Confused Leadership & Government Inconsistency?

These are just a few inconsistencies I have noticed but I can list many more.

Restore faith in government, appoint tax cheats to Cabinet.

I will reverse everything GW did to wreck our nation's reputation and I will begin by closing Gitmo. Maybe Gitmo should remain open.

The Black Panthers should not be prosecuted for intimidating voters. Tea Partyers and Cambridge Police are racists.

Eliminate the word terrorist.

Don't drill. Allow the nation's debt to soar along with gas prices while the dollar shrinks.

Take over health care but allow unions to opt out.

Expand government, attack the private sector.

Sue Arizona and defend Mexico.

Israel has no right to build settlements on its own land. Palestinians can expand on theirs.

Attack Israel when it defends itself say and do nothing when Arabs/Muslims murder each other in cold blod.

America backs its allies . America throws its allies under the bus.

Iran will not be allowed to build nuclear bombs. Remain silent while Iranians protest.

Force Mubarak out, protect Qaddafi. America should not undertake a no fly zone in Libya.

Maybe the fly in the ointment is Obama!

If I have overstated the case and/or mischaracterized any of the above please point the way of my errors. (See 1, 1a, 1b,1c and 1d below.)
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In the face of the threat the West faces from radical Islamists bent on re-establishing a caliphate and sharia law it becomes confused, mute and a pitiful Gulliver and Obama sets the tone and pace with his inconsistent and self-delusional actions.

Even with respect to Libya the contradictory cacaphony is deafening.(See 2, 2a, 2b and 2c below.)
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Dick
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1)Confiscate Americans' Wealth to Pay Government Workers?
By Steve McCann

Michael Moore and his fellow-travelers in the American version of the Socialist/Marxist cabal have picked up the mantle of defending public unionism in their demonstrations in Madison, Wisconsin and other state capitals. They are vocally calling for more confiscation of the wealth of the rich to pay for the bloated incomes of government workers and openly stating that all wealth belongs to the state while their true motives are deliberately obfuscated.


The age old premise and threadbare exhortation of class warfare has long found fertile ground among the lower classes but now they are being mouthed in support of one of the most advantaged groups in America today: public sector workers and their unions.


Even the most jaded of true-believers on the Left knows that confiscating the wealth and taxing what they consider to be unjust income would be self-defeating. What could be done one time can never be repeated and there would be no one to create jobs or a higher standard of living for the overall citizenry, particularly those on the left side of the ruling class. A cursory study of the experiences in the Soviet Union, Mao's Red China and Cuba among others reveals that government control of the means of production and wealth creation is a massive failure.


What would the United States gain if in fact the government did confiscate the wealth of the so-called rich and taxed at 100% all the income above $200,000.00 per household per year?


Using the latest statistics from the IRS, in 2004 there were 2.7 million adults with a net worth above $1.5 million. If the government were to seize all the wealth above the $1.5 million threshold, Washington would realize a one-time windfall of $4.0 Trillion -- and no one would again attempt to accumulate wealth. Assuming it was applied to the national debt (unlikely with the Left in charge as they would spend it) the national debt would only be reduced from$14.5 Trillion to $10.0 Trillion.


Assuming Michael Moore & Company decide that $200,000.00 per year is sufficient for any household, then in 2008 (the latest IRS statistics) the 6.9 million filers that had adjusted gross income above $200,000.00 would have forfeited all their income above that ceiling to the government. The one-time gain to Washington D.C.: $221.0 Billion; but in the future no one would work long enough to earn more than $200,000.00 per year. Tax revenues in subsequent years would never increase unless tax rates are raised which are self-defeating and historically results in even lower tax receipts.


The long-term impact on the economy and the country would mirror that of the failed socialist nations throughout history.


Thus class warfare rhetoric is just that, rhetoric. It is meant for the consumption of those gullible enough to support the ascendancy of the Socialist/Marxists into positions of power. The fact that it is used in conjunction with the so-called plight of the highly paid unionized government worker reveals: 1) a dearth of viable arguments to justify public sector unions; and 2) most importantly, the loss of a major source of funding for the Left and their organizations.


For many on the Left the real fear is that for the first times in their lives they would have to find a job in the private sector they so vilify.


Therefore the real interest of these radicals is not the so-called denial of the "right" to collective bargaining but that by eliminating compulsory union dues (which Wisconsin, Ohio and Indiana among others have or are doing) a major source of funding for their groups will be eliminated. The leaders of these unions are in bed with the far-left. For example the National Education Association, the largest national teachers union, contributed over $65 million of union dues as gifts and grants to a variety of liberal and left-wing groups in their fiscal year ending in 2004.


That process is repeated by all of the major public employee unions amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars in grants and gifts over the past five years. Were compulsory dues to be eliminated then a major source of funding would dry up for the Left. When combined with the take-over of the House of Representatives by the conservative wing of the Republican Party and the inevitable spending cuts, which would immediately impact many of these organizations, reality has reared its ugly head. The money the Left needs to support itself may well be drastically reduced and with it their clout and influence.


There is an old adage: "always follow the money." The Left, despite their protestations that they always have the best interests of the people at heart, have only their own interests at heart. It is their individual income stream and their massive egos which must be fed, and there is not enough private funding to do so. Therefore it must come from the public coffers whether directly from government programs or indirectly through compulsory public sector union dues.


It has taken a national and various state financial crises to pull back the curtain so the American public can view the corruption and greed in the full light of day. The Left, their bought politicians, their sycophants in the media and entrenched union bosses will not go gently into that good night; but no longer will they operate with such impunity as their influence wanes and funds dry-up.
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1a)A Time for Soul Searching
By Dan Gordon

At a recent meeting with American Jewish leaders, President Obama reportedly urged those in the room to speak to their friends and colleagues in Israel and to "search your souls" over Israel's seriousness about making peace.


