Taking Obama At His Word? Two Things to Ponder!

Due to public demand in Pittsburgh, Sweet Tammys will soon be expanding its presence in more local grocery stores.

Visit their web site should you wish to order some items during the Holidays!
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Having just returned from Israel I am now leaving Thursday to go to Orlando returning on Saturday.

My father's law firm recently opened an office in Orlando and in celebration of the firm's 125th anniversary they have invited family members  to come and tell about my father's achievements in the area of Civil Rights and his efforts on behalf of helping Israel prepare for nationhood.

My daughter was five when he died and she has asked me to come with her to speak about her grandfather.

Before I leave, I want to publish some additional current thoughts vis a vis Obama and his continued bewildering and muddled efforts in The Middle East.  (See 1, 1a, 1b, 1c, id and 1e below.)

Putin  acquiesced in the destruction of Syria's WMD and there has been some effective elimination of Assad's hand but whether all of his WMD have been located and will be destroyed is another matter. Meanwhile the disintegration of that nation continues and Russia's influence rises

I have no way of knowing or proving this next assertion but I am led to believe Wikki Leaks have placed Putin in a powerful position and he is using  knowledge gained  to apply pressure on Obama.  Time will tell.
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Two things to ponder and you decide:

1) God forbid if and when an atomic or nuclear device explodes in one of our cities or ports and Obama were still president, will that be deemed a workplace disruption, annoyance, intrusion?

Is his characterization of workplace violence limited only to hand held weapons and small bombs?

2)After the Korean and Viet Nam Wars large number of Asian refugees entered our country.

Have they made demands we change our language, have they made demands they be given vast amounts of welfare assistance, have they made demands upon our society it embrace their culture, have they sent money earned home to relatives to disrupt other nations through terrorism, have they established houses of worship for the purpose of indoctrinating and training their people to plant bombs and use them as money transfers etc.

From every general indication they have assimilated, emphasized education and become more productive citizens or have I missed something?
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Speaks for itself.  Click on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osYZ1uZasN8 
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Faber keeps being logical and eventually he mayl be right. The public is now streaming into the market, new issues are going to large  premiums and this is historically reminiscent of a market that is toppy.  (See 2 below.)
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Dick
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1)The World I've Known Has Come To An End
By Herb London - London Center for Policy Research

There was a time not so long ago when I could select my own doctor. There was a time when I could choose my health insurance company. There was a time when everyone believed Marxism was a failure, an idea relegated to the ash heap of history. There was a time when class warfare occurred in other places far away, but Americans believed in opportunity, not sponging from others.

Was that really not so long ago? It is true President Obama said he would transform America. He has lived up to his promise. Our Constitution has been twisted into an unrecognizable document. Washington has become a lawless town where criminals are heroes and heroes are ignored. Peace through strength – the bipartisan belief that military preparedness preserves order – has been converted into peace through prayer. If you hope for the best, it just might occur.

Although racial profiling has been lambasted, its opponents base racial fairness on a race based test, i.e. the number of arrests must be equal to the number of a racial group in a given community. If crime is committed by a racial group that is disproportionate to its number in the population, that’s too bad.

Common sense is on vacation. People who have violated the law and sing misogynistic lyrics are rewarded as millionaires in the rap world. Teachers who engage youthful students in sexual escapades cannot be fired. The aggregate pension liability for retired police officers and firefighters in New York City is more than the salaries of active employees. Laws that Congress passes for the rest of America do not necessarily apply to it. And a congressman tells us that the Tea Party, based on a grassroots effort to limit the expansion of government, is equivalent to the KKK and if you have the temerity to disagree with him, you are a racist.

Four Americans killed in Benghazi defending the ambassador and the embassy are ignored by the Secretary of State who said, “What difference does it make.” American students are more likely to know the winner on “American Idol” than the authors of the Federalist Papers.

Sophistry is the language of politics and television news. “Fairness” is taking from some and giving to others. Taxes are referred to as “investments.” Adversaries are enemies and enemies are friends. Islam is a religion of peace. The use of poison gas is a red line – oh, I meant a dotted line. The IRS is an “independent agency.” A deadline was established for the introduction of Obamacare, but it wasn’t meant as a “deadline.” The president asserted and reasserted that “If you like your doctor or healthcare plan, you can keep it.” Lies are merely “misinterpretations.”

