Obama No Socialist?

Professor Wilzig analyses Obama and his Middle East policy by reading tea leaves and projecting. Interesting, objective and scholarly article. Worthy read. (See 1 below.)

Olmert and Bush meet Monday. They have many things in common but most of all their low poll standings among the populace of their respective nations. GW somehwat more undeserving than Olmert (See 2 below.)

Barry Rubin, ever the hawk, wise in the advice he is offering. (See 3 below.)

Chapman - Obama not a socialist but he has other attributes that are worrisome. (See 4 below.)

Nobody may care but Rumsfed also offers some sound advice. (See 5 below.)

Michael Halloran offers his advice on the new Barbary Coast - Somali - pirates and how to stop them.

Michael Oren says get tough. Oren wrote a book, which I reviewed, about the U.S.'s involvement in the Middle East and documments it back to alomst the nation's founding. (See 6 below.)

Dick




1) Obama and the Middle East: Reading Election Tea Leaves
By Sam Lehman-Wilzig

In Israel, Barack Obama's victory has raised the question: "Is it good for Israel?" The answer depends on several yet unknown factors.


1) Who will win the Israeli elections?

As previous American administrations have learned, without Israeli cooperation the peace process cannot move forward. If Kadima wins and Tzippi Livni forms a coalition, Obama's election could be a watershed, as he will have an Israeli government that wants to continue the peace process. On the other hand, if Likud wins and Benjamin Netanyahu becomes Prime Minister, it is hard to see significant forward movement -- and Obama may not want to waste any political energy. Obama's victory might even influence the outcome of the Israeli election in Livni's favor. Israelis may want to avoid serious tension with the United States, their greatest friend and ally, something that would occur with Netanyahu at the helm.


2) Who will be the next Palestinian President?

The 2009 Palestinian elections will determine the next Palestinian leader. If current Chairman Mahmoud Abbas wins, then the Palestinians will have a leader who wants peace but is too weak to make significant concessions. President Obama might be able to offer economic carrots to Abbas, but the real problem is a lack of political courage and the ability to persuade his people that true peace can only come by relinquishing the "Dream of Refugee Return." Other younger and more determined Palestinian leaders might be able to succeed, if they are willing. Here too Obama has to wait for the election outcome.


3) Does Obama have street credibility with the Arab world?

The answer is obvious: more than any other entering President. With a middle name of Hussein and his paternal connection to Islam (he is not a Muslim) Obama will be viewed as a more honest broker than previous Presidents. For Israelis, the appointment of Rahm Emanuel, the son of an Irgun fighter, as White House Chief of Staff, will quell suspicions of Obama having a "pro-Arab bias". Thus, it is possible that all sides of the Israeli-Arab conflict can feel a measure of confidence in the American President.


4) What about other hot spots connected to Israel?

Here Obama's approach to international relations brings good news. Without a doubt he will encourage Israeli negotiations with Syria, and the Syrians too will be less wary of dealing with Israel and an American administration that does not call it part of the "axis of evil". And if Israel and Syria reach an agreement, Lebanon will be in the bargain too. That leaves the Palestinians, and most important of all: Iran.


5) Whither Iran?

Once again, the answer is to be partly found in the election tea leaves: Iranian elections! If Iran's current administration returns, then Obama's promised discussions with them will be short. If a more "moderate" President is chosen -- and perhaps that can occur precisely because Obama is far less threatening of Iranian sovereignty -- then there is an outside chance that Obama can diffuse the crisis. Moreover, if Russia and China conclude that Obama made a real effort to talk to the Iranians and came up empty, greater U.N. sanctions would be in the offing - and after that perhaps "sterner" measures from the Obama Administration. Israeli-Syrian negotiations could be influential here, if they include conditions that Syria break with terrorist regimes. Iran then might feel the diplomatic noose tightening and perhaps seriously consider a negotiated settlement.


6) What about the price of oil?

If oil prices stay depressed or drop even more, Iran's economy will be deeply in trouble - another incentive for possible serious negotiations regarding its nuclear program. What does Obama have to do with this? Any significant alternative energy program initiated by the Americans would have repercussions in the oil market, even if the actual impact on production and prices wouldn't be felt for years. The perception of eventual Middle East power decline cannot but move the Middle East power brokers to try and clear up their political and economic muddles.


In short, Obama is a huge "Joker" thrown into a complex game of Middle East poker. It is his hand to play, but he will need a few other good cards to succeed.