Periodic soul searching is probably good advice for anyone. But with the greatest possible respect, I would suggest to the President that while Israelis engage in that noble endeavor, he do so as well. Not about his seriousness in regard to facilitating a peace agreement. It is clear that the President is serious as a heart attack about that. He wants an agreement. So has every President of the United States for the past forty years.


As someone who came of age in Israel and who served in the IDF during four wars, I can assure you that no one wants to see peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis more than the people of Israel. Moreover, virtually every Israeli government for the past two decades has supported the notion and publicly committed itself to reaching an agreement which will see the creation of an independent democratic Palestinian State, living side by side with a Jewish and democratic State of Israel.


If that's the case, what's the problem? What, for forty years, has prevented such an agreement? The Obama administration according to its own statements views the settlement issue and territorial compromise as the keys to reaching a just and lasting peace. Indeed, President Obama reportedly said to Jewish leaders that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is eager to secure his legacy by establishing a Palestinian state and would accept a decent offer if one was on the table.


Thus, the problem must be Israeli intransigence, and hence the call for the necessary soul searching amongst Israel's leaders. That in fact has become a kind of mantra for many American administrations. Territorial compromise, land for peace, will bring about the desired peace agreement. Israeli intransigence over those issues is the impediment.


Most fans of the television series "Dallas" will recall that J.R. Ewing was the type of fellow, who if caught in flagrante, cheating on his wife, would deny the obvious reality and say to the long suffering Sue Ellen "Who are you gonna believe? Me or your lyin' eyes?" To continue to pound the drum to cut a land for peace deal with an Arab autocrat who rules by dictate instead of democracy, and does not enjoy either a sense of legitimacy or popular support amongst his own people, as is the case with President Abbas, is quite simply to disbelieve what ought to be obvious to anyone's eyes.


If the events of the past two months in the Middle East should have taught us anything, it is that peace agreements reached with Arab dictators are as substantial as sand dunes; the next strong wind that blows across the landscape can easily obliterate them.


Absolutely no one, including the Egyptians themselves, knows who will be the Egyptian leader six months from now, nor what form its government will take, let alone if that government will maintain the peace treaty which Israel signed with Anwar Sadat in exchange for giving up a territorial buffer zone that literally could mean life or death for the Jewish State.


In addition to giving up land in that treaty, Israel gave up oil and gas reserves which it had discovered and developed. Israel gave up those vital reserves because the Egyptians promised to supply Israel's natural gas needs. One of the first casualties in the wake of the events that have swept Egypt in the last weeks has been a key component of the Israel/Egyptian accords; the promised energy supply from Egypt. There was a terrorist attack in Sinai which blew up the gas line. The current military government of Egypt has confirmed that even once the pipeline is repaired, the flow of natural gas to Israel will not be resumed. In terms of that vital component, the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt has already been undone. No one can predict whether, nor how long, the rest of the components of that Peace Agreement will continue to stand.


Jordan's monarch, King Abdullah has already begun taking steps to deal with the street demonstrations which threaten his regime. The view from the "Arab street" in Jordan is that the Peace Agreement with Israel must be rescinded. No one on this earth including the American President can say with any certainty whether the Peace Agreement with Jordan will still be in effect one year from now, nor who Jordan's leader will be, nor what form its government will take.


In his discussion with Jewish leaders, President Obama, in describing the Peace Agreement which would materialize because of Israeli territorial concessions,


reportedly said that the Jewish sections of Jerusalem would remain in Israeli hands, but that the Arab sections would not. This is the other part of the mantra that has been chanted as a kind of orthodoxy since the Oslo Accords; "Everyone knows what the final deal between the Israelis and Palestinians will be."


There is a problem with that, however. Evidently what "everyone knows" doesn't extend to the Palestinian people. When sixteen hundred documents were leaked detailing secret Palestinian offers of compromise with Israel which comported exactly with what President Obama (as part of the "everyone" who knows what the final deal will be) outlined to the Jewish leaders, the reaction in the "Palestinian street" was outrage which threatened to topple Mr. Abbas' government. Everyone, including Mr. Abbas, and his Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat, who was forced to resign because of the revelations, vehemently denied that they would ever consider such compromise positions. The leaks were lies. Evidently, President Abbas and his negotiator found it simply too dangerous to "know" what everybody knows.


Virtually every "moderate" Arab dictator in the Middle East has followed the same tactic, cut a deal with Israel which ensures Western support on the one hand, while actively inciting or at very best turning a blind eye toward incitement of a virulent hatred toward both Israel and the Jewish people as a whole. Antisemitism in Egypt was used by its dictators as a way of deflecting public outrage against those regimes' shortcomings. And every American administration, Republican and Democrat alike, have turned a blind eye to it. The result has been that even when certain dictators are swept away the Jew hatred remains.


It is time for the American administration and the American President to demand of the Palestinian leadership, not only that they cease incitement against Israel, but begin to prepare their people for peace and reconciliation. That is the real impediment to peace. Absent that, no agreement built upon territorial concession with an Arab dictator will be worth the paper it's written on. In light of present events, the mantras of the past ring as hollow as J.R.'s exhortations to Sue Ellen not believe her lyin' eyes.


President Obama is justly concerned with his legacy, just as he assured American Jewish leaders that President Abbas was concerned about his. But the legacy for Israel of a failed Peace Treaty with its neighbors, built on territorial concessions, which rob the Jewish State of the ability to defend itself, is not loss of reputation, but loss of the lives of our children and grandchildren who will pay the price in blood, for what could be the most horrific war yet for Israel's survival. It is time for the American President to search his soul.