When there is so little to rely on, the basis for civilizational stability is undone. I observe tweeters on the street who communicate in 140 characters and cannot express a thoughtful opinion. Is it any wonder? Technology has given us many new opportunities, but these opportunities are saddled with toxins. So what if I can find out what you are having for dinner or who you are dating. Does it make a difference? All we have are distractions from what really matters.

What does matter are the interests of the nation. To my astonishment, the president has given Russia a veto over American foreign policy and the State Department has channeled foreign policy decisions through the United Nations, an organization reflexively opposed to American interests.

In surveying this landscape I realize that I am an alien in a foreign land. I don’t speak the language of puerile adolescents that dominate the media. I remain a patriot, albeit patriotism itself is an antediluvian idea. And I regard government’s coercive effort to redistribute wealth as theft. My world is at an end. There won’t be a funeral for the deceased nation, but there will be a lamentation. This is it.

1a) Compromise will likely lead to nuclear Iran,' says expert

By Yaakov Lappin 

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani [file]. (Photo: REUTERS/Fars News)

The international community and Iran are on a path to reaching a “middle ground” deal on Tehran’s nuclear program that will allow each side to claim victory, but which will allow Iran to eventually become a nuclear state, a leading Middle East expert told The Jerusalem Post on Tuesday.

Prof. Uzi Rabi, director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, who will soon publish the book The Shi’ite Crescent: An Iranian Vision and Arab Fear, added that an Israeli military operation against Iran’s nuclear program was feasible several years ago, but that today, “the train has left the station.”

He added, however, that the Iranian regime is rational and calculated, and that Israel will need to start thinking about how to contain a nuclear Iran together with Arab states that are also threatened by the Islamic Republic.

In current diplomatic talks between Iran and the international community, “the two sides understand they have to reach a middle ground,” Rabi said. An agreement will likely involve Iran decreasing its uranium enrichment activities and a timetable for inspection of nuclear facilities, though it will not include complete Iranian transparency, he added.

“Some of the sites will be open for inspection. Everything will be partial. This is convenient for the Iranian and the American presidents,” Rabi stated.

Such an agreement will likely be supported by Russia – and Europe, despite some reservations, will give its blessing as well.

Iran will not provide any further concessions, Rabi stressed.

A deal on Iran’s nuclear program might also expand to an international arrangement for the attempted resolution of the Syrian conflict, Rabi said.

“The Iranians can say: ‘If we’re accepted as a partner in future talks on Syria, we can carry out steps that will push towards an end to the conflict in Syria,’” he added.

The US will seek to calm its Middle East allies, Israel, the Gulf states and Egypt, all of whom are threatened by a nuclear Iran, and convince them that it did not abandon them.

In Iran, elites tied into the regime, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, will also create obstacles to any deal, Rabi argued.

Any lifting of sanctions will likely be gradual and could involve a slow easing of restrictions on the Iranian oil or banking industries.

But a partial nuclear deal is a “certified recipe for creating a nuclear Iran in the intermediate future,” Rabi warned. Israel and other regional states will have to start thinking about not only preventing Iran from arming itself with nuclear weapons, but how to contain a nuclear Tehran as well.

Rabi expressed skepticism that a military attack at this late phase could effectively stop the Islamic Republic’s march to atomic bombs.

“A strike can put them back perhaps by a year or two. What do you do at the end of that time? Strike again?” he asked. Instead, Israel should enter a regional coalition of states threatened by Iran, he argued.

Military generals in Israel who urged the government to wait before striking Iran years ago should not be pushing for a strike at such a late stage, he charged.

“I don’t think a nuclear Iran will cause a regional disaster. It will create very difficult challenges,” Rabi said.

He argued that Iran has been successful in using diplomatic forums to isolate Israel, and that Jerusalem needs to develop new diplomatic tools to fight back with.

Despite Israel’s “war of attrition” against Tehran’s plans, “the world is allowing Iran to go nuclear. Iran has things to offer behind closed doors. Israel isn’t there. It just gets reports.

“We have to be responsive and not enter a state of melancholy. There won’t be regional destruction or apocalyptic scenarios. Israel must develop tools to ensure that its back isn’t against the wall,” Rabi said.

“Iran is very calculated. It does not want to lose resources in a futile war,” he added.

