Today's memo postings are intended to raise more questions than provide answers. What do you think?
Two articles in support of why the FBI went off the tracks and various senior members of Obama's intelligence agencies should be brought to trial.
Do Barr and Durham hold the key to our Republic's continued support of the rule of law? (See 1 and 1a below.)
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Do corporations have a responsibility beyond it's stock holders? If so, what should be the role of the CEO's?
If corporations have a widening social responsibility what impact will this have on profits? Can corporations supplant the role of government? (See 2 below.)
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Thanks to those memo readers who sent checks to Star Parker's Tax Free Enterprise.
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DORIS
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1)The FBI’s Fusion Fiasco
Christopher Steele has little credibility left after the inspector general’s report.
By Kimberley Strassel
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has had its worst week in modern history. The Justice Department’s inspector general found that the bureau had deceived a federal court and abused Americans’ civil liberties. It was equally humiliating for the crew that gulled the FBI into its excesses: Fusion GPS, Christopher Steele and their media acolytes.
Fusion is the opposition-research firm the Democratic National Committee and the Hillary Clinton campaign hired in 2016 to kneecap Donald Trump. Fusion in turn hired Mr. Steele, a British former spy, to compile the infamous “dossier” that the FBI used to obtain surveillance warrants against former Trump aide Carter Page. Fusion co-founder Glenn Simpson, a onetime Wall Street Journal reporter, tapped a network of media buddies to provide the operation cover.
For years, Mr. Simpson spun a tale of how his firm—a team of “professionals”—had hired the “extremely well-regarded” former “lead Russianist at MI6.” Mr. Simpson told the Senate in August 2017 that he wanted Mr. Steele to look into Mr. Trump’s Russia business dealings. So it was “alarming” when Mr. Steele instead found a “political conspiracy” between the Trump campaign and Russia. Especially because Mr. Steele had “a sterling reputation as a person who doesn’t exaggerate, doesn’t make things up, doesn’t sell baloney.” The duo felt “obligated” to report this “national-security threat” to the FBI. The media would later assert that Mr. Steele had proved a valuable source to the FBI in the past; many claimed the FBI corroborated the dossier.
Now Mr. Horowitz has exposed the many fictions. His report notes that Mr. Steele was hired from the start to find Trump-Russia collusion. Mr. Steele told the inspector general that Mr. Simpson asked him in May 2016 to determine “whether there were any ties between the Russian government and Trump and his campaign” and “whether Russia was trying to achieve a particular election outcome.” The timing is notable: Mr. Simpson was talking about collusion months before the FBI was—and even before Mr. Steele reported it to him.
The report notes that the FBI didn’t bother to confirm any of Mr. Steele’s explosive claims before presenting them to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in October 2016 as a reason to surveil Mr. Page. The bureau also assured the court that Mr. Steele was a “reliable” source, whose prior reporting had been “corroborated and used in criminal proceedings.”
Yet even as the FBI prepared the warrant application, its “reliable” source was working with Mr. Simpson to turn their FBI plant into political gold—briefing reporters, trying to gin up an October surprise against Mr. Trump. The inspector general’s report says Mr. Steele grew frustrated that “the U.S. government had not announced that the FBI was investigating” the candidate. So on Oct. 31 he outed himself and the FBI’s “substantial inquiry” in a Mother Jones interview. The inspector general’s report says Mr. Simpson described this as his “Hail Mary attempt.”
Only after Mr. Steele exposed the FBI’s investigation did the bureau fire him and begin its overdue diligence. In November and December 2016, the FBI sent teams to talk with people who’d worked with Mr. Steele professionally. They were told he’d held only a “moderately senior” position at MI6 and that he “demonstrates lack of self-awareness,” was “prone to rash judgments,” and “didn’t always exercise great judgment.” Former FBI agent Peter Strzok acknowledged that Mr. Steele was the type to “follow the shiny object.” Just the sort of guy you’d trust to dig up accusations of treason against a presidential nominee.