1b)Qaddafi hits rebels with air power, tanks, tribal troops, opens way to Cyrenaica

Col. Muammar Qaddafi reached the tipping point of his offensive against rebel forces and his troops are advancing toward Ajdabiya, their first destination in the rebel-held eastern region of Cyrenaica, military sources report. Seriously outgunned, the anti-Qaddafi militias appeared to have folded and are no longer able to post a defense line to stop the government advance.

It took Qaddafi three weeks of savage warfare to reverse the tide against him. More and more rebel voices were heard Tuesday appealing desperately for international or Arab aid to rescue them from the oncoming Qaddafi war machine.

For now, no help is seen to be on the way.

President Barack Obama has not yet reached a decision about US military intervention in Libya and British Prime Minister David Cameron has backed away from his high rhetoric about a British military role in the war against Qaddafi and is now saying the British will go in only if the Americans do.

Not a single Arab ruler or government is willing to dip a toe into the Libyan cauldron. In the last few hours, Egypt's military rulers have notified Washington that they have no intention of helping the Libyan opposition, even by sending arms.

Qaddafi's commanders turned the tide of battle in their favor by the following tactic: At the start of the week, they concentrated around the key town of Sirte (Sidra) two armored battalions of T-72 tanks, three battalions of special forces, beefed up by an extra 3,000 tribal fighters flown in from the Sahara, and a fleet of dozens of helicopter gunships.

Sources report Qaddafi paid out many millions of petrodollars to the heads of the Saharan tribal federation to hire fighting manpower form the various tribes.

This force was split in two: One column advanced south along the Sidra Gulf coast towards the refinery town of Ras Lanuf and the second struck southeast toward the big oil town of Brega and Ajdabia. Both rolled forward behind a wall of fire of BM-21Katyusha rockets and helicopters firing missiles and heavy machine guns as T-72 tanks mowed down everything in their path.

Against the only rebel position west of Tripoli in the town of Zawiya, dozens of tanks crushed building after building before pulling out and then returning.

At the same time, the reports of Libyan air force bombardments of rebels have been exaggerated. Our military sources report that the fighter jets were used to sow panic in rebel ranks.

The ferocity of the pro-Qaddafi onslaught in the east and the west caught the Libyan opposition forces without the weapons to fight it off. By Tuesday night, they had paid the price with scores of dead and hundreds of injured.



1c)It started with Bush
Op-ed: Ex-president’s commitment to Iraq’s freedom paved way for latest Arab uprisings
By Ophir Falk

The trigger to the 2011 Middle East revolution will be studied and scrutinized by historians for many years to come. There will be superficial views on the unraveling of events that point to a disgruntled peddler in Tunisia that kicked off a social tidal wave that rippled to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, elsewhere and back. Others will give exaggerated acclaim to an executive Egyptian tweeter and facebook activist that supposedly steered the masses to the streets.

Thomas Friedman of the New York Times is convinced that a 2002 report compiled by a group of Arab intellectuals for the UN was “prophetic” in warning us about all of this. As Friedman mentioned in a recent op-ed, the report pointed to three paucities in the Arab world — lack of education, lack of freedom and lack of women empowerment.

In fact, the report findings were well known for decades to anyone slightly familiar with the Middle East. Nothing substantial was ever done about it. The question is what set the stage for the 2011 Middle East rebellion? What made the masses move and believe they could succeed? In a more recent op-ed, Friedman insisted that the revolt began mainly because of Barack Obama, his skin color, his middle name and Muslim ancestry, Google, al-Jazeera’s coverage of Israel’s legal system, “Fayyadism” (as in Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad), and the Beijing Olympics.

Granted, the mentioned events, platforms, statesmen and their effect on the region may be of some significance; however, the Pulitzer prized publicist is off the mark. Above all else, this march for freedom started with the Surge.

In January 2007, with the number of US casualties in Iraq climbing, al-Qaeda affiliates taking over tribal areas, with all public opinion polls, political allies and foes telling George W. Bush to bring US troops back from an ill-fated war in Iraq - the president decided to surge. He sent over 20,000 additional troops to provide security to the battered Baghdad and Al Anbar Province, sending a clear message to the world: America backs its allies and knows that “freedom is not for free.”

Will Obama follow suit?

Bush’s most difficult decision during his two-term presidency was also his best one. It succeeded. Violence in Al Anbar decreased by more than 90%, tribal leaders restored control of their constituencies, Iraqi civilian deaths declined by 70% in Baghdad and 45% across the country, and perhaps most importantly, America proved it could be trusted.


That does not expunge the numerous things that went wrong in the US-led war in Iraq. First was the flawed premise of Saddam’s stock of mass destruction weapons. Second was the American-led decision to fire all Ba’ath party members and to completely disband the Iraqi army. There were also tactical tumbles with over-reliance on Special Forces while neglecting the show of a strong presence to confront crime and insurgency riddled cities. Mistakes are made in wars. Even in just wars like the war in Iraq, where over 4,000 US fatalities and more than 30,000 wounded soldiers proved to an entire region that the US is committed to freedom.


One can only hope that President Obama doesn’t distort that impression. That he doesn’t look the other way as Gaddafi kills thousands of civilians in Libya or turn his back once again on Iranian students who take to the streets. That he doesn’t give Saudi Arabia a blank check or enable the Iranian backed Shiites of Iraq to subjugate the Sunnis of that country. When the President of the United States is idle, the President of Iran is not.


As for that small yet significant country in the region called Israel, there is one very important lesson to be learned – Do not Deal with the Devil - even if it stems from peace-seeking pragmatism. It was tried with Arafat and Assad in the 20th century. It was morally wrong and practically counterproductive. It should not be attempted again with Assad junior or any other Arab ruler that oppresses his people. When Middle East freedom is finally found, peace between the people will follow.



