Reporters get paid big bucks to ask vapid questions!

The media, having nothing better to do after the episode involving Miss New Jersey, are now entranced over al Qaeda. The press went over the same questions regarding GW's views this morning and he gave them the same answers. These reporters get page huge dollars to be stupid in front of millions of people. Amazing. (See 1 below.)

One of GW's biggest problems is that he did not move seriously enough against the Iraq rebels when he had the opportunity. By fighting the war along politically correct lines he has cost more casualties, spent more dollars, taken longer and thus, in the process, lost the support of the American people, By doing so he has given the nay-Sayers more time to cut the rug out from under him. Democracies, and American's in particular, are action oriented and time becomes an enemy when engaged in war.

James Woolsey, in a recent Op Ed piece in the WSJ; "What About Muslim Moderates" pointed out Britain seems to doing what is correct in terms of reaching moderate Muslims in Britain whereas the Bush Administration seems to be following the wrong path by appeasing radical Muslims and Muslim Organizations mistakenly believing this will gain their co-operation.

Israel has allowed Hezballah to re-arm and again given the advantage to the enemy. Why? Because PC'ism dictates Israel's ability as well as incompetent leadership. Bad combination for victory against one's sworn enemy. (See 2 below.)

Does a Livni interview suggest she differs with her boss, regarding Olmert's willingness to talk with talks with Syria? (See 3 below.)

Daniel Pipes offers his prescription regarding Iran. (See 4 below.)

Netanyahu appears to be a shoo-in for leading Likud and he visits the Lebanese Front and makes some critical observations. (See 5 below.)

Victor David Hanson takes on "Jimmy" and cites an Egyptian reformer. (See 6 below.)

Dick





1) The July 4 Al-Zawahiri Video: Protesting Too Much
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

On July 4, As-Sahab productions released a video to jihadist Web sites that featured al Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The 90-minute production differs from other videos featuring al-Zawahiri in that it uses a number of short audio and video cameos of other people to underscore the points al-Zawahiri is attempting to make. In some ways, the video is almost like a jihadist version of "The Daily Show," with al-Zawahiri as the host using audio and video footage to emphasize his points.

The cameo appearances in the video include jihadist hero Abdullah Azzam, Al-Quds Al-Arabi Editor-in-Chief Abdul Bari Atwan, 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas Kean, Saudi National Security Council Secretary-General Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Kuwaiti academic and Islamist writer Abdullah al-Nafisi and Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia leader Saad al-Faqih, among others.

The tone with which al-Zawahiri addresses Hamas and the larger Palestinian situation seems to indicate the video was recorded prior to Hamas' mid-June offensive that consolidated the group's control over Gaza. That would mean the video was recorded before al-Zawahiri's audio message released June 25, which noted the Hamas victory in Gaza and called on Hamas to establish a government in Gaza based on Islamic law.

The video was followed by the July 10 release of another recording from al-Zawahiri in which he threatens the United Kingdom for knighting author Salman Rushdie. Like his June 25 recording, it is a video comprising an audio recording and a still picture of al-Zawahiri. The flurry of recent recordings has been similar to the media blitz of last summer, except that Osama bin Laden was in the mix last time.

The July 4 video is clearly defensive in nature, though al-Zawahiri attempts to adopt a positive tone. It is an attempt to shore up the crumbling jihadist facade in Iraq, counter the fatwas and other statements from clerics condemning al Qaeda and jihadist ideology and, in a larger sense, assert al Qaeda's power. However, a careful review of the video reveals the places in which al Qaeda is feeling pressured and is attempting to push back. Furthermore, al-Zawahiri's need to have others proclaim al Qaeda's accomplishments -- a need a truly powerful entity would not have -- leaves viewers with the feeling that, to paraphrase The Bard, the jihadist doth protest too much.

Pressure Points: Unity in Iraq

The first obvious pressure point for al-Zawahiri and al Qaeda's core leadership is Iraq. Momentum has shifted in Iraq, and things are not going well for al Qaeda there. Tactically, al Qaeda's Iraqi node can still kill people -- but strategically, the group's hopes of establishing a caliphate there under the mantle of the Islamic State of Iraq are rapidly fading. These dashed hopes have caused the group to lash out against former allies, which has worsened al Qaeda's position.

