What Goes Round Seems Still To Be Coming Round!

An intelligence source takes a very dour view of the current scene in Pakistan and suggests Osama bin Laden has implemented two moves to challenge the West and most particularly Sec Rice and GW. What goes around seems to still be coming around. (See 1 below.)

Bin Laden speaks (See 2 below.)

The IAF just gets better and better at pinpoint targeting but warns it cannot always be so. (See 3 below.)

And so the war on terrorism will continue to go by escalating and spreading. An assessment by Walid Phares. (See 4 below.)

Herb Keinon reports one of Israel's priorities is to wean Assad from his friends. Good Luck! (See 5 below.)

My friend Toameh suggests Fatah's killing of two Israeli crack soldiers on leave and strolling in Hebron is a direct affront to Abbas. (See 6 below.)

Memri presents its usual excellent analysis and this time on events in Lebanon where ot suggests things are coming to a head. (See 7 below.)

IDF finds chemicals to make weapons in food shipments from EU. (See 8 below.)

Dick

1) Bhutto Murder Closes Anti-Terror War Cycle Bush Launched after 9/11



The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, Washington’s chosen linchpin-to-be in Islamabad, was an unmitigated disaster for America’s war on al Qaeda and its jihadist allies in the key Pakistan-Afghan arena. The 27/12 murder closed a cycle sent spinning by al Qaeda’s 9/11 assault on America in the early days of President George W. Bush’s first term. It has left him clutching at thin air.

This single act of violence hit the West as US-led NATO forces suffer one setback after another in Afghanistan and Taliban and a Qaeda are in control of more than 75 percent of the country. It has done more harm than all the evil wrought against US forces by al Qaeda’s ace commander in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the two years before he was slain.

Al Qaeda left its fingerprints – but typically no trace of the perpetrators. To this day, the master plotters who launched 19 suicide killers against America on Sept. 19, have not been caught, any more than those who engineered the 2004 Madrid rail bombers or the 2005 London transport attacks. The string-pullers of the Bhutto assassination may never come to light.

For now, Western counter-terror agencies are on tenterhooks for a Osama bin Laden message promised in the next 24-48 hours, in which al Qaeda promises he will divulge its steps for salvaging “Iraq’s Muslim Caliphate,” an oblique reference to US military gains.

Bin Laden is expected to make some reference to Pakistan as well, since al Qaeda’s strategists do not see their jihad in terms of separate fronts, but as a single interlinked arena stretching across several regions.

Furthermore, they try never to gamble on a chancy target. Their spadework is lengthy and thorough, consisting of long surveillance to seek out chinks in Western armor, the exploitation of its blunders, advance intelligence-gathering and a strike that leaves no tracks.

Benazir Bhutto was easy prey. Pakistan’s army and Inter-Service Intelligence are rife with Taliban and al Qaeda sympathizers. For more than a year, US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice bargained with President Pervez Musharraf on terms for a power-sharing deal that would bring the opposition leader back from her eight-year exile into heart of Islamabad politics.

No great strategic brain was needed to spot the glaring weakness in putting all of America’s eggs for reforming Pakistan’s political and military shortcomings into one basket. The same fallacy mars Rice’s Palestinian strategy: if Mahmoud Abbas is disposed of like Bhutto, US plans for the Eastern Mediterranean go up in smoke like its Asian arena.

Ahead of the Bhutto assassination, al Qaeda prepared follow-up actions in Iraq and Gaza.

Two major steps are revealed by counter-terror sources:

1. The Fatah al-Islam commander Shaker al-Abessi was transferred to Iraq to spearhead a new offensive. Al Abessi commanded the four-month Fatah al-Islam confrontation with the Lebanese army from the Badr al-Nahr camp near Tripoli in the summer of 2007. The Lebanese army saved the day and the northern provinces from falling into the hands of this al Qaeda offshoot, only after the US stepped in with assistance and an infusion of weapons. Even then, it took a battle of wits between Adm. William Fallon, chief of US Central Command, and al-Abessi to beat him.

Even then, al Qaeda had the last word: On Dec. 12, Brig. Gen. Francois el-Hajj, the Lebanese officer who worked with Adm. Fallon, was assassinated.

Meanwhile, al Qaeda, hoping to build al-Abessi into a second al-Zarqawi, has sent him to establish the “Iraq Front,” a new body for recouping the organization’s trounced forces and turning the tables on the US army. His plan to transit the Syrian-Iraqi border with his top men shows how fragile and uncertain are Washington’s gains in securing joint Syrian-US control of the border.

2. A large body of the Fatah al-Islam rank and file was transferred from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip, apparently by sea. This week, they were in the thick of the Hamas-Jihad Islami missile and mortar offensive against Israel.

By these two steps, al Qaeda established support structures for its next two offensives in a region ranging from Afghanistan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west.

Osama bin Laden’s momentum after Benazir Bhutto was murdered might have been slowed had the Americans reacted rapidly with a combined US-Pakistan military assault on al Qaeda and Taliban strongholds in Pakistan and Afghanistan, on a scale comparable to the post-9/11 campaign. But neither army was ready. The day before the murder, Washington laid plans to boost its special forces presence in Pakistan in the course of 2008.

In an interview to the Voice of America, Adm. Fallon said: “What we’ve seen in the last several months is more of a willingness to use their regular army units along the Afghan border.” He added: …”and this is where I think we can help a lot in providing the kind of training and assistance and mentoring based on our experience with insurgencies recently and with the terrorist problem in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

This belated plan will have to be re-examined in the anti-Musharraf, anti-US climate prevailing in Pakistan after the Benazir Bhutto tragedy.

