What will it take regarding Iran's nuclear program?

More evidence Iran is actually moving forward with nuclear project but all we have to do is sit down and talk with them and no doubt they will give up their ambition because they are reasonable. The NIE report may have been a bit off the mark but at least it blocked GW from any action and embarrassed him and that was its intent.

Even IAEA's Baradei is convinced the Iranians have been fudging. Now that is truly amazing. All it will take now is a mushroom cloud and the appeasers might get the message as well.

It looks like a dog, snarls and barks like a dog, even smells like a dog so it must not be a dog.(See 1 and 1a below.)

Talansky gave a big wad of dough to Olmert. So what! It is only money and corruption. Olmert is too busy giving away the store to be bothered with such inconvenient allegations. (See 2 below.)

Many years ago Lester Maddox, then Governor of Georgia, was photographed riding a bicycle backwards. Obama continues doing some back pedaling as well. (See 3 below.)

I Have Feith's book I just haven't gotten around to reading it. It would appear when GW went off message he made a big blunder. John Podhoretz, when he was here, told me those in the Administration were absolutely shocked not to have found evidence of WMD and apparentl;y did not know how to handle the matter. (See 4 below.)

Count the ways! (See 5 below.)

Dick



1)First documentary evidence Iran is into nuclear explosives, missile warhead design

The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna based its new and damning findings partly on 18 intelligence documents submitted by the United States, and now accuse Tehran of willful lack of cooperation. Iran dismissed the documents as forged or fabricated.

The documents came from materials contained in a laptop stolen from one of the heads of Iran’s nuclear program in Tehran in late 2006 by Iranian dissidents. It was passed to the CIA. Despite this evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program, sixteen US intelligence agencies, including the CIA, combined last year to announce this program was suspended in 2003.

Even the nuclear watchdog’s director Mohammed ElBaradei, who often meets the Iranians halfway, has concluded that Iran’s nuclear activities are of “serious concern” and require “substantial explanations.” which Tehran has refused to offer.

His latest report describes Iran’s installation of new IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges for enriching uranium at the Natanz site as “significant” yet not communicated to his agency. IAEA inspectors on a visit in April were denied access to the sites where the centrifuges are manufactured and the scientists involved. Some, the report states, were produced by Iran’s “military” (a reference to the Revolutionary Guards corps which is in charge of Iran’s nuclear weapons industry).

An official connected to the watchdog disclosed that since December, the Iranians have processed close to 150 kilograms, double the amount produced in the same period 18 months ago.

The watchdog director’s report was released Monday, May 26, to the IAEA’s 35-member board of directors and the UN Security Council, and will be discussed by the board next week.

1a) Israel's reaction to IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program IAEA: Iran continues to flout UN Security Council resolutions


The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's report
published yesterday reaffirms that Iran continues to flout UN Security
Council resolutions. The report specifies the military aspects of Iran's
nuclear activity.

The report notes that the IAEA views Iran's nuclear activity with serious
concern. Despite the fact that the IAEA assigns high credibility to the
information presented to it, Iran continues its tricks of deception and
evasiveness. Iran's response does nothing to remove the fears of the
international community concerning the true purpose of its nuclear program.

Israel repeats its call to members of the international community to
increase the pressure on Iran to abandon its dangerous plans to acquire
nuclear weapons.

2) Tearful Talansky: I gave $150,000 to Olmert from my own pocket
By DAN IZENBERG




American-Jewish businessman Morris Talansky told the Jerusalem District Court on Tuesday that he gave Prime Minister Ehud Olmert $150,000 out of his own pocket, speculating that some of the money went to fund Olmert's fondness for fine hotels, first-class flights and luxury goods.


He told the court that most of the money he turned over at meetings in New York and Jerusalem was to cover Olmert's political activities over a 15-year period. But a tearful Talansky also said Olmert's assistant, Shula Zaken, would often ask for cash to cover unidentified personal expenses.

He specifically mentioned that he met the prime minister 10 times between 2002 and 2005, while Olmert was industry, trade and labor minister, and on each occasion, gave him envelopes of cash. Talansky stressed, however, that he did not do it for personal gain.

