltration.[42] By October 2003, coalition forces had detained more than one hundred Iranians in Iraq.[43] While Hassan Kazemi Qomi, the Islamic Republic's ambassador in Baghdad, declared that "Iran will not accept anything that destabilizes Iraq,"[44] his very appointment suggested the opposite. Within the Iranian hierarchy, ordinary diplomats hold little power. Indeed, when conducting serious policy discussions, both diplomats and terrorists meet with the supreme leader or his office. On July 2, 2008, Velayati, now a special advisor to the supreme leader, acknowledged the subordination of Foreign Ministry personnel within Iranian diplomacy when he reminded officials that the supreme leader remains the ultimate foreign policy decision maker in the Islamic Republic.[45] Sadeq Kharrazi, a former ambassador to Paris and the brother of the former Iranian foreign minister, has also spoken of the subordination of foreign policy to the Supreme Leader's Office.[46] Qomi, however, is not an ordinary diplomat. He is a Qods Force officer specializing in working with militias and local forces.[47] Prior to his appointment to the Baghdad post, he coordinated Iranian aid to Afghanistan and served as the Islamic Republic's chief liaison to Lebanese Hezbollah.[48] Tehran's choice of Qomi for its Baghdad post suggests that far from rogue status, the IRGC coordinates Iranian policies toward Iraq with the full sanction of the Iranian leadership.

Ample evidence underlines the fact that Iranian destabilization efforts in Iraq are state-directed and that U.S. and coalition leadership would be naïve to accept as plausible Iranian denials of destabilization as official policy. An August 8, 2004 editorial in Jomhuri-ye Eslami, the mouthpiece of the Iranian intelligence community, declared that "the time for such a decision and call [for Iran to fight in Iraq] is fast approaching."[49] The call was heeded. Within days, Iraqi forces captured thirty Iranians fighting alongside Sadr's militia.[50] Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, secretary of the powerful Iranian Guardian Council, praised Sadr's resistance. "I should really thank and praise those who are resisting the bloodthirsty wolves," he said while giving the official state sermon, the Islamic Republic's weekly statement of priorities and policies, on behalf of the supreme leader.[51] In addition, seized IRGC documents showed that Tehran was paying 11,740 members of the Badr Corps, the militia of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).[52] The U.S. secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, confirmed that Iran was fueling the insurgency.[53] While diplomats and analysts may question official sanction for small-scale weapons smuggling or infiltration, the presence of an organized payroll suggests a widespread bureaucratic support network.

Iranian duplicity continued over the ensuing years. On March 23, 2006, Khalilzad said that as Iranian authorities professed support for the Iraqi political process, the Revolutionary Guards and Iranian intelligence ministry both sought to train and supply Iraqi insurgents and terrorist groups, both Sunni and Shi‘i.[54] The Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah established camps to train Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (Mahdi army) and other militiamen.[55] What had been a ragtag and unprofessional band transformed quickly into a professional and lethal force. Tensions increased in 2007 with the discovery in Iraq of Iranian-manufactured explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs)—capable of piercing advanced U.S. armor, as well as Iranian mortars, rockets, and sniper rifles.[56] Qods Force members maintained some deniability: They did not place the EFPs themselves but supplied them, trained Iraqi militiamen in their use, and in some cases, had employees of an Iranian charity operating in Iraq pay locals to place them.[57] Again, the coordination between Qods Force and other Iranian entities suggests a greater degree of coordination than possible during a rogue operation.

The sheer continuity of Qods Force operations further undercuts the idea that the IRGC or its elite units operate as rogues. On December 30, 2006, U.S. forces intercepted senior Qods Force operatives at the Baghdad headquarters of SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz Hakim with documents pertaining to weapons and their shipment.[58] Twelve days later, U.S. forces detained five alleged Qods Force operatives in Iraqi Kurdistan,[59] and on March 20, 2007, U.S. forces arrested a Lebanese Hezbollah operative with two Iraqi "special group" members; each spoke of Qods Force support and coordination in a January 2007 kidnapping and murder of U.S. servicemen in Karbala.[60] By contrast, rogue operations are usually limited in both location and time. The sheer breadth of activities some diplomats and commentators dismiss as rogue undercuts such a conclusion.
Case of the British Sailors

Since its seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, the Islamic Republic has embraced unconventional actions and flouted international diplomatic norms as a means of furthering state policy. Here, again, the IRGC plays a crucial role. What many diplomats may see as rogue action appears part of a comprehensive Iranian strategy to bolster negotiating positions. In the poker game of diplomacy, if Tehran feels its cards are weak, it will not hesitate simply to seize new cards. This was the case on March 23, 2007, when, as diplomatic tensions surrounding the Islamic Republic's nuclear program rose, two IRGC speed boats seized fifteen British sailors on an anti-smuggling mission in disputed waters between Iran and Iraq. After several hours of silence, Iranian foreign ministry officials issued a statement accusing the British sailors of violating Iranian territorial waters.[61] Over subsequent days, Iranian officials paraded their captives on television, elicited forced confessions, and threatened to try their captives for espionage.[62]