By pushing for elections to be held on Jan. 8 as scheduled, Secretary Rice is making the same mistake as before, when her democratic urge raised up the terrorist Hamas in a Palestinian election two years ago. Musharraf his holding his horses, waiting for Bhutto’s party to meet Sunday, Dec. 30, and decide whether to run or join the boycott declared by the rival Nawaf Sharif. Monday, the election commission convenes for its decision. This process cannot be foisted on Islamabad without risking increased violence directed against the president as an “American puppet.”

Musharraf was already on a downward slope before Bhutto’s death and his army was falling back in the war on Islamist extremists. Sources foresee this process accelerating and opening the way to the takeover by Taleban and al Qaeda of more parts of Pakistan.

Given this prospect, anxiety over the fate of Pakistan’s estimated 50-60 nuclear warheads is more acute. The Pentagon’s assurance Friday that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure under the control of the military would become meaningless if that military turns against the United States. An American operation to pluck that arsenal from terrorist clutches might be fought off by that same military.

In these circumstances, however badly they are needed for the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq, US special forces will need to be permanently deployed within speedy reach of Pakistan’s nuclear stocks. A single bullet (or blast) has switched the spotlight on the world’s most dangerous nuclear threat from Iran to Pakistan.

2) Bin Laden vows in Web audiotape he will 'expand jihad in Palestine'


Al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden made an unusally sharp threat of attacks against Israel in a new audiotape posted on the Web on Saturday.

"I would like to assure our people in Palestine that we will expand our jihad there," he said. "We intend to liberate Palestine, the whole of Palestine from the (Jordan) river to the sea," he continued, threatening "blood for blood, destruction for destruction."

Bin Laden and other Al-Qaida leaders frequently vow to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine in their messages. But the latest comments were a more direct language than bin Laden usually uses. Israel has warned of growing Al-Qaida activity in Palestinian territory, but the terror network is not believed to have taken a strong direct role there so far.

"We will not recognize even one inch for Jews in the land of Palestine as other Muslim leaders have," bin Laden said.

Most of the 56-minute tape dealt with Iraq, in the latest attempt by Al-Qaida to keep its supporters and other insurgents in Iraq unified behind it at a time when the U.S. military claims to have Al-Qaida's Iraq branch on the run.

In the tape, Bin Laden warned Iraq's Sunni Arabs against joining tribal councils fighting Al-Qaida or participating in any unity government.

A number of Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq's western Anbar province have formed a coalition fighting Al-Qaida-linked insurgents that U.S. officials credit for deeply reducing violence in the province. The U.S. military has been working to form similar Awakening Councils in other areas of Iraq.

In the audiotape, bin Laden denounced Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha, the former leader of the Anbar Awakening Council, who was killed in a September bombing claimed by Al-Qaida.

"The most evil of the traitors are those who trade away their religion for the sake of their mortal life," bin Laden said.

Bin Laden said U.S. and Iraqi officials are seeking to set up a national unity government joining the country's Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.

"Our duty is to foil these dangerous schemes, which try to prevent the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq, which would be a wall of resistance against American schemes to divide Iraq," he said.

The authenticity of the tape could not be independently confirmed. But the voice resembled that of bin Laden. The tape was posted on an Islamic militant Web site where Al-Qaida's media arm, Al-Sahab, issues the group's messages.

The tape was the fifth message released by bin Laden this year, a flurry of activity after he went more than a year without issuing any tapes. The messages began with a September 8 video that showed bin Laden for the first time in nearly three years. The other messages this year have been audiotapes.

In an October tape, bin Laden sought to patch up splits between Iraqi insurgent factions, urging them to unite with the Islamic State of Iraq - the insurgent coalition led by Al-Qaida. He took a conciliatory stance, chiding even al-Qaida's followers for being too extremist in their positions toward other insurgents.

Bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahri took a sharper tone in a December 16 video, branding as traitors those who work with the anti-Qaida tribal councils and calling for Sunnis to purge anyone cooperating with the Americans.

3) Pinpointed IAF attacks on Gaza more precise, hurt less civilians
By Amos Harel


Among those who attended last week's pilots' graduation at the Israel Air Force base in Hatzerim was Shin Bet security service chief Yuval Diskin. Why would a busy man like Diskin take the trouble of going to a military ceremony at a distant base in the Negev? The answer has to do with the tight cooperation between the Shin Bet and the Israel Defense Forces, particularly the air force, as reflected in fighting in the territories.

The Shin Bet and the IAF (in some cases the IDF Southern Command is also involved) are responsible for the most lethal part of combating terror organizations in the Gaza Strip: the assassinations from the air, for which Israel coined the euphemism "pinpointed thwarting." This past month alone, at least 40 armed terrorists were killed in IDF air attacks.

Lately, the thwartings have indeed become more worthy of the title "pinpointed." In all the attacks of recent weeks, only gunmen were hurt, as confirmed by Palestinians. The rate of civilians hurt in these attacks in 2007 was 2-3 percent. The IDF has come a long way since the dark days of 2002-2003, when half the casualties in air assaults on the Gaza Strip were innocent bystanders.

The attacks fall into three main categories: targeting specific known terrorists; targeting Qassam rocket-launching cells en-route or in action; and punitive bombardments of Hamas outposts, in response to rocket or mortar fire into Israel. Since Israel began air assaults on the Gaza Strip, in late 2000, the first two types of attacks killed more than 100 Palestinian civilians.