1d)Our Man-Made Energy Crisis
There's plenty of oil and no fundamental reason to expect prices of $200 per barrel. But that doesn't excuse the administration's punitive approach toward the industry. By NANSEN G. SALERI

The unfolding turmoil in Libya has amplified concerns about the reliability of global energy supplies in an era of political uncertainty. Is oil at $200 per barrel inescapable? Is this the beginning of the end so vigorously underscored by peak oil enthusiasts for the last several decades? The short answer is clearly "No."

Yet the question remains: What will happen to the price of crude? This, in turn, necessitates an appreciation of the "anxiety" component in current and future prices. The anxiety premium may range from $10 to $30 given current events in Libya and their spillover effects.

The good news is that such a premium is not sustainable in the long run. Prices will eventually come down due to global excess capacity—estimated at three million to five million barrels of oil per day—and even more so due to migration of demand from oil to natural gas by electric utilities and industrial markets. Natural gas holds more than a 3-to-1 price advantage over oil on an equivalent unit energy basis in the U.S. So $200 crude is unlikely given market fundamentals.

In the context of global liquids production, the civil strife in Libya represents a minor disruption (less than 2% of the total, approximately 85 million barrels of oil per day). Nor is there any evidence to suggest that even a protracted scenario of instability will result in a sustained reduction of crude supplies. Iraqi oil production dropped by 30% at the start of the second Iraq war in 2003, and then it quickly bounced back to the prewar level of two million barrels of oil per day. Currently, Iraqi oil production stands at 2.6 million barrels of oil per day, with much higher levels projected during this decade.

Fossil fuels make up about 85% of total U.S. energy demand, which is estimated at about 45 million to 50 million barrels of oil equivalent per day. Energy imports, mainly crude oil, account for 20% of the total U.S. energy requirements. This level of imports is a huge burden on the balance of payments, hence the U.S. dollar.

What is less widely recognized is the overall inefficiency of energy utilization. According to a 2007 study by National Petroleum Council, at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, approximately 61% of energy produced is lost due to factors such as poor insulation, gas-guzzling vehicles or suboptimal power plants. On average, only one out of three reservoir barrels is recovered, which translates to an overall efficiency of only 13% for oil that is converted to a usable form. Improving energy efficiency should be a top priority, not just in our surface usage but also at the point of extraction.

Technology is reshaping every facet of our lives. The energy world is no different. This includes the resurgence of U.S. liquid production in recent years (5.5 million barrels of oil per day and trending upward), as well as conventional gas production's six-fold increase over the last two decades (to approximately 32 billion standard cubic feet of gas per day in 2010, nearly equaling U.S. liquid production). Both are attributable to recent innovations, such as highly sophisticated wells that can reach thousands of feet underground with GPS precision.

The planet is endowed with plentiful sources of natural gas and oil, conventional and unconventional. Some estimates place global unconventional gas resources at about 33,000 trillion cubic feet, or about five times the amount of proven reserves at the end of 2009. The outlook for liquids is no less promising. At current rates of global consumption, there are sufficient oil and gas supplies to last well into the next century.

What's missing is a coherent U.S. energy policy. At best, the Obama administration's approach to U.S. domestic oil and gas production can be characterized as a strategy of ambivalence, an uneasy equilibrium between desire to lessen the role of fossil fuels and the reality of their necessity in a functioning U.S. economy. Last year's Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf tilted the current administration's policies to an even more punitive posture vis-a-vis domestic energy production.

As the French philosopher Antoine de Saint-Exupéry wisely observed, "A goal without a plan is just a wish." Unfortunately for the U.S., there is not even a wish. The time to rethink and redesign our entire energy strategy is now.

The Obama administration must seriously ponder the following questions, because they relate directly to what the president likes to call "winning the future." What will be the make-up of the energy-supply pie, and how can we dramatically increase, even double, our energy efficiency? What exactly are our carbon emission goals? And how do we go from where we are today—importing about 20% of our daily energy supply—to where we want to be in 2026, perhaps even an energy exporter?

We've already entered a new energy era that is dramatically more competitive, diverse and high-tech than the past. The global consumer is king. The future energy picture for the U.S. or the planet is not constrained by the availability of supplies, either fossil or non-fossil, but by efficiency gains in generation and consumption.

This will require real leadership and the clear articulation of energy goals, costs and priorities. Ambiguity will not serve the best interests of future generations. The U.S. does not have an energy problem. It has an energy strategy problem.

Mr. Saleri, president and CEO of Quantum Reservoir Impact in Houston, was formerly head of reservoir management for Saudi Aramco.
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2)Caliphate, Jihad, Sharia: Now What?
By Raymond Ibrahim

"You can sit here and talk about jihad from here to doomsday, what will it do? Suppose you prove beyond any shadow of doubt that Islam is constitutionally violent, where do you go from there?"

Such was Columbia professor Hamid Dabashi's response to my assertion that Islamists seek to resurrect the caliphate and wage offensive jihad to bring the world under Islamic rule (during a 2008 debate titled "Clash of Civilizations").

Today, as onetime arcane words—caliphate, jihad, sharia—become common place in the media, evoked by politicians, and comprehended by Americans, Dabashi's question returns.

You see, ever since Egypt became a hot topic in the media, there has been no shortage of pundits warning against the Muslim Brotherhood; warning that an Islamist takeover in Egypt may have a domino effect in the region; warning that the ultimate goal of Islamists around the world is the resurrection of an imperialistic and expansionist caliphate (see Andrew McCarthy's recent article). Similarly, the controversy caused by the Ground Zero mosque brought Arabic-Islamic concepts that were formerly the domain of academics, such as sharia, into the fore.

Yet, as the West begins to understand the unique nature of its enemy—caliphate, jihad, and sharia all pose a perpetual, transcendent threat—it must also understand that a unique response is required. The clean, hygienic way the West likes to deal with socio-political conflicts will simply not do this time, especially in the long run.

