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George Friedman on Muslim Revolutions. (See 1 below.)
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And so it and they go(es.) (See 2 below.)
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A letter from a dear friend to my dear friend who will be visiting us this May. (See 3 below.)
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Most committed Progressives are not only humorless but when push comes to shove they are willingly blind. (See 4 below.)
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My own LTE regarding Wisconsin and 'union badgering:'
There are those who characterize what is happening in Wisconsin and elsewhere as
an attack on unions to cripple them.
As I understand it, Progressives and Obama believe in and advocate "fairness."
As I read the situation in Wisconsin, the Governor is asking union members to
participate in their 'fair share' of the deficit their outrageous pension and
salary demands have created and pitch in some bucks!
State worker growth has outstripped the ability of states to finance union
greed. Furthermore, the idea that workers must involuntarily give part of their
salary to unions, so union bosses can finance more egregious demands on states,
must stop before states bankrupt along with our federal government.
It is a gravy train issue and union boss 'fat cats 'know a good thing when they
see it.
When industrial unions began to lose workers, Andy Stern took up the hue and
cry to unionize state employees. He has been so successful these unions have
now created the same situation their brethren accomplished by out pricing
themselves in virtually every facet of industry they were able to unionize.
Unions have become leeches - they suck the blood from everything they attach
themselves to and it is about time this trend is reversed.
Go Wisconsin and stop the 'Union Badgering.' (See 5 BELOW.)
Strassel writes about Obama's flip flopping and why initially he hawked and now has clammed! (See 51 below.)
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Churchill had it about right over 100 years ago. (See 6 below.)
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I have just concluded reading "Tough Man Without a Gun," the new biography of Humphrey Bogart by Stefan Kanfer.
In the final chapter Kanfer draws from many books and commentary as to why Bogart has never been nor will there ever be another "Bogie."
He discusses the sexual and economic changing role of the American male both on and off stage and why today's 'boy-men' stars can never measure up to Bogie's "...unique amalgam of integrity and rue..." which has not gone out of style just out of American cinema.
I commend this book to anyone who wants a fascinating story about an icon who was unique in life, a giant on the screen and remains so in after life.
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And now for a lesson in "give-away" and taxpayers are being stiffed for it. (See 7 below.)
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Have we and the Brits landed military in Libya? (See 8 below.)
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Dick
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1)Revolution and the Muslim World
By George Friedman of Stratfor
The Muslim world, from North Africa to Iran, has experienced a wave of instability in the last few weeks. No regimes have been overthrown yet, although as of this writing, Libya was teetering on the brink.
There have been moments in history where revolution spread in a region or around the world as if it were a wildfire. These moments do not come often. Those that come to mind include 1848, where a rising in France engulfed Europe. There was also 1968, where the demonstrations of what we might call the New Left swept the world: Mexico City, Paris, New York and hundreds of other towns saw anti-war revolutions staged by Marxists and other radicals. Prague saw the Soviets smash a New Leftist government. Even China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution could, by a stretch, be included. In 1989, a wave of unrest, triggered by East Germans wanting to get to the West, generated an uprising in Eastern Europe that overthrew Soviet rule.
Each had a basic theme. The 1848 uprisings attempted to establish liberal democracies in nations that had been submerged in the reaction to Napoleon. 1968 was about radical reform in capitalist society. 1989 was about the overthrow of communism. They were all more complex than that, varying from country to country. But in the end, the reasons behind them could reasonably be condensed into a sentence or two.
Some of these revolutions had great impact. 1989 changed the global balance of power. 1848 ended in failure at the time — France reverted to a monarchy within four years — but set the stage for later political changes. 1968 produced little that was lasting. The key is that in each country where they took place, there were significant differences in the details — but they shared core principles at a time when other countries were open to those principles, at least to some extent.
THE CURRENT RISING IN CONTEXT
In looking at the current rising, the geographic area is clear: The Muslim countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been the prime focus of these risings, and in particular North Africa where Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya have had profound crises. Of course, many other Muslim countries also had revolutionary events that have not, at least until now, escalated into events that threaten regimes or even ruling personalities. There have been hints of such events elsewhere. There were small demonstrations in China, and of course Wisconsin is in turmoil over budget cuts. But these don't really connect to what is happening in the Middle East. The first was small and the second is not taking inspiration from Cairo. So what we have is a rising in the Arab world that has not spread beyond there for the time being.
The key principle that appears to be driving the risings is a feeling that the regimes, or a group of individuals within the regimes, has deprived the public of political and, more important, economic rights — in short, that they enriched themselves beyond what good taste permitted. This has expressed itself in different ways. In Bahrain, for example, therising was of the primarily Shiite population against a predominantly Sunni royal family. In Egypt, it was against the person of Hosni Mubarak. In Libya, it is against the regime and person of Moammar Gadhafi and his family, and is driven by tribal hostility.
