I love the guy - Tom Sowell!

Zeihan discusses the Russian oil deal and sees a trap. (See 1 below.)


Hamas miscalulated. They thought Israel would cave and not seek to wipe them out. Big miscalculation. (See 2 below.)

Somalians have become equivalent of "rent a pirate" and have been hired by Iran in the hope of re-arming Hamas.(See 3 below.)

Late, nevertheless Olmert has gotten the message and turns a deaf ear to Barak. (See 4 below.)

Update on fighting in Gaza. Senior IDF official asks to let us finish the job. (See 5and 5a below.)

Tom Sowell writes about ugly realities. He makes the point Israel traded land for peace but never got the end of their bargain - peace. Sowell advises Israel: 'take back the land.'

I love the guy. If only he were president.(See 6 below.)

Kissinger sees current crisis can be turned into oportunity. America's pre-imminence has been clipped and thus, other nations must begin to determine what their own role should be. Meanwhile, America must return to a more historical approach and role. (See 7 below.)

Dennis Prgaer offers clarification for those who equate Israel with Hamas. The difference is so obvious it is foolish to try.(See 8 below.)

Obama and Iran. Maybe we will learn what Obama learned at Harvard Law School. (See 9below.)

Dick



1) The Russian Gas Trap
By Peter Zeihan

At the time of this writing, the natural gas crisis in Europe is entering its 13th day.

While the topic has only penetrated the Western mind as an issue in recent years, Russia and Ukraine have been spatting about the details of natural gas deliveries, volumes, prices and transit terms since the Soviet breakup in 1992. In the end, a deal is always struck, because Russia needs the hard currency that exports to Europe (via Ukraine) bring, and Ukraine needs natural gas to fuel its economy. But in recent years, two things have changed.

First, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004 brought to power a government hostile to Russian goals. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko would like to see his country integrated into the European Union and NATO; for Russia, such an evolution would be the kiss of death.

Ukraine is home to most of the infrastructure that links Russia to Europe, including everything from pipelines to roads and railways to power lines. The Ukrainian and Russian heartlands are deeply intertwined; the two states’ industrial and agricultural belts fold into each other almost seamlessly. Eastern Ukraine is home to the largest concentration of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers anywhere in the world outside Russia. The home port of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is at Sevastopol on Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, a reminder that the Soviet Union’s port options were awful — and that Russia’s remaining port options are even more so.

Ukraine hems in the south of European Russia so thoroughly that any hostile power controlling Kiev could easily threaten a variety of core Russian interests, including Moscow itself. Ukraine also pushes far enough east that a hostile Kiev would sever most existing infrastructure connections to the Caucasus. Simply put, a Ukraine outside the Russian sphere of influence transforms Russia into a purely defensive power, one with little hope of resisting pressure from anywhere. But a Russified Ukraine makes it possible for Russia to project power outward, and to become a major regional — and potentially global — player.


The second change in recent years is that Russia now has an economic buffer, meaning it can tolerate a temporary loss in natural gas income. Since Vladimir Putin first came to power as prime minister in 1999, every government under his command has run a hefty surplus. By mid-2008, Russian officials were regularly boasting of their $750 billion in excess funds, and of how Moscow inevitably would soon become a global financial hub. Not surprisingly, the 2008-2009 recession has deflated this optimism to some extent. The contents of Moscow’s piggy bank already have dropped by approximately $200 billion. Efforts to insulate Russian firms and protect the ruble have taken their financial toll, Russia’s 2009 budget is firmly in deficit, and all talk of a Russian New York is on ice.

But Russia’s financial troubles pale in comparison to its neighbors’ problems — not in severity, but in impact. Russia is not a developed country, or even one that, like the states of Central Europe, is seriously trying to develop. A capital shortage simply does not damage Russia as it does, say, Slovakia. And while Russia has not yet returned to central planning, rising government control over all sources of capital means the Russia of today has far more in common economically with the Soviet Union than with even the Russia of the 1990s, much less the free-market West. In relative terms, the recession actually has increased relative Russian economic power — and that says nothing about other tools of Russian power. Moscow’s energy, political and military levers are as powerful now as they were during the August 2008 war with Georgia.

This is a very long-winded way of saying that before 2004, the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas spat was simply part of business as usual. But now, Russia feels that its life is on the line, and that it has the financial room to maneuver to push hard — and so, the annual ritual of natural gas renegotiations has become a key Russian tool in bringing Kiev to heel.

And a powerful tool it is. Fully two-thirds of Ukraine’s natural gas demand is sourced from Russia, and the income from Russian natural gas transiting to Europe forms the backbone of the Ukrainian budget. Ukraine is a bit of an economic basket case in the best of times, but the global recession has essentially shut down the country’s steel industry, Ukraine’s largest sector. Russian allies in Ukraine, which for the time being include Yushchenko’s one-time Orange ally Yulia Timoshenko, have done a thorough job of ensuring that the blame for the mass power cuts falls to Yushchenko. Facing enervated income, an economy in the doldrums and a hostile Russia, along with all blame being directed at him, Yushchenko’s days appear to be numbered. The most recent poll taken to gauge public sentiment ahead of presidential elections, which are anticipated later this year, put Yushchenko’s support level below the survey’s margin of error.

Even if Yushchenko’s future were bright, Russia has no problem maintaining or even upping the pressure. The Kremlin would much rather see Ukraine destroyed than see it as a member of the Western clubs, and Moscow is willing to inflict a great deal of collateral damage on a variety of players to preserve what it sees as an interest central to Russian survival.

Europe has been prominent among these casualties. As a whole, Europe imports one-quarter of the natural gas it uses from Russia, and approximately 80 percent of that transits Ukraine. All of those deliveries now have been suspended, resulting in cutoffs of various degrees to France, Turkey, Poland, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria — in rough order of increasing severity. Reports of both mass power outages and mass heating failures have been noted in the countries at the bottom half of this list.

