Friday, October 3, 2008

Defeat Has Become an Acceptable Option!

Suzanne Garment on last night's debate. A very good read. (See 1 below.)

A response from an experienced and prescient memo reader. Also a good read and I replied as follows:

a) We have enough money for education we just waste it on dumb things. Too much obeisance to Political Correctness intrusions.

b) California is a special case because it is run by wild eyed liberals who are totally and fiscally irresponsible. Third world thinking.

c) Best thing would be to close the Department of Education and shift student loans to some other agency.

d) No Child Left Behind - good political sizzle - but wound up leaving all children behind and its focus was on testing not getting children to reason.

e) Training people for the presidency impossible in a free society.

f) We have schools which do train for The State Department, so I rest my case.

g) We are in the current pickle because, as she argues, we the people blew it. We would rather spend than save and thus lead from weakness than strength.

Mencken was right - Boobus Americanus! (See 2 below.)

Biden's comments about Hezballah and Lebanon were totally false. Biden supposedly is Obama's foreign expert. Oh well, he probably just mis-spoke. That's the new way of papering over ignorance. (See 3 below.)

One of the best minds on the Middle East is that of Michael Oren. I have posted his thoughts on how a McCain vs Obama, administration might deal with intractable problems in the region. Very thoughtful and good. Another must read.

Also, Bud McFarlane's article about Obama's willingness to lose in Iraq is quite compelling for those who understand what another military defeat means to our nation.

I am unable to attend a book signing private meeting with John Bolton, Monday but I read his book and wrote a brief review of it. Bolton, like McFarlane, understands why defeat is not an option - the title of his new book.(See 4 and 4a below.)

Dick



1) The Biden-Palin Debate
By Suzanne Garment

If the Republican National Committee has not already wired substantial sums into the Swiss bank accounts of Charles Gibson and Katie Couric, they were robbed.

Their interviews with Sarah Palin, in which the Alaskan governor came out looking like a first-class ditz, are an example of what Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan used to call political jujitsu.

Now, despite the imaginings of Democrats, the Republicans are nowhere near audacious enough to cook up a plot in which Palin, in the weeks before Thursday night's vice presidential debate, would be made to look like a fool so she could startle the debate audience with the news that she is not a fool at all. Palin looked unprepared in the interviews in large part because she was unprepared.

Nonetheless, because of them, it was impossible for the Obama campaign to counter the expectation that she would implode right on stage. She did not implode. In this limited sense, she definitely won.

Whether she won in a larger sense brings us to the matter of the cultural divide that runs as strongly as ever under the river of American politics.

If you were disposed not to like Palin, you would say that Sen. Joe Biden spoke with considerably more sophistication about policy. You would argue that her answers, though improved from past performances, still sounded like talking points. You would say she was manipulative with her down-home stories, her shout-out, her ever-present hockey mom references and her cute little black suit with the big American flag--with rhinestones, yet.

If you were disposed to like Palin, you would note that Biden, while informed, sounded like--well, a politician. You would argue that his answers, though spoken in a language familiar to the East and West coasts, were just as formulaic as hers. You would say that her ability to connect with her audience came not merely from manipulation but from the fact that her words and rhythms of speech really did mirror those of her audience.

From the point of view of a cosmopolitan (including most visitors to Forbes.com), Palin’s performance did not compute. True, she held her own with Biden, meaningless voting statistic for meaningless voting statistic. Yet she spoke the mantras--personal responsibility, low taxes, good jobs, shining city on a hill--that seemed fundamentally inconsistent with the depth of experience needed to govern.
Most of all, there was her voice. Biden’s voice was sometimes passionate but let us understand that he had been there, done that. Palin’s voice was high, perky, earnest, naive, twangy, aw-shucks and altogether unreflective of the weariness, ironies ambiguities that we expect from a leader who has seen and understood the world.

That was what Palin’s voice sounded like to cosmopolitans. Clearly, it did not sound that way to much of the country. Lots of Americans actually talk the way Palin talks (even some of us from Buffalo, which is pretty far east, have been asked to tone down the Midwestern accent). More, for many listeners, her phrases--it’s not our fault that the economy is hurting, but we have to learn the lessons so we’ll never be taken advantage of this way again; there are blunders, but you can’t keep pointing backward if you want to move forward--are not platitudes; they are meaningful indicators of how a leader will govern and are about as concrete as you can get in a presidential debate.