In their quest to hit terrorists, who operate in the midst of civilian populations, the IAF attacked even when the terrorists were in densely populated areas. There were always safety rules, but these were "bent" at times in view of the target's importance. The result was mass killing of civilians.

The best-known case involved the liquidation of a senior Hamas man, Salah Shehadeh. Besides Shehadeh and one of his aides, the one-ton bomb the IAF dropped on the Gaza house he was staying in also killed his wife, daughter and 13 civilians. That affair led to the infamous statement by then-IAF chief (and later IDF chief of staff) Dan Halutz about "a ding to the plane," in reference to the impact of civilian casualties.

The army's public responses in the Shehadeh affair and other incidents combined obtuseness with self-righteousness. Senior officers claimed there is simply no other way. The attacks are necessary, they said, and it's impossible to reduce the number of "noncombatants" who wind up getting hurt.

Turns out it is possible. Reducing the number of civilian casualties in the attacks on Gaza was one of the first tasks Halutz's heir as IAF chief, Eliezer Shkedi, marked out for himself. The data improved commensurately. From a 1:1 ratio between killed terrorists and civilians in 2003 to a 1:28 ratio in late 2005. Several IAF mishaps in 2006 lowered the ratio to 1:10, but the current ratio is at its lowest ever  more than 1:30.

The IAF warns, however, against expecting zero collateral damage. All it would take is for a missile to veer off-course by a few meters because of a technical malfunction and civilians would be killed. And another thing: When tensions escalate, such as under massive Qassam fire from the Gaza Strip, the IDF is more active and also takes more risks, leading to more civilian casualties among the Palestinians.

4) 2007: A Global Assessment of the Confrontation
By Walid Phares

The conflict we call the War on Terror still continues at the end of 2007 and all indications are that its battlefields are expected to spread further, and escalate, in the upcoming year.

The following is a global assessment of the confrontation that has taken place since 2001, though the systematic war waged by the Jihadi forces against democracies and the free world began at least a decade before 9/11. This evaluation isn't comprehensive or definitive, but a collection of observations related to major benchmarks, directions and projections.

Global cohesion lacking

The main powers and allies involved in the War on Terror still lack global cohesion. While the US integrates its efforts in the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with its efforts globally to defeat al Qaeda and contain nuclear proliferation of rogue regimes like Iran, other powers and blocs of countries have different outlooks and plans. While Britain and other U.S partners in Europe espouse common views on the global scale, France, Germany, Spain and Italy agree on the Afghan theater but still are uninvolved in the Iraqi theater. All Atlantic partners, however, pursue al Qaeda and consider it -- along with other Salafi networks -- as the principal threat. Also, most Western partners perceive the Iranian threat as serious, although differ in the ways in which to respond.

Non-Western powers fighting Jihadist forces do not necessarily unite in the international arena against a common foe. India is targeted by Islamists but doesn't associate with the US-led efforts in the Middle East. Russia is also at war with Jihadi terror, yet it distances itself from the Afghan theater, opposes the US in Iraq, and worse, backs the two terror-spreading regimes in Tehran and Damascus.

In the region, Western-inclined governments claim they fight "terrorism" but only the terrorists who threaten their own regimes, not the worldwide Jihadi threat. The current Turkish government fights the terrorist-coined PKK, but isn't concerned with the growth of Wahhabism and Khomeinism in the region. Saudi Arabia dismantles al Qaeda cells inside the Kingdom but still spreads fundamentalism worldwide. Qatar hosts the largest US base in the region, and at the same time funds the most notorious indoctrination programs on al Jazeera. In short, there are several "wars" on terror worldwide. Surely America is leading the widest campaign, but efforts around the globe are still dispersed, uncoordinated, and in many cases, contradictive.

Afghanistan

Many critics asserted in 2007 that the Taliban were returning and that NATO wasn't providing full stability yet. In my assessment, this is a long war: the neo-Taliban weren't able to achieve full enclave control anywhere in the country. The government of Mr. Karzai should take advantage of international backing to achieve a breakthrough in the counter-ideology campaign, because the US-led mission will be successful as long as it provides space and time for Kabul to win the war of ideas. Efforts in 2008 must focus on coordination with Pakistan against the Jihadists, and on civil society political gains.

Pakistan

Finally, General Musharaf's government widened its military offensives during 2007 in the neo-Taliban zones, prompting terror counter strikes in various cities and a major Jihadi uprising in Islamabad. The escalation opened a window among political opposition to make gains against Musharaf. By the year's end, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif came back to the country and were leading the opposition in the next elections. The assassination of Bhutto was a setback to the political process. Musharraf and the secular forces need to coalesce around a platform of national security and democracy and move forward with elections and anti-Terror campaign in 2008. But for international security, the priority is to preserve Pakistan's nuclear assets and keep the Jihadists at bay. Will secular opposition and the President understand this higher national priority in 2008?

Somalia

An important, but still temporary, victory was scored in Somalia against the Islamist Mahakem, the Taliban of the Horn of Africa, and it took Western support to the Somali Government and an Ethiopian intervention to accomplish it. Denying a state sanctuary to al Qaeda in Africa is a plus, but the future will depend on Bin Laden's advances or defeats across the African continent in 2008.

