No wonder Obama has a hard time making a decision. Not only is he incompetent to hold the office but he is also is conflicted.
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Because Obama is so indecisive the problems he faces just get magnified and his options narrowed. (See 1 and 1a below.)
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Iran needs Syria. Will it move to take it over? (See 2 below.)
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President Obama told college graduates to reject the voices that warn of government tyranny. Is
this another example of his "off-the-cuff" remarks, or does President Obama have something more sinister planned for the nation? Find out on thisTrifecta.
Democrats are demanding more money for the ObamaCare legislation that they promised would
save money. Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) even referred to ObamaCare as a coming “train wreck” if it isn’t properly implemented. Find out what will happen with your health insurance as Lt. Col. Allen West, Terry Jones and John Phillips discuss the troublesome health care legislation.
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Now for more humor.
--- Now for something serious again. With American unions adding cost to everything we do how can we possibly compete against such dedicated human ingenuity and effort? Obviously it took additional time to fabricate in the factory but still!
Chinese hotel construction
And this is what we are competing with:
Chinese hotel construction....
This 30 story Hotel took 15 days to erect!!!
Notice each of the sections already have electric and plumbing installed and were tested for accuracy, all prior to them leaving the factory. It looks like those "sections" formed and pre-tested at the factory, fit together like leggo building blocks. And look at the earthquake resistance level.....https://www.youtube.com/embed/GVUsIlwWWM8?rel=0
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An effort to tell the truth aboout the government's failure is being blocked by that same government -
how tragic!
This from the most open administration - remember Obama saying that in his first inaugural speech?
More lies! (See 3 below.)
Also, do you remember Hillary asking the nation to think about a 3 AM telephone call with Obama in
The White House?
Well looks like she did not even have a phone!
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Sowell on politics. (See 4 below.) --- | |
Dick
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1)What to Do About Syria
Act now against Assad or risk chemical weapons falling into terrorist hands.
By Bret Stephens
'There are no good options in Syria."
From this truism, endlessly repeated by people who think they're clever, comes this non sequitur: The U.S. should steer as far clear from Syria as it's possible for a superpower to steer. "If he [Bashar Assad] drops sarin on his own people, what's that got to do with us?" an anonymous Obama adviser told the New York Times the other day. Good to know the foreign policy of the United States is in the hands of Alfred E. Neuman.
In particular, draw up a list of the things it would be nice to do, and pay them lip service. That's what you've been doing anyway. Then draw up a list of the things you must do, and make them happen. That's what you haven't been doing, which is why the Syrian crisis keeps getting worse.
But foreign policy is never a simple choice between options marked "good," "bad" and "not our problem." In the real world, and especially in Syria, it's usually a menu consisting of "bad," "possibly worse" and, sometimes, "definitely-bad-but-probably-necessary." Please choose, Mr. President.
On the first list: Humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees—an excellent job for the EU. Sorting out the internal political disputes within the Syrian opposition—perfect for Turks or Saudis. Urging a fresh diplomatic initiative with the Russians—a wasted effort, as all such previous efforts have been. Worrying about the shape of a political transition in Syria—a speculative exercise over which the U.S. will have little influence.
On the second list: Preventing further use and distribution of Syria's chemical-weapons stockpiles. Preventing an outright victory by Assad and his Iranian and Hezbollah allies. Preventing the al Qaeda-linked al Nusra Front from gaining de facto control of the Syrian opposition. Preventing the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty in Jordan.
Oh, yes: Prevent. Prevention got a bad rap in the past decade, especially when it morphed into an attempt to reinvent entire societies under the banner of freedom. But when it comes to foreign policy, the alternatives are "ignore" and "react." In Syria, the result of an ignore-and-react policy is a country whose fires risk burning down the entire neighborhood.
So what should the Obama administration do?
(1) Disable the runways of Syrian air bases, including the international airport in Damascus. A limited military strike prevents the regime from deploying jets against its own people. It prevents Iran (and Russia) from supplying it (and Hezbollah) with arms. And it enforces U.N. Resolution 1701, which bans weapons transfers to Hezbollah, and No. 1747, which bans Iranian arms exports.