If a participant in one of these debates ever actually outscored his or her opponent on substantive points, the winner would not be a good bet to lead the country. These debates penalize palpable ignorance but do not and should not reward expertise. They test whether a candidate can cite an array of plausible facts within a framework that speaks to the beliefs of listeners. As Disraeli put it more elegantly, “Few ideas are correct ones, and what are correct no one can ascertain; but with words we govern men.”

No one knows how much Palin’s performance will help John McCain’s campaign. But if she is no longer an anchor on the campaign, it is because the debate showed--come to think of it, just as the bailout debate showed--that the country is a lot bigger than we sometimes fool ourselves into thinking it is.

Suzanne Garment, a tax lawyer in New York, is the author of Scandal: The Culture of Mistrust in American Politics.


2)Dick:

Thank you for continuing to post your thoughts. I realize one of your
communicated objectives is to emphasize strengths of Palin, noting
that she is a quick study as well as quick witted. So noted. What
continues to blow my mind is why, in my opinion, there is an ongoing
lack of preparation by either political party to groom, in the long
term, presidential candidates who are ready to step up and be leaders
of this nation. Expectations play a large part in the reaction of
media as well as the American people. So, perhaps part of the
reaction to the surprise element of Sarah Palin's nomination was
because of the appearance that she was pulled out of a hat like some
rabbit in a magic act. Should not be so surprising that she is looked
upon as fodder instead of a viable candidate for vice presidency.
Understand that I mean no disrespect to her but she was placed in the
"prove it" position by McCain from the onset. It is not a secret
which years a president will be elected. It is not a secret how long
their terms extend. So why, election after election, do so many
people feel that they either vote party line or for the least of two
evils? You hear that remark over and over again! Another significant
issue to me, that continues to go unresolved is more about "we the
people of this country" continuing to turn a blind eye to managing,
much less micromanaging our own areas of responsibility while
presuming that our vote is enough intervention for political macro
management of this nation. We the people aren't accountable and have
not held feet to the fire of ourselves much less our leaders. When
Obama asked, "How did this happen?" vis a vis the financial
crisis...we let it happen. I believe what we are seeing is a "trickle
up" effect if you will. America is not managing its debt any better
than the most over-extended households on any street much less main
street. When you have more people voting for a television show like
American Idol than in a presidential election you know we are living
like Alice in Wonderland. I totally agree with your points missed
comments and wish more was covered. As a former debate captain
myself, I am hopeful that the forthcoming presidential debates embrace
the format and inform people instead of being used as a platform to
pontificate.
You and I can agree to disagree about education focus. Having been a
district level school administrator, and a damn good one too, I take
issue with what I believe is rhetoric regarding dummying down
curriculum. A school district is no different than any other
corporation trying to deliver goods on a budget. School districts are
businesses and are in the business of educating. If you operated
Microsoft or Apple on a shoe string budget you would not have an
ability to employ or implement broad based talent pools to address the
varying needs of students, unions of teachers, unions of non-teachers,
administrators or communities surrounding individual schools. The
travesty, in my opinion, is that we don't remember the macro needs of
the nation when addressing education. I was "teacher of the year" of
a state, taught in a district of 350,000 students(4th largest in
country), was second in command of a 50,000 student school district
and head of special education of a district responsible for educating
as well as therapeutically enhancing 4,000 students. Here is my
soapbox....in my 35 year tenure, Dick, I lobbied at the state and
federal levels trying to open eyes of elected officials to the
educational crisis which is just as compelling an issue as the
financial crisis we address now. No results. I taught deaf students
but I am here to tell you that trying to educate selective hearing
government officials is far more challenging and I don't mean that in
a good way. No Child left Behind was a joke. The government was
already defaulting on payments to school districts so where was that
pool of funds suppose to come from? Cutting out administration? Who
would you have fill out all of the inane forms per child in order to
qualify for any funding at all? Teachers? At no time during my
tenure did the government fund more than 8% of the 40% for special
education. So, because it is federally mandated that special needs
enhancements be delivered, those required funds encroach into the
general education fund. Less dollars to educate all kids. If
government did its job of regulating and compensating then perhaps
school officials could do their job, that they spent upwards of 100K
dollars educating themselves, so they would be competent when given
the ability to come through. Ok, so my passion index is showing.
Now I'm going for my morning run with a whole bunch of things to think
about thanks to your marvelous blogging. Wish we lived closer so we
could do this face to face.