Sudan

The main international concern in Africa is undoubtedly toward Darfur. The Sudanese regime was able in 2007 to stall Western intervention for one whole year, allowing the Janjaweed to strengthen and perform additional atrocities. Playing the Arab League and the African Union roles to delay a UN action, Khartoum is battling African resistance movements on two fronts: Darfur, but also the south. The regime, similar to other Jihadi powers in the region, is gaining time to crumble its previous commitments and unleash counter campaigns. The international campaign in Darfur must begin in 2008, otherwise the Jihadi counter offensive in Africa will strike deep in Chad and across the Saharan countries by early 2009.

North Africa

Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian counter terrorism efforts increased in 2007 but so did Terror attacks by al Qaeda in the Maghreb. The North African battlefield is now wide open after the combat Salafists have joined Bin Laden officially. U.S and European support need to target the Sahara region as a whole from Mauritania to Chad in 2008 before it slips to the Jihadi forces. If al Qaeda entrenches itself in the area, West Africa will be threatened by 2009.

Iraq

The surge by US forces and allies has worked and al Qaeda plans have been impacted and delayed in 2007. The goals of the combined enemies of Iraqi democracy (al Qaeda and the Syrian and Iranian regimes) were to crumble the Coalition's role and to interdict the rise of a Government in the country. US military action eliminated al Qaeda's attempts to create enclaves. The rise of Sunni Tribes against the Terror groups in the center is a major development in the Iraq Theater. Furthermore, the rise of Shia tribes in the south against Iranian influence and in solidarity with the central Sunni tribes is the beginning of a strategic shift in the country. However the persistence of Damascus and Tehran in supporting Terror forces can eventually reverse these advances. Hence, during 2008, it is important for the US-led Coalition to counter the moves by the Iranian and Syrian regimes in Iraq and set up a national Iraqi capacity to deter the Pasdaran activities.

Iran

On the negative side, confusing messages issued by US Congressional leaders regarding a so-called "dialogue" with the Iranian regime during 2007 weakened the US containment strategy and harmed efforts by the Iranian opposition. Furthermore the American NIE findings during the Fall of this year gave Tehran's Mullahs additional room to maneuver. On the positive side, the sanctions issued by the US president against the Pasdaran and the Quds force reverberated throughout the country, encouraging an escalation by the opposition inside the country. President Sarkozy's strong attitude reinforced the Western coalition against nuclear weapons sought by the Khomeinists. However if by end of 2008, no further containment is achieved, by 2009, the (Iranian-Syrian) "axis" will be achieving a regional offensive. It is advisable that significant efforts to support Iran's civil society uprising during 2008.

Syria

During 2007 the Syrian regime continued to back Terror activities in Iraq, Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories without significant responses from the international community. In Lebanon, the Assad regime was successful in weakening the Government and the Cedars revolution to a tipping point. In Gaza, it backed Hamas coup along with Iran. And it was able to dodge the Hariri international tribunal for one more year. Furthermore Damascus continued to strengthen its missile capabilities and programs of weapons of mass destruction. As for Iran, if no serious containment strategy is applied to the Assad regime as of 2008, by the following year a domino effect would be taking place in the region against the rise of democracies with Syria playing a significant role. During the present year both US Congress political messaging towards "dialogue" and the Russian backing encouraged Assad to pursue his policies and created harsher conditions for the Syrian opposition.

Lebanon

The year 2007 witnessed a series of tragedies with terror assassinations directed against legislators from the majority in Parliament and a senior general in the Lebanese Army. Hezbollah and its allies were successful in intimidating the Government and the Cedars Revolution with violence and threats. The United States public position stayed the course in support to the democracy movement while French initiatives further confused the Lebanese. In 2008 the fate of Lebanon will be centered on the election of a new President. The US, the European Union and their allies in the region have about 9 months to back free Lebanon, otherwise the following year could witness the fall of the country back into the hands of the "axis."

Turkey

The inevitable dragging of the Turkish Army in incursions against the PKK in northern Iraq during 2007 indirectly serves the interests of the Syro-Iranian "axis." It also deflects the attention from the ideological change performed by the Islamist Government in Ankara.

Saudi Arabia

During 2007, the Saudi Kingdom continued its efforts against the al Qaeda cells inside the country. It developed additional tactics to wage theological pressures on the organization. But at the same time, Saudi funds were still made available to fundamentalists around the world.

Russia
Although Russia continues to be a main target to Wahhabi and Jihadist terror and incitement, ironically, the Putin government during 2007 staged three moves to the advantage of terror regimes: opposing the US missile defense system in Europe, meant to protect Europe from the Khomeinist threat; shielding Tehran from Wsetern ressures; and protecting the Assad regime. In 2008, the current direction taken by the Kremlin should be addressed seriously by the US and Europe through a historic and open dialogue on the future of Terrorism. Russia's current policies, if not corrected, can backfire against its own national security in view of the Jihadist rising activities in Chechnya and the Caucasus as well as in central Asia.

India

India continued to be targeted by the Jihadists in 2007. As a nuclear power, and the largest democracy in the world, this country should be further included in the international coalition against Terror and granted a more important role in south Asia in 2008.

China

During 2007, Chinese technology and weapons continued to flow to Terrorism-supporting regimes including Sudan, Iran and Syria. As for Russia, China's own security within its own borders can be affected by a growing Jihadi network in its north Western provinces.

France

The election of Nicholas Sarkozy in 2007 is a positive development as the new President intends to increase French participation in the War against Terrorism. Continuous incitements by Jihadists networks against France also escalated projecting forthcoming confrontations in France.

