Chess versus Poker. Who blinks?

Simon Jenkins writes a harsh rebuke of GW and concludes Putin is laughing all the way to Georgia. (See 1 below.)

Whenever GW goes out of town the walls come crashing down it seems. First it was 9/11, then Hurricane Katrina in La. and now The Chinese Olympics followed by Georgia. When GW stays home he also must do more than hurl empty threats and call for ineffective sanctions as part of his post Iraq diplomacy.

The Wall Street Journal is full of op ed articles taking the West and GW to task for their ineffectual behaviour towards Russia.The lead editorial reminds GW of what Truman did regarding the Berlin Airlift.

GW holds a weak hand but standing there like a deer in headlights will not work as Bush must have concluded so he has responded with aid and another demand Russia stand down. Putin is now challenged and it will be interesting to see how this plays out should there be further obstinacy on Putin's part. If Putin is perceived as backing down he will lose face and that must be going through his mind. Russians are master at chess. GW, hopefully, knows something about Texas poker.(See 2- 5 below.)

Investors, hold your breath and will China take umbrage at Putin's actions which have undercut their Olympic Party?

Furthermore, if I were Israel I would be asking what happened to the US satellite's that should have detected a Russian military build up? Is Israel's reliance upon US satellites warning of an Iranian missile launching going to cut it or be persuasive? Is this a safe sure bet for Israel?

Dick

1) Bush rebuking Russia? Putin must be splitting his sides
By Simon Jenkins


Moscow has to take some of the blame. But it is the west's policy of liberal interventionism that has fuelled war in Georgia

One thing is for sure. This week's operation in Georgia has displayed the failure of the west's policy of belligerence towards Vladimir Putin's Russia. The policy was meant to weaken Russia, and has strengthened it. The policy was meant to humiliate Russia with Nato encirclement, and has merely fed its neo-imperialism. The policy was meant to show that Russia "understands only firmness" and instead has shown the west as a bunch of tough-talking windbags.

Georgia, a supposed western ally and applicant to Nato, has been treated by Russia to a brutal lesson in power politics. The west has lost all leverage and can do nothing. Seldom was a policy so crashingly stupid.

Putin would die laughing if he read this week's American newspapers. The president, George Bush, declared the Russian invasion of Georgia "disproportionate and unacceptable". This is taken as a put-down to the vice-president, Dick Cheney, who declared the invasion "will not go unanswered", apparently something quite different. Bush says that great powers should not go about "toppling governments in the 21st century", as if he had never done such a thing. Cheney says that the invasion has "damaged Russia's standing in the world", as if Cheney gave a damn. The lobby for sanctions against Russia is reduced to threatening to boycott the winter Olympics. Big deal.

Every student of the Caucasus has known since the fall of the Soviet empire that this part of the world was an explosion waiting to happen. The crisscrossing fault lines of ethnicity, religion and nationalism, fuelled by gas and oil, would not long survive the removal of the Red Army and communist discipline. There were too many old scores to settle, too much territory in dispute and too much wealth at stake - rivalries brilliantly portrayed in Kurban Said's classic novel of Edwardian Azerbaijan, Ali & Nino.

In every crisis the west craves goodies and baddies. The media finds it impossible to report a modern conflict without taking sides. In Yugoslavia, where a similar clash of separatist minorities occurred in the 1990s, coverage was so biased that Kosovo is still "plucky little" and the Serbs can still do no right.

In South Ossetia both sides appear to have committed appalling atrocities, and can thus generate a sense of outrage in front of whatever camera is pointed at them. Georgia's government claimed the right to assert military control over its two dissident provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, even if they were openly in league with Russia. Equally, Russia felt justified in stopping the consequent evictions and killings of its nationals in these provinces, in which it had a humanitarian locus as "peacekeeper".

The difficulty is that entitlement and good sense are rarely in accord. Georgia may have been entitled to act, but was clearly unwise to do so. Russia may have been entitled to aid its people against an oppressor, but that is different from unleashing its notoriously inept and ruthless army, let alone bombing Georgia's capital and demanding a change in its government.

What is clear is that the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, is a poor advertisement for a Harvard education. He thought he could reoccupy South Ossetia and call Russia's bluff while Putin was away at the Olympics. He found it was not bluff. Putin was waiting for just such an invitation to humiliate a man he loathes, and to deter any other Russian border state from applying to join Nato, an organisation Russia had itself sought to join until it was rudely rebuffed.