Why has it come together now? One reason is that there was a tremendous amount of regime change in the region from the 1950s through the early 1970s, as the Muslim countries created regimes to replace foreign imperial powers and were buffeted by the Cold War. Since the early 1970s, the region has, with the exception of Iran in 1979, been fairly stable in the sense that the regimes — and even the personalities who rose up in the unstable phase — stabilized their countries and imposed regimes that could not easily be moved. Gadhafi, for example, overthrew the Libyan monarchy in 1969 and has governed continually for 42 years since then.
Any regime dominated by a small group of people over time will see that group use their position to enrich themselves. There are few who can resist for 40 years. It is important to recognize that Gadhafi, for example, was once a genuine, pro-Soviet revolutionary. But over time, revolutionary zeal declines and avarice emerges along with the arrogance of extended power. And in the areas of the region where there had not been regime changes since after World War I, this principle stays true as well, although interestingly, over time, the regimes seem to learn to spread the wealth a bit.
Thus, what emerged throughout the region were regimes and individuals who were classic kleptocrats. More than anything, if we want to define this wave of unrest, particularly in North Africa, it is a rising against regimes — and particularly individuals — who have been in place for extraordinarily long periods of time. And we can add to this that they are people who were planning to maintain family power and money by installing sons as their political heirs. The same process, with variations, is under way in the Arabian Peninsula. This is a rising against the revolutionaries of previous generations.
The revolutions have been coming for a long time. The rising in Tunisia, particularly when it proved successful, caused it to spread. As in 1848, 1968 and 1989, similar social and cultural conditions generate similar events and are triggered by the example of one country and then spread more broadly. That has happened in 2011 and is continuing.
A UNIQUELY SENSITIVE REGION
It is, however, happening in a region that is uniquely sensitive at the moment. The U.S.-jihadist war means that, as with previous revolutionary waves, there are broader potential geopolitical implications. 1989 meant the end of the Soviet empire, for example. In this case, the question of greatest importance is not why these revolutions are taking place, but who will take advantage of them. We do not see these revolutions as a vast conspiracy by radical Islamists to take control of the region. A conspiracy that vast is easily detected, and the security forces of the individual countries would have destroyed the conspiracies quickly. No one organized the previous waves, although there have been conspiracy theories about them as well. They arose from certain conditions, following the example of one incident. But particular groups certainly tried, with greater and lesser success, to take advantage of them.
In this case, whatever the cause of the risings, there is no question that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and control of them. Why wouldn't they? It is a rational and logical course for them. Whether they will be able to do so is a more complex and important question, but that they would want to and are trying to do so is obvious. They are a broad, transnational and disparate group brought up in conspiratorial methods. This is their opportunity to create a broad international coalition. Thus, as with traditional communists and the New Left in the 1960s, they did not create the rising but they would be fools not to try to take advantage of it. I would add that there is little question but that the United States and other Western countries are trying to influence the direction of the uprisings. For both sides, this is a difficult game to play, but it is particularly difficult for the United States as outsiders to play this game compared to native Islamists who know their country.
But while there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution, that does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Recall that 1848 and 1968 were failures and those who tried to take advantage of them had no vehicle to ride. Also recall that taking control of a revolution is no easy thing. But as we saw in Russia in 1917, it is not necessarily the more popular group that wins, but the best organized. And you frequently don't find out who is best organized until afterwards.
Democratic revolutions have two phases. The first is the establishment of democracy. The second is the election of governments. The example of Hitler is useful as a caution on what kind of governments a young democracy can produce, since he came to power through democratic and constitutional means — and then abolished democracy to cheering crowds. So there are three crosscurrents here. The first is the reaction against corrupt regimes. The second is the election itself. And the third? The United States needs to remember, as it applauds the rise of democracy, that the elected government may not be what one expected.
In any event, the real issue is whether these revolutions will succeed in replacing existing regimes. Let's consider the process of revolution for the moment, beginning by distinguishing a demonstration from an uprising. A demonstration is merely the massing of people making speeches. This can unsettle the regime and set the stage for more serious events, but by itself, it is not significant. Unless the demonstrations are large enough to paralyze a city, they are symbolic events. There have been many demonstrations in the Muslim world that have led nowhere; consider Iran.
It is interesting here to note that the young frequently dominate revolutions like 1848, 1969 and 1989 at first. This is normal. Adults with families and maturity rarely go out on the streets to face guns and tanks. It takes young people to have the courage or lack of judgment to risk their lives in what might be a hopeless cause. However, to succeed, it is vital that at some point other classes of society join them. In Iran, one of the key moments of the 1979 revolution was when the shopkeepers joined young people in the street. A revolution only of the young, as we saw in 1968 for example, rarely succeeds. A revolution requires a broader base than that, and it must go beyond demonstrations. The moment it goes beyond the demonstration is when it confronts troops and police. If the demonstrators disperse, there is no revolution. If they confront the troops and police, and if they carry on even after they are fired on, then you are in a revolutionary phase. Thus, pictures of peaceful demonstrators are not nearly as significant as the media will have you believe, but pictures of demonstrators continuing to hold their ground after being fired on is very significant.