Europe and the West

Developments and arrests made in Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium in 2007 all indicate that Jihadi warfare in Western Europe is to be expected in 2008 and beyond. Similar trends were detected in Australia and Canada during the same year

The United States

During 2007 several arrests and dismantling of cells within the United States demonstrated the spread of the Jihadi networks at various levels and in different areas. A Projection of these developments and of the type of infiltrations already in place in this country shows that the map of the Jihadi web is much wider and deeper than anticipated, even by Government agencies and estimates. The diverse nature of the Jihadi activities in America lead me to believe that the next waves will be more sophisticated and better inserted in the institutions and society. The 2007 arrests and reports show that the Jihadists had interest in penetrating the US defense system.

However another type of threat has also appeared: the Jihadi ideological penetration of various spheres of education and decision-making, including at the strategic level. Both Wahabi and Khomeinist funding and influence have been spotted in 2007. The US Congress and the Administration should be spending time and efforts during 2008 to develop a national consensus on the definition of the threat doctrine, Jihadism. Short of achieving a minimal understanding of the Terror ideology, 2009 and beyond will witness a faster mutation of the Jihadi threat inside the country.

Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a Visiting Scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of Future Jihad and TheWar of Ideas.

5) Israeli goal for 2008 - to isolate Syria from radical axis
By HERB KEINON

Formulating a strategy for separating Syria from the "radical axis" is one of the Foreign Ministry's highest priorities for 2008, according to a list complied by Foreign Ministry director-general Aharon Abramovitch and circulated to the ministry's staff last week.


The top goal, according to this list, was "promoting diplomatic processes in the Middle East with the goal of achieving comprehensive peace in the region and protecting Israel's security."

Under this heading were listed a number of secondary objectives, including "formulating a policy for separating Syria from the radical axis."

Another objective listed in this category was increasing international support for isolating extremists in the Gaza Strip and the region, and increasing cooperation with the moderate Palestinian leadership.

The second objective listed in the document was providing a "diplomatic response to strategic threats," with the first objective being "intensive diplomatic efforts to thwart Iranian efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities."

This category also included as one of its aims "leading the international campaign to prevent the participation of terrorist elements in democratic processes."

The Foreign Ministry's other aims, in descending order, were listed as: upgrading Israel's standing in the international arena; widening Israel's economic and trade ties abroad; improving Israel's image in the world and struggling against the deligitimization of Israel; strengthening cooperation with the Diaspora and fighting anti-Semitism; integration in international efforts to deal with global challenges; and providing quality service and support to Israeli citizens both in Israel and abroad both during normal times and at times of crisis.

6) Analysis: A Fatah member by any other name...
By KHALED ABU TOAMEH


Some of the gunmen who participated in Friday's shooting attack near Hebron belong to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah faction, Fatah activists in the West Bank confirmed over the weekend.

They said the attack was carried out jointly by Fatah and Islamic Jihad members.

The involvement of Fatah members in the attack is seen as a serious embarrassment for Abbas and the PA, whose representatives were quick to denounce the perpetrators, pledging to crack down on all armed groups in the West Bank.

The attack shows that several armed Fatah groups continue to operate in the West Bank despite statements by top PA officials to the effect that most of these groups had been dismantled.

Although many members of Fatah's armed wing, the Aksa Martyrs Brigades, have in recent months handed over their weapons to the PA security forces in return for jobs and salaries, dozens of Fatah gunmen are still refusing to follow suit.

Hoping to get better jobs and salaries, these gunmen have set up small militias in various parts of the West Bank.

Others have refused to surrender their weapons for ideological reasons, preferring to join forces with Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

One of these Fatah militias is called Fursan al-Layil (Horsemen of the Night), which is active in the old city of Nablus. Other Fatah gunmen are operating under the auspices of other militias called the Yasser Arafat Groups and the Martyr Ayman Judeh Groups, which took credit for Friday's attack.

On Saturday, the IDF arrested a number of Fatah activists belonging to the Yasser Arafat Groups in Hebron on suspicion of involvement in the killing of the two IDF soldiers on Friday.

Among those arrested was the leader of the group in Hebron, Ahmed Abu Sittah, also known as Abu Suleiman.

One of the gunmen killed in the attack, Basel al-Natsheh, was also known in Hebron as a Fatah activist, although his father, Nabil, is a Hamas member who is serving time in an Israeli prison.

Six other members of the al-Natsheh clan, brothers Naim, Firas and Hazem and brothers Nu'man, Abdullah and Shadi, were also arrested by the IDF. They, too, are said to be members of the Yasser Arafat Groups in Hebron.

Fatah activists said the attack may be linked to the faction's preparations to celebrate its 43rd anniversary this week. The attackers, they explained, were apparently hoping to send a message to the Palestinian public that, contrary to claims by Hamas, Fatah has not abandoned the path of armed struggle.

But while such attacks help Fatah score points on the Palestinian street, they also embarrass the PA leadership in Ramallah, especially in front of the international community, which has just pledged to channel to more than $9 billion to the Palestinians over the next three years.

That's why PA officials were quick to condemn the attack, vowing to take measures against the perpetrators. PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayad said during a tour of Nablus that his government would fulfill its security commitments toward Israel by pursuing those responsible. "The military operation took place on Palestinian soil and the PA will carry out all its duties in this regard," he said.