One of the reasons for this state of affairs is, according to al-Zawahiri, lack of unity. The controversy over the legitimacy of the Islamic State of Iraq is one source of that disunity. Some Islamic scholars and Iraqi tribal leaders say the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq was proclaimed prematurely, and that such a political entity can only be legitimately formed after the jihadists have been empowered. Al-Zawahiri says that many of the people who call the Islamic State of Iraq premature supported the formation of a similar government in Peshawar while the Soviets still controlled Afghanistan. Of course, al-Zawahiri fails to mention that, unlike Iraq, all the groups involved in Afghanistan were united in their opposition to the Marxist government in Kabul and its Red Army backers.

Al-Zawahiri also says the Islamic State of Iraq is more empowered and independent than the Hamas-led government in the Palestinian territories and has a larger army, but that the Palestinian government is considered legitimate while the Islamic State of Iraq is not.

During the video, al-Zawahiri not only calls for unity among the jihadists and nationalists in Iraq, he also tries to reach out to the Palestinians, Shia, Arab nationalists and Kurdish nationalists. This outreach to the Shia and failure to criticize Iran when discussing the situation in Iraq is a marked contrast to the July 8 statement from Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, in which he threatened the Shia and the Iranian government. Al-Baghdadi's group has also attacked scores of Shiite targets -- a strategy the group began under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's leadership, and one that al-Zawahiri counseled against.

Al-Zawahiri calls on the jihadists to "strengthen one another, and guide one another, and advise and instruct our brothers, even if we differ with them, and that we must study how to close gaps between us, in order to make use of and benefit from every achievement achieved by our mujahideen brothers." He also says this must be done "even where there are shortcomings or something less than perfection" -- a reference to the Islamic State of Iraq.

Al-Zawahiri posits that al Qaeda's efforts at fostering unity have set an example for others to follow. He says that because of al Qaeda's promotion of unity, Allah blessed its attacks against the U.S. embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole, along with the 9/11 attacks, and has protected al Qaeda's leaders from their enemies. He seems to forget the way his own ideological shift from the near to the far enemy, and his alignment with bin Laden, inflamed divisions in the already fractious Egyptian militant community.

Al-Zawahiri says al Qaeda is constantly striving to "unite the ranks of the mujahideen" and indicates that other independent jihadist groups have recently agreed to join the al Qaeda umbrella group. He says al Qaeda will soon announce the addition of some groups to its coalition, but that other groups prefer their union with al Qaeda be kept quiet right now. Al-Zawahiri did not provide any clues as to which groups have joined, but it is not illogical to conclude that, based on recent events, he could have been referring to Palestinian, Lebanese and Kashmiri groups.

However, even this assertion that more groups are in al Qaeda's ideological orbit is telling. If al Qaeda's ideology had momentum, if the Ummah were rising up in response to al Qaeda's call, there would be no reason to hide the affiliation. If, on the other hand, the United States and its allies have begun systematically dismantling al Qaeda's local nodes, then it makes sense that some of the weaker groups would want to avoid bringing that kind of pressure on themselves. Thus, a statement that al-Zawahiri intended to be an expression of strength is, in effect, a concession of weakness.

Ideological Assaults

Al-Zawahiri notes that the battles of the "crusaders and their slaves" (referring to the Muslims who cooperate with the United States and its Western allies) have expanded to the "doctrinal and moral fronts." He also says the "Ummah is currently facing a deceptive propaganda war from the Americans and their agents." These are references to the ideological war Stratfor has discussed as the only way jihadism can ultimately be defeated.

Clearly, al Qaeda also sees the attacks against its ideology as a significant threat. In fact, al-Zawahiri says, "I would like to remind everyone that the most dangerous weapons in the Saudi-American system are not buying of loyalties, spying on behalf of the Americans or providing facilities to them. No, the most dangerous weapons of that system are those who outwardly profess advice, guidance and instruction …" In other words, al Qaeda fears fatwas more than 500-pound bombs or cruise missiles. Bombs can kill people; fatwas can kill the ideology that lies at the root of the problem.

Al-Zawahiri also laments specific fatwas issued by clerics declaring that the jihad in Iraq is not obligatory and who forbid young Muslim men from going to Iraq. To counter these fatwas, al-Zawahiri plays an audiotape of Azzam (while a photo of Azzam is shown), in which Azzam comments on how jihad is the individual duty of every Muslim. Al-Zawahiri then urges Muslims to ignore such fatwas and scholars: "O youth of Islam, don't listen to them, and I convey to you the mujahideen's commanders' mobilization of you, so hurry to Afghanistan, hurry to Iraq, hurry to Somalia, hurry to Palestine and hurry to the towering Atlas Mountains." He also rails against the "religion traders in Iraq and Afghanistan to deem as haram (forbidden) the jihad against the invaders."

