Wednesday, July 18, 2007

Does Confusion reign? Can Political Parties function?

Friedman discusses the NIE Report, the seeming confusion regarding the make-up of al Qaeda and other matters pertaining to Iran, withdrawal and the general threat from terrorists.

One of GW's problem of waning U.S. support against his efforts to combat terrorism is that he has been successful in protecting our own nation from harm. When the wolf leaves the door for a long period those inside feel safe and drop their guard. An attack on this nation would have two consequences:

a) It would put Democrats in a terrible position.

b) The media would attack GW for being unprepared. (See 1 and 3 below.)

An investment manager recites history and gives a warning but acknowledges he has been wrong near term as I have as well. (See 2 below).

Has GW had the rug pulled out from him before his new initiative regarding Abbas and Fatah even begun? (See 4 and 9 below.)

New flap reaches Livni over handling of matters regarding Lebanese War. Olmert cannot avoid the fallout either. (See 5 and 8 below.)

Benziman writes Olmert's obituary. (See 6 below.)

Is Hamas about to be blamed for the consequences of its actions in Gaza as the economy nears collapse? (See 7 below.)

Daniel Pipes discusses the Red Mosque Rebellion. (See 8 below.)

In future memos I hope to address the nature of our current political party structure and what impact the internet may be having as Congress, under the Democrats, continues to implode.

Michael Oren maintains Bush has not wavered in terms of his demands upon both Israel and the Palestinians.. (See 9 below.)

Dick



1) Week out of Focus: Washington, Iraq and Al Qaeda
By George Friedman

Last week, the United States focused on the state of the war -- not just the one in Iraq, but the broader war against al Qaeda. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released asserting that al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in Pakistan and is either at or near its previous capabilities. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said his gut told him there is an increased risk of an al Qaeda attack in the United States this summer. President George W. Bush said at a press conference that the July 15 status report on Iraq would show that progress is being made in the war. When the report actually was released, it revealed a somewhat more pessimistic picture in some areas. Meanwhile, the Republican Party was showing signs of internal strain over the war, while the Democrats were unable to formulate their own collective position. So, it was a week in which everyone focused on the war, but not one that made a whole lot of sense -- at least on the surface.

In some ways, the most startling assertion made was that al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in Pakistan. What is startling is that it appears to acknowledge that the primary U.S. mission in the war -- the destruction of al Qaeda -- not only has failed to achieve its goal, but also has done little more than force al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan. Chertoff's statement that there is a high threat of an attack this summer merely reinforces the idea that the administration is conceding the failure of its covert war against al Qaeda.

This is not an impossible idea. A recent book by Pulitzer Prize-winning author Tim Weiner, "Legacy of Ashes," provides an extraordinary chronicle of the CIA's progressive inability to carry out its mission. So the NIE claim might well have been an admission of failure. But it was an odd admission and was not couched as a failure.

What made this odd is that the administration is not known to concede failure lightly. During the same week, it continued to assert the more dubious proposition that it is making progress in Iraq. Why, therefore, was it releasing such pessimistic reports on al Qaeda, and why was Chertoff saying his gut tells him an attack this summer is possible? Why make the best-case scenario for Iraq and the worst-case scenario for al Qaeda?

There is nothing absurd about a gut call in intelligence, and much of the ridicule of Chertoff was absurd. Intelligence analysis -- particularly good intelligence analysis -- depends on gut calls. Analysts live in a world of incomplete and shifting intelligence, compelled to reach conclusions under the pressure of time and events. Intuition of experienced and gifted analysts is the bridge between leaving decision-makers without an analysis and providing the best guess available. The issue, as always, is how good the gut is.

We would assume that Chertoff was keying off of two things: the NIE's assertion that al Qaeda is back and the attacks possibly linked to al Qaeda in the United Kingdom. His gut told him that increased capabilities in Pakistan, coupled with what he saw in England and Scotland, would likely indicate a threat to the United States.

One question needs to be asked: What should be made of the NIE report and the events in the United Kingdom? It also is necessary to evaluate not only Chertoff's gut but also the gut intuitions of U.S. intelligence collectively. The NIE call is the most perplexing, partly because the day it appeared Stratfor issued a report downplaying al Qaeda's threat. But part of that could well be semantics. Precisely what do we mean when we say al Qaeda?

When U.S. forces talk about al Qaeda, they talk about large training camps that move thousands of trainees through them. Those are not the people we talk about when we discuss al Qaeda. The people who go through the camps generally are relatively uneducated young men being trained as paramilitaries. They learn to shoot. They learn to devise simple explosives. They learn infantry tactics. They are called al Qaeda but they are more like Taliban fighters. They are not trained in the covert arts of moving to the United States, surviving without detection while being trained in flying airliners, and then carrying out complex missions effectively. They are al Qaeda in name and, inside Afghanistan or Pakistan, they might be able to do well in a firefight, but they are nothing like the men who struck on 9/11, nor are they trained to be. When the U.S. government speaks about thousands of al Qaeda fighters, the vision is that the camps are filled with these thousands of men with the skill level of the 9/11 attackers. It is a scary vision, which the administration has pushed since 9/11, but it isn't true. These guys are local troops for the endless wars of the region.

When we think of al Qaeda, we think of the tiny group of skilled operatives who gathered around Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef in the 1990s. That group was capable of planning attacks across continents, moving money and men around the world -- and doing so without being detected. Those people have been the target of U.S. intelligence. The goal has been to capture, kill or bottle up those men in inaccessible places in order to prevent another attack like 9/11 or worse.