2)Rice: Peace deal delayed due to political situation in Israel


Bush, Olmert to meet in Washington Monday to discuss Iranian nuclear program, Israel-PA peace talks. PM aide: He wants to leave process in best possible shape


President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, two lame-duck leaders, look to their final meeting to leave a blueprint for fulfilling their ambitious but unrealized Mideast agendas.



The White House session Monday evening was expected to focus on Iran's nuclear program and progress in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.


Just a year ago, Olmert and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, proudly announced the resumption of peace talks after a seven-year hiatus at a summit hosted by Bush in Annapolis, Maryland. The three set an ambitious target of wrapping up a final peace deal by the end of 2008.



Despite frequent negotiating sessions, two trips to the region by Bush and eight more by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the sides have little to show for their efforts and have acknowledged the year-end target will not be met.



"Even though there was not an agreement by the end of the year, it is really largely because of the political situation in Israel," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters aboard Air Force One as Bush back from a summit in Peru.



Still, she tried to sound upbeat about the peace process. "It's in pretty good shape," Rice said.



With his time in power running out, Olmert has become increasingly candid, saying Israel will have to withdraw from almost all the West Bank and parts of east Jerusalem to make peace with the Palestinians. Talk of such concessions was virtually unheard of just a few years ago.



"I know that Mr. Olmert wants to leave to whomever is elected as the next prime minister the peace process in the best shape possible," spokesman Mark Regev said.



Bush, who spent the weekend in Peru at a meeting of Pacific Rim nations, invited Olmert to Washington as part of his final round of talks with world leaders before he leaves office Jan. 20.



Olmert, who announced plans to resign in September amid corruption charges, will step down after a successor is chosen Feb. 10.



'It's a farewell, a double farewell'
With hardline opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu leading in Israeli polls, the future of peace talks appears murky. Netanyahu wants to keep much of the West Bank and all of east Jerusalem - areas captured by Israel in the 1967 Mideast war - and believes peace talks should be scaled down to discussions on the Palestinian economy. That approach has been rejected by the Palestinian leadership.


As for Tehran's nuclear program, Israel has identified it as the biggest threat in light of Iran's development of long-range weapons and its president's repeated calls for the destruction of the Jewish state. A report this past week by the International Atomic Energy Agency said Iran was stonewalling attempts to monitor its nuclear activities.



Israel believes Iran will be capable of building a bomb by 2010.



The UN Security Council has imposed three rounds of economic penalties against Iran, which insists its nuclear program is peaceful and designed to produce energy. Both the US and Israel say they hope diplomatic pressure resolves the standoff, but have not ruled out military action.



Olmert often speaks of the close personal friendship he has developed with Bush over the past three years. When Bush visited Israel in May, Olmert showered the president with praise, saying, "You're a great person, you're a great leader, and you're a great friend."



Though largely unpopular internationally, Bush is loved in Israel, where he is seen as a staunch defender of the US ally.

"It's a farewell, a double farewell," said Danny Ayalon, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington. "They will try to sum up a period and cement all the understandings and agreements between the US and Israel over the last eight years."



After Monday's meeting, Olmert and his wife, Aliza, will dine with president and first lady Laura Bush at the White House.



The two leaders probably also will discuss the global financial crisis, Israel's indirect peace talks with Syria and the future of arms and aircraft deals to Israel.



During his visit to Washington, Olmert also planned to meet with Rice, Vice President Dick Cheney, national security adviser Stephen Hadley, and congressional and Jewish leaders.


3) The Region: Don't flatter your enemies, protect your friends
By BARRY RUBIN

In explaining why he was too fearful to vote in Jerusalem's mayoral election, an east Jerusalem Palestinian shopkeeper, Issam Abu Rmaileh, said, "I would have liked to vote because it's in our interest, but who's going to protect me and my family afterwards?"

Let's call it the Abu Rmaileh principle; it is extraordinarily important in the Middle East. Why should someone support you if you cannot protect them? If they cannot depend on you to be tough, they might as well play it safe by doing nothing or make their own deal through appeasement and shout radical slogans.

Here is the Abu Rmaileh principle at a higher pay grade. Jordan's Foreign Minister Salah Bashir stated in a closed meeting, "For us the Iranian surge for hegemony has become a crisis," according to a participant who asked not to be named.

And here's the flip side from a frustrated American colonel fighting in Iraq, "All these guys we rounded up, they're saying in the interrogation, if we don't torture them, we're not going to get the information."