A REVOLUTION'S KEY EVENT
This leads to the key event in the revolution. The revolutionaries cannot defeat armed men. But if those armed men, in whole or part, come over to the revolutionary side, victory is possible. And this is the key event. In Bahrain, the troops fired on demonstrators and killed some. The demonstrators dispersed and then were allowed to demonstrate — with memories of the gunfire fresh. This was a revolution contained. In Egypt, the military and police opposed each other and the military sided with the demonstrators, for complex reasons obviously. Personnel change, if not regime change, was inevitable. In Libya, the military has split wide open.
When that happens, you have reached a branch in the road. If the split in the military is roughly equal and deep, this could lead to civil war. Indeed, one way for a revolution to succeed is to proceed to civil war, turning the demonstrators into an army, so to speak. That's what Mao did in China. Far more common is for the military to split. If the split creates an overwhelming anti-regime force, this leads to the revolution's success. Always, the point to look for is thus the police joining with the demonstrators. This happened widely in 1989 but hardly at all in 1968. It happened occasionally in 1848, but the balance was always on the side of the state. Hence, that revolution failed.
It is this act, the military and police coming over to the side of the demonstrators, that makes or breaks a revolution. Therefore, to return to the earlier theme, the most important question on the role of radical Islamists is not their presence in the crowd, but their penetration of the military and police. If there were a conspiracy, it would focus on joining the military, waiting for demonstrations and then striking.
Those who argue that these risings have nothing to do with radical Islam may be correct in the sense that the demonstrators in the streets may well be students enamored with democracy. But they miss the point that the students, by themselves, can't win. They can only win if the regime wants them to, as in Egypt, or if other classes and at least some of the police or military — people armed with guns who know how to use them — join them. Therefore, looking at the students on TV tells you little. Watching the soldiers tells you much more.
The problem with revolutions is that the people who start them rarely finish them. The idealist democrats around Alexander Kerensky in Russia were not the ones who finished the revolution. The thuggish Bolsheviks did. In these Muslim countries, the focus on the young demonstrators misses the point just as it did in Tiananmen Square. It wasn't the demonstrators that mattered, but the soldiers. If they carried out orders, there would be no revolution.
I don't know the degree of Islamist penetration of the military in Libya, to pick one example of the unrest. I suspect that tribalism is far more important than theology. In Egypt, I suspect the regime has saved itself by buying time. Bahrain was more about Iranian influence on the Shiite population than Sunni jihadists at work. But just as the Iranians are trying to latch on to the process, so will the Sunni jihadists.
THE DANGER OF CHAOS
I suspect some regimes will fall, mostly reducing the country in question to chaos. The problem, as we are seeing in Tunisia, is that frequently there is no one on the revolutionaries' side equipped to take power. The Bolsheviks had an organized party. In these revolutions, the parties are trying to organize themselves during the revolution, which is another way to say that the revolutionaries are in no position to govern. The danger is not radical Islam, but chaos, followed either by civil war, the military taking control simply to stabilize the situation or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control — simply because they are the only ones in the crowd with a plan and an organization. That's how minorities take control of revolutions.
All of this is speculation. What we do know is that this is not the first wave of revolution in the world, and most waves fail, with their effects seen decades later in new regimes and political cultures. Only in the case of Eastern Europe do we see broad revolutionary success, but that was against an empire in collapse, so few lessons can be drawn from that for the Muslim world.
In the meantime, as you watch the region, remember not to watch the demonstrators. Watch the men with the guns. If they stand their ground for the state, the demonstrators have failed. If some come over, there is some chance of victory. And if victory comes, and democracy is declared, do not assume that what follows will in any way please the West — democracy and pro-Western political culture do not mean the same thing.
The situation remains fluid, and there are no broad certainties. It is a country-by-country matter now, with most regimes managing to stay in power to this point. There are three possibilities. One is that this is like 1848, a broad rising that will fail for lack of organization and coherence, but that will resonate for decades. The second is 1968, a revolution that overthrew no regime even temporarily and left some cultural remnants of minimal historical importance. The third is 1989, a revolution that overthrew the political order in an entire region, and created a new order in its place.
If I were to guess at this point, I would guess that we are facing 1848. The Muslim world will not experience massive regime change as in 1989, but neither will the effects be as ephemeral as 1968. Like 1848, this revolution will fail to transform the Muslim world or even just the Arab world. But it will plant seeds that will germinate in the coming decades. I think those seeds will be democratic, but not necessarily liberal. In other words, the democracies that eventually arise will produce regimes that will take their bearings from their own culture, which means Islam.
The West celebrates democracy. It should be careful what it hopes for: It might get it.
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2) Moving to California : Arizona Is Taking A Beating From SB-1070
Phoenix, AZ (AP) - SB-1070 is having an effect.
Illegal immigrants are boycotting Arizona by the thousands, showing their outrage with Arizona's controversial new SB-1070 law by moving elsewhere.
In the small town of Guadalupe AZ, south of Phoenix, Manuel Renaldo is one of those who is punishing Arizona by leaving. As he loaded his stolen car with his belongings and family of ten, Renaldo told this reporter through an interpreter "It's a matter of principle. I refuse to be supported by a state that treats me like a criminal."
The effects of the exodus are being felt by Arizona retailers who are reporting dwindling sales of beer, spray paint, and ammunition. Also hit hard are the state’s hospitals, which have reported a dramatic decline in births and emergency room visits. Tattoo parlors are in a state of panic.
Renaldo told a reporter through an interpreter "He and his family are moving to California , which is a state that will support him and his family with dignity."
Manuel Renaldo: I get no respect in Arizona but will in California!!!
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3)Comments from my friend Beni on Kibbutz En-Herod. xxxE
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This letter can be viewed on my blog at:
http://benisisraelinewsletter.blogspot.com/2011/02/will-it-go-wrong.htm
I think historians will be kind to Gabi Ashkenazi. With the passage of time the Yoav Galant imbroglio will be forgotten or mentioned merely as a brief footnote. His able and qualified successor, IDF chief of staff Lt-Gen Benny Gantz now commands a formidable military machine.
Ashkenazi's four year command of the IDF began with a major overhaul necessitated by the army's much-criticised performance in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The IDF focused on enhancing accurate long-range firepower, rebuilding its neglected capacity for sweeping armoured manoeuvres, and improving coordination for joint ground, sea and air strikes. Training on all relevant parameters was increased by as much as 200 percent.
Ashkenazi and many military analysts say our development of "smart" guided missile firepower is unrivalled, and in many respects the IDF may even be a world leader in this type of cutting edge technology. Journalist Leslie Susser defined it as ,"the ability to pinpoint targets in the heat of battle and bring lethal fire to bear within seconds."
A few weeks ago the outgoing chief of staff could have presented a calmer appraisal of the nation's security. Hezbollah was preoccupied with the Hariri Tribunal findings and hadn't fired a shot at Israel in more than four years. Syria was more concerned about bolstering Hezbollah and cementing its ties with Iran. We were benefiting from a cold peace with Egypt and Jordan. Only Hamas in Gaza was practicing a kind of mini-brinkmanship, occasionally testing how far it could infringe the ceasefire without provoking painful reprisals.
Iran was behind schedule with its enriched uranium production due to damage caused to its batteries of centrifuges by the Stuxnet worm.
Since then a lot has changed. Are the uprisings that started in Tunisia and spread throughout the Middle East liable to change the present fragile but stable status quo?
Foreign commentators claim Israel's leaders are alarmed. “The Egyptian upset is heightening a sense of encirclement that has not been felt so acutely by Israelis in decades.” Said The Economist and asked if Israel was “encircled by enemies again?”
Surveying the deteriorating situation in the Middle East the paper singled out Jordan as our major cause for concern.
“Perhaps even more worrying for Israel is a rising fear that on its eastern flank the ruling monarchy in Jordan, the only Arab country bar Egypt that has a formal treaty with the Jewish state, is being shaken by an assortment of Islamists, tribal leaders, Palestinians (who make up a good half of Jordan’s people), disgruntled former security men and a middle class irritated by the royal family’s perceived extravagance.”
Worst case scenarios are more the rule than the exception in this region.
Our political and military decision makers tempered by the harsh reality of our unfriendly neighbourhood often quote Murphy's adage," Everything that can possibly go wrong will go wrong."
Last week Gabi Ashkenazi repeated his less than optimistic regional assessment when he addressed the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, referring specifically to the tectonic changes in the region that are leading to gains for the Iranian-led radical axis at the expense of the region’s moderates.
Ashkenazi and certainly his successor Benny Ganz believe the IDF needs to prepare for a significant broadening of the spectrum of threats against Israel. Not only does the IDF have to be ready to fight a simultaneous war on several fronts, it must be able to wage very different kinds of warfare -- from "low intensity" irregular conflict with terrorists, to classical conventional warfare against regular armies, to missile warfare against states or powerful non-state actors like Hezbollah.
Even though the threat of a terrorist or missile attack might seem more imminent, Ashkenazi's IDF doctrine emphasised preparedness for war between regular armies.
"We must train for classic conventional warfare. It poses the biggest challenge, and from it we can make adaptations to other forms of warfare, but not vice versa,” said Ashkenazi earlier this month when he addressed the 11th annual Herzliya Conference on national, regional and global strategic issues. "It would be a mistake to train for low-intensity conflict and to think that the army will be ready overnight to make the switch to full-scale warfare."
Despite the focus on conventional warfare, the IDF has also developed specific capabilities for terrorist and missile warfare. They include a four-layered anti-missile defence system starting with the Arrow missile, which is capable of intercepting long-range missiles at altitudes of above 50 miles, to the Iron Dome system for shooting down low-flying, short-range rockets.
In any future missile war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ashkenazi says the IDF will apply conventional warfare skills, committing ground forces to attack the enemy in its embedded positions and considerably shortening the duration of the conflict.
Perhaps the most dramatic stride forward made by the IDF over the past few years is in field intelligence. If in 2006, its "bank" of targets in Lebanon numbered approximately 200, today the bank contains thousands of potential targets. Ashkenazi insists that firepower is meaningless unless there are targets of high military value.
The tried and tested Iron Dome system is fully operational. Now more than ever before the thirteen units required to protect our borders with Lebanon and the Gaza Strip periphery should be provided without delay. Although the total cost of the thirteen units amounts to an awesome $1.4 billion the system possesses an added value factor. Interest in the Iron Dome System will probably develop into sales to other friendly nations once its effectiveness is proven "under fire."
A newer improved model of the Arrow missile was successfully tested last week and it too will take its place in the multi-layered anti-missile defence system. Despite the race against time, namely the need to have the complete system operational before Iran can produce a nuclear device and a missile system to deliver it, we can't afford to cut corners.
On the ground the IDF continues to further develop its main battle tanks.
Some military strategists have relegated the main battle tank to tertiary roles, others to national war museums. They claim large armoured corps battles have no place in modern warfare. The MBT is large, cumbersome and provides an easy target. Armour penetrating missiles have made them death traps for their crews. Furthermore, they argue, MBT's have little or no use in low intensity warfare. Admittedly improved tank armour provides a greater degree of protection, however more powerful armour penetrating missiles like the Kornet laser guided anti-tank missile are weapons to be reckoned with and now they have been acquired by both Hezbollah and Hamas.
The ultimate counter to anti-tank missiles is the new "Trophy" defence system: a miniature anti-missile system that detects incoming projectiles and destroys them down before they reach their targets. Eventually all IDF armoured vehicles, tanks and personnel carriers will be equipped with the Trophy system. Trophy is the product of a ten-year collaborative development project between the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems
The IDF is certainly not about to scrap its main battle tanks. Maybe major tank battles won’t feature in conventional warfare, however tanks are valuable adjuncts and have been used effectively even in low intensity warfare.
Should Israel really be alarmed by the prospect of regime change in the countries it shares a common border with?
It’s difficult to predict what will happen in Lebanon following the publication of the findings of the Hariri Tribunal.
Jeffrey White
White believes that at least four scenarios could emerge in the coming months. “First, the military forms an effective partnership with opposition elements and proceeds toward real political reform and transition to democracy. Second, the military attempts to rush the process in order to return to the barracks and avoid direct responsibility for mounting political and economic difficulties, or at least to reduce its overt role; this approach would produce a flawed or incomplete transition. Third, the SMC (Supreme Military Council) employs a divide-and-conquer strategy against the opposition in an attempt to retain essential control. Fourth, the military slowly gains power by default in response to a weak and fragmented opposition.
In the last scenario, the military might find itself in the difficult position of not having a competent partner for a transfer of power. At the moment, one of the first two scenarios seems most likely, but the others are well within the realm of possibility. Much will depend on how well and for what purposes the SMC plays the game in the period ahead. Mistakes will be made by all those involved, and new crises may develop. Revolutions are not deterministic processes, and as in most human affairs, the laws of unanticipated consequences and unexpected outcomes apply.”
Reading over these remarks I realise I have described a dismal state of affairs. Worst case scenarios, IDF strategy options and a lot of uncertainty.
Maybe I’m overstating the situation. By and large we go about our daily affairs without giving too much thought to the turmoil surrounding us. If we read a newspaper or turn to the newscasts we become more aware of the potential danger.
In the meantime I’m planning a Saturday trip with an overseas business associate. He is an observant Christian so Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee have been included in our itinerary.
Have a good weekend.
Beni 24th of February, 2011.
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4)The Public Worker Gravy Train
Many government employees are paid up to 30% more than those in the private sector.
By ANDREW BIGGS AND JASON RICHWINE
Leaders across the country are proposing restrictions on public employees' pay and benefits in order to put their budgets on a more sustainable path. The political left's counterattack is that government workers aren't overpaid compared to those in the private economy. Who's right?
Consider a study released last October by the Center on Wage and Employment Dynamics at the University of California, Berkeley, which concluded that Golden State public employees "are neither overpaid nor overcompensated." The Economic Policy Institute has generated reports arguing that government workers are underpaid.
These studies are misleading. Public-private pay comparisons vary from state to state, but a full accounting shows clearly that large, union-dominated states tend to overpay their workers. California is a good example.
The Berkeley study begins by studying salaries, where its methods are solid. Using individual-level data from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, it compares public and private wages while controlling for differences in age, education and other earnings-related characteristics. Using essentially the same methods, we found that California state and local government employees receive wages about 4% lower than those received by similarly skilled workers in large private firms, which offer the most generous pay and benefits. But if we compare public employees to all private workers, the 4% penalty becomes statistically zero.
Public employees really pull ahead in non-wage benefits. The Berkeley study concludes that counting benefits means that public workers' total hourly compensation is about 2% higher than that of private workers. But our research shows that the study underestimates what public workers receive from pensions and retiree health programs. It also doesn't account for the value of job security in government employment. Once these are noted, the balance tilts clearly in favor of public workers.
The first error in the Berkeley study concerns defined-benefit pension plans. The study erroneously conflated what governments pay into defined-benefit plans with what workers will eventually receive in retirement. So if governments contribute 10% of employee pay to defined-benefit pensions while private employers contribute 10% to 401(k)-type pensions, these studies conclude that pension compensation is equal.
But here's the problem: State and local pensions effectively guarantee employees an 8% return on both their contributions and those made by their employer. By contrast, a private-sector employee with a 401(k) can achieve a guaranteed return of only around 4% by investing in U.S. Treasury securities. Most economists believe governments are foolish to base their funding decisions on the assumption of high investment returns, but the benefits for public employees are guaranteed in any case.
Over a career, the difference between a 4% and 8% return is significant. Using data from California's major pension funds, we calculate that the higher implicit return on public pensions increases the compensation of California's government workers by around 4%.
The Berkeley study's second error is the omission of retiree health benefits. Private workers retire later and relatively few receive retiree health coverage. For those who do, eligibility has been tightened and premiums increased. But almost 90% of state and local governments offer retiree health benefits to employees. They generally retire in their 50s, at which point the government often pays most of their costs, including Medicare premiums and deductibles.
State actuarial reports show the annual cost of California retiree health benefits could top 8% of total compensation. Thus an accurate accounting of pension and retiree health benefits shows that public employees in California are paid about 15% more than individuals working for large private firms (accounting for age, education, etc.).
Another major benefit of public employment is job security. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that, on average, a private worker has about a 20% chance of being fired or laid off in a given year. In state and local government, the discharge rate is only about 6%—and several studies have found that public employees are more risk-averse than other workers, meaning they place particular value on job security. We estimate that government job security is equivalent to about a 15% increase in compensation.
Overall, our research suggests that government workers in California are compensated up to 30% more generously than are similar employees in large private firms. And the California experience is similar to that of other large states with powerful public unions. Elected officials are right to reassess public worker compensation as they try to close their budget deficits.
Mr. Biggs is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Richwine is a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation.
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5)Oh, To Be a Teacher in Wisconsin
How can fringe benefits cost nearly as much as a worker's salary? Answer: collective bargaining.
By ROBERT M. COSTRELL
The showdown in Wisconsin over fringe benefits for public employees boils down to one number: 74.2. That's how many cents the public pays Milwaukee public-school teachers and other employees for retirement and health benefits for every dollar they receive in salary. The corresponding rate for employees of private firms is 24.3cents.
Gov. Scott Walker's proposal would bring public-employee benefits closer in line with those of workers in the private sector. And to prevent benefits from reaching sky-high levels in the future, he wants to restrict collective-bargaining rights.
The average Milwaukee public-school teacher salary is $56,500, but with benefits the total package is $100,005, according to the manager of financial planning for Milwaukee public schools. When I showed these figures to a friend, she asked me a simple question: "How can fringe benefits be nearly as much as salary?" The answers can be found by unpacking the numbers in the district's budget for this fiscal year:
•Social Security and Medicare. The employer cost is 7.65% of wages, the same as in the private sector.
5A)Union Power for Thee, But Not for Me
If the president is so upset with Wisconsin's labor law reforms, why won't he allow federal workers to bargain collectively?
By KIMBERLEY A. STRASSEL
The union horde is spreading, from Madison to Indianapolis to a state capital near you. And yet the Democratic and union bigwigs engineering the outrage haven't directed their angry multitudes at what is arguably the most "hostile workplace" in the nation: Washington, D.C.
It will no doubt surprise you to learn that President Obama, the great patron of the working man, also happens to be the great CEO of one of the least union-friendly shop floors in the nation.
This is, after all, the president who has berated Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker's proposal to limit the collective bargaining rights of public employees, calling the very idea an "assault on unions." This is also the president who has sicced his political arm, Organizing for America, on Madison, allowing the group to fill buses and plan rallies. Ah, but it's easy to throw rocks when you live in a stone (White) house.
Fact: President Obama is the boss of a civil work force that numbers up to two million (excluding postal workers and uniformed military). Fact: Those federal workers cannot bargain for wages or benefits. Fact: Washington, D.C. is, in the purest sense, a "right to work zone." Federal employees are not compelled to join a union, nor to pay union dues. Fact: Neither Mr. Obama, nor the prior Democratic majority, ever acted to give their union chums a better federal deal.
Scott Walker, eat your heart out.
For this enormous flexibility in managing his work force, Mr. Obama can thank his own party. In 1978, Democratic President Jimmy Carter, backed by a Democratic Congress, passed the Civil Service Reform Act. Washington had already established its General Schedule (GS) classification and pay system for workers. The 1978 bill went further, focused as it was on worker accountability and performance. It severely proscribed the issues over which employees could bargain, as well as prohibited compulsory union support.
Democrats weren't then (and aren't now) about to let their federal employees dictate pay. The GS system, as well as the president and Congress, sees to that. Nor were they about to let workers touch health-care or retirement plans. Unions are instead limited to bargaining over personnel employment practices such as whether employees are allowed to wear beards, or whether the government must pay to clean uniforms. These demands matter, though they are hardly the sort to break the federal bank.
Which is precisely the point. Washington politicians may not know much, but they know power—in particular, the art of keeping it. Even Carter Democrats understood the difference between being in electoral debt to the unions, and being outright owned by them. And as Gov. Walker will attest, allowing unions to collectively bargain over pay and benefits is allowing them the keys to the statehouse.
Innocent Americans assume that unions use collective bargaining solely to obtain better pay and benefits. Not exactly. The real game is to insist that the dough runs through the union—giving it power over the state.
In Wisconsin, for instance, the teachers union doesn't just bargain for more health dollars. It also bargains to require that local school districts buy health insurance for their teachers through the union-affiliated health-insurance plan, called WEA Trust. That requirement gives the union (not the state) ultimate say over health benefits. It also costs the state at least $68 million more annually than it would if schools could buy the state-employee health plan—money that goes to a union outfit.
Since Washington pols aren't about to let unions run their town, the result is a weird bifurcation. On the state level, union campaign dollars are primarily contingent upon Democrats agreeing to allow public-employee unions to milk taxpayers dry. On the federal level, union dollars are primarily contingent upon Democrats agreeing to pervert federal laws and institutions so that private-sector unions get special privileges over employers and nonunion companies—consider project-labor agreements, Davis-Bacon and card check.
All of this helps explain why Mr. Obama has gone quiet on Wisconsin, and why Organizing for America is scurrying to hide its involvement. The president's initial instinct was to jump into the state, a 2012 battleground area where he might build points with his liberal base.
The White House has since sensed danger. As the world is painfully aware, Mr. Obama is under no obligation to balance his budget. So to whack Gov. Walker for his efforts to do so might strike some Americans as irresponsible, especially as the president is working to convince them that he really does care about deficits.
The other risk: The spotlight turns back to D.C. If the president is so worried about Wisconsin's "assault," why has he never taken up federal bargaining rights? If the Badger State's current system is the gold standard, why has he not replicated it? If it is so important that all parties "sit at the table"—as White House Press Secretary Jay Carney recently lectured Wisconsin—how dare Mr. Obama unilaterally declare a federal pay freeze? (Honestly, the union-busting gall!)
The debate over public-union giveaways has only started. That debate would benefit were Mr. Obama to explain how it is that Wisconsin is wrong to ask for the same budget flexibility that he enjoys as president. If he's unable to do that, perhaps the debate ought to be over.
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6)"How dreadful are the curses which Mohammedanism lays on its votaries! Besides the fanatical frenzy, which is as dangerous in a man as hydrophobia in a dog, there is this fearful fatalistic apathy. The effects are apparent in many countries; improvident habits, slovenly systems of agriculture, sluggish methods of commerce, and insecurity of property exist wherever the followers of the Prophet rule or live. A degraded sensualism deprives this life of its grace and refinement, the next of its dignity and sanctity. The fact that in Mohammedan law every woman must belong to some man as his absolute property, either as a child, a wife, or a concubine, must delay the final extinction of slavery until the faith of Islam has ceased to be a great power among men. Individual Moslems may show splendid qualities, but the influence of the religion paralyses the social development of those who follow it. No stronger retrograde force exists in the world. Far from being moribund, Mohammedanism is a militant and proselytizing faith. It has already spread throughout Central Africa, raising fearless warriors at every step; and were it not that Christianity is sheltered in the strong arms of science, the science against which it had vainly struggled, the civilization of modern Europe might fall, as fell the civilization of ancient Rome."
Sir Winston Churchill
The River War, 1st ed., vol. 2, pp 248-250, 1899, London
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7)THIS IS THE PERFECT EXAMPLE FOR ANYONE THAT DOESN'T BELIEVE SNOPES.COM IS A LIBERAL LEANING AGENCY JUST LIKE THE NATIONAL MEDIA.
GO TO SNOPES.COM AND SEARCH FOR PIGFORD VS GLICKMAN AND IT COMES UP AS “NO MATCHES FOUND”.
GO TO WIKIPEDIA AND THERE IT IS. SNOPES.COM IS NOT GOING TO REPORT ANYTHING LIKE THIS!!
Or, simply Google it ... there are a ton of references.
Pigford vs. Glickman
"In 1997, 400 African-American farmers sued the United States Department of Agriculture, alleging that they had been unfairly denied USDA loans due to racial discrimination during the period 1983 to 1997."
The case was entitled "Pigford vs. Glickman" and in 1999, the black farmers won their case.
The government agreed to pay each of them as much as $50,000 to settle their claims.
But then on February 23, 2010, something shocking happened in relation to that original judgment: In total silence, the USDA agreed to release more funds to "Pigford".
The amount was a staggering...... $1.25 billion. This was because the original number of plaintiffs - 400 black farmers had now swollen, in a class action suit, to include a total of 86,000 black farmers throughout America .
There was only one teensy problem:
The United States of America doesn't have 86,000 black farmers!!!!
According to accurate and totally verifiable Official USDA 2007 Census census data, the total number of black farmers throughout America is only 39,697.
Hmmm... by the Official USDA 1992 Census data the US had only 18,816 black farmers!!
Oops!!
Well, gosh - how on earth did 39,697 explode into the fraudulent 86,000 claims??
And how did $50,000 explode into $1.25 billion??
Well, folks, you'll just have to ask the woman who not only spearheaded this case because of her position in 1997 at the "Rural Development Leadership Network", but whose family received the highest single payout (approximately $13 million) from that action - Shirley Sherrod. Oops again!!
Yes, folks it appears that Ms. Sherrod had just unwittingly exposed herself as the perpetrator of one of the biggest fraud claims in the history of the United States - - a fraud enabled solely because she screamed racism at the government and cowed them into submission.
And it gets even more interesting...
Ms. Sherrod has also exposed the person who aided and abetted her in this race fraud.
As it turns out, the original judgment of "Pigford vs. Glickman" in 1999 only applied to a total of about 16,000 black farmers.
But....in 2008, a junior US Senator got a law passed to reopen the case and allow more black farmers to sue for funds.
The Senator was Barack Hussein Obama.
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8)US military advisers in Cyrenaica. Qaddafi's loses his air force
Hundreds of US, British and French military advisers have arrived in Cyrenaica, Libya's eastern breakaway province, exclusive military sources report. This is the first time America and Europe have intervened militarily in any of the popular upheavals rolling through the Middle East since Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution in early January. The advisers, including intelligence officers, were dropped from warships and missile boats at the coastal towns of Benghazi and Tobruk Thursday Feb. 24, for a threefold mission:
1. To help the revolutionary committees controlling eastern Libyan establish government frameworks for supplying two million inhabitants with basic services and commodities;
2. To organize them into paramilitary units, teach them how to use the weapons they captured from Libyan army facilities, help them restore law and order on the streets and train them to fight Muammar Qaddafi's combat units coming to retake Cyrenaica.
3. The prepare infrastructure for the intake of additional foreign troops. Egyptian units are among those under consideration.
Qaddafi was shaken up badly Friday, Feb. 25, when many of his air force commanders decided to no longer obey his orders or those of his commanders, exclusive military sources report. This loss deprived him at one stroke of one of the key pillars sustaining his fight for survival against the opposition since Sunday, Feb. 20. It means he is short of an essential resource for recapturing the eastern half of the country where half of Libya's oil wealth and its main oil export terminals are situated.
Friday, NATO Council and the UN Security Council meet in separate emergency sessions to consider ways to halt the bloodletting in Libya and punish its ruler Qaddafi for his violent crackdown of protesters.
The 22,000-strong Libyan Air Force with its 13 bases is Muammar Qaddafi's mainstay for survival against massive popular and international dissent. The 44 air transports and a like number of helicopters swiftly lifted loyal tribal militiamen fully armed from the Sahara and dropped them in the streets of Tripoli Monday Feb. 21
Thursday Qaddafi launched an offensive to wrest the coastal towns around Tripoli from rebel hands. Military sources report that tanks pounded opposition positions in the towns of Misrata, 25 km to the east of Tripoli and Zawiya, 30 km west of the capital, under the command of Gen. Khweldi Hamidi, a Qaddafi kinsman.
In a bloody battle, the insurgents ousted Qaddafi's forces from Misrata, but his troops broke through to Zawiya and captured the town at great loss of life. There are no reliable casualty figures but hundreds are believed to have been killed Thursday on both sides.
Later that day, the insurgents of Cyrenaica announced they were firmly in control of the region including Libya's main export oil terminal in Benghazi, the country's second largest town. Whether or not they decide to block the fuel supplies coming from Qaddafi-ruled areas, their seizure of the facility alone was enough to send oil prices shooting up again on world markets.
Thursday night, Brent crude went for $117 the barrel in London and $103 in New York.
In a 30-minute telephone interview Thursday night, Qaddafi again charged that Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood had instigated the protest uprising in Libya. He warned that the fall of Cyrenaica would open Libya to the establishment of a Muslim jihadi and radical rear base for attacks on Europe and incursions into Egypt.
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