The D.C. shuffle! Crisis, political response, scare tactics to still opponent's voices, load legislation with more pork than expect to be passed thus allowing opponents opportunity to cut, politicians get re-elected, the nation loses and everyone is lulled into feeling hopeful.
Stand back and watch it unfold! Michael Goodwin has and can't believe what he sees!(See 1 below.)
Glancing at the headlines of the newspapers, it occurred to me why so many Democrats favor higher taxes: because they don’t pay them!
In Israel are politicians frittering away what the military fought and died for? Have Olmert, Livni and Barak proven a greater threat than Hamas? They apparently have caved in eight specific areas.(See 2 below.)
Israelis face a fateful decision this week. Glick endorses Netanyahu and suggests he is the only responsible Israeli politician who is clesar eyed enough to look at reality while "Atlas Shrugged." (See 3 below.)
These four authors believe: "The recent Gaza war was portrayed by the international media as a local military conflict between Israel and Hamas. However, this war, like the 2006 war in Lebanon and various other military and political events in the last three decades in the Middle East have a common denominator - namely, all stem from the conflict between revolutionary Iran and the Saudi Kingdom and the respective camps of each. This conflict is key to understanding the Middle East in the 21st century." (See 4 below.)
Perhaps the time has come for Israel to also have "Think Tanks." (See 5 below.)
Victor Davis Hanson expresses three concerns. (See 6 below.)
Kissinger expresses his concern regarding threats posed by nuclear weapons. Can we contain the nuclear fire? (See 7 below.)
Commentary regarding Jimmy's latest diatribie. (See 8 below.)
Dick
1) Stumbling out the gate: Barack Obama flubs his first big test
By Michael Goodwin
The first days of President Barack Obama have not been easy ones.
It's not easy to waste a mandate and a honeymoon at the same time, but President Obama seems determined to try. You know he's off to a lousy start when his most favorable reviews came after he said, "I screwed up."
Did he ever, and not just once. If he keeps going this way, America will be saying, "We screwed up."
He's our President, it's a horribly dangerous time at home and abroad and we desperately need him to succeed. But he can't be successful unless he builds a broad swath of public trust in his leadership. So far, he's going backward.
It's very early, but it's worrisome that Obama has stumbled almost since he took the oath. His inauguration speech was uninspired and next to nothing has gone right for him. Already he looks like he needs a vacation.
The historic young President with the political wind at his back has quickly turned testy toward those who disagree with him. Despite promises to the contrary, he's been so rigid that the defeated Republicans are relevant again.
Obama's fumbled rollout is surprising, given a smooth and skillful transition. He appointed key players early, talked repeatedly of being ready "to hit the ground running" and was eager to get off to a fast start.
Maybe too fast. His vetting of top aides was shockingly sloppy, and he has been concerned primarily with the speed of the stimulus bill, not its contents. The failed vetting produced a string of embarrassments over tax dodgers and influence peddlers, and his embrace of the flawed stimulus has put him on the wrong side of the American public, with only about 1 in 3 voters with him.
Even more surprising, his famously cool temperament is AWOL. He has been visibly frustrated at what he calls needless delay, despite a rapid timetable given the whopping price tag of the stimulus legislation and the uncertainty of its impact.
He should genuinely welcome those who want to make the bill better. After all, there's never been much doubt he would get a huge package passed, so he doesn't need to make enemies over it. The only real question is whether it will succeed.
But unable to get his way quickly, he pulled rank with a snippy, "I won." When the Senate insisted on debate, he turned to harsh attacks and campaign-style rhetoric. Some insiders already are grumbling about disarray and arrogance.
So much for a change in Washington.
What happened to the gracious uniter, the man who held a dinner to honor opponent John McCain and embraced the concept of a team of rivals? That seems like ancient history as he and McCain now are sniping at each other.
It's also disappointing that, instead of appealing to our hopes, Obama has resorted to fear-mongering, a tactic he often accused former President George Bush of using. Our new President sounds like the old one, warning that failing to do what he wants would be a "catastrophe," a word he used twice in one day.
The real catastrophe would be to borrow a trillion dollars for no lasting result except the liberal pet projects that have turned the bill into a porkfest.
A friend, in a clever reference to JFK's first big mistake, calls it Bambi's Bay of Pork. Obama's touting the bill marks him as careless with taxpayer dollars, and it's a reputation he will not find easy to shake, especially if the legislation fails to boost the economy and add jobs.
Nor will it be easy to persuade anyone he is nonideological after his turn to hard partisanship on just his 16th day in office. In a political hot-house atmosphere, he called House Speaker Nancy Pelosi "our rock" and "an extraordinary leader," oblivious to her 18% approval rating. He claimed the stimulus she produced reflected "discipline," meaning he's either cynical or didn't bother to read the turkey before embracing it.
He accused critics of pushing "tired arguments and worn ideas," but there is nothing more tired than Washington's wasteful spending. He wants to "name and shame" corporate fat cats who abuse taxpayer bailouts, but cheers his Dem mates for an outrageous tab that knows no precedent in our nation's history.
Who is this guy? Where is the Barack Obama who charmed the country and challenged it to greatness?
That's the guy we elected. That's the President we need.
2) Outgoing Israeli government bargains away military success in Gaza
All too quickly Israel's three war leaders - prime minister Ehud Olmert, defense minister Ehud Barak and foreign minister Tzipi Livni - forgot the goals they set for the three-week military offensive launched against Hamas on Dec. 27, 2008: That Operation Cast Lead would not halt until security prevailed in southern Israel, that the eight-year Palestinian missile offensive be brought to an end and that Hamas never be allowed to rearm for a fresh assault of terror.
Six weeks later, the Islamists terrorists are reaping the spoils of a war they lost.
Jerusalem is feeding Egyptian mediators with concession after concession to keep Hamas at the negotiating table in Cairo and talking about a long-term truce. Frustrated Israeli commanders warn their victory is being traded to buy undreamed-of gains for Hamas, such as the creeping recognition of the Palestinian Islamist group as the Gaza Strip's legitimate ruling power and acceptance of the enclave's status as a forward Iranian base on Israel's southern border. The deal on the table in Cairo would moreover lead to perpetuating the separation between the pro-Western West Bank and the pro-Iranian Gaza Strip, generating a fixed impediment to any discussion of a potential Palestinian state.
Saturday, Feb. 7, defense minister Barak Hamas granted safe passage to Hamas leader Mahmoud A-Zahar to come out of hiding in Gaza for the first time since the hostilities began. He flew to Cairo and on to Damascus to deal with the release of the Israeli soldier Gilead Shalit, held since he was kidnapped in 2006. By this concession, Barak gave Tehran, from which Hamas-Damascus takes direct orders, the last word on all these transactions.
Barak is believed to have promised Egypt that other Hamas leaders may also safely emerge from their bunkers as long as the Cairo negotiations continue, even though Hamas has made no commitments of any kind and continues to shoot missiles into Israel as well as smuggling arms.
As Israel's general election looms Tuesday, Feb. 10, Barak, who leads the Labor party, and his colleagues are disseminating pink clouds of optimism while pursuing steps that reverse the goals of Operation Cast Lead: They are solidifying Hamas' strength and its grip on the Gaza Strip for years to come.
Military sources count eight areas in which the outgoing government is relinquishing assets to Hamas:
1. Military attacks on Palestinian military targets have been suspended in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has offered nothing in return except for an oral undertaking to Egypt to try and keep the level of missile fire down. The Israeli air force responds to each salvo by bombing empty Palestinian buildings and sand dunes.
2. Israel has suspended targeted strikes against Hamas leaders and commanders according to an understanding with Cairo.
3. According to another understanding, Israel will allow an increasing number of supply trucks and types of freights to enter the Gaza crossings daily.
This is a virtual surrender to Hamas' demands for fully opened crossings (translation: end of Israel's embargo of the Gaza Strip). Hamas has not been held to any guarantee for ending its smuggling of arms - or any other quid pro quo.
4. Israel has also promised Egypt to gradually lift its naval blockade of Gaza.
5. Jerusalem has given ground on its initial demand to remove Hamas from the crossings and pass them to Palestinian Authority control. The deal emerging is for foreign monitors to be posted on those crossings and report to Hamas. This is another form of Israeli recognition of the Palestinian extremists' rule of the Gaza Strip and its control of Israel's southwestern frontier.
If approved, it would also perpetuate the divide between the pro-Iranian entity in the Gaza Strip ruled by Hamas and the pro-Western territory of the West Bank under the control of its rival, Mahmoud Abbas' Palestinian Authority, which Hamas kicked out of the Gaza Strip in 2007
Israeli military sources warn that the eventual upshot of these Israeli concessions will be the collapse of Abbas' rule. Hamas will be able to use the Gaza Strip as a jumping-off base for taking over the West Bank as well.
It is a matter Israeli national policy to withhold recognition from the Palestinian Hamas – which the US and European Union also list as a terrorist organization for its commitment to violence and Israel's destruction. Yet, by knuckling under on this point, Israeli authorities will find themselves engaging Hamas officials willy-nilly in the day-to-day management of the shared border crossings.
6. Many of the soldiers who took part in the Gaza offensive declared that their mission was unfinished because Gilead Shalit remained in captivity. Instead of using its military feat to improve the chances for his release, Israel has allowed itself to be cornered here too. Hamas has upped its demand for the release of 1,000 jailed Palestinian terrorists including convicted multiple murderers of the Fatah, Tanzim, Popular Front and Hamas, which Israel was inclined to accept. Now the price has gone up to 1,250 inmates, all of whom are to be released at the Gaza crossings. The West Bank residents will be sent home later.
7. Israel has agreed to leave the monitoring of Hamas' arms smuggling in Egypt's hands, although Cairo's past record is notoriously wanting. For years, Egyptian police looked the other way as Hamas imported massive quantities of weapons through Sinai.
8. Not by a single word is Hamas required to dismantle its armed strength. Israel is therefore seen to be accepting the presence of an armed terrorist force on its border.
3) Israel's fateful elections
By Caroline B. Glick
Tuesday's general elections will officially end the briefest and most nonchalant electoral season Israel has ever experienced. Regrettably, the importance of these elections is inversely proportional to their lack of intensity. This is, these are the most fateful elections Israel has ever had. The events of the past week make this point clearly.
Monday Iran successfully launched a domestically manufactured satellite on a ballistic missile called the Safir-2 space rocket. Since the launch, experts have noted that the Safir-2 can also be used to launch conventional and non-conventional warheads. The Safir-2 has an estimated range of 2000-3000 kilometers. And so the successful satellite launch showed that today Iran is capable of launching missiles not only against Israel, but against southern Europe as well.
Many Israeli leaders viewed Monday's launch as a "gotcha" moment. For years they have been saying that Iran's nuclear program is a threat to global security - not merely to Israel's security. And Monday's launch just demonstrated that they were right all along. Israel isn't the only country on Iran's target list.
Unfortunately for Israel, the international community couldn't care less. Its response to Iran's latest provocation was to collectively shrug its shoulders.
On Wednesday emissaries of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany convened in Wiesbaden, Germany to discuss their joint policies towards Iran in the aftermath of the satellite launch. Some Israelis argued that Iran's provocation forced these leaders' hands. Their reputations for toughness were on the line. They would have to do something.
Unfortunately for Israel, the emissaries of Russia, Britain, China, France, Germany and the US are more interested in convincing the mullahs that they are nice than in convincing them that they are tough.
Far from deciding to take concerted action against Iran, the great powers did nothing more than wish the Obama administration good luck as it moves to directly engage the mullahs. As their post-conference press release put it, the six governments' answer to Iran's show of force was to "agree to consult on the next steps as the US administration undertakes its [Iranian] policy review."
As US President Barak Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have explained, the US is reviewing its policy towards Iran in the hopes of finding a way to directly engage the Iranian government. While they claim that the aim of these sought after direct negotiations will be to convince the mullahs to give up their nuclear weapons program, since taking office the new administration has sent out strong signals that preventing Iran from going nuclear has taken a backseat to simply holding negotiations with Teheran.
According to a report in Aviation News, last week the US Navy prevented Israel from seizing an Iranian weapons ship on the Red Sea suspected of carrying illicit munitions to either Gaza or Lebanon. A week and a half ago, the US Navy boarded the ship in the Gulf of Aden and carried out a cursory inspection. It demurred from seizing the ship however, because as US Admiral Michael Mullen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained on January 27, the US believed it had no international legal right to seize the ship.