(2) Use naval assets to impose a no-fly zone over western Syria, including Aleppo, Syria's largest (and most embattled) city. A U.S. threat to shoot down Syrian military aircraft, including helicopters, will keep the Syrian air force grounded without requiring the U.S. to destroy Syria's sophisticated anti-aircraft capabilities.
(3) Supply the Free Syrian Army with heavy military equipment, including armored personnel carriers and light tanks. Syrian insurgents have no shortage of light arms, but right now they're losing the war against the conventionally superior Syrian army. Giving the FSA military capabilities can speed the defeat of the regime and give it the upper hand against the Nusra front while posing little risk that the equipment could someday be used by terrorists or threaten Syria's neighbors.
(4) Throw money at Jordan, no questions asked. Mr. Obama promised King Abdullah a paltry $200 million to help Syrian refugees during his visit to Amman in March. But what the king really needs is cash to buy off potential political opponents and maintain oil and food subsidies. Those subsidies may be lousy economics in the long run. But when the alternative is losing the last remaining moderate Arab regime, then Milton Friedman can wait.
(5) Be prepared to seize and remove Syria's chemical weapons stockpile, even if it means putting boots (temporarily) on the ground.
Mr. Obama has categorically ruled out sending troops to Syria, and he plainly regrets drawing a red line that he didn't mean to honor when it came to the use of chemical weapons. But even scarier than the threat of Assad killing more Syrians with those weapons is the possibility they would fall into terrorist hands—Sunni or Shiite—as Syria dissolves further into anarchy. That may have happened already. It will certainly happen if nothing is actively done to stop it.
(6) Read "Underground," Haruki Murakami's journalistic account of the 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway. Here is an eyewitness description quoted in the book:
"There were bodies up and down the street, not sitting down but lying flat out, writhing in pain, struggling to loosen their collars and ties. People vomiting, too. A girl had vomited and was trying to take her handkerchief to wipe her mouth, but she couldn't even manage that. She looked so ashamed, she tried to hide her face."
Americans have spent the past weeks traumatized by the attacks in Boston. What if some future Tsarnaevs use sarin instead of crude explosives and cookware? Would that explain, to that unnamed Obama adviser, what all that stuff going on in Syria has got to do with us?
1a)The Non-Intervention War
The U.S. failure to lead on Syria has resulted in a wider regional conflict.
When Syria's uprising began two years ago, we were told that U.S. intervention would lead to tens of thousands of casualties and refugees, the rise of jihadists, the use of chemical weapons, and perhaps even a wider regional war. President Obama refused to intervene—even overruling his senior security advisers last year—and all of those bad results have happened in triplicate. Welcome to the non-interventionist Middle East.
By non-interventionist we mean those for whom the main lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan was that the U.S. must shrink from world leadership, defer to a U.N. chain of diplomatic custody, and above all not use military force. This has been the guiding impulse of the Obama Administration since 2009. America would engage dictators, not overthrow them. The great test case of this strategy has been Syria. The result is a widening conflict that threatens to become a regional war that could damage U.S. interests from the Levant to the Persian Gulf and perhaps even reach the homeland.
The latest escalation came in a pair of Israeli attacks on targets inside Syria. The attacks struck advanced missiles headed for Hezbollah in Lebanon and military sites near Damascus. U.S. officials concede that Israel didn't alert the U.S. before the strikes, which shows the degree to which the Obama Administration has become a regional bystander.
The attacks aren't likely to be the last, especially if Israel concludes that Syria is transferring chemical weapons to Hezbollah. These weapons should also greatly concern the U.S., because the Lebanese militia and Iranian subsidiary could transfer such weapons to terror groups to use against Americans.
Israel's calculation is that Syria won't retaliate given its struggle to survive against the rebels. But Iran may not feel as constrained, and Hezbollah is a giant missile force for hire. The point is that the realists who thought the Syrian rebellion would be contained inside Syria were mistaken. It was always a proxy war involving Iran, which can't abide the loss of its ally in Damascus.
The biggest difference now, compared to two years ago, is that the Syrian war is also evolving into a regional Sunni-Shiite conflict that is helping al Qaeda. The Islamist al-Nusra front has become the strongest rebel force in Syria, thanks to the U.S. refusal to help other rebels. These al Qaeda allies aim to establish a caliphate in Damascus and are already helping to revive sectarian strife in Iraq.