If the NIE report meant to say this group has reconstituted itself, it would be startling news. One of the ways this group survived is that it did not recruit new members directly into the core organization. One of the ways Palestinian terrorist organizations have been destroyed is by allowing new personnel into the core. This allowed intelligence agencies to vector agents into the core, map them out and destroy them. Al Qaeda was not going to make the same mistake, so it was extremely reluctant to expand. This has limited its operations. It could not replace losses and therefore weakened as it was assaulted. But it did protect itself from penetration, which is why capturing surviving leaders has been so difficult.

If the NIE report is true, then the NIE is saying al Qaeda not only has been recruiting members into the core group, but also that it has been doing so for some time. If that is true then there have been excellent opportunities to penetrate and destroy what is left of it. But we don't think that is true, because al-Zawahiri and others, possibly bin Laden, are still on the loose. Therefore, we think the NIE is saying that the broad paramilitaries are active again and are now located in Pakistan.

Strange Week in Washington

Alternatively, the NIE is saying that a parallel covert group has been created in Pakistan, is using al Qaeda's name and is mounting new attacks. The attacks in the United Kingdom might have been part of its efforts, though they are an example of why we have always argued that terrorism is technically much more difficult to carry out than it might seem. Those attacks were botched from beginning to end. Unlike strikes by al Qaeda prime -- the core group -- these attacks, if they represent an effort by a new al Qaeda, should be a comfort. It was the gang that couldn't shoot straight operating globally. If Chertoff's gut is speaking about a secondary group in Pakistan carrying out attacks similar to those in the United Kingdom, then certainly there is cause for concern, but nothing like the concern that should be felt if al Qaeda prime is active again. But then we don't think it can be, unless it has recruited new members. And if it has been recruiting new members and U.S. intelligence hasn't slipped someone inside during the process, then that would be not only a shame but also the admission of a major intelligence fiasco. We don't think that is what the NIE is discussing. It is a warning that a group calling itself al Qaeda is operating in Pakistan. That can be called a revived al Qaeda, but only if one is careless with terminology.

It should also be remembered that the United States is placing heavy pressure on the Pakistanis. A report leaked early last week by the New York Times confirmed what Stratfor said as early as January 2004, that a major incursion into northwestern Pakistan had been planned by the United States but was called off at the last minute over fear of destabilizing President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Or, more precisely, it was called off after Musharraf promised to carry out the operation himself. He did so, but ineffectively and half-heartedly, so that al Qaeda prime was not rooted out.

By leaking the report of the planned incursion, the United States was reminding Musharraf of his guarantee. By issuing the NIE report, it was increasing pressure on Musharraf to do something decisive about militant Islamists in Pakistan -- or the United States would have to do something. Already heavily pressured by domestic forces, Musharraf ordered the raid on the Red Mosque last week, demonstrating his commitment to contain radical Islamism in Pakistan and root out al Qaeda -- or at least that part of al Qaeda that is not part of the isolated primary group. Between the implicit threat of invasion and the explicit report that Pakistan is the center of a new al Qaeda, Pakistan got the message. Whether Islamabad will be able to act on it is another question.

So the NIE report was meant to pressure Pakistan, even if it looked like an admission of the total failure of the intelligence community's mission. Chertoff's warning of attacks this summer was partly an attempt to warn that there might be attacks like those that happened in the United Kingdom -- to which the answer is that one can only hope that they would be exactly like those. Even had they been successful, they would not have risen to the level of 9/11 or even close. And they failed.

The fact is that, in a simple empirical sense, the one thing that has been successful in this war is that there has not been a single follow-on attack to 9/11 in the United States. The reason might be because al Qaeda either doesn't want to attack or lacks the resources. Another answer might be that it has been stopped by effective U.S. counterterrorism activities. This is a subject that needs analysis. In our view, it is the latter. But the simple fact is that the one mission achieved by the administration is that no attacks have occurred.

There have been numerous warnings of potential attacks. Such warnings are always interesting. They imply that the United States has sufficient intelligence to know that attacks are being planned but insufficient intelligence to block them. The usual basis of these warnings is an attack elsewhere. The second is access to a fragmentary bit of intelligence, human or electronic, indicating in a nonspecific way that an attack is possible. But such warnings usually are untrue because an effective terrorist group does not leak information. That is its primary defense. So chatter about attacks rarely indicates a serious one is imminent. Or, and this happens, a potential attack was aborted by the announcement and by increased security. We have no idea what Chertoff saw to lead him to make his announcement. But the fact is that there have been no attacks in six years -- and should there be a strategic attack now, it would represent not a continuation of the war but a new phase.

All of this neatly intersected with Bush's discussion of Iraq. He does not want to withdraw or announce a time line for withdrawal. His reason should be that a withdrawal from Iraq would open the door to Iranian domination of Iraq and a revolution in the geopolitics of the Arabian Peninsula. Bush has not stated that, but it is the best reason to oppose a withdrawal. Not announcing a timetable for withdrawal also makes sense because it would be tantamount to announcing a withdrawal. It tells Iran to simply sit tight and that, in due course, good things will come to it.

The primary U.S. hope for a solution to Iraq is an understanding with Iran. The administration both hates the idea and needs it. A withdrawal would make any such understanding unnecessary from the Iranian point of view and end any chance that Iran will reach an agreement. In our view, Iran appears to have decided not to continue the negotiating process it began precisely because it thinks the United States is leaving anyway. Therefore, Bush must try to convince the Iranians that this isn't so.

Bush has not given a straightforward justification for his concerns from the beginning, and he is not starting now, although the thought of an Iran-dominated Iraq should give anyone pause. But in arguing that the war in Iraq is a war against al Qaeda, and that al Qaeda is getting stronger, he justifies the continuation of the war. In fact, Bush explicitly said that the people who attacked the United States on 9/11 are the same ones bombing American troops in Iraq today. Therefore, the NIE report and Chertoff's warning of attacks are part of the administration's effort to build support for continuing the fight.

