Two toes gone, eight to go!

I have invited Justice Thomas, to speak as part of my Speaker Series and he has, to date, turned me down.I still persist. The interview by David Rivkin and Lee Casey is an excellent read and Justice Thomas' responses demonstrate what a solid Jurist he is. His Liberal detractors are simply motivated by their own bigotry, prejudice and lack of respectful decency towards a fellow being.

If truth be told, we owe Justice Thomas a continuing debt of gratitude for struggling to ascertain and interpret the meaning and intent behind the words of our Constitution and for restraining himself, unlike the tendencies of other Justices who supplant Constitutional meaning with their own predilections in order to reshape our lives according to their judicial whims (See 1 below.)

Is the contemptible hatred Liberals displayed during Justice Thomas' nomination hearings now coming back to haunt them? I seriously doubt this to be the case. Any negativism towards Sen. Obama, is of his own making. It has surfaced because of his defense of his questionable relationship with Rev. Wright, whose inflammatory speeches prove the now retired minister remains out of touch and distorts reality.

In terms of whom the Democrats ultimately select as their nominee, the matter is still in play but statistics favor Sen.Obama, unless he continues to self-destruct. Certainly equating his grandma as being typically white, regarding her attitude towards blacks, was an unnecessary gratuitous comment which did not earn him any additional white votes. Perhaps it made his black supporters gleeful but he has them pretty well locked in, so once again this "inexperienced" campaigner has shot another toe off his foot that resides in his mouth.

So what are the pluses and minuses as I see them?

a) Statistically Sen. Obama is unbeatable if Super-Delegates fall in line and vote in accordance with the popular vote already cast.

b) Sen. Obama has energized The Millenials and if Democrats look to the future young voters become older voters.

c) Sen. Obama has been given a pass by the press and media and has cleverly exploited mis-placed "white guilt" which he artfully reminded them about in his recent address on racial divide.

d) Sen. Clinton has high negatives but presses forward betting Pa. will prove, once again, she wins the big states. (One editorialist dubbed her the political equivalent of the Energized Bunny.)

e) Sen. Clinton has Bill and Sen. Obama has Rev. Wright and Michelle - neither the kind of skeletons one wants in their closet.

f) Both Sens. Clinton and Obama are far far to the left and have demonstrated,in a variety of ways, their dubious judgment when it comes to defending our nation. Both favor allowing corporations to be sued for co-operating by providing intercepts of external communications from terrorist suspects. Both want to bring the troops home seemingly without regard to the aftermath.

g) Both have claimed experience and involvement beyond that which is factual.

h) Both are advantaged by the nation's angst and doubts over Iraq, fear of the economy and the administration's flaws. However, the current Democrat Congress has demonstrated an ineptness that places it below GW's own dire poll ratings. That could suggest the nation might feel uncomfortable placing the presidency in their column as well.

i) Democrats can legitimately fear a potential black backlash in view of Obama's vote count should the nomination be "pulled out" from under him since many conclude Obama has already won.

The best Sen. Clinton can hope for is a decisive win in Pa. demonstrating Obama's continued loss of momentum , her ability to capture the big state votes which might give Super-Delegates some pause.

At this point, John McCain would be wise to keep traveling and allow both Clinton and Obama to continue going at each other. At the very least, their attacks provide McCain future campaign fodder for the general election, against what will be a bruised Democrat nominee.

The forgotten writer's strike has been supplanted by campaign activity equal to any drama or comedy they could have scripted. Was it not Will Rogers who said I am not a member of an organized political party. I am a Democrat.

Cheney visits the Saudis, is told to get the Israelis to make concessions and is awarded the nation's highest honor - a bbl of oil.

Cheney came to discuss oil and the Saudi Monarch pulled an "Obama" and switched the conversation to Israeli intransigence. I did not know the Monarch attended Harvard Law School. (See 2 below.)

Hamas and Fatah are in Yemen's Capital discussing a co-ordinated effort to reach a joint cease fire with Israel. What is being suggested is Hamas return control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority and Abbas. Hamas and Fatah have spilled each other's blood and it is a long shot their enmity towards each will allow them to reach an agreement that will last. What Europeans are incapable and/or unwilling to accept is these Palestinian factions have two things in common; a) they hate each other almost as much as they b) hate Israel. (See 3 below.)

No sooner had I written the aforementioned than my prophesy was proven correct. (See 4 below.)

For a better understanding of Hamas and Fatah's embrace of Islamism see 5 below. (The four exhibits accompanying the article were not printed.)

Dick



1) COMMENTARY: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW: Clarence Thomas: Mr. Constitution
By DAVID B. RIVKIN and LEE A. CASEY


Clarence Thomas leaps from his chair. He retrieves a wire coat hanger from his closet for a demonstration -- the same demonstration he gives his law clerks. He bends it and says: "How do you compensate? So, you say well, deal with it. Bend this over here. Oh, wait a minute, bend it a little bit there. And you're saying that it throws everything out of whack. What do you do?"

He holds up a twisted wire, useless now for its original purpose and the point is made. "If you notice sometimes I will write just to point out that I think that we've gone down a track that's going to cause some distortion, then it's quite precisely because of that. I don't do things that I think are illegitimate in other areas, just to bend it back to compensate for what's already happened.