A source-validation review found that Mr. Steele’s prior work had only ever been “minimally corroborated” and never used in a criminal proceeding. The FBI discovered its guy worked for an attorney who represented a Russian oligarch. It tracked down the supersleuth’s sources, in particular his primary source who provided the allegations against Mr. Page in the FISA application. This primary source said “he/she never expected” Mr. Steele to present their discussions as “facts” since there was “no proof” and it was “hearsay,” the kind of “conversation that [he/she] had with friends over beers.” The source said that Mr. Steele had in any event “misstated or exaggerated” statements and the source’s access to Russian officials.
With quality like this, it’s no wonder the FBI’s strenuous efforts to corroborate the dossier proved a bust—as the inspector general has confirmed. None of the allegations provided to the FISA court were validated. Others—such as Trump attorney Michael Cohen’s alleged trip to Prague—were proved “not true.” Overall, “the limited information that was corroborated related to time, location, and title information, much of which was publicly available.” The dossier did at least get Carter Page’s job description right.
The findings overall are a warning to a red-faced press corps and FBI: Beware oppo researchers who offer noble intentions and fantastical claims. Sometimes they’re just oppo researchers. And poor ones at that.
1a) Participants at the annual Wall Street Journal CEO Council meeting this week watched history unfold as U.S. Attorney General William Barr took to the stage to deliver an extraordinary attack on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and to defend his boss, President Trump.
The attorney general was interviewed by Wall Street Journal Editor at Large Gerard Baker. Edited excerpts follow.
MR. BAKER: It may possibly have captured your attention this morning that the House of Representatives published two articles of impeachment against the president.
.S.MR. BAKERMR. BARR: There’s this political constitutional process under way on the Hill, and the attorney general was not part of that process. And at this stage I’m just not going to comment on it.
I will say that on the article of impeachment relating to obstruction, I don’t believe it’s the case that where somebody, including a branch of government, is asserting a legal privilege that they have under the law, that that constitutes obstruction.
MR. BAKER: Let’s move on to the other issue that was occupying a lot of your attention yesterday, which was the publication of the report of the Justice Department inspector general, Michael Horowitz, into the origins and the conduct of the investigation of President Trump and his associates around the Russia allegations about collusion with Russia. Mr. Horowitz in his report said yesterday, “We concluded that the FBI had an authorized purpose when it opened Crossfire Hurricane”—that was the name given to the investigation—”to obtain information about or protect against a national security threat or federal crime.”You said in response to that yesterday, “The FBI launched an intrusive investigation on the thinnest of suspicions that were, in my view, insufficient to justify the steps taken.” Could you tell us where exactly you disagree with Mr. Horowitz?
MR. BARR: I think there are three parts or issues, let’s say categories of analysis in the report. The first is, was the investigation adequately predicated, the start of it? The second one is, how was it conducted? And I break that down into two things: How was it conducted before the election and how was it conducted after the election? The real meat of Horowitz’s work, and the real thrust of the report actually deals with the conduct of the investigation, where I think it quickly became apparent that it was a travesty.
MR. BAKER: The abuses? I want to come onto these in detail, but the abuses that in particular refer to the application for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court—
MR. BARR: And also the fact that from day one it generated exculpatory information and nothing that substantiated any kind of collusion. But put that aside for a minute, going back to the issue. In many ways the issue of whether it was adequately predicated is something of academic interest only.
I think that it’s a big deal to use the law enforcement and the intelligence resources of the United States government to investigate a campaign of especially an opposing party. I’m sure there were instances in the past, but I can’t think of any recent instance where that was done.
MR. BAKER: The report does make clear there were concerns about that and discussions at very high levels within the FBI as to the sensitive information—
MR. BARR: What is the basis you have for looking into something? And what are reasonable steps to take, taking into consideration the weight of the evidence that’s prompting you to do that, the alternatives available, and exactly what you were trying to accomplish, and also the sensitivity of the area involved here, a political campaign—core First Amendment activity.And where I disagree with Mike is I just think this was very flimsy. This was a comment made by a 28-year-old volunteer on a campaign in a bar offhand, which was described as a suggestion of a suggestion. And I personally think the subject matter of it, some vague allusion to the fact that the Russians may have something that they could dump—at that time in May 2016 there was rampant speculation going on in the media, on the blogosphere, and in political circles that Hillary Clinton’s email server had in 2014 been hacked, and therefore the Russians might have those emails.
