Realism - will it ever drive our diplomatic inititaives?

As long as Sunni-Shia sectarian antipathy was directed elsewhere its more virulent strain was accepted by the Arab/Muslim world. However, when it spilled over the banks in 9/11 and we responded in Afghanistan and Iran causing their historical hatred of one another to spill into their streets threatening many of the Shia ruled autocratic fiefdoms, their leaders are now complaining and fearful.

These sheikdoms maintain our "failed" efforts in Iraq have put them in harms way. They seem unwilling to recognize their own tolerance of hate filled sermons and centers of twisted education might have some connection to that of which they complain.

The US has spent the blood of its youth and untold billions helping others. We have been doing the world's heavy lifting for decades and it has gotten us much scorn and criticism - some deserved, much not.

Though we cannot withdraw from the world it might prove instructive if we lowered our profile, curbed our involvement and let the world function more or less on its own. In fact, we could begin by lowering our funding of the UN and let the French have a go at it. The problem is, Russia and China would like nothing better and are already making inroads, particularly the latter in Africa. So we have to stay engaged. The question is whether we can as domestic support erodes and results are hard to achieve.

The Israelis learned, to their dismay, unilateralism does not work. Maybe one day we will discover our own efforts to deny reality and coddling are the basis of so many of our own self induced disappointments. Sec. Rice is going to the region again and it would be constructive if she took her blinders off and looked at the consequences of our diplomatic wishful thinking.

One of Israel's more liberal newspapers attacked Peretz, and for that matter Olmert as well, for being more interested in power than serving the critical defense needs of the nation. (See 1 below.)

Dennis Ross, who was there and involved, takes Jimmy Carter to task for purposeful ambiguity and playing with Mid East maps. (See 2 below.)

Dick



1) Cowards at the top


If the country's defense is in the hands of the wrong minister, and if everyone in the government recognizes this, the public should not be concerned by who is heading the Labor Party at the end of May - but by who is filling the defense portfolio tomorrow morning. The lack of public responsibility among elected officials, foremost Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, can go only so far. The breakdown in their relations illustrates the government's disconnect from what is really important for the country, and the extent of the selfishness of those in power.

The claim that the defense portfolio "belongs" to the Labor Party due to the coalition agreement is shameful - since the head of the party took the job upon himself, knowing nothing about it, and has proved he is incapable of assessing his skills and limitations, lacks the candor to admit it, and is unwilling to relinquish the post to a more appropriate person.

Amir Peretz destroyed his own career, and he is not worthy of compassion or understanding - only disposal from office. Since Labor is a party with working institutions, is not built around the passing popularity of a charismatic leader, has already recovered from factionalism and the assassination of its leader, and knows how to put forth an agenda and offer new leadership - it should not make do with the anomaly of Ehud Barak declaring his candidacy for "the party leadership and the post of defense minister."

This is not the way a parliamentary system is structured, nor is it how a government should function. Peretz, assisted by his party, must leave his post, and someone worthy should replace him immediately, regardless of the results of Labor's May primaries. Labor will hold internal elections, and the winner will be a candidate for prime minister. The public will follow the developments in the party, and decide how to vote accordingly.

If the prime minister had some leadership qualities, he would have replaced the defense minister a long time ago. Given that Peretz is not regarded as a successful defense minister - not by members of the government, or even the other Labor ministers - it can be assumed that if Olmert were to present Peretz with an ultimatum and ask him to take a different portfolio, Labor would not leave the coalition.

However, that is not how scores are kept in the government. Barak announced he is a candidate for defense minister so he wouldn't be seen as a threat to Olmert; Peretz announced he would not step down so that he could maintain his power before the Labor primaries; and the entire government is sitting and waiting for the five members of the Winograd Committee to do the work the government was elected to do.

This cowardly behavior, which lacks any semblance of statesmanship, is sufficient to show all of them as unworthy of serving in the government. It is impossible to negotiate with the Egyptians, the Palestinians or the Chinese, and to make promises regarding military preparations against the Iranian bomb, when a minor thing that needs fixing is not being fixed.

2)Dennis Ross: Carter mispresents maps to hide Arafat's rejection of peace
Don't Play With Maps
By DENNIS ROSS The New York Times January 9, 2007
www.nytimes.com/2007/01/09/opinion/09ross.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

Washington

I BECAME embroiled in a controversy with former President Jimmy Carter over
the use of two maps in his recent book, "Palestine Peace Not Apartheid."
While some criticized what appeared to be the misappropriation of maps I had
commissioned for my book, "The Missing Peace," my concern was always
different.