For all of its costs, the U.S. intervention in Iraq did impose the worst defeat on al Qaeda since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The 2007 U.S. surge and the Sunni Awakening killed thousands of jihadists and all but eliminated al Qaeda in Iraq as a threat to the Baghdad government. Rather than leave a residual antiterror force in Baghdad, however, Mr. Obama declared mission accomplished and withdrew in toto.
Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad during the surge, warned last week in the Washington Post that Iraq is heading back to the terrible days of 2006 without active U.S. diplomacy. But Mr. Obama gave up most of America's leverage when he withdrew from Iraq to make a re-election campaign point. If Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feels threatened by al Qaeda and a Sunni rebellion, he will increasingly look to Iran to help him stay in power.Now the jihadists have descended by the thousands on Syria, but with little countervailing force in the opposition. They are also moving men and weapons to and from Iraq, which is increasingly sinking back into Sunni-Shiite civil war. The Sunni tribal sheikhs of Anbar province are no longer counseling compromise and nonviolence.
Much of this might have been avoided had the U.S. marshalled a Syrian coalition two years ago, armed the rebels, and set up a no-fly zone. Bashar Assad may have fallen and the civil war might have been contained. Now even the Obama Administration is rethinking its strategy as it sees the results of its long abdication, but the costs and risks of intervening will be that much higher.
***
The U.S. could still steer this conflict toward a better outcome if Mr. Obama has the will. At this stage this would require more than arming some rebels. It probably means imposing a no-fly zone and air strikes against Assad's forces. We would also not rule out the use of American and other ground troops to secure the chemical weapons.
The immediate goal would be to limit the proliferation of WMD, but the most important strategic goal continues to be to defeat Iran, our main adversary in the region. The risks of a jihadist victory in Damascus are real, at least in the short-term, but they are containable by Turkey and Israel. The far greater risk to Middle East stability and U.S. interests is a victorious arc of Iranian terror from the Gulf to the Mediterranean backed by nuclear weapons.
At this stage, too, any U.S. intervention would require a full Presidential commitment. Mr. Obama couldn't merely make an announcement, deploy some troops and drop the subject as he did on Libya and Afghanistan. He has to make the case to the American public and commit himself both to toppling Assad and to shaping the aftermath. Such a commitment is not in Mr. Obama's political character, to put it mildly.
If nothing else, events in Syria are proving once again that in the absence of U.S. leadership, bad actors fill the vacuum. Sooner or later—usually sooner—the troubles they create implicate U.S. interests. By striving so hard to avoid U.S. intervention, the Obama Administration has made a wider war far more likely.
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2)Iran's Plans to Take Over Syria
- In mid-April, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah paid a secret visit to Tehran where he met with the top Iranian officials headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Gen. Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Suleimani prepared an operational plan named after him based upon the establishment of a 150,000-man force for Syria, the majority of whom will come from Iran, Iraq, and a smaller number from Hizbullah and the Gulf states.
- Suleimani’s involvement was significant. He has been the spearhead of Iranian military activism in the Middle East. In January 2012, he declared that the Islamic Republic controlled “one way or another” Iraq and South Lebanon. Even before recent events in Syria, observers in the Arab world have been warning for years about growing evidence of “Iranian expansionism.”
- An important expression of Syria’s centrality in Iranian strategy was voiced by Mehdi Taaib, who heads Khamenei’s think tank. He recently stated that “Syria is the 35th district of Iran and it has greater strategic importance for Iran than Khuzestan [an Arab-populated district inside Iran].” Significantly, Taaib was drawing a comparison between Syria and a district that is under full Iranian sovereignty.
- Tehran has had political ambitions with respect to Syria for years and has indeed invested huge resources in making Syria a Shiite state. The Syrian regime let Iranian missionaries work freely to strengthen the Shiite faith in Damascus and the cities of the Alawite coast, as well as the smaller towns and villages. In both urban and rural parts of Syria, Sunnis and others who adopted the Shiite faith received privileges and preferential treatment in the disbursement of Iranian aid money.
- Iran is also recruiting Shiite forces in Iraq for the warfare in Syria. These are organized in a sister framework of Lebanese Hizbullah. Known as the League of the Righteous People and Kateeb Hizbullah, its mission is to defend the Shiite centers in Damascus. It is likely that Tehran will make every effort to recruit additional Shiite elements from Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and even from Pakistan.