Consider the caliphate: its very existence would usher in a state of constant hostility. Both historically and doctrinally, the caliphate's function is to wage jihad, whenever and wherever possible, to bring the infidel world under Islamic dominion and enforce sharia. In fact, most of what is today called the "Muslim world"—from Morocco to Pakistan—was conquered, bit by bit, by a caliphate that began in Arabia in 632.

A jihad-waging, sharia-enforcing caliphate represents a permanent, existentialist enemy—not a temporal foe that can be bought or pacified through diplomacy or concessions. Such a caliphate is precisely what Islamists around the world are feverishly seeking to establish. Without active, preemptive measures, it is only a matter of time before they succeed.

In this context, what, exactly, is the Western world prepared to do about it—now, before the caliphate becomes a reality? Would it be willing to launch a preemptive offensive—politically, legally, educationally, and, if necessary, militarily—to prevent its resurrection? Could the West ever go on the offensive, openly and confidently—now, when it has the upper-hand—to incapacitate its enemies?

One may argue in the affirmative, pointing to the preemptive Iraq war. Yet there are subtle and important differences. The rationale behind the Iraq war was physical and practical: it was limited to the elimination of suspected WMDs and against a specific government, Iraq's Saddam regime. War to prevent the creation of a caliphate, on the other hand, is metaphysical and impractical: it is not limited to eliminating material weapons, nor confined to one government or person.

The fact is, the West does not have the political paradigms or language to justify an offensive against an ideological foe in religious garb. After all, the same international culture that saw to it that an autocrat like Egypt's Mubarak stepped down—simply because he was handicapped from responding to the protestors in the name of human rights—certainly cannot approve a preemptive offensive by the West articulated in terms of a "religious" threat.

What if an important nation like Egypt does go Islamist, a big domino in the quest of a caliphate? It is a distinct possibility. Can we also say that it is distinct possibility that the West would do everything in its power to prevent this from happening? Of course not: all the Muslim Brotherhood has to do is continue pretending to be "moderate"—recently by removing its by-laws from the Web, as shown by Steven Emerson, including its intention of creating an "Islamic state" presaging the caliphate.

Indeed, the Obama administration has already made it clear that it is willing to engage the Brotherhood, differentiating them from "radicals" like al-Qaeda—even as the Brotherhood's motto is "Allah is our objective, the prophet is our leader, the Koran is our law, jihad is our way, dying in the way of Allah our highest hope." Likewise, a theocratic, eschatologically-driven Iran is on its way to possessing nuclear weapons—all while the international community stands by.

In short, as it becomes clear that violence and intolerance are inextricably linked to concepts like caliphate, jihad, and sharia, so too should it become clear that the threat they pose is here to stay: the caliphate, jihad, and sharia have a 1400-year legacy, prompting Dabashi's observation: "Suppose you prove beyond any shadow of doubt that Islam is constitutionally violent, where do you go from there?"

Raymond Ibrahim is associate director of the Middle East Forum

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By George F. Will
Tuesday, March 8, 2011

In September 1941, Japan's leaders had a question for Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto: Could he cripple the U.S. fleet in Hawaii? Yes, he said. Then he had a question for the leaders: But then what?

Following an attack, he said, "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence" after that. Yamamoto knew America: He had attended Harvard and been naval attache in Japan's embassy in Washington. He knew Japan would be at war with an enraged industrial giant. The tide-turning defeat of Japan's navy at the Battle of Midway occurred June 7, 1942 - exactly six months after Pearl Harbor.

Today, some Washington voices are calling for U.S. force to be applied, somehow, on behalf of the people trying to overthrow Moammar Gaddafi. Some interventionists are Republicans, whose skepticism about government's abilities to achieve intended effects ends at the water's edge. All interventionists should answer some questions:


The world would be better without Gaddafi. But is that a vital U.S. national interest? If it is, when did it become so? A month ago, no one thought it was.


How much of Gaddafi's violence is coming from the air? Even if his aircraft are swept from his skies, would that be decisive?


What lesson should be learned from the fact that Europe's worst atrocity since the Second World War - the massacre by Serbs of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica - occurred beneath a no-fly zone?


Sen. John Kerry says: "The last thing we want to think about is any kind of military intervention. And I don't consider the fly zone stepping over that line." But how is imposing a no-fly zone - the use of military force to further military and political objectives - not military intervention?


U.S. forces might ground Gaddafi's fixed-wing aircraft by destroying runways at his 13 air bases, but to keep helicopter gunships grounded would require continuing air patrols, which would require the destruction of Libya's radar and anti-aircraft installations. If collateral damage from such destruction included civilian deaths - remember those nine Afghan boys recently killed by mistake when they were gathering firewood - are we prepared for the televised pictures?


The Economist reports Gaddafi has "a huge arsenal of Russian surface-to-air missiles" and that some experts think Libya has SAMs that could threaten U.S. or allies' aircraft. If a pilot is downed and captured, are we ready for the hostage drama?


If we decide to give war supplies to the anti-Gaddafi fighters, how do we get them there?


Presumably we would coordinate aid with the leaders of the anti-Gaddafi forces. Who are they?


Libya is a tribal society. What concerning our Iraq and Afghanistan experiences justifies confidence that we understand Libyan dynamics?


Because of what seems to have been the controlling goal of avoiding U.S. and NATO casualties, the humanitarian intervention - 79 days of bombing - against Serbia in Kosovo was conducted from 15,000 feet. This marked the intervention as a project worth killing for but not worth dying for. Would intervention in Libya be similar? Are such interventions morally dubious?


Could intervention avoid "mission creep"? If grounding Gaddafi's aircraft is a humanitarian imperative, why isn't protecting his enemies from ground attacks?


In Tunisia and then in Egypt, regimes were toppled by protests. Libya is convulsed not by protests but by war. Not a war of aggression, not a war with armies violating national borders and thereby implicating the basic tenets of agreed-upon elements of international law, but a civil war. How often has intervention by nation A in nation B's civil war enlarged the welfare of nation A?