"I had a very close relationship with him for over 16 years. The relationship was one of great admiration. I never expected anything from him and never received anything from him whatsoever," said Talansky, testifying as a witness for the prosecution in the investigation into allegations that Olmert accepted illegal payments from the US financier.


Talansky said that as well as the money he gave Olmert out of his own pocket, he also raised money for him on behalf of various organizations, saying that much of the money was raised in New York "parlor meetings," where Olmert would address American donors who would then leave contributions on their chairs.

Talansky said he wanted to help Olmert's progress since his ideology regarding Israel and Zionism was in line with his own. "He was articulate, he was intelligent. I felt that he would be a leader that I would have hoped to be if I had the talent," he said, adding that Olmert would warmly greet him during their meetings in Jerusalem.
[State Attorney Moshe Lador...]

State Attorney Moshe Lador talks to the media before Morris Talansky testifies against Olmert at the Jerusalem District Court.


"We raised at least 100,000 dollars," he continued. "We were not wealthy donors, there was nothing personal about it," he said, adding that it was "for the good of Israel."

"It never crossed my mind that it was for my benefit, I didn't need it and to get anything in return would have been blasphemy," continued Talanksy, adding "I really loved the man."

Nonetheless, Talansky, 75, said there were no records of how that money was spent. "I only know that he loved expensive cigars. I know he loved pens, watches. I found it strange," Talansky told the court, then shrugged.

The New York financier said he met the prime minister for the first time on a family visit to Israel around the time of the First Gulf War, in 1991. Talansky said Olmert asked him then for financial assistance, in cash, for campaign funding for the Jerusalem mayoral elections.

Talansky said Olmert preferred cash over checks for reasons connected to Likud fund-raising regulations. "I didn't really grasp it. I didn't really work out how the system works over all," he said.

He said that in 2002, Olmert was low on his party list and so he wanted to further help him financially.

Talansky went on to say that in October 2005, he paid Olmert's tab for a three-day stay at a Washington hotel.

He told the court that Olmert asked him for $5,000 and he duly complied, pulling out his credit card and paying the tab.

The businessman stressed that this money was a loan, saying that he believes Olmert was on a private visit to the US to attend an art exhibition put on by his wife, Aliza Olmert.

On another occasion, Talansky said he gave Olmert $15,000 cash, again as a loan, in two envelopes while he was staying at a New York hotel for his grandson's brit. Talansky said Olmert told him he needed the money for expenses.

The financier went on to say that another time, while in the US to deliver a lecture, Olmert asked Talansky for $3,000 cash for expenses. Talansky said he raised the cash and gave it to the prime minister.

Talansky said he also helped Olmert with his expenses at another event arranged by the Jewish community and attended by former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani.

On another occasion he said Olmert asked for a $25,000 loan for a family vacation to Italy, a request Talansky agreed to.

Notably, Talanksy said Olmert never paid back the loans. He recounted that he once asked for some of the money back. He said Olmert told him to go and speak to his son in New York, but that a payback never materialized.

He said that the latest monetary request by Olmert was for $70,000. Talansky said although the request shocked him he agreed to give Olmert the money but decided it would be his last payment to the prime minister.

The testimony was a trial procedure, though the state has not yet decided whether to indict Olmert or Zaken. State Attorney Moshe Lador, who put the questions to Talansky on behalf of the state, has stressed that the fact that a trial procedure was taking place does not indicate in any way that the state has decided to prosecute the prime minister or Zaken.

Talansky told the court that he met Zaken several times in Olmert's office between 2003 and 2005 and that on 90 percent of the occasions he donated money to Olmert, he handed it to Zaken.

Prior to the hearing, Lador told reporters not to jump to conclusions and called media reports "incorrect and irresponsible."

"There is no decision. We are at the height of the investigation. The case could develop in different directions down the road - there is a possibility that the whole case could be dropped, and there is also a possibility that another decision will be made in the case," he said.

If an indictment is ultimately served, Tuesday's hearing will become an integral part of the trial, and Talansky's testimony will be part of the evidence that the court considers when deciding whether or not to convict Olmert or his aide, even though it won't be used against the financier himself.