One reason the al Qaeda leadership is so threatened by these ideological attacks is that neither bin Laden nor al-Zawahiri has any Islamic scholarly credentials. Many Muslims do not believe they possess the training and authority to issue a fatwa.

Attacks Against the House of Saud

A significant amount of this video is devoted to an attempt to undermine the Saudi government as personified by the Saudi royal family. Though the tape also briefly mentions the other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Saudi regime receives a prolonged treatment, and the video clips of al-Faqih, Prince Bandar, al-Nafisi and others are used to vilify the House of Saud. Of course, verbal attacks against the Saudi regime are nothing new for al Qaeda. In bin Laden's August 1996 fatwa, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," he spends more ink condemning the Saudis than he does condemning the Americans the fatwa was reputedly authored against.

These attacks against the Saudis are meant to not only undermine the Saudi clerics' authority to issue fatwas, they also attempt to thwart Saudi efforts to halt the violence in Iraq. Such a settlement would effectively put al Qaeda's Iraq node out of business and hasten the demise of the Islamic State of Iraq. To this end, al-Zawahiri warns the divided jihadist and nationalist militant groups in Iraq that, "If the agents of the Saudi state were to take control of government in Iraq, or the regions of the people of the Sunnah, the Iraqis would then suffer the same repression and humiliation which the people suffer under Saudi rule." Elsewhere he says, "If Saudi influence were to spread in Iraq, it would impose on the people of Iraq a ruling clique which would own what is above the ground and beneath it, and would sell Iraq in its entirety to the Americans." He clearly wants to keep Iraq's tribal leaders off the Saudi bandwagon.

Egyptian Statements

Over the past several months, former Egyptian militants have issued a string of statements renouncing violence and al Qaeda. These statements, some of which have come from al-Zawahiri's friends and family members, appear to be another pressure point for him. He denounces the statements as the "blackmailing of the tortured and mutilated captives … who have been stripped of their thoughts and beliefs, and had their convictions removed for them to declare their remorse, regret and retractions ..."

Elsewhere he says, "I read a ridiculous bit of humor in Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, which claimed that it received a communique from one of the backtrackers, who faxed it from prison. I laughed inside and asked myself, 'Do the prison cells of Egypt now have fax machines? And I wonder, are these fax machines connected to the same line as the electric shock machines, or do they have a separate line?'

"Thus, I caution my Muslim brothers everywhere against the statements and retractions of the graduates and guests of the prisons, on the peninsula and in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Indonesia and all lands of Islam. They are either those who have been coerced and before whose eyes the memories of the torture, lashing, suspension and shocks play like a film, or are those who are disheartened and fallen and looking for a way out of prison and a little comfort. Neither type is to be listened to or relied upon in his statements and opinions …"

Despite his joke about the fax machine and the advice not to listen to these statements, al-Zawahiri is clearly bothered and issues a challenge: "Thus, I tell these enemies: This is not a noble fight, to be alone with an isolated prisoner and squeeze him physically and psychologically until he agrees with you for you, then to applaud that. If you are real men, then compete with us by yourselves, in the arenas of ideology, invitation and information, which are the arenas in which you yourselves have admitted your defeat."

Now, if the enemies of al Qaeda have admitted defeat in the area of ideology, how can al-Zawahiri call ideological attacks the most dangerous weapon facing al Qaeda? These ideological attacks clearly concern him greatly.

The End Strategy

Al-Zawahiri ends the video by mapping out a two-part strategy. The short-term plan involves targeting "Crusader-Jewish interests … in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia and everywhere we are able to strike their interests." The long-term plan is to change the "corrupt and corrupting" regimes in the Muslim world once the crusaders and Jews have been defeated and can no longer support these regimes.

The video contains some clips of Atwan and al-Nafisi talking about how al Qaeda has masterfully played its strategic hand, and trumpeting the organization's strength, but when taken in light of the only criterion that really matters -- successful attacks -- these proclamations ring hollow. Had al Qaeda recently conducted spectacular attacks, there would have been no need for the inclusion of video and audio footage of people informing the public of the jihadists' power. Their actions would have spoken for themselves.

Upon reflection, perhaps their actions have.