3) From “Contentions,” the blog of Commentary Magazine:

In Thursday night’s vice presidential debate between Senator Joe Biden and Governor Sarah Palin, Biden said the strangest and most ill-informed thing I have ever heard about Lebanon in my life. “When we kicked — along with France, we kicked Hezbollah out of Lebanon, I said and Barack said, “Move NATO forces in there. Fill the vacuum, because if you don’t know — if you don’t, Hezbollah will control it.” Now what’s happened? Hezbollah is a legitimate part of the government in the country immediately to the north of Israel.” [Emphasis added.]

What on Earth is he talking about? The United States and France may have kicked Hezbollah out of Lebanon in an alternate universe, but nothing even remotely like that ever happened in this one.

Nobody – nobody – has ever kicked Hezbollah out of Lebanon. Not the United States. Not France. Not Israel. And not the Lebanese. Nobody.

Joe Biden has literally no idea what he’s talking about.

It’s too bad debate moderator Gwen Ifill didn’t catch him and ask a follow up question: When did the United States and France kick Hezbollah out of Lebanon?

The answer? Never. And did Biden and Senator Barack Obama really say NATO troops should be sent into Lebanon? When did they say that? Why would they say that? They certainly didn’t say it because NATO needed to prevent Hezbollah from returning–since Hezbollah never went anywhere.

I tried to chalk this one up as just the latest of Biden’s colorful gaffes. Did he mean to say “we kicked Syria out of Lebanon?” But that wouldn’t make any more sense. First of all, the Lebanese kicked Syria out of Lebanon. Not the United States, and not France. But he clearly meant to say Hezbollah, not Syria, because he correctly notes just a few sentences later that Hezbollah is part of Lebanon’s government. He wasn’t talking about Syria. He was talking about Hezbollah all the way through, at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of his outlandish assertion.

Like many who watched the debate, I was bracing myself for Palin to say something off-putting about foreign policy. She’s the one who needed the crash course, allegedly; Biden is supposedly Mr. Foreign Policy. He’s supposed to be the experienced elder statesman Senator Barack Obama chose to help him govern and fill in some of his knowledge and experience gaps. He’s supposed to know far more about foreign policy than she does.

I wasn’t exactly encouraged by Palin’s answer to one of Katie Couric’s foreign policy questions: “What happens if the goal of democracy doesn’t produce the desired outcome?” Couric used Hamas’ victory in the West Bank and Gaza as an example. Palin either dodged the question or did not understand it.

Biden, though, against all expectations and odds, managed to say something far more bizarre and off-planet than anything Palin has said on the topic to date.

4) THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE
By Michael Oren

Published in: The Journal of International Security Affairs, Fall 2008, September 23, 2008

Supporters of Israel are intensely interested in which of two presidential candidates, John McCain or Barack Obama, is "best" for the Jewish state. Of course, "best" is an inherently subjective concept, colored by whether one regards settlements as beneficial or disastrous for Israel, for example, or the creation of a Palestinian state as essential or deadly. The word also assumes a substantial degree of familiarity with the candidates' positions on issues that impact Israel either directly or collaterally. Attaining such clarity from politicians is difficult even in normal times. But during an election year, it is especially daunting. Speeches by presidential hopefuls geared to special constituencies, statements from commentators and aides, misquotes and gaffes-together these can cloud the contenders' platforms, particularly on matters as complex and controversial as the Middle East. Moreover, more than a little disinformation on Obama and McCain has been disseminated by opponents and interested parties, further obscuring their true views.

Nevertheless, by carefully combing the mass of speeches, interviews, and press releases, a picture of the candidates' policies can still be culled. A map of where Obama and McCain stand on the peace process and other issues crucial to Israel-the War on Terror, the Iraq War, Iranian nuclearization-may be drawn, and points of distinction flagged. And on the basis of these findings, it is possible to speculate how a McCain or an Obama presidency might interact with Israel, to its benefit as well as its detriment.