So drawing the conclusion that this kind of vague comment related to and showed preknowledge of the DNC hack and dump, I think, was a big stretch. But let me just finalize it, which is from my experience the normal thing to do in this kind of situation, and I have had analogous experience here, is to go to the campaign. And here I don’t think there’s a legitimate explanation for why they didn’t, especially because they went to the Russians.
MR. BAKER: Well, I think in the report it actually does say that they considered this, but that there were concerns that it would be alerting the campaign and if there was criminal activity they would be able to shut it down.
MR. BARR: Right. And what the FBI person said as to why he didn’t is, “We only do that if there’s no possibility whatever that the person is witting.” And that’s simply not true. I have authorized defensive briefings, and I know of defensive briefings that are regularly conducted. You look at all the circumstances.
If your purpose was to protect the election, then you would’ve done a defensive briefing here, because the chances of people like Sessions or Chris Christie being in cahoots with the Russians were pretty minimal. But if there was stuff going on, then by going in, you brace them and you disrupt the activity in time to protect the election.
But it just doesn’t hold water because on Aug. 4 they contacted the head of Russian intelligence and said, “We know what you’re up to. You’d better stop it.” They did again in later August, and President Obama did it directly in September. So it doesn’t strike me as plausible that you would tell the Russians, who clearly were guilty of interference. But you wouldn’t go and talk to the campaign. That makes no sense.
MR. BAKER: Do you think there was some political motivation on the part of people at the FBI to go after the Trump campaign in this way?
MR. BARR: That’s why we have [U.S. Attorney John] Durham. Durham is able to look at all the evidence, he’s able to not only look at the evidence within the FBI, he’s able to require people to testify. He’s able to talk to other agencies, he’s able to talk to private parties.
There was a lot of swirl of activity going on at this time, it wasn’t all in the FBI. So I think he will have a broader appreciation of all the facts, and a determination can be made. I don’t know what the motivations were and I’m not saying they were improper motivations, but I think it’s premature to rule definitively there wasn’t.
MR. BAKER: On the Ukraine issue, the famous July 25 phone call between President Trump and President Zelensky, there’s a quote where President Trump says to President Zelensky, “There’s a lot of talk about Biden’s son, that Biden stopped the prosecution,” that was of the Ukrainian prosecutor, “and a lot of people want to find out about that. So whatever you can do with the attorney general would be great. It seems horrible to me.” Did the Ukrainians do anything with you?
MR. BARR: No.
MR. BAKER: Nothing at all?
MR. BARR: No. And that’s taken out of context, just to be fair. In the president’s call he started out by talking about the abuses in the 2016 election that he said, “our country has paid a heavy price for,” and he asked him to work with the attorney general on that.
Now the fact is, I was smart enough not to get involved with Ukraine, at least put it very low on the list.
MR. BAKER: Are you contrasting yourself with Rudy Giuliani ?
MR. BARR: No. I’m just saying that that hadn’t reached the top of my to-do list yet, and so fortunately I hadn’t looked into the Ukraine situation.
But he then later in the conversation gets into other things, and then he starts throwing different names around. But the fact, as I said at the time, I’ve had no dealings with Ukraine, no dealings with Rudy Giuliani about Ukraine.
MR. BAKER: The allegation was that a U.S. citizen was perhaps corruptly acting with a Ukrainian. All the pressure was on the Ukrainians to at least announce an investigation. Why would that not be a matter for U.S. investigatory authorities?
MR. BARR: At the time I don’t know whether it was or not, frankly.
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2) CEO's on the Hot Seat as The Role of The CEO Get's Harder
The business round table recently said companies should meet the interests of "all" stakeholders , rather than just shareholders. CEOs should brace themselves for the consequences.
By Rick Wartzman
A loud and swelling chorus is calling for CEOs to meet the interests of all their stakeholders—customers, employees, shareholders, the communities in which they operate and society as a whole.
By contrast, many of those leading the nation’s biggest companies assumed previously that, while none of their constituencies could be ignored, the interests of shareholders should invariably come first.“Much of the discussion has revolved around maximizing shareholder wealth,” says legendary Wall Street lawyer Martin Lipton, who has long maintained that companies have put too much emphasis on short-term financial results at the expense of society and, in many instances, to the detriment of their own long-term viability. “We’ve made some really bad mistakes. We’re now trying to rectify that.”