Bush's problem is that the idea that Iraq is linked to al Qaeda rests on semantic confusion -- many things are called al Qaeda, but they are different things. Something called al Qaeda is in Iraq, but it has little to do with the al Qaeda that attacked the United States on 9/11. They share little but the name.

U.S. policy on Iraq and the war is at a turning point. There would normally be a focusing down to core strategic issues, such as a withdrawal's consequences for the strategic balance of power. That not only is not happening, but Bush, for whom this is the strongest argument against withdrawing, also seems incapable of making the argument. As a result, the week saw an almost incoherent series of reports from the administration that, if examined carefully, amounted to saying that if you think the war in Iraq is going badly, you should take a look at the war against al Qaeda -- that is a total failure.

We simply don't think that is true. Of course, you can never prove a negative, and you cannot possibly prove there will be no more attacks against the United States by the original al Qaeda. Also, you can claim anything you want on a gut call and if it doesn't happen, people forget.

The intellectual chaos is intensifying -- and with it, the casualties on the ground.

2)This week's was an especially
good read. He spelled out a little market history comparing the current state of the market to past, similar periods:

* December 1961 (followed by 28% market loss over 6 months)

* January 1973 (followed by a 48% collapse over the following 20
months)

* August 1987 (followed by a 34% plunge over the following 3 months)

* July 1998 (followed abruptly by an 18% loss over the following 3
months)

* July 1999 (followed by a 12% loss over the following 3 months)

* December 1999 (followed by a 9% loss over the following 2 months)

* March 2000 (followed by a 49% collapse in the S&P over the following
30
months)

According to Hussman those periods all share the following with today:

* The price/peak-earnings multiple is above 18.

* The S&P 500 index (on a weekly closing basis), is at a 4-year high.

* The S&P 500 is 8% or more above its 52-week moving average
(exponential).


* Treasury and corporate bond yields are rising.

Hussman is quick to point out that he is not trying to make a prediction but
it trying to create a context for current market events.

This is an important distinction. The market can go in any direction, at any
time, for any reason, or no reason, at all. The general tone of Hussman's
article ties in with what he has been writing for a while, but the bullet
points sum it up nicely.

Clearly these sorts of obstacles can exist for a long, long time without
hurting the market. This is an argument for not making big bets to get out
of the market for fear of a correction, bear market, crash or whatever else.
I continue to be bearish (have been for a while and have been incorrect),
but am so without missing the market. My trigger point for taking action is
simple (a breach of the 200 DMA by the S&P 500), and this has not been
violated, so I ride along skeptically thinking a turn will come soon.

Bear markets come so infrequently that guessing about the next one in a
meaningful way is likely to be the wrong trade. Hussman creates a great
background of what stocks must continue to overcome in order to go higher.
The things Hussman cites, perhaps subprime, the dollar, or even something
else will cause the next bear market at some point, but time devoted to
trying to nail the top is probably not productive.

3)Juval Aviv - was Golda Meir's bodyguard and she appointed him to track down and bring to justice.

Palestinian terrorists who took the Israeli athletes hostage and

killed them during the Munich Olympic Games. Aviv recently shared

information EVERY American needs to know but our government has

not shared His bio is below, his book is "Staying Safe."



Juval Aviv allegedly gave intelligence (via what he had gathered in Israel and

the Middle East ) to the Bush Administration about 9/11 a month before

it occured His report specifically said they would use planes as

bombs and target high profile buildings and monuments. Again allegedly the

Administration ridiculed him and refused to respond (Congress has

since hired him as a security consultant - but still the

Administration does not listen to him).



Aviv didn't agree with going into Iraq - said it didn't make sense if

we wanted terrorists responsible for 9/11 (and also he believes in Golda

Meir's approach which was to bring justice to the terrorists but do

not take down civilians - killing civilians only creates more

terrorists - but similar to Bush , Israel 's subsequent leaders were

not as insightful as Golda Meir) - however, when we did decide to

invade Iraq we should have learned from Israel 's past mistakes. He

very articulately stated that Israel 's greatest mistake against their

war on terror was to invade the West Bank and Gaza and stay there...

He said they should have done the proven anti-terrorist strategy

which was "Hit and Leave" instead of "Hit and Stay." Now we are

stuck in Iraq and it is worse than Vietnam - Iraq is the U.S. 's West Bank /

Gaza . He doesn't think we will ever be able to truly leave because

even when we are able to pull our troops back we will still have to

go back regularly which will keep us quagmired. We should have hit hard

and left immediately - or actually, we shouldn't have gone in at

all...



He predicts the next attack on the U.S. is coming within the next few months. Forget

hijacking airplanes because he says terrorists will NEVER try and hijack a plane

again as the people on the plane will not go down quietly.

Aviv believes our airport security is a joke- we are being

reactionary versus looking at strategies that are effective.

1) our machines are outdated. They look for metal and the new

explosives are made of plastic

2) He talks about how some idiot tried to light his shoe on fire -

we now have to take off our shoes, a group of idiots tried to bring

aboard liquid explosives - now we can't bring liquids on board. He

is waiting for some suicidal maniac to pour liquid explosive on their

underwear and light up in a plane or in the terminal and then we will

all have to travel naked!

3) We only focus on security when people are heading to the gates, he

says that if a terrorist attack targets airports in the future, they

will target busy times and on the front end when people are checking

in. It would be easy for someone to take two suitcases of

explosives, walk up to a busy check-in line, ask a person next to them to watch

their bags for a minute while they run to the restroom or get a

drink (and I have done that for people myself) and then detonate the bags

BEFORE security even gets involved. Israel checks bags before people

can enter the airport.