Some diplomats and many commentators sought to isolate blame on the IRGC alone or its radical backers rather than hold the Iranian government accountable as a whole. "This was deliberate, no kidding," a senior U.S. official told The Washington Post, "the radicals are particularly under enormous pressure."[63] Bruce Riedel, former Clinton administration National Security Council Middle East director, also blamed the IRGC alone rather than the Iranian government.[64] Riad Kahwaji, an analyst for the Dubai-based Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, described the operation against the British sailors as the actions of a rogue IRGC naval commander.[65] Alan Bock, a columnist for The Orange County Register, dismissed the incident as the action of one "overzealous local commander."[66] But context undercuts the rogue action theory. The incident came just two days after Khamenei declared in a Iranian New Year's speech, "If they take illegal actions [such as sanctioning Iran's nuclear program], we, too, can take illegal actions and will do so."[67] Subsequent Iranian behavior makes clear the operation's high-level support. First, on February 12, 2008, during Revolution Day festivities, Iranian authorities rolled the three British naval boats on truck beds during a Tehran parade.[68] Then, on April 14, the IRGC featured Col. Abolqasem Amangah, the mastermind of the operation, in an article on the IRGC website.[69] Finally, on July 1, the IRGC decorated Amangah for his actions.[70]

Tehran has made clear who speaks for it and who it supports. Unwillingness to accept reality can be costly. In June 1941, as the Nazi army drove full steam into the Soviet Union, Soviet premier Josef Stalin remained convinced that the attack was the result of rogue German elements. He wasted precious hours in futile diplomacy, unwilling to accept either Adolf Hitler or the Panzer Units for what they were.[71]
Conclusions

The question of what constitutes rogue activity in the Islamic Republic is crucial to policy formulation and diplomacy. Three U.N. Security Council resolutions, among other targets, have singled out senior IRGC officials for financial sanctions.[72] On October 25, 2007, both the U.S. State and Treasury departments designated the IRGC and Qods Force for their rogue behavior.[73] Such actions are counterproductive, however. Singling out the IRGC or Qods Force for their activities effectively exonerates the remainder of the Iranian government. It is the diplomatic equivalent of excusing a person guilty of murder because only his fingers pulled the trigger.

Even a cursory look at the structure and personnel of the Iranian government and its history of involvement in terrorism and insurgency demonstrate that the IRGC and Qods Force are in fact the opposite of rogues—they are deliberate creations of the Islamic Republic's government, are tightly controlled by the government, and exist to serve the government's policy objectives in Iran and abroad. Many of the Islamic Republic's current leadership—at least the nonclerical portion—spent their formative years at the front serving with the Revolutionary Guards.[74] As they enter politics, these IRGC members operate not only according to official hierarchy—directors-general reporting to deputy ministers, who in turn report to ministers, and deputy governors reporting to governors, for example—but also according to the extensive networks they developed during their IRGC service. Veterans of the same military unit, for example, may invoke back-channel connections to skip levels of bureaucracy or transcend ministerial bureaucracies. Political figures—the governor of Qom, for example[75]—may connect directly to IRGC companions still serving in the military. Perhaps this runs afoul of the bureaucratic process, but it does not suggest rogue activity. After all, it is common to all governments: Before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Secretary of State Colin Powell bypassed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to coordinate policy with his former subordinates from his time as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[76]

What is clear is that both the IRGC and its elite Qods Force represent the core of the Iranian state and enjoy the full support of its supreme leader and his all-powerful office. This does not mean that rogues do not exist within the Iranian political system. As the Islamic Republic has evolved, the supreme leader has narrowed the bounds of acceptable political discourse. What was acceptable in the revolution's first months—Mojahedin-e Khalq, Tudeh (the Iranian communist party), and Iran Freedom Movement—have today become movements outside the bounds of acceptable political debate. With their substantive purge from office, it appears that the reformists, too, are outsiders in the system. U.S. and European diplomats may like these reformers' approach, especially when compared to the current leadership, but desire does not change the reality that the reformers do not operate the levers of power. Indeed, if rogue behavior is defined as operating without state sanction, it is increasingly clear that Mohammad Khatami and his reformist minions are the Islamic Republic's true rogue actors, not the IRGC and Qods Force. These, unfortunately, represent and are indivisible from the regime.

Michael Rubin, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School.