In August, the Business Roundtable released a statement signed by 181 CEOs in which they pledged “a fundamental commitment” to “deliver value to all” stakeholders. This was a reversal; since 1997, the Roundtable had endorsed shareholder primacy.
For CEOs, this new stance is certain to have far-reaching consequences: heightened scrutiny from various camps to ensure that the vows made to stakeholders aren’t empty rhetoric; the necessity to draw on personal traits and capacities that might have been underutilized when there were fewer priorities to juggle; and a push by reformers to revamp the incentives that determine executive pay.
Balancing interests
Tom Wilson, CEO of insurer Allstate Corp. , describes what’s happening as more “evolutionary” than revolutionary. “Businesspeople want to do good,” he says.
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that “most of the money” being generated by U.S. corporations—whose profits have soared over the past two decades, save for during the 2007-09 recession—has “gone to shareholders,” while the vast majority of workers have not prospered.
To what extent do you see the CEO role in 2025 becoming more focused on moral/ ethical leadership?
To what extent do you see future CEOs in 2025 shifting focus from a single focus of profit to a triple bottom line including profit people and planet?
To a great extent
To some extent
Same
5%
5%
33%
38%
56%
62%
From 1979 to 2018, according to the Economic Policy Institute, Americans’ hourly output went up about 70%, while the hourly wages and benefits of the typical worker essentially stagnated, increasing less than 12% after adjusting for inflation. A study published last month by the Brookings Institution showed that 44% of all U.S. workers ages 18 to 64—53 million people—now hold low-wage jobs, with median annual earnings of just $17,950.
“We’re in a place where people’s lives have not been made better off,” says Mr. Wilson, who serves as chairman of the executive committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In turn, he adds, a good portion of the public has lost faith in the capitalist system, while politicians are lining up to overhaul “our license to operate” and mandate that corporate fortunes be shared more widely—a regulatory reaction that, some fear, could throttle economic growth.
For its part, Allstate boosted its minimum wage to $15 an hour in 2016, and Mr. Wilson has not been shy about urging his fellow CEOs to create more decent-paying jobs. But he underscores that these are not simple decisions, as he tries to attend to all of his stakeholders, including the millions who own Allstate stock.
“It’s not like being a student where I can get an A in every class,” says Mr. Wilson. “There are trade-offs.”
You can see this tension play out in the Drucker Institute’s annual company rankings—a measure that is designed to assess how effectively managed a corporation is from a holistic, stakeholder perspective. (The rankings underlie the Management Top 250, a list of the best-run U.S. companies, produced in partnership with The Wall Street Journal.) Most are highly uneven in their performance across the five categories examined: customer satisfaction, employee engagement and development, innovation, social responsibility and financial strength. Indeed, of the 820 companies evaluated this year, only eight scored among the upper 20% in all five areas.
Done right, watching out for all stakeholders should ultimately improve societal well-being and bolster the bottom line.
“Yes, we have to make our margins, be competitive on price, drive profit, grow,” says Ajay Banga, CEO of Mastercard Inc., the financial-services provider. “That’s the textbook definition of capitalism, and that’s what you’ll see if you’re only looking a few feet ahead of you. But when you raise your eyes a little and recognize that most companies and nations survive on people making and spending money, you realize that you’re part of an interconnected system. Giving people a lift, expanding the middle class, helping them thrive and grow will also do the same for you.”
A question of commitment
All that said, whether most CEOs are prepared to make a real difference on the toughest challenges is an open question.
A number have spoken out on an assortment of important subjects—gun control, immigration, race relations, affordable housing, transgender rights and more. But they can be warier in taking on the issues that are most core to the business.
On the environment, for instance, “things are moving in the right direction—but not fast enough,” says Andrew Winston, who has advised major corporations on sustainability. “Emissions continue to go up, and companies are still preoccupied with asking, ‘What about the shareholder?’ ” A survey this year of 1,000 CEOs from around the world by Accenture discovered that just a third of them are willing to commit immediately to cutting greenhouse gases by amounts promulgated in the Paris climate agreement.