After Bush

By necessity, any analysis of the policies of the two candidates must begin with an assessment of the legacy that the president-elect will inherit. During his eight years in office, George W. Bush established new standards for the term "pro-Israel." He repeatedly affirmed Israel's right to defend itself against terror, and praised its value as America's primary Middle Eastern ally. He also expressed a deep ideological attachment to Israel as a democracy and, spiritually, to Israel as the biblical homeland. "You have raised a modern society in the Promised Land, a light unto the nations... [and] a mighty democracy," he told the Knesset during Israel's sixtieth anniversary celebrations.[1] And "you can always count on the United States of America to be at your side." Less publicly, the president also authorized an unprecedented level of cooperation between the U.S. military and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including intelligence sharing, anti-terror training, and the joint development of missile defense systems.

On the peace process, by comparison, Bush was less categorical. He became the first American president publicly to endorse the emergence of a Palestinian state and, to that end, he opposed the expansion of Israel's West Bank settlements. Yet Bush also rejected a large-scale repatriation of Palestinian refugees to Israel as well as a return to Israel's 1967 borders, insisting that any treaty take into account the "current realities" created by the settlements. He refused to deal with Hamas and Hezbollah, even obliquely, portraying them apocalyptically as the embodiments of "darkness" and "evil." More radically still, Bush reversed the formula, embedded in UN Resolution 242, of territory-for-peace. If previous presidents required Israel to relinquish territory first and only then receive peace from the Arabs, Bush demanded that the Arabs recognize Israel's existence and renounce violence in advance of retrieving captured land.

Bush's policies disappointed many on the Israeli left who longed for a more activist American role in peace-making, and antagonized Israeli rightists who resented his support for Palestinian sovereignty and his demands for a settlement freeze. Still, Bush remained singularly popular in Israel-considerably more so, in fact, than in the United States. "You have been a true leader," Benjamin Netanyahu, head of the Likud opposition, lauded the president in Knesset. "You have never hesitated from fighting tyranny and defending freedom."[2]

The pro-Israel paradigm established by Bush poses a hefty challenge for Obama and McCain. Neither candidate, though, has shied from meeting it. In spite of some initial questions surrounding his affection for Israel, Obama has been unexceptionally Zionist, asserting that "the idea of a secure Jewish state is a fundamentally just idea," and that "Israel's security is sacrosanct."[3]

McCain, no less effusive, has praised Israel as a bastion of democracy and social justice. He took out time from his campaign schedule to visit Israel and toured the towns along the Gaza border that were regularly shelled by Hamas. Obama visited Israel recently as well.

McCain and Obama have both pledged to maintain Israel's strategic edge by supporting Bush's proposal for increasing military aid to the Jewish State by $30 billion over the next decade. Both have called on the Arab states to recognize Israel in advance of Israeli territorial concessions; both have vowed to take an active, hands-on, role in the search for peace. Nevertheless, in their approach to that process, and their conception of its outcome, the candidates evince some subtle-and potentially significant-differences.



Parsing the Palestinian question

Take, for example, the issues of Israeli settlements and the borders of any future Palestinian state. While McCain has avoided criticizing Israel's settlement policy and balked at delineating the contours of "Palestine," Obama has impugned the settlements and taken up Bush's call for a "contiguous" Palestinian state free of Israeli roadblocks and joined by West Bank-to-Gaza routes. McCain, who did not meet with Palestinian leaders during his Israel visit, has emphasized the Palestinian Authority's duty to clamp down on terror in accordance with the Road Map "We must ensure that Israel's people can live in safety until there is a Palestinian leadership willing and able to deliver peace," he stated.[4] Obama, by contrast, has refrained from mentioning the PA's responsibility in suppressing terror.

Obama and McCain have also differed over aspects of Israel's domestic politics and foreign relations. Obama has expressed strong reservations about the Israeli right, complaining to American Jewish leaders that "there is a strain within the pro-Israel community that says unless you adopt an unwavering pro-Likud approach to Israel then you're anti-Israel."[5]

He has also welcomed the renewal of peace talks between Israel and Syria, and has urged the White House to "support the parties' efforts to achieve their goal of a negotiated settlement."[6]

McCain, however, has not revealed a preference for one Israeli party over another and has withheld comment on the Syria-Israeli discussions. Generally, though, he shares Bush's reservations about negotiating with Damascus "with no preconditions"-presumably, eschewing terror and forfeiting all claims to Lebanon.