In inspecting the ship the US was operating under UN Security Council Resolution 1747which bars Iran from exporting arms. The US argued that it lacked authority to seize the ship because 1747 has no enforcement mechanism. Yet the fact of the matter is that if the US were truly interested in intercepting the ship and preventing the arms from arriving at their destination, the language of 1747 is vague enough to support such a seizure.
And that's the point. The US was uninterested in seizing the ship because it was uninterested in provoking a confrontation with Teheran which it seeks to engage. It was not due to lack of legal authority that the US reportedly prevented the Israeli Navy from seizing the ship on the Red Sea, but due to the administration's fervent wish to appease the mullahs.
Today the ship, which was sailing under a Cypriot flag, is docked at the Port of Limassol. Cypriot authorities have reportedly inspected the ship twice, have communicated their findings to the Security Council, and are still waiting for guidance on how to deal with the ship.
All of this brings us back to next Tuesday's elections. With the US effectively giving up on confronting Iran, the entire burden for blocking Iran's quest for nuclear weapons falls on Israel's shoulders.
This means that the most important question that Israeli voters must ask ourselves between now and Tuesday is which leader and which party are most capable of achieving this vital goal?
All we need to do to answer this question is check what our leaders have done in recent years to bring attention to the Iranian threat and build coalitions to contend with it.
In late 2006, citing the Iranian nuclear menace, Yisrael Beitenu leader Avigdor Lieberman joined the Olmert government where he received the tailor-made title of Strategic Affairs Minister. At the time Lieberman joined the cabinet, the public outcry against the government for its failure to lead Israel to victory in the war with Iran's Lebanese proxy Hizbullah had reached a fever pitch. The smell of new elections was in the air as members of Knesset from all parties came under enormous public pressure to vote no confidence in the government.
By joining the government when he did, Lieberman single-handedly kept the Olmert government in power. Explaining his move, Lieberman claimed that the danger emanating from Iran's nuclear program was so great that Israel could not afford new elections.
But what did he accomplish by saving the government by taking that job? The short answer is nothing. Not only did his presence in the government make no impact on Israel's effectiveness in dealing with Iran, it prolonged the lifespan of a government that had no interest in forming a strategy for contending with Iran by two years.
In light of this fact, perhaps more than any other Israeli politician, Lieberman is to blame for the fact that Israel finds itself today with no allies in its hour of greatest peril. Had he allowed the people to elect more competent leaders in the fall of 2006, we might have been able to take advantage of the waning years of the Bush administration to convince the US to work with us against Iran.
Then there is Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. If Lieberman was the chief enabler of Israel's incompetent bungling of the Iranian threat, as Israel's chief diplomat, it is Livni - together with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert - who deserves the greatest condemnation for that bungling.
Throughout her tenure as Foreign Minister and still today as Kadima's candidate for Prime Minister, Livni claims that she supports using diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. But in her three years as Israel's top diplomat, Livni never launched any diplomatic initiative aimed at achieving this goal. In fact, she has never even publicly criticized the European and American attempts to appease the mullahs.
Livni has remained silent for three years even though it has been clear for five years that the West's attempts to cut a deal with Teheran serve no purpose other than to provide the Iranians time to develop their nuclear arsenal. She has played along with the Americans and the Europeans and cheered them on as they passed toothless resolutions against Iran in the Security Council which - as the Iranian weapons ship docked in Cyprus shows - they never had the slightest intention of enforcing.
As for Defense Minister Ehud Barak, as a member of the Olmert government, his main personal failure has been his inability to convince the Pentagon to approve Israel's requests to purchase refueling jets and bunker buster bomb kits, and to permit Israeli jets to fly over Iraqi airspace. To achieve these aims, Barak could have turned to Israel's friends in the US military and in Congress. But he did no such thing. And now, moving into the Obama administration, Israel finds itself with fewer and fewer allies in Washington's security community.
For the past several years, only one political leader in Israel has had the foresight and wisdom to both understand the dangers of Iran's nuclear program and to understand the basis for an Israeli diplomatic approach to contending with the threat that can serve the country's purposes regardless of whether or not at the end of the day, Israel is compelled to act alone.
In 2006, Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu took it upon himself to engage the American people in a discussion of the danger Iran poses not only to Israel but to the world as a whole. In late 2006, he began meeting with key US governors and state politicians to convince them to divest their state employees' pension funds from companies that do business with Iran. This initiative and complementary efforts by the Washington-based Center for Security Policy convinced dozens of state legislatures to pass laws divesting their pension funds from companies that do business with Iran.
Netanyahu also strongly backed the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs' initiative to indict Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as an international war criminal for inciting genocide. Both the divestment campaign and the campaign against Ahmadinejad have been Israel's most successful public diplomacy efforts in contending with Iran. More than anything done by the government, these initiatives made Americans aware of the Iranian nuclear threat and so forced the issue onto the agendas of all the presidential candidates.
For their part, instead of supporting Netanyahu's efforts, Livni, Barak and Lieberman have disparaged them or ignored them.
Because he is the only leader who has done anything significant to fight Iran's nuclear program, Netanyahu is the only national leader who has the international credibility to be believed when he says - as he said this week - that Israel will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. For its part, Likud under Netanyahu is the only party that has consistently drawn the connection between Iran, its Palestinian, Lebanese, Iraqi and Afghan terror proxies, its Syrian client state and its nuclear weapons program and made fighting this axis the guiding principle of its national security strategy.
Given the US-led international community's decision not to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, it is clear that in the coming months Israel will need to do two things. It will need to put the nations of the world on notice that they cannot expect us to stand by idly as they welcome Iran into the nuclear club. And Israel will need to prepare plans to strike Iran's nuclear installations without America's support.
More than ever before, Israel requires leaders who understand the gravity of the hour and are capable of acting swiftly and wisely to safeguard our country from destruction. Only Netanyahu and Likud have a credible track record on this subject.
For the sake of our country, our nation and our posterity, it is our responsibility to consider this fact when we enter the voting booths on Tuesday.
4) An Escalating Regional Cold War – Part I: The 2009 Gaza War
By: Y. Carmon, Y. Yehoshua, A. Savyon, and H. Migron
Table of Contents:
Introduction
The 2009 Gaza War: Timeline
The Iranian-Saudi/Shi'ite-Sunni Rivalry in the Wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution
The Escalation of the Conflict During Ahmadinejad's Presidency
Iran Extends Its Influence Into the Arab World
The Emergence of the Iran-Syria-Qatar-Hizbullah Axis
The 2009 Gaza War Deepens the Schism Between the Two Camps
After The War - The Schism Between the Two Camps is An Acknowledged Fact
The Saudi Camp: Iran Is Responsible for the Rift in the Arab World
"The Trojan Horse" - Qatar's Role in Consolidating the Iranian Axis
Two Camps, Two Contrasting Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Introduction
This Saudi-Iranian conflict, whose various aspects - geostrategic, religious, ethnic, and economic - have been affecting the Middle East for the past 30 years, began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Since then, there have been lulls (especially during the era of former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami), but the conflict flared up again after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rose to power. The conflict has now escalated into an actual cold war, and is reflected in the emergence of two distinct blocs in the Middle East: the Iranian axis (comprising Iran, Syria, Qatar, Hizbullah and Hamas) and the Saudi-Egyptian camp, with which most of the other Arab countries are identified.
This schism, and cold war, will have a major impact on the local, regional, and international level, severely restricting options for diplomatic activity, to resolve the intra-Palestinian rift, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the problem of a nuclear Iran.
The 2009 Gaza War: Timeline
The Gaza war broke out on December 27, 2008, after Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al refused - reportedly on orders from Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki [1] -to attend talks for a Cairo-brokered intra-Palestinian agreement. Instead, he announced in Damascus that the tahdia with Israel had ended and would not be renewed, as his men in Gaza fired dozens of rockets into southern Israel.
As soon as the fighting started, Syria and Qatar attempted to convene an emergency Arab League summit in order to help Hamas. This move was blocked by Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the December 31, 2008 Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo, where it was decided only to conduct international diplomatic activity aimed at stopping the hostilities. According to reports, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said at a closed meeting with E.U. foreign ministers that "Hamas must not be allowed to emerge triumphant from the present confrontation." [2]
Nevertheless, Qatar and Syria persisted in their efforts, setting the emergency summit for January 16, 2009, to be attended by anyone who wished. At this point, a campaign of pressure on the other Arab countries was launched by both sides: Iran, Syria, and Qatar urged them to attend, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt pressed them not to.
This clash ended with a victory for the Saudi-Egyptian camp, in that the summit, held in Doha, was convened in the absence of a legal quorum. [3] To the dismay of some Arab countries, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited to attend the summit as an observer. Also present as an observer was Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who expressed total support for Hamas. [4]
To reinforce its political victory, the Saudi-Egyptian camp enlisted international support by summoning all European leaders to a special weekend meeting at Sharm Al-Sheikh, on Sunday, January 18, 2009. The summit was attended by the mainEuropean leaders, which rallied to show its endorsement of the Saudi-Egyptian camp.
The following day, January 19, an economic summit that had been planned in advance was held in Kuwait, and part of it was devoted to the war in Gaza. This summit was likewise dominated by the Saudi-Egyptian camp. At the conference, Qatar demanded that the resolution of the Doha conference -- which called to revoke the peace agreements with Israel and to withdraw the Arab peace initiative - be endorsed, but Saudi Arabia and Egypt rejected its demand, and the summit ended with no resolutions regarding the war in Gaza.
On January 18, Hamas was compelled to accept the ceasefire declared unilaterally by Israel the day before, as well as Egypt's mediation in the intra-Palestinian talks - two demands it had categorically rejected prior to the war.
It can therefore be said that, unlike the 2006 war in Lebanon and the subsequent clash, in 2008, between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces, which ended in Lebanon's falling under the control of Hizbullah and the Iranian-Syrian axis, [5] the Gaza war yielded an achievement for the opposite side. It ended with Hamas defeated on the ground and with a political victory for the Saudi-Egyptian camp on the regional level.
The Iranian-Saudi/Shi'ite-Sunni Rivalry in the Wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution
The Iranian-Saudi conflict is rooted in Iran's aspirations to regional hegemony - both geostrategic and religious - which pose a threat to Saudi Arabia. From the onset of the Islamic Revolution era and Ayatollah Khomeini's rule (1979-89), Iran's attitude to Saudi Arabia was marked by ideological and political enmity, stemming from the historic religious, social, and ethnic rift between the Sunni-Wahhabi Arab society and the Shi'ite Persian one. The Sunnis perceive the Shi'ites as a political sect that seceded from Islam, while the Shi'ites regard the Sunnis, and especially the Wahhabis, as a radical apostate political sect that has taken over the Muslim holy places.
This rivalry, which emanates from revolutionary Iran's competition with Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Muslim world, reached its height in 1984, when thousands of Iranian pilgrims rioted in the streets of Mecca, calling for the overthrow of the Saudi regime. The Saudis forcibly quelled the riots, closing Mecca to Iranian pilgrims for several years. The Iranian threat also prompted the Saudis to support Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war.
The wave of solidarity with Iran's Islamic Revolution in the Sunni world prompted Saudi Arabia to exert great efforts in strengthening Sunni Islam in general and Wahhabi Islam in particular. To this end, Saudi Arabia acted mainly on two levels: giving massive support to the jihad in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s until the Soviets were defeated, and investing billions of dollars, over two decades and more, in establishing and maintaining schools, mosques, and other educational and religious institutions in Sunni communities worldwide. These efforts reversed much of the popularity of the Iranian revolution.
Saudi-Iranian enmity declined during the term of Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, and declined even more during the presidency of his successor, Mohammad Khatami. During Khatami's presidency, Iran strove to rejoin the international community by relaxing its efforts to export the revolution and by seeking to reconcile with its neighbors in the Gulf.