PA Information Minister Riad al-Malki strongly condemned the attack as an attempt to disrupt peace talks between the Palestinians and Israel.

However, both Fayad and Malki are well aware of the fact that the PA's plan to dismantle all the Fatah-affiliated militias in the West Bank is still far from achieving its goal.

Shortly after PA Interior Minister Abdel Razzak al-Yahya announced Saturday that the Aksa Martyrs Brigades had ceased to exist, the group responded by distributing thousands of leaflets throughout the West Bank scoffing at the claim and vowing to continue the armed struggle against Israel.

7) Arming, Military Training, and the Weapons Trade in Lebanon
By: H. Varulkar*

The current political crisis in Lebanon, which began following the August 2006 Israel-Hizbullah war, is now coming to a head. Two of the country's biggest camps - the March 14 Forces, which constitute the majority in the Lebanese parliament, and the Lebanese opposition headed by Hizbullah - have failed to reach agreement over who will be the country's next president and over the makeup of the next government. These two issues will affect the direction the country will take, whether towards the axis of Syria-Iran-Hizbullah, or towards the moderate Arab camp. If no president is chosen by December 31, 2007, the Lebanese parliament will adjourn for three months, leaving the presidential office vacant for a significant period of time - thus increasing the chances of armed violence in the country.

Along with the exacerbation of the political conflict, there is also increasing concern that the situation will deteriorate further, to the point of violence between the two sides, or even civil war. These fears are becoming more and more real, especially in light of the numerous media reports over the past few months that all political forces in Lebanon are arming themselves. These reports suggest that these political forces - and not only Hizbullah - are actively purchasing weapons and distributing them to their activists, who are being trained in military camps set up for that purpose. It seems that this arms race is the result of the desire of all sides to prepare for an armed confrontation that will be inevitable if no agreement can be reached.

Many Lebanese columnists have warned of the possibly severe consequences of this arming, which may even evolve into a second civil war. This concern is shared by the March 14 Forces and the opposition, both of which realize that the distribution of weapons is in itself enough to precipitate yet another Lebanese civil war. (It should be noted that the warnings of civil war are coming mostly from the March 14 Forces.)

Following are excerpts from articles, columns, and reports in the Lebanese and Arab press:
The Growth of the Arms Trade in Lebanon

A special investigation by the London daily Al-Hayat pointed to the arming of the Lebanese civilians. Following are excerpts from the report:

"Seventeen years after the end of the Lebanese civil war, there are again rumors about the 'ghost of armament and horror running through the veins of those who have not yet armed themselves'… Two years of security tensions and political recruitment… have revived the trade in personal weapons, which had been dormant for the past 15 years. No one concerned with the political issues in Lebanon denies the proliferation of personal weapons in the country. Nor do the parties deny that their activists or members are procuring personal weapons out of fear that the other [side] might strike… It is conceded by the representatives of all parties - the groups in power as well as the opposition - that no central decision has been reached by the [party] leaders with regard to the arming of party members. All attribute the trend of buying weapons - which is acknowledged by both the traders and the buyers - to [party members'] fear of the other group…" [1]
Buying Weapons in Lebanon - Not Much Harder than Buying Clothing

A similar investigation by www.islamonline.net showed the same phenomenon: "'Having a weapon at home makes me feel safe and enables me to protect my family and my possessions.' These words, spoken by a Lebanese citizen, explain why the Lebanese are again arming themselves, following the exacerbation of the political crisis between the opposition and the government... The citizen further said, 'The alacrity with which Lebanese citizens are buying weapons stems from fear of a recurrence of the conflict, or of the outbreak of civil war.' He claimed that 'the trade in weapons is flourishing even though prices have tripled'...

Columnist for the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar Hassan 'Aliq wrote, '[1]n Lebanon [today], buying a weapon is not much harder than buying clothing.' He added that 'the price of weapons has significantly risen as a result of the increased demand.' 'Aliq added that 'the make [of weapon] most in demand was the AK-47, followed by the M-16, followed by hand guns. The price of an AK-47 ranges from $300 to $700, while the price of an M-16 starts at $850 and reaches $1000.' 'Aliq further emphasized that 'the phenomenon of arming is not [limited] to a specific ethnic group or district, and the price of weapons is roughly the same in all regions'"... [2]
Lebanese Youth Fear Civil War and Are Leaving the Country

An investigative report by the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is affiliated with Hizbullah and Syria, described how the fear of an outbreak of armed violence impacts the day-to-day lives of the Lebanese. The report suggested that many Lebanese are reconsidering their priorities and changing their daily routine, fearing the start of hostilities between the two camps. The report also pointed to the prevalence of emigration: "Among young people, too, the atmosphere of worry prevails. While there are some who are excited about the [possible] war, since they have never experienced it in all its ugliness, others emphasize that the [constant] tension under which they have lived during the past two years has led them to a decision to finalize the arrangements necessary to leave Lebanon even before the [upcoming presidential] election..." [3]

The concern about the use of weapons was also reflected in the November 20, 2007 order by Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Al-Murr suspending the issuing of all weapons licenses countrywide until further notice, except to the bodyguards of ministers, MPs, and current and former party leaders. [4]
The Government Will Not Be Complacent in Dealing with the Phenomenon

In light of the numerous reports of the arming of all groups in Lebanon, on September 24, 2007 the Lebanese government held a special meeting to discuss the issue. Present at the meeting were Lebanese military intelligence chief Brig.-Gen. George Khouri, interior security forces information unit head Lt.-Col. Muqaddam Wissam Al-Hassan, and other officers. The official announcement following the meeting read: "Political disagreement among the various political forces in the country is a natural development. However, [encouraging people] to use weapons or force - whether by incitement from the pulpits and the [television] screens, or by sowing hatred in people's hearts and spreading venom and enmity, or by frightening people by telling them that there is no option other than street bombings... - all this is unacceptable. The state and its institutions will deal with such incidents seriously, using every available legal means and avenue to protect Lebanese [citizens]..." [5]
Lebanon's Political Parties Accuse Each Other Of Arming Themselves

Each side in Lebanon is accusing the other of distributing weapons to its activists and of providing them with military training.