Inside Iran, President Hassan Rouhani has managed to convince the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, that a change in tactics is in order to prevent a collapse of the economy and a new revolution.

Rouhani is a product of the Iranian regime, and his call for a change of course is merely tactical, not ideological, according to Rabi’s assessment.

“He belongs to the elite of the Islamic revolution… what he’s trying to do is prove that through his way, Iran can purchase estates of support abroad and ease the sanctions, without significantly harming Iranian interests.”

“The Iranian charm offensive is working on the Europeans and Americans, who do not want to get involved in another Middle Eastern saga, and want to look at the half-full glass,” Rabi added.

1b)How Iran is winning the war of words

By Emily B. Landau 

At a superficial level, one could be excused for assuming that Iran’s position in the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 should not be that strong. After all, Iran violated its commitment to the international community not to work on a military nuclear program, leading to the imposition of a long list of UN and unilateral (mainly U.S. and EU) economic and financial sanctions. Moreover, when facing the P5+1 at the negotiating table, Iran faces the combined political, military and economic strength of these six powers that far outweighs its own.

But as is quite well known, for a number of reasons that go to the structure of these talks, Iran’s bargaining position has actually proven to be quite robust.

One of the less appreciated, but probably more effective bargaining tactics that Iran has employed in dealing with the international community – in the hope of further strengthening its hand – is what might be called the “frame game.” This refers to Iran’s attempts to rhetorically frame issues relating to the negotiation in a manner that is in line with its own interests and positions, and with the hope of ultimately basing them as the widely accepted interpretation.

Several rhetorical tactics employed by Iran in order to turn its own messages and interpretations into the generally accepted ones can be identified. One commonly used tactic is quite straight-forward: The incessant repetition of certain messages, in every context, and at every turn, until they begin to sound like accepted common knowledge. This tactic has been employed regarding statements that Iran has an “inalienable right” to enrich uranium; that the international community accuses Iran of working on a military program but has never come up with evidence to support this; that Iran has answered all outstanding questions to the satisfaction of the IAEA; and that Iran has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. These statements are either untrue or only partially true, but by incessantly repeating them, Iran intends to make them sound absolutely true.

One of Iran’s major problems at the negotiations table is that the crisis is inherently non-symmetric. Iran made a commitment by joining the NPT and is now in violation of that commitment. The negotiation is thus fundamentally about compelling Iran to return to its commitments – it is not a give and take between two parties. But, this is where another “frame game” tactic comes into play: Namely, Iran’s attempts to reframe the negotiation as more symmetrical than it is, so that it can demand a give and take. Creating an image of symmetry between the two sides can go a long way in the negotiating room; if both sides seem equally at fault, they then have an equal responsibility to improve the situation. So by framing the negotiation as a give and take, Iran increases its leverage at the table.

A specific tactic that Iran employs in this regard is to rhetorically “turn the tables” on the other side. When demands are directed at Iran, Iran simply turns them around and fires them right back at the international community. So, if the international community says it needs to have confidence in Iran, Iran says it needs to have confidence in the international community! And if Iran needs to show its seriousness in the negotiation, clearly the international community must show its sincerity to Iran – indeed, it must change certain policies to demonstrate that it is serious. And the latest example regards talk of President Rohani’s (possibly insincere) “smile campaign.” Supreme Leader Khamenei has just noted that it is Iran that must be wary of the “enemy who smiles,” while at the same time threatens that all options are still on the table.

The success of this particular tactic can be discerned in the fact that nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 today indeed appear to be about bothsides having to make concessions: Iran in the nuclear realm, but many accept that the international community is equally required to lift sanctions in a gradual tit for tat. In order to further base this interpretation, Iran has also followed the “incessant repetition” tactic: saying over and over that these sanctions are illegal, immoral, and unjust.

Iran is also minded to broader issues of negotiations framing as an expression of “who has the upper hand:” Who needs to respond to whose proposal; who determines where meetings take place, etc. Iran has even recently taken steps to alter the overall frame of the negotiation – from solely nuclear, to U.S.-Iran bilateral relations – with an eye to influencing the framing of the larger picture, and likely in the hope of establishing a context that will make the international community even more receptive to a more lenient approach on the specific nuclear front.