The Escalation of the Conflict During Ahmadinejad's Presidency
With Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rise to power in 2005, the conflict reemerged, with greater intensity. Ahmadinejad reverted to Iran's previous policy of anti-Saudi hegemony, by pushing the export of the revolution, and promoting a messianic Shi'ite vision that stresses the imminent appearance of the Mahdi and the reestablishment of the great Persian Empire. In his second television appearance following his election, he said: "The message of the [Islamic] Revolution is global, and not restricted to a specific time or place. It is a human message, and it will move forward. Have no doubt... Allah willing, Islam will conquer. Islam will conquer what? It will conquer all the mountaintops of the world." [6]
The message of reviving revolutionary values became a recurring motif in Ahmadinejad's speeches: "In the recent elections, the [Iranian] people proved that they believe in the [Islamic] Revolution and want to see its ideals revived… This revolution was a continuation of the movement of the prophets, and all the political, economic, and cultural goals of the [Iranian] state must therefore be geared towards realizing the Islamic ideals… The followers of this divine school of Islamic thought are doing everything in their power to prepare the ground for the coming [of the Shi'ite messiah, the Mahdi]… It is our duty to guide the people back to these glorious ideals, and to lead the way towards the establishment of an advanced and powerful Islamic society that will be a model [to others]… Iran must emerge as the most powerful and advanced state…" [7]
"The Iranian people, as well as the Iranian government, which has emerged out of the will of the Iranian people, will defend their right to nuclear research and technology... The older people present here surely remember that one of our slogans during the revolution was, 'We will convert the entire world to Islam with our logic.' We are confident that the Islamic logic, culture, and discourse can prove their superiority in all fields over all theories and schools of thought." [8]
In a recent speech at the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini marking the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad said: "Even though the revolution took place in Iran, it is not confined to Iran alone... Even after 30 years, [the revolution] is alive. We are [still] at the beginning of our road, and there are great changes still before us. This great revolution will continue until justice is inculcated [throughout the world]." [9]
Ahmadinejad's declarations about restoring the glory of the Shi'ite Persian Empire in the region, and the revival of the revolutionary rhetoric by other Iranian leaders - all backed by the regime's leading ayatollahs - were perceived by the Arab countries, and especially by Saudi Arabia, as a reemergence of the Iranian threat.
The religious-ideological threat was compounded by Iran's attempt to position itself as a regional military superpower, and by its determination to develop nuclear capabilities in addition to its long-range missile capabilities. Iran's insistence on developing nuclear technology despite international opposition was perceived by the Sunni Muslim world as a threat to it.
Iran Extends Its Influence Into the Arab World
Another factor contributing to the conflict was Iran's effort to increase its influence throughout the Arab world. Iran's activity in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime, and the rise in the Shi'ites' status in that country after the war, intensified Saudi fears, and the fears of other Sunni countries, about the emergence of an "Iranian/Shi'ite crescent" in the very heart of the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia responded by increasing its support for the Sunni minority in Iraq, for various Muslim and Christian forces in Lebanon, and for others who were confronting Iranian threats in their territory (e.g. in Yemen, Sudan, and Palestine).
The military and political achievements of Hizbullah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, during the 2006 war and in the 2008 Doha agreement (which de facto gave Lebanon to Hizbullah's control) were likewise perceived as part of Iran's bid for regional hegemony - especially in light of statements by Iranian officials. Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani said after the signing of the Doha agreement: "We see this political victory in the regional arena as a harbinger of [even] greater victories..." He added that Nasrallah had "carried out some of [Khomeini's] teachings." [10]
After the Lebanon war, Saudi-Sunni concerns about Iran's growing aspirations for regional dominance came under more intensive and open discussion in the Arab world. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu Al-Gheit said that the Iranians "were trying to spread [their influence] and impose their idiosyncratic ideology over the region." [11] He also accused Iran of "trying to use Arab cards to realize interests and goals that are not Arab," [12] and said, "It is necessary to ensure that Iran does not become a nuclear military power." [13]
Similar concerns were also voiced in the Saudi and Egyptian press. In the Saudi government daily Al-Riyadh, Saudi columnist Muhammad bin Ali Al-Mahmoud described Iran's policy under Ahmadinejad, stating: "The change in the Iranian arena has led to the emergence of a Nazi-like atmosphere [there, and to the voicing of] empty slogans that are [even] more violent and bombastic [than those heard] during the first [Iranian] revolution [of 1979]... [14] Sadly, the Iranian threat is not just a theoretical [construct] whose nature and course is a matter of debate among scholars. It has become a reality, and there is no difference between the model [represented by] the terroristic Al-Qaeda and the one [represented by] the Iranian party in Lebanon [i.e., Hizbullah]..."
Al-Mahmoud warned about Iran's "octopus-like expansion," saying: "Iran wants to control the region, not by spreading its ideology... but by maintaining armed organizations [in Arab countries]... it violates their loyalty to their homelands, replacing it with loyalty to Iran. This, especially since Iran is a country that does not spread tolerance or a culture of moderation, but... a culture of one-sided hegemony, as part of a racist effort to impose a kind of occupation..." [15]
In an article in the Saudi government daily Al-Watan, Saudi columnist 'Ali Sa'd Al-Moussa wrote that the Arab countries were being subjected to "Persian colonialism," as evidenced by the Iranian "cantons and districts on the map of the Arab world..." He added: "Iran has become a major and central player in Arab politics... Today we are seeing new signs of Persian colonialism. This is a [new], more advanced colonial model: We are no longer talking of troops occupying [certain] regions or of flags [flying] over public buildings. The colonialism of the modern era is manifested by the submission of [various regional forces to Iran]... Iran chose [regions] on the Arab map and attacked them without [even] pulling the trigger. Its entire plan is being implemented by Arabs." [16]
The Emergence of the Iran-Syria-Qatar-Hizbullah Axis
As part of Iran's bid for regional hegemony, a political and military axis has formed, comprising not only Iran and the Shi'a in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, but also various Sunni forces that have an interest in opposing Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It was during the 2006 Lebanon war that a distinct Iran-Syria-Qatar-Hizbullah axis first emerged to oppose the Saudi-Egyptian camp. [17] At a later stage, this axis expanded to include Hamas, which has in recent years received increasing support from Iran, as well the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Lately, Syria and Iran have been striving to add Turkey to their ranks, and have met with some cooperation on the part of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. [18]
Saudi Arabia, for its part, has been trying to pry some of Iran's Sunni allies away from it. [19]
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mu'allem spoke of the "strategic alliance" among members of the Iranian axis, saying: "Our relations with Iran are strategic, and our relations with Turkey are also strategic, and we hope that our relations with the Arabs will be [strategic] as well. Our relations with Qatar are strategic, as are our relations with 'Oman, Algeria, and Libya, and we hope that in the future this [framework will expand] to include additional [countries] as well… We are acting in accordance with our interests and in the service of the Arab national cause and national security. To this end, we are coordinating with Iran and Turkey, and we are not ashamed of this… We coordinate [our efforts] towards our common goal - [which is finding a way] to protect the Palestinian resistance and the national resistance in Lebanon, by creating [strategic] depth for them." [20]
Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad spoke in a similar vein in a September 2008 interview with Iran's Al-Alam TV: "The strategic ties [between Syria and Iran] have proved to be of importance for the region in recent decades, but their real results have emerged [only] in the last 10 years. These include the victory of the resistance in Lebanon, and the unswerving fortitude of the resistance in Palestine since the Intifada, which began in 2000… We see before us a black slate dotted with bright spots that were once tiny but are now steadily increasing in size. This underscores the importance of [Syrian-Iranian] cooperation and the correctness of the political policy of Syria and Iran. Many countries that once objected to this policy are now beginning to realize its correctness, and to pursue a similar policy themselves…" [21]
The 2009 Gaza War Deepens the Schism Between the Two Camps
Just prior to its outbreak, the two camps engaged in reciprocal verbal attacks. Syria and Iran accused Saudi Arabia and Egypt of pursuing a pro-Israel and pro-American policy and of sabotaging the efforts of the resistance movements. Saudi King 'Abdallah was branded by Syria as an "infidel" and "collaborator with the Imperialist Satan," while Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was called a "traitor" and a "tyrant" who should be assassinated like Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for their part, claimed that Iran and Syria were striving to destabilize the region by interfering in internal Arab affairs and by nurturing the resistance movements in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority. They stressed that Syria was trying to divide the Arab ranks and was assisting Iran - a non-Arab country - in taking over the Middle East, to the detriment of Arab interests. [22]
After the war, the Iranian leaders boasted of the support they had given to Hamas - whose actions, they claimed, corresponded to the goals of the Islamic Revolution. The leaders also leveled harsh criticism at the Saudi-Egyptian axis. [23] Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani said that both Hizbullah's victory in 2006 and Hamas' victory in Gaza were fruits of the "great tree" that is Iran's Islamic Revolution. [24] Iranian Expediency Council Chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani declared at a rally that "the residents of Gaza, [just like] Hizbullah, have managed to defeat the army of the Zionist regime thanks to the beneficial influence of Iran." [25] Guardian Council Chairman Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati said in his Friday sermon in Tehran: "[In 2006], the host of Hizbullah [fighters], inspired by Islamic Iran, managed to deliver a crushing blow to Israel, to America and to the other Western countries supporting Israel. Now the same thing has happened in Gaza. Wherever Iran has a toehold, it will save and rescue [the Muslims]..." [26] The Iranian daily Kayhan, which is close to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stated that Israel's war on Hamas had created a new Middle East, and had proved that the entire alliance consisting of Israel, the U.S., the European Union, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could not defeat a small organization like Hamas, despite the use of massive military force. [27]
The pro-Saudi camp, for its part, accused Hamas of serving Iranian and Syrian interests rather than those of the Palestinians. Egyptian President Mubarak declared that "Egypt will not let anyone make political profits and increase their [regional] influence at the expense of Palestinian blood." [28] Egyptian Foreign Minister Abu Al-Gheit accused Iran of using its Arab proxies to bargain with the U.S. and further its own ends. In an interview with Al-Arabiya TV, he said: "All non-Arab hands should be kept off the Palestinian cause, and even some Arab hands." He added, "Iran... seeks to grab as many Arab bargaining chips as possible, in order to tell the next U.S. administration: If you wish to discuss any subject - especially the security of the Gulf or Iran's nuclear dossier - you will have to speak with us..." [29] Abu Al-Gheit made similar statements in 2007, when he said that Iran's activities had encouraged Hamas to carry out the Gaza coup, and that this "threatened the national security of Egypt, which is only a stone's throw away from Gaza." [30]
Senior Palestinian Authority officials likewise pointed to Iranian involvement in Gaza. PA Presidency secretary-general Al-Tayyeb 'Abd Al-Rahim stated that Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki had told the Hamas leaders to resume the resistance, and to keep Egypt from playing any role in the Palestinian dialogue. This, Al-Rahim said, was why Hamas refused to renew the tahdia and to continue the dialogue with Fatah. [31] PLO Secretary-General Yasser 'Abd Rabbo said that Hamas was advancing a regional conspiracy to turn Gaza into an independent entity separate from the West Bank, and to establish an Islamic emirate there, supported by Iran. [32]
Several days before Israel launched its Gaza offensive, the editor of the Egyptian daily Al-Gumhouriyya, MP Muhammad 'Ali Ibrahim, published a series of articles under the title "Hamas-Damascus-Iran - The New Axis of Evil." [33] Once the Israeli offensive had begun, Ibrahim wrote: "Hamas, Hizbullah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Tehran have decided to put the Palestinian cause and its martyrs into Iran's hands. However, everyone is forgetting one important point - namely, that we will not hand over our people's capabilities to lunatics who hide out in Syria and who fire not a single bullet at Israel... There is a plan to set the entire region ablaze, and to kill as many Palestinian and Lebanese martyrs as possible, in order to expose the helplessness of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the [entire] moderate Arab axis... [34]
After The War - The Schism Between the Two Camps is An Acknowledged Fact
The Western media has largely ignored the new reality in the Middle East - namely, the schism and the escalating cold war between the two camps - as well as the far-reaching political implications. However, in the Arab world, this reality has become a publicly acknowledged fact, and is being intensely discussed.