Both candidates have deplored Hamas as a terrorist organization committed to Israel's destruction. McCain's position on Hamas has hardened considerably since 2006 when, shortly after organization's electoral victory, he told a reporter, "They're the government [and] sooner or later we are going to have to deal with them."[7] His campaign subsequently retracted the remark and characterized Hamas as a force dedicated not only to Israel's destruction but to the annihilation of the United States. McCain has endorsed the conditions set down by Bush for including Hamas in peace talks-renunciation of terror, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements-but so, too, has Obama. Yet the Democratic contender seems less adamant than his Republican rival in opposing all communications with Hamas. Obama waited five days before distancing himself from former President Jimmy Carter's meetings with Hamas officials; McCain condemned them instantly. And while McCain withheld comment on Israel's ceasefire with Hamas, Obama greeted it as an opportunity to "bring calm to the people of southern Israel, improve life for Palestinians in Gaza, and lead to the release of [captured Israeli corporal] Gilad Shalit."[8]

Obama and McCain also appear to diverge on the peace process's most divisive issue: Jerusalem. Though supportive of talks to demarcate the final borders of Jerusalem, McCain has been unambiguous in his willingness to recognize unqualified Israeli sovereignty over the city, even prior to negotiations. "Jerusalem is undivided," he declared. "Jerusalem is the capital and we should move the [U.S.] embassy to Jerusalem before anything happens."[9]

Obama similarly announced that, "Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel, and it must remain undivided," surprising many of his listeners at a convention of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby.[10] But he quickly qualified that assertion, explaining that the city's final status must be determined by Israelis and Palestinians alone and sealed by "an agreement that they both can live with." Obama has not mentioned moving the American embassy to Jerusalem.

The most fundamental distinction between McCain and Obama on the peace question stems from their perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its relationship to other Middle Eastern disputes. According to the Des Moines Register, Obama told Iowa voters that "nobody has suffered more than the Palestinian people," but later claimed that he had been misquoted and had actually said that Palestinian suffering resulted from "the failure of the Palestinian leadership to recognize Israel and renounce violence."[11]

In his AIPAC speech, Obama assailed "those who would lay all the problems of the Middle East at the doorstep of Israel." But in an interview with The Atlantic, he described the conflict as a "constant wound" and "constant sore" that "infect(s) all of our foreign policy" and "provides an excuse for anti-American militant jihadists."[12] In spite of these reverses, Obama's position seems to reflect the view, long-held by the State Department and reified by the 2006 Iraq Study Group, that the Arab-Israel conflict is a major cause of Middle Eastern upheaval. Tellingly, perhaps, Obama's campaign has been associated with several former State Department officials and foreign policy experts known to favor intensified American pressure to secure Israeli concessions.

McCain's position, in this critical case, is unequivocal. "[1]f the Israeli-Palestinian issue were decided tomorrow," he has maintained, "we would still face the enormous threat of radical Islamic extremism."[13] Defeating that fanaticism, McCain contends, is the prerequisite for-rather than the consequence of-Israeli-Palestinian peace. Neither he nor any of his advisors have indicated a readiness to apply greater pressure on Israel.

On the basis of this comparison, it is reasonable to expect a McCain administration to maintain and perhaps accelerate the Annapolis process initiated by Bush last November, insisting that both Israelis and Palestinians live up to the Road Map's requisites. But McCain is unlikely to ratchet up pressure on Israel, to oppose Israeli claims to Jerusalem, or to link the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with any of the region's manifold struggles. He will not deal with Hamas, even in context of the national unity government that the organization is currently considering with the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

An Obama presidency, however, may well launch an entirely new initiative, one based on zero tolerance for Israeli settlement-building and checkpoints, as well as on the belief that the road to Baghdad and Teheran runs through Bethlehem and Nablus. Obama might be expected to show deeper sympathy for the Palestinian demand for a capital in Jerusalem and greater flexibility in including Hamas in negotiations, if only indirectly, through the national unity coalition with Abbas. Obama will probably seek a broader accord, including Syria as well as other Arab countries, while McCain would focus on the Israeli-Palestinian dimension. McCain's démarche is unlikely to ruffle the U.S.-Israel relationship; Obama's is liable to strain the alliance, especially if, as recent polls predict, Netanyahu and the Likud return to power.

How they will fight

In addition to the peace process, Israel has a cardinal interest in the candidates' attitudes toward other Middle East-related issues, beginning with the war on terror. Here, too, President Bush established a new paradigm based on preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their backers. This aspect of the Bush Doctrine accorded well with Israel, which, since its establishment, has reserved the option to strike its enemies preemptively. Obama and McCain, however, are markedly divided over the policy and the means for battling terror in the future.