At the end of the day, Iran’s frame game can also come back to haunt it. The new and more positive atmosphere that has been displayed by the Iranian team in the Geneva negotiations has created very strong expectations in many quarters for a substantively different approach –and results. If this proves not to be the case, disappointment could lead to much harsher measures.

But there is also the hope that Iran’s latest move in the frame game – a smiling rather than scowling approach – could also tie its own hands this time, and in a positive manner as far as the international community is concerned. Having conditioned the world to a newly positive atmosphere, an Iranian return to a hardline approach of rejection and defiance would be far more difficult to pull off.

Dr. Emily B. Landau is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). She is the author of “Decade of Diplomacy: Negotiations with Iran and North Korea and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation” (2012). 

1c) Kerry: US Sees Jewish Judea and Samaria as 'Illegitimate'

By Tova Dvorin and Ari Soffer - 

Abbas and Kerry (Flash 90 archive)

US Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed after meetings with Palestinian Arab representatives in Bethlehem today (Wednesday) that the US stance on Jewish life in Judea and Samaria is condemnation, AFP reports.

“We consider now, and have always considered, the settlements to be illegitimate,” Kerry said, after Mahmoud Abbas reportedly walked out of Tuesday's talks over Israel's statements supporting a new initiative to build more than 3,500 new Jewish homes in the region.

Regarding the fact that Israel has kept up its side of a deal which exchanged the buildings for the controversial release of 26 Arab terrorists back into civilian areas, Kerry claims that “at no time did the Palestinians in any way agree, as a matter of going back to the talks, that they could somehow condone or accept” Jewish building efforts in Judea and Samaria.

Kerry did throw Israel a bone by responding that the US was “aware” of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's plan for renewed construction efforts.

Kerry's remarks follow a tumultuous week between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, during which the released terrorists received a hero's welcome and threats of a third intifada were launched. Such a striking statement is unlikely to encourage an already skeptical Israeli public to support ongoing US-brokered talks.

Many Israelis have long suspected the Obama administration of sympathizing with the PA position, and concerns were raised at the very start of the latest round of talks over the controversial appointment of Martin Indyk as mediator in the talks. A number of Israeli groups have claimed his work with the far-left New Israel Fund rules Indyk out as an “honest broker” between the sides.

The confirmation also follows reports that the US President made derogatory remarks toward Israel, and toward Binyamin Netanyahu in particular, during discussions about the conflict in 2012.  

The US may possibly have vested interests in the talks' success, as Obama has allegedly offered Israel support in efforts to stop a nuclear Iran in the event of a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

The Prime Minister's office has not yet released a statement responding to the US condemnation, nor how it will affect future talks.

1d) Ten Basic points summarizing Israel's rights in Judea and Samaria

By Ambassador Alan Baker -

1. Upon Israel’s taking control of the area in 1967, the 1907 Hague Rules on Land Warfare and the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) were not considered applicable to the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) territory, as the Kingdom of Jordan, prior to 1967, was never the prior legal sovereign, and in any event has since renounced any claim to sovereign rights via-a-vis the territory.
2. Israel, as administering power pending a negotiated final determination as to the fate of the territory, nevertheless chose to implement the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva convention and other norms of international humanitarian law in order to ensure the basic day-to-day rights of the local population as well as Israel’s own rights to protect its forces and to utilize those parts of land that were not under local private ownership.
3. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibiting the mass transfer of population into occupied territory as practiced by Germany during the second world war, was neither relevant nor was ever intended to apply to Israelis choosing to reside in Judea and Samaria.
4.  Accordingly, claims by the UN, European capitals, organizations and individuals that Israeli settlement activity is in violation of international law therefore have no legal basis whatsoever.
5. Similarly, the oft-used term “occupied Palestinian territories” is totally inaccurate and false. The territories are neither occupied nor Palestinian. No legal instrument has ever determined that the Palestinians have sovereignty or that the territories belong to them.
6. The territories of Judea and Samaria remain in dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, subject only to the outcome of permanent status negotiations between them.
7. The legality of the presence of Israel’s communities in the area stems from the historic, indigenous and legal rights of the Jewish people to settle in the area, granted pursuant to valid and binding international legal instruments recognized and accepted by the international community. These rights cannot be denied or placed in question.
8. The Palestinian leadership, in the still valid 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo 2), agreed to, and accepted Israel’s continued presence in Judea and Samaria pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations, without any restriction on either side regarding planning, zoning or construction of homes and communities. Hence, claims that Israel’s presence in the area is illegal have no basis.
9. The Palestinian leadership undertook in the Oslo Accords, to settle all outstanding issues, including borders, settlements, security, Jerusalem and refugees, by negotiation only and not through unilateral measures. The Palestinian call for a freeze on settlement activity as a precondition for returning to negotiation is a violation of the agreements.
10. Any attempt, through the UN or otherwise, to unilaterally change the status of the territory would violate Palestinian commitments set out in the Oslo Accords and prejudice the integrity and continued validity of the various agreements with Israel, thereby opening up the situation to possible reciprocal unilateral action by Israel.