Nasrallah's deputy Sheikh Na'im Qassem explained that Hizbullah was proud to belong to the Iranian axis, which was hostile to the U.S. and its Arab supporters. He stated: "In today's world, there are two mutually opposing camps - the camp of the U.S. and its allies, and the camp of the resistance and its allies. The important point is that the American camp, which includes Israel [and is characterized by] corruption, aggression, and monopoly, is a hostile camp, and we, the resistance camp, must therefore oppose it staunchly and forcefully… [Our camp] will emerge triumphant. It is impossible to express solidarity [with the Palestinians] without supporting the resistance... Today, Gaza is the very embodiment of resistance. Everyone who supported Gaza [during the war] is on the side of the resistance, while everyone who did not support it, but was against it, is on the side of the U.S. and Israel…"
Qassem added: "Some thought that if they malign us [by calling us] allies of Iran, Syria, and Hamas, it would bother us. [Well], let me say that you can add Chavez and Bolivia [to the list of our allies], and all the free peoples in the world. We will [all] form a united front against the U.S. and Israel…" [35]
Dr. Majed Abu Madhi, columnist for the Syrian government daily Al-Ba'ath and lecturer at the University of Damascus, argued that the war in Gaza had exposed not only the rift in the Arab world between the regimes that support the resistance and those that oppose it, but also the conflict between the rulers who object to the resistance, and their peoples who support it. He wrote: "It has become patently clear which countries support the resistance. It has also become patently clear which [Arab] regimes are the ones that the U.S. calls 'moderate' -[those that] oppose the resistance and even conspire against it. In addition, there is another kind of division, [namely,] between countries where the position of the government and the political leadership is aligned with that of the general public, and countries in which the position of the government and the leaders is at odds with that of the public. We have discovered a gap - nay, a deep abyss - between the wishes of the rulers [who reject the resistance] and those of their people [who support it]." [36]
The Saudi Camp: Iran Is Responsible for the Rift in the Arab World
The pro-Saudi camp accused Iran of causing the rift in the Arab world. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal said that the current disagreement among the Arabs was the result of "intervention by non-Arab forces" in Arab affairs - referring to Iran. [37] During the Kuwait economic summit, Egyptian President Mubarak likewise hinted at Iranian interference, when he accused "internal and external" forces of dividing and weakening the Arab world. [38]
Editorials in newspapers associated with the Saudi-Egyptian camp stated that Iran was sowing division in the Arab world as part of its plan to achieve regional hegemony, and accused Arab forces such as Syria and Qatar of cooperating with this plan. Osama Saraya, editor-in-chief of the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram, wrote: "Like the Persians in all [past] eras, the contemporary [Iranian] clerics think that [all] the Arabs, from the ocean to the Gulf, are a bunch of camel herders or ignoramuses. [Therefore, they think] that they can still market illusions that hide their true intentions, which are to take control of our region and to annex it to the empire they hope [to reestablish]... You must stop spreading your religion [in other countries, and confine these efforts] to your land alone. You must respect the [other] Muslim countries and the treaties signed between the Sunnis and Shi'ites [in which they agreed] to refrain from spreading [their respective] religions and from taking over [each other's] lands." [39]
The editor of the Egyptian daily Al-Gumhouriyya, MP Muhammad 'Ali Ibrahim, wrote in his daily column: "Iran's ideology advocates eliminating [all] nationalities and national borders... The problem with the Iranian ideas is that [Iran] has passed them on to its followers in the Middle East... And the most dangerous [problem] with this Iranian philosophy... is that it calls for establishing states within states... This philosophy has indeed borne fruit in some parts of the Arab world. We have several examples of this: Hizbullah won the elections in Lebanon, and its state [within a state] was naturally stronger than Lebanon [itself]. [Furthermore], its militias were stronger than the government's armed forces. [The same thing] has happened with Hamas... [and with] the Shi'ites in Bahrain, who are wreaking havoc in their country [in an attempt to establish] a Shi'ite state alongside the Sunni Bahraini kingdom. In Kuwait, Egypt, and Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood is using its representation in parliament to try and take over the government and the leadership of the state... It is a dangerous and destructive idea to sacrifice the country for the sake of religion..." [40]
"The Trojan Horse" - Qatar's Role in Consolidating the Iranian Axis
It should be noted that Qatar has played a crucial role in exacerbating the rift in the Arab world by initiating the January 16, 2009 Doha summit, to the dismay of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Qatar's inviting of Iranian President Ahmadinejad to the summit against the will of several Arab countries (such as the UAE, which responded by canceling its participation) clearly identified the summit as a convention of the Iranian-Syrian axis. The summit's pro-Iranian and anti-Saudi orientation was underscored by the fact that it called on Egypt to revoke its peace agreement with Israel, and on Saudi Arabia to withdraw its initiative for peace with it.
After the war ended, Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al thanked Qatar for its support for his movement during the fighting. In a speech in Doha, he said: "Two weeks ago, we came to you and asked you to stand by our side, and today we thank Qatar, its Emir, and its people [for responding to this request]."
Galal Dweidar, former editor-in-chief of the Egyptian government daily Al-Akhbar, characterized the Doha summit as "a conference in support of the Persian [expansionist] ambitions" and called Qatar "a Trojan horse designed to pave the way for the Shi'ite Persian invasion of [the lands belonging to] Muhammad's nation and the Sunnis." [41]
Al-Ahram editor Osama Saraya wrote in a similar vein: "By calling the Doha summit, Qatar hoped not only to undermine all the Arab actions, but also to deepen the rift among the Arabs and to put the joint Arab action in the hands of the axis of destruction and evil… [i.e. in the hands of] the Iranian axis - whose role was exposed and rendered completely transparent during the recent events in the region, and in the wake of Israel's Gaza offensive." [42]
Two Camps, Two Contrasting Approaches to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict
Iran's and Syria's support of the resistance, as well as Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's support of a peace agreement with Israel, can both be understood in light of the Iranian - Saudi schism.
The Saudi camp's opposition to Hizbullah during the 2006 war, and its opposition to Hamas during the Gaza war, were both part of its conflict with Iran. Likewise, the Saudi camp's determination to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is meant to strengthen its position vis-Ã -vis Iran and its allies. Egypt is demanding to sponsor the intra-Palestinian dialogue and the current arrangements between Gaza and Israel, in order to prevent Iran from taking over Gaza via Hamas. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is striving to promote its peace initiative with Israel as a strategic option that will consolidate its position vis-Ã -vis the Iranian axis - at the same time as this axis attempts to undermine the Saudi position through its support for the resistance against Israel.
In fact, the Iranian axis has called to revoke all initiatives for peace with Israel and all manifestations of normalization with it - which it terms "collaboration" by the Arab regimes with Israel and the U.S. As part of this approach, Qatar and Mauritania announced at the Doha summit that they were severing ties with Israel. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei even equated the moderate Arab leaders who maintain ties with Israel with the Jews at the time of the Prophet Muhammad who were considered to be his enemies. In a letter to Hamas leader Isma'il Haniya, Khamenei said: "The Arab traitors must realize that their fate will be no better than that of the Jews at the Battle of Al-Ahzab [i.e. the Jews of the Al-Quraidha tribe who were killed for allegedly conspiring against the Prophet]." [43]
The Iranian axis contends that the correct course of action vis-Ã -vis Israel is resistance. Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad declared the Arab Peace Initiative "dead," and coined a new phrase by defining the resistance as "a way to achieve peace," explaining that "peace without resistance is surrender." [44]
Editor of the Syrian government daily Teshreen Samira Al-Masalma explained that the disagreement between the camps was profound and could not be bridged: "The dispute between the Arabs is no longer a matter of different positions or different approaches to the solution, as was the case in the past. [Today,] the dispute is about the fundamentals, the means, the [proper] conduct and the practical approach to the crucial issues. This is what makes the disagreements so blatant.
"Both in July 2006 and during the aggression against Gaza… two [different] positions emerged among the official Arab regimes... According to one position, there is no peace without resistance, while according to the other, surrender is the key to peace and resistance is but meaningless 'adventurism.' These two positions are not merely theoretical. The [proponents of] the former support the resistance in every possible way, while the [proponents of] the latter are openly involved in destroying it." [45]
Furthermore, spokesmen for the Iranian-Syrian axis hinted at the possibility of a further escalation in the region. Syrian President Al-Assad said: "It was the 1982 [Lebanon-Israel] war that gave birth to the resistance in its present form and brought about the liberation [of Lebanon]. The 2002 massacre in Jenin [sparked] a situation of resistance in Palestine. In 2006, the same thing happened [in Lebanon], and today [in 2009] we see the same thing [in Gaza]... There are displays of resistance, and each of these [further] consolidates the course of the resistance and the validity of its ideologies... These are small victories that are part of a great triumph. They will continue in the future, and undoubtedly there will be further confrontations in one form or another - not all of them necessarily armed. But these victories are like steps on a ladder leading to further victories, and we cannot attain the final victory without them." [46]
Ibrahim Al-Amin, chairman of the pro-Syrian and pro-Hizbullah Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, claimed that the Doha summit had provided a new impetus for the resistance, which would now become the preferred strategy not only of the resistance organizations themselves but also of certain Arab regimes. He wrote: "The most important point is that the Arab-Israeli conflict has entered a new phase… The meeting in Doha served as a lever for the camp that advocates resistance, [and resistance] has now become a dominant part of the operation methods employed [vis-Ã -vis Israel] - also by the [Arab] regimes and governments. This will have repercussions for relations with Europe and the U.S. It will also affect the situation in Iraq, which is the largest Arab country under U.S. occupation…"
Al-Amin contended that "the Arab world would [now] face a spell of score-settling even worse than the one witnessed by Lebanon in 2006 in the wake of the [Israeli] aggression." [47]
Hizbullah deputy leader Sheikh Na'im Qassem said: "We believe in resistance as a means [of bringing about] liberation and change... [for] the land and the people cannot be liberated from the force of arrogance [i.e. the U.S.] and from its pampered protectorate, Israel, in any other way... We carry out this resistance with our own hands in order to take back our rights. We do not [intend to count on] the [U.N.] Security Council or the superpowers; we will liberate our lands with our [own] weapons, as we did in the past and will [continue] to do [in the future]... The resistance we mean [to carry out] is military, and we say to the world: We will arm ourselves more and more, and we call to arm all the resistance [movements] that fight the enemy who occupies the land..." [48]
The Saudi-Egyptian camp, on the other hand, opposed the resistance strategy, and rejected calls to sever ties with Israel or withdraw the Arab Peace Initiative. The Saudi foreign minister said, "The Arab Initiative is still relevant," adding that it "places Israel under considerable pressure." [49]
Some even called to return to the original version of the Saudi Peace Initiative, before amendments were introduced in 2002 in response to demands by Syria, such as a clause acknowledging the Palestinian right of return. An editorial in the Lebanese daily Al-Mustaqbal stated: "The Arab Peace Initiative, especially in its original form, before it was injected with Syrian-Lahoudian [50] corruption during the 2002 Beirut summit [meaning the inclusion of the right of return for the Palestinian refugees], was a comprehensive strategic vision... Lasting peace is a condition for the success of the programs for reform in all the Arab countries. For the sake of all this, the Arab peace initiative was and still is alive and well, and is the only strategy that the Arabs can propose in today's world."
The daily also called "to remove the Syrian-Lahoudian flaws from the Arab Peace Initiative, and to reintroduce as it was it in its original form." [51]
*Y. Carmon is the President of MEMRI; Y. Yehoshua is Director of Research at MEMRI; A. Savyon is director of MEMRI's Iranian Media Project; and H. Migron is a Research Fellow at MEMRI
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[1] Al-Tayyeb 'Abd Al-Rahim, secretary-general of the Palestinian Authority Presidency, stated that during a visit to Damascus, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki had told the Hamas leaders to resume the resistance, and to keep Egypt from playing any role in the Palestinian dialogue. Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), January 1, 2009.
[2] Ha'aretz (Israel), January 6, 2009.
[3] According to the Arab League charter, an emergency meeting must be convened by a quorum of at least 15 member states. Consequently, each of the Arab countries was forced to take a side in the conflict by either supporting the initiative of the emergency summit or rejecting it, and thus effectively declaring its membership in one camp or the other.
The summit in Doha was eventually attended by Syria, Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon (whose president, according to Hizbullah, made a great show of attending under duress), Comoro Islands, Mauritania, Iraq, Oman, Libya, Morocco, and Djibouti. It should be mentioned that PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas, who is cooperating with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, did not attend. Conversely, representatives of several Palestinian factions, namely Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Democratic Front - General Command, did arrive, in the Qatari Emir's private jet.
[4] Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu Al-Gheit explained in an interview with Orbit TV that Egypt had thwarted attempts to hold an emergency Arab League summit because "the Arab actions cannot be contingent upon the consent of [non-Arab] countries like Comoro Islands..." He added: "Where are the large and influential countries in the region, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia?" Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), January 29, 2009.
