Sam Nunn Remains a national treasure!

An interesting article on Sarkozy's background. Will it have an impact on him or will, like so many of his heritage, deny their roots because of social pressures or physical threats, ie. Sulzbergers etc. (See 1 below.)

Sec Paulson is learning he has less clout vis a vis China than with his Goldman partners but he is trying and is being more effective than any of his predecessors in this administration. Finally GW has learned what an important Cabinet position Sec. of The Treasury can be. (See 2 below.)

Is GW posturing as our meeting with Iran draws near and if so will Iran pay any attention knowing and/or believing we are simply blustering? (See 3 below.)

Israel's confrontation with Hamas continues to escalate as Israel captures another Hamas leader. (See 4 below.)

Sam Nunn recently sent me the annual report of the organization he Co-Chairs and of which he is the CEO - NTI. Sam and his board continue to work on behalf of the world to reduce nuclear proliferation and restrain and/or reverse that which has already occurred. No doubt Sam would be opposed to any strike on Iran by the U.S. and his unwillingness to vote in favor The Gulf War probably led him to not seek re-election among other reasons.

Nunn remains a national treasure, continues to be light years ahead in his thinking about nuclear proliferation and his organization is doing some amazing things in this area.

That said, the reality of a nuclear Iran may overtake the intellectual argument against such. (See 5 below.)

I believe what Youseff Ibrahim wrote recently is worth repeating. (See 6 below.)

7) Giora Eiland tells it like it needs to be told.( See 7 below.)

Some statistical food for thought! (See 8 below.)