As to the experience of workers, there tends to be more self-congratulation among CEOs than honest self-reflection. Top executives “genuinely believe they are doing everything they can for their front-line workers and therefore don’t have a bad jobs problem,” Katie Bach and Zeynep Ton of the nonprofit Good Jobs Institutewrote last month in Harvard Business Review. “But they aren’t and they do.”
As CEOs try to navigate the crosscurrents, they are being forced to summon a host of new skills.
“Over the past decade, the CEO of choice was one who understood the balance sheet,” says Tierney Remick, co-leader of the Board and CEO Services team at Korn Ferry, the organizational consulting firm. “Over the next decade, you’re going to need someone who can drive both a business agenda and a much broader stakeholder agenda.”
Being successful at this, she says, “doesn’t mean having a lack of competitiveness.” But it takes considerable empathy and self-awareness, the ability to listen deeply and communicate cogently, and the courage to tackle an array of sometimes controversial topics. With an imperative to deal more with what’s happening outside the company’s walls, a CEO also has to prove adept at assembling and leading a strong cadre of senior executives who can concentrate internally.
“These were all nice-to-haves before,” Ms. Remick says. “They are must-haves now.”
How we got here
In many respects, there is a back-to-the-future quality in what CEOs are being asked to do. In the 30 years after World War II, those at the helm of America’s most prominent corporations routinely conveyed how crucial it was to look out for “the balanced best interests of all,” to use the catchphrase of Ralph Cordiner, who was CEO of General Electric Co. in the late 1950s and early ’60s.
But by the 1980s, shareholders had been left to feel as if they were the one party that wasn’t being accommodated, as many companies posted poor financial returns in the face of recession and ever-fiercer global competition. The Dow Jones Industrial Average first closed above 1000 in 1972—and wouldn’t again until 1982.
Investors embraced the emerging philosophy of a group of scholars—the University of Chicago’s Milton Friedman, Michael Jensen of the University of Rochester (and later Harvard) and others—that executives were the “agents” of the shareholders, and their single aim should be to make as much money as possible within the bounds of the law. “Agency theory” moved quickly and pervasively from the halls of academia to the realm of practice.
“The CEO job today is radically different from what it was 10 years ago,” says Joshua Bolten, president of the Business Roundtable. “They now actually have to respond to a variety of stakeholders,” including employees who are apt to express needs and concerns “beyond wages and working conditions.”
For example, Mr. Bolten cites several CEOs who are implementing plans to aggressively reduce their company’s carbon footprint. In addition to conviction about the policy, he says, “that’s also what their employees and, perhaps even more so, potential recruits are demanding.”
Paul Polman, who retired in 2018 as CEO of consumer-goods giant Unilever PLC and has co-founded a venture called Imagine to assist other CEOs in combating poverty and global warming, observes pressure from all directions—“employees walking out, citizens making their voices heard, consumers making spending choices, governments demanding change.”
And then there are shareholders, who, as Mr. Polman points out, are increasingly weighing where to put capital based “on the nonfinancials or intangibles,” including those captured by environmental, social and governance metrics. Last year, the US SIF Foundation reported that U.S. money managers addressed ESG criteria across $11.6 trillion in assets. That’s one in four dollars under professional management.
Mixed signals
For CEOs, however, figuring out how to please shareholders can be a minefield. The Council of Institutional Investors has opposed the Business Roundtable statement, asserting that while “it is critical to respect stakeholders…accountability to everyone means accountability to no one.”
“There has to be a north star, and it’s long-term shareholder value,” says Ken Bertsch, executive director of the council. While some decry shareholder primacy, Mr. Bertsch worries that it will be replaced by “CEO primacy”—with companies chasing all sorts of social objectives and not being answerable for their actions.
Mr. Bertsch concedes that too many investors “pay excessive attention to what’s happening to share price day to day.” But plenty of CEOs, he says, “haven’t been good at articulating their long-term vision” for turning their strategy into desired financial outcomes.
Investment firms with a distant time horizon, including those that primarily put money into passively managed exchange-traded funds and index funds, have been insisting that companies spell out how environmental and workforce matters translate into longer-term opportunity and risk. But CEOs complain—usually privately—that while those in the “corporate engagement” department preach a lot about these things, the individuals actually in charge of portfolios are still often fixated on shorter-term financial gains.