March 14 Forces: Hizbullah Is Recruiting and Training Young People

The March 14 Forces claim that Hizbullah is training activists from other Lebanese opposition parties and forces affiliated with Syria, and is even giving them weapons in preparation for the impending conflict. Some elements in the March 14 Forces claim to have information that the opposition is constructing various scenarios in the event that no agreement is reached over the next president - scenarios including a takeover of government offices and [other] facilities, military operations, and disturbances to carried out by the groups simultaneously in several regions.

A special investigation published November 7, 2007 by the Lebanese daily Al-Mustaqbal, which is owned by Sa'd Al-Hariri, son of assassinated former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri and chairman of the Al-Mustaqbal faction, the largest faction in the Lebanese parliament and part of the March 14 Forces, stated, "As early as a year and a half ago, Hizbullah started training activists from former MP and Workers' Union head Zaher Al-Khatib, from the Syrian Social Nationalist party, from the remnants of Syrian intelligence, and from the National Salvation Front, headed by Fathi Yegen - and all this under the umbrella name The Resistance Brigades. The investigation suggested that these activists are bused from their villages to southern Dhahiya, and from there to the Al-Haramil region in the Beqa' Valley, where they receive military training. These activists are paid a monthly salary of $400 to $600, and are given a weapon." The investigation quoted knowledgeable sources as saying that these activists, "together with Hizbullah, toured the Al-Kharub region in order to work out a plan to target the centers and homes of activists from the Socialist Progressive Party [which is headed by Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt], from the Al-Mustaqbal movement, and from Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya."

Al-Mustaqbal bloc MP Muhammad Al-Hajjar accused Hizbullah of taking advantage of the difficult economic situation of Lebanon's youth to recruit them to its armed groups: "There is a detailed plan to take advantage of the difficult economic situation to exploit the unemployed... They will entice them with money, offering a monthly allowance of $400 to $600..." Al-Hajar said that these young people were trained to use light and medium weapons, machine guns, AK-47s, and RPGs. Al-Hajar further claimed that Hizbullah had shifted its target from the Israeli enemy to the enemy within Lebanon. He said: "These groups, formed by [Hizbullah], are civil war militias, trained to generate a charged atmosphere, tension, instability, and internecine wars in all regions of Lebanon." [6]

Lebanese Forces executive body head Samir Geagea likewise warned that "Hizbullah might use armed forces to sabotage the presidential election" if it, that is, Hizbullah, fails to bring in a president who will ensure its interests, like Emil Lahoud did. He claimed that Hizbullah was training and arming activists from the Free National Stream (headed by Michel 'Aoun) or from the Druze opposition, so that they would sabotage the election when the time came. He added that Hizbullah was maintaining training camps in the Beqa' region for training these activists. [7]

In contrast to the March 14 Forces, which vehemently deny all accusations of distributing weapons and training activists, the opposition does not deny arming its activists and even endorses the accusations. The Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is affiliated with the opposition, also reported on the formation of resistance brigades, quoting a certain "field commander" saying that Wiam Wahhab and Zaher Al-Khatib were distributing Chinese-made state-of-the-art weapons to their activists, and that Al-Khatib had recruited approximately 700 activists. In an interview with the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Gen. Michel 'Aoun confirmed that members of his party were buying weapons, and stated that this was being done for self-defense, and that they had received licenses for personal weapons only. He denied that his party was providing military training to its activists. [8]

Lebanese Opposition: March 14 Forces are Distributing Weapons to Their Activists

On the other hand, the Lebanese opposition asserted that the Al-Mustaqbal movement was enlisting hundreds of young Lebanese men, mostly from the north of the country, and training them and equipping them with weapons on the pretext that they were security guards. The In an article titled "Armed Youth of Al-Mustaqbal or Guards of Abandoned Buildings?" the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, which is affiliated with the Lebanese opposition, reported that hundreds of armed young men from the Al-Mustaqbal movement were deployed throughout the streets of Beirut on the pretext that they were guards from a security company called Pro-Secure. [9]

Al-Mustaqbal supporter Col. ('Aqid) Muhammad Al-'Ajouz, director of another security company, called Secure Plus, told www.islamonline.net that his company did not serve any party or military function, and stressed that it was a government-licensed private security company. He claimed that the accusations were part of "the war of rumors being spread by the opposition against the Al-Mustaqbal movement." [10]

In another report, Al-Akhbar alleged that the Socialist Progressive Party, which is headed by Walid Jumblatt, was distributing weapons to residents of the coastal region and the Al-Tariq Al-Jadida district in Beirut in an effort to attract supporters. The report further stated that Jumblatt's party was also giving out anti-tank RPGs that had been stored in warehouses since the civil war. In addition, it was claimed that Jumblatt had given his men a green light to fire at opposition activists if violent conflict broke out. [11]

Both March 14 Forces and Opposition Columnists Warn of Civil War

The arming of all the elements in the country is arousing great concern among Lebanon's citizens, as is evident from numerous columns on the subject, mainly by columnists affiliated with the March 14 Forces. They warn about the possibly grave ramifications of this widespread arming, which could include another civil war.