He says the next attack will come in

the next few months and will involve suicide bombers and non-suicide

bombers in places that people congregate: Disneyland, Las Vegas , Big

Cities (NY, SF, Chicago , etc...) and there it will be shopping

malls, subways in rush hour, train stations, casinos, etc.. as well as rural

America ( Wyoming , Montana , etc...). The attack will be simultaneous

detonations around the country (they like big impact) 5-8 cities

including rural areas. They won't need to use suicide bombers

because at largely populated places like the MGM Grand in Vegas - they can

simply valet park!



He says this is well known in intelligence circles but our government

does not want to alarm Americans. However, he also said that Bush

will attack Iran and Syria before he leaves office (we are being

prepared for that! and I have to wonder if we are not hearing about

this impending attack so America will support attacking Iran and

Syria ?). In addition, since we don't have enough troops Bush will

likely use small, strategic nuclear weapons regardless that the

headlines the next day will read "US Nukes Islamic World" and the

world will be a different place to such an extent that global warming

will be irrevelant.



These are not conspiracy theories or crazy rantings. This is the man

(and we have all heard/read that the Bush Administration was warned

about 9/11 prior to it happening) who did the warning. He travels

regularly to the Middle East and he knows his stuff.

On a good note - he says we don't have to worry about being nuked -

he says the terrorists who want to destroy America will not use

sophisticated weapons - they like suicide as the frontline approach.

He also says the next level of terrorists will not be coming from

abroad, but will be homegrown - having attended our schools and

universities - but will have traveled frequently back and forth to

the Middle East . They will know and understand Americans but we

won't understand them - we still only have a handful of Arabic and Farsi

speaking people in our intelligence networks and we need that to

change he said...What can we do? From an intelligence perspective he says the U.S.

needs to stop relying on satellites and technology for intelligence

but follow Israel , Ireland and England 's example of human

intelligence both from an infiltration perspective as well as trust citizens to

help. We need to engage and educate ourselves as citizens but our

government treats us like babies and thinks we can't handle it and

will panic.



He did a test for Congress recently putting an empty briefcase in 5

major spots in 5 US cities and not one person called 911 or sought a

policeman to check it out. In fact, in Chicago - someone tried to

steal it! In Israel an unattended bag or package would be reported

in seconds with a citizen shouting "Unattended Bag" and the area cleared

slowly, calmly and immediately by the people themselves.

Unfortunately, we haven't hurt enough yet for us to be that

concerned....



He also discussed how many children were in preschool and

kindergarten after 9/11 without parents to pick them up and the schools did not

have a plan. Do you have a plan with your kids, schools and families

if you cannot reach each other by phone? If you cannot return to

your house? If you cannot get to your child's school - do they know what

to do? We should all have a plan.



He said that our government's plan after the next attack is to

immediately cut-off EVERYONE's abiltity to use their telephone, cell

phone, blackberry because they don't want terrorists to be able to

talk to one another - do you have a plan if you cannot communicate

directly with those that you love?



Juval Aviv holds an M.A. in Business from Tel Aviv University and is

President and CEO of Interfor, Inc., an international corporate

intelligence and investigations firm.



Juval Aviv is President and CEO of Interfor, Inc. Based in New York

with offices around the world, founded in 1979, Interfor provides

foreign and domestic intelligence services to the legal, corporate

and financial communities and conducts investigations around the world.

In addition, Mr. Aviv serves as a special consultant to the U.S.

Congress and other policy makers on issues of terrorism, fraud and money

laundering.



A leading authority on terrorist networks, Mr. Aviv served as lead

investigator for Pan Am Airways into the Pan Am 103-Lockerbie

terrorist bombing. He was featured in the recent film, Munich , as

the leader of the Israeli team that tracked down the terrorists who

kidnapped the Israeli Olympic team. Interfor's services encompass

white-collar crime investigations, asset search and recovery,

corporate due diligence, litigation support, fraud investigations,

internal compliance investigations, security and vulnerability

assessments. Since its inception, Interfors asset investigation

services have recovered over $2 billion worldwide for its clients.



Before founding Interfor, Mr. Aviv served as an officer in the Israel

Defense Force (Major, retired) leading an elite Commando/Intelligence

Unit, and was later selected by the Israeli Secret Service (Mossad)

to participate in a number of intelligence and special operations in

many countries in the late 1960s and 1970s. While working as a consultant with El Al, Mr. Aviv surveyed the

existing security measures in place and updated El Als security

program, making El Al the safest airline in business today.



Most recently, Mr. Aviv wrote Staying Safe: The Complete Guide to

Protecting Yourself, Your Family, and Your Business,(2004,HarperResource).



He has been a guest on ABC Nightline, FOX News, CNN, BBC

Newsnight, ZDF (German National Television) and RAI (Italian

National Television) and has been featured in numerous articles in

major magazines and newspapers worldwide.

4) Bush’s Middle East peace conference plan peters out after telephone conversation with Saudi King Abdullah



Washington sources report the White House tried to play down the importance of the proposal put forward by President George W. Bush Monday, July 16, after Saudi King Abdullah said he would not attend. White House spokesman Tony Snow said it was too early to say where or when the conference for discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would take place. "I think a lot of people are inclined to try to treat this as a big peace conference" said. "It's not."

The president could have known before he unveiled his conference plan that not only the Saudi ruler but also Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, both key regional players, would not be coming.

Neither goes along with Bush’s boycott of Hamas. Washington’s total rejection of the Islamist terrorists who seized the Gaza Strip was highlighted in his speech. That morning, Egyptian intelligence minister Gen. Omar Suleiman arrived in Washington to try and persuade White House advisers to rewrite some changes into the speech. No chance, he was told.

Middle East sources note that the Bush Middle East statement had the effect of accentuating the gaps dividing the very Arab rulers most needed to back peacemaking. Three opposing camps emerged more clearly than ever:

One. The US, Israel and Jordan, are convinced an uncompromising boycott of Hamas will bring down its Gaza government and restore the rule of Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah.