Before we intervene in Libya, do we ask the United Nations for permission? If it is refused, do we proceed anyway? If so, why ask? If we are refused permission and recede from intervention, have we not made U.S. foreign policy hostage to a hostile institution?


Secretary of State Hilary Clinton fears Libya becoming a failed state - "a giant Somalia." Speaking of which, have we not seen a cautionary movie - "Black Hawk Down" - about how humanitarian military interventions can take nasty turns?


The Egyptian crowds watched and learned from the Tunisian crowds. But the Libyan government watched and learned from the fate of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments. It has decided to fight. Would not U.S. intervention in Libya encourage other restive peoples to expect U.S. military assistance?


Would it be wise for U.S. military force to be engaged simultaneously in three Muslim nations?

2a) Is Intervening in Libya a Vital U.S. National Interest? -
By George F. Will

In September 1941, Japan's leaders had a question for Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto: Could he cripple the U.S. fleet in Hawaii? Yes, he said. Then he had a question for the leaders: But then what?

Following an attack, he said, "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence" after that. Yamamoto knew America: He had attended Harvard and been naval attache in Japan's embassy in Washington. He knew Japan would be at war with an enraged industrial giant. The tide-turning defeat of Japan's navy at the Battle of Midway occurred June 7, 1942 - exactly six months after Pearl Harbor.

Today, some Washington voices are calling for U.S. force to be applied, somehow, on behalf of the people trying to overthrow Moammar Gaddafi. Some interventionists are Republicans, whose skepticism about government's abilities to achieve intended effects ends at the water's edge. All interventionists should answer some questions:


The world would be better without Gaddafi. But is that a vital U.S. national interest? If it is, when did it become so? A month ago, no one thought it was.


How much of Gaddafi's violence is coming from the air? Even if his aircraft are swept from his skies, would that be decisive?


What lesson should be learned from the fact that Europe's worst atrocity since the Second World War - the massacre by Serbs of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica - occurred beneath a no-fly zone?


Sen. John Kerry says: "The last thing we want to think about is any kind of military intervention. And I don't consider the fly zone stepping over that line." But how is imposing a no-fly zone - the use of military force to further military and political objectives - not military intervention?


U.S. forces might ground Gaddafi's fixed-wing aircraft by destroying runways at his 13 air bases, but to keep helicopter gunships grounded would require continuing air patrols, which would require the destruction of Libya's radar and anti-aircraft installations. If collateral damage from such destruction included civilian deaths - remember those nine Afghan boys recently killed by mistake when they were gathering firewood - are we prepared for the televised pictures?


The Economist reports Gaddafi has "a huge arsenal of Russian surface-to-air missiles" and that some experts think Libya has SAMs that could threaten U.S. or allies' aircraft. If a pilot is downed and captured, are we ready for the hostage drama?


If we decide to give war supplies to the anti-Gaddafi fighters, how do we get them there?


Presumably we would coordinate aid with the leaders of the anti-Gaddafi forces. Who are they?


Libya is a tribal society. What concerning our Iraq and Afghanistan experiences justifies confidence that we understand Libyan dynamics?


Because of what seems to have been the controlling goal of avoiding U.S. and NATO casualties, the humanitarian intervention - 79 days of bombing - against Serbia in Kosovo was conducted from 15,000 feet. This marked the intervention as a project worth killing for but not worth dying for. Would intervention in Libya be similar? Are such interventions morally dubious?


Could intervention avoid "mission creep"? If grounding Gaddafi's aircraft is a humanitarian imperative, why isn't protecting his enemies from ground attacks?


In Tunisia and then in Egypt, regimes were toppled by protests. Libya is convulsed not by protests but by war. Not a war of aggression, not a war with armies violating national borders and thereby implicating the basic tenets of agreed-upon elements of international law, but a civil war. How often has intervention by nation A in nation B's civil war enlarged the welfare of nation A?


Before we intervene in Libya, do we ask the United Nations for permission? If it is refused, do we proceed anyway? If so, why ask? If we are refused permission and recede from intervention, have we not made U.S. foreign policy hostage to a hostile institution?


Secretary of State Hilary Clinton fears Libya becoming a failed state - "a giant Somalia." Speaking of which, have we not seen a cautionary movie - "Black Hawk Down" - about how humanitarian military interventions can take nasty turns?


The Egyptian crowds watched and learned from the Tunisian crowds. But the Libyan government watched and learned from the fate of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments. It has decided to fight. Would not U.S. intervention in Libya encourage other restive peoples to expect U.S. military assistance?


Would it be wise for U.S. military force to be engaged simultaneously in three Muslim nations?



2b)Don't Use U.S. Force in Libya!
By Leslie H. Gelb

The Obama administration is wavering over an intervention that would inevitably widen and trigger greater carnage, writes Leslie H. Gelb. Instead, the president should let the Europeans, Arabs, and Africans take the lead—with Washington only helping.

Hold your wallets and hang on to your military-age children. Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and McCain, along with hordes of humanitarians and neoconservatives, have converged with one aim, to push the U.S. into war in Libya. Yes, it would be war, though they like to call it "humanitarian action" and pretend it's just a simple matter of declaring and enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya. What they're really proposing is a potential tragedy—for the U.S. and for Libyans. Better to let Libya's neighbors do the heavy lifting with restricted U.S. help, as President Obama seems inclined to do.


To begin with, what's going on in Libya should not in any way be confused with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In that African horror, Hutus were slaughtering an estimated 800,000 defenseless Tutsis. The U.S. military actually had a good and workable response to this genocide. The generals suggested sending in a few thousand troops to set up a "safe haven" in Rwanda's border region, where civilians could flock for protection. U.S. troops would not engage in combat at all.