Iran Cannot Afford to Lose Syria
In mid-April, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah paid a secret visit to Tehran where he met with the top Iranian officials headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Gen. Qasem Suleimani, who is in charge of Iranian policy in Lebanon and Syria. The visit was clandestine and no details were divulged on an official level – except for the exclusive posting on Hizbullah’s official website of a photograph of Khamenei with Nasrallah beside him in the former’s private library, with a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini above them.1
Suleimani’s involvement in the meeting with Nasrallah was significant. He has been the spearhead of Iranian military activism in the Middle East. In January 2012, he declared that the Islamic Republic controlled “one way or another” Iraq and South Lebanon.2 He now appeared to be prepared to extend Iran’s control to all of Syria.
A media source normally hostile to Iran and Hizbullah but which nonetheless contains accurate information, reported that Iran has formulated an operational plan for assisting Syria. The plan has been named for Gen. Suleimani. It includes three elements: 1) the establishment of a popular sectarian army made up of Shiites and Alawites, to be backed by forces from Iran, Iraq, Hizbullah, and symbolic contingents from the Persian Gulf. 2) This force will reach 150,000 fighters. 3) The plan will give preference to importing forces from Iran, Iraq, and, only afterwards, other Shiite elements. This regional force will be integrated with the Syrian army. Suleimani, himself, visited Syria in late February-early March to prepare the implementation of this plan.3
In the past, senior Iranian officers, like Major General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards who is an adviser to Khamenei, have said that Lebanon and Syria gave Iran “strategic depth.
”4 Now it appears that Tehran is taking this a step further, preparing for a “Plan B” in the event Assad falls.
”4 Now it appears that Tehran is taking this a step further, preparing for a “Plan B” in the event Assad falls.
Nasrallah rarely makes such trips. The last time he went on a visit outside Lebanon was in February 2010 when he met in Damascus with Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Nasrallah has taken great care not to appear in public since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and even more so since the assassination of the head of Hizbullah’s military wing, Imad Mughniyeh, in Damascus in February 2008. Even in Iran itself Nasrallah maintained total secrecy for fear of becoming an assassination target there. After the visit, he gave
a speech in Lebanon on April 30, but did not say anything about his visit to Iran. He did remark that Syria “has real friends” that wouldn’t let it fall, implying that, if necessary, he would redouble his efforts to defend Iranian interests, which has always been one of the missions of Hizbullah.
a speech in Lebanon on April 30, but did not say anything about his visit to Iran. He did remark that Syria “has real friends” that wouldn’t let it fall, implying that, if necessary, he would redouble his efforts to defend Iranian interests, which has always been one of the missions of Hizbullah.
It appears that Hizbullah’s ongoing involvement in Syria, and the extent of this involvement, formed the main issue
on the agenda during Nasrallah’s visit to Tehran. The more time passes, the more Iran appears to regard Syria as a lynchpin of its Middle Eastern policy, in general, and of leading the jihad and the Islamic resistance to Israel, in particular. Hizbullah’s inclusion in the armed struggle in Syria is intended first and foremost to serve the Iranian strategy, which has been setting new goals apart from military assistance to the Syrian regime. Iran already seems to be looking beyond the regime’s survivability and preparing for a reality where it will have to operate in Syria even
if Assad falls. Even before recent events in Syria, observers in the Arab world have been warning for years about growing evidence of “Iranian expansionism.”5
on the agenda during Nasrallah’s visit to Tehran. The more time passes, the more Iran appears to regard Syria as a lynchpin of its Middle Eastern policy, in general, and of leading the jihad and the Islamic resistance to Israel, in particular. Hizbullah’s inclusion in the armed struggle in Syria is intended first and foremost to serve the Iranian strategy, which has been setting new goals apart from military assistance to the Syrian regime. Iran already seems to be looking beyond the regime’s survivability and preparing for a reality where it will have to operate in Syria even
if Assad falls. Even before recent events in Syria, observers in the Arab world have been warning for years about growing evidence of “Iranian expansionism.”5
An important expression of Syria’s centrality in Iranian strategy was voiced by Mehdi Taaib, who heads Khamenei’s think tank. He recently stated that “Syria is the 35th district of Iran and it has greater strategic importance for Iran than Khuzestan [an Arab-populated district inside Iran]. By preserving Syria we will be able to get back Khuzestan, but if we lose Syria we will not even be able to keep Tehran.”6 Significantly, Taaib was drawing a comparison between Syria and a district that is under full Iranian sovereignty. What was also clear from his remarks was that Iran cannot afford to lose Syria.