2)Hizballah Has the highly mobile Rapier 2 anti-air missile for Downing Israeli Warplanes One Year after Lebanon War


One year ago to the day, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist Hizballah sent a unit across the border into Israel and ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing eight of its members and kidnapping two. The raid, followed by a Katyusha rocket attack on northern Israel sparked the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and a 34-day war.

Military sources report that Hizballah is in better military shape than ever before. its sponsors, Iran and Syria, have not only replenished the rocket stocks depleted by daily barrages against Israeli towns and villages, but topped them up by 50%. Whereas Hizballah started the 2006 war with 12,000 rockets of different types, today the Lebanese Shiite terror group has accumulated 18,000 in its arsenal.

Drawing lessons of that war, Hizballah has doubled the number of teams trained to launch rockets and given them a fleet of all-terrain vehicles and motorbikes for speedy movement between firing locations.

Hizballah’s long-range rocket force, designated “Planning Unit,” is stationed in northern Lebanon in the Hermel district. Most of the new rocket supplies, including hundreds of Zilzal-2, Zilzal-3, and Fatah-110, which has a range of 250 km (reaching Tel Aviv and points south), are stored in large emergency depots on the Syrian side of the border with Lebanon to keep them out of sight of UN peacekeepers and out of the way of the Israeli Air Force in a flare-up of hostilities.

Hizballah plans to delay hauling the rockets into Lebanon until the last moment before they are fired.

Hizballah’s short-range rocket unit, designated the “Nasr Unit”, is stationed in the Tyre region of the South and its command center in the village of Maarub. They are positioned for striking the northern Israeli towns of Haifa, Kiryat Shemona, Tiberias, Safed, Acre and Nahariya.

To stay out of sight of UN peacekeepers policing in the South, this brigade keeps a low profile, reactivating only very few of the bunkers which served them in the war. the bulk have been cleared out, restocked with ammunition and combat rations, prepared for military use and kept closed.

This enables the Lebanese government and, less willingly, the Israel high command, to maintain that a lot has changed for the better since the war and Hizballah is no longer deployed right up to the border but at a distance.

This is only a half-truth. The fact is that the Shiite terrorists are back in the South, albeit well hidden in the Shiite villages. Consequently, Israeli policy-makers can continue to spin illusions, like those the Olmert government fed the public and the media before the last war.

Hizballah has tripled its shore-to-sea C-802 missiles, one of which crippled an Israeli missile ship in July, 2006. With 25-30 of these weapons, the Shiite militia is capable of menacing any of the warships cruising Mediterranean waters opposite the Lebanese coast, be they Israeli missile boats, the American Sixth Fleet or the European flotilla attached to UNIFIL.

Several dozen more are concealed across the Syrian border, ready for transfer at short notice.

Hidden there too is double the number of anti-tank missiles in service with the Hizballah in 2006, of types which caused heavy damage and casualties to Israeli tank crews. Syria has upgraded this stock with a large supply of “Third Generation” missiles bought in Russia with Iranian funding.

Another major difference between then and now is that Hizballah has established its first air defense unit armed with ground-to-air shoulder-borne Strela-7 missiles and the mobile Rapier 2s.

Last year, Hizballah fielded 1,600 well-trained commandos, the backbone of its fighting force, and lost 750 in combat with the Israeli army. Since then, 1,200 fresh fighters have been recruited and are undergoing commando training at a special facility near Tehran.

Each course of three to four months has an intake of 300 to 400 Hizballah recruits. The third course went into training in July. By the end of the year, Hizballah will have some 2,000 elite troops, 400-500 more than its number at the outset of the last war.

Hizballah’s secretary-general, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, presents a charismatic, powerful image. However, since the war, Iran and the movement’s leadership have reduced his mandate to internal Lebanese politics in opposition to prime minister Fouad Siniora and the rest of Lebanon’s anti-Syrian political bloc, headed by Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt.

The militia’s present war chief, special operations planner and liaison with Iran, Syria and al Qaeda, is the veteran Hizballah super-terrorist and kidnapper, Imad Mughniyeh.

Serving under him as chief of staff is Ibrahim Aqil.

Number 3 in the movement’s military hierarchy is Hajj Khalil Harb, commander of Unit No. 1800, which kidnapped the Israeli soldiers Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev in its cross-border raid of July 12, 2006, and is responsible for special operations in Israel, the Palestinian territories and Iraq.

