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I do not believe Israel will defend The Saudis but I do believe it will dawn on many powerful members of the Saudi Royal Family that a strong Israel, capable of defending itself, is critical to their own survival. Therefore, I believe in various ways and out of the public's view, Israel and The Saudis will draw closer and that has already begun in subtle ways.
As with all nation states The Saudis act in accord with their own self-interest and sometimes that is adverse to our own but it is evident The Saudis no longer trust America as long as Obama remains in office and will seek other relationships.
The Saudis have observed and dealt with Obama, deem him weak and no longer trust he would be willing to act on their behalf should push come to shove. Furthermore, what he has done, they have concluded, is dangerous and threatening to their inimical interests.
That said, I do not believe The Saudis will go to war with Iran but tribal animosities and the Arab tribal, desert temperament can boil and spill over. Time will tell.(See 1 below.)
Are fissures developing in the Iranian Russian relationship regarding Syria? (See 1a below.)
Are fissures developing in the Iranian Russian relationship regarding Syria? (See 1a below.)
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Americans will have to accept one man government for another year, anathema as it may be. (See 2 below.)
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Donald Trump is not my candidate to become president but I will vote for him over Hillarious.
Many of my smug liberal friends begin a conversation by rhetorically stating: "You would not vote for Trump?"
In part they do this to avoid having to defend why they are willing to embrace Hillarious.
I respond, if they are willing to listen, by reminding them they would have said the same about Harry Truman and did about Reagan. Both were among our best presidents. Why? Because of their ability to make decisions , their vision and understanding of what it meant to be an American and the fact that common sense guided much of their thinking.
I am not placing Trump in their category but I am willing to speculate , should he be elected, he will be a better president than most assume.
a) Trump has proven a very shrewd candidate and quickly sensed the frustration and discontent of the American people with Obama.
b) Trump has proven he knows how to take advantage of media technology and is not afraid to defend himself. He may be a bully type but he also is no wimp. He also says what is on our collective minds but, because of PC'ism, we are afraid to utter
c) He obviously is a shrewd negotiator and has done a masterful job of building a real estate empire, mostly with the money of others. I am personally familiar with a situation involving a hotel complex that was failing and the developer/owner went to Trump and negotiated a deal whereby he could use Trump's name, Trump insisted on various architectural changes and the project became quite successful . Cache sells.
d) I suspect Trump would surround himself with competent people who are mostly non-government types and they would bring a refreshing and new look to government and who knows they might even accomplish some needed changes.
e) Trump understands economics and balance sheets etc. and though government is never thought of as a business, its impact on business is vast and, at times, critical and stifling. I believe he might press for legislation that would make government less oppressive and this would unleash the power of the market place. Capitalism would be safe while he is president.
f) Being a man of personal wealth, Trump would come into office with less baggage than Hilarious who, with "OLE BILL," have milked their public positions for their own benefit even to the point of breaking laws, (or at the very least they do not pass even a low smell test) and/or making deals with those who have broken laws and been jailed.
g) There is something roguish about Trump that is both unattractive yet likable. Hillarious is not likable and a president who is not liked is less effective.
h) There is a danger having a president and Congress all from the same party but the partisan gridlock which has become the norm must be broken because America must move forward and away from the crippling impact of Obama's authoritarian mismanagement.
i) I suspect Trump would be far more willing to accept, trust and employ the advice of our military and would command their respect accordingly. Obama has proven he has a basic distrust , dislike and even a contempt for the military. After all, being weak, never having served and being arrogant his narcissistic demeaning personality has to grate on military types who are spit and polish, patriotic and yes, warlike.
j) Finally, I know about Hillarious, I have witnessed over 30 years of her presence and I have nothing but contempt for the way she has manipulated the truth, has played various self-serving cards to enrich herself and you know the rest.
There comes a time when the diaper must be changed.