[5] The 2008 confrontation between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces ended with a victory for the former, since the organization's major demands were met: a one-third majority in cabinet giving it control over government decisions, and the nomination of a president approved by the organization. In addition, the government of Prime Minister Fuad Al-Siniora reversed its May 6, 2008 decisions which had been the immediate trigger for the clash between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces - namely, the decision to declare Hizbullah's private communications network an illegal enterprise undermining Lebanon's sovereignty and to charge those responsible for establishing it, as well as the decision to fire Beirut airport security chief Wafiq Shuqair, who is affiliated with Hizbullah. Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), May 15, 2008.
Hizbullah's takeover of Lebanon was facilitated by Qatar, who convened the May 21, 2008 Doha summit, in which the political achievements of Hizbullah and the Iranian-Syrian-Qatari axis were consolidated.
[6] http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/782.htm, July 25, 2005.
[7] Sharq, IRNA (Iran), November 15, 2005.
[8] See MEMRI TV Clip No. 782, http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/782.htm.
[9] IRNA (Iran), January 31, 2009
[10] Al-Hayat (London), May 29, 2008.
[11] Al-Hayat (London), December 15, 2008.
[12] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 3, 2007.
[13] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 19, 2006.
[14] Ahmadinejad's rise to power is sometimes referred to as the "Second Islamic Revolution." See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 229, "Iran's ‘Second Islamic Revolution': Fulfilled by Election of Conservative President," June 28, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA22905 and MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 253, "The 'Second Islamic Revolution' in Iran: Power Struggle at the Top," November 17, 2005, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA25305.
[15] Al-Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), May 29, 2008.
[16] Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), May 15, 2008.
[17] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1249, "Arab Media Accuses Iran and Syria of Direct Involvement in Lebanon War," August 15, 2006, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=lebanon&ID=SP124906.
[18] Sunni countries and forces, such as Syria, Qatar, Turkey, and Hamas, have various motivations in joining the axis of Shi'ite Iran. Syria, whose standing in the Arab world is at odds with its self-perception as the cradle of Arab civilization and of pan-Arab ideology, sees the Iranian axis as a framework for enhancing its regional status. In addition, it is probably motivated by considerations of political survival. Faced with the danger of conviction by the international tribunal for the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, Syria hopes that its alliance with Iran will provide it with some backing against this tribunal (like the backing extended by the Arab countries to Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir). See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 490, "Recent Attempts to Form Strategic Regional Bloc: Syria, Turkey and Iran," January 6, 2009, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA49009.
Qatar likewise sees the Iranian axis as a platform for elevating its regional status and also for challenging Saudi Arabia's dominance in the Arabian Peninsula. The policy of Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani is one of blatant opposition to Saudi Arabia, which did not support him in his 1995 coup attempt against his father. To counterbalance the fact that Qatar is home to the largest U.S. air base in the Middle East, and has ties with Israel, the Qatari Emir uses Al-Jazeera TV - his long arm in the Arab and Muslim world - to attack the Arab regimes and the U.S., and to support the global jihad organizations, the ideology of resistance, and the Nasserist pan-Arab ideology.
In the past few years, Qatar has been actively supporting Syria, Iran and the resistance movements. In 2006, it assisted Hizbullah in the passing of U.N. Resolution 1701 for ending the Lebanon war, and, unlike the other Gulf states, it refrained from condemning Hamas' 2007 takeover of Gaza. Additionally, in an attempt to prevent the isolation of Syria, it was the only Arab country that abstained in the vote on Security Council Resolution 1737 on establishing an international tribunal for the Al-Hariri assassination. Finally, it served Iran's interests by inviting Ahmadinejad to the December 2007 GCC summit in Doha - to the astonishment and consternation of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia - in an attempt to break up the anti-Iranian Gulf bloc. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 416, "The Collapse of the Saudi Sunni Bloc against Iran's Aspirations for Regional Hegemony in the Gulf," January 11, 2008, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA41608. (A further report on Qatar's policy will be published by MEMRI in the near future).
Hamas likewise regards the Iranian axis as a suitable framework of operation, since its political goals are at odds with the positions of the Saudi-Egyptian axis.
As for Turkey, in the past few years it too has been inclining towards the Iranian axis. During the 2009 Gaza war, it expressed solidarity with Hamas, and Prime Minister Erdogan attended only the forum of the Iranian axis (e.g. the Doha Summit) and did not attend the summit at Sharm Al-Sheikh. He offered to mediate between the Palestinian factions in coordination with Syria, but not in coordination with Egypt. On the recent Turkish-Iranian rapprochement, see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 490, "Recent Attempts to Form Strategic Regional Bloc: Syria, Turkey and Iran," January 6, 2009, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA49009.
[19] In 2007 and in 2009, Saudi Arabia tried but failed to bring Syria and Hamas back into the Arab Saudi-Egyptian fold.
[20] Al-Manar TV, January 7, 2009.
[21] Al-Thawra (Syria), September 18, 2008.
[22] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 485, "Rising Inter-Arab Tensions: Saudi Arabia and Egypt versus Syria and Iran, Part I - Deepening Crisis in Saudi-Syrian Relations," December 22, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA48508 ; Inquiry and Analysis No. 486, "Rising Inter-Arab Tensions: Saudi Arabia and Egypt versus Syria and Iran, Part II - Egypt Trades Accusations with Hamas, Syria, Iran," December 22, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA48608 ; Inquiry and Analysis No. 487, "Rising Inter-Arab Tensions: Saudi Arabia and Egypt versus Syria and Iran, Part III - Syria, Saudi Arabia Clash over Fath Al-Islam," December 22, 2008, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA48708.
[23] In demonstrations in Tehran, strong accusations were made against the Arab regimes, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. During the war, and even before it, there were calls to bring down the Egyptian regime and assassinate Mubarak, like Sadat. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 479, "Calls in Iran to Topple Egyptian, Saudi Regimes," December 12, 2008,
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=egypt&ID=IA47908.
[24] IRNA (Iran), January 22, 2009; Ayandenews News (Iran), January 21, 2009.
[25] IRNA (Iran), January 31, 2009.
[26] ISNA (Iran), January 16, 2009.
[27] Kayhan (Iran), January 27, 2009.
[28] Al-Ahram (Egypt), December 31, 2008.
[29] www.alarabiya.net, January 1, 2009.
[30] Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), June 20, 2007.
[31] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (PA), January 1, 2009.
[32] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), January 23, 2009.
[33] The articles appeared on December 22, 23, and 24, 2008.
[34] Al-Gumhouriyya (Egypt), December 29, 2008.
[35] www.alintiqad.com, January 17, 2009.
[36] Al-Ba'ath (Syria), January 19, 2009.
[37] Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), January 18, 2009.
[38] Al-Ahram (Egypt), January 20, 2009.
[39] Al-Ahram (Egypt), January 16, 2009.
[40] Al-Gumhouriyya (Egypt), December 19, 2008.
[41] Al-Akhbar (Egypt), January 18, 2009.
[42] Al-Ahram (Egypt), January 16, 2009.
[43] Fars (Iran), January 15, 2009. In a recent Friday sermon, Ayatollah Jannati called Saudi Arabia "a U.S. puppet" and Egypt "an ally of Israel," adding that the heads of those countries should fear an uprising by their people and the wrath of God. ISNA (Iran), January 16, 2009.
[44] Al-Ba'ath (Syria), January 17, 2009.
[45] Teshreen (Syria), January 17, 2009.
[46] Al-Thawra (Syria), January 27, 2009.
[47] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), January 17, 2009.
[48] www.alintiqad.com, January 17, 2009.
[49] Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), January 17, 2009.
[50] A reference to then-Lebanese president Emil Lahoud.
[51] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), January 17, 2009.
5) Does Israel Need Think Tanks?
By Hannah Elka Meyers
Think tanks may once have been a solely American phenomenon, but they have now begun to take root in many countries, including Israel.[1] In the United States, think tanks are immensely influential. Prominent examples, such as the Heritage Institute, Hoover Institution, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and Brookings Institution, among other things serve as personnel resources for new administrations and their impact on policy is pronounced. In Iraq, for example, the Baker-Hamilton Commission, sponsored jointly by the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, on the one hand, and the American Enterprise Institute's "Choosing Victory," which led to the surge, on the other, helped define the U.S. debate.[2]
In Israel, however, think tanks have failed to influence policy significantly despite Israel's democratic culture, the gravity of its policy debates, and the fact that, per capita, Israel actually has a higher percentage of think tanks than the United States.
Think Tank Beginnings
Maj.-Gen. Yaakov Amidror, former head of the Israel Defense Forces' National Defense College and program director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs, attends a conference on "NATO, the Mediterranean and the Broader Middle East," September 11-12, 2006. Many scholars employed in national security policy at Israeli think tanks were high-ranking members of the IDF. Top officials who would not consult think tank materials may, nevertheless, feel comfortable placing a call to an old army buddy. (NATO photo)
The think tank phenomenon in the United States began in 1916 when Robert S. Brookings assembled a group of political reformers to found the Institute for Government Research, which merged in 1927 with two sister organizations to found the Brookings Institution. Today, there are more than 1,400 think tanks in the United States, which include all institutions that research, analyze, and propose recommendations to policymakers and the public concerning domestic or international public policy. As policy research institutes investigating any number of foreign policy and domestic political issues, think tanks range in size from one-man operations like the Institute for Research-Middle East Policy (IRMEP) to institutes like RAND, which employs over 1,500 people. The most prominent American think tanks—the American Enterprise Institute, Brookings, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations—may lean to the right or left but remain independent of any political party. Others, such as the Center for American Progress or Heritage, are in both reality and practice more closely, if not directly, linked to political parties.
U.S. think tanks also vary in their level and type of funding. Some, such as AEI and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, remain independent of government money and rely on foundation and individual donor support. Others, such as RAND and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, perform contract research for the U.S. government. On the far end of the spectrum, the U.S. Institute for Peace and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars accept the bulk of their budgets from the U.S. government. In 2005, for example, Congress provided $100 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace for a new building on the Washington Mall.[3]
As freedom and democracy have spread, so too have think tanks. There are now more than 5,000 internationally: 1,873 in the United States and Canada; 1,187 in Western Europe; 480 in Eastern Europe; 462 in Latin America; 548 in South and East Asia; 265 in Africa; 32 in Australia and New Zealand; and 188 in the Middle East. [4] Of those in the Middle East, Israel is home to 35; 19 are in Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority hosts 17. Only six other Middle East or North African states have think tanks numbering in the double digits.[5]
Israel's thirty-five think tanks range from the well-established and -endowed Van Leer Institute, with its focus on secular and social issues, to the relatively young Reut Institute, which examines security and socioeconomic topics. Many think tanks are affiliated with academic institutions, including the Institute for National Security Studies, which incorporated the older Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, and The Global Research in International Affairs Center affiliated with the Lauder School of Government and Diplomacy of the Interdisciplinary Center, all of which focus on national security and Middle East affairs. Others, such as the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute and the Shalem Center, are specifically dedicated to issues relating to Jewry in Israel.
Israel's Think Tanks Take Root
Three factors helped smooth Israel's introduction to think tanks. The first is what Benjamin Balint, a fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and former associate editor of the Shalem Center's quarterly Azure, describes as Israel's "Western political culture."[6] The second is Israelis' familiarity with American political life, which is linked to the third factor: the high numbers of Israelis who have lived and studied in the United States. Indeed, Balint argues, most Israeli think tank founders "are very well connected with the States because they were either educated there or lived there."[7]
Still, familiarity with Western political life alone cannot account for the proliferation of Israeli research centers. After all, elsewhere in the Middle East, exposure to U.S. political norms has not translated into the establishment of think tanks. "If you're living in Jordan, in the Hashemite elite, you come back from time in the States to work in government, to be an advisor. You do not start a think tank because there's no political space for it," says Balint.[8] In sharp contrast to most Arab states, Israel's political climate and governmental structures possess the necessary preconditions for carrying out independent policy analyses of societal and political problems. Only Israel, Turkey, and perhaps the United Arab Emirates possess sufficient freedom of speech and of the press both to pursue policy-relevant research and to publicize it. And even then, in the Middle East, freedom to criticize government policies is a uniquely Israeli phenomenon.