Though both have reiterated their readiness to meet terrorist threats with force, McCain has never abjured preemption, stressing his commitment "to uncover [terrorist] plots before they take root."[14] But Obama's recent comments suggest that, rather than embark on preventative military incursions, he prefers to treat terror as a criminal act to be prosecuted post-facto by the courts. "[1]n previous terrorist attacks-for example, the first attack against the World Trade Center (in 1993), we were able to arrest those responsible, put them on trial," he explained to ABC News. "I have confidence that our system of justice is strong enough to deal with terrorists."

Further insight into the candidates' divergent approaches to combating terror can be gleaned from their reaction to the Supreme Court's June 12, 2008 decision granting security suspects the right to petition civilian courts. The ruling, Obama said, was "an important step toward reestablishing our credibility as a nation" and "rejecting a false choice between fighting terrorism and respecting habeas corpus."[15] McCain, on the other hand, called it "one of the worst decisions in the history of this country."[16]

The War on Terror, for both candidates, is inextricably linked to the conflict in Iraq. McCain sees the latter as a natural extension of the former; Obama views the second as a dangerous diversion from the first. Unlike the candidates' stances on the peace process and the fight against terrorism, which are often open to interpretation, their statements on Iraq leave little latitude for debate.

Obama asserts that the Iraqi war has drained America's resources and inhibited it from effectively fighting terror. He denies that the surge has sufficiently reduced violence in Iraq, compelled the Iraqi government to fulfill its sovereign responsibilities, or helped bridge the country's ethnic differences. In keeping with the recommendation of the Iraq Study Group, he has called for a sixteen-month phasing out of the American military involvement. Apart from a "residual force" which will stay behind to guard the embassy, train Iraqi troops, and hunt down al-Qaeda, there will be no permanent American bases. Though he has acknowledged the need to make "tactical adjustments" as the withdrawal proceeds, Obama has determined that "it is time to end this war" and focus on Afghanistan.[17]

McCain insists that America "is winning and will win" in Iraq, which he regards as the central theater in the struggle against Islamist terror.[18] An ardent defender of the Bush administration's "surge" strategy, he believes that withdrawal at this time will endanger Americans at home and bolster Iran and al-Qaeda. McCain has repeatedly cited 2013 as a target date for withdrawal, though he once said that U.S. forces might remain in Iraq for as long as a century, following the Korean model.

These disparities are rife with ramifications for Israel. Long-time advocates of preemption, Israelis may be disappointed by an Obama administration that abandons the tactic and recoils from further preventative action against terrorists. They will have to grapple with the fallout of an American evacuation from Iraq, which is almost certain to be perceived in the region as an Islamist triumph. Still, Israel could benefit from a United States that is less inclined to pursue polices unilaterally and more in line with international opinion.

The situation might be reversed under McCain. The U.S. would continue to press its anti-terror campaign in the Middle East and stay the course in Iraq but remain to a large extent isolated globally. The Israeli ideal of an America that is engaged militarily in the Middle East and in synch with the international community may well prove elusive.

Addressing the Iranian challenge

Yet the ultimate crucible of the candidates' positions affecting Israel lies not in the peace process, in the War on Terror, or even in Iraq, but rather in the burgeoning crisis with Iran. The master of Hamas and Hizbollah, the dominant partner of Syria, and the rising regional hegemon, Iran poses multiple threats to Israel's security-and, through its nuclear program, a danger to Israel's very existence. The Islamic regime that routinely pledges to "wipe Israel off the map" could easily transfer nuclear weapons to one of its terrorist proxies while prompting other Middle East states to achieve to develop similar armaments. Israel could soon find itself in the epicenter of a nuclear neighborhood that is relentlessly hostile and volatile. On no other issue are the Jewish State's interests in the platforms of McCain and Obama so paramount and, potentially, existential.