Two. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and most of the Gulf emirates object to this boycott and advocate power-sharing between Hamas and Fatah because they are convinced the latter will never recoup its military strength either in Gaza or the West Bank.

Three. Iran and Co. - Syria, Yemen and Hizballah, whose solid backing for the Palestinian Islamists is expressed in cash, arms, advisers and combat training.

By concretizing these gaps, the Bush speech has motivated the three camps to prove its path is the correct one. Therefore, Camp One while backing Abbas all the way will find it harder than ever before to isolate Hamas. So long as the extremist rulers of Gaza benefit from the support of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Syria, the massive US-Israeli cornucopia of cash, benefits and concessions showered on the Salam Fayyad government in Ramallah will lend Fatah rule not much more than a limited and artificial lease of life.

5) Livni: PM does not need to resign over Comptroller's report
By Amos Harel and Barak Ravid

Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said Wednesday that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert does not need to resign in the wake of State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss' scathing report on Olmert and the Israel Defense Forces' handling of the home front during the Second Lebanon War.

"The government's job is to correct the mistakes revealed in the report, and we have begun doing so," said Livni, during a press conference with visiting EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. "The Defense Ministry has taken responsibility for the issue and that is the government's job now."

Livni, who did call on the prime minister to resign following the publication of the Winograd Committee's partial report on the war in late April, added that the government must "stick together as part of the correction of the failures that are presented in the report." Livni said she had yet to read the full report.


MKs across the political spectrum called on Olmert to step down over the reports findings, and both Likud and National Union-National Religious Party submitted no-confidence motions Wednesday afternoon.

Likud faction whip Gideon Sa'ar said the prime minister's response to the report, in which he issued a harsh personal attack on Lindenstrauss, was "embarrassing and humiliating," adding that "this government of failure is not able to rectify [problems] and learn lessons."

National Union-NRP faction whip Uri Ariel said "a government that abandoned millions of civilians in wartime cannot continue to function, regardless of the prime minister's multiple cover-up attempts.

Meretz faction whip Zahava Gal-On said the reports findings paint the picture of a "reckless prime minister, who gambled not just with IDF soldiers' lives, but also with the lives of the residents of the North."

"Instead of accepting responsibility for the failures and correcting the mistakes, he attacks the comptroller," she continued. "He should draw the obvious conclusions today, and resign."

PMO blasts comptroller report as 'biased and superficial'
The Prime Minister's Office launched a personal attack on State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss on Tuesday, following the publication of a damning report on the political and military handling of the home front during the Second Lebanon War.

The criticism from the PMO was levelled at Lindenstrauss himself, and distinguished him from the State Comptroller's Office.

"The state comptroller, as is his way, chooses attractive targets and shoots from every direction in order to get big headlines and public attention," said a written response from the PMO.

Senior officers in the Israel Defense Forces General Staff have also in recent days launched attacks on the comptroller in the media, harshly criticizing his choice of language in the report.

The response referred to an "unfathomable and unbridgeable gap" between the 582-page report as a whole, assembled by the office of the comptroller, and the chapter summing up the entire report, written by the comptroller himself.

It called the former and "impressive professional report" while blasting the chapter written by the comptroller himself as "biased and superficial... reflecting the personal and private positions of the State Comptroller regarding several people, the prime minister among them."

The attack on the comptroller also targeted his language use.

"To our surprise, the term 'eclipse of reason,' which is repeated three times in the ten pages of the summary, is not found once in the 600 pages of the report."

The PMO also said that the comptroller blamed decades-old problems with the home front on the Olmert government.

"The comptroller chose to direct his poisonous arrows at the government, which had only been in existence for two months. Was there really an expectation that within two months, the government would solve all of the problems on the home front that had accompanied Israel for a generation?"

The government also responded to a claim in the report according to which it decided to go war without considering the risk to the home front, and did not deal with the matter of the home front during the course of the war.

The response said that the matter was discussed at the outset of the war on July 12, and again in meetings on July 30 and August 6.

In response to the criticism in the report that the government did not hold hearings on evacuating civilians from the north of the country, the PMO response said that its policy on "selective evacuation" was the right one, because, it said, a "mass evacuation would have meant more ghost towns in the north."

IDF top brass: Report unfairly critical of home front chief
Senior IDF General Staff officers have in recent days joined the PMO in criticizing the comptroller's report, saying he was unfairly critical of GOC Home Front Command Yitzhak (Gerry) Gershon.

Chief of Staff Gaby Ashkenazi, while announcing that the IDF is studying the report, nonetheless issued a statement expressing full support for Gershon.

According to the senior officers, both the comptroller and the media often fail to differentiate properly between the home front and the Home Front Command, placing too much emphasis on the Home Front Commands responsibility for addressing the problems that arise in war.

The officers said that the neglect of the home front was "the responsibility of all governments past and present. For years, they failed to resolve legal problems and did not provide the resources necessary for cope with threats. You can't now put the whole story on Gerry."

The officers added that the report itself points out that in areas where the Home Front Command operated during the war, the civilian population received improved assistance. "Show us one local authority that says we didn't help it during the war," they said.

The officers also rejected the report's claims that Gershon ignored wartime defense minister Amir Peretz's orders, specifically regarding a broader call-up of reserve troops. "The problem is that the minister made the comments during situation assessments, and did not issue them as explicit orders," they said, adding that a more extensive call-up would not have helped the communities under attack.

6) How will Olmert be remembered?
By Uzi Benziman

Ehud Olmert's response to George Bush's speech on Monday demonstrates his manner of thinking and how he perceives his own role: His people rushed to explain that the American president's statements were fully coordinated with the prime minister, that he was very satisfied with them, that they reflected a strong loathing for Hamas and that they placed the burden of proof on Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. There was a follow-up to the verbal reaction: Olmert announced that Vice Premier Haim Ramon would head a ministerial committee charged with discussing the implementation of the report on the West Bank outposts issued over two years ago by attorney Talia Sasson.