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Dick
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Jerusalem on Monday was closely monitoring the rapid breakdown in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, knowing full well that ripples from that crisis will surely be felt in Israel. Yaakov Amidror, the former head of the National Security Council and, before that, of Military Intelligence, told The Jerusalem Post there could be two immediate ramifications for Israel. The first, he said, is that the crisis will prolong the Syrian civil war, in which Iran and Saudi Arabia are backing different forces, and the second is that the crisis with Riyadh will mean Tehran will have an additional front and point of friction to keep in mind when making decisions, including those having to do with Israel. Referring to attempts to negotiate an end to the Syrian crisis, Amidror, who is now a senior fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, said: “Anyone who thinks he will be able to bring about calm here does not know where they are living. It is clear that so much oil has been poured on the flames now that I don’t know how long it will take to put them out.” He sidestepped the question as to whether a continuation of the war in Syria was good or bad for Israel, saying that depended on how one looked at the situation on Israel’s northern border. There are some who believe the current situation is bad for Israel since chaos in Syria provides an opening for various elements hostile to Israel to operate directly on the country’s borders. Others, however, maintain that having Hezbollah and Iran embroiled in Syria’s conflict not only weakens them, but also keeps them from focusing on Israel. This school of thought maintains that the war has removed Syria as a conventional threat to Israel for the foreseeable future. The second immediate fallout from the diplomatic crisis between Iran and Saudi Arabia is that the Iranians will now have to factor in another point of friction in their decision making, he said. No country has infinite energy, he said, and Iran – when making its decisions – will now have to take into consideration their considerable conflict with Saudi Arabia. “They will be busy with other things,” he said. “That doesn’t meant they won’t do anything [toward Israel]. This doesn’t mean, for instance, that this will influence Hezbollah [backed by Iran] not to carry out revenge attacks against Israel. But it means that whenever there is something, there will be someone in Iran who will say that they have other problems to think about; we will not be the only issue they will be focusing on. “The very fact that they have another source of friction is not bad for Israel,” Amidror said, adding that there were parallels between how this crisis may affect Israel, and how the crisis between Moscow and Ankara stemming from Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter-plane impacted on Israel. While stopping short of saying that the crisis with Moscow is what has led to a recent softening of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s position toward Israel, he said it was one of the elements leading to a change of tone because Turkey had to consider other sources of friction. The same thing is likely to happen with the Iranians, he said. Amidror added that another likely result of the current conflict will be that “when Saudi Arabia looks around and asks who their allies are, they will not find too long a list.” Asked whether as a result of this he could imagine a scenario in which Saudi Arabia would turn to Israel for intelligence or logistical help in dealing with the Iranian threat, Amidror said he had “nothing intelligent” to say on that matter. He did say, however, that he did not see how the current Iranian-Saudi crisis could have any impact on the diplomatic process with the Palestinians. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said in the past that a confluence of interests between Israel and the moderate Sunni states in the region could – by getting them to press the Palestinians into taking more flexible positions – have a positive impact on peace efforts with the Palestinians. “There is a big gap between the sentiments in the [Arab] street [about the Palestinian issue] and the understanding of the [Arab] leaders [of the issue]. The understanding of the leaders, in all the Arab countries, is that the Palestinian issue does not impact at all on the real situation in the Middle East and all the countries in the Middle East, except perhaps for Jordan, where there are more Palestinians,” he said. “But except for Jordan, there is not a state that thinks that what we do with the Palestinians will influence their fate, situation, problems, solutions and the sentiments on the street,” he said. “As a result, there will always be a gap between what the leaders can do in public, and what they can do [with Israel] under the radar.” 1a) How Deep are the Cracks in the Russian-Iranian Coalition in Syria?
After months of an air-land military effort by the Russian-Iranian coalition in Syria, the integrated attack has been halted. The main goal of Iran’s intervention in the fighting in Syria is a strengthened Shiite Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis, built on the Alawite regime with its pro-Iranian orientation. For its part, Russia has other interests, and its preferred goal is a settlement that will give it a foothold and facilitate its influence in the Middle East, while putting an end to Western dominance in the region. Yet regardless of various points of contention, and despite the efforts of the Western powers and Sunni Arab countries to puncture the Russian-led coalition, the pro-Assad partnership is still a long way from dissolution. Iran has no option for an exit from the game in Syria, and will therefore prefer continued cooperation with Russia, even if it sometimes leaves a sour taste.