Despite their numbers, Israeli think tanks have little impact. Even such heavyweights as the Shalem Center, International Institute for Counterterrorism in Herzliya, and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs have had little impact on Israeli policymaking. Many research centers' own heads admit their lack of political influence. Eyal Zisser, director and senior research fellow at Tel Aviv University's Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, for example, acknowledges a lack of "real influence."[9] Efraim Inbar, a political science professor at Bar-Ilan University and director of its Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies has said, "We should be modest in our evaluation of the impact of think tanks,"[10] and Balint observed that even leading Israeli think tanks
never seem to have the same level of success or influence as in the States. There's no AEI here; it just doesn't exist. The Shalem Center, maybe, comes closest, but it's sort of amazing how divorced from Israeli reality it is sometimes.[11]
The only prominent dissenter to such an assessment is Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, who argues that Israel's centers have more political influence than in other countries. Rubin explains,
It's not that the Likud [center/right party] or Labor [left party] are going to a research center and saying "Advise us." Political parties do not consult with think tanks, but government civil servants or officials might—the opposite of the British model where the Labour and Conservative parties have their own think tanks. [12]
What Hampers Israeli Think Tanks?
Much of the reason for the Israeli think tank sector's weak influence lies in Israel's political structure. Like parliaments in many European states, Israel's Knesset offers fewer points of access for outside policy advice than does either the U.S. Congress or the executive branch. James McGann, a Foreign Policy Research Institute senior fellow and director of its Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, explains, "In the parliamentary model, the legislative and executive are fused. In the U.S. model, you can go through the legislative branch or to the executive branch [with policy advice]; you do not have to go to a single source." In addition, U.S. federalism results in weak political parties. The "decentralized, porous system, with a separation of powers between federal, state, and local levels … provides yet another access point to influence federal policy," says McGann.[13] Conversely, parliamentary systems engender greater party discipline, dissuading legislators from looking to the outside for policy suggestions or taking positions contrary to their party leadership.[14]
In addition, Israel's proportional electoral system discourages the election of officials interested in new, independent policy ideas.[15] Proportional representation allows special interest political parties, such as the Shas party and the Pensioners of Israel party, to hold sway over mainstream parties by joining any coalition that will support pet projects. Such a phenomenon tends to deter intelligent and creative thinkers from running for office, discourages the creation of policy to solve mainstream problems, and leads to inorganic party coalitions uninterested in tackling the most important issues. In this environment, where politics is dominated by strong parties advancing narrow interests, think tanks and outside policy experts have little entrée.
U.S. think tanks also benefit from Americans' traditional distrust of government. As McGann explained, "Deeply ingrained in American culture is the philosophy that the `government that governs best, governs least.' Such distrust for the government bureaucrat can lead to greater reliance on outside experts."[16] Israeli citizens, on the other hand, are less likely to look to nongovernmental policy solutions. They "have a cynical, traditional idea of politics as a closed game," says an Israeli think tank project coordinator, who preferred not to be identified. The result, explains Balint, is that, in Israel,
the great strategic decisions are made without the level of public debate that Americans might expect. For example, there was little public discussion about the merits of the withdrawal from Gaza. It was more like [Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon did it—then the public debate occurred accompanied by an aura of futility.[17]
Funding also limits the influence of Israeli institutes in comparison to their American counterparts. Faisal Azaiza, head of the Jewish-Arab Center at Haifa University, explains, "Of course I would be happy if I had money to establish a team of think tanks in education, health, and social welfare that puts statements on the tables of the government policymakers. But I'm not there yet."[18]
Gabriel Motzkin, director of the 50-year-old Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Israel's oldest think tank, says, "We have one of the largest endowments, about a $6.5 million budget per year, which is a lot of money in Israel." It is miniscule, however, compared to the annual budgets of its American counterparts, such as the Rand Corporation ($250 million)[19] or the Brookings Institution ($61 million).[20]
Israel offers few internal sources of money. Unlike the U.S. government and major U.S. corporations, neither the Israeli government nor Israeli businesses contract think tanks to carry out specific research, nor do they provide grants in fulfillment of public diplomacy projects that the civil and foreign service is unable or unwilling to conduct. Nor are there major Israeli foundations equivalent in resources to the Smith-Richardson Foundation or the Ford Foundation. Lastly, the Israeli tax code does not provide incentives for giving to nonprofit research organizations. McGann notes, "In the U.S., nonprofits—whatever income they have, they are not taxed on it." This, combined with the tax breaks available for donors to all sorts of nonprofits, encourages giving by Americans. Other governments also do not provide incentives for giving. The Russian government, for example, taxes donors for their gifts to independent research institutes, and then taxes the recipient when the money is received.[21] The Israeli government does not fear independent research, but the tax code does not encourage it. Balint puts it succinctly: "There is no state funding in Israel; it's all private. And Israelis are not in the habit of donating to such institutions, in the way that Americans do." Additionally, the perceived lack of influence that Israeli think tanks have over policy further discourages Israelis from making donations. American donors, therefore, become very important for Israeli centers. Roger Hertog, an important major backer of the Manhattan Institute and a trustee of the American Enterprise Institute, is a major supporter of Shalem.[22] American billionaire Sheldon Adelson is also a major donor of Shalem, last year granting the center $4.5 million to fund its Institute for Strategic Studies.[23]
Because they lack funding, think tanks often choose university affiliation over independence. This in turn leads research institutions either to rely on university faculty or to tailor their work and their output to an academic rather than a policy audience. Relative to U.S. think tanks, this greater academic focus is evident in the Israeli think tanks' emphasis on publishing books. Some 800 books are produced annually by Middle East think tanks, compared to about 540 produced in North American centers.[24] "There's nothing wrong with books, but policymakers don't read them," McGann writes. "Why are you producing them? Only one major explanation: There's an academic orientation." Motzkin acknowledges Van Leer's academic focus: "We're not only interested in policy papers. We're interested in the link, the interface between theory and practice: how theory can play out practically, and how practice can play out theoretically."[25]
Even privately-funded Israeli think tanks gear their work toward academe. Motzkin says that because most funding for think tanks is short-term, Israeli scholars cannot fully break with universities because they may again need the stability the institutions provide.[26] This leads experts to worry more about pleasing university department heads than about pleasing politicians.
The temporary nature of funding as well as the danger of immediate crisis also leads Israeli think tanks to focus on the short-term and on specific projects. Such short-term work, McGann argues, "may make impossible the ability to look at problems in an interdisciplinary or long-term fashion. Institutions, therefore, are structured to respond to immediate concerns but not so driven by long-term. But they must be both to be effective."[27] So, for example, an Israeli think tank analyzing educational policies may be pressured to collect data for a briefer period of time, from fewer sources, and evaluate it using less comprehensive techniques than an equivalent U.S. center. U.S. think tanks, in contrast, thrive on the luxury of being able to remove themselves from day-to-day debates in order to examine long-term strategy in a way that government officials often cannot.
Israeli think tanks' academic orientation limits their impact on policymakers in another way. When think tank scholars receive university salaries, it limits the extent to which they can take politically contentious or partisan positions. "Because they're related to universities," Zisser says, "they have no clear agenda." In other words, university affiliation curtails work deemed controversial or partisan, and this in turn can make the output from academic think tanks less useful to policymakers. The same trend is certainly present in many U.S. university think tanks and institutes, with the notable exception of Stanford University, perhaps because the Hoover Institution maintains a higher degree of autonomy.
The relevance of Israeli university-linked think tanks also suffers from their political slant. Like their U.S. counterparts, most Israeli universities lean toward the left of the political spectrum. "It's not declared," Zisser says, "it's simply that individuals, if you gather them together, are to the left."[28] In the United States, many think tanks evolved to address hot-button issues without the constraints of stifling peer-review or the underlying assumptions and political correctness so prevalent at universities. Accordingly, while universities drift leftward, the most prominent U.S. think tanks are centrist or lean right and, in either case, fall far to the right of where most university humanities and social science professors operate. In Israel, there is a parallel tendency for independent think tanks to balance the leftist leanings of academic centers although many of the non-university-based think tanks in the Jewish state are younger and, therefore, have not developed the reputation that can bolster influence.
This, of course, also plays into the question of funding, as ideology influences donors. Foreign donors, primarily American Jews but also Australians and others, tend to be more concerned about security than social issues. Zisser highlights the example of "Shalem, founded and supported by Ron Lauder, which has a conservative agenda."[29] This funding focus exacerbates an inherent split between the interests of the Right and the Left in Israeli society. Motzkin explains,
The right wing is wonderful when it comes to security, strategy. You ask what do you do with social or economic problems? Never thought about them. The Left knows all about poverty, lower class. You ask them about politics, and they say, `Haven't you read Foucault?'[30]
Finally, Israeli think tanks—like many European counterparts—are less influential than American institutes because they are not pipelines for government officials. Many U.S. think tanks act as holding places for people who have ambitions to get into government or are waiting to go back, something much rarer in Israel, where few political appointments are made. Nir Boms, based in Israel and vice president of the Center for Freedom in the Middle East, in Washington, D.C., points out, "We [in Israel] don't have so many political appointments to begin with."[31] And there is much less turnover with new administrations. Barry Rubin contrasted careers in American think tanks where the "U.S. secretary of state of a new administration has at least 120 top appointments to make" with Israeli institutes, largely staffed by "long-serving pros" who are "not waiting to go into government."[32] There are exceptions, as Motzkin notes: "Shalem has General Ya`alon: He finished a term, went to a research center to wait it out till next election—that's if the Right wins." Such a trend works both ways. Many U.S. think tanks are so influential—at least compared with university centers—because the constant influx of Ph.D.s with policy experience sharpens and refines debates. American policymakers tend not to take university professors seriously—even those who become frequent mainstream commentators—because their lack of policy realism and understanding of how decisions are made undercuts the utility of their work.
If a Tree Falls in a Forest …
On a deeper level, the reason Israeli think tanks have less pull with politicians than do U.S. institutes reflects wider cultural norms about how people interact and how business is conducted. For example, Israeli scholars arguably do not need to work through think tanks to interject ideas into public debate because Israeli politicians are far more accessible. Israel is roughly the size of New Jersey. The government is correspondingly small, and people tend to know each other in a network of personal ties with fewer layers of staff between outside advisors and top officials. "You can get access at the highest level, which would be impossible in the U.S. In the U.S., people just like to pretend that they're getting high-level attention," said the director of an Israeli think tank who preferred to remain anonymous.
One former Shalem Center researcher observes, "Because Israel is a small country, it tends to be more single-man operations than an AEI or the Hudson Institute, which are much larger than the people who lead them. They serve the organization rather than the other way around. Shalem exists for Yoram Hazony [the center's founder and provost]—it is not imaginable without him. You wouldn't say the same about American ones: It's not like [AEI president] Chris DeMuth has this incredibly charismatic profile."[33]
Israel's culture of informality is another reason that government officials seek advice from personal acquaintances rather than from institutes. This informality is due not only to Israel's size but also to its youth, its socialist and idealistic roots, and its universal army service. An early example of this ad hoc informality was Prime Minister Golda Meir's famous "Kitchen Cabinet," which made major decisions in Meir's kitchen over coffee and cigarettes, says Dov Waxman, associate professor of political science at Baruch College and formerly a visiting fellow at both the Dayan Center and the BESA Center.[34] To an American, the idea that top officials can address audiences on state occasions without a tie and jacket would be unheard of, but this is still representative of Israel's more casual aesthetic.
The reliance on personal relationships for exchanging policy information and advice is reinforced by universal service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which creates a network of personal and professional relationships. Many of the scholars employed in national security policy at think tanks were high-ranking members of the IDF. Top officials who would not consult think tank material may, nevertheless, feel comfortable placing a call to an old army buddy.