Olmert's response is mainly spin: He wants to be viewed as having developed an exceptionally close relationship with Bush and as being completely undisturbed by the American president's expectations of Israel.

The demands of Olmert's government set forth by Bush in his speech - the dismantling of unauthorized outposts, an end to West Bank settlement expansion and a reduced presence in the territories - are being presented by officials in Jerusalem as negligible in comparison with Bush's demands of the Palestinians.

In any event, Olmert is acting the part of someone who is genuinely prepared to do his part in realizing the vision outlined by Bush: He replaced the justice minister with his vice premier as head of the committee that is ostensibly dealing with the removal of the illegal outposts. For anyone needing a reminder, a month after becoming acting prime minister, only one outpost (Amona) was evacuated, and only partially; since his election, the government has been deterred from evacuating even the disputed building in Hebron.

The time has come for Olmert to ask himself how he wants to go down in history. Each of his 11 predecessors stamped his or her mark in office: David Ben-Gurion earned the title of principal founding father and shaper of the state. Moshe Sharett will be remembered as representing the conciliatory line vis-a-vis the Arabs. Levi Eshkol is remembered as the great reconciler between the Labor and the Revisionist movements, and for not standing in Dayan's way in the Six-Day War. Golda Meir is considered to hold supreme responsibility for the Yom Kippur War. Menachem Begin is the person who brought peace with Egypt and set the precedent of withdrawing from territories occupied in the Six-Day War. Yitzhak Rabin (in his second term) and Shimon Peres created the Oslo Accords, and Benjamin Netanyahu neutered them. Ehud Barak is etched into the national consciousness as the person who pulled the Israel Defense Forces out of Lebanon and offered Yasser Arafat a peace agreement based on a near-total withdrawal from the territories, including East Jerusalem. The overriding feature of Ariel Sharon's tenure was the implementation of the Gaza Strip disengagement plan.

And what will Olmert leave behind? So far, his name is connected only with the defeat in the Second Lebanon War.

He did make some new noises when he placed his convergence plan on the public agenda, and he did appear to be genuine in his recognition that to maintain the state's Zionist character it must get rid of the lion's share of the territories - but his performance last summer foiled his good intentions. Now he is busy jockeying for survival and bogged down in schemes to save himself from the judgment of the Winograd Committee. Hovering above is the question of why he is so determined to stay in office. Is it just to lick the wounds of his injured pride?

Olmert's ability to change the verdict of history regarding his term in office depends, first and foremost, on his courage.

He talks as if he has come to the realization that the key to saving Israel from its existential problems is a willingness to withdraw from the West Bank. He must translate that awareness into action. Even if he does not have much time left in his term, he should take advantage of it to bring about a sea change in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.

The outline sketched by President Bush on Monday is a serviceable vessel in which to pour an Israeli push to end the conflict with the Palestinians. This is a national goal of the first order, and there can be no more appropriate personal enterprise for which to be recorded in the chronicles of the state.

7) Gaza's economy on verge of collapse


Gaza's economy could collapse within weeks unless Israel reopens crucial commercial trade crossings, UN officials and Gazan businessmen warned Wednesday.

More than 68,000 workers have lost their jobs since Gaza's borders were closed in mid-June, following fierce factional battles in which Hamas expelled the forces of the rival Fatah faction, said Nasser el-Helu, a prominent Gaza businessman.

The closings added to the already high unemployment rate in the narrow coastal strip.

Israeli officials say they cannot open the main commercial crossing point at Karni, citing security concerns, though they have promised to maintain the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

In recent weeks, some border points were opened to transfer humanitarian supplies. But no industrial material has entered Gaza, bringing construction activity and manufacturing to a halt, including $93 million (€67.5 million) worth of UN-funded projects employing 121,000 people, according to the United Nations.

More than 70 percent of Gaza's factories have stopped production, says Gisha, an Israeli human rights group.

The appeal came a day before the so-called Quartet of Mideast mediators, the US, the UN, the European Union and Russia, meet in Portugal with their newly appointed emissary, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

"We are asking them (the Quartet) to take consideration of what is happening here. They must take political decisions to open all the crossings, and then the operational solutions will be found," said John Ging, director of the United Nations Relief Works Agency in Gaza.

The UN provides food aid to 80% of Gaza's 1.4 million people.

"Please lift the siege of Gaza," el-Helu said. "Mr. Blair, the siege is destroying our economy, our community."

El-Helu said Israeli business partners had begun canceling contracts because Palestinian factories were unable to meet deadlines.

He said if the borders remained closed, Gaza's economy would collapse "in one or two weeks maximum."

8) Red Mosque in Rebellion
by Daniel Pipes


Imagine that an Islamist central command exists — and that you are its chief strategist, with a mandate to spread full application of Shariah, or Islamic law, through all means available, with the ultimate goal of a worldwide caliphate. What advice would you offer your comrades in the aftermath of the eight-day Red Mosque rebellion in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan?

Probably, you would review the past six decades of Islamist efforts and conclude that you have three main options: overthrowing the government, working through the system, or a combination of the two.

Islamists can use several catalysts to seize power. (I draw here on "Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop: How Inevitable is an Islamist Future?" by Cameron Brown.)

* Revolution, meaning a wide-scale social revolt: Successful only in Iran, in 1978–79, because it requires special circumstances.
* Coup d'état: Successful only in Sudan, in 1989, because rulers generally know how to protect themselves.
* Civil war: Successful only in Afghanistan, in 1996, because dominant, cruel states generally put down insurrections (as in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria).
* Terrorism: Never successful, nor is it ever likely to be. It can cause huge damage, but without changing regimes. Can one really imagine a people raising the white flag and succumbing to terrorist threats? This did not happen after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1981, or after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in America, or even after the Madrid bombings of 2004.