HOW IMPORTANT is popularity? According to the school enthusiastic about President-elect Barack Obama in the United States, it is everything. One journalist explained that al-Qaida is afraid of Obama because, presumably, he will win away Muslims from supporting radical Islamism. It is written in the Washington Post: "Even among the followers of radical groups, such as Hamas and the Taliban, Obama has inspired a sense of change and opportunity."

That last statement - intended to imply that even extremists like Obama - is worded with a shocking, though unintentional, ambiguity. It is sure true that Hamas, the Taliban, Hizbullah, Iran, Syria, and al-Qaida view this "change" as an "opportunity." Unfortunately, they view it as an opportunity for being more aggressive.



Here's how Iranian Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami put it, in words typical of the reaction from Iran and these other groups. He sees Obama's slogan of "change" as a retreat caused by Iran's revolution, which brought down American power, and says the United States is continuing to decline.

For them, Barack the creator of a more popular America and a figure of weakness. Should there be any doubt that his flexibility will be interpreted as retreat, no matter how well-intentioned he is?

THE DEBATE in Washington is far away from the debate in the Middle East. In America's capital, the talk is of how the radicals are more moderate than thought, how they will be won over by Obama's charisma and changed American policies. The disconnect between the region and the rationalizers is frightening.

There is no policy change in Washington that will appease the radicals. And there are no concessions that will make an American president popular in a meaningful way among Middle Easterners. Even more worrisome, such steps are not going to make moderates feel more secure.

Here the al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri gets it just right. He tells Obama: "It appears that you don't know anything about the Muslim world and its history... You are neither facing individuals nor organizations, but are facing a jihadi awakening and renaissance which is shaking the pillars of the entire Islamic world; and this is the fact which you and your government and country refuse to recognize and pretend not to see."

Zawahiri even invokes the Abu Rmaileh principle: "It appears that you don't know anything about... the fate of the traitors who cooperated with the invaders against it." In other words, anyone who cooperates with the United States or fights the Islamists will die.

Al-Qaida is not a very important group nowadays. But the rise of Islamist forces is clear, even though some of them are hostile to each other. It is Iran, not Ayman, who is the main beneficiary of this phenomenon, though Muslim Brotherhood groups - most notably Hamas - are also advancing.

IN WHICH way are President George Bush and his successor identical? Both believe that being liked in the Middle East will bring victory. Bush thought that by gifting the locals with a non-dictatorial Iraq and democracy they would come to love him. The opposite happened. Obama's strategy of being a nice guy and making concessions is likely to be less costly in direct terms for the United States but will also be used by the radicals for their own benefit.

One problem with the belief that Obama's popularity and flexibility will succeed is the Abu Rmaileh principle: Don't tell me who is nice; tell me who is going to protect me. Being feared and respected, as Syrian dictator Bashar Assad rightly put it, is more important than being liked. Osama bin Ladin noted that people understandably prefer to put their money on the horse that seems more certain to win the race.

A SECOND problem is how people in the Middle East are going to find out that you are such a great guy. They don't follow the American or European media but local sources, including both government and radical Islamist propaganda.

The frustrated American colonel in Iraq quoted above was bewildered by the fact that ""We poured a lot of our heart and soul into trying to help the people" only to hear them say the most inaccurate things about the United States stealing their oil, taking their land, and "turning our country over to Israel." A US pull-out may well be the right policy, but it will not bring gratitude.

What's needed is not a president who can work with Iran or Syria but a president who can work with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Lebanese forces who want their country to be free, and so on, along with Israel and Europe in a grand alignment. Yes, it is in large part a zero-sum game: What makes Teheran or Damascus happy is going to damage their intended victims.

Alas, just because something isn't true doesn't mean people can't believe it. That's a truism applicable both to the Middle East and to Washington DC.

4) 'Socialism' Is Not the Problem
By Steve Chapman

Something about Barack Obama has a way of driving some conservatives completely batty. John McCain detected something "a lot like socialism" in his tax plan. Veteran conservative media critic L. Brent Bozell has no doubt the new president will "deliver socialism." But the prize goes to Rep. Paul Broun, R-Ga., who says "we've elected a Marxist" who may create an American Gestapo.

In the radioactive atmosphere of modern partisan politics, no one puts much value on verbal precision. So it's safe to say that over the next four years, the 44th president will come to think his name is Socialist Obama, as critics on the right abandon analysis in favor of invective.