As McCain's stance on Hamas once hardened, so too has Obama's on Iran. After initially ranking Iran with Cuba and Venezuela that "do not pose a serious threat to us the way the Soviet Union posed a threat to us,"[19] Obama later assured AIPAC members that "the danger from Iran is grave, it is real, and my goal will be to eliminate this threat." He swore to employ "all elements of American power," including military force, to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons.[20] Throughout, though, Obama has emphasized the need for discussions with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "without self-defeating preconditions, but with a clear-eyed understanding of our interests," to locate points of common interest and possibly diminish tensions.[21]

More consistently than Obama, McCain characterized Iran as a threat to the free world, "hell-bent on the destruction of Israel, hell-bent on driving us out of Iraq, [and] hell-bent on supporting terrorist organizations."[22] To deter Tehran, he has recommended a multi-tiered strategy of escalated sanctions and divestment campaigns, without ruling out an eventual use of force. "The military option has to be there," he insisted. But contrary to Obama, McCain rejects the very notion of dialogue with Ahmadinejad. This, he argues, would weaken Iranian moderates and reinforce the radicals. "It's hard to see what such a summit would actually gain," McCain observed, "except an earful of anti-Semitic rants and a worldwide audience for a man who denies one Holocaust and talks... about starting another."[23]

The McCain-Obama split over Iran was poignantly reflected in their reactions to the Kyl-Lieberman Amendment passed in September 2007 and the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued three months later. Endorsed by three-quarters of the Senate, the amendment recognized the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist group and authorized the use of "all instruments of United States national power" to protect Iraq from Iran and its proxies. Though neither senator participated in the vote, McCain hailed the bill for sending "exactly the right message-to Iran, to the region and to the world."[24] Obama, however, derided what he perceived as "saber-rattling" and a "reckless" attempt to perpetuate the American intervention in Iraq and possibly justify attacking Iran.[25] In a similar vein, Obama embraced the NIE as "a compelling case for less saber-rattling and more direct diplomacy," while McCain rebuffed it. "We don't want the intelligence agencies to make the policies," he said.[26]

The Obama-McCain split over Iran presents Israel with life-and-death dilemmas. Israel would certainly gain from a president who garnered international legitimacy by exhausting all possible options with Iran, including offers to communicate, before resorting to violence. But if diplomacy fails to modify Iranian behavior and instead furnishes Tehran with time to complete its nuclear weapons program, the outcome for Israel could be catastrophic. Compounding the stakes for Israel is the fact that-according to current Israeli Defense Forces estimates, Iran will possess an operational nuclear weapon by 2009, rendering either Obama's dialogue plan or McCain's sanction strategy moot.[27]



Alliance in the balance

The presidential election of 2008 is arguably the most pivotal for Israel in its sixty years of existence. The next occupant of the White House can immensely influence the course of Israel's relations with the Palestinians, the Syrians, and a range of Arab regimes. He can alter or maintain American policies on Jerusalem, the settlements, and negotiations with Hamas, and influence the shape and nature of any future Palestinian state. By upholding or disavowing preemption or by reducing or augmenting American troop strength in Iraq, he can radically sway the Middle East's balance of power. Most fatefully, in his determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weaponry, he can fortify Israel's security, if not ensure its survival.

Four months is a long time in a national election, especially one so heatedly contested and close. The Middle East, the world's most protean region, is supremely subject to change. No doubt the candidates will adjust their positions as circumstances shift; they will persist in conveying different messages to different audiences, in clarifying and qualifying their stands.

Yet, in spite of these correctives, the core platforms are unlikely to change. While both aspirants will honor Bush's pro-Israel legacy and actively pursue peace, McCain would be less prone than Obama to pressure Israel for concessions and more inclined to take the Palestinian Authority to task for its Road Map infractions. Obama may prove more flexible than McCain in admitting some role for Hamas in negotiations and recognizing Palestinian claims to Jerusalem. McCain would preserve and Obama would renounce much of his predecessor's policies on preemption and the war on terror; Obama intends to remove American troops from Iraq and McCain plans to retain them. Though unwilling to rule out any option vis-à-vis Iran, Obama wants first to talk with Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders. McCain rules out dialogue but prefers to levy intensified sanctions on Iran before resorting to force.

Gaining an appreciation of these aspects of Obama and McCain platforms will remain vital for supporters of Israel, irrespective of what they think is "best" for it. For them, this analysis can continue as a constructive guide throughout the period leading up to November 4th, and thereafter, a useful reference for the next president of the United States.





Obama; Obama's position reflects the view, long-held by the State Department and by the 2006 Iraq Study Group, that the Arab-Israel conflict is a major cause of Middle Eastern upheaval.