Interpreting the Constitution is the Supreme Court's most important and most difficult task. An even harder question is how to approach a Constitution that, in fact, is no longer in pristine form -- with the Framers' design having been warped over the years by waves of judicial mischief. There is an obvious temptation to redress the imbalance, which Associate Justice Thomas decisively rejects. Thus his coat hanger metaphor.

So is the most controversial Supreme Court justice an "originalist" when it comes to Constitutional interpretation? He says he doesn't like labels, though he does admit to being a "meat and potatoes" kind of guy.

Upon entering his spacious office overlooking the Capitol Dome in Washington, D.C., the first thing to catch your eye is his Nebraska Cornhuskers screen saver. Mr. Thomas never attended the University of Nebraska, or even lived in the state. He's just a fan. His office is also decorated with pictures of the historical figures he admires, Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, Booker T. Washington, Thomas More and Winston Churchill, and he speaks of them with knowledge and passion. Watching over all is a bust of his grandfather atop Mr. Thomas's bookcase -- its countenance as stern as a Roman consul. There is little doubt this man was the driving force in Mr. Thomas's life -- a fact he confirms, and which is reflected in the title of his recently published memoir, "My Grandfather's Son."

Mr. Thomas faced one of the most destructive and personally vicious Supreme Court confirmation hearings in American history -- described at the time by Mr. Thomas himself as a "high-tech lynching." Mr. Thomas's opponents smeared his character and integrity. To this day, disappointed and embittered, they feel entitled to insult his qualifications, intelligence and record.

In 2004, when Mr. Thomas's name was floated as a possible replacement for ailing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, then Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid called him an "embarrassment" to the Court, and attacked his opinions as "poorly written."

In point of fact, Mr. Thomas's opinions are well-written, displaying a distinctive style -- a sure sign that the Justice and not his clerks does most of the writing.

As for his judicial philosophy, "I don't put myself in a category. Maybe I am labeled as an originalist or something, but it's not my constitution to play around with. Let's just start with that. We're citizens. It's our country, it's our constitution. I don't feel I have any particular right to put my gloss on your constitution. My job is simply to interpret it."

In that process, the first place to look is the document itself. "And when I can't find something in that document or in the tradition or history around that document, then I am getting on dangerous ground. Because that's when you drift so much more towards your own policy preferences."

It is the insertion of those policy preferences into the interpretive process that Mr. Thomas finds particularly illegitimate. "People can say you are an originalist, I just think that we should interpret the Constitution as it's drafted, not as we would have drafted it."

Mr. Thomas acknowledges that discerning a two-hundred-year-old document's meaning is not always easy. Mistakes are possible, if not inevitable, as advocates of a malleable "living constitution," subject to endless judicial revision, never tire of pointing out. "Of course it's flawed" agrees Mr. Thomas, "but all interpretive models are flawed."

Simply following your own preferences is both flawed and illegitimate, he says. "But if that is difficult, does that difficulty legitimate just simply watching your own preference?" By doing that "I haven't cleared up the problem, I've simply trumped it with my personal preferences."

Mr. Thomas has also been criticized for his supposed lack of respect for precedent. Even his fellow conservative, Justice Antonin Scalia, was reported by a Thomas biographer to have claimed that Mr. Thomas just doesn't believe in "stare decisis." Latin for "let the decision stand," stare decisis is an important aspect of the Anglo-American system of precedent -- deciding new cases based on what the courts have done before and leaving long established rules in place.

Mr. Thomas, however, is less absolute here than his critics suggest. He understands the Supreme Court can't simply erase decades, or even centuries, of precedent -- "you can't do it."

At the same time, he views precedent with respect, not veneration. "You have people who will just constantly point out stare decisis, stare decisis, stare decisis . . . then it is one big ratchet. It is something that you wrestle with." History would seem to vindicate Mr. Thomas and his insistence on "getting it right" -- even if that does mean questioning precedent.

The perfect example is Brown v. Board of Education (1954), where the Supreme Court overruled the racist "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which permitted legally enforced segregation and had been settled precedent for nearly 60 years.

It is the Plessy dissent of Justice John Marshall Harlan to which Mr. Thomas points for an example of a Justice putting his personal predilections aside to keep faith with the Constitution. Harlan was a Kentucky aristocrat and former slave owner, although he was also a Unionist who fought for the North during the Civil War. A man of his time, he believed in white superiority, if not supremacy, and wrote in Plessy that the "white race" would continue to be dominant in the United States "in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power . . . for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty."

"But," Harlan continued, "in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens."

That, for Mr. Thomas, is the "great 'But,'" where Harlan's intellectual honesty trumped his personal prejudice, causing Mr. Thomas to describe Harlan as his favorite justice and even a role model. For both of them, justice is truly blind to everything but the law.

More than anything else, this explains Mr. Thomas's own understanding of his job -- a determination to put "a firewall between my [PERSONAL]view and the way that I interpret the Constitution," and to vindicate his oath "that I will administer justice without respect to person, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States."

This insistence by the Justice on judging based upon the law, and not on who the parties are, presents a stark contrast with today's liberal orthodoxy. The liberal approach -- which confuses law-driven judging with compassion-driven politics, enthused with a heavy distrust of the American political system's fairness -- was recently articulated by Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama, who emphasized the need for judges with "heart" and "empathy" for the less fortunate, judges willing to favor the dis-empowered.