The prominence of the army in Israeli society further deflects from think tanks' influence by offering another, more historical, information source. One reason that think tanks have not been go-to sources for policymakers is that the army has analogous research facilities, which may lack think tanks' independence but are privy to classified information. The IDF, says Balint, has "historically done the work of think tanks, not in a public way. The army has its own entire school devoted to strategy, dogma, and its own thinkers." Motzkin agrees:
Most people doing military thinking are career army people. Intel services have always had in-house people taking some of the role of the think tanks. The Israeli government really wants to know how advanced Iran's development program is: A think tank won't know.[35]
Growing More Effective
Nevertheless, there are signs that shifts in Israeli political culture are causing a greater appreciation of what think tanks can provide. Israel certainly meets the precondition that McGann describes as a "crisis in confidence in government officials." [36] There is a growing consensus that fundamental changes are needed in government, following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. According to Boms, corruption scandals have also led to "an Israeli realization that government is not a source of policy—and sometimes government needs to be challenged." Motzin also notes a cultural reality:
the nature of political leadership is changing all the time. In the future, it will be a much more educated group—it already is. A whole generation came out of the army with only an informal education; now the Knesset is full of people with a high level of education. To the degree that this continues, the new guys will be much more comfortable with think tanks than guys who grew up with tomatoes on a kibbutz.[37]
Zisser speaks for a growing consensus that there is "a lacuna, a need." For example, many think tank directors agreed that one of the most potent functions a think tank can serve is as a "safe" place for opposing parties to meet and discuss policy outside of an official government setting. Take Israel's strained relationship with her Arab neighbors: The past decades have witnessed a history of tenuous cease-fires, treaties, and discussions of peace with diplomacy conducted under pressure from citizens' intense emotions and in the eyes of the world. Think tanks also offer a more private, unofficial place for independent scholars, politicians, and others to meet and consider alternate solutions to long entrenched problems. Motzkin comments, "Israel is strewn with ideas that are never implemented because of a political deadlock between the Right and Left."[38] Particularly paralyzing, according to Motzkin, "are issues of religion that no one wants to touch with a 30-foot pole. That's why there's no constitution, because they don't want to figure out the relationship between religion and state." If more think tanks had an independent funding source separate from universities, they could enable more open and lively political discussion on some of the many deadlocked battles within Israel over domestic and foreign policy.
Meanwhile, Israel's place in the global high-tech industry is eroding the informality that characterizes Israeli culture. Israel is adopting Western and American norms. This is visible in the business culture where Western-style punctuality and ceremony are now emphasized. Israeli think tanks now adopt the aesthetic of prestige that marks their American counterparts with features such as showy conferences.
At the moment, arguably the most influential think tank event in Israel is the Herzliya Conference, hosted annually by the Interdisciplinary Center and sponsored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy at The Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy. Balint notes that "the Herzliya Conference does have a large effect: It draws political officials and visitors. They had Mitt Romney this year, everyone from Natan Sharansky to Uzi Ayalon. That does have an effect in terms of shaping strategic studies. People fight over slots at Herzliya." Boms agrees: "Herzliya in many ways put themselves on the map. They work an entire year for one conference. It's no coincidence that Sharon eventually gave his speech about disengagement [from Gaza] at the conference." The conference started in 2000 but already its prominence has increased.
Conclusion
There is no guarantee that the impact of Israeli think tanks will continue to expand. After all, McGann points out, Hong Kong has seemed on the verge of producing many significant think tanks for over a decade without their actual appearance. But Motzkin speaks for many observers when he concludes: "Yes, I think there will be fundamental changes: We are on the eve."
Israel will probably continue to be confronted with more than its share of crises and tensions. But better researched and developed policies, informed by more varied sectors of society, would improve the country's decision-making.
Hannah Elka Meyers is pursuing a master of arts in international relations at Yale University. She has worked at the Hudson Institute and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
[1] James McGann, "2007 Survey of Think Tanks: A Summary Report," Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Phila., Aug. 2007.
[2] James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, "The Iraq Study Group Report," Dec. 6, 2006; Frederick W. Kagan, "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq," American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., Jan. 5, 2007.
[3] "Congress Supports Institute of Peace Headquarters Project with $100 Million Appropriation," news release, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., Dec. 8, 2004.
[4] McGann, "2007 Survey of Think Tanks."
[5] Ibid.
[6] Author telephone interview with Benjamin Balint, Jan. 28, 2008.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Author telephone interview with Eyal Zisser, Feb. 24, 2008.
[10] Author telephone interview with Efraim Inbar, Feb. 10, 2008.
[11] Balint telephone interview, Jan. 28, 2008.
[12] Author telephone interview with Barry Rubin, Feb. 3, 2008. [13] James McGann, "Development of Think Tanks and Their Role as Catalysts for Ideas and Actions in the U.S. Political System," briefing, Foreign Press Center, Washington, D.C., Feb. 28, 2006.
[14] James McGann, Stephen Boucher, and Morgan Lahrant, "Think Tanks in Europe and US: Converging or Diverging?" seminar, Notre Europe, Etudes and Recherches, Paris, Dec. 13, 2004.
[15] Amotz Asa-El, "Israel's Electoral Complex," Azure, Winter 2008.
[16] Author telephone interview with James McGann, Feb. 19, 2008.
[17] Balint telephone interview, Jan. 28, 2008.
[18] Author telephone interview with Faisal Azaiza, Mar. 6, 2008.
[19] RAND 2006 Annual Report, Steve Baeck, ed. (Arlington, Va.: RAND Corporation, 2006), accessed Oct. 8, 2008.
[20] Brookings Institution 2007 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2007), p. 38.
[21] McGann, "Think Tanks and Their Role as Catalysts."
[22] Manhattan Institute Board of Trustees, accessed Oct. 14, 2008; American Enterprise Institute Board of Trustees, accessed Oct. 14, 2008.
[23] "$4.5 Million Gift Establishes Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem," Shalem Center, Jerusalem, Apr. 29, 2007; Connie Bruck, "The Brass Ring,"The New Yorker, June 30, 2008.
[24] McGann, "2007 Survey of Think Tanks."
[25] Author telephone interview with Gabriel Motzkin, Feb. 19, 2008.
[26] Ibid.
[27] McGann telephone interview, Feb. 19, 2008.
[28] Zisser telephone interview, Feb. 24, 2008
[29] Ibid.
[30] Motzkin telephone interview, Feb. 19, 2008.
[31] Author telephone interview with Nir Boms, Feb. 11, 2008.
[32] Rubin telephone interview, Feb. 3, 2008.
[33] Author telephone interview with a former Shalem Center researcher, Jan. 30, 2008.
[34] Author interview with Dov Waxman, New York, Feb. 19, 2008.
[35] Motzkin telephone interview, Feb. 19, 2008.
[36] James McGann, "2007 Global Survey of Think Tanks Fact Sheet," The Global "Go-To Think Tanks," Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Phila., p. 6.
[37] Motzkin telephone interview, Feb. 19, 2008.
[38] Ibid.
6) Our Brave New World
By Victor Davis Hanson
The Apocalyptic Style
Be careful when one uses the superlative case--best, most, -est, etc.--or evokes end-of-the-world imagery. The new Secretary of Energy Chu, who seems eminently qualified and is a Nobel Prize Winner, strangely just declared, 'We're looking at a scenario where there's no more agriculture in California', and went on to declare vineyards all but doomed here--apparently due to global warming.
True, we've had this year (and part of last) a mini-drought. In my 50 years of memory of California there have been many; usually they last for a year or two, then we get matching wet years. (In some years in lieu of Sierra irrigation water, I have turned on our electric pumps (15 hp/1000 gallons a minute) in May and turned them off in late August--24/7. And over a 10-year span of dry/wet years, the seasons balance out (e.g., the water table in my front yard varies from 35 feet in wet years to 50 in dry; and my great-great-grandmother's abandoned 6-inch well, that in the 19th century used to provide hand-pumped water for the house, still, after 130 years, has water in its casing that goes down only 50 feet.)
More germanely, I drove Thursday from Los Angeles in a pouring rainstorm, and now am looking at a steady snowfall outside my window in the Sierra. Several feet are piled up on the ground as we are nearing mid-February blossom break for fruit trees--with more predicted on the way. Is the Secretary convinced that we will run out of water and have no crops (grapes, remember, grow well in the desert if they are irrigated), or does he think hotter weather means things simply don't grow? If the former, perhaps the Sec. might support raising the Sierra dams a few feet, or even building a new one, given that millions of acre feet of precious water pour out of the Sierra each spring and into San Francisco Bay from the Sacramento and San Joaquin watersheds, due to law suits and legislation that aim to restore 19th-century water runs that supposedly will bring back former populations of amphibians, insects, fish, and riparian mammalian life.
The truth is that we have plenty of water to farm and to support millions of people--if we utilize properly our resources and invest more in reservoirs and water conservation and storage. But we do not have enough water--if we insist on a business-as-usual infrastructure, designed for 15 million Californians that must now serve 36 million. Open borders, radical environmentalism, urbanization and edge-citification, enormous entitlements instead of infrastructure investments, high taxes that lead only to gargantuan deficits--not Mother Nature-- will, in the aggregate, ensure Dr. Chu's prediction of an end to California agriculture.
Hyperbolic
So it is unwise to use such hyperbole. Compare the Obama administration's much ballyhooed "most stringent ethics standards"--ever!--that only leads to 10 ("exempt") lobbyists appointed to the administration, and at least four tax cheats (an accurate rather than hyped description) nominated to Treasury, government oversight, HHS, and Labor, as well as someone like Richardson imploding, and complete silence about Rangel, Dodd, and Frank.
Likewise it is unwise to keep evoking "patriotic" to describe those who vote for the stimulus package, and cry 'catastrophic" if opponents disagree and the $1 trillion dollar debt program is delayed. If supporters in congress of Bush and Cheney were criticized for suggesting that to cut off funds for soldiers in the field or to declare a war "lost" was unpatriotic, then surely it is wrong to do the same for an opponent of a stimulus or tax plan.
The Obama Style
If one would carefully read Obama's al Arabiya interview, or the text of Biden's Munich address, or Eric Holder's acceptance speech, there is a now clear style:
1) preface your remarks with the fact that the last 8 years have been horrible (ruined relations with the Muslim world, politicization of the Justice Department, ruined relations with our allies, (fill in the blanks.).
2) Then evoke the superlative to promise something entirely new, singularly moral, historically ethical.
3) Hope that no one remembers 9/11 or that you just praised the Saudi king and trashed a US president, or that you once helped pardon a Most Wanted fugitive, or that we already enjoy good relations with Germany, Britain, Italy, France, etc., or that Russia, Iran, and radical Islam really do not care too much what we say--only whether we do pretty much what they want.
I think in political terms it would be far wiser for Team Obama to say that problems are complex and have no easy solutions; that they will try to continue with what they thought worked the last eight years and won't with they thought didn't; and that there are too often only bad and worse choices. All that would be honest and would lower expectations, much more honestly and effectively than the constant "We are in a Great Depression" rhetoric or "The world hates us" screaming.
Confused
So is rendition fascistic or necessary? Is FISA shredding the Constitution or problematic? Is the Patriot Act now necessary, and no longer dictatorial? Is Guantanamo a Gulag that must be shut down, or a complex issue requiring a task force and a year of study? Should we have been out of Iraq by March 2008, or are we to withdraw according to the General Betray US/"suspension of disbelief" Petraeus plan? Will there a Hollywood movie Rendition II? Or a Nicholson Baker Knopf sequel to Checkpoint?
Stimuli
I think we are ignoring three things about the stimulus package. First, the soaring deficits and mounting aggregate debt in the 2000s contributed to our present debacle. (Yes, Bush and the Republican Congress are to be blamed for spending sprees that cannot be explained entirely by 9/11, Katrina and the two wars). We were already 'stimulated' and running a Keynesian economy, so why is more of what got us into this trouble the solution?
Second, the crash in oil prices from $148 a barrel to less than $40 has resulted in, along with dives in imported natural gas, a monstrous stimulus-perhaps three-quarters of a trillion dollars per year for consumers. Can't we pause a month or three to see the effects of thousands of dollars in cheaper heating and transportation costs for the American household?
Third, interest on US treasury bonds is nearing almost nothing. Yet, Asia and Europe are still buying them. The result is that the US is receiving trillions in free loan money that should be translating into cheap mortgages and interest rates, and an infusion of cash that will soon kick in unexpectedly dramatic fashion.
In other words, while we scream about the Great Depression, there are insidious, rarely mentioned stimuli already in play that are far more helpful that borrowing a $1 trillion to redistribute and hire more government employees.
Brave New World
I wonder sometimes how many Americans think they are going crazy as they sense a certain reality that cannot be spoken of for a variety of political, or cultural reasons. What sort of system subsidizes an unemployed single mother to have fertility treatments to deliver 8 more children to ensure a family of 14, after receiving tens of thousands of dollars in past state entitlements? Was the Dr. involved desirous of the assured business from a subsidized patient, were the parents oblivious to the ill-equipped daughter living in their home, would the mother have delivered the children had she not been assured of free medical services?