Syria as a Shiite State
All in all, then, Iran will have to step up its military involvement in Syria. Khamenei’s representative in Lebanon will have to take part in building the new strategy in Syria, acting in tandem with Iran against the Sunni Islamic groups that threaten Iran’s interests in Syria.
Tehran has had political ambitions with respect to Syria for years and has indeed invested huge resources in making Syria a Shiite state. The process began during the rule of Hafez Assad when a far-reaching network was created of educational, cultural, and religious institutions throughout Syria; it was further expanded during Bashar’s reign. The aim was to promote the Shiization of all regions of the Syrian state. The Syrian regime let Iranian missionaries work freely to strengthen the Shiite faith in Damascus and the cities of the Alawite coast, as well as the smaller towns and villages.7 A field study by the European Union in the first half of 2006 found that the largest percentage of religious conversions to Shiism occurred in areas with an Alawite majority.8
In both urban and rural parts of Syria, Sunnis and others who adopted the Shiite faith received privileges and preferential treatment in the disbursement of Iranian aid money. The heads of the tribes in the Raqqa area were invited by the Iranian ambassador in Damascus to visit Iran cost-free, and the Iranians doled out funds to the poor and financial loans to merchants who were never required to pay them back..9 The dimensions of the Iranian investment in Raqqa, which included elegant public buildings, mosques, and Husayniyys (a Shiite religious institute), were recently revealed by Sunni rebels who took over the remote town and destroyed, plundered, and removed all signs of the Iranian and Shiite presence there.10
As of 2009 there were over 500 Husayniyys in Syria undergoing Iranian renovation work. In Damascus itself the Iranians invested huge sums to control the Shiite holy places including the tomb of Sayyida Zaynab, the shrine of Sayyida Ruqayya, and the shrine of Sayyida Sukayna. These sites attract Iranian tourism, which grew from 27,000 visitors in 1978 to 200,000 in 2003.
Iran also operates a cultural center in Damascus that it considers one of its most important and successful. This center publishes works in Arabic, holds biweekly cultural events, and conducts seminars and conferences aimed at enhancing the Iranian cultural influence in the country. The Iranian cultural center is also responsible for the propagation and study of the Persian language in Syrian universities, including providing teachers of Persian.11
Iran’s Sponsorship of Shiite Forces in Syria
At present, bloody battles are being waged over the centers of Iranian influence in Syria, most of all the mausoleum of Sayyida Zaynab – sister of the Imam Husayn – who in 680 carried his severed head to Damascus after the massacre at Karbala. In Iranian historiography, the great victory over the Sunnis is marked in Damascus in the form of a Shiite renaissance in the capital of the hated Umayyad Empire. The Sunnis, however, are now threatening
these Iranian achievements. Hizbullah has been recruited to the cause, with hundreds of its fighters coming to Syria from Lebanon. These fighters try to downplay their Hizbullah affiliation and instead identify themselves as the Abu El Fadl Alabbas Brigade, named after the half-brother of the Imam Husayn.
these Iranian achievements. Hizbullah has been recruited to the cause, with hundreds of its fighters coming to Syria from Lebanon. These fighters try to downplay their Hizbullah affiliation and instead identify themselves as the Abu El Fadl Alabbas Brigade, named after the half-brother of the Imam Husayn.
