Since Reid has not put forth a budget in over 2 years as dictated by law and Obama's unspoken strategy, all along, has been to attack anything presented by Republicans, it is interesting how effortless the media and news folks were able to find the 'adult' in the room.
As is evident, Obama has no plan, Reid has presented no plan then why is the manipulated public angry at the Republicans for having presented several plans which the Democrats and Obama have rejected? Part of the answer is the bias of the press and media and secondly, Republicans have a problem explaining their position. They get defensive and garbled about what should be a pretty clear cut and dry message.
Most importantly of all, this is what Obama wants ie. for the public to blame Republicans for refusing to believe you solve out of control spending by spending more. Obama wants to kick the ball down the field without solving anything until after 2012, in order to finesse his re-election. Of course, by then we will be several trillion more in debt and the solution will become more intractable.
Republicans should simply keep telling the nation we presented a plan, Obama did not like it, never presented an alternative so we left the heavy lifting to him and his party. But, since Republicans are afraid to let go they will continue to be blamed as being the fly in the ointment.(See 1 below.)
---
There need not be limits to your knowledge of what debt ceiling talk is all about. (See 2 below.)
---
Not unusual for Wall Street Hedgies to hedge their political bets as well. Their primary interest is being on the right side of any trade so sending money to a politician who speaks out of both sides of his mouth, as far too many do, is a no brainer.
The tragedy lies not with individuals exercising their constitutional rights but it is special interest lobbyists who basically frame our legislation. Once again, our two faced president stated he was going run the most open administration ever and lobbyists would have diminished influence. The gullible public bought his rhetoric garbage and lobbyist influence is greater than ever and will continue to be so because it pays off in the long run. Ask trial lawyers and the politicians they control. Al Franken was a joke before becoming a senator but he is not a buffoon because he knows where to dial for those dollars. (See 3 and 3a below.)
---
Not so fast. It is time to take a time out.
David Goldman writes why conventional wisdom, as relates to Israel moving fast to avoid being overwhelmed by Palestinian birth rates, is a myth and presents facts not rhetoric to support his case. (See 4 below.)
A greater problem is that Israel always loses the war of words.(See 4a below.)
---
Another day another dead Iranian scientist. (See 5 below.)
---
Caroline Glick goes after Livni and suggests she has become Obama's lap dog in order to gain politically. (See 6 below.)
---
Egypt's military to hold free and open elections but please no peeking by the foreign press and/or media. (See 7 below.)
---
The view from Syria and Lebanon not an encouraging one if you believe democracy is on the ascendancy.
Our State Department's initiatives have been rejected by Assad and our influence in Lebanon has been reduced to zero but Obama at least can claim victory in Libya and, by the way, I have a bridge for sale! (See 8 below.)
---
Racist, radical Republicans versus Obama's thwarted economic policies - is that how the 2012 election will be characterized by the adoring press and media folks? I would not bet against it.
Read the article below and get a taste of what is to come. (See 9 below.)
---
Dick
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)Boehner runs laps around Obama, again
By Jennifer Rubin
He's been ridiculed by the media. Liberal spinners say he has lost control
over the Tea Party. But in fact the Speaker of the House Rep. John Boehner
(R-Ohio) had a plan, stuck to it, and is likely to get much of what he
wants.
In a remarkable press conference revealed that he had a deal with the White
House on large debt reduction and $800 billion in additional revenue to be
achieved through tax reform and enhanced enforcement. Boehner brought out
his "Jell-O" analogy once again to describe the White House. He said
bluntly, "It's the president who walked away from his agreement and demanded
more money at the last minute."
Boehner is the composed "adult in the room" now. He, excuse the expression,
called the president's bluff - a viable deal with no tax hikes and Obama
blinked (or sloshed in the other direction, to follow the Jell-O imagery).
All of this followed Obama's appearance in which he angrily accused Boehner
of walking away from the deal. (According to Boehner, Obama upped the
revenue figure at the last moment.)
Boehner now has left the White House on the sidelines, has his troops in
order and can craft a deal with the Senate. At this point, the Senate
Democrats who have never put forth a plan of any type must be desperate for
a deal. The ranking member on the Senate Budget Committee, Sen. Jeff
Sessions (R-Ala.), took the opportunity to twist the knife, putting out a
statement that read in part: "The President has never put a single plan on
paper that actually reduces spending, and he has no program that would
substantially reduce the deficit. If he does, it's a closely guarded secret.
And if such a secret plan does exist it should be made public. The honest
truth is that this president, and this Democrat-led Senate, will not agree
to the level of spending cuts in a debt deal necessary to put our country on
a sound path."
In his letter to his House colleagues
Boehner made the case that he had stood up to the White House and now could
craft a deal without violating the House's principles:
"The Democratic leaders of the House and Senate have not been participants
in the conversations I and Leader Cantor have had with the White House; nor
have the Republican leaders of the Senate. But I believe there is a shared
commitment on both sides of the aisle to producing legislation that will
serve the best interests of our country in the days ahead - legislation that
reflects the will of the American people, consistent with the principles of
the Cut, Cap, & Balance Act that passed the House with bipartisan support
this week. "Boehner a
The much maligned Majority Leader Rep Eric Cantor (R-Virg.) found
vindication as the talks seem to be headed in precisely the same direction
as he had suggested, prompting Obama to stalk out of a White House meeting.
His spokesman told me, "Eric has been adamantly clear that raising taxes
with millions of people out of work is the wrong policy, one that we would
not consider, and one that couldn't pass the House."
A senior Republican Senate adviser said admiringly of Boehner, "I'm glad he
stayed calm." The White House now is left sputtering, fully aware that if
the Senate and House reach a deal Obama will be in no position to veto it
and send the country into default. All in all, a very good day for Boehner
and the House Republicans.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2)What You Need to Know About the Debt Ceiling
By Andrew Packer
There’s a lot of opinion circulating about the possibility of a debt default. Although it’s currently estimated that the government has until Aug. 2 before it hits that point, the legislative deadline is currently at Friday, July 22. We asked members of our Financial Braintrust to chime in on what could happen, and answer a few basic questions about the debt ceiling for our readers.
What is the debt ceiling exactly?
The debt ceiling is a spending cap set by Congress on the level of debt the federal government can legally borrow. The limit was established in 1917 (at a mere $11.5 billion), and has been raised over 74 times since then, to current levels of $14.294 trillion.
Why is it important?
The debt ceiling was brought into creation under the theory that it would help Congress reign in spending, and that every time the limit was near, our national lawmakers would have to take a close look at the country’s finances and fiscal decisions.
Since 1917, it has expanded to include the payment of unemployment benefits, Social Security, and all other types of spending by the federal government. So for millions of Americans dependent on this source of revenue, the debt ceiling talks are quite important.
At least in theory. After all, it’s been raised on 10 different occasions in the past 10 years. For politicians, however, votes on the debt ceiling are prime opportunities to appeal to their base.
Does it really matter from an economic standpoint, or is it just political grandstanding?
It’s a little of both — but mostly political grandstanding at this point, as has often been the case during prior debates about raising the debt ceiling.
During the debate to raise the debt ceiling in 2006, then-senator Barack Obama had this to say:
)
“The fact that we are here today to debate raising America's debt limit is a sign of leadership failure... America has a debt problem and a failure of leadership . Americans deserve better. I therefore intend to oppose the effort to increase America's debt limit.”
He subsequently voted against raising the ceiling. As president, however, Obama has called opposing a rise in the debt ceiling as dangerous.
What makes the current debate so contentious, however, are warnings from ratings agencies that US government debt could be downgraded from a near-riskless AAA rating.
What’s most likely to happen?
Dividend Machine editor Bill Spetrino sums up the most likely outcome from the debt ceiling debate:
“The debt limit will be raised. Democrats and republicans will agree to spending. Republicans do NOT want to take any blame for a government shutdown. They will tell tea party folks that they did the best they could for only controlling one house of Congress. This is all political theatre and the S&P should run once it’s all done.”
What if there’s no deal reached before the deadline?
If no deal is reached right away, there will be a partial shutdown. This will start with non-essential services, such as parks departments. Payment on programs such as Social Security and interest on the debt is expected to continue.
What’s the worst-case scenario?
In the worst case scenario, no compromise will be reached, ratings agencies will substantially downgrade US debt, and US government debt will lose its allure as a risk-free investment. This may cause a rally out of Treasuries into the dollar, other sovereign debt, or into precious metals such as gold.
Either way, the government will be spending billions of dollars per day and will not be able to borrow to make payments. That spells higher taxes or reduced government spending, most likely a combination of the two.
How does extending the debt ceiling solve America’s long-term fiscal problems?
It doesn’t. The debt ceiling has been raised on average once per year since 2001. It is simply raised to cover increased government spending.
Why are credit ratings agencies threatening to downgrade US debt if the debt limit isn’t raised?
Braintrust member Michael J. Carr notes:
“Because Dodd-Frank makes them. That law placed new requirements on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) and intends for them to become more forward-looking. These agencies completely missed warning on the financial crisis and now being vilified for that. They seem to be trying to get in front of any future train wrecks by downgrading sovereign debt early and often.
In part, it's an unintended consequence of a 2300 page bill that requires more than 60 studies and over 200 new rules.”
What does Obama mean when he says he can’t guarantee Social Security payments if the debt ceiling is breached? Isn’t there a trust fund for Social Security?
Braintrust member Andrew Packer says:
“Officially, Social Security revenues go into a trust fund. But in reality, that money gets spent on everything right away, from current Social Security benefits to federal salaries to highway funds and every other government expense under the sun. So, Obama is correct to say that he can’t guarantee Social Security payments, because the money technically isn’t there.
What is in the fund, however, are Treasury IOUs to the fund, which could in theory be cashed in. The fund still has a substantial surplus of these Treasury IOUs to draw down, so any threat is just designed to motivate politicians to arrive at a solution faster.“
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3)Wall Streeters Top Obama Re-Election Supporters
By Julie Crawshaw
A just-released study by the Center for Responsive Politics shows that President Obama is relying more on Wall Street to fund his re-election this year than he did in 2008, according to CNBC, which obtained an advance copy of the report.
The report says that one-third of the money Obama's elite fund-raising corps has raised on behalf of his re-election has come from the financial sector.
"Individuals who work in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector are responsible for raising at least $11.3 million for Obama's campaign and the Democratic National Committee," the report says.
And, all of Obama's “bundlers” — top fundraisers who obtain donations from people and groups in their business, professional, and personal networks — have raised a minimum of $34.95 million.
Obama has even added new Wall Streeters who did not work for him in 2008, including former Goldman Sachs CEO Jon Corzine, Evercore Partners executive Charles Myers, Greenstreet Real Estate Partners CEO Steven Green, and Azita Raji, a former investment banker for JPMorgan.
Obama and the DNC combined are on pace to far exceed the amounts Obama raised from Wall Street donors in 2008, both in raw dollar amounts and as a percentage of what he raises overall.
According to the Center's research, Obama fundraisers who worked in the finance, insurance and real estate sector were responsible for a minimum of $16 million, or about 21 percent of the $76.5 million estimated minimum amount brought in by top bundlers.
Moreover, the Center has identified 80 bundlers — out of 244 whose names were released by the Obama campaign last week — who are part of the financial sector.
Forty-four of these specifically work for the securities and investment industry.
United Press International reports that Obama has raised more money than his Republican rivals in 36 states and Washington, D.C.
3a).The Senate's Lawsuit Factory Trial lawyers use a controversial case to undermine the arbitration system.
By KIMBERLEY A. Strassel
Somewhere, in some secret drawer at Tort Bar Headquarters, is an instruction manual labeled "How To Wring Legal Jackpots Out of Congress." It reads something like this:
1) Identify a law or regulation that prevents trial lawyers from cashing in. 2) Identify a "victim" of this law or regulation. 3) Get congressional allies to turn said victim into a cause célèbre. 4) Use ensuing moral outrage to get the law or regulation changed. 5) Buy a yacht.
It is to the trial bar's credit that it manages to pull this formula off again and again, even in today's more tort-reform environment. Consider Jamie Leigh Jones.
Remember Ms. Jones? She's the former Kellogg, Brown & Root worker who in 2007 made the explosive claim that she'd been gang-raped by colleagues in Iraq's Green Zone. Pro-litigation politicians and lawyers seized on her story as an excuse to make it easier to sue federal contractors. And now comes the end of the tale: A Houston jury recently dismissed Ms. Jones's claims, unanimously finding (in one day's deliberation) that she had not been raped or defrauded by her employer.
The Jones case played out in Washington in textbook trial-lawyer style. In recent years, one of the tort bar's top priorities has been getting rid of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Those clauses require employees to settle disputes with employers in front of a neutral arbiter. Plaintiffs' attorneys hate the efficiency and fairness of this system, since it denies them a chance to clog up courts and win giant punitive damages.
Ms. Jones, meanwhile, was as perfect a "victim" as a lawyer could wish. In 2005 she went to Iraq, working for KBR, a government contractor and former subsidiary of Halliburton. She claimed that within a few days of arrival she was drugged, raped by colleagues, and imprisoned in a shipping container. Her attack had been so violent, she alleged, as to require reconstructive surgery to her chest and intense psychiatric treatment. The kicker: Ms. Jones had a contract clause that appeared to require her to seek redress through arbitration, rather than the courts.
Minnesota Sen. Al Franken—who in 2008 received some $900,000 in campaign contributions from lawyers, more than any other category of donors—turned the case into a centerpiece of his first months in office. Joined by Senate Judiciary Chairman Pat Leahy, Mr. Franken highlighted Ms. Jones in hearings and press conferences, bemoaning that a company was "robbing" her of her "day in court."
News organizations sensationalized the case, presenting Ms. Jones's allegations as fact. National Public Radio declared "Jones had been vaginally and anally raped, repeatedly. By how many men, she's not sure." ABC's 20/20 did an exposé, playing up Halliburton and its Dick Cheney ties. Public Citizen ginned up a letter-writing campaign to protest "Halliburton's arbitration trap," while the American Association of Justice—the trial lawyer lobby—highlighted Ms. Jones's case as an example of "how powerful corporations use forced arbitrations to evade accountability."
Here's the thing: Ms. Jones was getting her day in court. In 2008, before Mr. Franken had even won election, a federal judge ruled that sexual assault fell outside the scope of standard workplace complaints and therefore was not subject to arbitration. In October 2009, an appeals court agreed. These rulings were in fact the basis of the civil case Ms. Jones lost this month, in which she was claiming $145 million in damages.
None of that stopped Mr. Franken from spinning her case to get sweeping legal changes in aid of his trial lawyer benefactors. He began pushing a Senate measure prohibiting defense contractors from requiring employees to use arbitration to resolve a range of complaints. The Jones story cowed a number of Republicans into voting for the amendment, which passed 68-30 in late October 2009.
The 30 Republicans who voted against it were targeted as rape apologists, the subject of a murky website that appeared under the name "Republicans for Rape." Local newspapers denounced their "no"-vote senators. The Franken crowd, happy to press this advantage, began pushing for the Arbitration Fairness Act, a bill that would ban arbitration clauses in all employment cases—not just those of defense contractors. This was the trial bar's real aim all along, and only a hot 2010 election year denied them a victory.
It isn't clear whether Ms. Jones will appeal, though the Houston jury was clearly disturbed by grave inconsistencies in her story and the evidence, as well as her self-promotion—including her rounds on the media circuit, a book and film deal, and a starring role in the new pro-trial-lawyer movie "Hot Coffee."
Even Mr. Franken is these days arguing that his campaign was "never about one court case." In April, he doggedly reintroduced the Arbitration Fairness Act (though, notably, his press release made no mention of Ms. Jones). He will undoubtedly also be pressing for his contractor amendment to be renewed as part of the defense appropriations process.
Republicans have seen the trial lawyer play frequently enough to recognize it. Yet in 2009 many of them succumbed again, putting at risk an arbitration system that has done wonders to curb frivolous litigation and is at the heart of their own tort-reform beliefs. Let the Jones case be yet another lesson.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4)Time Out
Conventional wisdom says Israel must reach a peace deal quickly, before population trends and diplomatic isolation overtake the Jewish state. Demographics and geopolitics tell a different story.
BY DAVID P. GOLDMAN
"Time isn't on Israel's side" must be the most-repeated phrase in Israeli politics, in the Jewish state as well as in the Diaspora. It's Kadima party leader Tzipi Livni's refrain, as Simon Schama put it recently in the Financial Times. Ronald Lauder, the president of the World Jewish Congress, said so in a Jerusalem speech to Jewish legislators from various parliamentary democracies June 29. We've heard the same shibboleth this year from Australia's Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, Turkish commentator Ömer Taşpinar, Rabbi Donniel Hartman of the Shalom Hartmann Institute, Jewish Week editor Gary Rosenblatt, and many others.
The claim that Israel is fighting the clock has two components: diplomacy and demographics. Israel's diplomatic isolation will corner the Jewish state while fast-breeding Arabs will overwhelm the population balance between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, goes the argument. On both counts, though, the facts speak against the notion that time is running out for Israel. Time, on the contrary, seems to be on Israel's side.
The Palestinian Authority's much-feared march toward a United Nations vote for statehood has become something of an embarrassment. A vote for statehood in the General Assembly has no legal implications, and the United States will always veto the measure in the Security Council. Some Palestinian leaders think that token support in the General Assembly will do more harm than good; Palestine Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki last week offered to withdraw the U.N. vote if negotiations with Israel restarted before September. And even the Kingdom of Jordan might vote against Palestinian statehood, according to the Middle East Research Center's Alexander Bligh.
Arab rhetoric in support of Palestinian statehood, moreover, isn't matched by real support. Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian Authority's prime minister,complained last week that Arab donors have paid out only a third of their pledges to his government, leaving the Palestinian Authority without enough cash to pay public employees' salaries. "The Palestinians cannot count on the friends cheering them on rhetorically to step up financially if the going gets rough post-September," warnedMichael Singh, an associate fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in a blog post on Foreign Policy's website.
Israel hardly seems as isolated as it did before Greece blocked another Gaza flotilla earlier this month, and the IHH-the Hamas-linked Turkish "charity" that sponsored the Mavi Marmara flotilla last year-dropped out of the exercise. Israeli diplomacy seemed quite effective. "The decision [for IHH to drop out] was taken for no other reason than that the Turkish government has made restoring its previously excellent relationship with Israel a priority," reported Stephen Pollard in the Guardian. "The very last thing the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, wants is another pointless conflict. Having been re-elected for a third term he no longer needs to play to the gallery and paint Israel as a pantomime villain-his stock message since Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009. With Syrian troops on his southern border, Erdogan has been keen to move on from the Mavi Marmara incident and return to good relations and military co-operation with Israel."
Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Muslim countries-including Turkey-have shifted their rhetoric away from Israel and toward the risk of rising Iranian influence. Only a few months ago, conventional wisdom stated that the United States needed a Middle East peace deal to steer the Arab Spring in a pro-American direction. But as it turned out, the Arab Spring had little to do with the Palestine issue, and as the political chaos in the Arab world became less tractable, Israel's position improved.
Israel is less isolated because Syria is isolated-except for Iran's continued sponsorship-and because civil wars in Yemen and Libya and renewed political unrest in Egypt have validated Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's claim before the U.S. Congress in May that "Israel is the one anchor of stability" in "an unstable Middle East." Until the Syrian government provoked attacks on the American and French embassies in Damascus, the U.S. administration and other Western governments made it clear that they preferred to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power there, based on the commonplace notion that no comprehensive peace agreement is possible without Syria and no partial agreement is likely, given the dependence of Hezbollah and Hamas on his regime. It is hard to pressure Israel to negotiate a peace deal when a pivotal player is absent, and the recent meeting of the Middle East Quartet (the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) in Washington ended without a public statement.
Even if the Arab revolt and its consequences have eased Israel's diplomatic isolation and undercut the pressure for a settlement with the Palestinians, that does not serve Israel's interests, according to President Barack Obama. "The number of Palestinians living west of the Jordan River is growing rapidly and fundamentally reshaping the demographic realities of both Israel and the Palestinian territories," he told the America-Israel Political Action Committee in May.
Whether the proportion of Arabs in Judea and Samaria as well as in Israel itself is growing may be the most politicized demographic question in the world. Yet the Israeli Jewish fertility rate has risen to three children per female while the Arab fertility rate has fallen to the point where the two trend lines have converged and perhaps even crossed. A 2006 study by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies claims that the West Bank and Gaza population in 2004 was only 2.5 million, rather than the 3.8 million claimed by the Palestinian authorities. Presumably the numbers were inflated to increase foreign aid and exaggerate the importance of the Palestinian population.
Most of the phantom population, the report argues, comes from births that never occurred:
[The Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics] projected that the number of births in the Territories would total almost 908,000 for the seven-year period from 1997 to 2003. Yet, the actual number of births documented by the PA Ministry of Health for the same period was significantly lower at 699,000, or 238,000 fewer births than had been forecast by the PCBS. . The size of the discrepancy accelerated over time. Whereas the PCBS predicted there would be over 143,000 births in 2003, the PA Ministry of Health reported only 102,000 births, which pointed to a PCBS forecast 40%beyond actual results.
Palestinian fertility on the West Bank has already fallen to the Israeli fertility rate of three children per woman, if we believe the Palestine Ministry of Health numbers rather than the highly suspect Central Bureau of Statistics data. The Begin-Sadat estimates were disputed by other Israeli demographers, notably Sergio DellaPergola of the Jewish People Policy Institute. Yet the idea that economic and cultural modernization leads to falling birthrates is a commonplace among demographers who study the developing world. In 1963, Israeli Arab women had eight or nine children; today they have three, about the same as Israeli Jews. Education explains most of the fertility decline among Arabs, and it is likely that Arab fertility behind the Green Line as well as in Judea and Samaria will continue to fall.
More recent data also show that the Israeli Jewish birth rate has risen faster than predicted. Jewish births rose from 96,000 in the year 2000 to 125,000 in 2010, while Arab births fell slightly over the same period-from about 40,781 to 40,750, according to a new study by Yaakov Faitelson at the Institute for Zionist Strategies. The proportion of Jewish pupils in Israel's elementary schools is increasing, Faitelson reports:
The percentage of students in the Arab educational system out of all Israel's total first grade student body will decrease from 29.1% in 2007 to only 24.3% in 2016 and 22.5% in 2020. At the same time the percentage of students in the Jewish educational system out of the total first grade student body will reach 75.7% by 2016 and 77.5% by 2020.
While Israel's ultra-Orthodox minority contributes disproportionately to Jewish population growth, most of the increase in Jewish births comes from the secular and non-Orthodox religious categories, which average 2.6 children per woman. Faitelson notes that the ultra-Orthodox fertility rate fell over the past decade, while the fertility of the general Jewish population rose.
If present trends continue, the proportion of Jews in Israel and the West Bank will remain roughly constant; it may even rise. Muslim fertility is falling faster than anywhere in the world, with some Muslim countries-notably Iran, Turkey, Algeria, and Tunisia-reaching levels well below replacement. "In most of the Islamic world it's amazing, the decline in fertility that has happened,'' Hania Zlotnik, head of the United Nations' population research branch, told a 2009 conference. Within every Muslim country and across the Muslim world, one variable explains most of the fertility air-pocket, namely education. Once Muslim women leave the cocoon of traditional society for secondary or university education, their fertility drops quickly to levels below replacement.
If Israel's total fertility rate holds at three, its population will reach 24 million by the end of this century, the United Nations' population model predicts. And if the low fertility rates prevailing elsewhere hold steady, Israel will have more people under the age of 25 than Turkey, Iran, or even Germany. It will be able to field the largest army in the Middle East. And it will have a thriving high-tech economy, enormous energy resources, and a reliable supply of desalinated water. Israel has a near-optimal mix of economics and demographics, while time is running out for Arab countries that have failed over and over again to rise to the demands of the modern world.
There is just one remaining argument that the clock is ticking against Israel, namely "linkage" between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran's strategic threat to Israel. Gen. David Petraeus, the new head of the Central Intelligence Agency, made this assertion in congressional testimony in March 2010. "Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations," Petraeus argued. "The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas." I argued at the time that Petraeus was outrageously wrong and that Jewish conservatives were misguided to hail Petraeus as a hero.
Iran's nuclear program and its support for Hezbollah and Hamas are significant threats to the Jewish state. Yet it is hard to find a policy analyst of any stripe today who will defend the idea that an Israeli-Palestine agreement, even if such a thing were possible in the present environment, might meaningfully reduce the Iranian threat. In the uncertain aftermath of Arab revolts, Petraeus' "linkage" argument has quietly faded into the inoperative list of embarrassing past policy statements. The commonplace argument that time is not on Israel's side looks like it will be next.
4a)Israel's War of the Words
By Andrew Pessin
Almost everyone agrees about Israel's military superiority over its adversaries. After all, it has won all the conventional wars, as well as the non-conventional ones -- Hamas's fantastic victory declarations in 2009, amidst the ruins of Gaza City, notwithstanding. But there is another war, an ongoing war, in which Israel suffers nothing but defeat after defeat. And in the long term this war might be even more important than the military wars, the economic wars, and the political wars.
That is the War of the Words.
The war over the very words which people use to talk, and therefore think, about the conflict.
There are too many examples. Even the very name, "State of Israel," is one: the founders of the new nation chose that name for legitimate reasons, to be sure, but failed to foresee that, over time, it has come to seem, to all too many people, that today's "Palestinians" must be by definition the indigenous people of that region long known previously as "Palestine." Had the founders simply named their new Jewish state "Palestine" (say) then the Jews would today be the "Palestinians" while the Arabs would be -- what -- the "Arabs"? And then it would be clear -- verbally, and perhaps psychologically -- that the true Palestinians were indeed living in their ancestral homeland after all.
Similar points can be made about such charged terms as "the West Bank" (v. "Judea" and "Samaria"), "refugees," "settlers," the security "wall" (or "fence"), and so on. But since Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has finally begun to recognize the significance of the War of the Words -- as reflected in Deputy Minister Danny Ayalon's recent release of a video on the legal status of the West Bank[1] -- here, let's take a quick look at the phrase "occupied territories."
Although major Arab governments (such as Hamas), as well as significant proportions of Arab civilian populations, consider all of Israel to be "occupied territory," that view fortunately remains outside the mainstream of Western discourse. What is quite mainstream, however, is that at least the West Bank is, and until 2005 the Gaza Strip was, legitimately labeled as "occupied territory."
But why?
"Occupation" typically refers to a condition whereby a foreign power takes control of an area that was previously possessed by another sovereign state. But of course that does not apply here. The overall region was part of the Ottoman Empire for 400 years up to World War I. Subsequently those areas corresponding to Israel and Jordan constituted Britain's "Mandatory Palestine"; in 1922 Britain carved off all of the land east of the Jordan River to establish Jordan and, in 1937, via the Peel Commission, offered the Arabs west of the Jordan an independent state on 85% of the remaining Mandatory land. But the Arabs rejected that offer, with violent revolts -- as they also rejected the United Nations' partition plan a decade later, to which they responded by sending in seven Arab armies to destroy the nascent Jewish state. In a word, there has never been a sovereign Arab or Palestinian state in this region. So there is nothing for any foreign power to "occupy."
Of course when the dust of 1948-9 (temporarily) settled, Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, as would remain the case until 1967. It was widely recognized that these were forceful, totalitarian, and punitive administrations, in defiance of international law and United Nations resolutions 181 and 194 -- yet there were no Arab or Palestinian protests about this, no violent "resistance," no calls for the overthrow of the "occupations." Why not? Because in these decades there were no distinct Palestinian people and there was no Palestinian "homeland" to be occupied. There were just Arab governments controlling Arab populations.
All that changed in 1967.
Yet again the Arabs attempted to destroy Israel, by means of troops from more than a half-dozen Arab armies. In a stunning upset, Israel not only won but tripled the amount of territory it controlled, reunifying Jerusalem and capturing the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. It promptly signaled its willingness to negotiate, offering to return captured lands in exchange for peace. The Arabs replied with the infamous three Nos of Khartoum: No peace, No recognition, and No negotiations. Over time, of course, the Arab position weakened, and Israel subsequently returned the Sinai to Egypt, various territories to Jordan, and all of the Gaza Strip and much of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority. To date more than 90% of the territory Israel captured in the 1967 war has been returned in exchange for "peace."
These points show Israel's willingness to make major concessions for peace with its neighbors. They also show something else. Had Israel been the aggressor in 1967 then its control of the West Bank and Gaza would indeed have been against international law. But as the victim of aggression its position is quite different, for according to the Charters of the League of Nations and subsequently of the United Nations -- which govern such situations -- the legal status of territories captured in self-defense can only be determined by peace treaties between the warring parties. When the Arabs uttered their three Nos, therefore, Israel would have been perfectly justified, legally, in annexing those territories.
So not only has there never been a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, but to date the Palestinians have rejected every proposed treaty which would create such a state.
In the absence of such a treaty, again, there quite literally is nothing to "occupy."
What, then, is the status of the West Bank?
Both parties can and do make various legitimate claims to that land, on the basis of various considerations. Until relevant treaties are established, however, the only internationally recognized conditions under which "possession" is officially established will not have been satisfied. The more accurate expression for the West Bank, then, would be "disputed territory."
But nobody seems to speak this way. Instead they speak in a way reflecting the Arab narrative, despite the complete lack of justification for doing so.
But this point, again, is part of a larger pattern: Israel has consistently lost the War of the Words. These may just be "verbal" battles, true; but while such battles may not seem as important, in the short term, as military, economic, and political battles, in the long term, they may well be. For how you verbally frame the issues at the beginning can have major ramifications for how you are ultimately able to resolve them at the end. In particular, the framing is crucially important for those people who are either outside the conflict, or new to it and just learning about it, for it can subtly instill in them initial biases which are subsequently very difficult to dislodge. The words we use shape minds, affect conceptions, and govern interpretations -- and until enough people's minds, conceptions, and interpretations are in the right place then it may never be recognized that with the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, the Jews are too.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5)Slain Iranian scientist was working on a nuclear bomb detonator
Daryush Rezaee-Nejad, 35, who died Saturday, July 23, when two motorcyclists shot him in the head and throat in front of his home in Tehran, was a rising star of the new generation of Iranian nuclear scientists. Iranian sources disclose he was attached to one of the most secret teams of Iran's nuclear program, employed by the defense ministry to construct detonators for the nuclear bomb and warhead already in advanced stages of development.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6) When raw ambition puts your career before your country's security
By Caroline B. Glick
MeetIsrael's premier opportunist who thinks Obama can do no wrong
Saying that Israel faces daunting challenges today and that those challenges will multiply and grow in the near future should not be construed as a partisan or ideological statement. Rather, it is a statement of fact.
It is also a fact that the greatest dangers facing Israel stem from US President Barack Obama's rapid withdrawal of the US from its position as the predominant power in the Middle East on the one hand, and from Iran's rise as a nuclear power and regional power on the other.
These power shifts along with the Muslim Brotherhood's rising power in Egypt; Turkey's Islamist government's regional ambitions; the rise of jihadist forces throughout the Persian Gulf; and the growing instability of the Syrian and Jordanian regimes, together constitute a threat environment unmatched in Israel's history.
Alongside these conventional threats, Israel is the target of a sustained, escalating political campaign to delegitimize its right to exist and its right to defend itself by the Palestinians and the international Left. This campaign threatens Israel's economy and prepares the ground for violent aggression against Israel by conditioning the West to believe that Israel deserves to be attacked.
Given the magnitude, multiplicity and complexity of the threats Israel faces, it would be reasonable to expect our leading politicians from all parties to place patriotism above partisanship and at least on the issues that are beyond dispute to work together to defend the country. And it would seem reasonable to assume that the issues beyond dispute are Israel's right to exist and defend itself as well as its need to deter or defeat its enemies.
Throughout most of Israel's 63 year history, opposition leaders have joined forces with the government to defend the country in times of trouble. Most recently, while serving as head of the opposition during Ehud Olmert's tenure as prime minister, in 2006 Binyamin Netanyahu travelled to Europe at Olmert's request and defended Israel's war against Hezbollah.
During the course of hostilities, Netanyahu never criticized Olmert's poor war leadership in public. He did not publicly criticize then foreign minister Tzipi Livni's scandalously incompetent handling of the ceasefire negotiations at the UN Security Council. Instead, Netanyahu communicated his criticism to Olmert behind closed doors. As he saw it, public criticism would diminish Olmert's ability to win the war.
Shortly after Netanyahu took office, the UN released its libelous Goldstone Report in which Olmert and his government were falsely accused of conducting war crimes during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Although Netanyahu himself was not mentioned or accused of anything, he led a staunch campaign to discredit the report.
Netanyahu didn't act as he did because he wanted to help Kadima. He acted as he did because he realized that it was Israel, not Olmert and Livni that was under attack. As Prime Minister and as opposition leader, it is his job to defend Israel from attack even when the most direct beneficiaries of his actions are his political rivals.
Netanyahu's decent behavior didn't make him a hero. His behavior is the minimum we can and should expect from our elected officials whether they are in the government or the opposition. We should be able to reasonably expect that those who seek public office with the declared intention of serving as national leaders will always put the national interest above their partisan interests when the two conflict.
Unfortunately, this fundamental, eminently reasonable expectation is being trampled by opposition leader Tzipi Livni today. Since taking the helm of the opposition, Livni has never been willing to recognize that foreign attacks on Netanyahu are quite often attacks on Israel. Rather than acknowledging that attacks on the legitimacy of the democratically elected government of her country are attacks on her country, Livni has viewed every attack on Netanyahu as an opportunity to weaken his government.
In this vein, Livni has consistently sided with Obama, the Palestinians, and the international Left against Netanyahu and blamed Netanyahu for their attacks on Israel. For instance, when during his visit to the US in May, Netanyahu rejected Obama's hostile call for Israel to retreat to the indefensible 1949 armistice lines, Livni defended Obama as a friend of Israel and accused Netanyahu of harming Israel's ties to the US.
Indeed, Livni called for Netanyahu to resign. Livni ignored Obama's shocking renunciation of pledges his predecessor made to the Sharon government regarding Israel's right to defensible borders and US rejection of the Palestinians' demands for unlimited immigration to Israel and for Israel to vacate all the Israeli towns and villages built beyond the 1949 armistice lines.
Livni ignored the fact she herself demanded that the Palestinians renounce the so-called "right of return," and blamed Netanyahu for all the unpleasantness. As she put it, "A prime minister that harms the relationship with the US over something unsubstantial is harming Israel's security and deterrence."
As for the Palestinians, as far as Livni is concerned, they can do no wrong while Netanyahu is in office. Although the Palestinian negotiations department documents that were leaked earlier this year to The Guardian show Livni arguing that the Palestinians have to recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state, since Netanyahu took office, she has abandoned this position in favor of blanket support for the Palestinians against Netanyahu.
In Livni's world, the fact that the Palestinians have refused to hold negotiations with Israel for two years is an opportunity to attack Netanyahu. The fact that her friends in Fatah just signed a unity deal with Hamas is insignificant. As for their bid to ditch the peace process and ask the UN to recognize a Palestinian state without peace with Israel — that too is an opportunity to attack Netanyahu.
Last month Netanyahu told an interviewer that the conflict with the Palestinians is not about territory but about their rejection of Israel's right to exist. He asserted that as a consequence, it will be impossible to resolve the conflict until they change their view of Israel.
As is her wont, Livni treated her opponent's observation about an unpleasant reality as equivalent to creating that reality. Attacking Netanyahu from the Knesset podium she hissed, "Who are you to tell the citizens of Israel that they and their children, and later their children's children, will continue to live by their swords forever? Who are you to bury the chances of a deal and of normal life here, after just a few hours in the room meant for negotiations you didn't conduct?"
Then there is Livni's ardent support for far Left organizations in Israel and abroad that work actively to undermine Israel's legitimacy. Take J Street. It took less than a year for J Street to demonstrate that its claim that it is pro-Israel is a sham. J Street lobbied the US Congress not to impose sanctions on Iran. It lobbied the Obama administration to allow an anti-Israel resolution to pass at the UN Security Council. It has included advocates of the boycott, sanctions and divestment campaign against Israel at its annual conference. It supports several of the most anti-Israel members of Congress.
Due to J Street's hostility, the government has rightly shunned it. But Livni has embraced it — mainly in a bid to make Netanyahu look petty. In so doing, she has given legitimacy to a deeply hostile organization whose goals are far outside the mainstream of both Israeli public opinion and American public opinion.
Then there is her outspoken support for anti-Zionist Israeli and foreign organizations that participate in the international Left's campaign to delegitimize Israel. Many of these groups worked with the Goldstone Commission and others to criminalize Kadima's leadership — including Livni —as war criminals.
If it hadn't been for Livni, last week the Knesset would have passed an anti-boycott law that enjoyed support from across the political spectrum. The original anti-boycott bill was co-sponsored by Likud MK Zev Elkin and Kadima MK Dalia Itzik. Several Kadima MKs were vocal advocates of legislation punishing those waging economic war against Israel.
For instance, Kadima MK Otniel Schneller said, "Those who oppose the bill with phony democratic claims are legitimizing the international trend of boycotting Israeli academia, culture and economics, thereby damaging the legitimacy of Israeli democracy and Jewish morals."
But Livni would have none of it.
Last week Livni forbade Kadima MKs from supporting the legislation in any form and then led the charge in attacking it with those very same "phony democratic claims."
By acting as she did, she didn't merely hurt the government. She hurt the country. Now everyone from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, to B'Tselem, to International Solidarity Movement will cite Livni's position as proof that there is nothing wrong with waging economic warfare against Israel. They will quote her to claim it is reasonable to single Israel out from the rest of the nations of the world for delegitimization and divestment.
Livni insists that Kadima is not a leftist party and that she is not a leftist even as her positions are identical to those of the post-Zionist Meretz party.
Livni's political rationale is clear. She knows that despite her protestations, no one other than her media supporters believes that Kadima is a centrist party. As a consequence, her only chance of forming a government is by capturing the entire leftist vote.
Although many Kadima MKs object to her positions and criticize her for being too radical, they realize they have no choice but to go along. If they want to remain in Kadima and in politics, they must appeal to Kadima's voters — who are all on the Left.
This is why Livni's rival for part leadership Shaul Mofaz has adopted a peace plan that is even more radical than Livni's plan to give Fatah everything they want. Mofaz's plan is to recognize and seek to negotiate a settlement with Hamas.
Mofaz is no dove. But his only option for beating Livni in the Kadima leadership primary is to outflank her on the Left.
Livni has always been an opportunist. When Netanyahu brought her into the Knesset in 1999 she was a super hawk. When in 2004 then prime minister Ariel Sharon adopted the far Left's strategy of wholesale territorial surrender, Livni moved from junior minister to senior minister in under two years by adopting the positions of the far Left. Today, as she attacks Netanyahu for advancing positions that most Israelis agree with, she does so not because she believes Netanyahu is wrong. After all, she advanced many of the same positions when she was foreign minister. She attacks him because she wants to bring down his government so that she can have another shot at getting elected to replace him. Her behavior's impacts Israel's ability to withstand political and military aggression is clearly of no concern to her.
It is hard to quantify the damage Livni's opportunistic attacks on the government have already caused the country. As we move into an uncertain future, it is disconcerting to consider the damage Livni will cause with her shameless exploitation of Israel's vulnerabilities for her own political gain.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7)Egypt to ban foreign election observers in first ‘democratic’ election
By Kristen Chick
Move by ruling military council has those seeking true freedom worried
Egyptian rights activists are raising strong concerns after the country's military rulers banned international observers for the first elections of the post-Mubarak era.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military junta that took over after President Hosni Mubarak was pushed out, said Wednesday that elections will be delayed to November, two months later than originally expected. International monitors will not be permitted on the grounds of national sovereignty, said Maj. Gen. Mamdouh Shahin, the military council's legislative adviser.
"This is a very terrible development," says Bahey El Din Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. "It was usual to hear this from the Mubarak regime because the elections were always fraudulent."
But for the military to take the same position, citing the same excuse the Mubarak regime used, "raises serious questions about the credibility of the coming election," he says.
A fair vote is vital to establishing both domestic and international trust in Egypt's new government, and international monitors would be a natural way to ensure one, says Mr. Hassan. Election fraud was rife throughout the 30 years of Mubarak's rule. Parliamentary elections held in November and December of last year were widely seen as some of the most fraudulent in Egypt's modern history.
Mohamed Mahmoud, an Egyptian from the Nile Delta who is camped out in Cairo's central Tahrir protesting the military rulers' slow pace of reform, says he's suspicious about the ban on foreign observers.
"Why would they not allow the international observers unless they have something to hide?" he asks. "This should be our first free election in Egypt. But maybe they don't want it to be free."
Shahin said that Egyptian civil society organizations will be free to monitor the vote. The Mubarak regime said the same, but then went to great lengths to restrict those organizations' efforts. Some activists wonder if they will experience a similar obstacles this fall, says Hassan.
"This raises questions of what they are looking to cover up," he says. "Even Egyptians won't buy it because of their long experience with Mubarak."
The parliament scheduled to be elected in the fall will be charged with forming a commission to write a new constitution, and presidential elections will come after that. The military has pledged to give up power after elections are held.
The announcement on international monitors came as the military laid out the new laws that will govern the election, which will take place in three stages. Half of the 504 parliamentary candidates will be elected individually, while the other half will be elected under a list system, in which parties receive seats proportionate to the percentage of the vote they received. A women's quota instituted under Mubarak to ensure women's representation will be abolished, though every party list must include at least one woman. A nearly half-century old quota reserving half of the seats for farmers and workers was left in place.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Move by ruling military council has those seeking true freedom worried
JewishWorldReview.com
AIRO— (TCSM)
Egyptian rights activists are raising strong concerns after the country's military rulers banned international observers for the first elections of the post-Mubarak era.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military junta that took over after President Hosni Mubarak was pushed out, said Wednesday that elections will be delayed to November, two months later than originally expected. International monitors will not be permitted on the grounds of national sovereignty, said Maj. Gen. Mamdouh Shahin, the military council's legislative adviser.
"This is a very terrible development," says Bahey El Din Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. "It was usual to hear this from the Mubarak regime because the elections were always fraudulent."
But for the military to take the same position, citing the same excuse the Mubarak regime used, "raises serious questions about the credibility of the coming election," he says.
A fair vote is vital to establishing both domestic and international trust in Egypt's new government, and international monitors would be a natural way to ensure one, says Mr. Hassan. Election fraud was rife throughout the 30 years of Mubarak's rule. Parliamentary elections held in November and December of last year were widely seen as some of the most fraudulent in Egypt's modern history.
Mohamed Mahmoud, an Egyptian from the Nile Delta who is camped out in Cairo's central Tahrir protesting the military rulers' slow pace of reform, says he's suspicious about the ban on foreign observers.
"Why would they not allow the international observers unless they have something to hide?" he asks. "This should be our first free election in Egypt. But maybe they don't want it to be free."
Shahin said that Egyptian civil society organizations will be free to monitor the vote. The Mubarak regime said the same, but then went to great lengths to restrict those organizations' efforts. Some activists wonder if they will experience a similar obstacles this fall, says Hassan.
"This raises questions of what they are looking to cover up," he says. "Even Egyptians won't buy it because of their long experience with Mubarak."
The parliament scheduled to be elected in the fall will be charged with forming a commission to write a new constitution, and presidential elections will come after that. The military has pledged to give up power after elections are held.
The announcement on international monitors came as the military laid out the new laws that will govern the election, which will take place in three stages. Half of the 504 parliamentary candidates will be elected individually, while the other half will be elected under a list system, in which parties receive seats proportionate to the percentage of the vote they received. A women's quota instituted under Mubarak to ensure women's representation will be abolished, though every party list must include at least one woman. A nearly half-century old quota reserving half of the seats for farmers and workers was left in place.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8)The View from Syria and Lebanon
Middle Eastern Upheavals
By Hilal Khashan
Demands for democracy are unlikely to make headway in fragmented societies such as Syria and Lebanon. While Egypt and Tunisia are historically and geographically well-defined entities with fairly homogeneous populations and national attributes, Syria is dominated by a small minority sect whose fate hinges on the survival of President Bashar al-Assad's regime, which will not flinch from crushing pro-reform demonstrations, even if these do not demand a systemic change. Nor is political reform conceivable in Lebanon—a country suffering from a serious sovereignty deficit resulting from deep-seated sectarian divisions.
Democracy and Its Critics
Having publicly precluded the spread of the Tunisian and Egyptian upheavals to Syria, President Bashar Assad (left, with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) has been loath to acknowledge the true nature of the rapidly spreading discontent in his own country, repeatedly attributing it to foreign attempts to subvert Syria.
Lebanese analysts and politicians have unabashedly claimed credit for the Arab uprisings, which, in their view, are bound to culminate in the establishment of democratic political systems throughout the region. Speaking on the sixth anniversary of the Cedar Revolution last March, its politically battered leader Saad Hariri asserted that the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were all inspired by those Lebanese who in 2005 converged in downtown Beirut to demand the departure of Syria's occupying army from the country.[1] This process, according to a London-based Lebanese publication, amounted to nothing short of "the beginning of the collapse of the Arab equivalent of the Berlin Wall … a new Arab order in which political authority is transferred periodically and peacefully."[2]
At the same time, this rhetorical hype has been marred by apologetics and blatant misrepresentation. Thus, for example, columnist Hassan Sabra entreated Arab youths "to take revenge for their grandparents who unsuccessfully rebelled against despotism and their fathers who regrettably appeased it and bequeathed them shame and sorrow." This, however, did not prevent him from empathizing with Egypt's Husni Mubarak, "who served his country in peace and war and seemed ready to step down,"[3] or from commending Saudi King Abdullah for "launching his own revolution several years ago for the sake of transforming his society long before the spring of reform has crept up many Arab publics' list of priorities."[4]
For their part, Assad's supporters in Syria and Lebanon dismissed Hariri's claim to parenthood of the Arab uprisings (ridiculing the Cedar Revolution as the Gucci Revolution due to the presence of many high-heeled young women in the daily sit-ins following the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri),[5] equating the public demand for freedom not with a yearning for democratic participation but with standing up to the alleged machinations of the United States and Israel. "The Arab publics admire the Syrian policy line because it arrested Arab collapse and is currently well-positioned to take the initiative to win back usurped Arab rights," argued the prominent anti-Hariri journalist Nizar as-Sahli[6] while Subhi Ghandour, a Lebanese analyst and director of the Arab Dialog Center in Washington, reduced the Egyptian uprising to "an endeavor to restore for Egypt its leading role in advocating the just causes of the Arab nation."[7]
Trouble in Assad's Satrapy
On March 12, 2011, the Arab League urged the U.N. Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya to protect the civilian population from strikes by Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi's air force. The move was opposed by Yemen, Algeria, and Syria—probably the league's most fragmented countries: Yemen is divided along tribal, sectarian, and regional lines; Algeria's political fault line pits Arabs against Berbers and Islamists against secularists; and in Syria, the divide is most pronounced in that it places the ruling Alawite minority, no more than 12 percent of the population, against the rest of the country's ethnic-religious mosaic. Small wonder, therefore, that the regime's supporters condemned the no-fly zone in harsh Baathist rhetoric, reminiscent of the pan-Arab discourse of the 1950s and 1960s: "This weird decision appeared as if it was issued by the U.S. Congress or Israeli Knesset."[8]
Assad's resentment of the international protection of Libyans from their heavy-handed ruler is not difficult to understand. Evidently equating democracy with regime change, the Syrian dictator has been loath to loosen his grip on his long suffering subjects lest even the most modest political reform might lead to his undoing.[9] The Damascus regime may digress from David Ignatius's assertion that "if the experience of other countries over the past two months shows anything, it's that delaying reform too long in a one-party state like Syria is potentially a fatal mistake,"[10] yet it has missed no opportunity to underscore Assad's personal commitment to reform despite the foreign conspiracies confronting him: "Mr. President Bashar Assad perseveres in his reform mission and cannot possibly be sidetracked by those who bear malice against Syria and wish to destabilize it."[11]
To be sure, the road to reform is rarely easy or smooth, and even the most thorough reforms hit the occasional snag. As an editorial in the official mouthpiece of the regime put it: "There is no doubt that the march of reform, begun several years ago, has made progress at different levels, but at the same time, it has not been unblemished or corruption-free."[12] Yet this does not mean that the authorities will put up with "a foreign conspiracy" masquerading as public protests and "aimed at destabilizing Syria and the rest of the region," to use the words of Buthaina Sha'ban, Assad's advisor for political and media affairs.[13]
It is doubtful whether the official clichés about Assad's unwavering commitment to reform have struck a responsive chord with ordinary Syrians. Even some of the regime's supporters have become increasingly disillusioned with its neglect of the real issues pertaining to reform. One such critic is veteran Lebanese analyst and former Arab League official Clovis Maksud. Noting that, as early as April 2005, Assad requested the executive director of the U.N. development programs to propose reform policies for presentation before the Tenth Baath Party Congress, which convened two months later, Maksud expressed his astonishment at the failure to act on these reforms "that were adopted by the congress and the Syrian cabinet."[14] Nor could he hide his disapproval of the regime's derision of the demonstrators as "lackeys of foreign agents."[15]
The fact of the matter is that despite his inner insecurity, Assad seems to have concluded that the Western intervention in Libya is not repeatable in the Syrian context, apparently drawing some comfort from Hillary Clinton's assurance after the killing of dozens of protesters in the northern port city of Latakia that "the USA will not interfere in Syria in the way it has in Libya."[16] Moreover, judging by his defiant speech of March 30, in which he laid the blame for the protests on "saboteurs [who] tried to undermine and divide Syria and push an Israeli agenda," Assad seems to believe that he has received a new lease to rule Syria as he sees fit whereby "reforms are not a wave that we ride, and we will not proceed hastily."[17]
Ribal al-Assad, director of the London-based Organization for Democracy and Freedom in Syria, dismissed his cousin's declared intention to reform the Syrian political system as "a big, deceptive campaign in the name of democratic reform."[18] Therefore, "it seems inevitable that protest may soon crack the regime's brittle political immobility … the birth of freedom … is not easily forgotten—or trumped by state handouts and vacuous statements by a distant, self-isolated leadership."[19]
What may be working in Bashar al-Assad's favor is that the protest movement, while spreading from the southern border city of Dar'a to other parts of Syria, including Damascus, still appears too weak to seriously challenge his regime, owing to the heterogeneity of Syrian society, which discourages cohesion among the opposition.[20]
Official statements and press editorials leave no doubt regarding the regime's readiness for an all-out showdown: "We are in the midst of a confrontation and not on a picnic. The country is facing a real battle with foreign forces spending tens of millions of dollars, whose aim is to destabilize Syria."[21] This decision came only three days after the authorities had promised to exercise maximum restraint in dealing with public protests: "There are orders from the highest echelons to all security agencies to refrain from opening fire on demonstrators, even if they deliberately wound or kill politically disinterested countrymen."[22]
It is highly unlikely that these contradictory statements demonstrate a shift of course in dealing with the protests since the government's vacillation has had little impact on the scale and intensity of regime repression. Confronted with the gravest domestic challenge to the Assad dynasty since 1982, when Bashar's father, Hafez, killed tens of thousands of civilians in the northern city of Hama in an attempt to suppress the ongoing, nationwide Islamist revolt, the regime decided to invoke terrorism as a dominant factor overshadowing the demands for reform.
Accordingly, the government has repeatedly claimed that armed gangs keep opening fire on protesters, army troops, and security forces. Oddly enough, these armed gangs have conspicuously failed to open fire on demonstrators and security personnel when regime-organized, pro-Assad rallies caused traffic congestion in major Syrian cities. As Anis Karam, the Lebanese chairperson of the American-Middle Eastern Congregation for Freedom and Democracy, put it, the regime has been "labeling demonstrators as outlaws to justify its mass killings."[23] Indeed, the authorities have clearly indicated that they have no intention of desisting from their excessive force in quelling the disturbances. Assad even fired Samira al-Masalima, editor in chief of the state-run Tishrin daily, after she told al-Jazeera television that opening fire on demonstrators in Dar'a was "a security breach because it violates the explicit orders of President Assad."[24]
The Syrian protests may intensify, but they are unlikely to create a wholly new political reality. Though winning some seemingly major concessions, notably the lifting (on April 19) of Syria's 48-year-old state of emergency,[25] the balance of power overwhelmingly favors the regime for now.
Lebanon: No Door to Knock on
Some Lebanese writers expect the Arab uprisings to reach Lebanon. Nasser al-As'ad, a member of Hariri's party and a former activist in the defunct Communist Action Movement, believes that "the ultimate goal of the Arab risings is the installation of modern democracies and the emergence of a pluralist Arab order." Since Lebanon is a mirror image of the state of affairs in the region, he reasoned, any positive developments there were bound to have a similar impact on Lebanese politics.[26] Lebanese intellectual Karim Pakraduni has been similarly upbeat, arguing that Lebanese youths are no less capable of effecting change than their Arab counterparts elsewhere and prophesying the "eventual demise of Lebanon's confessional political system and the inauguration of a civil polity on its ruins."[27] Likewise, the communist-minded Lebanese Youths Movement called for a mass demonstration to spark the process of bringing down the country's confessional system: "Why do we accept to be ruled by a confessional system that has lasted longer than the combined regimes of Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Qaddafi?"[28]
Very few people showed up for the demonstration and repeated calls failed to attract a significant number of participants. This did not surprise prominent columnist Talal Salman, who lamented the Lebanese exception in the age of Arab revolutions: "The nature of the country's political system prevents the Lebanese from ridding themselves of the shackles of quiescence and attaining their natural right of becoming citizens, and not just subjects or hapless followers of confessional leaders."[29]
For his part, political analyst Ahmad Ayyash sees no chance for the Lebanese people to follow the Egyptian example "since the country does not have a solid and cohesive regime to rebel against. The Lebanese political system amounts to nothing more than a small bourgeoisie and sectarian interests patronized by conflicting regional and international powers."[30] Likewise, Lebanese commentator Michael Young finds the Arab upheavals unworkable in the context of the country's sectarian divide, making a case for shielding Lebanon against its vagaries in fear that the destabilization of the Arab world lead to a "Sunni-Shiite conflict in the country [that] would be devastating for all."[31]
As much as the Lebanese are focused on developments in the Arab countries, very few of them are eager to start an uprising of their own. Attributing their country's travails to foreign meddling, they content themselves with considering the regional changes as a positive development without expecting them to affect their own country.
The Future of Arab Democracy
Until very recently, most political scientists and commentators considered the Arab world impervious to change. They were wrong. Arab publics have been gathering enormous pent-up frustration for at least two generations, and all that was needed for its release was an appropriate spark. This was provided by the self-immolation of an ordinary Tunisian, which served as a devastating, political indictment of the magnitude of ordinary people's suffering at the hands of self-aggrandizing ruling elites and set in train the momentous chain of events sweeping the Middle East.
Yet it is one thing for the Arab uprisings to get started; it is quite another for them to reach the ultimate goal of empowering the people and introducing true democracy. These uprisings are making the Arab world as unstable as ever. Heightened instability is likely to persist for years to come.
Hilal Khashan is a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut.
[1] An-Nahar (Beirut), Mar. 14, 2011.
[2] Al-Hawadith (London), Feb. 11, 2011.
[3] Ash-Shiraa (Beirut), Feb. 7, 2011.
[4] Ibid., Mar. 28, 2011.
[5] Al-Akhbar (Beirut), Mar. 14, 2011.
[6] Ath-Thabat (Beirut), Jan. 21, 2011.
[7] Nabd Suria (Beirut), Feb. 10, 2011.
[8] Ath-Thabat, Mar. 18, 2011.
[9] Ash-Shiraa, Apr. 4, 2011.
[10] The Daily Star (Beirut), Feb. 28, 2011.
[11] As-Siyasa (Kuwait), Apr. 10, 2011.
[12] Tishrin (Damascus), Mar. 20, 2011.
[13] BBC Arabic, Mar. 26, 2011.
[14] An-Nahar, Apr. 13, 2011.
[15] Ibid., Apr. 3, 2011.
[16] The Guardian (London), Mar. 27, 2011.
[17] As-Safir (Beirut), Mar. 31, 2011.
[18] BBC Monitoring, Feb. 5, 2011.
[19] The Daily Star, Mar. 3, 2011.
[20] Ibid., Mar. 19, 2011.
[21] Al-Watan (Damascus), Mar. 24, 2011.
[22] Ibid., Mar. 21, 2011.
[23] Al-Muharrir al-Arabi (London), Apr. 2, 2011.
[24] As-Siyasa, Apr. 10, 2011.
[25] BBC News, Apr. 20, 2011.
[26] Now Lebanon (Beirut), Mar. 5, 2011.
[27] Al-Hawadith, Mar. 25, 2011.
[28] Al-Jadeed TV (Beirut), Mar. 3, 2011.
[29] As-Safir, Mar. 7, 2011.
[30] Ash-Shiraa, Mar. 7, 2011.
[31] The Daily Star, Mar. 24, 2011.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9)Why Obama Will Win in 2012
It might be “the economy, stupid,” but radicalism on the right will doom Republicans’ chances at the presidency.
By Jamelle Bouie
It’s not hard to find signs that President Barack Obama is destined for a single term. Unemployment continues to hover at 9 percent, and a June poll from American Research Group says 39 percent of Americans disapprove of how he has handled the economy, which 71 percent of registered voters say will be “extremely or very important.” When asked whom they’d vote for in the 2012 presidential election, 47 percent said the “Republican Party’s candidate for president,” as opposed to the 39 percent who would support Obama.
Obama isn’t the only incumbent to start a re-election campaign with low approval ratings, but others enjoyed the advantage of a growing economy. Ronald Reagan might not have earned the reputation for political genius he’s been credited with had the economy stalled in 1984 instead of growing at a rapid clip. Likewise, Bill Clinton might not have regained his title as the “comeback kid” if the economy hadn’t begun to supercharge in 1995 and 1996. For Obama, even if the economy grows quickly in 2012, unemployment will still top 8 percent, and per-capita income growth (a major predictor of presidential elections) is projected to stagnate.
Taken together, this is bad news for the White House. Nonetheless, there are reasons for optimism.
For starters, Obama is far more popular than he should be under the current conditions. The relationship between presidential approval and unemployment is well established, and with the jobless rate at 9.2 percent, Obama should have approval numbers in the high 30s, on par with George H.W. Bush’s performance in the last year of his term. According to Gallup, however, his job approval for the current quarter (from April to July 19) averages to 47 percent, as does his year-to-date approval rating. Obama maintains high approval ratings among core Democratic constituencies—liberals, African Americans, and the poor—and a plurality of Americans still trust him to do right by the country. On the current budget negotiations, for example, 47 percent say that Obama is “putting the country’s interests first,” compared with 24 percent for Republicans in Congress.
Likewise, a plurality of Americans hold negative views about the Republican Party as a whole, by a margin of 47 percent to 42 percent. This extends to the state level; Republican governors in swing states are deeply unpopular with their constituents. Governor Rick Scott of Florida leads the loser pack with an approval rating of 29 percent—the worst of any governor in the country. Governor John Kasich of Ohio and Governor Tom Corbett of Pennsylvania follow with approval ratings of 33 percent and 39 percent, respectively. This doesn’t guarantee votes for President Obama, but it could drive Democratic turnout in those states if activists use those unpopular governors to mobilize voters and increase turnout.
Obama’s chief Republican competitors aren’t popular with the public, either. As the moderate former governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney is best positioned to challenge Obama in a general election, but in a head-to-head matchup, even he trails Obama. What’s more, if early fundraising is a sign of voter interest and intensity, Obama is far ahead of his Republican competitors. As of last week, the president had raised $85.6 million for his re-election bid—twice as much as the entire Republican field has brought in.
Yes, voters hate the sluggish economy, and they are dissatisfied with the country’s direction. So far, though, that hasn’t translated into personal disdain for the president. Voters are still reluctant to saddle him with responsibility for existing economic conditions. By a 2-to-1 margin, according to a survey released last week by Quinnipiac University, voters still say that President George W. Bush is culpable for the current situation. This also holds true among independent voters—49 percent blame Bush; just 24 percent blame Obama.
It’s easy to say that none of this will matter come October 2012, when the economy is still sluggish and unemployment is still high. If history and political science offer any insight, presidents lose when economic conditions are poor. But today’s political circumstances are unusual. Incumbents have never raised this much money, the electorate has never been this diverse, and—with the exception of the 1930s—the economy has never been this terrible. Political-science models are useful but limited, and we don’t have enough data to make conclusive judgments about the upcoming election.
At this point in the game, even with poor conditions, I’d call the 2012 election for Obama. I’d do so not because of his personal popularity or his massive campaign operation but because of the Republican Party. The GOP has been captured by its most extreme members, and even the most moderate Republican candidate will be forced to kowtow to the party’s far-right wing to win the nomination. As Obama struggles with slow economic growth, the GOP’s fanaticism could be the thing that saves him. High unemployment aside, if the history of presidential politics shows anything, it’s that when you give voters a choice between the incumbent they know and the radicals they don’t, the former will win.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No comments:
Post a Comment