Born in rural Georgia in 1948, Mr. Thomas and his brother were mostly raised in Savannah by their maternal grandparents. His grandfather, Myers Anderson, believed in work, and that rights come with responsibilities. According to his book, Mr. Anderson told the seven-year-old Clarence that "the damn vacation is over" the morning he moved in.

Says Mr. Thomas: "Being willing to accept responsibility, that sort of dark side of freedom, first -- before you accept all the benefits. Being ready to be responsible for yourself -- you want to be independent. That was my grandfather." Anderson also taught his grandson to arrive at his conclusions honestly and not "to be bullied away from opinions that I think are legitimate. You know, not being unreasonable, but not being bullied away."

For a man who has been subjected to a great deal of vitriol, Mr. Thomas manifests remarkable serenity. He rejoices in life outside the Court, regaling us with stories about his travels throughout the U.S., his many encounters with ordinary Americans, and his love of sports -- especially the Cornhuskers, the Dallas Cowboys and Nascar.

Mr. Thomas isn't much bothered by his critics. "I can't answer the cynics and the negative people. I can't answer them because they can always be cynical about something."

Mr. Thomas speaks movingly about the Court as an institution, and about his colleagues, both past and present. He sees them all, despite their differences, as honorable, each possessing a distinctive voice, and trying to do right as they see it. Our job, he concludes, is "to do it right. It's no more than that. We can talk about methodology. It's merely a methodology. It's not a religion. It is in the approach to doing the job right. And at bottom what it comes to, is to choose to interpret this document as carefully and as accurately and as legitimately as I can, versus inflicting my personal opinion or imposing my personal opinion on the rest of the country."

And why doesn't he ask questions at oral argument, a question oft-posed by critics insinuating that he is intellectually lazy or worse? Mr. Thomas chuckles wryly and observes that oral advocacy was much more important in the Court's early days. Today, cases are thoroughly briefed by the time they reach the Supreme Court, and there is just too little time to have a meaningful conversation with the lawyers. "This is my 17th term and I haven't found it necessary to ask a bunch of questions. I would be doing it to satisfy other people, not to do my job. Most of the answers are in the briefs. This isn't Perry Mason."

2) Saudi king urges U.S. to press Israel over peace with Palestinians


King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on Friday urged U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney to pressure Israel to seal a peace deal with the Palestinians before President George W. Bush leaves office in January 2009, official Saudi sources said. Cheney, on a 10-day regional tour, arrived Friday in Saudi Arabia where he met Abdullah at the king's al-Janadriya horse farm near Riyadh.

Sources said Saudi Arabia is not happy with the "slow" pace of US efforts to push the Middle East peace process by putting pressure on Israel to reach a peace agreement and end the building of settlements and excavations around Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

Cheney was due to travel to Israel on Saturday for a meeting with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. On Easter Sunday, after attending a church service, Cheney will head to the West Bank for talks in Ramallah with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

Cheney spokeswoman Lea Ann McBride said Bush asked the vice president to visit Israel to discuss significant regional issues in advance of the president's return trip in May to mark the 60th anniversary of the modern state of Israel.

"The vice president's discussions will involve the ways forward in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Israel's right to defend itself against terrorism and protect its citizenry," she said. "The vice president also looks forward to visiting the Palestinian territories to reaffirm the president's commitment to the current efforts towards the two-state solution and efforts to strengthen Palestinian institutions."

Abdullah and Cheney also discussed Iran's nuclear program and its growing regional influence. The king confirmed his opposition to any U.S. military strike against Iran, the sources said.

Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf Arab countries, sees negotiations as the best way to ease tension between the U.S. and Iran.

Abdullah also told Cheney that the Middle East should be free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The Saudis say any nuclear non-proliferation efforts should include Israel, which many in the Arab world suspect has a secret nuclear program.

The situation in Iraq was also discussed.

The U.S. wants Saudi Arabia to step up formal ties with the Iraqis by sending an ambassador to Baghdad and encouraging visits by ministers and officials.

Washington wants to see its Arab allies, such as Riyadh and Cairo, upgrade ties with Baghdad as a way of containing Iran's fledgling influence in Iraq, according to U.S. and Arab officials.

Saudi diplomats visited Baghdad at the end of last year to explore the possibility of opening an embassy there.

Washington and Riyadh disagree over the Iraqi government led by Shiite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, with Saudis saying al-Maliki is not doing enough to promote reconciliation between the country's Shiite and Sunni Arabs and is giving Iran a chance to deepen its foothold in Iraq.

The political standoff in Lebanon, resulting from the failure of its parliament to elect a president, was also discussed at the talks. The Saudis are key players in Lebanon with financial muscle and political influence on some factions there.

Spiraling oil prices were on the agenda in talks, with both countries agreeing on restoring the balance in oil markets.

The US has called for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase the output to curb spiraling prices, but OPEC, of which Saudi Arabia is the biggest producer, has refused to heed the calls.

Cheney has asked the king to press the organization for an output increase to ease pressures on the U.S. economy, according to sources at the U.S. embassy in Riyadh.

Abdullah presented Cheney with a the country's highest honor.