1e)

The U.S.-Iran Talks: Ideology and Necessity

By George Friedman

The talks between Iran and the Western powers have ended but have not failed. They will reconvene next week. That in itself is a dramatic change from the past, when such talks invariably began in failure. In my book The Next Decade, I argued that the United States and Iran would move toward strategic alignment, and I think that is what we are seeing take shape. Of course, there is no guarantee that the talks will yield a settlement or that they will evolve into anything more meaningful. But the mere possibility requires us to consider three questions: Why is this happening now, what would a settlement look like, and how will it affect the region if it happens?

Precedents

It is important to recognize that despite all of the other actors on the stage, this negotiation is between the United States and Iran. It is also important to understand that while this phase of the discussion is entirely focused on Iran's nuclear development and sanctions, an eventual settlement would address U.S. and Iranian relations and how those relations affect the region. If the nuclear issue were resolved and the sanctions removed, then matters such as controlling Sunni extremists, investment in Iran and maintaining the regional balance of power would all be on the table. In solving these two outstanding problems, the prospect of a new U.S.-Iranian relationship would have to be taken seriously.

But first, there are great obstacles to overcome. One is ideology. Iran regards the United States as the Great Satan. The United States regards Iran as part of the Axis of Evil. For the Iranians, memories of a U.S.-sponsored coup in 1953 and Washington's support for the Shah are vivid. Americans above the age of 35 cannot forget the Iranian hostage crisis, when Iranians seized some 50 U.S. Embassy employees. Iran believes the United States has violated its sovereignty; the United States believes Iran has violated basic norms of international law. Each views the other as barbaric. Add to this that the ideology of radical Islamism regards the United States as corrupt and evil, and the ideology of the United States sees Iran as brutal and repressive, and it would seem that resolution is impossible.

From the American side, there is precedent for reconciling national differences: China. When the United States reached out to China in the 1970s, Beijing was supplying weapons to the North Vietnamese, who used them against American troops. China's rhetoric about U.S. imperialism, replete with "running dogs," portrayed the United States as monstrous. The United States saw China, a nuclear power, as a greater threat for nuclear war than the Soviet Union, since Mao had openly stated -- and seemed to mean it -- that communists ought to welcome nuclear war rather than fear it. Given the extremism and brutality of the Cultural Revolution, the ideological bar seemed insurmountable.

But the strategic interests of both countries superseded ideology. They did not recognize each other, but they did need each other. The relative power of the Soviet Union had risen. There had been heavy fighting between China and the Soviet Union along the Ussuri River in 1969, and Soviet troops were heavily deployed along China's border. The United States had begun to redeploy troops from Europe to Southeast Asia when it became clear it was losing the Vietnam War.

Each side was concerned that if the Soviet Union chose to attack China or NATO separately, it could defeat them. However, if China and the United States collaborated, no Soviet attack would be possible, lest Moscow start a two-front war it couldn't win. It was not necessary to sign a treaty of military alliance or even mention this possibility. Simply meeting, talking and establishing diplomatic relations with China would force the Soviet Union to consider the possibility that Washington and Beijing had a tacit understanding -- or that even without an understanding, an attack on one of them would trigger a response by the other. After all, if NATO or China were defeated, the Soviets would be able to overpower the other at its discretion. Therefore, by moving the relationship from total hostility to minimal accommodation, the strategic balance changed.