That is a mistake -- as McCain's losing campaign confirms. Accusing Obama of socialism is unwise for three reasons: 1) It's not true, and 2) it makes the accuser sound like an idiot, and 3) it distracts from Obama's true inclinations, which are worrisome enough.

These days, no one believes in socialism -- defined by the late, left-wing economist Robert Heilbroner as "a centrally planned economy in which the government controls all means of production." A socialist wouldn't favor government aid to the automakers or the banks. He'd propose that the government take them over and run them for the benefit of society. But you haven't heard Obama or anyone else suggest that.

The president-elect is not unaware of the superiority of capitalism. His book "The Audacity of Hope" contains a testimonial that could have been plagiarized from Ayn Rand: "Our Constitution places the ownership of private property at the very heart of our system of liberty. ... The result of this business culture has been a prosperity that's unmatched in human history. ... Our greatest asset has been our system of social organization, a system that for generations has encouraged constant innovation, individual initiative and the efficient allocation of resources."

Of course Obama believes the government should do more to help the poor and vulnerable. If redistributing wealth makes you a socialist, though, you have to apply that label to the legendary libertarian economist Milton Friedman, who proposed a "negative income tax" to assure everyone basic sustenance.

But just because Obama is not nearly as bad as his detractors claim doesn't mean we have no worries. His biggest shortcoming is a common one in his party: the assumption that every problem can be solved by government intervention, and that if a little intervention is good, more is better.

His plan on climate change shows the problem. He has a sensible idea -- putting caps on greenhouse gas emissions and letting companies buy and sell the right to pollute. That would discourage harmful activity while leaving market forces to find the most efficient means to that end.

Alas, Obama isn't content to leave it there. He unpacks an array of bright ideas to reduce carbon emissions -- demanding higher fuel economy from automakers, showering money on clean coal technology, giving consumers tax credits for plug-in hybrids, and on and on.

This belt-and-suspenders approach reflects a familiar liberal vice: the insatiable urge to meddle. It's like the team owner offering the coach a generous new contract if he wins the championship -- and then dictating the starting lineup and the play selection for the entire season. It presumes that the government knows in advance the right mix of changes to achieve cleaner energy use at the lowest cost, which neither it nor Stephen Hawking nor anyone else does.

Obama also seems to regard the nation's productive sector as a laboratory for well-intentioned policymakers. In his "60 Minutes" interview, he praised Franklin Roosevelt for his "willingness to try things. And experiment in order to get people working again." What he overlooks is that experimentation creates uncertainty, and uncertainty discourages businesses from doing what they are supposed to do.

During the 1930s, as economist Robert Higgs showed in a 1997 essay, the effect of all the experimentation was the opposite of what Obama assumes. The endless fear of what FDR might do caused net business investment to fall, year after year, prolonging the very catastrophe he was trying to end.

Obama exhibits blithe confidence in the government's power to take economic problems and make them better. He will fare better if he keeps in mind its unbounded capacity to make things worse. For that you don't need socialism.

5) One Surge Does Not Fit All
By DONALD H. RUMSFELD

THE surge in Iraq has been one of the most impressive military accomplishments in recent years. It has been so successful that the emerging consensus is that what may now be needed in Afghanistan is a similar surge of American forces. President-elect Barack Obama campaigned on his intention to do so, as did his former opponent, John McCain.

As one who is occasionally — and incorrectly — portrayed as an opponent of the surge in Iraq, I believe that while the surge has been effective in Iraq, we must also recognize the conditions that made it successful. President Bush’s bold decision to deploy additional troops to support a broader counterinsurgency strategy of securing and protecting the Iraqi people was clearly the right decision. More important, though, it was the right decision at the right time.

By early 2007, several years of struggle had created the new conditions for a tipping point:

•

Al Qaeda in Iraq’s campaign of terrorism and intimidation had turned its Sunni base of support against it. The result was the so-called Anbar Awakening in the late summer of 2006, followed by similar awakening movements across Iraq.

•

From 2003 through 2006, United States military forces, under the leadership of Gen. John Abizaid and Gen. George Casey, inflicted huge losses on the Baathist and Qaeda leadership. Many thousands of insurgents, including the Qaeda chief in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, were captured or killed and proved difficult to replace.

•

The Iraqi Security Forces had achieved cohesion, improved operational effectiveness and critical mass. By December 2006, some 320,000 Iraqis had been trained, equipped and deployed, producing the forces necessary to help hold difficult neighborhoods against the enemy. By 2007, the surge, for most Iraqis, could have an Iraqi face.