3) Yemen: Breakthrough in talks between Fatah and Hamas
Khaled Toameh Contributed

Fatah officials have agreed to Yemen's reconciliation initiative and are prepared to sign it, while Hamas officials requested additional time to discuss the initiative with the group's leaders, Yemen's Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi announced on Saturday.

According to a Yemenite news agency, talks between the rival Fatah and Hamas are continuing to take place in Yemen, after a crisis in talks occurred on Thursday in which Fatah representatives threatened to return to Ramallah.

"Hamas is not declining the Yemenite initiative which aims to resolve the rivalry between Hamas and Fatah," Ahmed Youssef, adviser to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, told the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi.

Youssef also said that Hamas is maintaining contacts with European representatives. "Most of the Europeans we maintain contact with are British, Swedish, Swiss and French. In most cases they were unofficial European representatives who are helping change the European attitude towards Hamas."

On Thursday, An attempt by the Yemeni government to mend fences between Fatah and Hamas failed after the Fatah delegation walked out of the talks.

Earlier this week, representatives of Fatah and Hamas were invited to Yemen's capital Sanaa for talks on an initiative by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to end the ongoing power struggle between the two parties.

The initiative urges Hamas to end its control of the Gaza Strip and hand the area back to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah.

Earlier Saturday, the Palestinian news agency Ma'an reported that senior representatives of Hamas and Islamic Jihad are set to meet Egyptian officials on Saturday in order to discuss a truce, or period of calm, with Israel.

4) Yemeni bid to reconcile Fatah and Hamas Fails.

The latest attempt to reconcile Fatah and Hamas ended in failure yesterday,
with each party blaming the other.

The announcement came as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in
Syria that Palestinian reconciliation was key to solving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The initiative, sponsored by Yemen, called for a return to the political
status quo that existed before Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in
June, routing forces loyal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in a week
of deadly street battles.

Abbas, who also leads Fatah, claimed Hamas rejected the proposals.

Hamas "did not accept the formula proposed by Yemen and expressed
reservations that voided it of substance," said Abbas.

Palestinian Authority spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeina claimed Hamas refused to
engage in dialogue with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which
includes several organizations, including Fatah, but not Hamas.

"Hamas rejected the Yemeni initiative for inter-Palestinian reconciliation,"
said Abu Rudeina.

However, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri insisted in Gaza the Islamists had
accepted the initiative, but that the announcement of failure demonstrated
that Abbas "shuns any dialogue."

Hamas and PLO delegations were in Sanaa this week for separate talks on the
bid to heal the deep rift between them.

Abbas said the PLO delegation was heading home, but would be willing to
return to Yemen should Hamas accept the full initiative.

Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr Al-Kurbi said the rival groups would make a
renewed attempt to reach a compromise tomorrow.

Hamas No. 2 Mussa Abu Marzuk said in Yemen on Wednesday they would share
control of Gaza if Abbas reappoints Ismail Haniyeh as prime minister.

After his forces were routed from Gaza, Abbas dismissed Haniyeh and
suspended talks with the Islamists, which he has refused to resume until the
movement relinquishes control of the Palestinian enclave.

In Damascus, Lavrov said it was crucial Palestinian unity should be
restored. "It is necessary in order to continue negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians," Lavrov said at a news conference.

Long-stalled peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians have made
little progress since they were revived at a US-sponsored conference in
November.

Israel has been negotiating with the Abbas government, but refuses to engage
in talks with Hamas. Israel has also imposed a crippling embargo on Gaza
and, on Feb. 27, launched a deadly five-day blitz on the narrow enclave.

Lavrov called for a "global solution" to the Arab-Israeli conflict and said
talks should be restarted with Israel on the Syrian and Lebanese peace
tracks.

5) Fatah's Embrace of Islamism
by Ido Zelkovitz
Middle East Quarterly Spring 2008, pp. 19-26

Many U.S. and European diplomats contrast Fatah's Palestinian nationalism with Hamas's Islamism. At a November 28, 2007 press conference, U.S. national security advisor Stephen Hadley praised Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas and cited President George W. Bush's argument that "Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda [are] different faces of the same evil: a radical ideology seeking to impose its world-view throughout the Middle East and beyond."[1] But, while Fatah, the core of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), may have its roots in the revolutionary, secular-oriented ideologies of the 1960s and 1970s,[2] Islamist discourse is also integral to the movement.[3] Indeed, even as Western diplomats seek to bolster Fatah's Abbas as an alternative to Hamas, they underestimate the degree to which Palestinian nationalism now intertwines itself with Islam.[4] Since the 2000 Palestinian uprising, Fatah has fused national and religious symbols in order to use Islam as an instrument of mobilization.[5]
Fatah Imagery in the Twentieth Century

In the 1970s, Fatah graphic art promoted the culture of armed struggle which was at the heart of Fatah's ideology. (See Figure 1.) This enabled Fatah to mobilize the masses in the absence of a solid ideology among the divided and faction-ridden Palestinian society. Its imagery and texts sanctified violent struggle as the miracle cure for Palestinian problems. From the everyday struggle, they believed, would grow the formulas and theories for their ideology in the future.[6]