Dick

1) Who is Nicolas Sarkozy?
> By Raanan Eliaz
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> What to expect from France's new president, scion of one of the oldest Jewish families of Salonika, Greece
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> In an interview Nicolas Sarkozy gave in 2004, he expressed an extraordinary understanding of the plight of the Jewish people for a home:
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> "Should I remind you the visceral attachment of every Jew to Israel, as a second mother homeland? There is nothing outrageous about it. Every Jew carries within him a fear passed down through generations, and he knows that if one day he will not feel safe in his country, there will always be a place that would welcome him. And this is Israel." (From the book " La Rˆ©publique, les religions, l'espˆ©rance", interviews with Thibaud Collin and Philippe Verdin.)
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> Sarkozy's sympathy and understanding is most probably a product of his upbringing; it is well known that Sarkozy's mother was born to the Mallah family, one of the oldest Jewish families of Salonika, Greece. Additionally, many may be surprised to learn that his yet-to-be-revealed family history involves a true and fascinating story of leadership, heroism and survival. It remains to be seen whether his personal history will affect his foreign policy and France's role in the Middle East conflict.
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> In the 15th century, the Mallah family (in Hebrew: messenger or angel) escaped the Spanish Inquisition to Provence, France and moved about one hundred years later to Salonika. In Greece, several family members became prominent Zionist leaders, active in the local and national political, economic, social and cultural life. To this day many Mallahs are still active Zionists around the world.
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> Sarkozy's grandfather, Aron Mallah, nicknamed Benkio, was born in 1890. Beniko's uncle Moshe was a well-known Rabbi and a devoted Zionist who, in 1898 published and edited "El Avenir", the leading paper of the Zionist national movement in Greece at the time. His cousin, Asher, was a Senator in the Greek Senate and in 1912 he helped guarantee the establishment of the Technion ’Äî the elite technological university in Haifa, Israel. In 1919 he was elected as the first President of the Zionist Federation of Greece and he headed the Zionist Council for several years. In the 1930's he helped Jews flee to Israel, to which he himself immigrated in 1934. Another of Beniko's cousins, Peppo Mallah, was a philanthropist for Jewish causes who served in the Greek Parliament, and in 1920 he was offered, but declined, the position of Greece's Minister of Finance. After the establishment of the State of Israel he became the country's first diplomatic envoy to Greece.
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> In 1917 a great fire destroyed parts of Salonika and damaged the family estate. Many Jewish-owned properties, including the Mallah's, were expropriated by the Greek government. Jewish population emigrated from Greece and much of the Mallah family left Salonika to France, America and Israel. Sarkozy's grandfather, Beniko, immigrated to France with his mother. When in France Beniko converted to Catholicism and changed his name to Benedict in order to marry a French Christian girl named Adˆ®le Bouvier.
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> Adˆ®le and Benedict had two daughters, Susanne and Andrˆ©e. Although Benedict integrated fully into French society, he remained close to his Jewish family, origin and culture. Knowing he was still considered Jewish by blood, during World War II he and his family hid in Marcillac la Croisille in the Corrˆ®ze region, western France.
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> During the Holocaust, many of the Mallahs who stayed in Salonika or moved to France were deported to concentration and extermination camps. In total, fifty-seven family members were murdered by the Nazis. Testimonies reveal that several revolted against the Nazis and one, Buena Mallah, was the subject of Nazis medical experiments in the Birkenau concentration camp.
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> In 1950 Benedict's daughter, Andrˆ©e Mallah, married Pal Nagy Bosca y Sarkozy, a descendent of a Hungarian aristocratic family. The couple had three sons ’Äî Guillaume, Nicolas and Franˆßois. The marriage failed and they divorced in 1960, so Andrˆ©e raised her three boys close to their grandfather, Benedict. Nicolas was especially close to Benedict, who was like a father to him. In his biography Sarkozy tells he admired his grandfather, and through hours spent of listening to his stories of the Nazi occupation, the "Maquis" (French resistance), De Gaulle and the D-day, Benedict bequeathed to Nicolas his political convictions.
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> Sarkozy's family lived in Paris until Benedict's death in 1972, at which point they moved to Neuilly-sur-Seine to be closer to the boys' father, Pal (who changed his name to Paul) Sarkozy. Various memoirs accounted Paul as a father who did not spend much time with the kids or help the family monetarily. Nicolas had to sell flowers and ice cream in order to pay for his studies. However, his fascination with politics led him to become the city's youngest mayor and to rise to the top of French and world politics. The rest is history.
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> It may be a far leap to consider that Sarkozy's Jewish ancestry may have any bearing on his policies vis-ˆÝ-vis Israel. However, many expect Sarkozy's presidency to bring a dramatic change not only in France's domestic affairs, but also in the country's foreign policy in the Middle-East. One cannot overestimate the magnitude of the election of the first French President born after World War II, whose politics seem to represent a new dynamic after decades of old-guard Chirac and Mitterrand. There is even a reason to believe that Sarkozy, often mocked as "the American friend" and blamed for 'ultra-liberal' worldviews, will lean towards a more Atlanticist policy. Nevertheless, there are several reasons that any expectations for a drastic change in the country's Middle East policy, or foreign policy in general, should be downplayed.
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> First, one must bear in mind that France's new president will spend the lion's share of his time dealing with domestic issues such as the country's stagnated economy, its social cohesiveness and the rising integration-related crime rate. When he finds time to deal with foreign affairs, Sarkozy will have to devote most of his energy to protecting France's standing in an ever-involved European Union. In his dealings with the US, Sarkozy will most likely prefer to engage on less explosive agenda-items than the Middle-East.
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> Second, France's foreign policy stems from the nation's interests, rooted in reality and influenced by a range of historic, political, strategic and economic considerations. Since Sarkozy's landing at the Elysˆ©e on May 16 will not change those, France's foreign policy ship will not tilt so quickly under a new captain.
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> Third reason why expectations for a drastic change in France's position in the Middle-East may be naˆØve is the significant weight the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs exerts over the country's policies and agenda. There, non-elected bureaucrats tend to retain an image of Israel as a destabilizing element in the Middle-East rather then the first line of defense of democracy. Few civil servants in Quai d'Orsay would consider risking France's interests or increasing chances for "a clash of civilizations" in order to help troubled Israel or Palestine to reach peace.
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> It is a fair to predict that France will stay consistent with its support in establishing a viable Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, existing side by side with a peaceful Israel. How to get there, if at all, will not be set by Sarkozy's flagship but rather he will follow the leadership of the US and the EU. Not much new policy is expected regarding Iran, on which Sarkozy has already voiced willingness to allow development of civilian nuclear capabilities, alongside tighter sanctions on any developments with military potency.
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> One significant policy modification that could actually come through under Sarkozy is on the Syrian and Lebanese fronts. The new French president is not as friendly to Lebanon as was his predecessor, furthermore, as the Minister of the Interior, Sarkozy even advocated closer ties between France and Syria. Especially if the later plays the cards of talking-peace correctly, Sarkozy may increase pressure on Israel to evacuate the Golan Heights in return for a peace deal with Assad.
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> Despite the above, although Sarkozy's family roots will not bring France closer to Israel, the presidents' personal Israeli friends may. As a Minister of Interior, Sarkozy shared much common policy ground with former Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The two started to develop a close friendship not long ago and it is easy to observe similarities not only in their ideology and politics, but also in their public image. If Netanyahu returns to Israel's chief position it will be interesting to see whether their personal dynamic will lead to a fresh start for Israel and France, and a more constructive European role in the region.