Furthermore, by persisting in this cooperation, Iran avoids leaving Russia to build the foundations of a settlement in Syria by itself, at the expense of Iranian interests in Syria and elsewhere in the region.
Recent developments in the international arena and on the battlefield in Syria invite some perspective on the stability of the Russian-Iranian coalition formed in September 2015. It appears that after three months of military effort, Russia’s involvement in Syria has not produced the results Moscow anticipated.
Russia made a strategic decision to intervene militarily in the civil war in Syria in order to defend the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This decision was based on Russia’s interests in the Middle East and elsewhere, headed by the desire to expand Russia’s regional influence, preserve a naval foothold on the Mediterranean shore, and to challenge the overriding standing of the United States in the Middle East. A “natural” coalition of Assad’s allies formed in Syria, comprising Russia, Iran, the Syrian army, Hezbollah, and Shiite militias operating as Iranian proxies. Despite the Russian statements that its military involvement in Syria was aimed primarily at combating the Islamic State, most of Russia’s attacks were designed to help the al-Assad regime, with airstrikes targeting rebel organizations and air support for Assad’s allies fighting on the ground.
It now appears that after months of air-land military effort by the Russian-Iranian coalition, the integrated attack, which focused on gaining control of essential territory in northern Syria (the Aleppo area, the Aleppo-Homs artery, and the passages to the coastal sector) has been halted. As a result, friction and conflicts of interest have surfaced between the pro-Assad coalition members, and political disputes have added to the military difficulties. Russian President Vladimir Putin has attempted to exploit the military intervention to forge an international framework to devise a political roadmap for ending the civil war in Syria. The diplomatic measures, however, have also bogged down. Moreover, the agreement between the major powers, specifically between Russia and the United States, to launch a political process that will shape a future settlement in Syria including the regime’s future was not regarded favorably by Iran.
Russia-Iran: Between the Strategic Connection and Political and Military Disputes
Despite a history of strategic rivalry, Russia and Iran have found common ground since the founding of the Islamic Republic. Russia has aided Iran in various spheres, including the military and nuclear realms. This multi-faceted cooperation has continued, notwithstanding the Russian participation in recent years in the sanctions regime against Iran and its active role in the negotiations on the nuclear question. Russia profited from this policy – wielding international political influence on the one hand, and exploiting economic opportunities with Iran on the other. The need to bolster the tottering Assad regime in Syria highlighted the confluence of Iranian and Russian interests. This aid likewise became an essential tool in promoting Russia’s strategic goals – both combating radical (Salafi jihadist) Islam, which threatens Russia, and shaping a regional settlement to Russia’s liking.
Nonetheless, the common ground did not obliterate the disputes between the two countries. The question of Assad’s personal future – Russia is flexible on this point while promoting a negotiated settlement with the international community on a political transition in Syria – is only one such bone of contention. Indeed, each side takes a different view of its main goals in Syria.
The main purpose of Iran’s intervention in the fighting in Syria is to design a future settlement that advances its needs. Specifically, a strengthened Shiit–e Iran-Iraq-Syria-Hezbollah axis requires the preservation of the Alawite regime and the guarantee of its pro-Iranian orientation. This is the key element in Iran’s current regional strategy, which aims at regional hegemony by forming a sphere of influence under its leadership while thwarting other actors – be they regional (mainly Saudi Arabia and Turkey) or international (the West) – that strive to promote a different settlement.