Before the outbreak of the second intifada, a Palestinian public opinion survey (conducted between November 1997 and March 1999) revealed that 87.6 percent of Fatah supporters believed Islam should play a major role in the future life of Palestinian society, and 80 percent said that any future Palestinian state should be run according to Islamic law.[7]

Fatah was the dominant political movement in the West Bank and Gaza from the Oslo-sanctioned return of PLO leader Yasir Arafat in 1994 until at least 2000. In September 2000, the Palestinians launched an uprising and unleashed a wave of terrorist attacks, which they named the "Al-Aqsa" intifada. Fatah re-branded its armed wing—previously known as the Storm, Al-'Asifa[8]—calling it Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, a name chosen to bolster both Palestinian claims to Jerusalem and Fatah's religious claims. In one of the brigades' earliest proclamations, its members said they fought for independence, and national and religious values.[9]

Previously, Palestinian figures embraced the sectarian diversity of Palestinian Arabs, especially for the Western audience. For example, in a London press conference, Yasir Arafat said that "according to our religiousness, Christians should be mentioned before the Muslims," which was in the context of the suffering of the Palestinian people as a result of the intifada.[10] But today Palestinian society emphasizes Muslim supremacy. Fatah expresses its new Islamist discourse not only in educational and cultural terms but also in its embrace of suicide bombing—"self-martyrdom" (istishad)—as a tactic.

Fatah infused its icons with religious imagery in support of its fighters and suicide bombers. A proclamation in memory of Suhail ‘Ali Bakr, an Al-Aqsa member responsible for producing and launching rockets and killed in a February 7, 2007 Israeli air strike, combined the traditional colors of the Islamic jihad flag with the black-and-white checkered headscarf (kaffiyeh), long the symbol of the Fatah movement.

Fatah has embraced Islamist discourse for several reasons. First, competition with Hamas led its leaders to invoke Islam as a way to create a system of symbols and images that, combined with the national struggle, would fuse past and present and pave the way to an ideal future.

In the mid-1980s, Fatah established satellite groups with an Islamic appearance in response to the activities of Islamic Jihad.[11] Then, as Hamas became a competitor in the run-up to and after the outbreak of the second intifada, Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades printed a Qur'anic verse on their banner that read, "Fight against them! God will chastise them by your hands, and will bring disgrace upon them, and will succor you against them; and He will soothe the bosoms of those who believe."[12] It is no coincidence that Hamas used the same verse on its proclamations during the first intifada.[13]

Even Arafat embraced religious reference. Arafat often used the language of the Qur'an to mobilize the Palestinians,[14] especially during times of war. For example, on July 22, 1981,[15] in the months before the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Arafat told his followers, "Permission (to fight) is granted to those who are being persecuted, since injustice has befallen them, and God is certainly able to support them. They were evicted from their homes unjustly, for no reason other than saying, ‘Our lord is Allah.'"[16] Arafat then cites the Qu'ran to promise the afterlife to those who fight for God and Palestine:

God has bought from the believers their lives and their money in exchange for Paradise. Thus, they fight in the cause of God, willing to kill and get killed. Such is His truthful pledge in the Torah, the Gospel, and the Qur'an—and who fulfills His pledge better than God? You shall rejoice in making such an exchange. This is the greatest triumph.[17]

In response to allegations that the Israeli army planned to deport him from the West Bank and Gaza, in 2002, he said, "They will not take me captive or prisoner, or expel [me], but as a martyr, martyr, martyr. O God, give me martyrdom." He then quoted the Prophet Muhammad:

There still exists a group in my nation that preserves its religion, vanquishes its enemy, and is not harmed by any one who attacks it, and its people are the victors, due to God's strength. It was said [to the Prophet Muhammad], "O Messenger of God, where are they and who are [these people]?" The Prophet answered: "They are in Jerusalem and its surroundings, and they are at the forefront until Judgment Day."[18]

In many ways, Arafat paved the way for the growth of Islamism within Fatah.

Second, given Israel's military dominance, Fatah may have embraced Islamism to counterbalance its technological weakness. Faith can be a useful counterweight to science and technology. During the Iran-Iraq war and in subsequent Arab suicide bombing campaigns, Islam provided the motivation for young fighters to confront technologically superior enemies, which conventional forces usually refrain from fighting.

Third, Islam may have provided a useful glue to overcome factionalization within Fatah. The second intifada left Fatah beset by internal divisions and rivalries. The clan and sub-clan nature of Palestinian-Arab society compounded the problem.[19] Arafat empowered the biggest clans and extended families as a counterweight to the rising, young, local leadership from the "new middle class."[20] Bodies which rely on a sub-national identity in the broader framework of a national movement need an additional element to broaden their power base. Islam provided a useful mechanism by which to hold the clans together.

Islam also provided Fatah a much-needed makeover. Implanted as a political entity in the West Bank and Gaza after the 1993 Oslo accords, by 2000, Fatah was associated with corruption in the minds of many Palestinians.[21] An Islamist patina enabled Fatah to create an image of incorruptibility, purity, and devotion to jihad.