In looking at Iran, the most important thing to note is the difference between its rhetoric and its actions. If you listened to Iranian government officials in the past, you would think they were preparing for the global apocalypse. In truth, Iranian foreign policy has been extremely measured. Its one major war, which it fought against Iraq in the 1980s, was not initiated by Iran. It has supported third parties such as Hezbollah and Syria, sending supplies and advisers, but it has been extremely cautious in the use of its own overt power. In the early days of the Islamic republic, whenever Tehran was confronted with American interests, it would pull closer to the Soviet Union, an atheistic country making war in neighboring Afghanistan. It needed a counterweight to the United States and put ideology aside, even in its earliest, most radical days.

New Strategic Interests

Ideology is not trivial, but ultimately it is not the arbiter of foreign relations. Like all countries, the United States and Iran have strategic issues that influence their actions. Iran attempted to create an arc of influence from western Afghanistan to Beirut, the key to which was preserving and dominating the Syrian regime. The Iranians failed in Syria, where the regime exists but no longer governs much of the country. The blowback from this failure has been an upsurge in Sunni militant activity against the Shiite-dominated regime.

But the arc of influence was interrupted elsewhere, particularly Iraq, which has proved to be the major national security challenge facing Iran. Coupled with the failures in Syria, the degradation of Iraq has put Iran on the defensive when, just one year earlier, it was poised to change the balance of power in its favor. 

At the same time, Iran found that its nuclear program had prompted a seriously detrimental sanctions regime. Stratfor has long argued that the Iranian nuclear program was primarily a bargaining chip to be traded for guarantees on its security and recognition of its regional power. It was meant to appear threatening, not to be threatening. This is why, for years, Iran was "only months" away from a weapon. The problem was that despite its growing power, Iran could no longer withstand the economic repercussions of the sanctions regime. In light of Syria and Iraq, the nuclear program was a serious miscalculation that produced an economic crisis. The failures in foreign policy and the subsequent economic crisis discredited the policies of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, changed the thinking of the supreme leader and ultimately led to the electoral victory of President Hassan Rouhani. The ideology may not have changed, but the strategic reality had. Rouhani for years had been worried about the stability of the regime and was thus critical of Ahmadinejad's policies. He knew that Iran had to redefine its foreign policy.

The United States has also been changing its strategy. During the 2000s, it tried to deal with Sunni radicals through the direct use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States could not continue to commit its main force in the Islamic world when that very commitment gave other nations, such as Russia, the opportunity to maneuver without concern for U.S. military force. The United States did have a problem with al Qaeda, but it needed a new strategy for dealing with it. Syria provided a model. The United States declined to intervene unilaterally against the al Assad regime because it did not want to empower a radical Sunni government. It preferred to allow Syria's factions to counterbalance each other such that neither side was in control.

This balance-of-power approach was the alternative to direct military commitment. The United States was not the only country concerned about Sunni radicalism. Iran, a Shiite power ultimately hostile to Sunnis, was equally concerned about jihadists. Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival, at times opposed Islamist radicals (in Saudi Arabia) and supported them elsewhere (in Syria or Iraq). The American relationship with Saudi Arabia, resting heavily on oil, had changed. The United States had plenty of oil now and the Saudis' complex strategies simply no longer matched American interests. On the broadest level, a stronger Iran, aligned with the United States, would counter Sunni ambitions. It would not address the question of North Africa or other smaller issues, but it would force Saudi Arabia to reshape its policies.

The Arab Spring also was a consideration. A mainstay of Washington's Iran policy was that at some point there would be an uprising that would overthrow the regime. The 2009 uprising, never really a threat to the regime, was seen as a rehearsal. If there was likely to be an uprising, there was no need to deal with Iran. Then the Arab Spring occurred. Many in the Obama administration misread the Arab Spring, expecting it to yield more liberal regimes. That didn't happen. Egypt has not evolved, Syria has devolved into civil war, Bahrain has seen Saudi Arabia repress its uprising, and Libya has found itself on the brink of chaos. Not a single liberal democratic regime emerged. It became clear that there would be no uprising in Iran, and even if there were, the results would not likely benefit the United States.

A strategy of encouraging uprisings no longer worked. A strategy of large-scale intervention was unsustainable. The idea of attacking Iran was unpalatable. Even if the administration agreed with Israel and thought that the nuclear program was intended to produce a nuclear weapon, it was not clear that the program could be destroyed from the air.