Lebanon Has Not Yet Recovered From the Last Civil War

In a column in the Lebanese daily Al-Nahar, Nailah Tweini warned about the possibly grave ramifications of the current upsurge in arming: "...We call on the Lebanese youth themselves, who may not have experienced destruction first hand - as did the preceding generation, which became entangled in a 15-year war of annihilation. Lebanon [has not yet recovered from] the consequences [of that war], and is still paying the price. The fact that over a million Lebanese, mostly young people, have left the country [since the end of the war] is in itself enough to show every young Lebanese citizen the danger of being swept up in the current trend of arming, [military] training, and [following] in the footsteps of the militia. [12]

"No One Will Accept Hizbullah's Use of Force, Coercion, and Oppression"

In an op-ed in the Lebanese daily Al-Mustaqbal, Nusair Al-As'ad called to end Hizbullah's rule of force and oppression: "...We have no option but to put an end to the Hizbullah state and to the slogans [that Hizbullah is spreading in order to take control of] the domestic Lebanese arena... It is one thing for Hizbullah to debate the legitimacy of its weapons against Israel, but it is quite a different matter for it to lay the groundwork for an alternate state [within Lebanon] - and still another matter for it to make life in Lebanon militia-like in order to bring the country down. All this has nothing to do with 'resistance' against Israel or anything that that requires... No one will accept Hizbullah's use of force, coercion and oppression... We must be resolute..." [13]

Hizbullah's Weapons are Aimed Within Lebanon

Dalia 'Obeid, an activist in the Democratic Left movement, which is part of the March 14 Forces, wrote: "...It's no big secret that Hizbullah's weapons have lost their title of 'weapons of resistance'... There are no longer any external manifestations of the resistance against the Israeli occupation (defeated in 2000) - they have been replaced by the manifestations of resistance against Lebanon's state, independence, and constitution. The roles of these weapons inside Lebanon have multiplied... It [i.e. Hizbullah's weapons] is aimed at those who hold opinions [differing from those of Hizbullah's] in regions of Hizbullah control and hegemony - and [these weapons are] the jailer and executioner of the Lebanese security forces. These weapons will cut off any hand reached out [to disarm] Hizbullah's regional and military arsenal [and will serve as] defender of the honor of the Syrian regime. [Hizbullah is using these weapons] to bully [and control] the Lebanese people... [14]

This Arms Race Will Lead to Civil War

While it is mostly the March 14 Forces that expresses fear over the arming trend, the Lebanese opposition appears to be disturbed about it as well. In his column in the Lebanese pro-Syrian daily Al-Safir, Suleiman Taqi Al-Din claimed that the arming was bound to lead to civil war and schism: "It is [the illegal weapons] that led to civil war in 1975 - the fear of the weapons, the fear of the hegemony, the fear of regional decisions [taken by Hizbullah alone] which are not accepted by the Lebanese people as a whole. Along with the weapons of the Hizbullah resistance, many weapons are [also] spreading amongst all the Lebanese political forces and groups. An intense arms race is underway - no matter how fervently this is denied by those who [choose] to deny it.

"This arms race will inevitably lead to civil war. No one group can assure the other, or give it guarantees, or say that the arming is just for defense… Accordingly, [if we want] to deal seriously with the national crisis, we have no choice but to deal with the problem of weapons...

"Weapons are currently in the hands of every group [in Lebanon], beyond the reach of government supervision and control. Under these circumstances, these weapons will, in essence, serve to drive a wedge among the Lebanese, and as a tool for anarchy..." [15]

*H. Varulkar is a research fellow at MEMRI.

[1] Al-Hayat (London), April 14, 2007.

[2] www.islamonline.net, March 4, 2007.

[3] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), November 10, 2007.

[4] Lebanese National News Agency, November 20, 2007.

[5] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), September 25, 2007.

[6] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), November 7, 2007; Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), November 3, 2007.

[7] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), September 9, 2007.

[8] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), November 3, 2007 and November 16, 2007; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 21, 2007.

[9] Al-Akhbar (London), November 12, 2007.

[10] www.islamonline.net, March 4, 2007.

[11] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), November 13, 2007; November 16, 2007.

[12] Al-Nahar (Lebanon), September 27, 2007.

[13] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), September 30, 2007.

[14] Al-Nahar (Lebanon), October 23, 2007.

[15] Al-Safir (Lebanon), September 22, 2007

8) Army finds explosive chemicals in EU aid bags

6.5 tons of potassium nitrate hidden in sacks marked as sugar from the European Union for needy Palestinians in Gaza. EU declines comment



Israel said on Saturday it had recently seized a truck carrying chemicals used to make explosives hidden in bags marked as EU aid for the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.


The army said 6.5 tons of potassium nitrate were in bags marked as sugar from the European Union for Palestinians in the coastal enclave.


EU officials in Jerusalem had no immediate comment.


The cargo in a Palestinian truck was traveling in the West Bank and seized several weeks ago at an Israeli checkpoint, the army said.




The EU is the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Israel tightened its military and economic cordon of the Gaza Strip after Islamist Hamas seized the territory in a June war with secular Fatah.


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