Last week's encounter between former acting CIA Director Michael Morell and the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence may have brought us a bit closer to the truth of how four Americans came to be killed at the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, on Sept. 11, 2012, and how their countrymen came to be lied to about it. But the progress toward truth was probably not made in a way that Mr. Morell intended. The encounter on Capitol Hill also made clear that the forum that will take us all the way to the truth must be something other than a congressional hearing.
Mr. Morell announced at the start of the hearing that he was there to refute claims that he had "inappropriately altered CIA's classified analysis and its unclassified talking points . . . for the political benefit of President Obama and then-Secretary of State Clinton." Critics of the government's performance on Benghazi have charged that Mr. Morell's revisions principally although not exclusively involved changing the description of the violence and its perpetrators, and removing the suggestion that they might have had ties to a terrorist organization. These changes, it is argued, enabled Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations at the time, to promote the discredited and since abandoned narrative that the violence was a reaction to an anti-Muslim YouTube video produced by a probationer in Los Angeles.
Enlarge Image
Michael Morell, former acting director of the CIA, examines an enlargement of the Obama administration's Benghazi 'talking points' during congressional testimony, April 2. Associated Press
The acting CIA director's changes to the talking points did indeed enable the blame-it-on-the-video fiction, which served the interest of a president seeking re-election based in part on having put al Qaeda on the run, although in fairness it is not clear that was Mr. Morell's motive. Thus he edited out a description of the warnings that the CIA had provided to the State Department of earlier terrorist attacks on the British embassy and on the Red Cross that caused them to withdraw their personnel, and a description of an attack that blew a hole in the U.S.'s own installation—events that might have suggested that Sept. 11, 2012, was not an isolated event.
Mr. Morell said he did the revising because it would have looked unseemly for the CIA to appear to be pounding its chest and blaming the State Department.
He substituted "demonstration" for "attack" despite the direct statement by the CIA's Libya station chief in Tripoli that there was no demonstration; Mr. Morell changed "terrorist" to "extremist." His explanation is that he relied on the CIA's analysts, who he said had comprehensive information available to them, rather than on the CIA's station chief, who relied on the testimony of eyewitnesses who arrived soon after the attack started. He used the term "extremist" because that's what CIA analysts call terrorists.
Here it is actually possible that Mr. Morell fell victim to a bifurcated culture within the CIA. On one side is the directorate of operations, made up of those who do things, from gathering information to carrying out covert activities. On the other is a directorate of intelligence staffed by analysts who evaluate the information gathered by the directorate of operations and others. Mr. Morell spent his career in the directorate of intelligence. By his own account, when faced with a contradiction between what people on the ground were saying and what analysts were saying, his view was that unless the analysts—whom he called "my analysts"—changed their view, he would go with their version, even though they relied in large measure on local press reports.
The directorate of intelligence functions according to a protocol whose rigidity we more often associate with the military. So analysts whose deductions put them at odds with those on the scene wouldn't have considered, and apparently didn't consider, simply ringing up those on the scene and getting their input. To the contrary, analysts deal only with information that comes in the prescribed way. The CIA station chief's communication to headquarters came in an email and did not get circulated within the intelligence community as it would have if it had been contained in a cable.
There was, as it happens, other information available. A private company, Agincourt Solutions, had followed the Twitter, TWTR +1.07% Facebook FB -0.56% and other social media in the vicinity of the U.S. installation attacked in Benghazi. The company found no evidence of a "demonstration." There were video cameras trained on the front gate of the consulate that showed no demonstration. Days before the attack, al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had been calling for an attack to avenge the death of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a senior al Qaeda member who was, as his name suggests, a Libyan. And Sept. 11 is a date of highly symbolic value to people who set great store by symbols.
The last two data points were certainly available to the CIA analysts, and the camera feed should have been. But all this was discounted, apparently in favor of their consensus view that the attack at Benghazi had started with a demonstration that drew inspiration from violence inflicted on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo—allegedly as part of a protest against the video.
That consensus about what happened in Cairo, which Mr. Morell repeated in his House testimony, is just as flawed as the conclusions initially drawn about Benghazi. The Cairo violence was organized by Zawahiri's brother and ended with the hoisting of the al Qaeda black flag over our embassy.
To be sure, after the attack Mr. Morell pointed out to White House officials during a secure video teleconference on Sept. 15 that the station chief disputed the analysts' conclusion that there had been a demonstration in Benghazi. That objection might have been sobering if the disclosure of the analysts' conclusion had taken place in a setting where the agency was performing its usual task of briefing policy makers who would then take a decision. And Mr. Morell seemed surprised, in this testimony, that the analysts' views were taken public. Yet the CIA was asked soon after the attack by the White House to help draft "talking points," which should have tipped him off that some extramural talking was planned.
Of course, neither Mr. Morell nor the directorate of intelligence is responsible for where the administration took the narrative, which included both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama invoking the YouTube video over the caskets of the four slain Americans when they arrived in this country. Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton told the grieving families that the producer of the video would feel the weight of the law. It was one promise they kept: Nakoula Basseley Nakoula was arrested in the middle of the night in the glare of TV lights for a probation violation—the only arrest thus far growing out of the Benghazi attack, even though the identity and whereabouts of the principal suspects, one of whom is an alumnus of Guantanamo Bay, have long been known.
The Kabuki of a House intelligence hearing—with the witness delivering prepared remarks and committee members keeping one eye on the television cameras and relying on small staffs with many other responsibilities, questioning in five-minute bursts—is not suited to the sustained and focused effort necessary to test a witness's story and to pursue leads, even for members who wish to conduct a serious inquiry. The rules of Congress permit the appointment of a select committee to investigate a particular topic when circumstances warrant—a committee staffed for the job and with no other mandate. Notwithstanding Secretary Clinton's immortal "what difference at this point does it make?," the creation of such a committee is overdue.
Mr. Mukasey served as U.S. attorney general (2007-09) and a U.S. district judge for the Southern District of New York (1988-2006).