•

And the political scene in Iraq had shifted. Moktada al-Sadr, the firebrand cleric, declared a cease-fire in February 2007. The government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, seated in May 2006, moved against militias and Iranian-backed militias and has imperfectly, but notably, rejected narrow sectarian policies.

The best indication that timing is everything may be that there had been earlier surges without the same effect as the 2007 surge. In 2005, troop levels in Iraq were increased to numbers nearly equal to the 2007 surge — twice. But the effects were not as durable because large segments of the Sunni population were still providing sanctuary to insurgents, and Iraq’s security forces were not sufficiently capable or large enough.

The decision to conduct a surge came out of an interagency review in the fall of 2006. By mid-December, as I was leaving the Pentagon, there was a rough consensus in the Defense Department that deploying additional combat brigades to Iraq was the right step. Some military leaders raised reasonable questions about the potential effectiveness of a surge, in part because of a correct concern that military power alone could not solve Iraq’s problems. I agreed, and emphasized that a military surge would need to be accompanied by effective diplomatic and economic “surges” from other departments and agencies of the American government, and by considerably greater progress from Iraq’s elected leaders.

During my last weeks in office, I recommended to President Bush that he consider Gen. David Petraeus as commander of coalition forces in Iraq, as General Casey’s tour was coming to an end. General Petraeus and his deputy, Gen. Ray Odierno, had the experience and skill to recognize and exploit the seismic shifts that were taking place in Iraq’s political landscape. And United States troops had the courage to win the alliance of Iraq’s people against a common enemy — and the benevolence to win their friendship.

At the critical moment — a moment when the Iraqis were able and willing to be part of the surge with the American forces — the United States surged into Iraq with the right commanders, additional forces and a fresh operational approach rooted in years of on-the-ground experience. Americans can be proud of what has been accomplished in Iraq over the last five-plus years. They should also be impressed by the results of the surge, which, thus far, has outstripped expectations, including mine.

President Bush’s decision to increase combat troop levels in Iraq in January 2007 sent a clear message that he was determined not to abandon a people to death squads and terrorists. We will need the same commitment to helping the people of Afghanistan succeed, but that does not mean we will achieve it with the same tactics or strategies.

The way forward in Afghanistan will need to reflect the current circumstances there — not the circumstances in Iraq two years ago. Additional troops in Afghanistan may be necessary, but they will not, by themselves, be sufficient to lead to the results we saw in Iraq. A similar confluence of events that contributed to success in Iraq does not appear to exist in Afghanistan.

What’s needed in Afghanistan is an Afghan solution, just as Iraqi solutions have contributed so fundamentally to progress in Iraq. And a surge, if it is to be successful, will need to be an Afghan surge.

Left unanswered in the current debate is the critical question of how thousands of additional American troops might actually bring long-term stability to Afghanistan — a country 80,000 square miles larger than Iraq yet with security forces just one-fourth the size of Iraq’s. Afghanistan also lacks Iraq’s oil and other economic advantages. It is plagued by the narcotics trade. Its borders are threatened by terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan. Fractured groups of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border do not yet appear willing to unite and take on the insurgents in their midst, as Arab tribes did in Iraq.

Further, Afghanistan has a long history of defeating foreign armies that sought strength in numbers. The Soviet Union tried to occupy Afghanistan with hundreds of thousands of troops — and withdrew, defeated and broken. More United States troops could raise tensions, particularly in Afghanistan’s Pashtun south, where the insurgency is strongest.

Only capable indigenous forces can ultimately win an insurgency. Afghan forces, backed by coalition troops, will need to move into the most violent areas to secure and protect the local population, enabling Afghans to cooperate with their government without losing their lives.

To do this, the size of the Afghan National Army will need to be increased well beyond its 70,000 or so troops and its training accelerated. More American forces will need to undertake the unglamorous work of embedding with Afghan soldiers as advisers, living and fighting together. Kingpins and senior facilitators in the thriving poppy industry that helps to fuel the insurgency will need to be treated as military targets, as Qaeda and Taliban leaders are. Reconstruction projects should be focused on provinces and towns that are cooperating with the Afghan government, instead of making blanket commitments to increase foreign assistance across Afghanistan and possibly fostering a culture of dependence.