Therefore, in the particular case of Iran's nuclear program, the United States could only employ sanctions. On the broader issue of managing American interests in the Middle East, the United States had to find more options. It could not rely entirely on Saudi Arabia, which has dramatically different regional interests. It could not rely entirely on Israel, which by itself could not solve the Iranian problem militarily. These realities forced the United States to recalibrate its relationship with Iran at a time when Iran had to recalibrate its relationship with the United States.

All Things Possible

The first U.S.-Iranian discussions would obviously be on the immediate issue -- the nuclear program and sanctions. There are many technical issues involved there, the most important of which is that both sides must show that they don't need a settlement. No one negotiating anything will simply accept the first offer, not when they expect the negotiations to move on to more serious issues. Walking away from the table for 10 days gives both sides some credibility.

The real negotiations will come after the nuclear and sanctions issues are addressed. They will pertain to U.S.-Iranian relations more broadly. Each side will use the other to its advantage. The Iranians will use the United States to repair its economy, and the Americans will use the Iranians to create a balance of power with Sunni states. This will create indirect benefits for both sides. Iran's financial woes will be an opportunity for American companies to invest. The Americans' need for a balance of power will give Iran weight against its own enemies, even after the collapse of its strategy.

The region will of course look different but not dramatically so. The balance of power idea does not mean a rupture with Saudi Arabia or Israel. The balance of power only works if the United States maintains strong relationships on all sides. The Saudis and Israelis will not like American rebalancing. Their choices in the matter are limited, but they can take comfort from the fact that a strictly pro-Iranian policy is impossible for the United States. The American strategy with China in the 1970s was to try to become the power that balanced the Soviet Union and China. After meeting with the Chinese, Henry Kissinger went to Moscow. Thus, in terms of bilateral relationships, U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Israeli relations can stay the same. But it now creates another relationship and option for the United States. In the end, Iran is still a secondary power and the United States is the primary power. Iran will take advantage of the relationship, and the United States will manage it.

It is hard to imagine this evolution, considering what the United States and Iran have said about each other for the past 34 years. But relations among nations are not about sentiment; they are about interest. If Roosevelt could ally with Stalin, and Nixon with Mao, then it is clear that all things are possible in U.S. foreign policy. For their part, the Persians have endured for millennia, espousing many ideologies but doing what was necessary to survive and prosper. All of this may well fall apart, but there is a compelling logic to believe that it will not, and it will not be as modest a negotiation as it appears now

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2)Marc Faber: Global Economy Worse Now Than in 2008

By Michael Kling

The global economy is in a more dangerous position than it was in 2008, the year of the financial crisis, Marc Faber, editor and publisher of The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report, tells CNBC. 

Faber points to a recent report from former Bank for International Settlements chief economist William White who points out that total credit in advanced economies is now 30 percent higher as a share of GDP than it was in 2007.

"If I am telling you that we had a credit crisis in 2008 because we had too much credit in the economy, then there is that much more credit as a percent of the economy now," Faber says. "So we are in a worse position than we were back then." 

China's large jump in borrowing is a major factor in the increase in worldwide credit. 

"Look at China, its credit as a percent of the economy has increased by 50 percent in the last 4 1/2 years," Faber explains. "This is the fastest credit growth you can imagine in the whole of Asia." 

The increase in household debt in Asia is also a worry, he adds, saying household debt has increased even more than government debt has.

"It will end badly," Faber predicts. 

The question, he says, is if there will be a minor economic crisis followed by a huge amount of money printing or if an "inflationary spiral" will come first.

Prices for products in Singapore and Hong Kong are more expensive than in the United States because high property prices mean shops have to pay higher rents and then must pass along those costs to consumers. 

"So asset inflation can flow into consumer price inflation at some point," Faber told CNBC. 

Many economists worry that a financial crisis in China could spread though out the world. 

That's why the world's eyes will be on this weekend's meeting of Chinese leaders, notes Reuters columnist Anatole Kaletsky. 

China, as well as other emerging markets, now poses the greatest risk to global economic stability, he writes. 

"China has recently become not just the strongest engine of growth in the world economy, but also the biggest source of potential economic surprises, both good and bad." 

Reforming its financial system without sparking an economic downturn will be challenging, Kaletsky predicts. 

"Rather than risk a macroeconomic hard landing by trying to simultaneously restructure industry and clamp down on credit," he says, "the Chinese will probably concentrate on reforming state-owned enterprises and shifting demand from heavy industry to services, while leaving the more ambitious financial reforms for another day.
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