A variety of diversification programs have put Europe well on its way to removing its need for Russian natural gas entirely, but these programs are still years from completion. Until then, not much can be done for states that use natural gas for a substantial portion of their energy needs.

Unlike coal, nuclear energy or oil, natural gas can be easily shipped only via pipeline to previously designated points of use. This means the decision to link to a supplier lasts for decades and is not easily adjusted should something go wrong. Importing natural gas in liquid form requires significant skill in cryogenics as well as specialized facilities that take a couple of years to build (not to mention a solid port). Alternate pipe supply networks, much less power facilities that use different fuels, are still more expensive and require even more time. All European countries can do in the immediate term is literally rely upon the kindness of strangers until the imbroglio is past or a particularly creative solution comes to mind. (Poland has offered several states some of its share of Russian natural gas that comes to it via a Belarusian line.) Some Central European states are taking the unorthodox step of recommissioning mothballed nuclear power plants.

Because Russia’s goal in all this is to crack Kiev, there is not much any European country can do. But one nation, Germany, is certainly trying. Of the major European states, Germany is the most dependent upon Russian resources in general, and energy in particular.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Putin spent three nights this past week on the phone with each other discussing the topic, and the pair has a two-day summit set for later this week. The Germans have three primary reasons for cozying up to the Russians at a time when it seems they should be as angry as anyone else in Europe.

First, because most of the natural gas Germany gets from Russia passes not through Ukraine, but through Belarus — and because the Russians have not interrupted these secondary flows — the Germans desperately want to avoid rocking the boat and politicizing the dispute any more than necessary. The Germans need to engage the Russians in discussion, but unlike most other players, they can afford not to be accusatory, because they have not been too deeply affected so far. (Like all the other Europeans, the Germans are working feverishly to diversify their energy supplies away from Russia, but while Berlin can keep the lights on, it doesn’t want to ruffle any more feathers than it needs to.)

Second, as any leader of Germany would, Merkel recognizes that if current Russian-Western tensions devolve into a more direct confrontation, the struggle would be fought disproportionately with German resources — and perhaps even on German soil. Germany is the closest major power to Russia and would therefore be the focus of any major action, Russian or Western, offensive or defensive. France, the United Kingdom and the United States enjoy the buffer of distance — and in the case of the last two, a water buffer to boot.

German national interest, therefore, is not to find a way to fight the Russians, but to find a way to live with them. Germany traditionally has been Russia’s largest trading partner. Every time the two have clashed, it has been ugly, to say the least. In the German mind, if Ukraine (or perhaps even adjusting the attitude of Poland) is what is necessary to make the Russians feel secure, so be it.

Third, Germany has a European angle to think about. To put it bluntly, Merkel is always on the lookout for any means of easing Germany back into the international community with a foreign policy somewhat more sophisticated than the “I’m sorry” that has reigned since the end of World War II. After the war, France successfully hijacked German submission and used German economic strength to achieve French political desires. Since the Cold War’s end, Germany has slowly wormed its way out of that policy straitjacket, and the natural gas crisis raises an interesting possibility. If Merkel’s discussions with Putin result in restored natural gas flows, then not only will Russia see Germany as a partner, but Germany might win goodwill from European states that no longer have to endure a winter without heat.

Still, it will be a tough sell: the European states between Germany and Russia have always lived in dread that one power or the other — or, God forbid, both — will take them over. But Germany is clearly at the center of Europe, and all of the states affected by the natural gas crisis count Germany as their largest trading partner. If Merkel can muster sufficient political muscle to complement Germany’s economic muscle, the resulting image of strength and capability would go a long way toward cementing Berlin’s re-emergence.

2) Israeli forces storm Gaza City neighborhood
By IBRAHIM BARZAK and CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA,

On the diplomatic front, Egyptian mediators pushed Hamas to accept a truce proposal and, in a hopeful sign, Israel sent its lead negotiator to Cairo for "decisive" talks on a cease-fire. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also headed for the region to join diplomatic efforts.

Israeli military officials say that depending on what happens with what they described as "decisive" talks in Cairo, Israel will move closer to a cease-fire or widen its offensive. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were discussing sensitive policy matters.

Asked if Israel's war aims had been achieved, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said: "Most of them, probably not all of them."

Israeli troops now have the coastal city of 400,000 virtually surrounded as part of an offensive launched Dec. 27 to end years of Palestinian rocket attacks on its southern towns.

Early Wednesday an Israeli warplane fired a missile at the former Gaza city hall, used as a court building in recent years, witnesses said. The 1910 structure was destroyed and many stores in the market around it were badly damaged, they said.

Palestinian medical officials reported at least 42 deaths from the conflict on Tuesday throughout Gaza.

The Israeli military said three soldiers were wounded, including an officer who was searching a northern Gaza house when a bomb exploded.

Palestinian hospital officials say more than 940 Palestinians, half of them civilians, have been killed in the fighting. A total of 13 Israelis, 10 of them soldiers, have died.

Palestinian rocket fire has dropped significantly since the offensive was launched. Some 15 rockets and mortar shells were fired toward Israel Tuesday, causing no injuries, the army said.

Fireballs and smoke plumes from Israeli bombing have become a common sight in the territory of 1.4 million people, who are effectively trapped because of blockaded border crossings. Recent fighting has focused on Gaza City, where Israeli soldiers could be increasingly exposed to the treacherous conditions of urban warfare.

The operation in Tel Hawwa neighborhood, one mile (1.5 kilometers) southeast of downtown, matched fast-paced forays into other areas designed to avoid Israeli casualties. Residents said troops entered overnight, reconnoitered the area, and then pulled back to more secure positions.

One Israeli military officer told The Associated Press that Hamas fighters often operate in small groups of up to four and have largely refrained from confronting Israeli troops at close range.

"Their strategy has mainly been to use lots of booby-traps, shooting guns and missiles from afar," the Israeli officer said on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media.

"Soldiers are taking lots of precautions, they are being more careful than the army has ever been before in any war," he said. "Soldiers shoot at anything suspicious, use lots of firepower, and blast holes through walls to move around."