The Oslo process enabled the Palestinian Authority to develop a formal armed force. Arafat built ten separate security apparatuses, each headed by loyalists.[22] For example, Amin al-Hindi led General Intelligence, and Faisal Abu Sharkh led Presidential Security.[23]

On September 28, 2000, followers of Marwan Barghouti, a West Bank Fatah leader convicted on May 20, 2004, of five counts of murder, formed the core of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.[24] The brigades' operations are decentralized, in part because of the tension between the young guard, born in the West Bank and Gaza, and Fatah's old guard, who spent most of their lives overseas.[25] Islam provided a bond to hold the factions together and, unlike Palestinian nationalism, also allowed the group to establish links to non-Palestinian movements under the banner of Islamic solidarity. Zakaria Zubaydi, the chief commander of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in the Jenin area, for example, said that his group receives funds from Hezbollah.[26]
Fatah Factions Discover Islam

The change in the discourse can be seen in the case of the Fatah Hawks who, during the first intifada, both spearheaded the Fatah fight against Israel in the Gaza Strip and fought against Hamas activists. The Hawks, who had earlier represented themselves as a national element fighting against the extreme Islamist movement,[27] today boast that, upon "God's great name," they "will protect the beautiful Islamic land of Palestine."[28]

Hawks' communiqués abound in Islamic discourse. Reference to "pure soil" is also a frequent motif in Hawks' statements as the group seeks to claim the land of Israel as exclusive Muslim property. Their statements often speak about "the Arabic and Islamic people," tying Fatah to a struggle greater than just Gaza and the West Bank.[29]

Visual material about the Hawks also testifies to the importance of Islam in their ethos. The profession of faith and the cry of "God is Great," both of which fighters recite on their way to jihad, appear on their flag.


On their shield, the Hawks also use visuals, such as the Dome of the Rock, which reflect Palestinian folklore as national symbols. From the dome arises a map of Palestine, incorporating all of Israel and colored green to represent Islam. That the map rises from the dome suggests a reference to Muhammad's nocturnal ascent to heaven. While the Qur'an does not mention Jerusalem, and the Arabs built Al-Aqsa mosque more than fifty years after Muhammad's death,[30] Muslims commonly consider it the site of Muhammad's night journey to heaven. Above the image is a Qur'anic verse, "When God's Succor Comes, and Victory."[31] The Arabic term nasr, which appears at the pinnacle of the Fatah shield, has two meanings: "salvation" and "victory." Fatah seeks to intertwine the two even further with its slogan, "Revolution until Victory" (thawra hata' an-nasr).


The Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish Brigades, a Fatah faction centered in the Khan Yunis and Rafah areas, also accord Islam a central role. The brigades acknowledge a close relationship with Hamas based both on shared religious principles and on having fought together "in the trenches against the enemies of the motherland and religion."[32] On their Internet site, they call themselves Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam), an expression that refers to the companions of Muhammad in Medina.[33]

The Abu'r-Rish Brigades declare their aims to be not only the liberation of Palestine but also exaltation of God and flying the flag of Islam. They explain, "We believe that Allah is God, and Islam is our faith, for the Prophet is a model and teacher for us, for our way is the way of the jihad for the sake of Allah."[34] This slogan, which mirrors one used by the Muslim Brotherhood, is now a staple of Fatah demonstrations in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.[35] They also use the Arabic hijra calendar.

On an earlier home page, the brigades appealed to religious emotion, portraying the Qur'an and the Dome of the Rock on a green background. This page was shut down by the Canadian government in mid-2006 after a Canadian court accused the Abu'r-Rish Brigades of terrorism.[36] Like their mother organization, the Fatah Hawks, they created a motif of a map of undivided Palestine in green above the Dome of the Rock, denoting the whole of Palestine as a waqf, or religious endowment. Crossed Kalashnikov rifles signify fulfillment of the goal of liberating the land through jihad—through armed struggle against the Israeli presence. The Abu'r-Rish Brigades forbid any Western solution involving compromise with Israel. They mix classical Fatah discourse describing Israel as a branch of Western imperialism[37] with Islamic terminology and suggest jihad to be the only solution to the Palestinian question.[38] This policy is reflected in the Qur'anic quotes: "O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors. They are but friends and protectors to each other."[39] By this quote they portray themselves as a nationalist-Islamic force that stands against the "imperialist-infidel" conspiracy to divide Palestine.

The Clear Victory Brigades, whose name in Arabic derives from the Qur'an,[40] call for the continuation of the struggle by means of the word and the rifle and seek both moral reckoning and the preservation of social values now in decline.[41] The use of names indicating the Islamic roots of Fatah falls into a pattern reminiscent of the first intifada when the political struggle between Fatah and Hamas was expressed in part through Fatah graffiti bearing a religious complexion: "Allah is my Lord; Islam is my faith; the Qur'an is my book; to the Ka‘ba, I turn in prayer; Muhammad is my prophet; Fatah is my movement," or "There is no god but Allah—thus we have always believed (Fatah, Nablus)," and "Fatah everywhere—even in the Qur'an."[42]

The Holy Warriors Brigade, active in the Sabra neighborhood of Gaza City, was created from within Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades after the death of Jihad ‘Amarin, one of the founders of the brigades in the Gaza Strip. Abu al-Sheikh, one of its activists, said the name symbolizes "those who stand for the Islamic ideal within Fatah, which is a movement with a variety of modes of action (ijtihadat). We have no connection with any other movement, despite our good relations with the other Palestinian organizations."[43] (See Figure 5.)