For its part, Russia has other interests, and its intervention in Syria serves its global objectives. Its preferred goal is a settlement that will give it a foothold and facilitate its influence in the Middle East, while putting an end to Western dominance in the region. Preserving the al-Assad regime is not a required condition, provided that Moscow’s status in Syria is maintained, and thus Russia is fairly flexible in its negotiations with the West on this point. Russia also fears Iranian “defection” to the Western camp, following the nuclear agreement and given the coordination with the United States on the situation in Iraq, and even in Syria, against the Islamic State. Tehran is not happy with Russia’s strengthened foothold in Syria, which could eventually disrupt its plans on two levels.
On the political level, Iran finds it hard to accept Russia’s preference to enlist the West and the Sunni states in the effort to stabilize Syria and design a political settlement there. Furthermore, in the political talks, Russia is completely ignoring Iran’s status. Russia has succeeded in leading the political process in two rounds of meetings in Vienna and in drafting a Security Council resolution to outline a roadmap for dialogue and transitional arrangements in Syria to end the war and achieve a solution within 18 months. However, in addition to the difficulty encountered by Russia in enlisting cooperation from the Syrian rebel factions, it appears that the West, led by the United States, is also unenthusiastic about facilitating Russia’s leading role, and is certainly reluctant to facilitate Putin’s political success, which presumes that military intervention in Syria would also bring political dividends. At the same time, however, Russia succeeded in taking the leading role in the political process only after it demonstrated its determination through the use of military force.
The second problematic level is military. Russia’s coalition partners include not only Iranian forces and the Syrian army loyal to Assad, but also Shiite militias and Hezbollah, which are under Iranian influence. Russia’s coolness toward the latter groups has prompted complaints from Iran about partial cooperation from Russia. For the integrated offensive effort, Iran sent 2,000 of its Revolutionary Guards ground troops – the al-Quds force – as reinforcements (in addition to the force that was previously fighting alongside Bashar), as well as volunteer Shiite militias and Hezbollah forces. The successful defense by the rebel forces and the number of losses among the al-Quds force commanders and soldiers, however, have aroused criticism in Iran itself about the resources devoted to Syria, and Iran has now withdrawn its reinforcements.
Israel’s Position in the Situation
A related element is Russian-Israeli cooperation, which detracts from the trust between Iran and Russia, and complicates the Iranian attempt, in coordination with Hezbollah, to establish an infrastructure in southern Syria for terrorist operations against Israel in the Golan Heights area. Some of the coordination between Israel and Russia in Syria seems to involve Israeli freedom of action in Syrian and Lebanese airspace (even though the area is covered by Russian surface -to-air missile batteries). Indeed, Israel has taken care to maintain its freedom of action in countering what it defines as a concrete threat against it. Thus far, in what should not be taken for granted, Israel has managed to sustain its aerial coordination with Russia. The recent action in Syria attributed to Israel, however – the killing of Samir Kuntar in the outskirts of Damascus – has aroused the fury of Hezbollah and Iran. From their perspective, this operation involved understandings between Israel and Russia that are taking precedence over Russia’s commitments to the pro-Assad coalition. If the appearance of stepped-up Russian-Israeli coordination indeed reflects strategic coordination, it will undoubtedly give rise to second thoughts in the Russian coalition about the validity of the partnership, while at the same time enhancing the Israeli interest to coordinate with Russia while avoiding possible areas of friction with the Russian forces operating in Syria.
Yet regardless of these points of contention, and despite the efforts of the Western powers and Sunni Arab countries to puncture the Russian-led coalition, the pro-Assad partnership is still a long way from dissolution. The upheavals in the Middle East have created new partnerships and coalitions limited in objectives and time. Just as NATO member Turkey can maintain relations with the Islamic State, while the United States proclaims that the war against the Islamic State is the principal American effort, Russia can lead a coalition in partnership with Iran and Hezbollah, while at the same time maintaining strategic understandings with Israel. Iran has no option for an exit from the game in Syria, and will therefore prefer continued cooperation with Russia, even if it sometimes leaves a sour taste.
Furthermore, by persisting in this cooperation, Iran avoids leaving Russia to build the foundations of a settlement in Syria by itself, at the expense of Iranian interests in Syria and elsewhere in the region.
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