Gabi Ashkenazi, chief of staff of the Israeli military, said Hamas militants also have put on Israeli military uniforms to try to approach troops and carry out suicide bombings.

Hamas, which is backed by Iran, cannot hope to score a battlefield victory over the powerful Israeli military, but mere survival could earn it political capital in the Arab world as a symbol of resistance to the Jewish state. Lebanon's Hezbollah, another Iran-backed group, largely achieved that goal in its 2006 war with Israel.

On Tuesday, a Gaza resident said he saw Hamas militants in civilian clothing firing rockets from the southeastern corner of the territory. He spoke by telephone and requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information.

Israel says it will push forward with the offensive until Hamas ends all rocket fire on southern Israel, and there are guarantees the militant group will stop smuggling weapons into Gaza through the porous Egyptian border.

Hamas has said it will only observe a cease-fire if Israel withdraws from Gaza.

"We will not allow our enemy to gain any political achievement from this war on Gaza," said Salah Bardawil, a Hamas envoy in Egypt.

Much of the ongoing diplomacy focuses on an area of southern Gaza just across the Egyptian border that serves as a weapons smuggling route, making Egypt critical to both sides in any deal.

Israel wants smuggling tunnels along the border sealed and monitored as part of any deal, and has bombed suspected tunnel sites throughout its campaign.

One resident, Khader Mussa, said he fled his house while waving a white flag as Israeli forces advanced. He spent the night huddling in the basement of a relative with 25 other people, including his pregnant wife and his parents.

"Thank God we survived this time and got out alive from here. But we don't know how long we'll be safe in my brother's home," Mussa, 35, said by telephone.

The Israeli military said it carried out dozens of airstrikes on squads of gunmen, rocket launching sites and smuggling tunnels along the Egyptian border.

The Gaza fighting has raised tensions around the region and galvanized anger toward Israel throughout the Arab world. On Tuesday, at least one gunman opened fire at an Israeli army patrol along the desert border between Israel and Jordan, the military said. There were no casualties, and Jordan said the claim was "baseless."

In the southern West Bank city of Hebron, the Israeli military said, a Palestinian was shot and injured after he tried to grab a gun from an Israeli soldier whose patrol stopped him for questioning. The man later died, according to an Associated Press reporter who saw his body.

Humanitarian concerns have increased amid the onslaught although some aid is getting through to Gaza during daily three-hour lulls declared by Israel to allow delivery of supplies.

In Brussels, the European Union's aid chief said Israel has not respected international humanitarian aid during the war. In Oslo, Norway, the head of the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, Karen Abu Zayd, urged the Israeli army to do more to allow supplies into the besieged area.

"We are getting a lot of help from the Israeli Defense Forces on the one crossing that's open to get more and more trucks in, but it's just not enough," she said.

3) Iran recruits Somali pirates to replenish Hamas arms stocks
Somali pirates help fellow Islamists

Military sources reveal a secret war waged by the US, Israel and Egypt to shut down Iran's serpentine maritime routes through the Red Sea and Suez for refilling Hamas' depleted arsenal by sea. After Hamas lost an estimated 60 percent of its weapons stocks to Israeli bombardments, Iran enlisted Somali pirates to step up the flow of smuggled hardware to Gaza. Tehran is rearming the Palestinian Islamists at top speed to persuade them to carry on the war against Israel and not surrender to Egypt's ceasefire terms.

According to military sources, the Iranian sealift is conducted along three routes:

1. The Iranian segment: Iranian freighters from the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas sail to the Gulf of Suez. Some are intercepted by the American warships patrolling the sea against Somali pirates. US Marines board the ships and confiscate any weapons cargoes in their holds. But not all are caught; some of the Iranian freighters, especially the small vessels, escape the anti-piracy net.

Western intelligence informants report that in the past week, Iranian agents hired Somali pirates to rendezvous with their freighters before they entered the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, offload the weapons and carry them in small Somali craft to Eritrea. The pirates have strong ties with Eritrea.

The Iranian freighters sail straight back to Bandar Abbas to reload.

2. The Eritrean route: Some of the Iranian arms freighters put into the Eritrean port of Assab to unload the cargoes, which are then consigned to Sudan, where the authorities turn a blind eye, for transit to southern Egypt. At that point, they are picked up by Egyptian smuggling gangs and carried by boat to Sinai shores.

3. The European route: The Balkan ports at Montenegro and Croatia are the starting points for freighters laden with containers carrying weapons for Hamas - mostly mortars and anti-air and anti-tank missiles. They head for the Suez Canal where they drop their cargoes overboard for waiting pirates' boats to collect.

Iran's seaborne arms corridor to Hamas depends heavily on three Sinai Bedouin tribes: The Tarabin, which controls areas adjoining the Israeli and Gazan borders; the Tiyaha, which rule central Sinai; and the Azazmeh, whose wide spread covers northern Sinai, the Israeli Negev, Jordan and Syria. They form a human chain to relay the Iranian shipments, including heavy Grad rockets, into the Gaza Strip.

4) Olmert ignoring calls from Barak, Livni for immediate Gaza truce
By Aluf Benn, Amos Harel, Anshel Pfeffer and Avi Issacharoff




Defense Minister Ehud Barak is promoting a week-long "humanitarian cease-fire" in the Gaza Strip. In contrast, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert believes the military operation still has not achieved its goals.

Olmert is delaying a meeting with senior ministers in an effort to allow the military operations in Gaza to continue.


On Tuesday, Olmert did not meet with his "troika" - Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, both of whom support a cease-fire. On Wednesday, he will not convene the political-security cabinet to discuss whether the operations should go on.

Meanwhile, the Israel Defense Forces continued advancing from the northern Gaza Strip toward Gaza City. It is also concentrating forces to potentially deepen the ground offensive.

In northern Gaza, an officer was seriously injured by an improvised bomb. Two other soldiers suffered light to moderate injuries.

In Tuesday's fighting, the IDF killed at least 50 Palestinians, putting the total body count from the 18 days of Operation Cast Lead at 970. Many of the dead are civilians.