3) Barack Obama: I wouldn't promise Ahmadinejad a meeting

U.S. Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama underscored his willingness to talk to leaders of countries like Iran that are considered U.S. adversaries but said on Monday that does not necessarily mean an audience with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Obama, the Democratic Party front-runner vying to face Republican Sen. John McCain in the November race for the White House, has said he was willing to meet with leaders of countries such as Iran, Syria, Cuba and Venezuela without preconditions.

McCain has criticized that view, saying that sitting down with someone like Ahmadinejad would give the Iranian president a spotlight and send the wrong signal to U.S. allies such as Israel.

Iran does not recognize Israel's existence and Ahmadinejad has been repeatedly quoted calling for its descruction. Earlier this month, he called the country a "stinking corpse" and said that its destruction was imminent.

Obama, an Illinois senator, said Iranian presidential elections in 2009 would be a factor in the timing of any meetings, as would considerations of who wields the power.

"There's no reason why we would necessarily meet with Ahmadinejad before we know that he was actually in power. He's not the most powerful person in Iran," Obama told reporters while campaigning in New Mexico.

Under Iran's system of clerical rule, the Islamic Republic's religious establishment has final say in all state matters.

The McCain campaign accused Obama of backtracking.

"Over the past year, Sen. Obama has repeatedly confirmed that he'd meet unconditionally with Ahmadinejad and the leaders of Syria, Cuba and Venezuela," said McCain spokesman Brian Rogers.

Republicans have accused Obama of inconsistency on his policy on talking to adversaries. In recent weeks, Obama and his aides have emphasized that, while there would be no "preconditions" for potential top-level meetings, there would be extensive staff-level preparations.

In the case of Iran, Obama said, "Preparation means that there are low-level talks in which there's clarity about our concerns around the nuclear weapons program but that we're willing to listen to their perspective."

Obama said his position has been consistent.

"I've said that with sufficient preparation I would be happy to meet leaders from other sovereign states including countries like Iran or North Korea or Venezuela," he said. "I have said that it is important to make sure that it begins with low-level diplomatic engagement and that there's a clear agenda so that any meetings would be constructive."

4) How Bush Sold the War
By DOUGLAS J. FEITH

In the fall of 2003, a few months after Saddam Hussein's overthrow, U.S. officials began to despair of finding stockpiles of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The resulting embarrassment caused a radical shift in administration rhetoric about the war in Iraq.

President Bush no longer stressed Saddam's record or the threats from the Baathist regime as reasons for going to war. Rather, from that point forward, he focused almost exclusively on the larger aim of promoting democracy. This new focus compounded the damage to the president's credibility that had already been caused by the CIA's errors on Iraqi WMD. The president was seen as distancing himself from the actual case he had made for removing the Iraqi regime from power.


This change can be quantified: In the year beginning with his first major speech about Iraq – the Sept. 12, 2002 address to the U.N. General Assembly – Mr. Bush delivered nine major talks about Iraq. There were, on average, approximately 14 paragraphs per speech on Saddam's record as an enemy, aggressor, tyrant and danger, with only three paragraphs on promoting democracy. In the next year – from September 2003 to September 2004 – Mr. Bush delivered 15 major talks about Iraq. The average number of paragraphs devoted to the record of threats from Saddam was one, and the number devoted to democracy promotion was approximately 11.

The stunning change in rhetoric appeared to confirm his critics' argument that the security rationale for the war was at best an error, and at worst a lie. That's a shame, for Mr. Bush had solid grounds for worrying about the dangers of leaving Saddam in power.

In the spring of 2004, with the transfer of sovereign authority to the Iraqis imminent, the president was scheduled to give a major speech about Iraq. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld received an advance draft and he gave it to me for review. In keeping with the new trend, the drafted speech focused on the prospects for Iraqi democracy.

White House officials understandably preferred to declare affirmative messages about Iraq's future, rather than rehash the government's intelligence embarrassments. Even so, I thought it was a strategic error for the president to make no effort to defend the arguments that had motivated him before the war. Mr. Bush's political opponents were intent on magnifying the administration's mistakes regarding WMD. On television and radio, in print and on the Internet, day after day they repeated the claim that the undiscovered stockpiles were the sum and substance of why the U.S. went to war against Saddam.