Figure 5: Poster of Muhammad Abu Shari‘a, from the Holy Warriors Brigade.

The Pioneers of the Army of the People—The Brigade of the Return—is another clear example of the mixing of religious and national symbols. Its banner also features a green map of repartition Palestine and an image of the Dome of the Rock with crossed rifle-barrels. Accompanying the banner is the Qur'anic verse, "Kill those who fight you everywhere."[44] Its members devote themselves to liberation of land "completely under the aegis of God and in the fulfillment of His commandments."[45]

The picture of an activist of the faction sitting on what appears to be a rostrum reflects the depth of the blending of the symbols (see Figure 6): Behind the activist hangs a Palestinian flag decorated with the Muslim profession of faith, next to which is the logo of Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. A Pioneers of the Army of the People flag covers the table. The activist himself chose to be photographed reading the Qur'an with weapons placed beside him.

Figure 6: Image from the group Pioneers of the Army of the People, The Brigade of the Return.

Despite their internecine struggles for prestige, all of these Fatah factions duplicate certain symbols: the Dome of the Rock and a green map of Palestine. Quotations from the Qur'an cement the link between religion and Palestinian nationalism. Yunus Karim, a senior Fatah member imprisoned in Israel for twenty-five years for the murder of an Israeli soldier, complained that the new generation of Fatah fighters know about jihad but only learn about Fatah's philosophy when in prison.[46]

Conclusion:

Fatah imagery chronicles the Islamization of the movement. In the 1970s, Fatah graphic art dedicated itself to promoting the culture of armed struggle, which, at the time, was the heart of the movement's ideology.

Today, the gap between Fatah and Hamas in terms of the role of Islam has narrowed. Fatah is more likely to see Islam as one component of national identity while Hamas preaches the primacy of Islamic identity,[47] but both agree that Palestinian society should be Islamist. Fatah leaders may try to keep their movement distinct, not by reversion to its secular past, but rather by arguing that its version of Islam is less extreme than that of Hamas.[48] It is not a coincidence that Fatah organized mass prayers in public areas in the Gaza Strip to protest against Hamas policies.[49]

Fatah's loss to Hamas in the January 2006 parliamentary elections, though, forced it to externalize its Islamism. This may further a trend within the West Bank and Gaza—as well as, perhaps, in Jordan—toward Islamist radicalism.

It is no surprise that Fatah chairman Mahmoud Abbas recently attended Friday prayers at his Muqata‘a mosque, accompanied by the political leadership of Hamas in the West Bank.[50] To preserve his legitimacy, as well as national unity among Palestinians, Abbas must strengthen the Islamic elements in his political behavior. Fatah has deepened its own Islamic terminology and now preaches on the importance of prayer and faith in God during training and indoctrination of its new members.[51] Fatah has also started a propaganda campaign accusing Hamas of being a servant of Iranian interests and Shi‘i supporters,[52] thereby using Islam to criticize its rival.

Fatah's new religiosity cannot easily be undone. It is ironic that while many Western diplomats now turn to Fatah as an alternative to Hamas's Islamism, the real Fatah is much closer to Hamas while the secular Fatah now appears to be a relic of the past.