The IDF also destroyed a tunnel built by Hamas close to the fence, near Nahal Oz.

The head of the political-security bureau at the Defense Ministry, Amos Gilad, has postponed a visit to Cairo for talks on a cease-fire, and will probably depart for Egypt only on Wednesday.

Responding to a call by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon for an immediate cease-fire, Barak said on Tuesday, "We respect the request of the UN Secretary General and are following developments with the Egyptian initiative. However, the fighting is continuing."

A senior political source explained on Tuesday that even though Olmert holds a minority view in the troika, he holds the power because he decides when cabinet meetings will be held, and sets the agenda. The troika is a monitoring and coordinating body, and lacks the authority to broaden or end IDF operations. This can be done only by a cabinet vote.

Barak believes Operation Cast Lead has achieved its main objectives, first and foremost bolstering Israel's deterrent power. He does not believe continuing the offensive will bring further gains, but rather only operational complications and casualties.

On this point, Barak accepts the view of GOC Southern Command Major General Yoav Galant that expanding the operation and occupying Gaza would require a lengthy deployment - possibly up to a year.

Barak is proposing the IDF cease its fire, hold its positions and keep the reservists under arms, and thus negotiate with Egypt and the United States on an arrangement that would include preventing arms smuggling into the Strip.

The defense minister is concerned that when U.S. President-elect Barack Obama takes office next Tuesday, he will demand that Israel immediately cease the operation. A tough UN Security Council resolution is also a risk.

Livni insists Israel must end the operation without an agreement, enjoying its refreshed deterrence against Hamas. She also believes the mission cannot obtain any more major gains.

Meanwhile, senior IDF officers expressed concern on Tuesday that continuing the fighting would increase the number of casualties.

Also on Tuesday, an Iranian vessel bearing an estimated 200 tons of humanitarian supplies turned away from Gaza. Iran says Israel forced the vessel away; Israel says it took no action against it.

5) Incessant fighting in Gaza
By Hanan Greenberg

More than 40 gunmen killed by IDF forces Tuesday; Air Force strikes 50 targets throughout Strip. 'Our job is to continue to strike Hamas, and that's precisely what we're doing,' army official says



While the IDF is beginning to sense that Operation Cast Lead is nearing its end, forces on the ground had one of their most successful days Tuesday since the offensive in Gaza began some two-and-a-half weeks ago.


Palestinian Death Toll



Medical officials in Strip say more than 940 Palestinians killed in Israeli offensive. Deep ground incursion made it impossible for residents to reach Martyrs Cemetery in Gaza City; gravedigger: Gaza is all a graveyard
Full Story





"On the ground no one speaks of end dates, but it's safe to say that the forces can sense that the operation is coming to a close," a military official said, "on the other hand, we are well-aware that the situation can change and that the operation will go on, so our job is to continue to strike Hamas, and that's precisely what we're doing."



According to the IDF, more than 40 gunmen were killed in Gaza on Tuesday in a number of gun battles and encounters with army forces, as well as from aerial strikes and artillery fire. During the day Israeli forces discovered anti-aircraft weaponry and other arms in a mosque located in the Zeitun neighborhood on the outskirts of Gaza City, as well as an underground tunnel that was dug on the Palestinians side of the Nahal Oz fuel terminal, which was meant to be used to carry out a terror attack in Israel.



Army officials said the tunnel was dug before the war began as part of Hamas' preparations for a conflict with Israel, and suspect there are more tunnels in the area.



Following the deployment of reserve soldiers in Gaza, regular army forces were freed up to conduct raids around Gaza City, during which several clashes with Palestinian gunmen were reported.



During a tour of IDF positions in Gaza Tuesday night, Southern Command Chief Major General Yoav Galant and Golani Brigade commander Colonel Avi Peled were briefed by Engineering Corps forces on the numerous underground tunnels and booby-trapped homes they have uncovered.



According to the forces, the explosive devices placed in numerous Palestinian homes throughout the various neighborhoods are connected in such a way that the detonation of one bomb can simultaneously set off the rest.



Soldiers said RPG launchers were found in many homes and that terrorists were carrying large amounts of explosives on their bodies.



Also on Tuesday, Israel's Air Force struck more than 50 targets in Gaza, including some 25 tunnels and eight rocket launching sites. In a joint operation with ground forces, helicopters hit 10 terror cells.



On Monday night an IDF officer was critically injured after an explosive device blew up inside a booby-trapped building in northern Gaza. Two other soldiers were lightly-to-moderately wounded in the incident. Forces later found weapons at the place. Two more soldiers sustained mild injuries Tuesday afternoon when gunmen opened fire at an army bulldozer in south Gaza.

5a) Senior official: Don't put gun to our head
By Roni Sofer


Israel does not face any pressure to complete Gaza operation, campaign will continue until all objectives are secured, senior official tells Ynet. Israel does not wish to see Gaza op end with a Lebanon-style truce deal, he says.


As Operation Cast Lead enters its 19th day, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has made it clear that Israel does not face any pressure to end the campaign, a senior official in Jerusalem says.


"Nobody should stand there with a stop watch or try to put a gun to our head," the official told Ynet Tuesday night.


"We don't want to see another Resolution 1701 like we did in Lebanon," he said after a day of discussions at the Prime Minister's Office. "We don't want to find ourselves tomorrow, in two days, or in five or 10 years facing a terror organization armed with missiles that cover the whole of Israel. A unilateral withdrawal on our part at this time won't guarantee that this won't happen."


"We are seeking guarantees, assurances, and for things to be clear," the official said. "The prime minister defined two objectives – an end to Hamas fire and terror, and an end to the organization's military build-up. As long as these objectives are not secured, we will not be under any pressure (to end the operation).)"


The senior official added that Israel was no longer talking about an exit strategy.


"We are not seeking an exit, but rather, success," he said. "As Olmert defined it, what we need here is a strategy of success, regardless of how much time it takes."