Members of this elite unit are deployed in the Gaza Strip in support of Hamas.

In Iraq, they cooperate with Sunni and Shiite terrorists fighting US troops.

Unit No. 1800 has a permanent complement of 5,000 trained men and a partially-trained reserve force of 9,000 on standby.

The militia’s fighting manpower, including its special intelligence and security agencies, totals between 15,000 and 16,000.

3) FM Livni: Israel should not enter talks with Syria


Israel should not talk to Syria, and the region as a whole should deal with the country, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said in an interview with French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur quoted by Israel Radio Thursday afternoon.

"The rumors regarding the renewal of talks between Israel and Syria are baseless," Livni was quoted as telling the magazine.

"Syria continues playing a dangerous game. It supports Hizbullah, inflicts damage to the independence of Lebanon and keeps a dangerous partnership with Iran," Livni said.

On a different topic, Livni rejected the notion of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, saying such a move would lead to a civil "war between the Palestinian similar to the one in Gaza," referring to Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip following several days of fighting between the Islamist organization and the secular Fatah faction.

Earlier Thursday Reuters reported that Syria has signalled to the UN's Middle East envoy a willingness to change its relationship with Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas if progress were made towards a peace deal with Israel.

UN special envoy Michael Williams told Reuters in an interview that he has conveyed to top Israeli officials his "impressions" from talks with Syrian leaders in recent months, but acknowledged deep-rooted suspicions on both sides would make reviving the peace process difficult.

Williams said Syrian officials had made clear to him during his recent visits to Damascus that they believed negotiations that collapsed in 2000 had largely set the parameters for a deal.

"The Syrian side has basically said, 'Look, the work is done. It's here in the drawer. The big issues like water, security and access were all looked at then, were pretty much thrashed out. So if negotiations were resumed, then maybe we could make real progress,' " Williams said.

A Syrian Foreign Ministry official recently said Israel and Syria had solved some 85 percent of the problem in past negotiations.

US President George W. Bush, however, has shown little enthusiasm for an Israeli-Syrian peace track, casting doubt on the chances of progress.

Williams said he believed that Syria's assessment that a deal was "in the drawer" was "somewhat exaggerated."

"It is difficult. There's awkwardness on both sides that stems from the history of their relationship over 60 years. It's very difficult to remove the suspicions and antipathies that have resulted from that," Williams said.

Williams said he briefed Prime Minister Ehud Olmert last month on his talks in Damascus.

Williams said he believed Israel was genuinely interested in "testing the waters" for a resumption of talks, and that he was using his role as a go-between to try to "clarify for each what I perceived to be the other's view".

"I think both sides find it quite difficult making an assessment of each other," Williams said.

Olmert has said he was willing to hold direct talks with Damascus provided it was willing to sever ties with Iran, Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas.

Asked by Reuters if Syria had shown a willingness to sever those relations, Williams said: "The impression I got from my visit to Damascus was that if there was progress in terms of establishing a peace track, then we would see some changes in Syrian behavior on the three issues, Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas."

Williams did not offer specifics about how those signals were conveyed and how seriously he took them.

4) Unleash the Iranian Opposition:[the Mujahedeen-e Khalq]
by Daniel Pipes


Navigating the fractious currents of émigré politics is never easy, and especially for the Iranian opposition group known as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq or the People's Mujahedeen of Iran. Simply put, the rogue oil state regime it opposes terrifies one half the West and tempts the other, and the MEK is itself accused of being a superannuated Marxist-Islamist terrorist cult.

These obstacles have not, however, prevented the MEK from trumpeting Islamism as the new global threat, providing important intelligence to the West – for example, about Iran's nuclear program – terrifying the regime in Tehran, and putting on major displays of anti-regime solidarity.

Participants at a Mujahedeen-e Khalq rally outside Paris on June 30 boisterously welcomed Maryam Rajavi.


I witnessed one such display at a vast exposition hall outside Paris last week, where some 20,000 Iranians from around the world met to hear music from the old country, wave flags and banners, and listen to brief speeches by non-Iranian well-wishers – notably U.S. Congressman Bob Filner, Democrat of California, and former Algerian prime minister Sid Ahmad Ghozali. The crowd then settled in for an 85-minute tour d'horizon by the MEK leader, Maryam Rajavi.

The meeting inspired several observations. First, the slick production, with hints of an American political convention – balloons and chaff falling from the rafters, a televised sequence of the leader arriving in cavalcade – was aimed mostly at an audience outside the hall, especially in Iran.