Saakashvili thought he could call on the support of his neoconservative allies in Washington. Tbilisi is one of the few world cities in which Bush's picture is a pin-up and where an avenue is named after him. It turned out that such "support" was mere words. America is otherwise engaged in wars that bear a marked resemblance to those waged by Putin. It defended the Kurdish enclaves against Saddam Hussein. It sought regime change in Serbia and Afghanistan. As Putin's troops in South Ossetia were staging a passable imitation of the US 101st Airborne entering Iraq, Bush was studiously watching beach volleyball in Beijing.

The truth is that the world has no conceptual framework for adjudicating, let alone resolving, these timeless border conflicts. Where poverty is rife, it takes only a clan war and a ready supply of guns for hostilities to break out. The only question is how to stop them escalating.

Once such conflicts could be quarantined by the United Nations' requirement to respect national sovereignty. That has been shot to pieces by the liberal interventionism of George Bush and Tony Blair. The result has reinvigorated separatist movements across the world. Small-statism is not an evil in itself: witness its quadrennial festival at the Olympics. But the process of achieving it is usually bitter and bloody.

The west's eagerness to intervene in favour of partition, manifest in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Sudan, is more than meddling. It encouraged every oppressed people and province on earth to be "the mouse that roared", to think it could ensnare a great power in its cause.

The parallels are glaring. If we backed Kosovo against the Serbs, why not back South Ossetia against the Georgians? But if we backed the Kurds against the Iraqis, why not the Georgians against Russia? Indeed, had Nato admitted Georgia to full membership, there is no knowing what Caucasian horror might have ensued from the resulting treaty obligation. Decisions which in Washington and London may seem casual gestures of ideological solidarity can mean peace and war on the ground.

I retain an archaic belief that the old UN principle of non-interference, coupled with a realpolitik acceptance of "great power" spheres of influence, is still a roughly stable basis for international relations. It may on occasions be qualified by soft-power diplomacy and humanitarian relief. It may demand an abstinence from kneejerk gestures in favour of leaving things to sort themselves out (as in Zimbabwe). But liberal interventionism, especially when it leads to military and economic aggression, means one costly adventure after another - and usually failure.

The west has done everything to isolate Putin, as he rides the tiger of Russian emergence from everlasting dictatorship. This has encouraged him to care not a fig for world opinion. Equally the west has encouraged Saakashvili to taunt Putin beyond endurance. The policy has led to war. If ever there were a place just to leave alone, it is surely the Caucasus.

2) BUSINESS WORLD: First Yukos, Then Georgia
By HOLMAN W. JENKINS, JR.





Now the world is getting an idea of what a "war for oil" really looks like. Few in the West appreciate the degree to which Vladimir Putin and the Soviet, er, Russian, elite subscribe to a prewar view of power relations and national greatness. Their view is not based on self-reproducing institutions and innovation and the power of trade, but on territory and resources -- lebensraum, as one of their intellectual progenitors called it.

Whatever the pretexts and emotional resonances, the Republic of Georgia, transit territory for two important energy pipelines, was also a challenge to Mr. Putin's pursuit of power through control of energy supplies, especially for home heating, to Western Europe.

Western governments and Western oil executives have played an unwise role in Mr. Putin's plan. No amount of contract abrogation, outright seizure of property or subsidiary mayhem by Russian authorities seems able to dissuade them from throwing good money after bad in pursuit of Russian resources. Western minority shareholders in Yukos were wiped out with nary a peep when the Russian government seized the oil company on tax charges. There's been virtually no official pushback as environmental offenses were alleged as a reason to squeeze Western partners out of various drilling and pipeline projects after billions of dollars were committed.

Indeed, with what breezy confidence Mr. Putin must have turned Western oil companies into his political punching bags, knowing that back home Western politicians (Nancy Pelosi, Byron Dorgan, Dick Durbin, etc.) were doing exactly the same in pursuit of their own narrow and shortsighted political quests.

Barack Obama thinks the solution to high gasoline prices is punitive taxes on Exxon. All this in the background could not have failed to reassure Mr. Putin that the West would not invest political capital in protecting the interests of its oil companies. He learned that his allies could go so far as to commit nuclear terrorism (so it has been alleged) to murder one of his political critics in London without consequences. Why expect any blowback from merely repeatedly defrauding Western energy investors?