Turning his attention to Barack Obama's move to the White House next Tuesday, the official said this was not one of the considerations weighed by Olmert at this time.




"The prime minister is not in touch with the president-elect or his people as long as there is another serving American president" he said.



Finally, officials at the PM's Office declined to elaborate on the tensions vis-à-vis Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Earlier Tuesday, the State Department said that comments made by Olmert in respect to Rice were "100% not true." However, officials in Jerusalem insisted that Olmert's version of events was accurate, claiming that Rice misled Israel ahead of last week's Security Council vote on a Gaza ceasefire.

6) Pretty Talk and Ugly Realities
By Thomas Sowell

No phrase represents more of a triumph of hope over experience than the phrase "Middle East peace process." A close second might be the once-fashionable notion that Israel should "trade land for peace."


Since everybody seems to be criticizing Israel for its military response to the rockets being fired into their country from the Gaza strip, let me add my criticisms as well. The Israelis traded land for peace, but they have never gotten the peace, so they should take back the land.


Maybe a couple of generations of Palestinians in Gaza living in peace under Israeli occupation and a couple of generations of the occupation troops squelching the terrorists — "militants" for those of you who are squeamish — would set up conditions where the Palestinians would be free to vote on whether they would like to remain occupied or to have their own state — minus terrorists and their rockets.


Casualty totals alone should be enough to show that the Palestinian people are the biggest losers from the current situation, where the terrorists among them, firing rockets into Israel, can bring devastating retaliatory strikes.


Why don't the Palestinians vote for some representatives who would make a lasting peace with Israel? Because any such candidates would be killed by the terrorists long before election day, so nobody volunteers for that dangerous role.


We don't know what the Palestinians really want — and won't know as long as they are ruled by Hamas, Hezbollah and the like.


Whatever the benefits of peace for the Palestinian population, what are the terrorists going to do in peacetime? Become librarians and furniture salesmen?


So-called "world opinion" has been a largely negative factor in this situation. Nothing is easier than for people living in peace and safety in Paris or Rome to call for a "cease fire" after the Israelis retaliate against people who are firing rockets into their country.


The time to cease fire was before the rockets were fired.


What do calls for "cease fire" and "negotiations" do? They lower the price of launching attacks. This is true not only in the Middle East but in other parts of the world as well.


During the Vietnam war, when American clergymen were crying out "Stop the bombing!" they paid little attention to the fact that bombing pauses made it easier for North Vietnam to move more ammunition into South Vietnam to kill both South Vietnamese and Americans.


After Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, if British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had heeded calls for a "cease fire," that would have simply lowered the price to be paid by the Argentine government for their invasion.


Go back a hundred years — before there was a United Nations and before "world opinion" was taken into account.


An Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands at that time would have risked not only a British counter-attack to retake the islands but also British attacks on Argentina itself.


Anywhere in the world, attacks such as those on Israel today would not only have risked retaliation but invasion and annihilation of the government that launched those attacks.


Today, so-called "world opinion" not only limits the price to be paid for aggression or terrorism, it has even led to the self-indulgence of third parties talking pretty talk about limiting the response of those who are attacked to what is "proportionate."


By this reasoning, we should not have declared war on Japan for bombing Pearl Harbor. We should have gone over to Japan, bombed one of their harbors — and let it go at that.


Does anyone imagine that this would have led to Japan's becoming as peaceful today as it has become after Hiroshima and Nagasaki?


Or is the real agenda to engage in moral preening from a safe distance and at somebody else's expense?


Those who think "negotiations" are a magic answer seem not to understand that when A wants to annihilate B, this is not an "issue" that can be resolved amicably around a conference table.

7) The Chance for a New World Order
By Henry Kissinger

As the new U.S. administration prepares to take office amid grave financial and international crises, it may seem counterintuitive to argue that the very unsettled nature of the international system generates a unique opportunity for creative diplomacy.

That opportunity involves a seeming contradiction. On one level, the financial collapse represents a major blow to the standing of the United States. While American political judgments have often proved controversial, the American prescription for a world financial order has generally been unchallenged. Now disillusionment with the United States' management of it is widespread.

At the same time, the magnitude of the debacle makes it impossible for the rest of the world to shelter any longer behind American predominance or American failings.

Every country will have to reassess its own contribution to the prevailing crisis. Each will seek to make itself independent, to the greatest possible degree, of the conditions that produced the collapse; at the same time, each will be obliged to face the reality that its dilemmas can be mastered only by common action.

Even the most affluent countries will confront shrinking resources. Each will have to redefine its national priorities. An international order will emerge if a system of compatible priorities comes into being. It will fragment disastrously if the various priorities cannot be reconciled.

The nadir of the existing international financial system coincides with simultaneous political crises around the globe. Never have so many transformations occurred at the same time in so many different parts of the world and been made globally accessible via instantaneous communication. The alternative to a new international order is chaos.

The financial and political crises are, in fact, closely related partly because, during the period of economic exuberance, a gap had opened up between the economic and the political organization of the world.

The economic world has been globalized. Its institutions have a global reach and have operated by maxims that assumed a self-regulating global market.

The financial collapse exposed the mirage. It made evident the absence of global institutions to cushion the shock and to reverse the trend. Inevitably, when the affected publics turned to their national political institutions, these were driven principally by domestic politics, not considerations of world order.

Every major country has attempted to solve its immediate problems essentially on its own and to defer common action to a later, less crisis-driven point. So-called rescue packages have emerged on a piecemeal national basis, generally by substituting seemingly unlimited governmental credit for the domestic credit that produced the debacle in the first place - so far without more than stemming incipient panic.

International order will not come about either in the political or economic field until there emerge general rules toward which countries can orient themselves.

In the end, the political and economic systems can be harmonized in only one of two ways: by creating an international political regulatory system with the same reach as that of the economic world; or by shrinking the economic units to a size manageable by existing political structures, which is likely to lead to a new mercantilism, perhaps of regional units.