I drove from Peppderdine to Fresno on Friday and tried to tune into local radio stations as they came in and went out of range. As I left the LA basin, went into the San Fernando Valley, descended into Bakersfield, passed through Delano, and whizzed on by Visalia, there was a disturbing pattern. In every on-the-half-hour news flash, some illegal alien or gang member was announced as wanted for hit-and-run/drunk driving, or arrested for gang shootings, or suspected of some sort of theft or armed robbery. At these moments I was looking around at hundreds of cars in the three lanes of freeways (yes, in the pouring rain), and wondering whether they too were listening to these frightening news accounts--and wondering about the billions of dollars necessary to offer emergency room surgeries, rehab, and follow ups, legal bills to try, defend, sentence, jail, and release such felons, and the tab for providing interpreters and entitlement support for dependents of such criminals. And then I remembered that even to cite the above is to incur the charge of racism or illiberality. Strange times.
It doesn't compute
One senses something is very wrong with our tax system when quite well-off people like Daschle, Geithner, Killefer, and Solis simply don't pay their taxes and then suddenly do only when they are nominated for administration posts. That raises the question: those of us who go to an accountant, pass on any deduction that is iffy, try to take a lot of withholding to pay the fed early, and do not quibble on anything with our quite legalistic accountant, are, well, in a minority.
Those who have more money, and know more about the tax code, seem not only to cheat, but to cheat until they are forced to pay something back at the 11th hour, and then are never charged for what might well have put the rest of us in jail. I have no idea whether the phenomenon is specific to Washington or liberal Democrats, or the rich in general. But I do know that there are thousands in my environs who work off the books, are paid in cash and do not pay their proper share either--as the country is ripped off by both the top and bottom ends of the spectrum. Past time for the fair or flat tax.
About every three weeks Andrew Sullivan posts something about what I wrote, apparently because he finds it illiberal--the latest my predictions (before the Obama apocalyptic ultimatums, the Solis tax problems, etc) of a near Obama meltdown. Odd--as I once wrote, my only connection with this bizarre person is a debate once in which quite animatedly he alleged that I had supported torture, before apologizing a few days later when he discovered I had written TMS columns taking the direct opposite stance. So I am absolutely baffled how and why someone like this can continue to be taken seriously: for weeks he peddled vicious, absolutely false rumors that Sarah Palin did not deliver her recent child. On the eve of Iraq, (he now seems to suggest that he was brainwashed by, yes, those sneaky neo-cons), he blathered on with blood and guts rhetoric, mixed with fawning references to Bush, and embraced apocalyptic threats, including the advocacy of using nuclear weapons against Saddam should the anthrax attacks be connected to him. He seems not merely to support any incumbent President, but to deify them, and can go from encomia about the rightwing Bush to praise of leftwing Obama without thought of contradiction. In the summer before 9/11 he was in the major news outlets, trying to save his career after accused (accurately as he confirmed) of trafficking anonymously in the sexual want ads as an HIV-positive would-be participant in the unmentionable. (In other words, someone who was caught in a well-publicized scandal about which he confirmed its main details, without much sensitivity to human fraility, helped to spread false information about a potential VP designed to ruin her reputation.) At some point, one would think such a suspect individual would have been ostracized by sane people--or indeed perhaps he already has.
Final Note
I had a conversation (an argument) recently with a European, about contemporary culture. I tried to explain the mutually reinforcing elements of socialism, atheism, utopianism, pacifism, and statism (he was giving America a second chance to morph into Euros under Obama). But if one believes in no transcendence, that there is nothing other than the present, then for too many satisfying the appetites becomes the prime directive. Childlessness, living at home in one's 30s, dependence on the state, all that derives from a system that ensures equality of result, and substitutes Logos and Ratio for any notion of a deity that sees sin and sacrifice, and reminds us that our souls are immortal and affected by their brief residences in our flesh. In other words, that Euros expect free health care, free care for their elderly parents, free schools, free defense from the USA, harbor little hopes for rising above the station of anyone else, find housing and jobs scarce, and don't feel they can or want to leave behind something for their children larger than what they inherited-- are all interrelated phenomena. European postmodern man offers mostly platitudes that he thinks please those who might be dangerous to him, and finds psychological recompense and solace by gratuitously trashing those who aren't. Note how such peoples favor Hamas over Israel--and usually almost anyone over the US. Were Hamas a successful democracy that took no European aid and offered it in turn no threats, and Israel a failed fascistic terrorist movement that depended on Europe for aid and comfort, while engaging in terrorism and voicing postmodern platitudes about oppression, then we would expect Israel to be a strong European ally. (I think many Europeans are more sympathetic to the Palestinian Authority or Syria or Iran than the incipient democracy in Iraq).
7) Containing the Nuclear Fire
By Henry Kissinger
Over 200 years ago, the philosopher Immanuel Kant defined the ultimate choice before mankind: World history would ultimately culminate in universal peace either by moral insight or by catastrophe of a magnitude that left humanity no other choice. Our period is approaching having that choice imposed on it.
The basic dilemma of the nuclear age has been with us since Hiroshima: how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapons into some moral or political relationship with the objectives that are being pursued.
Any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign policy objectives. Efforts to develop a more nuanced application have never succeeded, from the doctrine of a geographically limited nuclear war of the 1950s and 1960s to the mutual assured destruction theory of general nuclear war of the 1970s.
In office I recoiled before the options produced by the prevalent nuclear strategies, which raised the issue of the moral right to inflict a disaster of such magnitude on society and the world. But I was also persuaded that if the U.S. government adopted restraints, it would be turning over the world's security to the most ruthless and perhaps genocidal force.
In the two-power world of the Cold War, the adversaries managed to avoid this dilemma. But today, the sharpening of ideological dividing lines and the persistence of unresolved regional conflicts have magnified the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, especially by rogue states or non-state actors.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons has become an overarching strategic problem for the contemporary period. Any further spread of nuclear weapons multiplies the possibilities of nuclear confrontation; it magnifies the danger of diversion, deliberate or unauthorized.
How will publics react if they suffer or even observe casualties in the tens of thousands in a nuclear attack? Will they not ask two questions: What could we have done to prevent this? What shall we do now so that it can never happen again?
Considerations as these induced former Senator Sam Nunn, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Secretary of State George Shultz and me - two Democrats and two Republicans - to publish recommendations for systematically reducing and eventually eliminating the danger from nuclear weapons.
We continue to affirm the importance of adequate deterrent forces, and we do not want our recommendations to diminish essentials for the defense of free peoples while a process of adaptation to new realities is going on. At the same time, we reaffirm the objective of a world without nuclear weapons that has been proclaimed by every American president since Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Such a world will prove increasingly remote unless the emerging nuclear weapons program in Iran and the existing one in North Korea are overcome. Both involve the near-certainty of further proliferation and of further incorporation of nuclear weapons into the strategies of nuclear weapons states.
I have long advocated negotiations with Iran on a broad front, including the geopolitical aspect. Too many treat this as a kind of psychological enterprise. In fact, it will be tested by concrete answers to four specific questions: a) How close is Iran to a nuclear weapons capability? b) At what pace is it moving? c) What balance of rewards and penalties will move Iran to abandon it? d) What do we do if, despite our best efforts, diplomacy fails?
A critical issue in nonproliferation strategy will be the ability of the international community to place the fuel cycle for the material produced by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under international control. Is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) capable of designing a system which places the enrichment and reprocessing under international control and in locations that do not threaten nuclear proliferation?
Arresting and then reversing the proliferation of nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on the established nuclear powers. They share no more urgent common interest than preventing the emergence of more nuclear-armed states.
Established nuclear powers should strive to make a nuclear capability less enticing by devoting their diplomacy to diffuse unresolved conflicts that today make a nuclear arsenal so attractive.
A new nuclear agenda requires coordinated efforts on several levels: first, the declaratory policy of the United States; second, the U.S.-Russian relationship; third, joint efforts with allies as well as other non-nuclear states relying on American deterrence; fourth, securing nuclear weapons and materials on a global basis; and, finally, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the doctrines and operational planning of nuclear weapons states.
The Obama administration has already signaled that a global nuclear agenda will be a high priority in preparation for the Review Conference on the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty scheduled for the spring of 2010. A number of measures can be taken unilaterally or bilaterally with Russia to reduce the pre-emptive risk of certain alert measures and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.
-Russian relations:Russia and the United States between them control around 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. They have it in their control to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in their bilateral relationship. They have already done so for 15 years on such issues as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
The immediate need is to start negotiations to extend the START I agreement, the sole document for the verification and monitoring of established ceilings on strategic weapons, which expires at the end of 2009.
That should be the occasion to explore significant reductions from the 1,700 to 2,000 permitted under the Moscow Treaty of 2002. A general review of the strategic relationship should examine ways to enhance security at nuclear facilities in Russia and the United States.
A key issue has been missile defense - especially with respect to defenses deployed against threats from proliferating countries. The dialogue on this subject should be resumed at the point at which it was left by President George W. Bush and then-President Vladimir Putin in April 2008.
The Russian proposal for a joint missile defense toward the Middle East, including radar sites in southern Russia, has always seemed to me a creative political and strategic answer to a common problem.
-Allies: The effort to develop a new nuclear agenda must involve our allies from its inception. Key European allies are negotiating with Iran on the nuclear issue. America deploys tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO countries, and NATO's declaratory policy mirrors that of the United States. Britain and France - key NATO allies - have their own nuclear deterrent.
A common adaptation to the emerging realities is needed, especially with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. Parallel discussions are needed with Japan, South Korea and Australia. Parallel consultations are imperative with China, India and Pakistan. It must be understood that the incentives for nuclear weapons on the subcontinent are more regional then those of the established nuclear powers and their threshold for using them considerably lower.
The complexity of these issues explains why my colleagues and I have chosen an incremental, step-by-step approach. Affirming the desirability of the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, we have concentrated on the steps that are achievable and verifiable.
Sam Nunn has described the effort akin to climbing a mountain shrouded in clouds. We cannot describe its top or be certain that there may not be unforeseen and perhaps insurmountable obstacles on the way. But we are prepared to undertake the journey in the belief that the summit will never come into view unless we begin the ascent and deal with the proliferation issues immediately before us, including the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.
The program sketched here is not a program for unilateral disarmament. So long as other countries build and improve their nuclear arsenals, deterrence of their use needs to be part of Western strategy. The efficiency of our weapons arsenals must be preserved. Both President Obama and Senator John McCain, while endorsing this approach, also made it clear, in Obama's words, that the United States cannot implement it alone.
The danger posed by nuclear weapons is unprecedented. They should not be integrated into strategy as simply another more efficient explosive. We thus return to our original challenge: Our age has stolen the fire from the gods; can we confine it to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?
8) CARTER'S NEW BOOK IS FLAWED
By Richard Friedman
Cover of Jimmy Carter's last book featured Israel's security barrier, portraying it as oppressing Palestinians; the security barrier was built to protect Israel against suicide bombers and other forms of terror after all other measures, including negotiation, failed.
Jimmy Carter's done it again: He's written a book on the Middle East. It's not as bad as his last one, which was called "Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid," but it's not great. His latest book is called, "We can have peace in the Holy Land: A plan that will work," and though his criticism of Israel is slightly toned down, there's really nothing new in this book.
Carter being Carter for the most part still gives short shrift to Israel's security concerns, while implying that Israel shares most of the blame for the failure of any true peace process to take hold. He also keeps pushing the idea that if Israel would just make more concessions, and be more accommodating toward the Palestinians, then groups such as Hamas would abandon their desire to destroy Israel, paving the way for peace.
He castigates Israel for constructing a security barrier to protect its citizens against suicide bombings and other forms of terror, failing to note that Israel chose to do this after all other measures had failed. Carter, using a very dramatic map early in the book, also criticizes Israel for the network of checkpoints it set up in the West Bank to further prevent suicide bombings and other acts of terror.
SURPRISED BY BACKLASH
Interestingly enough, Carter almost -- but not quite -- apologizes for using the word apartheid in his previous book. He insists he wasn't referring to Israel itself, but rather to Israeli policies in the West Bank. He says he was surprised at the backlash, including a negative reaction from long-time friends who know him well. If that's the case, then Carter, a former president who has traveled the world for years and portrayed himself as an international statesman, should have chosen his words -- or word -- more carefully. Linking Israel with apartheid -- an onerous and restrictive policy applied in South Africa to separate the races -- defamed the Jewish state.
Carter obviously is not a "one president at a time" guy and still thinks it's his role to help guide American foreign policy in the Middle East. The former president also comes across in his new book as peeved that he "can't get no respect" (my words, not his) from Israeli leaders. It's not surprising. As a result of his objectionable book "Palestine: Peace not Apartheid," and constant unfair, one-sided criticism of Israel, it is he who has marginalized himself.
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