[1] Stephen Hadley, remarks at Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., Nov. 28, 2007.
[2] Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 91.
[3] Rafiq Shakir an-Natsha, Al-Islam wa-Filastin (Beirut: Manshurat Filastin al-Muhtalla, 1981), p. 17.
[4] Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism (London: Kegan Paul International, 1982), pp. 65-6, 77-86; Saqr Abu Fakhr, Al-Haraka al-Wataniya al-Filastiniya: Min an-Nidal al-Musallah ila Dawlat Manzu'at as-Silah (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-‘Arabiya li'd-Dirasat wa'n-Nashr, 2003), pp. 26-9.
[5] Emanuel Sivan, Hitnagshut be-Tokh ha-Islam (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 2005), pp. 190-2 .
[6] Fawaz Turki, Soul in Exile: Lives of a Palestinian Revolutionary (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), p. 53.
[7] "Political Beliefs and Preferences of People Who Trust Fatah and People Who Trust Leftist Factions," Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion on Politics, Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Sept. 2000, p. 35.
[8] Kata'ib Shuhada' al-Aqsa, "Kilmat al-Kata'ib—Min Al-'Asifa ila Kata'ib Shuhada' al-Aqsa," accessed Nov. 21, 2007.
[9] Kata'ib Shuhada' al-Aqsa, "‘An al-Kata'ib," Sept. 21, 2005.
[10] Tony Blair and Yasir Arafat, news conference, Prime Minister's Office, Oct. 15, 2001.
[11] Ronni Shaked and Avivah Shabi, Hamas: Me-emunah be-Allah le-derekh ha teror (Jerusalem: Keter, 1994), pp. 204-6; Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 2001), p. 69.
[12] Qur. 9:14.
[13] See Hamas proclamations, nos. 3, 5, and 7, in Shaul Mishal and Reuven Aharoni, eds., Avanim zeh lo ha-kol: ha-Intifadah ṿe-nesheḳ ha-keruzim (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad and Avivim, 1989), pp. 202-13.
[14] Hillel Frish, "Nationalizing a Universal Text: The Quran in Arafat's Rhetoric," Middle Eastern Studies, May 2005, pp. 322-5.
[15] Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, Rasail al-Akh Abu A'mmar Ra'is al-Lijna at-Tanfidhia li-Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-Filastini—Al-Qa'id al-‘Amm li-Quwwat ath-Thawra al-Filastinyya ila Abtal al-Quwwat al-Mushtarika wa-Jamahir ash-Sha‘bayn al-Lubnani wa'l Filastini fi'l-Harb as-Sadisa, Wathiqa 1-2-3-4-5 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 23-40.
[16] Qur. 22:39-40.
[17] Qur. 60:111.
[18] Al-Hayat (London), Oct. 5, 2002, in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series, no. 428, Oct. 11, 2002.
[19] Ephraim Lavi, "Zehoyot Kibotziot Mitharot be-He'ader Medina Leomit," paper delivered at "The Solidarity of the Arab State—Is It in Decline?" conference, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, Mar. 21, 2006.
[20] Michael Milstein, Fatah ve-Hareshot Hafalastinit Bein Mahapekha le-Medine (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 2004), p. 57.
[21] Fabio Forgione, "The Chaos of the Corruption: The Challenges for the Improvement of the Palestinian Society," The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group Report, Jerusalem, Oct. 2004.
[22] Gal Luft, "The Palestinian Security Services: Between Police and Army," Middle East Review of International Affairs, June 1999.
[23] Nigel Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 154.
[24] Medinat Israel Neged Maerwan Iben Hatib Barghuthi (The state of Israel vs. Maerwan Iben Hatib Barghuthi), file no 1158/02, Beit Ha-Mishpat Ha-Mehozi Be-Tel Aviv, May 20, 2004.
[25] Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle (Eastbourne, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p. 140.
[26] Ar-Ra'y al-‘Amm (Kuwait), Mar. 6, 2004.
[27] Rema Hammami, "From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the Women's Movement, and National Identity in the Intifada," in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 204-6.
[28] Sukur al-Fatah, ‘Ashat Dhikra al-Marid al-Fathawa'i, Jan. 1, 2005.
[29] Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine, p. 66.
[30] Daniel Pipes, "The Muslim Claim to Jerusalem," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2001, pp. 49-66.
[31] Qur. 110:1.
[32] Kata'ib ash-Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish, Hawla Mushkilat Kata'ib ash-Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish ma‘a Hamas (n.p.: Rabi'a al-Thani 4, 1426 A.H., May, 13, 2005).
[33] Sivan, Hitnagshut be-tokh Ha-Islam, pp. 190-2.
[34] Kata'ib ash-Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish, "Min Nahnu-Nibadha Muhtasara," accessed Nov. 15, 2007.
[35] "Masirat Fatah fi Mukhaym al-Bureij," Sept. 20, 2007.
[36] Yusuf Sadik, "Kanada Taharib Kata'ib ash-Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish," accessed Nov 28, 2007; Kata'ib ash-Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish, "Iftitah al-Maktab al- I‘alami li- Kata'ib ash-Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish Ba‘d Ighlaqahu mi qabal Jihat Sahyuniya-Kanadiya," Mar. 13, 2007.
[37] Fatah, "An-Nizam al-Assasi," Fatah Basic Order, first part, articles 7-8, accessed Nov. 12, 2007.
[38] Kata'ib ash-Shahid Ahmad Abu'r-Rish, "Min Nahnu-Nibadha Muhtasara," accessed Nov. 15, 2007.
[39] Qur. 5:51-52.
[40] Qur. 48:2.
[41] "Kata'ib Fatah al-Mubin," n.p., 2005.
[42] Tariq Ibrahim and Muhammad Ibrahim, Sha‘rat al-Intifada (London: Filastin al-Muslima, 1994), pp. 265, 367-6.
[43] ‘Abu ash-Shaykh: "Afkhar inani Ibn li-hadha al‘A'ila wa-Fakdan ithnayn min ashiqqa'i la Yuharabuni'," accessed Mar. 12, 2006.
[44] Qur. 2:192.
[45] Kata'ib Shuhada' al-Aqsa, "Bayan Na‘i min Kata'ib Shuhada' al-Aqsa wa- Talai‘ al-Jaysh ash-Sha‘bi- Kata'ib al-A‘wda: Al-Ab al-Qa'id Yasir A‘rafat fi Dhimmat Allah," Nov. 11, 2004.
[46] Yunus Karim, interview on Israeli Channel One, May 18, 2005.
[47] Lavi, "Zehoyot Kibotziot Mitharot be-He'ader Medina Leomit."
[48] Bakr Abu Bakr, Harakat Fath wa't-Tanzim Allathi Nurid (Ramallah: ‘Anah li't-Taba‘a wa'n-Nashr, 2003), p. 165.
[49] Al-Ta'amim (Fatah periodical, Ramallah), Aug. 2007.
[50] Al-Ayyam (Ramallah), Nov. 3, 2007.
[51] Bakr abu-Bakr, "Qiyam as-Sala wa-ikhtirak al-Gudur," accessed July 11, 2007.
[52] Fatah- al-I'alam al-Markazi, "M'ashal: Hamas al-ibn ar-ruhi lil-Imam Khumayni" (M'ashal: Hamas is the spiritual son of Imam Khomeini), accessed Aug. 21, 2007.