A new Bretton Woods-kind of global agreement is by far the preferable outcome. America's role in this enterprise will be decisive. Paradoxically, American influence will be great in proportion to the modesty in our conduct; we need to modify the righteousness that has characterized too many American attitudes, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

That seminal event and the subsequent period of nearly uninterrupted global growth induced too many to equate world order with the acceptance of American designs, including our domestic preferences.

The result was a certain inherent unilateralism - the standard complaint of European critics - or else an insistent kind of consultation by which nations were invited to prove their fitness to enter the international system by conforming to American prescriptions.

Not since the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy half a century ago has a new administration come into office with such a reservoir of expectations. It is unprecedented that all the principal actors on the world stage are avowing their desire to undertake the transformations imposed on them by the world crisis in collaboration with the United States.

The extraordinary impact of the president-elect on the imagination of humanity is an important element in shaping a new world order. But it defines an opportunity, not a policy.

The ultimate challenge is to shape the common concern of most countries and all major ones regarding the economic crisis, together with a common fear of jihadist terrorism, into a common strategy reinforced by the realization that the new issues like proliferation, energy and climate change permit no national or regional solution.

The new administration could make no worse mistake than to rest on its initial popularity. The cooperative mood of the moment needs to be channeled into a grand strategy going beyond the controversies of the recent past.

The charge of American unilateralism has some basis in fact; it also has become an alibi for a key European difference with America: that the United States still conducts itself as a national state capable of asking its people for sacrifices for the sake of the future, while Europe, suspended between abandoning its national framework and a yet-to-be-reached political substitute, finds it much harder to defer present benefits.

Hence its concentration on soft power. Most Atlantic controversies have been substantive and only marginally procedural; there would have been conflict no matter how intense the consultation. The Atlantic partnership will depend much more on common policies than agreed procedures.

The role of China in a new world order is equally crucial. A relationship that started on both sides as essentially a strategic design to constrain a common adversary has evolved over the decades into a pillar of the international system.

China made possible the American consumption splurge by buying American debt; America helped the modernization and reform of the Chinese economy by opening its markets to Chinese goods.

Both sides overestimated the durability of this arrangement. But while it lasted, it sustained unprecedented global growth. It mitigated as well the concerns over China's role once China emerged in full force as a fellow superpower. A consensus had developed according to which adversarial relations between these pillars of the international system would destroy much that had been achieved and benefit no one. That conviction needs to be preserved and reinforced.

Each side of the Pacific needs the cooperation of the other in addressing the consequences of the financial crisis. Now that the global financial collapse has devastated Chinese export markets, China is emphasizing infrastructure development and domestic consumption.

It will not be easy to shift gears rapidly, and the Chinese growth rate may fall temporarily below the 7.5 percent that Chinese experts have always defined as the line that challenges political stability. America needs Chinese cooperation to address its current account imbalance and to prevent its exploding deficits from sparking a devastating inflation.

What kind of global economic order arises will depend importantly on how China and America deal with each other over the next few years. A frustrated China may take another look at an exclusive regional Asian structure, for which the nucleus already exists in the Asean-plus-three concept.

At the same time, if protectionism grows in America or if China comes to be seen as a long-term adversary, a self-fulfilling prophecy may blight the prospects of global order.

Such a return to mercantilism and 19th-century diplomacy would divide the world into competing regional units with dangerous long-term consequences.

The Sino-American relationship needs to be taken to a new level. The current crisis can be overcome only by developing a sense of common purpose. Such issues as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy and the environment demand strengthened political ties between China and the United States.

This generation of leaders has the opportunity to shape trans-Pacific relations into a design for a common destiny, much as was done with trans-Atlantic relations in the immediate postwar period - except that the challenges now are more political and economic than military.

Such a vision must embrace as well such countries as Japan, Korea, India, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, whether as part of trans-Pacific structures or, in regional arrangements, dealing with special subjects as energy, proliferation and the environment.

The complexity of the emerging world requires from America a more historical approach than the insistence that every problem has a final solution expressible in programs with specific time limits not infrequently geared to our political process.

We must learn to operate within the attainable and be prepared to pursue ultimate ends by the accumulation of nuance.

An international order can be permanent only if its participants have a share not only in building but also in securing it. In this manner, America and its potential partners have a unique opportunity to transform a moment of crisis into a vision of hope.

8) The Difference Between Israel and Hamas
By Dennis Prager

For those individuals -- such as nearly all members of the world news media -- who, in light of Israel's invasion of Gaza -- see moral equivalence between Israel and the Palestinians, here are some clarifying thoughts.

First, it would be difficult nearly to the point of impossibility, to find Israeli or other Jews who celebrate the deaths of Palestinian civilians. Jews both within and outside of Israel cringe when they see pictures of dead Palestinian men, women, and children in Gaza. For thousands of years at their Passover seders, Jews have removed wine from their cups to ceremonially weep for the Egyptians -- their erstwhile slave owners for 400 years -- who died during the Jews' exodus. Jews have never stopped weeping for enemies.

The opposite is the case with the large majority of Palestinians. It would be quite difficult to find many Palestinians who do not celebrate the deaths of Israeli Jews or non-Israeli Jews. This is not only reflected in Palestinian polls that show majority support for terrorism -- and terrorism means killing innocent Jews -- it is also reflected in Palestinian media, Palestinian schools, and Palestinian mosques that routinely glorify murderers of Jews, and refer to all Jews as "monkeys" and the like.

Take for example, Palestinian reaction to the 2001 Palestinian terror bombing of a Jerusalem Sbarro pizzeria in which 15 Jews, five of whom were two sets of parents and their children, were murdered and an additional 130 people were injured, some permanently maimed.

As reported by the Associated Press, a month later, "Palestinian university students opened an exhibition that included a grisly re-enactment" of that mass murder. The students built a replica of the Sbarro pizzeria, with fake blood, splattered pizza, a plastic hand dangling from the ceiling, and a fake severed leg wearing jeans and a bloody black sneaker.