McCain; "[1]f the Israeli-Palestinian issue were decided tomorrow," he has maintained, "we would still face the enormous threat of radical Islamic extremism."[13] Defeating that fanaticism, McCain contends, is the prerequisite for-rather than the consequence of-Israeli-Palestinian peace.

4a) Obama Was Willing to Lose in Iraq: A president cannot treat a war as if it's a game.
By ROBERT MCFARLANE


A profoundly important point is being missed in the campaign debate over which candidate was right on Iraq. In 2006, when conditions on the ground were trending downward and a decision was required either to continue the struggle or to cut our losses, Barack Obama stated that the proposed deployment of more forces, the "surge," was doomed to failure and instead called for a phased withdrawal of all forces within a defined period.

In short, Sen. Obama was willing to lose. It was an astonishing display of ignorance to be so cavalier about defeat, almost as if losing a war was tantamount to losing a set of tennis -- something without lasting consequence.

I recall very vividly April 30, 1975, the day we acknowledged defeat in the Vietnam War -- the day Ambassador Graham Martin and others were evacuated ignominiously from the roof of our embassy in Saigon. Only later did it become clear how damaging that defeat was.

There were consequences for all nations, especially small states who are vulnerable to great-power pressures. In the late 1970s it contributed to a greater Russian willingness to take risks and a more aggressive Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, in the years immediately following our defeat in Vietnam, an emboldened Soviet Union established a dominant influence in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, Nicaragua and ultimately invaded Afghanistan with 100,000 troops.

Our loss also lessened our willingness to criticize the Soviet Union and thereby undermined the struggles of oppressed minorities inside that totalitarian state.

Losing a war also affects the behavior of allies who begin to wonder whether the United States can still muster the means and will to uphold its obligations, and to ask themselves whether they need at least to hedge their bets by being more conciliatory to adversaries. I recall very well the sudden rush of European foreign ministers to Moscow in the late '70s without so much as a preliminary discussion with their counterpart in Washington.

Further, losing a war also has a profound effect on the thinking within our military concerning how it was led, restricted, or abused in wartime. Painful reflection on a loss penetrates every level of the military and conditions its future relationship with civilian leaders -- as it surely did in the wake of the Vietnam War. Specifically, it led to the adoption, at military urging, of the Weinberger Doctrine, which asserted stringent criteria to be met in the future before any resort to the use of military force. These criteria included not committing forces to combat unless it was vital to our national interest, we had clearly defined political and military objectives, and unless the engagement had the support of the American people and Congress -- and then only as a last resort.

Allies and adversaries could see that these criteria were virtually impossible to fulfill, thus worrying the former and encouraging the latter. Yet such was the effect on senior military leaders of losing a war they knew they could have won. We are seeing some of the same disdain within the military toward our political leadership today as a consequence of how civilian leaders mismanaged the war in its first three-plus years.

Losing a war also affects our body politic. Americans have a low tolerance for foreign wars; losing one only reinforces their inclination to avoid foreign involvement and focus on matters here at home. Now is such a time. Yet can you imagine how much worse our political stability would be today -- faced with the financial and housing crises -- if we were also coming home from losing a war?

Consideration of these costs raises the question of whether we are forever bound to continue suffering losses if it becomes clear that we aren't winning. Considering the family of threats we face today, the question is specious. Notwithstanding the hubris and intelligence failure regarding Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program, which motivated our launching the Iraq war in the first place, and our failure to plan for the likely contingency of an insurgency arising, it is difficult to imagine circumstances anywhere in the world today where the U.S. military cannot prevail if properly employed.

This is not at all to say that we should be frivolous toward using military force -- quite the contrary. We are entering a time requiring consummate judgment and careful deliberation toward how to resolve the panoply of challenges before us. Indeed these challenges put a very high premium on coordinating the use of our political and economic resources with allies and avoiding war wherever possible.

The next president will enter office with the war in Iraq winding down but with the conflict in Afghanistan requiring urgent, focused attention. The stakes engaged there go well beyond restoring order in that country alone. How we emerge from Afghanistan will go far toward determining our ability to prevail in the global war against radical Islam, our ability to limit nuclear proliferation, and to bring order and the hope for a brighter future to the almost two billion people in South and Central Asia. These are issues of profound importance to the future security of our nation and our citizens. Losing is not an option, and no sensible leader should entertain the thought that it is.

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