Electoral politics aside, I thought it was important for national security reasons that the president refute his critics' misstatements. The CIA assessments of WMD were wrong, but they originated in the years before he became president and they had been accepted by Democratic and Republican members of Congress, as well as by the U.N. and other officials around the world. And, in any event, the erroneous WMD intelligence was not the entire security rationale for overthrowing Saddam.

On May 22, 2004, I gave Mr. Rumsfeld a memo to pass along to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and the president's speechwriters. I proposed that the speech "should deal with some basics – in particular, why we went to war in the first place." It would be useful to "make clear the tie-in between Iraq and the broader war on terrorism" in the following terms: The Saddam Hussein regime "had used WMD, supported various terrorist groups, was hostile to the U.S. and had a record of aggression and of defiance of numerous U.N. resolutions."

In light of 9/11, the "danger that Saddam's regime could provide biological weapons or other WMD to terrorist groups for use against us was too great" to let stand. And other ways of countering the danger – containment, sanctions, inspections, no-fly zones – had proven "unsustainable or inadequate." I suggested that the president distinguish between the essential U.S. interests in Iraq and the extra benefits if we could succeed in building democratic institutions there: "A unified Iraq that does not support terrorism or pursue WMD will in and of itself be an important victory in the war on terrorism."

Some of the speech's rhetoric about democracy struck me as a problem: "The draft speech now implies that we went to war in Iraq simply to free the Iraqi people from tyranny and create democracy there," I noted. But that implication "is not accurate and it sets us up for accusations of failure if Iraq does not quickly achieve 'democracy.'"

As was typical, the speech went through multiple drafts. Ms. Rice's office sent us a new version, and the next day I wrote Mr. Rumsfeld another set of comments – without great hope of persuading the speechwriting team. The speech's centerpiece, once again, was the set of steps "to help Iraq achieve democracy." One line in particular asserted that we went to Iraq "to make them free." I dissented:

- "This mixes up our current important goal (i.e., getting Iraq on the path to democratic government) with the strategic rationale for the war, which was to end the danger that Saddam might provide biological or [other] weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against us."

- "There is a widespread misconception that the war's rationale was the existence of Iraqi WMD stockpiles. This allows critics to say that our failure to find such stockpiles undermines that rationale."

- "If the President ignores this altogether and then implies that the war's rationale was not the terrorism/state sponsorship/WMD nexus but rather democracy for Iraqis, the critics may say that he is changing the subject or rewriting history."

Again, I proposed that the president distinguish between achieving our primary goal in Iraq – eliminating a security threat – and aiming for the over-and-above goal of democracy promotion, which may not be readily achievable.

Mr. Bush gave his speech at the Army War College on May 24, as Iraq was entering into the last month of its 14-month occupation by the U.S. The president declared: "I sent American troops to Iraq to defend our security, not to stay as an occupying power. I sent American troops to Iraq to make its people free, not to make them American. Iraqis will write their own history, and find their own way."

I had hoped the president would explain why sending American troops to Iraq had helped defend our security, but he did not. The questionable line about sending those troops to make Iraq's people free had remained in the speech. And it was rather late to be promising the Iraqis that we would not stay as an occupying power but instead let them find their own way.

The president had chosen to talk almost exclusively about Iraq's future. His political opponents noticed that if they talked about the past – about prewar intelligence and prewar planning for the war and the aftermath – no one in the White House communications effort would contradict them. Opponents could say anything about the prewar period – misstating Saddam's record, the administration's record or their own – and their statements would go uncorrected. This was a big incentive for them to recriminate about the administration's prewar work, and congressional Democrats have pressed for one retrospective investigation after another.

But the most damaging effect of this communications strategy was that it changed the definition of success. Before the war, administration officials said that success would mean an Iraq that no longer threatened important U.S. interests – that did not support terrorism, aspire to WMD, threaten its neighbors, or conduct mass murder. But from the fall of 2003 on, the president defined success as stable democracy in Iraq.

This was a public affairs decision that has had enormous strategic consequences for American support for the war. The new formula fails to connect the Iraq war directly to U.S. interests. It causes many Americans to question why we should be investing so much blood and treasure for Iraqis. And many Americans doubt that the new aim is realistic – that stable democracy can be achieved in Iraq in the foreseeable future.