"The exhibit also includes a large rock in front of a mannequin wearing the black hat, black jacket and black trousers typically worn by ultra-Orthodox Jews. A recording from inside the rock calls out: 'O believer, there is a Jewish man behind me. Come and kill him,'" paraphrasing a verse in the Koran. It became a popular tourist attraction for Palestinians, to which Palestinian parents took their little children.

Here's the question: Can anyone even imagine Jews, in Israel or anywhere else on earth -- no matter how right-wing they are politically or religiously -- doing something analogous to celebrate the death of Palestinian civilians? I have spoken to Jewish groups on both U.S. coasts since the Israeli invasion of Gaza, and when the subject of Palestinian civilian deaths is mentioned, all I hear is regret and sadness.

This moral chasm that separates Israel from its enemies, and separates the Jews from their enemies, merely confirms what Hamas repeatedly says about itself: "We love death more than the Jews love life." This motto is so true that Hamas not only doesn't weep for dead Israelis, it doesn't weep for dead Palestinians. It uses living Palestinians as human shields and uses dead Palestinians as propaganda. The moral disequilibrium is such that Jews weep for dead Palestinian far more than Hamas does.

The second point to be raised is about perspective.

If during World War II, Western news media had reported German and Japanese civilian casualties in the same detail and with the same sympathy they report Palestinian civilian casualties in Gaza, it is doubtful that the Nazis and the Japanese militarists would have lost that war. Certainly, at the very least, the anti-Nazi, anti-Fascist war effort would have been severely compromised.

The analogy is entirely apt. Hamas is on the same moral level as the two World War II enemies. Do those who condemn Israel for its attacks on Hamas fighters that have tragically resulted in hundreds of civilian Palestinian deaths also condemn the Allied bombings of German and Japanese military targets that resulted in far more civilian deaths? I suspect not since most critics of Israel still regard World War II as a moral war. The overriding issue, therefore, is whether fighting Hamas is moral. If it is, then the unintended death of Palestinian civilians is a tragedy, not an evil (except on the part of Hamas, because it situates its fighters and its missiles among civilians, including schools).

Third, if Hamas had the same ability to bomb Israel as Israel has to bomb Gaza, would the number of Jewish civilians be in the hundreds? Or would there be the Holocaust in Israel that Hamas and its Iranian sponsors dream of?

The answer is so obvious that this consideration alone renders moral Israel's war to destroy Hamas. In a short period of time Hamas will have more accurate missiles and longer-range ones. One of them could kill a thousand or more. Another one could destroy passenger planes coming into Ben-Gurion Airport, thereby causing foreign airlines to stop flying into Israel. It is that inevitability that Israel is fighting to prevent. But in the morally confused world we live in, only with thousands of Israelis dead, would Israel's invasion of Gaza be "proportional," and therefore acceptable. But Israel is more interested in living with world condemnation than in dying with world sympathy.

9) Obama, Iran and the perils of a Grand Bargain
Stephen Blackwell

The anticipation surrounding Barack Obama’s election to the US presidency is based on the promise of a new start in the full range of American foreign and domestic policies. Not least of these is the prospect of initiatives to reverse the hostility that existed between the Bush administration and Iran.

Many hope that Mr Obama will be able to turn a new page by initiating direct talks with Tehran. In a TV interview at the weekend, the President-elect promised to treat the Islamic republic with respect, and signalled a move from confrontation to diplomacy.

These developments are profoundly important for the UAE and the rest of the GCC. There is uncertainty over exactly what shape an approach by the Obama administration would take. Mr Obama sees Iran’s truculent and antagonistic attitude as a direct consequence of the US-led invasion of Iraq. He favours offering “carrots” in the form of support for Iran’s membership of the World Trade Organisation, along with security guarantees.

In a lecture at the Emirates Centre of Strategic Studies last week, the prospects were assessed by Professor Mahmood Monshipouri of the San Francisco State University. Prof Monshipouri argued that Mr Obama should immediately seek to engage with Iran. There was much to be said in favour of direct talks, not only from the perspective of the US, but also Washington’s major allies in Europe and the Arab world, he said. Strategic rivalry between Iran and the GCC countries would prove costly and unsettling, and would be especially unfortunate given the increasingly dense web of commercial and trade links connecting both sides of the Gulf.

The question is whether the President-elect would seek a “Grand Bargain” with Iran that would resolve all the issues of contention. For the GCC states, such an agreement could marginalise their interests. Mr Obama’s willingness to talk to the Iranian leadership runs the risk of becoming a unilateral gesture that would undermine UN Security Council resolutions agreed since 2006 aimed at stopping the Iranian nuclear programme.

The Europeans in particular are anxious to maintain the diplomatic pressure over the nuclear issue. The fear is that a botched initiative by the Obama administration would have the unintended outcome of undermining multinational cooperation on the nuclear issue in the way that the US did over the question of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Indeed, John McCain’s camp went out of its way during the presidential campaign to accuse Mr Obama of proposing “unilateral cowboy summitry” in his policy on Iran.

Despite the promise of a bold initiative, it is more likely that the President-elect’s openness to bilateral talks with Iran will be tempered by the constraints imposed by an array of domestic and international factors. The probably tentative nature of any approach is evident from Obama’s comments during the election campaign.

In his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) last June, Obama dismissed the Bush administration’s policy on Iran as half-hearted, piecemeal talks while the Europeans were left to carry on with sustained diplomatic engagement. However, he did stress the need for “careful preparation” before a US initiative, with measures to “open up lines of communication, build an agenda, coordinate closely with our allies and evaluate the potential for progress”.

Mr Obama must take into account the views of the major European powers towards the Iranian nuclear programme. The British government, in particular, is worried that his willingness to engage with the Iranian leadership will undermine the common front adopted by the UN Security Council permanent five members and Germany in recent years. British intelligence chiefs believe that Iranian nuclear proliferation is the second greatest security threat after Islamist terrorism.

Iran’s continued links with Shiite groups, in particular Hamas and Hizbollah, also remain a concern. As with many other foreign governments, an early objective of British representatives in Washington will be to assess how far Mr Obama wishes to go with his policy of engagement. He will have to take these concerns into account, as he will require Nato support for his proposed “surge” in Afghanistan.