2) China, U.S.: The Strategic Economic Dialogue as a Tool for Managing Relations
By Rodger Baker

Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi is in Washington to meet with U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson for the second of the planned biannual Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) sessions between the two countries. The dialogue brings together representatives of numerous ministries on both sides of the Pacific, covering finance, labor, trade, agriculture and the environment, among others. As the talks get under way, business and media attention is focused almost exclusively on two main issues: the Chinese-U.S. trade imbalance and China's undervaluing of the yuan.

The dialogue, however, is designed to integrate a much broader array of issues between Beijing and Washington, moving beyond trade to the larger matter of how the world's only remaining superpower deals with the rapid emergence of China on the international economic and political scene. For Washington, the dialogue is a tool to manage China's international relations as much as China's economic development. And for Beijing, the dialogue represents an attempt to shape relations with the United States in terms of economic cooperation, rather than strategic competition.

The economic framework for discussions seems to appeal to both Washington and Beijing, and the current dialogue, then, serves as a convenient tool for managing relations that sit on a much broader geopolitical framework. Still in its early stages, the SED reflects a changing dynamic in the management of U.S.-Chinese relations. From Beijing's perspective, the SED is a way to focus on the potential positive elements of U.S.-Chinese ties -- business and trade -- and reduce attention on questions of the "China threat" and the emergence of China as a military competitor to the United States.

The SED serves, in Beijing's mind, as one way of using the U.S. administration as a balance to the U.S. Congress. If the administration is looking at the broader strategic issues posed by China's global emergence, then it will be less likely to accede to congressional politicking on the China issue -- or so Beijing hopes. China sees the U.S. Congress as "unsophisticated" on China issues, and Capitol Hill as a place where short-term political interests, based to a large degree on electioneering and campaign contributions, drive periodic spurts of anti-Chinese rhetoric. However, during the past two decades, Beijing itself has grown a little more sophisticated in its understanding of U.S. politics, and has moved past dealing primarily with image management at the presidential and ministerial level to trying to shape U.S. political views from the ground up.

With the rapid rise of the Chinese economy in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis and Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organization, China looked to both protect its growing economic connections and expand its international influence in the post-Cold War environment. With the Soviet Union gone and Europe failing to rise as a counterbalance to the United States, China set its sights on Washington as the biggest challenge to Chinese power -- and yet the best economic path to Chinese growth. Washington was headed for a presidential change, Beijing was dealing with increasing U.S. warnings of the China threat and the Chinese government was looking at its own upcoming leadership transition and the internal battle over best economic policies and security posture. For each of these issues, managing relations with the United States became the critical common factor.

In the late 1990s, Beijing ramped up a program of perception management in Washington, moving from trying to buy influence through campaign contributions to a more subtle approach of accelerating political and economic dialogue with U.S.-based think tanks, research institutes and academic institutions. Chinese scholars, both in the academic fields and in semi-government research institutes, embarked on numerous exchanges, dialogues and forums, sharing insights into policy debates and internal economic inconsistencies in China. At the same time, the state began releasing economic statistics that, through close examination, painted a picture not of a strong and unbreakable China, but of one that faced many of the same economic challenges and potential pitfalls as its Asian neighbors.

Through a carefully managed spread of information, China began shaping the perception of the key U.S. researchers on Chinese issues. Beijing seemed more open, more willing to admit mistakes and more receptive to suggestions for economic, social and even limited political reform. Discussions of the China threat shifted from a military concern to one of economics to one of potential Chinese collapse -- and the attendant ripples that would affect the international (and U.S.) economic systems. This information began trickling up to congressional aides, members of Congress and into the U.S. government bureaucracy and administration.

And Beijing is seeing a payoff, at least on the surface. When the current administration took power, relations with Washington were contentious to say the least. U.S. President George W. Bush came into office with a Cabinet that viewed China as the next strategic threat now that the Soviet Union was relegated to history. China's economic rise, and its military expansion that focused on new missiles and naval technology, was seen as a challenge to U.S. dominance of the seas, and thus to U.S. core national security. Now, the administration is pursuing strategic dialogue and cooperation with China, even if this is just a stopgap measure until Washington can free itself from Iraq.

In 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, Washington and Beijing came to a working arrangement. The United States would essentially leave China alone, and China would not present any direct challenge to the United States as Washington dealt with what it saw as a new strategic threat: al Qaeda and international Islamist militancy. Beijing welcomed the reprieve from the more contentious relations with Washington, which had declined precipitously following the collision that left a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on a military runway in southern China.

At the time, Beijing was neither militarily nor politically prepared to square off against the United States. In fact, China was facing a major generational shift in leadership and needed the external buffer to allow Beijing to focus on internal issues. With the political transition completed, Beijing then shifted focus to economic and social stability -- and again used the minimal external pressure from Washington to give it breathing room while these issues took priority.