To fight a long war, the president has to ensure he can preserve public and congressional support for the effort. It is not an overstatement to say that the president's shift in rhetoric nearly cost the U.S. the war. Victory or defeat can hinge on the president's words as much as on the military plans of his generals or the actions of their troops on the ground.

Mr. Feith was under secretary of defense for policy from July 2001 until August 2005. This article is adapted from his new memoir, "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism" (HarperCollins)

5) How does Obama love Israel?
By Vel Nirtist

Senator Obama recently expressed his deep love of, and "unshakeable commitment to" Israel. I believe him, but I am still worried. What exactly does he mean by love?

Love is indeed a many splendored thing, and people use the word to cover a wide range of phenomena. There are, after all, love-hate relationships, not to mention varieties of twisted love. But even more benign forms of love come in a variety of shapes.

Love between equals is far from the only manifestation. How does Senator Obama see Israel? As a peer? Or perhaps something smaller, needing guidance?

I worry about a President Obama loving Israel the way a strict parent loves a child.

"Spare the rod and spoil the child" expresses well one dilemma of love. Pampering which gives instant gratification to both the parent and the child results in a selfish brat of a grown-up, unable to cooperate with others and making both himself and those around him miserable, or so believes the strict parent, full of love.

A President Obama might think that pressure on the Israel is the way to express his love. He might tell himself that pressure, both internal and external, pushed it to participate in the Oslo process and Madrid conference, to allow Palestinian self-rule, to arm Palestinian "police" and "security" forces, to not react adequately to murderous "intifada," to unilaterally withdraw from Hezbullia (or, geographically speaking, "South Lebanon") and Gaza. He can tell himself that pressure is in the "best long-term interests" of Israel.

The rod of terrorism which resulted from these moves was explained away by the political wise heads as a "sacrifice for peace," under the assumption that the peace will indeed come about when "occupation" is lifted and the Palestinians are allowed full measure of self-rule and economic opportunity. The current pressure from Tony Blair and our own State department to remove roadblocks in the West bank and provide freedom of movement for the Palestinians -- of necessity, to terrorists among them -- that pressure is merely a kind parental rod guiding a child towards a better destiny.

So the question regarding Israel to candidate Obama is this: will his professed love for Israel translate into the loving rod of pressure, resulting in more terrorism which should be endured for the sake of the messianic vision of peace?

Or does he clearly recognize that all this is nonsense? Does he realize that Palestinian suffering (even if indeed "nobody is suffering more than the Palestinian people" as he put it*) is purely self-inflicted?

Does he realize that Palestinians lived within the '67 borders for full 20 years, yet were not happy with them, and that they seek the destruction of Israel, not just the '67 borders?

Does he realize that Hamas is not some aberration, but a genuine expression of the mindset of the Palestinian people and of their intentions towards Israel?

Does he realize that were the Palestinians willing to live and let live, there would be peace starting yesterday -- but the Palestinians find the "let live" portion unbearable, and would rather not live normal lives themselves as long as they can ruin normalcy for the Israelis?

Does he realize that the conflict is fuelled not by economic conditions, but by religious and ideological hate, which no amount of international handouts or even genuine economic prosperity will heal?

Does he realize that, in the absence of hate, Palestine will be a prosperous country within any borders allotted to it, but if the Palestinians continue to torment themselves with their old drudges, and see others, rather then themselves and their fellow-Arabs, as the cause of all their problems, both past and present, no borders, '67 or otherwise, would stop terrorism?

Does he understands that Iran too is motivated by ideology and religion and not by some material interests which can be accommodated, and so there is nothing to negotiate with it other then the schedule of the world's universal submission to the "True Faith" of Shia Islam?

If candidate Obama's answer to any of those questions is a "no," than no amount of his love for Israel -- whether genuine of feigned -- would do Israel any good. Because, for the sake of that love, for the sake of "Israel's own best interests" he will unleash the rod of pressuring Israel into unconscionable concessions, and causing it to continue to suffer under the rod of terrorism -- or worse.