I was concerned less with where the maps had originally come from - Mr.
Carter has said that he used an atlas that was published after my book
appeared - and more with how they were labeled. To my mind, Mr. Carter's
presentation badly misrepresents the Middle East proposals advanced by
President Bill Clinton in 2000, and in so doing undermines, in a small but
important way, efforts to bring peace to the region.

In his book, Mr. Carter juxtaposes two maps labeled the "Palestinian
Interpretation of Clinton's Proposal 2000" and "Israeli Interpretation of
Clinton's Proposal 2000."

The problem is that the "Palestinian interpretation" is actually taken from
an Israeli map presented during the Camp David summit meeting in July 2000,
while the "Israeli interpretation" is an approximation of what President
Clinton subsequently proposed in December of that year. Without knowing
this, the reader is left to conclude that the Clinton proposals must have
been so ambiguous and unfair that Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, was
justified in rejecting them. But that is simply untrue.
In actuality, President Clinton offered two different proposals at two
different times. In July, he offered a partial proposal on territory and
control of Jerusalem. Five months later, at the request of Ehud Barak, the
Israeli prime minister, and Mr. Arafat, Mr. Clinton presented a
comprehensive proposal on borders, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and
security. The December proposals became known as the Clinton ideas or
parameters.

Put simply, the Clinton parameters would have produced an independent
Palestinian state with 100 percent of Gaza, roughly 97 percent of the West
Bank and an elevated train or highway to connect them. Jerusalem's status
would have been guided by the principle that what is currently Jewish will
be Israeli and what is currently Arab will be Palestinian, meaning that
Jewish Jerusalem - East and West - would be united, while Arab East
Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state.

The Palestinian state would have been "nonmilitarized," with internal
security forces but no army and an international military presence led by
the United States to prevent terrorist infiltration and smuggling.
Palestinian refugees would have had the right of return to their state, but
not to Israel, and a fund of $30 billion would have been created to
compensate those refugees who chose not to exercise their right of return to
the Palestinian state.

When I decided to write the story of what had happened in the negotiations,
I commissioned maps to illustrate what the proposals would have meant for a
prospective Palestinian state. If the Clinton proposals in December 2000 had
been Israeli or Palestinian ideas and I was interpreting them, others could
certainly question my interpretation. But they were American ideas, created
at the request of the Palestinians and the Israelis, and I was the principal
author of them. I know what they were and so do the parties.

It is certainly legitimate to debate whether President Clinton's proposal
could have settled the conflict. It is not legitimate, however, to rewrite
history and misrepresent what the Clinton ideas were.

Indeed, since the talks fell apart, there has emerged a mythology that seeks
to defend Mr. Arafat's rejection of the Clinton ideas by suggesting they
weren't real or they were too vague or that Palestinians would have received
far less than what had been advertised. Mr. Arafat himself tried to defend
his rejection of the Clinton proposals by later saying he was not offered
even 90 percent of the West Bank or any of East Jerusalem. But that was
myth, not reality.

Why is it important to set the record straight? Nothing has done more to
perpetuate the conflict between Arabs and Israelis than the mythologies on
each side. The mythologies about who is responsible for the conflict (and
about its core issues) have taken on a life of their own. They shape
perception. They allow each side to blame the other while avoiding the need
to face up to its own mistakes. So long as myths are perpetuated, no one
will have to face reality.

And yet peace can never be built on these myths. Instead it can come only
once the two sides accept and adjust to reality. Perpetuating a myth about
what was offered to justify the Arafat rejection serves neither Palestinian
interests nor the cause of peace.

I would go a step further. If, as I believe, the Clinton ideas embody the
basic trade-offs that will be required in any peace deal, it is essential to
understand them for what they were and not to misrepresent them. This is
especially true now that the Bush administration, for the first time, seems
to be contemplating a serious effort to deal with the core issues of the
conflict.
Of course, one might ask if trying to address the core issues is appropriate
at a moment when Palestinians are locked in an internal stalemate and the
Israeli public lacks confidence in its government. Can politically weak
leaders make compromises on the issues that go to the heart of the conflict?
Can the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, compromise on the right of
return and tell his public that refugees will not go back to Israel? Can
Israel's prime minister, Ehud Olmert, tell his public that demography and
practicality mean that the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem will have
Palestinian and not Israeli sovereignty?

The basic trade-offs require meeting Israeli needs on security and refugees
on the one hand and Palestinian needs on territory and a capital in Arab
East Jerusalem on the other. But producing such trade-offs won't simply come
from calling for them. Instead, an environment must be created in which each
side believes the other can act on peace and is willing to condition its
public for the difficult compromises that will be necessary.

So long as mythologies can't be cast aside, and so long as the trade-offs on
the core issues can't be embraced by Israelis or Palestinians, peace will
remain forever on the horizon. If history tells us anything, it is that for
peace-making to work, it must proceed on the basis of fact, not fiction.