A clever strategist should conclude from this survey that overthrowing the government rarely leads to victory. In contrast, recent events show that working through the system offers better odds — note the Islamist electoral successes in Algeria (1992), Bangladesh (2001), Turkey (2002), and Iraq (2005). But working within the system, these cases also suggest, has its limitations. Best is a combination of softening up the enemy through lawful means, then seizing power. The Palestinian Authority (2006) offers a case of this one-two punch succeeding, with Hamas winning the elections, then staging an insurrection. Another, quite different example of this combination just occurred in Pakistan.



The Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) complex sits at the heart of official Islamabad, the capital city of Pakistan, amid the country's ruling institutions.

The vast Red Mosque complex, also known as the Lal Masjid, geographically in the midst of Pakistan's ruling institutions, boasts long-standing connections to the regime's elite, and includes huge male and female madrassas. But, turning on its benefactors, Kalashnikov-toting burqa-clad students confronted the police in January 2007 to prevent them from demolishing an illegally constructed building.

In April, the mega-mosque's deputy imam, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, announced the imposition of Shariah "in the areas in our control" and established an Islamic court that issued decrees and judgments, rivaling those of the government.

The mosque then sent some of its thousands of madrassa students to serve as a morals police force in Islamabad, to enforce a Taliban-style regime locally with the ultimate goal of spreading it countrywide. Students closed barbershops, occupied a children's library, pillaged music and video stores, attacked alleged brothels and tortured the alleged madams. They even kidnapped police officers.

The Red Mosque leadership threatened suicide bombings if the government of Pervez Musharraf attempted to rein in its bid for quasi-sovereignty. Security forces duly stayed away. The six-month standoff culminated on July 3, when students from the mosque, some masked and armed, rushed a police checkpoint, ransacked nearby government ministries, and set cars on fire, leaving 16 dead.

This confrontation with the government aimed at nothing less than overthrowing it, the mosque's deputy imam proclaimed on July 7: "We have firm belief in God that our blood will lead to a[n Islamic] revolution." Threatened, the government attacked the mega-mosque early on July 10. The 36-hour raid turned up a stockpiled arsenal of suicide vests, machine guns, gasoline bombs, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-tank mines — and letters of instruction from Al-Qaeda's leadership.

Mr. Musharraf termed the madrassa "a fortress for war." In all, the revolt directly caused more than 100 deaths.

Mosques have been used as places for inciting violence, planning operations, and storing weapons, but deploying one as a base to overthrow the government creates a precedent. The Red Mosque model offers Islamists a bold tactic, one they likely will try again, especially if the recent episode, which has shaken the country, succeeds in pushing Mr. Musharraf out of office.

Our imaginary Islamist strategist, in short, can now deploy another tactic to attain power.

9) 'Media spin can't mask government failures'
by Amnon Meranda
Political arena rages following state comptroller's war report. Movement for Quality Government calls on Olmert to resign immediately




"No media spin aimed at discrediting the state comptroller can disguise the grave failures of the government, or spare the prime minister from the need to take responsibility and draw personal conclusions," head of the Knesset State Control Committee MK Zevulun Orlev said Wednesday.


Orlev said that the state comptroller's report on the government's handling of the home front during the Second Lebanon War was "one of the most severe reports in the history of the State of Israel.

War Report
Comptroller faults government over home front handling / Yoav Friedman
State comptroller's report on last summer's war points to government's and army's failure in protecting civilian population, says years of budget cuts dealt a blow to local authority's preparedness for emergencies
Full story


"The findings unequivocally confirm the government's failure to treat the home front and its abandoning of the north's residents," he added.



Knesset Speaker Dalia Itzik said she didn't think the report was tainted by personal motives, as suggested by the Prime Minister's Office: "I don't think the comptroller is 'out to get' the prime minister… you can't expect a two-month old administration to take on deficiencies that had been building up for years…we are all at fault."


MK Avshalom Vilan (Meretz) said that "the prime minister and the government must stop shirking responsibility… and start correcting the mistakes."



Direct responsibility for failures
The Movement for Quality Government called on the prime minister to resign following the report's publication.


"Olmert bears direct responsibility for the deep failures exposed by the comptroller, which join the errors made during the war and revealed by the Winograd Commission," the movement stated.


MK Amy Ayalon (Labor), who headed the sub-committee in charge of looking into the government's handling of the home front during the war, slammed the way in which the various government authorities applied the lessons of war.


"Our report may not have been so blunt, but its essence was the same – the decision-making process was lacking to begin with… the government was completely unaware of the war's realities."


Chairman of the Likud faction MK Gideon Sa'ar said the government's failure was common knowledge, adding that "the worst thing is that nothing has been done over the past year to rectify the situation…the government is simply unable to learn any lessons."


"The prime minister and his government have failed miserably," said MK Arieh Eldad (National Union). "Olmert is nothing more than an accident-ridden driver on Israel's road in history. The sooner we revoke his license the sooner we will be on our way to recovery."

Former MK Yossi Sarid, who headed a committee nominated by various social organizations to investigate the government treatment of the home front during the war, called Olmert "an impertinent brat that insists on damaging things further instead of accepting responsibility and stepping down."


The Legal Forum for the Land of Israel called Prime Minister Olmert's reaction to the report "hazardous to the government" adding that he was "slamming the comptroller's motives in order to distract the public from the report itself."


Aviram Zino and Attila Somfalvi contributed to this report

9)The Bush Doctrine Lives
The president isn't selling out Israel or relaxing his call for Palestinian democracy.
BY MICHAEL B. OREN

Newspapers in Israel yesterday were full of stories about President Bush's call on Monday for the creation of a Palestinian state and an international peace conference. While Israeli officials were quoted expressing satisfaction with the fact that "there were no changes in Bush's policies," commentators questioned whether the Saudis would participate in such a gathering and whether Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, with his single-digit approval ratings, could uproot Israeli settlers from the West Bank.