Second, the event had two apparent goals: reminding Iranians that an alternative does exist to today's theocracy, plus pressuring the European Union to remove the MEK from its terror list. For Iranians, the music portion included pretty girls in (for them, daring) Western clothing. For Europeans, it pointedly included "Le chant des partisans," the anthem of the French Resistance during World War II.

Third, Rajavi's in-depth analysis mentioned neither the United States nor Israel, something extremely rare for a major speech about Middle Eastern politics. Nor did she even hint at conspiratorial thinking, a deeply welcome change for Iranian politics.



Young singers at the Mujahedeen-e Khalq rally outside Paris on June 30. Many participants wore vests inscribed with the slogan, "Notre choix, Maryam Rajavi," an allusion to the MEK leader.

Finally, no other opposition group in the world can mount so impressive a display of muscle as does the MEK, with its thousands of supporters, many young, and a slate of dignitaries.

These factors, combined with the mullah's near-phobic reaction toward the MEK, suggest that the organization presents a formidable tool for intimidating Tehran.

Alas, Westerners presently cannot work with the MEK, due to a 1997 decision by the Clinton administration, followed five years later by the European Union, to offer a sop to the mullahs and declare it a terrorist group, putting it officially on a par with the likes of Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hizbullah. A Portuguese member of the European parliament, Paulo Casaca, notes that "Officials on both sides of the Atlantic are on the record as saying that the only reason why the group was put on the U.S. terrorism list in the first place was to send a ‘goodwill gesture' to the Iranian regime."

But the MEK poses no danger to Americans or Europeans, and has not for decades. It does pose a danger to the malign, bellicose theocratic regime in Tehran. The MEK's utility to Western states is reflected in the inconsistent, even contradictory, U.S. government attitude toward it over the past decade. One amusing instance came in October 2003, when Colin Powell, the secretary of state, tartly wrote Donald Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense, to remind him that the 3,800 MEK forces at Camp Ashraf in Iraq were supposed to be treated as captives, not as allies.

But there will be nothing amusing as the American presence in Iraq winds down and thousands of unarmed MEK members are left to the tender mercies of the pro-Tehran regime in Baghdad. Belatedly, the Bush administration needs to take three steps. First, let the MEK members leave Camp Ashraf in a humane and secure manner. Second, delist the organization from the terror rolls, unleashing it to challenge the Islamic Republic of Iran. Third, exploit that regime's inordinate fear of the MEK.

As Patrick Clawson and I suggested over four years ago, "To deter the mullahs from taking hostile steps (supporting terrorism against coalition troops in Iraq, building nuclear weapons), it could prove highly effective to threaten U.S. meetings with the MEK or providing help for its anti-regime publicity campaign."

That remains good advice, but there's not another four years to wait.

5) Netanyahu: We'll give as good as we get

Opposition leader visits north on anniversary for Lebanon War. 'Upcoming Winograd report will change political map' he says



Opposition leader MK Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) visited the Upper Galilee Thursday, marking the first anniversary of the Second Lebanon War.


He was accompanied by MK Haim Katz (Likud) and former head of the Northern Command, major-general (ret.) Yossi Peled.

The three began their tour at border-mark 105, where IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were kidnapped last July.



They continued down to Kiryat Shmona, where Netanyahu commented on what he called the "events leading up to the war".



"There is a direct link between the hasty retreat from Lebanon, through the restrained response we showed to the kidnapping that took place that year, down to the kidnappings last year and the war that followed.



"As I said before – we will give as good as we get… this is a clear equation. If they (Hizbullah) fire Katyushas at us, they can expect a formidable response.



"I've spoken to the kidnapped soldiers' families earlier today," added Netanyahu. "I told them I hope we'll have good news for them soon."



''There's no grand plan'

"I am utterly amazed," said Netanyahu when he visited shelters in Kiryat Shmona and addressed the ongoing debate regarding the uninhabitable state most of them are in.



"Most of these shelters were renovated with contribution funds not with government funds… I don't understand why the government can't find a few dozen million shekels to take care of the shelters throughout the north.



"The separation fence cost us 10 billion shekels, which we had no problem finding at the time, regardless of the budget," he said, adding "I guess that's the way things are when there's no grand plan."


Netanyahu went on to say he believed the next general elections would be held in 2008, and that the upcoming Winograd report would have a profound affect on the political map in Israel.

6) Upside-Down Politics in the Middle East
By Victor Davis Hanson

Jimmy Carter - a self-proclaimed champion of human rights and nonviolence - has called the U.S.'s unwillingness to accept the 2006 Palestinian election of the terrorists of Hamas "criminal."

But unlike Carter, Egyptian reformer Sa'd Al-Din Ibrahim - no friend of the United States - thinks members of Hamas are real criminals.

In an article on the terrorist organization's recent takeover of Gaza, Ibrahim wrote, "The Hamas fighters behaved in a barbaric, bloody manner, while repeatedly (shouting) 'Allahu Akbar' and religious prayers. . . . The victors executed a number of Fatah leaders and fighters, shooting them or throwing them from the roofs of buildings, with no trial - not even a mock trial."

Carter is one among many Western liberals who either ignore or, worse, defend Hamas and other acknowledged enemies of free speech, due process and religious and political tolerance.

After the attempted jihadist bombings last month in London and Glasgow, new British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that his ministers were not to connect Muslims with terrorism. Then he even ordered the nomenclature of a "war against terror" dropped.

But a former British jihadist, Hassan Butt, argued in an op-ed in the Guardian of London concerning the failed plots that Islam is integral to the current epidemic of global terrorism.

"What drove me and many of my peers to plot acts of extreme terror within Britain, our own homeland and abroad," wrote Butt, "was a sense that we were fighting for the creation of a revolutionary state that would eventually bring Islamic justice to the world."

In anger at the Bush administration's refusal to meet with the Assad regime in Syria - which conducts assassinations of Lebanese reformers, aids terrorists in Iraq and funds Hezbollah and Hamas - House Speaker Nancy Pelosi flew to Damascus for direct talks.

Yet some of her critics were liberal Syrians fighting for freedom at great risk to their lives.

"So much of Syria's opposition was against Pelosi's visit, against the EU's talks with the regime," remarked Syrian reformist Akram al-Bunni. "They believe that these offers of friendship strengthen the regime and increase its totalitarian tendencies, and they're angry."

Western liberals seek to downplay the Islamic roots of terrorism and engage in dialogue with authoritarian regimes and movements. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern dissidents find themselves in an odd, if not embarrassing marriage of sorts with the conservative Bush administration on the need to identify and confront the causes and abettors of intolerance and terror.

What explains such strange political alliances?

Modern liberals - fearful of offending non-Westerners - have almost become more like old-time conservatives in their "live and let live" politics and neo-isolationism.

In contrast, some conservatives have gradually drifted away from their past realpolitik and easy detente with illiberal regimes.

Such an about-face did not start with George Bush and his now maligned neo-con advisers. It was evident earlier with Ronald Reagan. He rejected detente with the Soviet Union and instead championed religious and political dissidents, calling for the end of, not tolerance of, the tyranny of the Soviet "evil empire."

Liberals, on the other hand, have embraced multiculturalism often in guilt and as a reaction against past purported Western chauvinism. We are not supposed to judge different religions and foreign cultures by imposing our own arbitrary standards of morality.

But the end result of multiculturalism in the real world is an insidious relativism. So Jimmy Carter turns a blind eye to Hamas' street executions. Gordon Brown fears offending radical Muslims, and Nancy Pelosi flies to embrace Syrian President and terrorist enabler Bashar al-Assad.

Conservatives more often believe in universal absolutes: Some things like authoritarianism are always worse; others like freedom are always better, regardless of cultural differences.

At home in a freewheeling, affluent society, such rigid consistency may seem reactionary, unimaginative and unrealistic. But, abroad, it can translate into something different, as more Western conservatives than liberals have supported such troublemaking champions of individual rights as former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky or the Somali-born former Dutch legislator Ayaan Hirsi Ali.

Finally, there is the matter of tactics. Liberals believe more in universal redemption through nonviolence. Evil is not so much innate as it is a result of poverty, prejudice or some sort of oppression. Its antidote then should be education, understanding, dialogue and diplomacy. So don't give up on an Assad, demonize Islamists or isolate Hamas.

Conservatives are more likely to believe evil is elemental, so combating and isolating it is the necessary first step in protecting the weaker from harm.

Who, then, condemns religious fanaticism, terrorists and their illiberal state supporters in the Middle East? Not necessarily, as we would expect, contemporary liberals. Instead, they now more often rail about the Patriot Act at home than the jailing or killing of innocents in places like Damascus and Gaza.