“That’s where the power lies,” Mr. Lipton says.
Betty Yee, who as California’s controller sits on the boards of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, agrees that institutional investors can send contradictory signals. But she says that initiatives such as the Climate Action 100+, in which more than 370 investors have banded together to lean on companies on greenhouse gases, indicate that they’re on the right track. “We get things done when we don’t send mixed messages,” she says.
Which of the following global issues are most critical for your company’s competitive strategy?
How are these issues impacting your company’s ability to address global environmental, social and economic sustainability challenges?
Increased my company’s sustainability efforts
Reduced or stalled my company’s sustainability efforts
Political uncertainty across markets
Environmental degradation*
Global and local governance models
Trust in business
63%
63%
41%
41%
33%
36%
33%
36%
16
19
21
22
16
19
21
22
42
39
42
48
39
48
54
54
Market closures and limitations on free trade
Lack of stable institutions and rule of law
Rising income and wealth disparity
Technology skills gap
32%
32%
31%
31%
23%
26%
23%
26%
19
19
15
15
15
26
15
33
32
26
33
32
34
35
34
35
All the while, however, there’s another set of shareholders who make no bones about trying to wring out more profit in the short term: activist investors, who have been known to swoop in and threaten to oust the CEO unless costs are cut and more money is handed to those who own the stock. The presence of activists—who have won more than 800 board seats since 2013, by Lazard Ltd. ’s count—is one reason, among several, that CEO turnover has been climbing and time on the job has been dropping. PricewaterhouseCoopers notes that median CEO tenure at big public companies stands at about five years, down from eight years in 2000.
“One group wants this, one group wants that—one wants short-term, one wants long-term,” says Steve Odland, president and CEO of the Conference Board, a business research organization, and the former CEO of Office Depot Inc. and AutoZone Inc. “It’s like you’re trying to play a game, and there are not consistent rules.”
Compensation’s role
At the same time, some wonder whether compensation—more than confusion—is the steepest impediment to adopting a true stakeholder orientation.
Last year, median pay rose to $12.4 million for the heads of S&P 500 companies, up 6.6% from 2017, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis. Critics suggest that such fat paychecks make it hard for CEOs to relate to the kinds of hardships with which many people are struggling, and this inhibits how far they’re willing to go to enhance workers’ wages or benefits.
“If you were a CEO in the 1960s, you lived in one of the biggest houses in town, but you didn’t live in a different world,” says Leo Strine, who just stepped down as chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, where many landmark business cases are litigated.
As much as a CEO’s pay level may affect things, so does the mix. Two-thirds of CEO compensation last year was tied to share price through restricted stock and options. By comparison, less than 15% of companies in the S&P 500 incorporate ESG-type indicators into their executive-compensation packages, a review by my colleague Kelly Tang, the Drucker Institute’s senior director of research, has found. And generally, the sums involved are relatively trivial.
As long as this situation persists, say advocates of a stakeholder approach, expecting CEOs to refrain from favoring shareholders will remain wishful thinking.
Meanwhile, for those who would like to link a bigger slice of CEO compensation to a full range of stakeholder metrics that include ESG, the absence of a universal structure for doing so is a significant barrier. Although efforts are under way to remedy this, “things right now are all over the map,” says Jim DeLoach, managing director at the consulting firm Protiviti. “We need globally accepted standards.”
Ms. Yee, the California controller, is likewise eager for the government to establish what stakeholder information companies must disclose. “I can’t overstate the role of the regulators,” she says.
Even the most committed CEOs stress that it will be impossible to make progress alone. Some, such as Allstate’s Mr. Wilson, want boards of directors to step up.
Jim Keane, CEO of furniture maker Steelcase Inc., says he has been encouraging everyone up and down the ranks to weigh the broader impacts of the company’s activities. “Every decision made by every employee would be better if it more explicitly considered the contextual understanding that comes from an ESG mind-set,” he says.
That is undoubtedly so. Yet it will be the CEO who is celebrated for demonstrating authentic and meaningful “woke leadership,” as Ms. Yee terms it—or who gets slammed for being all talk.
Mr. Wartzman is the head of the KH Moon Center for a Functioning Society, a part of the Drucker Institute at Claremont Graduate University.
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