Iran is also recruiting Shiite forces in Iraq for the warfare in Syria. These are organized in a sister framework of Lebanese Hizbullah. Known as the League of the Righteous People and Kateeb Hizbullah, its mission is to defend the Shiite centers in Damascus.12 Hizbullah fighters are also operating in other areas, some of them beyond the Lebanese border in the Shiite villages in Syrian territory on the way to Homs, thereby creating a sort of territorial continuity for ongoing Alawite control under Iranian influence. This continuity is strategically important to Iran since it links Lebanon and Damascus to the Alawite coast.13 Iran aims to have a network of militias in place inside Syria to protect its vital interests, regardless of what happens to Assad.14
The war in Syria persists with no decisive outcome on the horizon. Hizbullah’s battle losses are growing. Subhi Tufayli, the first head of Hizbullah who was dismissed from its leadership by Iran at the start of the 1990s, has been one of the prominent critics of Hizbullah’s involvement in Syria. Tufayli claimed that 138 Hizbullah fighters had been killed there along with scores of wounded who were brought to hospitals in Lebanon.15 Ceremonies for burial of the dead are frequently held clandestinely, sometimes at night, so as to avoid anger and resentment. These casualties, however, did not disappear from sight, and the families have raised harsh questions about such unnecessary
sacrifice that is not in the sacred framework of jihad against Israel, which is Hizbullah’s raison d’être.
sacrifice that is not in the sacred framework of jihad against Israel, which is Hizbullah’s raison d’être.
Tufayli, for his part, asserted that Hizbullah fighters who are killed in battle in Syria “are not martyrs” and “will go to hell.” Syria, he remarked, “is not Karbala” and the Hizbullah men in Syria “are not fighters of the Imam [Husayn]. The oppressed and innocent Syrian people is Karbala and the members of the Syrian people are the children of Husayn and Zaynab.” Tufayli went on to say that he “lauds the fathers and mothers who prevent their children from going to Syria and says to them that God’s blessing is with them.” Tufayli further pointed out that, legally speaking, no fatwa has been issued that permits Hizbullah’s participation in the war in Syria. He said he had appealed to the supreme religious authority – the sources of emulation (Maraji Taqlid) in Najaf and in Lebanon – not to issue such a fatwa.16
In the Lebanese Shiite community, Tufayli is not alone in leveling severe criticism at Hizbullah’s role as an arm of Iran in Syria. Voices within Hizbullah itself are increasingly casting doubt on the wisdom of involving the movement on Bashar Assad’s side. Others refuse to go and fight in Syria, and there have already been desertions from Hizbullah’s ranks. So far, though, it does not appear that all this is deterring Hizbullah from persisting. At the end of the day, Hizbullah is not a Lebanese national movement but a creation of Iran and subject to its exclusive authority. Nasrallah was summoned to Tehran so as to encourage him and order him to continue as a faithful and obedient soldier of Velayt-e Faqih (literally: the Rule of the Jurisprudent, referring to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei).
It is likely that Tehran will make every effort to recruit additional Shiite elements from Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and even from Pakistan. For the Islamic Republic, this is a war of survival against a radical Sunni uprising that views Iran and the Shiites as infidels to be annihilated. This is the real war being waged today, and it is within Islam. From
Iran’s standpoint, if the extreme Sunnis of the al-Qaeda persuasion are not defeated in Syria, they will assert themselves in Iraq and threaten to take over the Persian Gulf, posing a real danger to Iran’s regional hegemony. Khamenei does not intend to give in. Hizbullah’s readiness to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Iran against the radical Sunnis could shatter the delicate internal order upon which the Lebanese state is based and bring about a Hizbullah take-over of Lebanon in its entirety.
Iran’s standpoint, if the extreme Sunnis of the al-Qaeda persuasion are not defeated in Syria, they will assert themselves in Iraq and threaten to take over the Persian Gulf, posing a real danger to Iran’s regional hegemony. Khamenei does not intend to give in. Hizbullah’s readiness to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Iran against the radical Sunnis could shatter the delicate internal order upon which the Lebanese state is based and bring about a Hizbullah take-over of Lebanon in its entirety.
Notes
1. On the picture and its significance, see Ali al-Amin, Al-Balad, April 23, 2013, http://www.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=74383&cid=76.
2. “Chief of Iran’s Quds Force Claims Iraq, South Lebanon under His Control, Al Arabiya News, January 20, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/20/189447.html.
3. A-Shiraa, March 15, 2013.
4. Nevvine Abdel Monem Mossad, “Implication of Iran Accepting Military Role in Syria, Lebanon,” The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, October 7, 2012.
5. Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, “Iran and Its Expansionist Tendencies,” Arab News, February 6, 2013, http://www.arabnews.com/iran-and-its-expansionist-tendencies; “US Embassy Cables: Omani Official Wary of
Iranian Expansionism,” The Guardian, November 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/165127.