The current suggestion of “opening negotiations” with the Taliban may well win over some low- and mid-level supporters, but if history is any guide, offering the hand of peace to hardened fanatics is not likely to prove successful. Aggressive action against Taliban and Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan will need to continue. Pakistani officials will have to isolate any factions in their military and intelligence services that are sympathetic to the Taliban.

In a few weeks, the new commander in chief, Barack Obama, will assume the responsibility of leading a nation at a time of war. Time and flexibility are the two constants of military success. In a struggle with an adaptable, thinking enemy, there is no single template for success. More is not always better. One size does not fit all.

The singular trait of the American way of war is the remarkable ability of our military to advance, absorb setbacks, adapt and ultimately triumph based upon the unique circumstances of a given campaign. Thus it has been throughout our history. And thus it will be in Iraq and Afghanistan, if we have the patience and wisdom to learn from our successes, and if our leaders have the wherewithal to persevere even when it is not popular to do so.

6) How to Stop the Pirates
By Richard Halloran

Pirates armed with guns and grenades grabbed headlines around the world last week by hijacking the 320,000 ton Saudi Arabian tanker Sirius Star 450 miles off the coast of Somalia in East Africa and holding hostage the crew of 25. The piracy was bold as the captured ship was the largest ever taken and was seized the farthest from land.

In striking contrast, five pirates armed with long knives recently boarded a tug towing a barge in the Straits of Singapore off the coast of Malaysia as she headed from Singapore to Thailand. The pirates stole personal belongings of the crew of seven, then put them ashore unharmed.

While piracy near Somalia has soared in number and audacity, that in the South China Sea in Southeast Asia has been on a steady decline, largely due to the concentrated anti-piracy operations of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. Thailand has just joined the campaign while the US and Japan have supported the Southeast Asians in the background.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which tracks piracy worldwide, reported 49 incidents in Southeast Asia during the first nine months of 2008, down from 133 in the same period of 2004. Piracy around the Indonesian archipelago was third in the world, behind Somalia and Nigeria, on Africa's west coast, but had dropped to 23 incidents from 70 in 2004.

The IMB asserted that "the number of attacks has dropped due to the increase and constant patrols by the littoral states." Patrols at sea begin in 2004, those in the air in 2005. Moreover, the bureau said, "all except two of these cases were low level incidents aimed at theft of valuables and stores."

In addition, a lash-up between pirates and terrorists in Southeast Asia, long feared by American and Southeast Asian officials, has so far failed to materialize. Even so, intelligence agencies continue to watch this closely.

A critical part of the US support has been erecting radar sites for Southeast Asian nations to track ships.If a ship deviates from its plotted course, that may be a sign it is under attack. The US has also encouraged Southeast Asians to share such intelligence.

The IMB said the US had given Indonesia five radar stations to provide surveillance in the Straits of Malacca and four to watch the Straits of Makassar, with three more coming. Radar stations have either been given to Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines or are on the way.

Although piracy in that region has declined, said Captain Jeffrey Breslau, spokesman for the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, "Maritime security remains a central theme of this command's theater security cooperation program."

"The focus of discussions regarding maritime security is on partnership and cooperation among regional nations," Breslau said. "Most countries realize that building a collective capacity to defeat or deter piracy serves to promote regional stability as well as prosperity."

The Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea are important to the US for military operations and to the economies of most Asian nations. They comprise the primary passageway for US warships between the Pacific and Indian oceans. If that sea lane was closed, ships would need to sail routes three to five times longer.

Over the last two decades, that passage has become the world's most travelled sea line of communication. Between 50,000 to 70,000 ships a year transit this passage, more than through the Suez and Panama Canals combined, particularly carrying Persian Gulf oil to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

US officers said getting Southeast Asian nations to work together meant overcoming issues of sovereignty. Those nations, once ruled by the US, France, Britain, Portugal, or the Netherlands, are jealous of the independence gained after World War II and suspicious of any encroachment on sovereignty.

The officers said they have sought first to get agencies within a nation to work together. In Indonesia, for example, 13 agencies are engaged in maritime security. Second is to get each nation to work with its next door neighbors.

Third is to foster a process in which decisions can be made rapidly. In cultures that prizes consensus, this takes patient explanation. Fourth is interdiction of a suspected pirate and communicating in a timely manner with another nation's forces.

"An advantage we have in the Pacific," said one officer, "is that we have functioning governments ashore. The first step to stopping piracy begins ashore. Without that, pirates can live and operate freely, as you see in Somalia."