1a) Iran Must See Ramifications if Nuclear Talks Fail, Former Advisers Say

ByJay Solomon

Iranian President Hasan Rouhani
Associated Press
Two former top advisers to the Obama administration on Iran are calling for the White House and Congress to increase the threat of using military force against Tehran if talks aimed at curbing its nuclear program fail – or the country’s Islamist government is caught cheating on the terms of an agreement.

This hawkish stance taken by Robert Einhorn and Dennis Ross – both strong proponents of President Barack Obama‘s diplomacy with Iran – underscores the skittishness in Washington and Europe about the prospects for the negotiations losing momentum.

American and Iranian diplomats continue to stake starkly different positions on the end state for Tehran’s nuclear program. The U.S. wants a dismantling of much of Iran’s facilities, while President Hasan Rouhani’s government maintains it will keep them.

The five members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, a bloc known as the P5+1, are scheduled to meet with Iran’s negotiating team next week in Vienna.

Mr. Einhorn served as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s top adviser on nuclear issues during her term and took part in numerous negotiations between the P5+1, before leaving the administration last year.

The proliferation expert, in a paper released by the Brookings Institution this week, called for Congress to pass legislation authorizing new sanctions on Iran and the use of American military force if Iran pulls out of any negotiated agreement or takes steps to produce nuclear weapons. He also calls for the U.S. to coordinate its response with the United Nations Security Council and allies in Europe.

“The president would be required to report immediately to the Congress on the reasons for using military force, including evidence that Iran had violated the agreement and was moving toward the production of nuclear weapons,” Mr. Einhorn wrote in the nearly 50-page Brookings report.

Mr. Ross echoed his former colleague’s positions and called for the Obama administration to clearly state to Iran during the upcoming negotiations the ramifications for diplomacy failing in Vienna.  Mr. Ross is a veteran diplomat and arms negotiator, and served as Mr. Obama’s point man on Iran in the National Security Council during the president’s first term.

“The Iranians must see the consequences, not just of cheating if there is an agreement, but the failure of diplomacy,” Mr. Ross said after appearing at the launch of Mr. Einhorn’s study this week. ”There is an irony: The more we demonstrate resolve, including by talking about consequences of violations…the more we signal to the Iranians that we mean what we say. And that will be key if we are to produce an agreement in the first place.”

Mr. Ross added: “They will have to roll back their program far more than they think, and it won’t happen unless they are convinced of the consequences of not doing so.”
Obama administration officials have refused to discuss the internal deliberations with Iran. But Mr. Obama has repeatedly stated that force remains on the table if the diplomatic track fails.

Next week’s negotiations in Vienna – which start on April 7 – will mark the seventh high-level meeting between the P5+1 and Iran since Mr. Rouhani took power in August. The two sides have set a soft deadline of late July for the talks to be completed, but have said they could be extended by “mutual consent.”


1b)

MEMRI Report Illustrates Abbas' Duplicity

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' stated positions on the core issues framing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are completely contradictory when addressing an Israeli or Western audience versus the Palestinian people and the Arab world. A Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) report outlines the contrasting positions concerning refugees, Jerusalem, and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.
For example, Abbas offers two completely different positions over the rights of Palestinian refugees. He told Israelis visiting Ramallah that he did not wish to flood Israel with Palestinian refugees and their decedents.
“We only put the issue of the refugees on the negotiating table because it is a sensitive matter that must be resolved in order to end the conflict, and so that the refugees are pleased with the peace agreement. In any case, we do not wish to flood Israel with millions and change its demographic makeup. That is nonsense and what was written in the Israeli press is untrue,” Abbas said.
Yet, when Abbas spoke to a Palestinian audience, he said “the right of return is a personal right. No country, authority, organization or even Abu Mazen or [other] leaders can deny anyone of his right.”
In separate remarks to students in Ramallah, Abbas said, “If you want to return to Israel and receive an Israeli citizenship or not – you are free [to decide].” In this context, Abbas is clearly advocating for a Palestinian right of return to pre-1967 Israel, should the individual refugee and his/her descendants decide to do so.
Addressing an Israeli audience, Abbas stressed that Jerusalem would not be divided in any future peace agreement, but would have two municipalities with an appropriate coordinating body.
To Palestinians, he promised that, “Occupied Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine, since without it there will be no solution. No one is authorized to sign [such an agreement]. He added: “Without East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital there will be no peace between us and Israel. I heard that they object to mentioning Jerusalem in any negotiations or talks.”
Abbas told his Israeli audience that the PA would accept a United Nations decision that Israel is a Jewish state. To Palestinians, he vowed that the PA “not recognize [Israel as a Jewish state], we will reject this and it is our right to not recognize the Judaism of the state.”
MEMRI's analysis comes on the heels of Abbas' decision to seek statehood benefits from 15 international bodies despite promising not to make such a move during ongoing peace talks. Those talks now face collapse.
MEMRI's report shows the folly of accepting Abbas' talk of peace and reconciliation when it is directed at Israeli and Western audiences.