6. Ali-al-Amin, Al-Balad, February 17, 2013.
7. On the Shiization of Syria, see Khalid Sindawi, “The Shiite Turn in Syria,” Hudson Institute, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 8, 82-127, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-shiite-turn-in-syria.
8. Ibid., 84.
9. Ibid., 89-90.
10. Martin Kramer, “The Shiite Crescent Eclipsed,” April 16, 2013, http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/2013/04/the-shiite-crescent-is-broken.
11. Nadia von Maltzahn, “The Case of Iranian Cultural Diplomacy in Syria,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 2 (2009): 33-50.
12. Rabbiah Jamal, “Iraq’s Kateeb Hezbollah announces involvement in Syria,” Now Lebanon, April 7, 2013.
13. See the excellent article by Hanin Ghadder, “Hezbollah sacrifices popularity for survival: In Syria, The Party of God is struggling for an un-divine victory,” Now Lebanon, April 10, 2013.
14. Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran and Hezbollah Build Militia Networks in Syria in Event that Assad Falls, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, February 10, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-10/world/37026054_1_syrian-government-forces-iran-and-hezbollah-president-bashar.
15. www.metransparent.com, April 25, 2013.
16. Subhi Tufayli, interview, Al Arabiya, February 26, 2013.
1. On the picture and its significance, see Ali al-Amin, Al-Balad, April 23, 2013, http://www.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=74383&cid=76.
2. “Chief of Iran’s Quds Force Claims Iraq, South Lebanon under His Control, Al Arabiya News, January 20, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/20/189447.html.
3. A-Shiraa, March 15, 2013.
4. Nevvine Abdel Monem Mossad, “Implication of Iran Accepting Military Role in Syria, Lebanon,” The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, October 7, 2012.
5. Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, “Iran and Its Expansionist Tendencies,” Arab News, February 6, 2013, http://www.arabnews.com/iran-and-its-expansionist-tendencies; “US Embassy Cables: Omani Official Wary of
Iranian Expansionism,” The Guardian, November 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/165127.
6. Ali-al-Amin, Al-Balad, February 17, 2013.
7. On the Shiization of Syria, see Khalid Sindawi, “The Shiite Turn in Syria,” Hudson Institute, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 8, 82-127, http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-shiite-turn-in-syria.
8. Ibid., 84.
9. Ibid., 89-90.
10. Martin Kramer, “The Shiite Crescent Eclipsed,” April 16, 2013, http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/2013/04/the-shiite-crescent-is-broken.
11. Nadia von Maltzahn, “The Case of Iranian Cultural Diplomacy in Syria,” Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 2 (2009): 33-50.
12. Rabbiah Jamal, “Iraq’s Kateeb Hezbollah announces involvement in Syria,” Now Lebanon, April 7, 2013.
13. See the excellent article by Hanin Ghadder, “Hezbollah sacrifices popularity for survival: In Syria, The Party of God is struggling for an un-divine victory,” Now Lebanon, April 10, 2013.
14. Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran and Hezbollah Build Militia Networks in Syria in Event that Assad Falls, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, February 10, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-10/world/37026054_1_syrian-government-forces-iran-and-hezbollah-president-bashar.
15. www.metransparent.com, April 25, 2013.
16. Subhi Tufayli, interview, Al Arabiya, February 26, 2013.
Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
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3)
Lawyer Implies State Department Is Threatening Benghazi Whistleblower
The lawyer for Benghazi "whistleblower" Gregory Hicks is hinting the State Department threatened her client with retaliation if he kept insisting the assault on the U.S. Embassy in Libya was known to be a terrorist attack "from the get-go."
Victoria Toensing said she plans to reveal at a Congressional hearing on Benghazi Wednesday the pressure Hicks has been under since pressing his case that federal officials knew all along the massacre was staged by terrorists.
"We'll go into those facts at the hearings but let me just say, in general, people don’t threaten, they don’t come up and say you better not testify," Toensing, of the law firm of DiGenova & Toensing, told "The Steve Malzberg Show" on Newsmax TV.
"What they do is they say, 'You know that job assignment that you had scheduled in June? It just got eliminated.'"
On the day of the attack Sept. 11, 2012, Hicks was informed by Ambassador Christopher Stevens himself that the embassy was under siege. A short time later, Stevens and three other Americans were killed.