Mr Obama’s promise to consult with allies thus opens up an opportunity to influence the new administration before the mooted approach to Iran crystallises into its final form. The new administration has a vested interest in taking into consideration the views of the UAE and its local allies.

The key interest for the GCC states is the maintenance of the Gulf as a stable region free of weapons of mass destruction. For the UAE, there is also the issue of the islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa, which have been under Iranian occupation since 1971. In exchange for diplomatic support for US policy initiatives on Iran, the GCC would be entitled to seek reassurances on regional security.

Any dramatic new departure in the first months of Mr Obama’s presidency is unlikely. His cautious response to the Gaza conflict is a reminder that he is, first and foremost, a pragmatist. He will commit himself to an approach to Iran only after exhaustive discussions in Washington and consultations with allies. Before engaging Iran, Mr Obama would seek a commitment from other nations to much tougher sanctions if negotiations failed again.

Given the nature of the US presidency and foreign policymaking, Mr Obama is likely to prioritise short-term tactical rewards over long-term strategic gains in his policy on Iran. The likely result is that any improvement in relations between the US and Iran will be based on progress on an issue-by-issue basis rather than a Grand Bargain. Pragmatism will dictate the outcome of any negotiations between the two countries.







Obama, Iran and the perils of a Grand Bargain
Stephen Blackwell

Last Updated: January 13. 2009 9:30AM UAE / GMT The anticipation surrounding Barack Obama’s election to the US presidency is based on the promise of a new start in the full range of American foreign and domestic policies. Not least of these is the prospect of initiatives to reverse the hostility that existed between the Bush administration and Iran.

Many hope that Mr Obama will be able to turn a new page by initiating direct talks with Tehran. In a TV interview at the weekend, the President-elect promised to treat the Islamic republic with respect, and signalled a move from confrontation to diplomacy.

These developments are profoundly important for the UAE and the rest of the GCC. There is uncertainty over exactly what shape an approach by the Obama administration would take. Mr Obama sees Iran’s truculent and antagonistic attitude as a direct consequence of the US-led invasion of Iraq. He favours offering “carrots” in the form of support for Iran’s membership of the World Trade Organisation, along with security guarantees.

In a lecture at the Emirates Centre of Strategic Studies last week, the prospects were assessed by Professor Mahmood Monshipouri of the San Francisco State University. Prof Monshipouri argued that Mr Obama should immediately seek to engage with Iran. There was much to be said in favour of direct talks, not only from the perspective of the US, but also Washington’s major allies in Europe and the Arab world, he said. Strategic rivalry between Iran and the GCC countries would prove costly and unsettling, and would be especially unfortunate given the increasingly dense web of commercial and trade links connecting both sides of the Gulf.

The question is whether the President-elect would seek a “Grand Bargain” with Iran that would resolve all the issues of contention. For the GCC states, such an agreement could marginalise their interests. Mr Obama’s willingness to talk to the Iranian leadership runs the risk of becoming a unilateral gesture that would undermine UN Security Council resolutions agreed since 2006 aimed at stopping the Iranian nuclear programme.

The Europeans in particular are anxious to maintain the diplomatic pressure over the nuclear issue. The fear is that a botched initiative by the Obama administration would have the unintended outcome of undermining multinational cooperation on the nuclear issue in the way that the US did over the question of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Indeed, John McCain’s camp went out of its way during the presidential campaign to accuse Mr Obama of proposing “unilateral cowboy summitry” in his policy on Iran.

Despite the promise of a bold initiative, it is more likely that the President-elect’s openness to bilateral talks with Iran will be tempered by the constraints imposed by an array of domestic and international factors. The probably tentative nature of any approach is evident from Obama’s comments during the election campaign.

In his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) last June, Obama dismissed the Bush administration’s policy on Iran as half-hearted, piecemeal talks while the Europeans were left to carry on with sustained diplomatic engagement. However, he did stress the need for “careful preparation” before a US initiative, with measures to “open up lines of communication, build an agenda, coordinate closely with our allies and evaluate the potential for progress”.

Mr Obama must take into account the views of the major European powers towards the Iranian nuclear programme. The British government, in particular, is worried that his willingness to engage with the Iranian leadership will undermine the common front adopted by the UN Security Council permanent five members and Germany in recent years. British intelligence chiefs believe that Iranian nuclear proliferation is the second greatest security threat after Islamist terrorism.

Iran’s continued links with Shiite groups, in particular Hamas and Hizbollah, also remain a concern. As with many other foreign governments, an early objective of British representatives in Washington will be to assess how far Mr Obama wishes to go with his policy of engagement. He will have to take these concerns into account, as he will require Nato support for his proposed “surge” in Afghanistan.

Mr Obama’s promise to consult with allies thus opens up an opportunity to influence the new administration before the mooted approach to Iran crystallises into its final form. The new administration has a vested interest in taking into consideration the views of the UAE and its local allies.

The key interest for the GCC states is the maintenance of the Gulf as a stable region free of weapons of mass destruction. For the UAE, there is also the issue of the islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa, which have been under Iranian occupation since 1971. In exchange for diplomatic support for US policy initiatives on Iran, the GCC would be entitled to seek reassurances on regional security.

Any dramatic new departure in the first months of Mr Obama’s presidency is unlikely. His cautious response to the Gaza conflict is a reminder that he is, first and foremost, a pragmatist. He will commit himself to an approach to Iran only after exhaustive discussions in Washington and consultations with allies. Before engaging Iran, Mr Obama would seek a commitment from other nations to much tougher sanctions if negotiations failed again.

Given the nature of the US presidency and foreign policymaking, Mr Obama is likely to prioritise short-term tactical rewards over long-term strategic gains in his policy on Iran. The likely result is that any improvement in relations between the US and Iran will be based on progress on an issue-by-issue basis rather than a Grand Bargain. Pragmatism will dictate the outcome of any negotiations between the two countries.