But all the focus on the conference misses the point. Mr. Bush has not backtracked an inch from his revolutionary Middle East policy. Never before has any American president placed the onus of demonstrating a commitment to peace so emphatically on Palestinian shoulders. Though Mr. Bush insisted that Israel refrain from further settlement expansion and remove unauthorized outposts, the bulk of his demands were directed at the Palestinians.

"The Palestinian people must decide that they want a future of decency and hope," he said, "not a future of terror and death. They must match their words denouncing terror with action to combat terror."

According to Mr. Bush, the Palestinians can only achieve statehood by first stopping all attacks against Israel, freeing captured Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and ridding the Palestinian Authority of corruption. They must also detach themselves from the invidious influence of Syria and Iran: "Nothing less is acceptable."

In addition to the prerequisites stipulated for the Palestinians, Mr. Bush set unprecedented conditions for Arab participation in peace efforts. He exhorted Arab leaders to emulate "peacemakers like Anwar Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan" by ending anti-Semitic incitement in their media and dropping the fiction of Israel's non-existence. More dramatically, Mr. Bush called on those Arab governments that have yet to establish relations with Israel to recognize its right to exist and to authorize ministerial missions to the Jewish state.

Accordingly, Saudi Arabia, which has offered such recognition but only in return for a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, will have to accept Israel prior to any territorial concessions. Mr. Bush also urged Arab states to wage an uncompromising battle against Islamic extremism and, in the case of Egypt and Jordan, to open their borders to Palestinian trade.

If the Israeli media largely overlooked the diplomatic innovations of Mr. Bush's speech, they completely missed its dynamic territorial and demographic dimensions. The president pledged to create a "contiguous" Palestinian state--code for assuring unbroken Palestinian sovereignty over most of the West Bank and possibly designating a West Bank-Gaza corridor. On the other hand, the president committed to seek a peace agreement based on "mutually agreed borders" and "current realities," which is a euphemism for Israel's retention of West Bank settlement blocks and no return to the 1967 lines.

Most momentous, however, was Mr. Bush's affirmation that "the United States will never abandon . . . the security of Israel as a Jewish state and homeland for the Jewish people." This means nothing less than the rejection of the Palestinians' immutable demand for the resettlement of millions of refugees and their descendents in Israel. America is now officially dedicated to upholding Israel's Jewish majority and preventing its transformation into a de facto Palestinian state.

Beyond these elements, the centerpiece of Mr. Bush's vision was the international conference. The Israeli press hastened to interpret this as a framework for expediting the advent of Palestinian statehood, yet it is clear that the conference is not intended to produce a state but rather to monitor the Palestinians' progress in building viable civic and democratic institutions. The goal, Mr. Bush said, will be to "help the Palestinians establish . . . a strong and lasting society" with "effective governing structures, a sound financial system, and the rule of law."

Specifically, the conference will assist in reforming the Palestinian Authority, strengthening its security forces, and encouraging young Palestinians to participate in politics. Ultimate responsibility for laying these sovereign foundations, however, rests not with the international community but solely with the Palestinians themselves: "By following this path, Palestinians can reclaim their dignity and their future . . . [and] answer their people's desire to live in peace."

Unfortunately, many of these pioneering components in Mr. Bush's speech were either implicitly or obliquely stated, and one might have wished for a more unequivocal message, such as that conveyed in his June 2002 speech on the Middle East. Still, there can be no underrating the sea change in America's policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brought about by this administration. If, under U.N. Resolution 242, Israelis were expected to relinquish territory and only then receive peace, now the Arabs will have to cede many aspects of peace--non-belligerency and recognition--well in advance of receiving territory.

Similarly, Mr. Bush's commitment to maintain Israel's Jewish majority signals the total rescinding of American support for Resolution 194, which provided for refugee return. Moreover, by insisting that the Palestinians first construct durable and transparent institutions before attaining independence, Mr. Bush effectively reversed the process, set out in the 1993 Oslo Accords, whereby the Palestinians would obtain statehood immediately and only later engage in institution building. Peace-for-land, preserving the demographic status quo, and building a civil society prior to achieving statehood--these are the pillars of Mr. Bush's doctrine on peace.

But will it work? Given the Palestinians' historical inability to sustain sovereign structures and their repeated (1938, 1947, 1979, 2000) rejection of offers of a state, the chances hardly seem sanguine.

Much of the administration's hope for a breakthrough rests on the Palestinians' newly appointed prime minister, Salaam Fayyad, who is purportedly incorruptible. Nevertheless, one righteous man is unlikely to succeed in purging the Palestinian Authority of embezzlement and graft and uniting its multiple militias.

The Saudis will probably balk at the notion of recognizing Israel before it exits the West Bank and Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees throughout the region will certainly resist any attempt to prevent them from regaining their former homes. Iran and Syria and their Hamas proxies can be counted on to undermine the process at every stage, often with violence.

Yet, despite the scant likelihood of success, Mr. Bush is to be credited for delineating clear and equitable criteria for pursuing Palestinian independence and for drafting a principled blueprint for peace. This alone represents a bold response to Hamas and its backers in Damascus and Tehran. The Palestinians have been given their diplomatic horizon and the choice between "chaos, suffering, and the endless perpetuation of grievance," and "security and a better life."

So, too, the president is to be commended for not taking the easy route of railroading the Palestinians to self-governance under a regime that would almost certainly implode. Now his paramount task is to stand by the benchmarks his administration has established, and to hold both Palestinians and Israelis accountable for any failure to meet them.

Mr. Oren is a fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and the author of "Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present" (Norton, 2007).

No comments: