Now that Democrats represent Republicans they are beginning to wonder why they are supporting their own Party? Staying in office trumps loyalty to Obama?
Political prostitutes get religion quickly when their own constituents are about to be gored. (See 1 below.)
The 3 O'clock call came but from a very surprising source - Chavez! The thug from South Ameica realizes he has a friend in D.C. - Obama. Could it possibly be Obama is on the wrong side of 'freedom's fence?' (See 2 below.)
George Friedman analyzes Russia's influence in Iran and posits the CIA may have been behind an effort to begin a color revolution there - the kind we were successful at in weaning Ukraine away from Russia. However, if Ahmadinejad and Russia are in bed with each other this raises serious problems for Obama's effort regarding Iran. (See 3 below. - very interesting.)
Iran cleverly makes Israel's nuclear storehouse a condition precedent. (See 4 below.)
Jordan continues concerned about its Palestinian residents which comprise 70% of their nation's population. My friend Toameh reports. (See 5 below.)
Water water everywhere but not where it needs to be so let's go to war. (See 6 below.)
Another long article but interesting. It asks the question has Damascus begun to shift in its support of terrorism. (See 7 below.)
Obama's unravelling continues and he has only himself to blame. He promised more than he can deliver and is pushing programs a long sought desire of the Far Left but are unaffordable and outside mainstream thinking.
The boomerang of discontent is in the air and headed for the Oval Office's window.
Obama is now drowning in the juice of his own arrogance, attempt to exclude the opposition and ram through his exhorbitant agenda as if the house were on fire..(See 8 below.)
Pass the malaise please as Obama's health care plans develops a slipped disc. (See 9 below.)
Dick
1) Democrats' New Worry: Their Own Rich Voters
By JONATHAN WEISMAN
A group of Democrats elected in recent years from some of the country's richest congressional districts have emerged as a stumbling block to raising taxes on the wealthy to pay for President Barack Obama's ambitious health-care overhaul just as the plan has begun to meet increasing resistance over its cost.
Friday, two freshmen representatives -- Dina Titus, from suburban Las Vegas, and Colorado's Jared Polis, representing Boulder, Vail and some of the tonier suburbs of Denver -- joined Republicans to vote against Mr. Obama's top-priority health-care overhaul when it faced a vote in their House Education and Labor Committee. One reason was a one-percentage point-surtax on couples earning between $350,000 and $500,000 -- gradually increasing to 5.4 percentage points on earnings more than $1 million -- to pay for it.
The bill passed the committee anyway, but if the number of Democratic defectors grows it could pose a serious obstacle to the president.
Also on Friday a busload of freshmen Democrats went to the White House to plead their case against sharp tax increases with the president and his chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel. The organizer was Rep. Gerald Connolly, the president of the freshman class whose Northern Virginia district is the richest in the U.S. as measured by median household income.
"There could come a time," said Rep. Michael McMahon, a freshman Democrat from New York City's borough of Staten Island, when Democrats are in open rebellion. "We will certainly see in the next few weeks where we are going."
Election gains in some of these affluent regions have helped give Democrats big majorities in the House and Senate. Of the 25 richest districts, 14 are represented by Democrats, according to Congressional Quarterly. In 1995, Democrats represented just five of those districts.
Recently elected Democrats from higher-income areas also have been cautious about legislation that would make it easier for labor unions to organize, and about legislation imposing tough new rules on banks. Republicans have savaged the new Democrats for supporting legislation to stem global warming by capping greenhouse-gas emissions, then forcing polluters to purchase and trade emissions credits -- a "cap and tax," the GOP says.
But planned tax increases are likely the source of the toughest intra-Democratic tensions. The president wants to allow George W. Bush's income-tax cuts to expire in 2011 for families earning at least $250,000 and to stop the estate tax from being repealed next year. Mr. Obama also campaigned on putting an additional payroll tax of two to four percentage points on incomes above $250,000 to help put Social Security back on solid footing. As the president confronts a surging budget deficit and presses his ambitious agenda, all those tax increases may be necessary to make ends meet.
All together, Democratic plans could push the top tax rate to 47%, the highest level since the tax code was rewritten in 1986.
Republicans remain strongly unified in their opposition to the president, who has promised not only to create a national health-care plan, ease the nation away from fossil fuels and overhaul education, but also to pay for it all -- largely through higher taxes and other fees.
Strong Democratic majorities, especially in the House, give the White House plenty of latitude. But if wary freshmen team with the more seasoned centrists in the fiscally conservative Blue Dog Democrat coalition, who are threatening the health bill in the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the coalition could be formidable.
The White House defends its approach. "The bottom line is that I think the president believes that the richest 1% of this country has had a pretty good run of it for many, many, many years," said White House spokesman Robert Gibbs.
Mr. Connolly, the Northern Virginia representative, has a different calculation. Households earning at least $200,000 represent 14% of his district, "and they all vote," he said.
"They're just hanging themselves," says Republican Rep. Sam Graves, who last year beat back a spirited challenge in his northwestern Missouri district, which includes suburban Kansas City, and said he is looking forward to a race on taxes in 2010.
The tax issue is presenting many new Democrats with a quandary as they struggle to get their political footing. "These members are going to have to make their own determinations on how to balance these interests," said Maryland Rep. Chris Van Hollen, chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and himself a representative of the affluent suburbs of Washington.
The issue of taxes has long bedeviled Democratic candidates, but in 2008, Mr. Obama took control of it. He campaigned hard on tax cuts for the middle class, savaged as a tax increase Republican Sen. John McCain's proposal to subject the value of health-insurance benefits to income taxation, and convinced most Americans they would be unaffected even as he said he would allow taxes to rise on the rich.
But as Democrats who served in Congress in 1994 will attest, the game changes when abstractions on taxing the rich turn to reality. President Bill Clinton's 1993 deficit-reduction plan largely focused tax increases on the rich, but the collateral damage on Democrats was broad. And nobody wants to be the next Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky, the suburban Philadelphia House freshman who cast the deciding vote on the Clinton budget, only to be swept from office the next year.
"I never should have been asked to take that vote, ever," said Ms. Margolies-Mezvinsky, who now runs Women's Campaign International, a Philadelphia-based group with a mission to empower women politically.
Since the 1994 GOP sweep, districts like Ms. Margolies-Mezvinsky's have swung back to the Democrats. For 14 years, Republican Tom Davis represented most of Northern Virginia's Fairfax and Prince William counties. Now, Fairfax and Prince William belong to Mr. Connolly. Rep. John Hall took over the Hudson River Valley suburbs of New York after defeating veteran Republican Sue Kelly in 2006.
Boulder's Mr. Polis authored a letter on Friday, signed by 21 freshmen and one sophomore, Rep. Paul Hodes of New Hampshire, opposing the surtaxes. "Especially in a recession, we need to make sure not to kill the goose that will lay the golden eggs of our recovery," they declared.
For now, most freshmen aren't saying how they will vote on the House health-care bill. Mr. McMahon, whose New York district also includes parts of Brooklyn, said there is no open revolt, but there have been two meetings with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and there was the White House meeting Friday with Messrs. Obama and Emanuel. Taxes dominated what Mr. Connolly described as a cordial but inconclusive discussion.
"I spend all my time here making the case that the profile of the rich doesn't stand in my district," Mr. McMahon said. "People feel that they're getting hit from all sides."
2)The U.S. Steers Left on Honduras: Why would Hugo Chavez expect Obama to help him?
By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
When Hugo Chávez makes a personal appeal to Washington for help, as he did 11 days ago, it raises serious questions about the signals that President Barack Obama is sending to the hemisphere's most dangerous dictator.
At issue is Mr. Chávez's determination to restore deposed Honduran president Manuel Zelaya to power through multilateral pressure. His phone call to a State Department official showed that his campaign was not going well and that he thought he could get U.S. help.
This is not good news for the region. The Venezuelan may feel that his aims have enough support from the U.S. and the Organization of American States (OAS) that he would be justified in forcing Mr. Zelaya on Honduras by supporting a violent overthrow of the current government. That he has reason to harbor such a view is yet another sign that the Obama administration is on the wrong side of history.
In the three weeks since the Honduran Congress moved to defend the country's constitution by relieving Mr. Zelaya of his presidential duties, it has become clear that his arrest was both lawful and a necessary precaution against violence.
The Americas in the NewsGet the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
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Mr. Zelaya was trying to use mob rule to undermine Honduras's institutions in much the same way that Mr. Chávez has done in Venezuela. But as Washington lawyer Miguel Estrada pointed out in the Los Angeles Times on July 10, Mr. Zelaya's actions were expressly forbidden by the Honduran constitution.
"Article 239," Mr. Estrada noted, "specifically states that any president who so much as proposes the permissibility of reelection 'shall cease forthwith' in his duties, and Article 4 provides that any 'infraction' of the succession rules constitutes treason." Congress had little choice but to take its next step. It convened "immediately after Zelaya's arrest," Mr. Estrada wrote, "condemning his illegal conduct, and overwhelmingly voting (122-6) to remove him from office."
Mr. Zelaya was shipped out of the country because Honduras believed that jailing him would make him a lightning rod for violence. Interim President Roberto Micheletti promised that presidential elections scheduled for November would go forward.
That might have been the end of it if the U.S. had supported the Honduran rule of law, or simply refrained from meddling. Instead President Obama and the State Department joined Mr. Chávez and his allies in demanding that Mr. Zelaya be restored to power. This has emboldened Venezuela.
On July 5, Mr. Zelaya boarded a plane manned by a Venezuelan crew bound for Tegucigalpa, knowing full well that he would not be allowed to land. It didn't matter. His intention was to incite a mob on the ground and force a confrontation between his supporters and the military. It worked. One person was killed in clashes near the airport.
Yet the tragedy did not produce the desired condemnation of the Micheletti government. Rather, it empowered Honduran patriots. Perhaps this is because the airport violence reinforced the claim that Mr. Zelaya is a threat to the peace.
He was not the only one to lose credibility that day. OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza had encouraged the fly-over stunt despite its obvious risks. He even traveled in a separate plane behind Mr. Zelaya to show support. The incident destroyed any possibility that Mr. Insulza could be considered an honest broker. It also proved the charge that by insisting on Mr. Zelaya's return the U.S. was playing with fire.
The next day Costa Rican President Oscar Arias offered to act as a mediator between Mr. Zelaya and the new government. Mr. Arias would seem to be far from an impartial referee given that he is a supporter of Mr. Zelaya. Yet it is also true that Central America has the most to lose if Honduras descends into civil war. It follows that the San José venue offers better odds for the Honduran democracy than, say, the auspices of the OAS.
Other influential Central Americans have expressed support for Honduras. Last week the Honduran daily El Heraldo reported that Salvador's OAS ambassador said he hopes to see the resolution that suspended Honduras from the group revoked under the new permanent-council president. Catholic Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga has condemned Mr. Zelaya's violent tactics and says that Honduras does not want to emulate Venezuela.
Mr. Chávez understands that Mr. Zelaya's star is fading, which is why he called Tom Shannon, the State Department's assistant secretary for the Western Hemisphere at home at 11:15 p.m on July 9. Mr. Shannon told me that Mr. Chávez "again made the case for the unconditional return of Mr. Zelaya, though he did so in a less bombastic manner than he has in the past."
Mr. Shannon says that in response he "suggested to him that Venezuela and its [allies] address the fear factor by calling for free and fair elections and a peaceful transition to a new government." That, Mr. Shannon, says, "hasn't happened."
Nor is it likely to. Yet the U.S. continues exerting enormous pressure for the return of Mr. Zelaya. If it prevails, it is unlikely that Mr. Zelaya's mobs or Mr. Chávez will suddenly be tamed.
3) Russia, Ahmadinejad and Iran Reconsidered
By George Friedman
At Friday prayers July 17 at Tehran University, the influential cleric and former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani gave his first sermon since Iran’s disputed presidential election and the subsequent demonstrations. The crowd listening to Rafsanjani inside the mosque was filled with Ahmadinejad supporters who chanted, among other things, “Death to America” and “Death to China.” Outside the university common grounds, anti-Ahmadinejad elements — many of whom were blocked by Basij militiamen and police from entering the mosque — persistently chanted “Death to Russia.”
Death to America is an old staple in Iran. Death to China had to do with the demonstrations in Xinjiang and the death of Uighurs at the hands of the Chinese. Death to Russia, however, stood out. Clearly, its use was planned before the protesters took to the streets. The meaning of this must be uncovered. To begin to do that, we must consider the political configuration in Iran at the moment.
The Iranian Political Configuration
There are two factions claiming to speak for the people. Rafsanjani represents the first faction. During his sermon, he spoke for the tradition of the founder of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who took power during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Rafjsanjani argued that Khomeini wanted an Islamic republic faithful to the will of the people, albeit within the confines of Islamic law. Rafsanjani argued that he was the true heir to the Islamic revolution. He added that Khomeini’s successor — the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — had violated the principles of the revolution when he accepted that Rafsanjani’s archenemy, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had won Iran’s recent presidential election. (There is enormous irony in foreigners describing Rafsanjani as a moderate reformer who supports greater liberalization. Though he has long cultivated this image in the West, in 30 years of public political life it is hard to see a time when has supported Western-style liberal democracy.)
The other faction is led by Ahmadinejad, who takes the position that Rafsanjani in particular — along with the generation of leaders who ascended to power during the first phase of the Islamic republic — has betrayed the Iranian people. Rather than serving the people, Ahmadinejad claims they have used their positions to become so wealthy that they dominate the Iranian economy and have made the reforms needed to revitalize the Iranian economy impossible. According to Ahmadinejad’s charges, these elements now blame Ahmadinejad for Iran’s economic failings when the root of these failings is their own corruption. Ahmadinejad claims that the recent presidential election represents a national rejection of the status quo. He adds that claims of fraud represent attempts by Rafsanjani — who he portrays as defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi’s sponsor — and his ilk to protect their positions from Ahmadinejad.
Iran is therefore experiencing a generational dispute, with each side claiming to speak both for the people and for the Khomeini tradition. There is the older generation — symbolized by Rafsanjani — that has prospered during the last 30 years. Having worked with Khomeini, this generation sees itself as his true heir. Then, there is the younger generation. Known as “students” during the revolution, this group did the demonstrating and bore the brunt of the shah’s security force counterattacks. It argues that Khomeini would be appalled at what Rafsanjani and his generation have done to Iran.
This debate is, of course, more complex than this. Khamenei, a key associate of Khomeini, appears to support Ahmadinejad’s position. And Ahmadinejad hardly speaks for all of the poor as he would like to claim. The lines of political disputes are never drawn as neatly as we would like. Ultimately, Rafsanjani’s opposition to the recent election did not have as much to do with concerns (valid or not) over voter fraud. It had everything to do with the fact that the outcome threatened his personal position. Which brings us back to the question of why Rafsanjani’s followers were chanting “Death to Russia?”
Examining the Anomalous Chant
For months prior to the election, Ahmadinejad’s allies warned that the United States was planning a “color” revolution. Color revolutions, like the one in Ukraine, occurred widely in the former Soviet Union after its collapse, and these revolutions followed certain steps. An opposition political party was organized to mount an electoral challenge the establishment. Then, an election occurred that was either fraudulent or claimed by the opposition as having been fraudulent. Next, widespread peaceful protests against the regime (all using a national color as the symbol of the revolution) took place, followed by the collapse of the government through a variety of paths. Ultimately, the opposition — which was invariably pro-Western and particularly pro-American — took power.
Moscow openly claimed that Western intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, organized and funded the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. These agencies allegedly used nongovernmental organizations (human rights groups, pro-democracy groups, etc.) to delegitimize the existing regime, repudiate the outcome of election regardless of its validity and impose what the Russians regarded as a pro-American puppet regime. The Russians saw Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as the breakpoint in their relationship with the West, with the creation of a pro-American, pro-NATO regime in Ukraine representing a direct attack on Russian national security. The Americans argued that to the contrary, they had done nothing but facilitate a democratic movement that opposed the existing regime for its own reasons, demanding that rigged elections be repudiated.
In warning that the United States was planning a color revolution in Iran, Ahmadinejad took the Russian position. Namely, he was arguing that behind the cover of national self-determination, human rights and commitment to democratic institutions, the United States was funding an Iranian opposition movement on the order of those active in the former Soviet Union. Regardless of whether the opposition actually had more votes, this opposition movement would immediately regard an Ahmadinejad win as the result of fraud. Large demonstrations would ensue, and if left unopposed, the Islamic republic would come under threat.
In doing this, Ahmadinejad’s faction positioned itself against the actuality that such a rising would occur. If it did, Ahmadinejad could claim that the demonstrators were — wittingly or not — operating on behalf of the United States, thus delegitimizing the demonstrators. In so doing, he could discredit supporters of the demonstrators as not tough enough on the United States, a useful charge against Rafsanjani, whom the West long has held up as an Iranian moderate.
Interestingly, while demonstrations were at their height, Ahmadinejad chose to attend — albeit a day late — a multinational Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference in Moscow on the Tuesday after the election. It was very odd that he would leave Iran at the time of the greatest unrest; we assumed that he had decided to demonstrate to Iranians that he didn’t take the demonstrations seriously.
The charge that seems to be emerging on the Rafsanjani side is that Ahmadinejad’s fears of a color revolution were not simply political, but were encouraged by the Russians. It was the Russians who had been talking to Ahmadinejad and his lieutenants on a host of issues, who warned him about the possibility of a color revolution. More important, the Russians helped prepare Ahmadinejad for the unrest that would come — and given the Russian experience, how to manage it. Though we speculate here, if this theory is correct, it could explain some of the efficiency with which Ahmadinejad shut down cell phone and other communications during the postelection unrest, as he may have had Russian advisers.
Rafsanjani’s followers were not shouting “Death to Russia” without a reason, at least in their own minds. They are certainly charging that Ahmadinejad took advice from the Russians, and went to Russia in the midst of political unrest for consultations. Rafsanjani’s charge may or may not be true. Either way, there is no question that Ahmadinejad did claim that the United States was planning a color revolution in Iran. If he believed that charge, it would have been irrational not to reach out to the Russians. But whether or not the CIA was involved, the Russians might well have provided Ahmadinejad with intelligence of such a plot and helped shape his response, and thereby may have created a closer relationship with him.
How Iran’s internal struggle will work itself out remains unclear. But one dimension is shaping up: Ahmadinejad is trying to position Rafsanjani as leading a pro-American faction intent on a color revolution, while Rafsanjani is trying to position Ahmadinejad as part of a pro-Russian faction. In this argument, the claim that Ahmadinejad had some degree of advice or collaboration with the Russians is credible, just as the claim that Rafsanjani maintained some channels with the Americans is credible. And this makes an internal dispute geopolitically significant.
The Iranian Struggle in Geopolitical Context
At the moment, Ahmadinejad appears to have the upper hand. Khamenei has certified his re-election. The crowds have dissipated; nothing even close to the numbers of the first few days have since materialized. For Ahmadinejad to lose, Rafsanjani would have to mobilize much of the clergy — many of whom are seemingly content to let Rafsanjani be the brunt of Ahmadinejad’s attacks — in return for leaving their own interests and fortunes intact. There are things that could bring Ahmadinejad down and put Rafsanjani in control, but all of them would require Khamenei to endorse social and political instability, which he will not do.
If the Russians have in fact have intervened in Iran to the extent of providing intelligence to Ahmadinejad and advice to him during his visit on how to handle the postelection unrest (as the chants suggest), then Russian influence in Iran is not surging — it has surged. In some measure, Ahmadinejad would owe his position to Russian warnings and advice. There is little gratitude in the world of international affairs, but Ahmadinejad has enemies, and the Russians would have proven their utility in helping contain those enemies.
From the Russian point of view, Ahmadinejad would be a superb asset — even if not truly under their control. His very existence focuses American attention on Iran, not on Russia. It follows, then, that Russia would have made a strategic decision to involve itself in the postelection unrest, and that for the purposes of its own negotiations with Washington, Moscow will follow through to protect the Iranian state to the extent possible. The Russians have already denied U.S. requests for assistance on Iran. But if Moscow has intervened in Iran to help safeguard Ahmadinejad’s position, then the potential increases for Russia to provide Iran with the S-300 strategic air defense systems that it has been dangling in front of Tehran for more than a decade.
If the United States perceives an entente between Moscow and Tehran emerging, then the entire dynamic of the region shifts and the United States must change its game. The threat to Washington’s interests becomes more intense as the potential of a Russian S-300 sale to Iran increases, and the need to disrupt the Russian-Iranian entente would become all the more important. U.S. influence in Iran already has declined substantially, and Ahmadinejad is more distrustful and hostile than ever of the United States after having to deal with the postelection unrest. If a Russian-Iranian entente emerges out of all this — which at the moment is merely a possibility, not an imminent reality — then the United States would have some serious strategic problems on its hands.
Revisiting Assumptions on Iran
For the past few years, STRATFOR has assumed that a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran was unlikely. Iran was not as advanced in its nuclear program as some claimed, and the complexities of any attack were greater than assumed. The threat of an attack was thus a U.S. bargaining chip, much as Iran’s nuclear program itself was an Iranian bargaining chip for use in achieving Tehran’s objectives in Iraq and the wider region. To this point, our net assessment has been accurate.
At this point, however, we need to stop and reconsider. If Iran and Russia begin serious cooperation, Washington’s existing dilemma with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its ongoing standoff with the Russians would fuse to become a single, integrated problem. This is something the United States would find difficult to manage. Washington’s primary goal would become preventing this from happening.
Ahmadinejad has long argued that the United States was never about to attack Iran, and that charges by Rafsanjani and others that he has pursued a reckless foreign policy were groundless. But with the “Death to Russia” chants and signaling of increased Russian support for Iran, the United States may begin to reconsider its approach to the region.
Iran’s clerical elite does not want to go to war. They therefore can only view with alarm the recent ostentatious transiting of the Suez Canal into the Red Sea by Israeli submarines and corvettes. This transiting did not happen without U.S. approval. Moreover, in spite of U.S. opposition to expanded Israeli settlements and Israeli refusals to comply with this opposition, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will be visiting Israel in two weeks. The Israelis have said that there must be a deadline on negotiations with Iran over the nuclear program when the next G-8 meeting takes place in September; a deadline that the G-8 has already approved. The consequences if Iran ignores the deadline were left open-ended.
All of this can fit into our old model of psychological warfare, as representing a bid to manipulate Iranian politics by making Ahmadinejad’s leadership look too risky. It could also be the United States signaling the Russians that stakes in the region are rising. It is not clear that the United States has reconsidered its strategy on Iran in the wake of the postelection demonstrations. But if Rafsanjani’s claim of Russian support for Ahmadinejad is true, a massive re-evaluation of U.S. policy could ensue, assuming one hasn’t already started — prompting a reconsideration of the military option.
All of this assumes that there is substance behind a mob chanting “Death to Russia.” There appears to be, but of course, Ahmadinejad’s enemies would want to magnify that substance to its limits and beyond. This is why we are not ready to simply abandon our previous net assessment of Iran, even though it is definitely time to rethink it.
4)Tehran: Israel's "200 nuclear warheads" must first be part of Middle East disarmament
Iran has posted a new package of "proposals" to the West in response to its offer of engagement on Tehran's nuclear activities. Foreign ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said the "comprehensive and updated" package aims to prepare the ground for more "fluid interaction" with the West. "But we cannot speak of a Middle East without nuclear weapons without discussing the more than 200 nuclear warheads of the Zionist regime Israel," he said. This is "based on an international approach."
Iranian sources report the point of the new package, whose contents have been transferred piecemeal to Washington and some European capitals, is for Tehran to retain the whip hand in any forthcoming negotiations by posting demands but no concessions.
Qashqavi's words were the corollary to first statement made by the new head of the Iranian nuclear energy commission Ali Akbar Salehi after his appointment Saturday, July 18. He said the time had come to end six years of animosity between Tehran and the West and start building bridges of trust. But he also said: "legal and technical discussions about Iran's nuclear case have finished and there is no room left to keep this case open."
Qashqavi's statement is the Islamic Republic's typical way of launching a hardball game with the West by a demand to dismantle Israel's never-confirmed nuclear arsenal without making any promises about Iran's nuclear program, or even the uranium enrichment activities banned by the UN Security Council. In fact, he persisted in denying that Tehran had any plan to develop nuclear weaponry.
The foreign ministry spokesman also mentioned another price for dialogue with the West: "Iran's proposed package will suggest solutions to the economic crisis based on the principles of the Islamic economy," he said.
5) Amman begins stripping state's Palestinians of citizenship
Khaled Abu Toameh
Jordanian authorities have started revoking the citizenship of thousands of Palestinians living in Jordan to avoid a situation in which they would be "resettled" permanently in the kingdom, Jordanian and Palestinian officials revealed on Monday.
The new measure has increased tensions between Jordanians and Palestinians, who make up around 70 percent of the kingdom's population.
The tensions reached their peak over the weekend when tens of thousands of fans of Jordan's Al-Faisali soccer team chanted slogans condemning Palestinians as traitors and collaborators with Israel. Al-Faisali was playing the rival Wihdat soccer team, made up of Jordanian-Palestinians, in the Jordanian town of Zarqa.
Anti-riot policemen had to interfere to stop the Jordanian fans from lynching the Wihdat team members and their fans, eyewitnesses reported. They said the Jordanian fans of Al-Faisali hurled empty bottles and fireworks at the Palestinian players and their supporters.
Reports in a number of Jordanian newspapers said that the Jordanian fans also chanted anti-Palestinian slogans and cursed Palestine, the PLO, Jerusalem and the Aksa Mosque.
Prince Ali bin Hussein, chairman of Jordan's National Football Association, strongly condemned the racist slurs chanted by the Jordanian fans, saying those responsible would be severely punished.
Baker al-Udwan, director of Al-Faisali team, also condemned the behavior of his team's supporters. He said that a minority of "outcasts" and "corrupt" elements were behind the embarrassing verbal and physical assault on the Palestinian soccer players and their fans.
"We condemn this uncivilized demeanor and welcome any step that would result in the elimination of this tiny group of parasites," he said.
Tarek Khoury, chairman of the Wihdat team, instructed his players to abandon the field as soon as the Jordanian fans started hurling abuse against Palestinians and the Aksa Mosque.
Palestinians said that the confrontation with the Jordanians was yet another indication of increased tensions between the two sides.
"Many Palestinians living in Jordan are convinced that the Jordanian authorities are trying to squeeze them out," said Ismail Jaber, a West Bank lawyer who has been living in the kingdom for nearly 20 years. "There is growing discontent and uncertainty among Palestinians here."
He and other Palestinians said that Jordanians' "hostile" attitude toward them had escalated after the rise to power of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu earlier this year.
Several Jordanian government officials, they said, are convinced that Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman are secretly working toward turning Jordan into a Palestinian state.
As a preemptive measure, the Jordanian authorities recently began revoking the citizenship of thousands of Palestinians, leaving many of them in a state of panic and uncertainty regarding the future.
The Jordanians have justified the latest measure by arguing that it's aimed at avoiding a situation in which the Palestinians would ever be prevented from returning to their original homes inside Israel.
Since 1988, when the late King Hussein cut off his country's administrative and legal ties with the West Bank, the Jordanian authorities have been working toward "disengaging" from the Palestinians under the pretext of preserving their national identity.
That decision, said Jordan's Interior Minister Nayef al-Kadi, was taken at the request of the PLO and the Arab world to consolidate the status of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
"Our goal is to prevent Israel from emptying the Palestinian territories of their original inhabitants," the minister explained, confirming that the kingdom had begun revoking the citizenship of Palestinians.
"We should be thanked for taking this measure," he said. "We are fulfilling our national duty because Israel wants to expel the Palestinians from their homeland."
Kadi said that, despite the new policy, Palestinians would be permitted to retain their status as residents of the kingdom by holding "yellow ID cards" that are issued to those who have families and homes in the West Bank.
He said that Palestinians working for the Palestinian Authority or the PLO were among those who have had their Jordanian passports taken from them, in addition to anyone who did not serve in the Jordanian army.
The Jordanian minister said that the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank had been notified of the decision to revoke the Jordanian citizenship of Palestinians.
A PA official in Ramallah expressed deep concern over Jordan's latest move and said that it would only worsen the conditions of Palestinians living in the kingdom. The official said that PA President Mahmoud Abbas raised the issue with King Abdullah II on a number of occasions, but the Jordanians have refused to retract.
Asked by the London-based Al-Hayat daily where the Palestinians should go after they lose their Jordanian passports, the minister replied: "We're not expelling anyone, nor are we revoking the citizenship of Jordanian nationals. We are only correcting the mistake that was created after Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank [in 1988]. We want to highlight the true identity and nationality of every person."
Kadi claimed that the kingdom was seeking, through the new measure, to thwart an Israeli "plot" to transfer more Palestinians to Jordan with the hope of replacing it with a Palestinian state.
"We insist that Jordan is not Palestine, just as Palestine is not Jordan," he stressed. "We will continue to help the Palestinians hold on to their Palestinian identity by pursuing the implementation of the 1988 disengagement plan from the West Bank."
6)Editor of Leading Pakistani Paper: 'If, in Order to Resolve Our Water Problems, We Have to Wage Nuclear War with India, We Will' – Water Disputes Between India and Pakistan – A Potential Casus Belli
By: Tufail Ahmad *
Introduction
Concern is growing in Pakistan that India is pursuing policies in an attempt to strangulate Pakistan by exercising control over the water flow of Pakistan's rivers. The concern is most related to Pakistan’s agricultural sector, which would be greatly affected by the building of dams and by the external control of the waters of several rivers that flow into Pakistan.[1] The issue has a layered complexity, as three of the rivers flow into Pakistan through the Indian portion of Jammu & Kashmir, the territory over which the two countries have waged multiple wars.[2]
Pakistani columnists, religious leaders, and policymakers are increasingly articulating their concern over the water dispute in terms of a traditional rivalry against India and in terms of anti-Israel sentiment that has been fostered by the country's establishment over the years. In one such recent case, Ayaz Amir, a renowned Pakistani columnist, warned: "Insisting on our water rights with regard to India must be one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy. The disputes of the future will be about water."[3] Hamid Gul, former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), charged: "India has stopped our water."[4] Pakistan's Indus Basin Water Council (IBWC), a pressure group that appears deceivingly authoritative as an organization whose central purpose is to address Pakistani water concerns, currently maintains near hegemony over the pubic debate of the issue. IBWC Chairman Zahoorul Hassan Dahir claimed that "India, working in conjunction with the Jewish lobby" is using most of the river waters, causing a shortage of food, water and electricity in Pakistan.[5]
The Pakistani concern involves six rivers that flow into Pakistan through northern India, including the disputed state of Jammu & Kashmir and the state of Punjab, both of which have been ideologically divided between India and Pakistan since 1947. After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, disagreements began to arise over sharing of river waters, leading to the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, an attempt at a resolution brokered by the World Bank.[6] Though the treaty is perhaps the most enduring pact between the two nuclear powers, it is coming under increasing strain.
Understanding the IndusRiver System
The Indus Water Treaty sets out the legal framework for the sharing of the waters of six rivers: the Indus River and its five tributaries. All six rivers - Indus, Chenab, Jhelum, Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi - flow through northern India into Pakistan. Under the pact, the waters of three rivers - the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum, which pass through Jammu & Kashmir - are to be used by Pakistan, while India has rights to the waters of the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi before these three enter Pakistani territory. The Chenab is the key tributary, as it carries the waters of the rest four rivers into the Indus.
The complicated origins of the Indus river system plays a key role in the water debates, as the rivers originate in and pass through a number of countries. According to the Indus Water Treaty, the following three rivers are for use by Pakistan:
The Indus River: originates in Chinese-controlled Tibet and flows through Jammu & Kashmir.
The Chenab: originates in India’s Himachal Pradesh state, travels through Jammu & Kashmir.
The Jhelum: rises in Jammu & Kashmir and flows into Pakistan, finally joining Chenab.
The Treaty affords India use of the following three rivers:
The Sutlej: originates in Tibet, flows through Himachal Pradesh and Punjab before joining the Chenab.
The Beas and the Ravi: originate in Himachal Pradesh state and flow into Pakistan, emptying into the Chenab.
Taking into account the flow of the rivers, the importance of the Chenab and the Indus becomes clear. The Chenab combines the waters of four rivers, the Jhelum, the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi, to form a single water system which then joins the Indus in Pakistan. The Indus River is considered to be the lifeline of Pakistani economy and livestock.
Pakistani Concern and Baglihar Dam
Pakistani concern regarding the water from the rivers started in the 1990s after India began constructing a hydroelectric power project on the Chenab River in the Doda district of Jammu & Kashmir. Since the Chenab is the key tributary of the Indus, Pakistani policymakers, religious and political parties, and political commentators feared that India could exert control over the waters. Such control could be used to injure the Pakistani economy and livestock, or could be used to cause floods in Pakistan by the release of water during times of war. Discussions of Pakistan's concerns are most often centralized around the Baglihar dam, though it is only one of the several water projects being developed by India in its part of Jammu & Kashmir.[7]
The first phase of the Baglihar dam, a 450-MW hydroelectric power project initiated in the 1990s, was completed on October 10, 2008. Inaugurating the project, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted: "It is a matter of satisfaction that the reconstruction program... [entailing] 67 projects is well under way with 19 projects completed, one of which is the Baglihar project that I inaugurated today." [8] The fact that the Baglihar dam is one of 67 development projects underway in Jammu & Kashmir raises further concerns among many Pakistanis who believe that Kashmir, having a Muslim majority, rightfully belongs to the Islamic state of Pakistan. The extensive building of infrastructure by India is therefore a cause of further Pakistani displeasure and contention.
The discussion of water easily ignites popular passion because Pakistan is increasingly confronted by an impending water crisis. In early 2009, it was estimated that Pakistan is on the brink of a water disaster, as the availability of water in Pakistan has been declining over the past few decades, from 5,000 cubic meters per capita 60 years ago to 1,200 cubic meters per capita in 2009. By 2020, the availability of water is estimated to fall to about 800 cubic meters per capita.[9] M. Yusuf Sarwar, a member of the Indus Basin Water Council, has warned that the lessening flow of water in rivers and shortage of water generally could cause Pakistan to be declared a disaster-affected nation by 2013.[10] Dr. Muhammad Yar Khawar, a scientist at the University of Sindh, released research last year based on sample surveys that warns that less than 20 percent of below-surface water in the Sindh province, previously thought to be a viable water source, is acceptable for drinking.[11]
Amidst this shortage of water, Pakistan is also confronted with a number of internal factors that amount to further strain. One columnist warned that with Pakistan's population set to jump to 250 million in just a few years' time, a shortage of water, along with that of oil, sugar, and wheat, will become a major problem.[12] Pakistan is also estimated to be losing 13 million cusecs [approximately 368,119 cubic meters/second] of water every year from its rivers into the sea, as it does not have enough reservoirs or dams to store water.[13] Further tensions arise from allegations of inequitable distribution of water between various Pakistani provinces. The Indus River System Authority (IRSA), which allocates water to provinces, averted a major political controversy between provinces in June 2009 by declaring that there would be not cut in their water supply.[14]
While a number of Pakistan's internal behaviors are responsible for the depleting water table, the construction of Baglihar dam by India has multiplied Pakistani concern. Pakistani writers warn that the dam will deprive Pakistan of 321,000 acre feet of water during agricultural season, greatly affecting wheat production in the Punjab province and leading to crop failures.[15] There are some warnings that the dam will adversely affect 13 million acres of irrigated land around the Chenab and Ravi rivers, forcing Pakistani farmers to change crops, and in the face of starvation, deepening Pakistan’s dependence on food imports and burdening the country's national exchequer.[16] In an editorial published in June 2009, Pakistan's mass-circulation Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Jang said India "is nursing an unpious dream of turning the entirety of Pakistan into a desert."[17]
Pakistan-Indian Talks
Under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, India is not permitted to build dams for the purpose of water storage on the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers, but it is allowed to make limited use of their waters, including developing run-of-the-river hydroelectric power projects.[18] India is required to provide Pakistan with the technical details of any water project it wants to develop on these rivers before building begins.[19] Pakistan has formally raised objections on the technical specifications of the Baglihar dam, including design, size, gated spillways, and water capacity.[20] Over the past decade, India and Pakistan held a series of talks on the issue of the Baglihar dam but could not resolve the matter within the framework of the 1960 treaty.
In 2003, Pakistan formally served a final notice to the Indian government, urging it to resolve the Baglihar issue by December 31, 2003, a process that failed to yield results.[21] In 2005, Pakistan approached the World Bank for mediation. The World Bank noted that it was "not a guarantor of the treaty," but had the authority to appoint a neutral expert.[22] In 2007, the appointed neutral expert Professor Raymond Lafitte of Switzerland delivered a verdict rejecting most of the Pakistani objections.[23] However, Professor Lafitte did require India to make some minor changes, including reducing the dam's height by 1.5m.[24] Significantly, Professor Lafitte's judgment classified Pakistani objections as "differences" and not a serious "dispute," which could have paved the way for the issue to be taken to a Court of Arbitration as envisaged in the treaty.[25]
To this day, Pakistan remains dissatisfied over the Lafitte verdict. Though India has facilitated visits by Pakistani officials to the dam site and Indian delegations have visited Pakistan to examine Pakistani claims of a water shortage in the Chenab river, the countries remain at an impasse.[26] Bilateral talks between the two countries are now increasingly focused on water disputes. Pakistan has accused India several times of completely stopping Pakistan's water from the Chenab River. In March 2008, Hafiz Zahoorul Hassan Dahir, the IBWC chairman, charged that India "completely shut down the Chenab river from the 1st to the 26th of January 2008, with not even a drop of water moving."[27] India was also accused of curtailing the water supply from the Chenab River during September-October, 2008. Due to a precedent set in the 1978 case of the Salal dam construction by India in Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan is requesting to be paid a compensation for any water shortfall.[28] In June 2009, the Pakistani government declared that India rejected its demand for monetary compensation for the loss of water from the Chenab River. Pakistan alleged that the waters of the Chenab had been stopped by India during August 2008; however India refuted these claims, citing unreliable Pakistani statistics regarding water stoppage and loss.[29] In an editorial, the Urdu-language Pakistani newspaper Roznama Express noted: "If India continues to build dams on our rivers and stop our water, then the day is not far when our lands will become barren and this nation, that has a spectacular history of agricultural production, will be forced to import food."[30] The daily observed that during a meeting with President Asif Zardari, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh assured the President that he was looking into the matter, but no action was taken. In October 2008, President Zardari took "serious notice" of the issue and warned of "damage to bilateral relations" if Pakistani concerns were not addressed.[31] A few days before President Zardari’s statement, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the Baglihar dam project, stating that "Pakistan's concerns about the project had been addressed."[32]
On June 6, 2009, two years after the Lafitte verdict, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi accused India of violating the Indus Water Treaty.[33] Qureshi further warned that any failure to resolve the water disputes "could lead to conflict in the region."[34] A sentiment is now emerging in Pakistan that the 1960 Indus Water Treaty has proven to function to the sole advantage of India. Ayub Mayo, the president of the farmers' lobby group Pakistan Muttahida Kisan Mahaz, declared that the 1960 pact is simply "a conspiracy to deprive Pakistan of its due share of water."[35] While the talks between the two nations regarding water-related issues are continuing into the second half of 2009, public debate in Pakistan on the subject continues to be vigorous and sentimental, raising complicated concerns of national security, traditional rivalry with India, as well as historical anti-Semitism.
The Perceived Threat
During the past two years, the debate in Pakistan about the Indian water projects in Jammu & Kashmir has gained a bitter momentum, as Pakistani leaders have begun to describe India as their eternal enemy and accuse India of trying to suffocate the Pakistani economy. Speeches by the leaders often carry an element of anti-Semitism, blaming India for acting under an international conspiracy led by Israel, the U.S. and India against the Islamic state of Pakistan.
In early 2008, an editorial in the Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Ausaf accused India of planning a "Water Bomb" strategy to economically strangulate Pakistan. The article quoted the officials of the IBWC pressure group as saying that India wants to achieve through a "water bomb" what it could not achieve through the three wars waged over the past six decades.[36] Noting that India is planning "50 dams to raid the waters of the rivers" flowing into Pakistan, the IBWC warned: "If this is not foiled, Pakistan will face the worst famine and economic disaster."[37]
In April 2008, IBWC Chairman Hafiz Zahoorul Hassan Dahir stated that India plans to construct 10 more dams on rivers streaming into Pakistan in addition to the ongoing construction of 52 new dams. "We believe that if India succeeded in constructing the proposed dams," Dahir disclosed, "Pakistan would join the list of the countries facing a severe water crisis. If we are to save Pakistan, we have to protect our waters and review our policies in Kashmir."[38]
One month later, Dahir accused India of using 80 percent of the water of the Chenab and Jhelum rivers and 60 percent of the water of the Indus, stating: "We can do nothing about what India is doing but we are concerned about the role of our government. If continued, this distribution of water would not only affect our energy but also agricultural production. We wonder as to why we are leading toward collective suicide."[39] In May 2009, Dahir described "India's water terrorism as a bigger threat than Talibani terrorism," and then added: "The day is not far when circumstances like those in Somalia, Ethiopia and Chad will emerge inside Pakistan... Between India and Pakistan, there is an extremely dreadful dispute. In an aggressive manner, India has readied a weapon for use against Pakistan that is more dangerous and destructive than an atomic bomb."[40] Dahir warned that by 2012, India will acquire the capability to completely stop the waters of the Jhelum and the Chenab.[41]
One month after the inauguration of first phase of the Baglihar project by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Jamaat Ali Shah, Pakistan's Indus Water Commissioner and liaison between the countries within the framework of the 1960 treaty, warned that India plans to make Pakistan barren by 2014 by stopping its water. At a seminar in Lahore, Shah contented that India is permitted to generate electricity from the waters of the rivers but not to stop Pakistan's water as it has on several occasions, most notably from August 19 to September 5, 2008, a suspension presumably necessary to fill up the Baglihar dam.[42] Pakistani leaders estimate that during the 36 day hiatus from September-October 2008, India deprived Pakistan of more than 1.2 million cusecs water.[43]
Defense Security Concerns
Within a week of the dam's October 2008 inauguration, Major General Athar Abbas, a spokesman for the Pakistan Army, expressed concern over the Baglihar dam, describing it as a "defense security concern." [44] Abbas stated that a number of canals, drains and artificial distributaries used for irrigation purposes are crucial during times of war. [45] The strategic importance of the Indian water projects in Kashmir is so significant that officials from the Pakistani Army headquarters attended a government meeting on the issue in February 2009 "to discuss the impact of the said dams on Pakistan's water and defense interests... The armed forces became alarmed when they learned the projects could wreak havoc... if the said dams were to collapse or malfunction." [46]
Retired General Zulfiqar Ali, former chairman of Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority expressed that by building dams on rivers in Kashmir, India has achieved military, economic and political supremacy vis-a-vis Pakistan. [47] In an editorial, the Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Khabrain accused India of using water as a weapon, proclaiming: "In order to establish its hegemony over the region [of South Asia], India is even using water as a weapon." [48] Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad, a senior Pakistani politician and former Minister of Railways, has warned that Pakistan and India may go to war on the issue of water, adding: "India wants to make Pakistan a Somalia by stopping its water." [49] Addressing a seminar in late-2008, Javed Iqbal, an eminent retired justice in Pakistan, said, "the government of Pakistan should pressure the Indian government to resolve this issue; and if it does not agree, then a threat be issued that we are ready for a war." [50]
A number of Pakistani commentators warned that the water issues may incite nuclear war between the two countries. At the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a convener of the Pakistani chapter of the Kashmiri secessionist organizations’ alliance, Syed Yousaf Naseem stated that Pakistan is facing a water crisis and that the Indian efforts to effect cuts in its water share from the rivers flowing into Pakistan could compel Pakistan to use unconventional weapons against India. Naseem added that: "The Kashmir issue is cardinal to Pakistan-India relations. Unless this issue is resolved, the Damocles' sword of a nuclear clash will remain hanging over the region. Kashmir is very important for Pakistan and a delay in the resolution of this issue will jeopardize the peace of the region." [51]
The warning of nuclear war between the two neighbors has been reiterated by multiple sources, including veteran Pakistani editor Majeed Nizami. [52] Even former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, a center-right politician who was responsible for conducting the 1998 nuclear tests, warned in May 2009 that "the issues of water and Kashmir must be resolved as early as possible so that the clouds of war between Pakistan and India can be eliminated forever." [53] A similar linking between water issues and Kashmiri emancipation has been articulated by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the founder of jihadist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba. In an address to a group of farmers in Lahore last year, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed warned that the "water problem cannot be resolved without liberating Kashmir from India." [54] Syed Salahuddin, the chairman of the Muttahida Jihad Council, a network bringing together nearly two dozen Pakistan-based militant organizations, warned in October 2008 that jihad against India in Jammu & Kashmir will continue until the territory is liberated. [55]
Blaming the Jews
Though a few Kashmiri secessionist organizations maintain their own opinions on the water matters, Pakistan's water rows with India are essentially bilateral in nature. [56] However, religious and political commentators in Pakistan often frame the issue in terms of an international conspiracy involving the Jews and Israel.
Majeed Nizami, editor-in-chief of Pakistan’s influential Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, inserted anti-Israel sentiments in an article that primarily described India as the "eternal enemy of Pakistan." [57] Nizami aaccused India of blocking water from the Chenab River and further proclaimed that India wants to destroy Pakistan, saying: "Our crops are not getting water. If this situation continues, Pakistan will become Sudan and Somalia." [58] Nizami elaborated on the international threats faced by Pakistan, proclaiming that Pakistan's fight is with the "Three Satans": India, the U.S. and Israel. Nizami accused these satanic nations of being united against Pakistan because Pakistan is the only Islamic power with nuclear capability. He added: "If, in order to resolve our problems, we have to wage a nuclear war with India, we will." [59]
At a seminar organized by Nazaria-e-Pakistan Foundation in April 2008 entitled "Water Crisis - Challenges Faced by the Nation and Their Solutions," Majeed Nizami went to the extent of declaring that "the Hindus [of India] had decided to make Pakistan barren even before 1947," i.e. before Pakistan was created. [60] Presiding over the seminar was Gen. (ret) Hamid Gul, former ISI chief, who addressed the Indian dams on rivers from Jammu & Kashmir by warning: "The nation needs to be determined. If necessary, India's dams will be blown up." [61] Though the subject of the seminar was water crisis in Pakistan, Gul went on to add: "Two states came into existence in 1947 and 1948: one, Pakistan; two, Israel. The two are threats to each other. Ultimately, only one of them will survive…. Pakistan can be saved by making a role model of the Prophet [Muhammad]." [62] Alluding to Samuel P. Huntington's Clash-of-Civilizations thesis, Gul went on to note: "At this point, the matter is not of a war between civilizations, but that of a clash between systems. Islam is a humanity-loving religion. The West is fighting the last battle for its survival." [63]
Hafiz Zahoorul Hassan Dahir too has repeatedly accused India of working "in cooperation with the Jewish lobby" on its power projects on the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum rivers in order to stifle the Pakistani economy.[64] In an article, Dahir accused India of working on a "mega plan of water aggression against Pakistan," observing that, "the practical objective of this plan is to ensure that Pakistan is reduced to being a colony of India….. A consortium has been set up in cooperation with the Jewish lobby, three other nations, two multinational firms, one trans-national NGO, secret agencies of three countries, including the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) of India, are involved."[65] In another public statement, Dahir said that "with the cooperation of the Jewish lobby, India has opened a battlefront of water war aimed at making Pakistan’s fertile lands barren."[66]
In an editorial concerning the water issues, the Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Ausaf also attacked Israel. Accusing the Pakistani government of not developing a counter-strategy to confront India's "dangerous ambitions," the article alluded to external supporters of India's anti-Pakistani policy, claiming that, "India was given easy rides which helped it complete most work on Baglihar dam." [67] The Roznama Ausaf editorial added that "with the aid of Israel, India also managed to build a fence on the working boundary and on the Line of Control [in Kashmir]. It was with Israeli help that India installed sensitive equipment on the working boundary and Line of Control to monitor the movement of Kashmiri freedom fighters." [68]
The International Conspiracy
In April 2009, former member of Pakistani parliament and Emir of Jamaat-e-Islami in the Sindh province Maulana Asadullah Bhutto said: "India is Pakistan’s eternal enemy and from day one until now has been engaged in destroying Pakistan. It first occupied Kashmir through a conspiracy, thereafter cut off our eastern arm [creating Bangladesh] and for the past several years now has been stealing Pakistan’s share of water... India is using Pakistan’s water and is engaged in efforts to make our lands barren." [69]
The Pakistan-India water dispute was discussed by the Majlis-e-Shura (executive council) of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan in May 2009. In a resolution adopted at the end of the meeting, the Jamaat-e-Islami condemned "water aggression" by India and described it as "a dreadful international conspiracy to make Pakistan face a situation like [the drought-stuck] Ethiopia by making Pakistan’s fertile lands barren." [70]
At another meeting organized by the Jamaat-e-Islami in Lahore, Syed Salahuddin, a jihadist commander based in Pakistani Kashmir, explained: "An attempt is being made to change the character of the population of Kashmir by inhabiting it with Hindus [from other parts of India] depriving Pakistan of water. Until now, India has not accepted the existence of Pakistan. The 160 million people of Pakistan support the Kashmiri mujahideen [militants fighting against India in Kashmir], making this fight the essence of Pakistan’s national interest. The Israeli and Brahman [elite Hindu caste] imperialism can only be defeated by jihad and the use of force. Jihad will continue to liberate every corner of Kashmir from the Indian occupation." [71]
Conclusion
Although bitter feelings and heated public debates are likely to persist in the years ahead, the people and leadership of Pakistan generally accept that there is nothing that Pakistan can do, especially in light of the judgment delivered in February 2007 by the World Bank-appointed neutral expert Professor Raymond Lafitte. In an editorial, the Pakistani daily The News observed: "The only way to avoid problems arising is for the 1960 accord to be respected. India has, on more than one occasion, attempted to violate its spirit if not its letter, by seeking loopholes and technical flaws that can be used to its advantage. But in all this, there is also another message. The interests of the two countries are so closely linked, that they can be protected only by establishing closer ties. A failure to do so will bring only more episodes of discord, over river water, over dams, over toxic dumping in drains and over illegal border crossings...."[72]
In late June 2009, Pakistani Water and Power Minister Raja Parvez Ashraf observed that India does have a right to build dams, but that it cannot stop the flow of water into Pakistan in order to fill the dams.[73] In fact, Jamaat Ali Shah, Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner, gave a rare candid interview in April 2008, stating that the Indian water projects currently undertaken do not contravene the provisions of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. Noting that India can construct dams within the technical specifications outlined in the treaty, Shah acknowledged: "In compliance with the Indus Water Treaty, India has so far not constructed any storage dam on the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum rivers. The hydroelectric projects India is developing are on the run-of-the-river waters of these rivers, projects which India is permitted to pursue according to the treaty."[74]
*Tufail Ahmad is Director of Urdu-Pashtu Media Project at The Middle East Media Research Institute (www.memri.org ).
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[1] The author would like mention a note of thanks to senior Pakistani journalists Rifatullah Orakzai and Zulfiqar Ali for clarifying some aspects of the issue.
[2] The two nations have gone to war over Kashmir in 1947-48, 1965, and 1999. Pakistan has also backed militant organizations in Kashmir since 1989.
[3] The News, Pakistan, May 1, 2009.
[4] Roznama Jang, May 25, 2009.
[5] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, May 6, 2008. Hafiz Zahoorul Hassan Dahir emerges as the most vocal Pakistani personality on Indian water projects on Kashmir. However, his organization Indus Basin Water council, though sounding like a government authority, is a pressure group.
[6] For the text of the Indus Water Treaty, see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf
[7] According to Roznama Express newspaper of June 3, 2008, Pakistan is also worried that another hydroelectric power project being built by India on Kishan Ganga river, a tributary of Jhelum, will curtail water supply to Pakistan. The Roznama Express noted that Pakistan has also threatened to take the matter to the World Bank. According to The Times of India newspaper of July 29, 2004, India’s Tulbul Navigation Project on Jhelum river (known as Wullar Barrage in Pakistan) worries Pakistan that it will affect water supply to Pakistan. The barrage is built at the mouth of fresh water Wullar Lake in Kashmir valley. According to the Lahore-based Daily Times of June 4, 2009, Pakistan has also raised the issue of India’s Nimo Bazgo hydroelectric power project on Indus river in Laddakh region of Jammu and Kashmir state.
[8] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, New Delhi; See link http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=43550
[9] The News, Pakistan, February 9, 2009.
[10] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, April 24, 2009.
[11] Roznama Express, Pakistan, April 16, 2008.
[12] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, April 1, 2008.
[13] Roznama Express, Pakistan, April 5, 2008.
[14] Daily Times, Pakistan, June 28, 2009. Sindh, low riparian province, accuses Punjab of diverting its share of water because the government officials who are charged with allocating water to provinces are predominantly from Punjab. In fact, all provinces in Pakistan accuse Punjabi bureaucrats of working against their interests.
[15] Dawn, Pakistan, February 14, 2005.
[16] Dawn, Pakistan, February 14, 2005.
[17] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 27, 2009.
[18] Run-of-the river hydroelectric generation utilizes the natural elevation drop of a steadily flowing river to generate electricity.
[19] The Hindu, India, June 9, 2005.
[20] Newsline, Pakistan, February 2005.
[21] Dawn, Pakistan, December 10, 2003.
[22] Dawn, Pakistan, January 20, 2005.
[23] The Hindu, India, March 1, 2007.
[24] The Hindu, India, March 1, 2007. In his verdict, Professor Raymond Lafitte a) rejected Pakistani objection that gated spillways are not necessary; b) neither accepted Indian justification of a free board of 4.5m nor the Pakistani proposal of 1.5m, but recommended to India a reduction in dam’s height by 1.5m; c) did not accept Pakistani calculation of a pondage of 6.22mcm but found Indian design of 37.7mcm excessive, suggesting a reduction to 32.5mcm; d) accepted India’s figure of 16500 cumec on probable maximum flood (PMF); e) did not accept Pakistan’s contention that bottom of spillways are not at the highest level possible, instead found sluice spillways prudent for sediment control; f) partially accepted Pakistani objection that water intake for the power plant is not as high as possible, suggesting that it be raised by 3m.
[25] Dawn, Pakistan, January 20, 2005. Under the treaty, any "questions" between India and Pakistan are resolved bilaterally, while "differences" are resolved through mediation of a neutral expert and "disputes" by a Court of Arbitration, to be appointed specially for the purpose.
[26] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, December 1, 2008.
[27] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, March 27, 2008.
[28] Dawn, Pakistan, December 8, 2008. In 1978, India had stopped water flow to fill the Salal Dam but later released a similar amount of water as compensation from Sutlej River to Pakistan.
[29] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 25, 2009.
[30] Roznama Express, Pakistan, June 26, 2009.
[31] The News, Pakistan, October 14, 2008.
[32] The News, Pakistan, October 11, 2008. While inaugurating the Baglihar project, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also noted: "While we cannot change borders, we can make them irrelevant. When I met President Zardari in New York recently, I invited Pakistan to work with us to usher in a new era of sub-continental cooperation."
[33] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 7, 2009.
[34] The News, Pakistan, June 7, 2009.
[35] The News, Pakistan, June 29, 2009.
[36] Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, March 15, 2008.
[37] Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, March 15, 2008.
[38] Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, April 4, 2008.
[39] Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, May 7, 2008.
[40] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 5, 2009.
[41] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 26, 2009.
[42] Daily Times, Pakistan, November 24, 2008.
[43] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, October 7, 2008.
[44] The News, Pakistan, October 14, 2008.
[45] The News, Pakistan, October 14, 2008.
[46] The News, Pakistan, February 22, 2009.
[47] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, March 30, 2008.
[48] Roznama Khabrain, Pakistan, June 2, 2008.
[49] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, November 15, 2008.
[50] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, November 5, 2008.
[51] The Post, Pakistan, October 9, 2008.
[52] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, October 27, 2008.
[53] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 29, 2009.
[54] Roznama Express, Pakistan, April 23, 2008.
[55] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, October 27, 2008.
[56] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, November 5, 2008. While the issue is essentially bilateral in nature between two sovereign nations, secessionist Kashmiri organizations have their own viewpoint. Abdul Ghani Bhatt, a leader of All Parties Hurriyat Conference, noted in November 2008 that Kashmiris should be paid royalty by India.
[57] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, October 27, 2008.
[58] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, October 27, 2008.
[59] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, October 27, 2008.
[60] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 25, 2008.
[61] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 25, 2008.
[62] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 25, 2008.
[63] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 25, 2008.
[64] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, May 6, 2008.
[65] Roznama Khabrain, Pakistan, June 17, 2008. Dahir did not identify the NGO or the multinational firms, but his references to two other nations mean U.S. and Israel.
[66] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 26, 2009.
[67] Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, March 15, 2008.
[68] Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, March 15, 2008. The "Line of Control" divides Kashmir valley between Pakistan and India, while the rest of the boundary between the two nations is known as "international border."
[69] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, April 28, 2009.
[70] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 13, 2009.
[71] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, October 27, 2008. Brahmans are upper caste Hindus who form the ruling elite in Indian society.
[72] The News, Pakistan, October 15, 2008.
[73] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 23, 2009.
[74] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 6, 2008.
7) Has Damascus Stopped Supporting Terrorists?
By Ryan Mauro
On March 3, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that she would send Jeffrey Feltman, assistant secretary of State, and Daniel Shapiro, a senior National Security Council official, to meet with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in Damascus.[1] The trip was the most prominent manifestation of the Obama administration's moves to reverse the Bush administration's isolation of Syria, imposed because of Syrian sponsorship of terrorism, its continued interference in Lebanon, and its support for insurgents in Iraq.[2]
Syrian president Bashar Assad (L) meets with U.S. senator Benjamin Cardin (Dem., Md.) in Damascus, February 18, 2009. The Syrian government continues to provide critical support to the infrastructure that allows the Iraqi insurgency and Al-Qaeda to survive in the Middle East. Despite Syrian support for terrorist activities, the Obama administration has been keen to engage the regime.
Diplomatic normalization may be premature, however. While the Pentagon reported in early 2008 that Damascus had decreased the flow of foreign fighters across their border into Iraq by half,[3] Syria's contributions to the insurgency's start and survival are fact. The government of Syria continues to provide critical support to the infrastructure that allows the Iraqi insurgency and Al-Qaeda to survive in the Middle East. In the absence of real reform in Damascus, the Syrian government can reactivate or augment its networks as the U.S. military scales down its presence in Iraq.
Is Syria an Al-Qaeda Enabler?
The U.S. State Department has listed Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism for the past twenty years. The 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism noted that Syria provides political support to myriad Palestinian terrorist groups. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command continue to operate offices openly in Damascus.[4] The Syrian government provides material support to Hezbollah, the organization responsible for the deaths of more Americans in terrorist attacks than any group until Al-Qaeda struck New York City and Washington on September 11, 2001. The Syrian government long hosted—until his February 2008 assassination –Imad Mughniyah, Hezbollah's operations chief, who engineered the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985, and the kidnapping, torture, and execution of American hostages, including William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Lebanon.[5]
Despite the Syrian government's continued support for terrorists targeting U.S. citizens and U.S. interests—or perhaps because of it—the Obama administration has been keen to engage. In his inaugural speech, Obama declared, "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit … we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist."[6] Obama, after all, promised during his campaign to focus U.S. counterterrorism efforts more on Al-Qaeda.[7] However, it is difficult to reconcile the fight against Al-Qaeda with a new embrace of Syria, given the Assad regime's array of both direct or indirect links to bin Laden's organization and its operatives.
Many international Al-Qaeda plots have Syrian links. The head of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain, which claimed responsibility for the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, trained in Syria.[8] The prosecutor in the trial of the terrorists who attacked Madrid in 2004 suspects Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain member Hassan el-Haski of involvement in the train bombings.[9] In May 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's lieutenants and, perhaps Zarqawi himself, held meetings on Syrian territory to plan terrorism in Iraq aimed at provoking sectarian violence.[10] Syria harbored and refused to extradite Suleiman Khaled Darwish, Zarqawi's second-in-command and, reportedly, a liaison between Al-Qaeda and Syrian military intelligence.[11] (He was finally killed in October 2008 in a U.S. raid on Syrian territory).[12]
Abu Faraj al-Libi, a high-level Al-Qaeda operative, met with several of his colleagues in Syria to plan terrorist attacks on the U.S., Europe, and Australia, according to testimony at his hearing.[13] Hamid Mir, the only journalist to interview bin Laden after 9/11, explained in 2006, "Syria is a safe haven for Al-Qaeda now" even if Al-Qaeda does not trust the Syrian leadership.[14]
While Al-Qaeda can pursue its own operations, the organization must often establish symbiotic relations with states that host it. The Taliban, for example, utilized Al-Qaeda in their fight against Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud.[15] Perhaps in exchange for free passage if not a safe haven in Syria, Al-Qaeda has launched attacks against states whose governments Assad distrusts, including Jordan, Lebanon, and the United States.
Between May and September 2002, for example, Zarqawi set up the terrorist cell in Syria which, on October 28, 2002, gunned down U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley outside his home in Amman.[16] Then, in March 2004, Jordanian authorities thwarted an Al-Qaeda chemical weapons attack that had been organized in and launched from Syria.[17] Operatives linked to Zarqawi planned to attack the Intelligence Ministry, the U.S. embassy, and the Office of the Prime Minister, killing up to 80,000 people and, according to King Abdullah, decapitating the government.[18]
The Syrian government has also used its contacts in an Al-Qaeda affiliate to destabilize Lebanon. The Syrian government had long used its army's presence on Lebanese territory to exert its influence over its neighbor, but after the February 14, 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, both Lebanese outrage and diplomatic pressure compelled Damascus to withdraw its troops. According to Lebanese officials, rather than allow the Lebanese government to go its own way, the Syrian regime used its ties to Al-Qaeda to assert leverage by sponsoring a radical, Sunni terrorist group, Fatah al-Islam, which established itself in Lebanon's Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora, for example, reported to the United Nations that interrogations of captured group members showed direct contact between Fatah al-Islam and senior Syrian intelligence officials.[19] Arab press reports suggest that the Syrian government both provided weaponry through groups under its control and used Fatah al-Islam to assassinate thirty-six individuals in Lebanon who opposed the Syrian government.[20]
Fatah al-Islam leader, Shakir al-'Absi, is a former Syrian air force officer, sentenced to death in absentia by Jordan for his involvement in the 2002 assassination of Laurence Foley.[21] While 'Absi denies the group is part of Al-Qaeda,[22] it is allied with Asbat al-Ansar which, according to the State Department, is an Al-Qaeda affiliate.[23]
Syria and the Iraqi Insurgency
Perhaps nowhere does the Assad regime's willingness to enable Al-Qaeda impact U.S. interests as much as in Iraq where, even after the troop surge, insurgents and terrorists continue to threaten, wound, or kill U.S. soldiers. As the U.S. administration prepared to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, the Syrian government was already transforming its territory into a critical lifeline for the Iraqi insurgency.[24] While the Syrian government says they have no control over foreign fighters entering Iraq, eyewitness reports from the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom described how "fighters swarmed into Iraq aboard buses that Syrian border guards waved through open gates."[25] Toward the end of 2004, Bush administration pressure led Syrian domestic intelligence services to sweep up insurgency facilitators, but many returned after just a few days.[26] In 2004 after coalition forces recaptured Fallujah, photographs were found of Muayid Ahmad Yassin, the head of the Jaysh Muhammad insurgent group, meeting with a senior Syrian official. Coalition forces also captured a GPS system that showed waypoints in western Syria.[27] Damascus rebuffed Riyadh's demands to shut a terrorist training camp in Syria, then hosting approximately 1,000 Saudi jihadis.[28] Four streams of Syrian financing totaling $1.2 million per month reached insurgents in Ramadi as of 2004.[29] Fatiq Sulayman al-Majid, a former Iraqi intelligence officer and a relative of Saddam Hussein, is also a key financier of the insurgency in Iraq.[30] The Iraqi insurgency consists of two major components: Iraqi Baathists fighting for nationalist reasons and foreign fighters serving Al-Qaeda. From 2003 to 2007, the interests of the two parties converged. So, too, did their reliance on Syrian facilitation.
The Baathist element of the insurgency has long enjoyed safe haven in Syria. The Bush administration reportedly presented the Assad government with videotape of Iraqi Baathists dining in a Syrian resort town.[31] Former members of Saddam Hussein's regime have formed a "New Regional Command" that directs and finances the insurgency from Syria.[32] At an April 15, 2004 press conference, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported, "There are other foreign fighters. We know for a fact that a lot of them find their way into Iraq through Syria."[33] By the end of 2004, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency officials concluded that Syria played a larger role in directing the insurgency than they had earlier realized. U.S. troops in Fallujah, for example, found a GPS system in an explosives production facility that showed routes originating in western Syria.[34] The Iraqi defense minister in 2005 said that 400 detainees had trained in Syria.[35]
Since 2006, Syria has hosted Misha'an al-Jaburi, a former member of the Iraqi parliament and owner of Az-Zawra'a television, which broadcast pro-Baathist and insurgent propaganda. In one case, Jaburi broadcast songs with secret messages in them for the Islamic Army of Iraq. His nephew provided him with safe houses in which to store weapons and money that was moving in and out of Iraq.[36] While Jaburi was publicly critical of Al-Qaeda, the U.S. Treasury Department has argued that he worked with an Al-Qaeda jihadist umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council, to fund Sunni extremist operations.[37]
Syrian support of terrorism has helped other Al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq. Ansar al-Islam, an Al-Qaeda-linked group that operated out of northern Iraq, benefited greatly from Syria's lax attitude. Italian court documents show that Ansar operatives traveled to Europe from Iraq and vice versa through Syria. These Syria-based operatives oversaw the flow of terrorists and often made telephone calls to their colleagues in Europe. In a police state such as Syria, such high-level coordination and communication by telephone is unlikely without the authorities' knowledge. Among the operatives overseeing this network in Syria are fugitives linked to the Hamburg Al-Qaeda cell that planned 9/11 and also to a car bomb targeting Israelis in Kenya in November 2002.[38] Italian authorities arrested seven Al-Qaeda operatives that took part in this network after they sent forty terrorists to Iraq via Syria where the Al-Qaeda operatives were to team up with Ansar al-Islam.[39]
Perhaps no network was as devastating within the context of the Iraqi insurgency as Zarqawi's. In May 2004, Zarqawi's lieutenants held meetings on Syrian territory to plan a terrorism offensive in Iraq aimed to provoke sectarian violence.[40] On February 23, 2005, Iraqi television aired the confession of a detainee who admitted to "receiving all the instructions from Syrian intelligence" to "cause chaos in Iraq." The detainee, who identified himself as Lt. Anas Ahmad al-Issa, said he was sent to Iraq in 2001 in order to prepare for the day that America would invade. Reuters quoted another group of captured insurgents who said they were being trained in Latakia, Syria, as far back as 2001 in terrorist tactics that included kidnappings and beheadings.[41]
Another Iraqi detainee in the videotapes named a range of insurgent groups and said they were Syrian fronts. Ten Iraqis on the tapes said that Syrian intelligence recruited them.[42] Egyptian and Sudanese insurgents also confessed to being trained in Syria. One of Issa's aides said that insurgents were required to send progress reports back to Syria, that they received $1,500 per month, and were supplied with weapons, explosives, and other equipment. The aide said that he was originally recruited in an Iraqi mosque in 2001 and then went to Pakistan for eleven months of training. After that, he traveled to Syria for a month where Syrian intelligence provided training before his dispatch to Iraq.[43]
There is little doubt that the foreign fighters network in Syria constitutes a link between the regime and Al-Qaeda. It is impossible for Syria not to know that the networks it sponsors are working with Al-Qaeda. In fact, in April 2005, an admitted supporter of Al-Qaeda was arrested in Iraq as he was planning a car bomb attack. He confessed to his captors that he had links with Syrian intelligence.[44]
The Iraqi government said in 2007 that more than half of the foreign fighters arrive in Iraq via Syria.[45] A large number of these fighters fly into the Damascus International Airport.[46] In October 2007, U.S. military forces discovered a stockpile of records in the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar documenting 606 foreign fighters in Iraq. These "Sinjar records" describe how foreign fighters met with Al-Qaeda representatives upon arriving in Syria. Approximately 90 percent of the fighters that arrived in Iraq between 2006 and 2007 arrived via Syria, and these fighters are responsible for 90 percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq.[47]
Syria's assistance to the Iraqi Baathist network directly benefits Al-Qaeda. Today, it is virtually impossible to make a distinction between the two forces because of their tight cooperation. Many of these ex-Baathists have joined Al-Qaeda, partially morphing the two forces into one insurgent army.[48]
Syria: Ally in the War against Terror?
Some diplomats and analysts argue that if Washington engages Damascus, Syria could become a responsible partner in the war on terror. The State Department praised Syria for its cooperation in 2003, but Cofer Black, the department's counterterrorism coordinator, said that public proclamations do not tell the whole story. In 2003, he told Newsweek, "We clearly don't have the full support of the Syrian government on the Al-Qaeda problem. They have allowed Al- Qaeda personnel to come in and virtually settle in Syria with their knowledge and support."[49] Still, the idea that engagement can flip Syria has resonance. After all, intelligence shared by Syria helped thwart a terrorist attack against the U.S. navy in Bahrain. Syrian cooperation, however, was less than complete. The Syrian government refused to give U.S. investigators direct access to Muhammad Zamar which, according to one expert, means it can be "safely assumed that the Syrians did not pass on information that reflected poorly on them in any way."[50] The high profile 2006 Iraq Study Group report, cochaired by former secretary of state James A. Baker III, and Lee H. Hamilton, the vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, for example, recommended that the United States should "actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions."[51]
The Assad regime has become more adept at public relations. In an attempt to portray itself as a natural ally in the war on terror, the Syrian government has framed itself as an enemy and target of Al-Qaeda. The examples given of Al-Qaeda targeting Syria, however, do not hold up. In April 2004, the Syrian regime accused Al-Qaeda of bombing a vacant U.N. building, an attack for which Al-Qaeda did not claim credit.[52] Timing, however, was suspect since the alleged Al-Qaeda operation occurred just as the U.S. Congress debated placing tougher sanctions on Syria. Syrian officials then refused to allow U.S. investigators to look into the incident. Nor is there any evidence that a September 12, 2006 attack on the U.S. embassy in Damascus was Al-Qaeda's handiwork.[53] Within ninety minutes of the attack, the crime scene was cleared of debris, including the destroyed vehicle, the bodies, and any forensic evidence. If the Syrians believed Al-Qaeda was behind the attack, they failed to allow the examination of any evidence.
Proponents of diplomacy base their recommendation on the assumption that the Syrian government has reformed. Practitioners, however, find evidence to support such conclusions lacking. In an October 2008 interview, U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander in Anbar province, said, "The Syrians clearly have harbored AQI [Al-Qaeda in Iraq], allowed them to live over there and go back and forth. It's a sanctuary." And "They have done cross-border raids and killed Iraqis. The biggest mistake they made was a cross-border raid on the second of May and murdered 11 Iraqi policemen. They cut their heads off, a sickening thing. It was a huge mistake. We know the guy who did it, AQI guy. Kind of a big dog who works with Syrian intelligence."[54]
Conclusion
The Assad regime sponsors terrorism because it is a regime based on terrorism. The advantages for the Assad regime to sponsor jihadists are many. They seek to use terrorists to defeat the United States in the region, thwart the development of democracies in Lebanon and Iraq, and to employ terror as a means of waging war against Israel. Outmatched by the weapons the West possesses, Syria repeatedly turns to unconventional means. Terror sponsorship also creates a dependency upon the Assad regime making it counterproductive for the forces of Islamic extremism to wage war against it. So long as Assad retains a tight grip on Syria, he need not fear these forces turning against him. Finally, the regime sponsors such forces as a tool of diplomacy. By supporting insurgents and terrorists and allowing radical Islam to show its head inside Syria, Assad makes clear that there is no viable alternative to him and that it is he who must be courted if the West is to be successful in the region.
Any strategy to tackle Assad's support for terrorism must rely on more than engagement and shuttle diplomacy. The Obama administration should develop ways to make Syrian support of terrorism counterproductive to its own objectives. Rather than allowing terrorism to be an effective tool of diplomacy, such actions must be met with economic sanctions and international pressure. Rather than handing Assad victory in the region, every move by Syria should be countered. The regime must see no gain and only loss from its support of terrorism. Finally, the West should find a third option beyond either reliance on Assad or removing him from power—which would allow the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists to take his place. The Obama administration should assist the development of the democratic opposition forces in Syria, however weak they may be. By promoting Syrian democratic forces, Washington will regain a strong hand at the negotiating table, simultaneously decreasing the power of Assad and the Muslim Brotherhood and, most importantly, ending the brutal terrorist regime that threatens innocents both in the Middle East and in the West.
Ryan Mauro is the founder of WorldThreats.com and the assistant director of intelligence of The Counter Terrorism Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Centre.
[1] Associated Press, Mar. 4, 2009.
[2] Claudia Rosett, "Commerce Department Waives Syria Sanctions," Forbes, Feb. 12, 2009.
[3] Agence France-Presse, Jan. 20, 2008.
[4] "State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview," Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, U.S. Department of State, Apr. 30, 2008.
[5] The Guardian (London), Feb. 13, 2008.
[6] "President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address," The White House, Jan. 21, 2009.
[7] "Homeland Security," "Barack Obama and Joe Biden: The Change We Need," official campaign website, accessed Mar. 23, 2009.
[8] Emerson Vermaat, "Madrid Terrorists Possessed an Important Al-Qaeda Manual," Militant Islam Monitor, Feb. 20, 2007.
[9] Ibid.
[10] International Herald Tribune (Paris), May 19, 2005.
[11] The Daily Star (Beirut), Oct. 1, 2004.
[12] BBC News, Oct. 28, 2002.
[13] "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal—Al Libi, Abu Faraj," U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 8, 2007.
[14] Author interview with Hamid Mir, May 24, 2006, via e-mail.
[15] "Profile: Afghanistan's 'Lion of Panjshir,'" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Sept. 5, 2006.
[16] Jane's Security News (Surrey, U.K.), June 16, 2003.
[17] CNN.com, Apr. 26, 2004.
[18] The Jordan Times (Amman), Apr. 27, 2004.
[19] The New York Sun, Oct. 25, 2007; Ar-Ra'y (Amman), June 8, 2007.
[20] Ya Lubnan (Beirut), June 5, 2007; Michael Young, "Syria's Useful Idiots," The Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2007.
[21] CNN.com, May 24, 2007.
[22] The International Herald Tribune, Mar. 15, 2007.
[23] The New York Daily News, June 18, 2007.
[24] The Washington Post, June 8, 2005.
[25] The Washington Post, June 8, 2005.
[26] The Washington Post, June 8, 2005.
[27] The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 23, 2004.
[28] The New York Sun, Sept. 14, 2007.
[29] Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 409.
[30] The New York Times, July 5, 2004.
[31] Gary Gambill, "How Significant Is Syria's Role in Iraq?" Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 7, 2004.
[32] The Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2004.
[33] "Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing with General Richard Myers, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander, Coalition Ground Forces," Baghdad, Iraq, Apr. 15, 2004.
[34] The Washington Post, Dec. 8, 2004.
[35] "180 Terrorists Escape to Syria at Start of Operation Steel Curtain," Kuwait News Agency, Nov. 5, 2005.
[36] "HP-759: Treasury Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi Insurgency," U.S. Department of Treasury, Jan. 9, 2008.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Los Angeles Times, Apr. 27, 2003.
[39] Los Angeles Times, Apr. 17, 2003.
[40] The International Herald Tribune, May 19, 2005.
[41] BBC News, Feb. 23, 2005.
[42] Associated Press, Feb. 24, 2005; USA Today, Feb. 24, 2005.
[43] USA Today, Feb. 24, 2005.
[44] CNN.com, Apr. 12, 2005
[45] CNN.com, Feb. 4, 2007.
[46] Sen. Joseph Lieberman, "Al Qaeda's Travel Agent," The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 20, 2007.
[47] The Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2008.
[48] Mark Eichenlaub, "Hundreds of Loyalists and Benefactors of Saddam Hussein's Regime Have Been Found Working with or for Al-Qaeda in Iraq," RegimeofTerror.com, July 20, 2007.
[49] Newsweek, May 6, 2003.
[50] Matthew Levitt, "Iran and Syria: State Sponsorship in the Age of Terror Networks," lecture presentation, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Mar. 7, 2005.
[51] The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006), p. 36.
[52] BBC News, Apr. 29, 2004.
[53] BBC News, Sept. 13, 2006.
[54] U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 27, 2008.
8) Re: Obama’s Summer of Discontent
By Jennifer Rubin
Pete, your cogent take is yet again corroborated, this time by the Washington Post-ABC News poll. What we see is an across-the-board erosion in not just the public’s overall approval of Obama’s performance, but in confidence in his ability to manage every significant domestic item on his agenda. The Post explains:
Heading into a critical period in the debate over health-care reform, public approval of President Obama’s stewardship on the issue has dropped below the 50 percent threshold for the first time, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll.
Obama’s approval ratings on other front-burner issues, such as the economy and the federal budget deficit, have also slipped over the summer, as rising concern about spending and continuing worries about the economy combine to challenge his administration. Barely more than half approve of the way he is handling unemployment, which now tops 10 percent in 15 states and the District.
The president’s overall approval rating remains higher than his marks on particular domestic issues, with 59 percent giving him positive reviews and 37 percent disapproving. But this is the first time in his presidency that Obama has fallen under 60 percent in Post-ABC polling, and the rating is six percentage points lower than it was a month ago.
The underlying figures are startling. Confidence in his ability to handle health care has plunged from 57 percent to 49 percent, while disapproval has jumped from 29 percent to 44 percent. On the deficit, respondents disapprove by a 49 percent to 43 percent margin. And it appears that Obama’s embrace of tax and spending policies has not gone over well:
Nearly a quarter of moderate and conservative Democrats (22 percent) now see Obama as an “old-style tax-and-spend Democrat,” up from 4 percent in March. Among all Americans, 52 percent consider Obama a “new-style Democrat who will be careful with the public’s money.” That is down from 58 percent a month ago and 62 percent in March, to about where President Bill Clinton was on that question in the summer of 1993.
Concerns about the federal account balance are also reflected in views about another round of stimulus spending. In the new poll, more than six in 10 oppose spending beyond the $787 billion already allocated to boost the economy. Most Democrats support more spending; big majorities of Republicans and independents are against the idea.
Support for new spending is tempered by flagging confidence on Obama’s plan for the economy. Fifty-six percent are confident that his programs will reap benefits, but that is down from 64 percent in March and from 72 percent just before he took office six months ago. More now say they have no confidence in the plan than say they are very confident it will work. Among independents and Republicans, confidence has decreased by 20 or more points; it has dropped seven points among Democrats.
Higher income Americans, who made up a key part of Obama’s coalition, have figured out health care is going to be paid by them if Obama has his way. Accordingly, the poll shows that “those with incomes above $50,000 now are split evenly between Obama and Republicans on dealing with health care. In June, they favored Obama by a 21-point margin.”
Moreover, the poll sampled all adults, not merely voters or even likely voters in 2010. It is quite possible that among actual voters Obama’s numbers are far worse.
Why does all of this matter? At the time in which Obama is thrusting himself forward to “sell” government-centric health care, his credibility on that on other issues is skidding. Furthermore, lawmakers can read these numbers too. They understand that the public is losing faith in a government-run health-care scheme and in the massive tax plan that would be needed to fund it. There is a reason lawmakers of both parties are openly challenging Obama’s timetable and vision for a massive health-care reform effort.
Meanwhile, the administration appears to be panicking, resorting to every trick in the book to stem the tide of discontent over its leftward drift. The A.P. reports:
The White House is being forced to acknowledge the wide gap between its once-upbeat predictions about the economy and today’s bleak landscape.
The administration’s annual midsummer budget update is sure to show higher deficits and unemployment and slower growth than projected in President Barack Obama’s budget in February and update in May, and that could complicate his efforts to get his signature health care and global-warming proposals through Congress.
The release of the update — usually scheduled for mid-July — has been put off until the middle of next month, giving rise to speculation the White House is delaying the bad news at least until Congress leaves town on its August 7 summer recess.
But this sort of sleight of hand rarely works, and in this case, Hourse Minority Leade Boehner is already going ballistic, arguing that the Obama administration is trying to “hide the fact that the policies of this Administration have buried our children and grandchildren under historic debt.”
If all that isn’t sobering enough for Obama-philes, there is this jaw-dropper from Rasmussen: in a potential 2012 presidential election match-up, Mitt Romney ties Obama at 45% and beats Obama among unaffiliated voters by 48% to 41%. Well, it’s very early but still. Wow.
Whether Obama, who possesses admirable oratorical skills, can own up to the fiscal train-wreck he is presiding over and reverse his slide in the polls, remains to be seen. But it may be that the problem is not Obama personally, nor a deficit in rhetorical skills. It may frankly be that Americans didn’t vote for a leftward lurch in their government and now are registering their extreme discomfort with a president who is trying to pull off one of the most audacious bait-and-switch political maneuvers in recent memory.
9) Make mine malaise
By Steven F. Hayward
More than a few observers have pointed out that President Obama and the Democrats in Congress seem determined to repeat the errors of the 1970s by returning to inflationary spending, tax increases, auto company bailouts and cuts to the defense budget while coddling dictators who hate America.
So it was inevitable that this recycling effort would get around to attempting the most brazen rehabilitation of all: Jimmy Carter was a visionary president! If only we had listened to him.
It was 30 years ago this month that Mr. Carter reached the nadir of his presidency with his famous "malaise" speech in which he criticized the American people for their materialism and "crisis of confidence." To be fair, Mr. Carter never used the word malaise in his speech (an aide used "malaise" in characterizing the speech to the media the next day), but the label stuck because it so accurately conveyed the substance of his message. Having run for president in 1976 on a slogan of giving us "a government as good as the people," Mr. Carter essentially was saying the people were no good.
Today the malaise speech is being revived as a totem of Mr. Carter's unrecognized greatness and profundity. Writing a few days ago in the New York Times, Gordon Stewart, one of Mr. Carter's speechwriters responsible for the text, argued that "the speech was extremely popular" at the time, which is not entirely wrong. Initial polls showed positive public response, but it wilted within days.
Mr. Stewart thinks this was because "it was just too hard to compete with Ronald Reagan and his banner of limitless American consumption." Over in Politico, Princeton professor Julian E. Zelizer also argues that Mr. Carter had it right, that "many Americans, especially those in the middle and upper income brackets, live in homes, drive cars, and consume resources in ways that are not environmentally sustainable."
In the midst of an energy crisis that was largely the result of bad government policy, Mr. Carter embraced the "limits to growth" mentality at the core of modern environmentalism and told Americans they should get used to making do with less. Mr. Carter resisted every change in policy that would have ended the energy crisis (such as decontrolling energy markets) and indeed made the problem worse over the long run by locking up huge oil and gas reserves in Alaska, where they remain closed off even as our oil imports continue to grow, and creating a web of subsidies for "renewable" energy such as wind and solar power that still can't provide more than a sliver of our energy needs.
Criticisms of American materialism and self-indulgence certainly have merit and are a staple of the American character stretching back to the Puritans in Colonial days. This is one reason Mr. Carter's speech at first received public favor -- the Puritan strain in Americans likes to be scolded, preferably on Sunday by men of the cloth.
But the presidency is not a pulpit, and Americans rightly figured out that they were being blamed for Mr. Carter's own failings, especially whenthe hypocrisy of the speech was so easy to see. When, a year before, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn had made a similar critique of American materialism and spiritual drift in his infamous Harvard commencement address, the Carter White House had joined liberals in denouncing him. First lady Rosalynn Carter had strongly criticized Mr. Solzhenitsyn, saying Americans did not suffer from "unchecked materialism" and adding that "the people of this country are not weak, not cowardly and not spiritually exhausted." Her remarks were considered to be the administration's semiofficial response to Mr. Solzhenitsyn. But now her husband was saying much the same thing as Mr. Solzhenitsyn. Americans notice those kind of self-serving inconsistencies.
Mr. Carter didn't help his case by building up unrealistic expectations for his speech when he disappeared for 10 days to Camp David to gaze at his navel and consult with a Who's Who of the nation's most pretentious thinkers on how to solve the nation's problems. This fateful interregnum gave rise to persistent rumors that Mr. Carter had suffered a nervous breakdown.
We do know for certain that much of the Camp David chatter had little to do with solving the energy crisis and that Mr. Carter actually contemplated calling for a constitutional convention to fix the supposed defects of the American system.
Vice President Walter Mondale was so dismayed at Mr. Carter's course that he contemplated resigning -- the ultimate no-confidence vote. "Everything in me told me that this was wrong," Mr. Mondale said later. "You can't castigate the American people," Mr. Mondale told Mr. Carter directly, "or they will turn you off once and for all."
Mr. Mondale was right. Another leading figure at the time nailed it: "People who talk about an age of limits are really talking about their own limitations, not America's." So said Ronald Reagan, whose first act on entering office 18 months later was to decontrol oil prices by executive order (a step Mr. Carter had refused). Liberals predicted $4-a-gallon gasoline. Instead, oil prices fell for a decade, along with what was left of Mr. Carter's reputation on energy issues.
Steven F. Hayward is F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of "The Real Jimmy Carter" and the forthcoming "The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980-1989."
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