It was a tragedy that President Clinton rejected this proposal for fear of getting involved in an African civil war like Somalia. It was also a tragedy that he waited so long to intervene militarily in Bosnia, where the aggressors, the Serbs, and the victims, the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats, were quite clear. Helping the victims in Bosnia was not a shot in the dark; Americans and Europeans knew the leaders of the victims pretty well and could make sensible decisions on whom to help and how.

Violence on a significant scale has been occurring in Africa for decades in places like Sudan, the Ivory Coast, and Congo. Did Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and McCain propose U.S. military intervention in those countries? Were these catastrophes any less deserving of humanitarian intervention?

The violence in Libya is quite serious, but it has not reached the levels of past crises such as those in Africa or Bosnia—yet. My concern is that it could get to those proportions after U.S. military intervention. It might also reach those proportions after either the rebels or Col. Muammar Gaddafi's forces prevail. The point is, this could happen when whichever side wins. We know Col. Gaddafi is a nut, a thug, and a killer, and the three senators were well aware of that for many years—but did they propose military force to depose him?

The United States would be crazy to hitch its star, in any military manner, to the new “freedom fighters.”

The real question is this: If the rebels gained power, would they be any better than Col. Gaddafi? I haven't found many Americans, or anyone else, for that matter, who know much about them. Doubtless, some are noble freedom fighters who seek democracy for their nation. Still, I wouldn't bet on many of them falling into that category; they've had little opportunity to learn about democracy under the tutelage of Col. Gaddafi. Many of them could turn out to be thugs, thieves, and would-be new dictators. Surely, some will be Islamic extremists. One or more might turn into another Col. Gaddafi after gaining power. Indeed, when the good colonel led the Libyan coup in 1969, many right-thinking Westerners thought him to be a modernizing democrat. "I guess we were kind of euphoric about him at first," William D. Rogers, who was President Nixon's secretary of state at the time of Gaddafi's ascension to power, has said. Many caring and anti-colonial Westerners felt the same good vibes coming from the likes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Hafez al-Assad in Syria, and on and on.

The troubling truth Americans need to learn is that they know little or nothing about these societies and even less about the monsters who might emerge after a civil war. The United States would be crazy to hitch its star, in any military manner, to the new "freedom fighters." Whatever the results, Muslims will blame America for another war and new bad leaders.

Then, tragedy could also follow U.S. military intervention—namely, step by step into a wider war with more killing all around. Among intervention advocates, it is popular to say that a no-fly zone and supplying rebels with arms would be simple matters and would not draw the United States into a wider conflict. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen speak the contrary truths of experience. They worry about step-by-step escalation. They caution that "little steps" will lead to deeper U.S. immersion in another war. For example, no responsible military man would send U.S. aircraft over Libya to enforce a no-fly zone without first destroying anti-aircraft defenses on the ground. That would be a war. And after we won that war, those U.S. jets high up in the sky still wouldn't be able, in most cases, to spot Libyan helicopter attacks at much lower altitudes and destroy them. Since these helicopters are doing the most damage now, what would the interventionists advocate at that point?


Even to provide arms such as rifles, machine guns, and anti-aircraft missiles to the rebels is not so simple. That very act would tie America to these unknown protesters. Would that make things better or worse when the fighting stopped? Either way, providing arms would make America more responsible for whatever happened. If Europeans, Arabs, or Africans want to provide these weapons, it's their call, and so be it. They live there, let them decide.

The Obama administration seems to be wavering internally over what to do. A few in the National Security Council staff and in the State Department favor intervention of various sorts. The Pentagon thinks doing so is crazy. The president himself appears undecided or somewhat negative about using U.S. force. Far too often in the past, but especially in recent weeks with the Middle East and North Africa in upheaval, his tendency to jump from position to position has worsened. At times, his team seems to equate the rebels with democrats, then retreats to calling them protesters and revolutionaries, then talks about America's commitment to democracy, then hints at intervention of sorts ("keeping military options open" is the line), then backs away and hints of new toughness while agonizing in the press about the woes of intervening again in the Muslim world.

Of course, no one knows how events in Libya or elsewhere in the Middle East will evolve. Sure, we want real democracies, and Americans can help Arab democrats in that path, but only if asked. It is folly to start that incredibly dangerous process of arming and protecting rebels on the supposition that they are democrats, or that they would be better than their present dictators, or that they could "win" with U.S. help.

Instead, the only safe and sound course is to continue to freeze Libyan funds in the United States; warn Libyan killers of all stripes that they will be held to humanitarian account; provide active and massive humanitarian relief services and aid to refugees; condemn Gaddafi's actions at the U.N.; call for the peaceful resolution of the civil war; and leave any military action and military aid to the African Union, the Arab League, the Europeans, or individual states from these groups. And should Britain and France seek a U.N.-approved no-fly zone, Washington should neither thwart nor join it. In the end, the United States cannot and should not be more helpful than Libya's neighbors themselves. Remember, no one maintains that Libya is a vital strategic interest to Washington. One reason is that it produces only 1 percent of the world's daily oil consumption, not worth fighting about.

As the administration weighs its choices, I have one last plea: Please, Mr. President, don't make policy on a daily basis to please howling senators or the maniacal voices on cable news. They won't pay for the consequences of their words. You and the American people will.

(Leslie H. Gelb, a former New York Times columnist and senior government official, is author of Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy (HarperCollins 2009), a book that shows how to think about and use power in the 21st century. He is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.)





2c)Options for Military Intervention in Libya
By Jeffrey White

Libya's internal conflict is entering its fourth week and shows no signs of coming to a rapid close. The fighting has reached a rough balance, with both sides possessing some strengths but neither able to achieve a decisive military advantage that could end the war. Depending on its scale and scope, military intervention against the regime could alter the balance and push the hostilities to a quicker and more favorable conclusion. Although much of the discussion regarding external action has focused on establishing no-fly zones, that is not the only option -- other approaches entailing greater or lesser risk and complexity should be considered. Any such discussion requires some understanding of the way the war is being fought and the factors shaping its course.