[1] The New York Times, Feb. 12, 2007.
[2] Associated Press, Feb. 13, 2007.
[3] Associated Press, Feb. 15, 2007.
[4] Time, Mar. 23, 2007.
[5] Salam, Aug. 17, 1994, as cited in Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? (Washington: Washington Institute/Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000), p. 73.
[6] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 66.
[7] On control of independent newspapers, see Arash Sigarchi, "The Battle for Cyberspace: Blogging and Dissidence in the Middle East," American Enterprise Institute conference, Washington, D.C., Feb. 4, 2008.
[8] For a history of vigilante groups in Iran, see Michael Rubin, Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001).
[9] Buchta, Who Rules Iran? pp. 47-55.
[10] Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 26-8.
[11] Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Military (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 51.
[12] Katzman, The Warriors of Islam, pp. 30-6.
[13] Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Military, pp. 52-3.
[14] Katzman, The Warriors of Islam, p. 3.
[15] Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 264.
[16] United Press International, Aug. 25, 1986; Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA, Tehran), Aug. 27, 1986.
[17] Associated Press, Oct. 3, 1986.
[18] The Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1986.
[19] Associated Press, Sept. 28, 1987.
[20] Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 69.
[21] Emrooz (Tehran), May 3, 2008.
[22] Asr-e Iran (Tehran), May 6, 2008.
[23] Iran Student Correspondents Association (Tehran), May 22, 2008.
[24] No Safe Haven: Iran's Global Assassination Campaign (New Haven: Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, May 2008), p. 3. For a chronological list of assassination victim and location, see Appendix 1.
[25] Ibid., pp. 25-9.
[26] Ibid., p. 28.
[27] Murder at Mykonos: Anatomy of a Political Assassination (New Haven: Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2007), pp. 2-20.
[28] Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), Aug. 30, 1992, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 2, 1992.
[29] Agence France-Presse, Apr. 11, 1997.
[30] Agence France-Presse, Apr. 14, 1997.
[31] Agence France-Presse, Apr. 19, 1997.
[32] RadioFarda.com (Prague), Dec. 11, 2007.
[33] The New York Times, Nov. 10, 2006; The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 16, 2007; Newsweek, Nov. 26, 2007.
[34] Associated Press Worldstream, Sept. 16, 1998; The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 16, 2007.
[35] Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (Tehran), Oct. 28, 2006; "Amia Case," IRNA, accessed July 14, 2008.
[36] "INTERPOL General Assembly Upholds Executive Committee Decision on AMIA Red Notice Dispute," INTERPOL media release, Nov. 7, 2007.
[37] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (London), June 20, 2003.
[38] Time, Aug. 15, 2005.
[39] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, Apr. 25, 2003.
[40] Time, Aug. 15, 2005.
[41] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, Apr. 9, 2004.
[42] Ari Fleischer, White House news briefing, Apr. 23, 2003.
[43] Agence France-Presse, Oct. 23, 2003.
[44] Hambastegi (Tehran), Apr. 18, 2004.
[45] Alef.com (Tehran), July 2, 2008.
[46] Etemaad-e Melli (Tehran), July 7, 2008.
[47] Time, Apr. 12, 2006.
[48] The New York Sun, Apr. 12, 2004.
[49] Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran), Aug. 8, 2004.
[50] The Guardian (London), Aug. 13, 2004.
[51] Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio (Tehran), Aug. 13, 2004.
[52] Time, Aug. 15, 2005.
[53] The Washington Times, Sept. 8, 2004.
[54] The Washington Post, Mar. 24, 2006; The New York Times, Aug. 11, 2006.
[55] Brig.-Gen. Kevin Bergner, news briefing, Combined Press Information Center, Baghdad, July 2, 2007.
[56] The New York Times, Feb. 10, 2007; Daily Telegraph (London), Feb. 13, 2007.
[57] Kimberly Kagan, "Iraq," in Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Danielle Pletka, Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 2008), p. 20.
[58] The Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2006.
[59] The New York Times, Jan. 12, 2007.
[60] Bergner, news briefing, July 2, 2007.
[61] CNN.com, Mar. 24, 2007.
[62] Sunday Times (London), Mar. 25, 2007.
[63] The Washington Post, Mar. 23, 2007.
[64] The Washington Post, Apr. 7, 2007.
[65] Al-Jazeera English (Doha), Jan. 9, 2008.
[66] Antiwar.com, Apr. 7, 2007.
[67] Associated Press, Mar. 22, 2007.
[68] Asr-e Iran, Feb. 12, 2008.
[69] Sepahnews.com, Apr. 14, 2008.
[70] Agahsazi.com (Tehran), July 1, 2008.
[71] James P. Duffy, Hitler Slept Late, and Other Blunders that Cost Him the War (New York: Praeger Books, 1991), p. 72.
[72] UNSCR 1737 (2006); UNSCR 1747 (2007); and UNSCR 1803 (2008).
[73] "Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism," Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Oct. 25, 2007; "Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., on Iranian Designations," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Oct. 25, 2007.
[74] Ali Alfoneh, "Iran's Parliamentary Elections and the Revolutionary Guards' Creeping Coup d'Etat," AEI Middle Eastern Outlook, Feb. 2008.
[75] I am grateful to Ali Alfoneh for tracing the IRGC membership of current Islamic Republic officials.
[76] Multiple discussions by author with members of the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2004 and 2005.