All along, governments and CEOs have reasoned that sooner or later Russia would discover its stake in commercial comity: Russia needs Western capital and technology to develop its oil. To get, you have to give; potential partners must see over time that Russia's word is reliable.

Westerners miscalculated Mr. Putin's ability to miscalculate, a mistake they've made before.

More than once, we've likened Mr. Putin to Saddam Hussein. Both got the upper hand over aging mentors, and forced them into retirement. Both launched wars (Chechnya and Iran). Both gambled that their control of energy made them immune to Western pushback. Never mind that a U.S.-led coalition willingly shut Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil out of world markets after Saddam's invasion in 1990, even at the cost of spiking prices and recession in the West. Saddam to the end believed dangling oil contracts in front of French and Russian companies would be proof against a second President Bush's determination to remove him.

Likely, Mr. Putin miscalculates too. Western powers may not do much immediately about his squeeze on Georgia, but over time he will find he has created conditions for the emergence of a coalition to contain Russian energy power. His immediate neighbors, with fresh memories of Soviet domination, will be even more eager to align themselves with the West and NATO. Possibly even the myopic Germans will discern they've gone too far in putting themselves in energy hock to Moscow. They may even start asking pointed questions about the presence of former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on the board of Nord Stream, a Gazprom affiliate devoted to increasing German reliance on Russian gas.

Those of escapist bent will see in all this a reason to put Congress in charge of spending billions aimed at the false utopia of "energy independence." You will hear such blather in the coming months, but it will amount to little. America instead will grapple with the need to administer the reality principle to the Russian regime; we will face up to our responsibility to diversify our energy supplies -- dropping our trade barriers to Brazilian ethanol and opening up our domestic resources to development would be good places to start. The time to really worry will be when America, in pursuit of primitive concepts like energy independence, decides to follow Mr. Putin back to the 1930s.

3) Welcome Back:To the Great Game
By MELIK KAYLAN


Last year, President Mikheil Saakashvili invited me along on a helicopter flight to see Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, from the air. We viewed it at some distance to avoid Russian antiaircraft missiles manned by Russian personnel.

He pointed out a lone hilltop sprinkled with houses some 10 miles inside Georgian territory -- scarcely even a town. Much of the population, namely the Georgians, had long ago been purged by Russian-backed militias, leaving behind a rump population of Ossetian farmers and Russian security forces posing as Ossetians. "We have offered them everything," he said, "language rights, land rights, guaranteed power in parliament, anything they want, and they would take it, if the Kremlin would let them."

Moscow's thin pretense of protecting an ethnic group provided just enough cover for Georgia's timorous friends in the West to ignore increasing Russian provocations over the past few years. Moscow, it now seems, intends to "protect" large numbers of Georgians too -- by occupying and killing them if that's what it takes -- and prevent them from building their own history and pursuing their democratic destiny, as it has for almost two centuries.

As we worry about another Russian imperialist adventure in Georgia, we shouldn't lose sight of the bigger picture either: To wit, Moscow has always had a clear strategic use for the Caucasus, one that concerns the U.S. today more than ever.

Having overestimated the power of the Soviet Union in its last years, we have consistently underestimated the ambitions of Russia since. Already, a great deal has been said about the implications of Russia's invasion for Ukraine, the Baltic States and Europe generally. But few have noticed the direct strategic threat of Moscow's action to U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Kremlin is not about to reignite the Cold War for the love of a few thousand Ossetians or even for its animosity toward five million Georgians. This is calculated strategic maneuvering. And make no mistake, it's about countering U.S. power at its furthest stretch with Moscow's power very close to home.

The pivotal geography of the Caucasus offers the Kremlin just such an opportunity. Look at a map, and the East-meets-West, North-meets-South vector lines of the region illustrate all too clearly how the drama now unfolding in the Caucasus casts Moscow's shadow all across Central Asia and down into the Middle East. In effect, we in the West are being challenged by Russian actions in Georgia to show that we have the nerve and the stamina to secure the gains not just of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but of the entire collapse of Soviet power.
[Welcome Back to the Great Game]

Between Russia and Iran, in the lower Caucasus, sits a small wedge of independent soil -- namely, the soil of Azerbaijan and Georgia combined. Through those two countries runs the immensely important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which delivers precious oil circuitously from Azerbaijan to Turkey and out to the world. This is important not just because of the actual oil being delivered free of interference from Russia and Iran and the Middle East, but also for symbolic reasons. It says to the world that if any former Moscow colonies wish to sell their wares to the West directly, they have a right to do so, and the West will support that right. According to Georgian authorities, Russian warplanes have tried to demolish the Georgian leg of that pipeline several times in the last days. Their message cannot be clearer.