Ground War

Currently, the ground fighting remains a contest between the numbers and will of the rebels and the firepower and organization of the regime's forces. Government offensives have involved a few battalions of heavy forces with tanks and armored infantry fighting vehicles along with light infantry mounted on sport utility vehicles and trucks, all supported by mortars and rocket launchers. Their tactics have been simple: bombardment, armored vehicle and infantry assaults, and indiscriminate fire. Although government forces have at times penetrated opposition defenses at Zawiyah, Misratah, and Marsa al-Burayqah, they have been unable to consolidate gains there. The rebels in turn have countered such attacks with captured heavy weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and light arms.

Thus far, opposition forces have depended on numbers and resolve to continue the fight. They are equipped with a wide range of weapons, but their heavy weapons are few in number and often employed singly. This makes it difficult to sustain attacks where regime defenses are prepared and organized. The rebels are best at operating in fluid situations where their numbers can overwhelm disorganized and dispirited regime troops. Yet they are vulnerable to heavy firepower and air attack, especially when operating in the open.

Air War

The air war is quickly becoming more of a factor. The regime has been using airpower to soften the rebels' defenses in key cities, break up their attacks, harass their movements, and strike at their logistics. Airstrikes generally consist of only one or two jets or helicopters, which do not press their attacks and are not very accurate in delivering munitions. This suggests that the air force is incapable of mounting large attacks with multiple aircraft, and that aircrews are either unable or unwilling to act more aggressively.

The main value of air attacks has probably been psychological -- a factor that should not be discounted. Opposition troops in the open, especially irregulars without air defense, are more likely to panic and become disorganized in the face of airstrikes, while civilian sympathizers are likely to feel vulnerable and helpless. The rebels are highly dependent on the will and commitment of their followers, and the regime's control of the air hampers the opposition's ability to sustain the struggle.

Military Determinants

The war is being shaped by a number of important determinants, and any external intervention should be carried out with the following in mind:

•Fighting in Libya requires operating over long distances and controlling large areas. This factor creates major challenges for logistics, maneuver, and defense for both sides.


•Currently, firepower favors the regime. To be sure, this is a wasting asset -- regime forces are incurring combat losses in these systems, and maintenance problems associated with heavy tracked vehicles will inevitably reduce their numbers still more, likely decreasing the regime's firepower advantage. For now, though, the regime has a distinct advantage.


•The opposition seems capable of putting large numbers of irregulars in the field. In contrast, the regime is steadily losing regular and mercenary soldiers in the fighting, and these will be more difficult to replace than opposition losses.


•Both sides are relying on stocks of arms and munitions accumulated by the regime prior to the war, and both can probably sustain combat at some level for weeks, if not longer. Keeping combat forces supplied will be a logistics challenge given the great distances involved. At present, the regime has an advantage in that it can rely on stockpiles relatively close to the areas of combat. It also has access to intact supply and transportation units in the army and security services. For its part, the opposition will have to find the means of sustaining its forces as they extend from the east to the west. This will require either establishing some sort of supply and transportation capability or capturing weapons and ammunition as they advance.


•Regime forces have an advantage in command and control -- they can rely on their existing military communications infrastructure, command structures, and staff. In contrast, the opposition's command and control appears to be rudimentary, with little structure.


•Intangibles are a critical element in combat. It remains to be seen whether the forces supporting the regime -- especially mercenaries and conscripts -- will continue to attack or even fight at all in the face of casualties, fatigue, and other stresses. So far, the rebels seem to have high levels of morale and an enthusiasm for engaging regime forces.
In sum, firepower, logistics, and command and control currently favor the regime and account for its ability to stay in the fight. Yet manpower and intangibles seem to favor the rebels, accounting for their ability to take and hold cities and sustain the struggle. Intervention that addresses these military determinants could reduce the regime's advantages while enhancing the opposition's capabilities.

Types of Intervention

Continued international inaction would likely prolong the conflict and increase the chances of the Qadhafi regime surviving in some form. A number of military measures could be taken to avert such an outcome.

Lower-risk options include:

•Providing the opposition with intelligence about regime force concentrations, movements, and air activity, allowing them to avoid ambushes, prepare defenses, and deploy their forces in optimal fashion.
•Enhancing logistics and support for rebel forces by providing ammunition, fuel, and medical assistance to maintain their operational capabilities and boost morale.
•Enhancing the opposition's command and control by providing communications systems and quick training for rebel commanders.
•Training opposition units on key weapons systems such as antiaircraft guns and missiles, antitank weapons, and artillery systems.
•Supplying rebel forces with game-changing weapons such as advanced antitank and antiaircraft systems to increase the attrition of regime combat forces and reduce their firepower advantage.
Higher-risk options include:

•Providing air defense for liberated areas or humanitarian aid operations in eastern Libya, through either combat air patrols or ground-based air defenses. This would reduce the fear of airstrikes among the population and likely have some deterrent effect on regime air operations. It would not be as complicated or risky as creating a no-fly zone over the entire country.
•Creating no-fly and no-drive zones to reduce the regime's air and ground firepower advantages.
•Conducting airstrikes against critical government military assets (e.g., aircraft, command and control, armored forces, artillery units) to both reduce the regime's capabilities and facilitate the opposition's combat maneuver and operations. This option would carry the most risk but would also have the most direct impact on the war.
In short, the range of potential U.S. and international actions is not limited to either establishing a no-fly zone or doing nothing. The risk to intervening forces varies from option to option, and some would require more time to implement. Yet some of these options could be put into action quickly, with potentially dramatic effect on the conflict.

Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in military and security affairs.
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