"He was the No. 2 person in the embassy and so he was in Tripoli when the attack occurred," Toensing told "The Steve Malzberg Show" on Newsmax TV.
"He'd gotten a call from the ambassador. ... The ambassador said to him, 'Greg, we're under attack.' And then it cut off."
On Sunday, CBS News' "Face the Nation" released excerpts from an interview Hicks conducted with federal investigators in which he thought the strike was "a terrorist attack from the get-go."
"I think everybody in the mission thought it was a terrorist attack from the beginning," Hicks said in the interview.
His testimony is in direct conflict with U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, who characterized the assault as a spontaneous attack. President Barack Obama's administration later called it an act of terror.
Hicks is one of several witnesses testifying before the House Oversight Committee.
The Benghazi scandal has become a thorn in the side of the Obama administration and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Some critics believe the State Department has tried to cover up the fact there was lax security in place at the embassy.
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4)Bouncing Ball Politics
If you are driving along and suddenly see a big red rubber ball come bouncing out into the street, you might want to put your foot on the brake pedal, because a small child may well come running out into the street after it.
We all understand that an inexperienced young child who has his mind fixed on one thing may ignore other things that are too dangerous to be ignored. Unfortunately, too much of what is said and done in politics is based on the same tunnel vision pursuit of some "good thing," in utter disregard of the repercussions.
For years, home ownership was a big "good thing" among both liberal Democrats like Congressman Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd, on the one hand, and moderate Republicans like President George W. Bush on the other hand.
Raising the rate of home ownership was the big red bouncing ball that they pursued out into the street, in utter disregard of the dangers.
A political myth has been created that no one warned of those dangers. But among the many who did warn were yours truly in 2005, Fortune and Barron's magazines in 2004 and Britain's The Economist magazine in 2003. Warnings specifically about the dangerous roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were made by Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan in 2005 and by Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snow in 2003.
Many, if not most, of the children who go running out into the street in pursuit of their bouncing ball may have been warned against this by their parents. But neither small children nor politicians always heed warnings.
Politicians are of course more articulate than small children, so the pols are able to not only disregard warnings but ridicule them. That was what was done by Congressman Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd, among many other politicians who made the pursuit of higher home ownership rates the holy grail.
Politicians are of course more articulate than small children, so the pols are able to not only disregard warnings but ridicule them. That was what was done by Congressman Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd, among many other politicians who made the pursuit of higher home ownership rates the holy grail.
In pursuit of those higher home ownership rates, especially among low-income people and minorities, the many vast powers of the federal government -- from the Federal Reserve to bank regulatory agencies and even the Department of Justice, which issued threats of anti-discrimination lawsuits -- were used to force banks and other lenders to lower their standards for making mortgage loans.
Lower lending standards of course meant higher risks of default. But these risks -- and the chain reactions throughout the whole financial system -- were like the traffic ignored by a small child dashing out into the street in pursuit of their bouncing ball. The whole economy got hit when the housing boom became a housing bust, and we are still trying to recover, years later.
What makes all this painfully ironic is that the latest data show that the rate of home ownership today is lower than it has been in 18 years. There was a rise of a few percentage points during the housing boom, but that was completely erased during the housing bust.
Housing has been just one area where the bouncing ball approach to political decision-making has led the country into one disaster after another.
Pursuit of the bright red bouncing ball of "universal health care" has already begun to produce collisions with reality in the form of rising insurance premiums to cover the cost of generous government-mandated benefits, to be paid for by someone else.
Here again, there have been many warnings, but the political response to those warnings was to rush ObamaCare to a vote before even the Congressmen who voted for it had a chance to read it. Now, one of the Democratic Senators who voted for it -- Senator Max Baucus -- has called it "a train wreck." And ObamaCare, with its thousands of regulations, has not even fully taken effect yet.
The same mindset has prevailed internationally. Trying to make Middle East countries more "democratic" is the bipartisan bouncing ball of American foreign policy. Some of these countries existed thousands of years before there was a United States -- and, in all that time, they never came close to being democratic.
Maybe democracy has prerequisites that do not exist in all places at all times. And maybe pursuing it in utter disregard of the repercussions -- which we have already begun to see in Libya and Egypt -- is one of the most dangerous pursuits of a bouncing ball.
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