Besides their own pipeline, Georgia and Azerbaijan offer a fragile strategic conduit between the West and the "stans" of Central Asia -- including Afghanistan -- an area that the Soviets once controlled in toto. We should remember that an isolated Central Asia means an isolated Afghanistan. Look at the countries surrounding Afghanistan -- all former Soviet colonies, then Iran, then Pakistan.

The natural resources of Central Asia, from Turkmenistan's natural gas to Kazakhstan's abundant oil, cannot reach the West free of Russia and Iran except through that narrow conduit in the Caucasus. Moscow's former colonies in Central Asia are Afghanistan's most desirable trading partners. They are watching the strife in Georgia closely. It will tell them whether or not they will enter the world's free markets without a Russian chokehold on their future -- or, whether they, and their economies, are doomed for the foreseeable future to remain colonies in all but name. And it won't be long before Moscow dictates to them exactly how to isolate Kabul. Moscow is perfectly aware, even if we are not, that choking off the bottleneck in the Caucasus gives Iran and Russia much say over our efforts in Afghanistan.

In Iraq too, the Kremlin's projection of power down through Georgia will soon be felt. Take another look at the map. If Russia is allowed to extend its reach southwards, as in Soviet times, down the Caucasus to Iran's borders, Moscow can support Iran in any showdown with the West. Iran, thus emboldened, will likely attempt to reassert itself in Iraq, Syria and, via Hezbollah, in Lebanon.

We could walk away from this challenge, hoping for things to cool off, and let the Russians impose sway over the lower Caucasus for now. But no one will fail to notice our weakness. If we don't draw the line here, it doesn't get easier down the road with any other border or country. We would be risking the future of Afghanistan, and the stability of Iraq, on the good will of Moscow and the mullahs in Tehran. This is how the game of grand strategy is played, whether we like it or not.

4) REVIEW & OUTLOOK: Bush and Georgia


On June 13, 1948, the day after the Soviet Union took the first step in its blockade of Berlin, U.S. General Lucius Clay sent a cable to Washington making the case for standing up to the Soviets. "We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent." The Berlin Airlift began 13 days later.

Sixty years on, U.S. credibility is again on the line as the Bush Administration stumbles to respond to the Russian invasion of Georgia. So far the Administration has been missing in action, to put it mildly. The strategic objective is twofold: to prevent Moscow from going further to topple Georgia's democratic government in the coming days, and to deter future Russian aggression.
* * *

President Bush finally condemned Russia's actions on Monday after a weekend of Olympics tourism in Beijing while Georgia burned. Meanwhile, the State Department dispatched a mid-level official to Tbilisi, and unnamed Administration officials carped to the press that Washington had warned Georgia not to provoke Moscow. That's hardly a show of solidarity with a Eurasian democracy that has supported the U.S. in Iraq with 2,000 troops.

Compared to this August U.S. lethargy, the French look like Winston Churchill. In Moscow yesterday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, acting as president of the European Union, got Russia to agree to a provisional cease-fire that could return both parties' troops to their positions before the conflict started. His next stop was Tbilisi, on the heels of a visit from Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.

If both sides agree to a cease-fire, Mr. Sarkozy promises that Europe will consider sending peacekeepers to enforce it. We trust he will find volunteers from the former Soviet republics, which see the writing on the wall if Russian aggression in Georgia is left unchallenged. The leaders of Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia flew to Tbilisi this week in a show of solidarity.

NATO also met yesterday and denounced the invasion, while stopping short of promising military aid to Georgia. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said the allies "condemned and deplored [Russia's] excessive, disproportionate use of force," and demanded a return to the status quo ante.

The NATO leader also said Georgia's potential membership remains "very much alive" and that it would be a member of NATO one day. Georgia and Ukraine's applications come up again in December, and perhaps even Germany, which blocked their membership bids earlier this year, will now rethink its objections given that its refusal may have encouraged Russia to assume it could reassert control over its "near abroad."

Much as it respects and owes Georgia, the U.S. is not going to war with Russia over a non-NATO ally. But there are forceful diplomatic and economic responses at its disposal. Expelling Russia from the G-8 group of democracies, as John McCain has suggested, is one. Barring Russia's long desired entry into the World Trade Organization is another. Russian leaders should also be told that their financial assets held abroad aren't off limits to sanction. And Moscow should know that the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi on the Black Sea are in jeopardy. A country that starts a war on the weekend the Beijing Olympics began doesn't deserve such an honor.

The Georgian people also deserve U.S. support. One way to demonstrate that would be a "Tbilisi airlift," ferrying military and humanitarian supplies to the Georgian capital, which is currently cut off by Russian troops from its Black Sea port. Secretary of State Rice or Defense Secretary Robert Gates should be in one of the first planes. After the fighting ends, the U.S. can lead the recovery effort. And since the Russians are demanding his ouster, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili deserves U.S. support too. Moscow wants a puppet leader in Tbilisi, and U.S. officials are playing into Valdimir Putin's hands with their media whispers that this is all Mr. Saakashvili's fault.

Reshaping U.S. policy toward Russia will take longer than the months between now and January 20, when a new President takes office. But Mr. Bush can at least atone for his earlier misjudgments about Mr. Putin and steer policy in a new direction that his successor would have to deal with. If that successor is Barack Obama, this is an opportunity to shape a crucial foreign policy issue for a novice who could very well go in the wrong direction.
* * *

The alternative is ending Mr. Bush's tenure on a Carter-esque note of weakness. To paraphrase General Clay: Whether for good or bad, how the U.S. responds to Russia's aggression in Georgia has become a symbol of American credibility. By trying to Finlandize if not destroy Georgia, Moscow is sending a message that, in its part of the world, being close to Washington can be fatal. If Mr. Bush doesn't revisit his Russian failures, the rout of Georgia will stand as the embarrassing coda to his Presidency.

5)Bush orders US Air Force-Navy humanitarian airlift to Georgia


Bush starts to remove the gloves demanding Russia open all routes to these deliveries and to civilian transit.

Military sources report that the strong military actions a furious US president George W. Bush ordered Wednesday, Aug. 13, after seven days of Russian-Georgian warfare, amount to a bid to break the sea, land and air blockade Russia still maintains against Georgia in violation of the EU-brokered ceasefire.

The first direct US-Russian military clashes in Georgia are now possible if the Russians fail to give way when challenged by US air transports and vessels heading for Georgia. For seven days, Russia has exerted exclusive mastery of Georgia’s skies, sea and land routes.

Flanked by the secretaries of state and defense, Bush said that Robert Gates as head of the military had already sent the first US Air Force transport with humanitarian and medical aid on its way to Georgia.

Our military sources report that the US air corridor has a short distance to fly from US bases in Italy and Turkey.

The US president accused Moscow of violating the less than one-day old ceasefire fire in its conflict with Georgia, by sending Russian tanks and APC’s to the east of the Georgian town of Gori, threatening the capital Tbilisi, bombing the Black Sea port of Poti and sinking Georgian vessels.

Bush reiterated US support for Georgia’s democratically-elected government and territorial integrity and declared Russia must cease all military acts and withdraw to positions held before the conflict flared.

Referring to Moscow’s efforts to integrate into the diplomatic, political, economic, and security structures of the 21st century, Bush said Russia is now putting its aspirations at risk by taking actions in Georgia that are inconsistent with the principles of those institutions. Voicing a veiled threat, the US president said: “To begin to repair the damage to its relations with the United States, Europe, and other nations, and to begin restoring its place in the world, Russia must keep its word and act to end this crisis.”

The Bush statement Wednesday followed reports of Russian tanks entering Gori after the ceasefire, and some 15 armored personnel carriers heading out of the devastated ghost city and blocking the highway connected South Ossetia to the rest of Georgia. Russian “irregulars” were reported killing, burning and looting in Gori and destroying ammunition dumps. A Georgian checkpoint has been placed outside Tbilisi.

Russia was also said to have shot down two Georgian spy drones over the breakaway province.