Internationally, Beijing used the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the North Korean nuclear crisis to try to raise the profile of international organizations such as the United Nations to counter the unipolar power of the United States. At the same time, it tried to raise China's profile and importance to Washington -- since, after all, the U.S. government could not face off against al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Iraq and North Korea all at the same time.

By 2005, Washington was looking at longer-term involvement in Iraq than it had planned, and then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick made an indirect offer to Beijing for closer potential cooperation -- offering to treat China as a global player if Beijing proved a "responsible stakeholder." The offer appealed to Beijing, and China, cautiously at first but with increasing boldness, launched into a more open dialogue with Washington, making token trades on currency issues and offering its services in "rogue" nations such as North Korea and, more recently, Sudan in order to demonstrate its "responsibility" and keep real pressure from the United states to a minimum.

While the U.S. administration, particularly the Pentagon, was not all that reassured by China's behavioral change (as seen in early 2006 with a series of reports labeling China a strategic threat and culminating in a several-minute-long tirade by a Falun Gong activist at the White House reception for Chinese President Hu Jintao), Washington, with the exception of Congress, has taken a relatively relaxed approach to China. Trade issues dominate the headlines, as does the yuan valuation, but the administration pushes for more cooperative dialogue with Beijing rather than punitive sanctions or tariffs.

On Beijing's side, shortly after the first SED meeting in December 2006, China's Foreign Ministry launched the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at its research institute, the China Institute for International Studies. The center is designed to bring together top Chinese scholars on U.S. issues from across a broad spectrum of China (economic, international relations, security and others) and encourage increased exchanges with counterparts in the United States -- thus managing the perception campaign from a unified center. Earlier this year, China also appointed Yang Jiechi as foreign minister, calling on Yang's years of experience in the Chinese Embassy in Washington, his work with both sides of Congress and his long-standing ties with the Bush family.

The SED, then, provides both Washington and Beijing with a more centralized (and less random) point of contact for managing bilateral relations. But management and fundamental alterations are very different things. China's trade and economic policies will not be set with Washington's concerns as the top priority. Beijing's first concern is the maintenance of Communist Party rule, followed closely by the maintenance of social stability (which allows the party to remain in power). Economics are a tool, one that must balance domestic social pressures with international concerns. Furthermore, while dialogue can provide a channel for managing relations with the United States, China is not abandoning other tools for preserving its increasing economic vulnerabilities as its trade and energy requirements are internationalized.

China's anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) test in January was a clear reminder that China still sees the United States as the top challenge to Chinese economic security. China is a land power, not a maritime power. But China's economics have grown increasingly linked to longer and longer supply lines, particularly with energy imports. As such, Beijing sees a major vulnerability in its supply routes, as a large portion of its energy must pass through waters that, for all intents and purposes, are controlled by the United States. The ASAT test was intended to notify Washington that Beijing has ways to deal with the U.S. strategic dominance of the seas by threatening critical U.S. communications and guidance infrastructure.

China's vulnerabilities as a land power increasingly dependent on sea routes makes Beijing always extremely nervous about the United States, regardless of whether Washington intends to interdict Chinese trade and energy supplies. At the same time, China's expanding trade and political links around the globe are starting to rub up against U.S. strategic interests, particularly where China taps into energy resources Washington wants, or where Beijing's relations in places like Africa and Latin America challenge U.S. access to raw materials. But economic competition notwithstanding, Washington is loath to directly confront China, as attacking a land power in Asia is never wise or easy.

There is a standoff, then, between Washington and Beijing. Washington is heavily occupied with Iraq and Iran, and Beijing is taking advantage of this to expand its political and economic ties as broadly as possible. At the same time, China is obsessed with internal economic and social instability, and Washington can use these concerns to needle Beijing and keep China from taking too much advantage of Washington's limited bandwidth. Both see the SED as a useful place to manage this dance. Neither sees the SED as a real forum for a strategic partnership between China and the United States, or a place for drastic changes in the relationship.

There is something beyond the SED, however, that could start bringing Washington and Beijing closer together: the re-emergence of Moscow.

Relations between Washington and Beijing have been rather manic since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. After Beijing's initial flirtations with Washington, China and the United States soon found themselves facing one another on the battlefields of Korea. China's ally at the time, the Soviet Union, largely sat out the conflict, leaving Beijing to ensure the communist revolution in Asia -- and letting China fight the United States while Moscow avoided the potential World War III feared by U.S. strategists at the time. Rather than using the opportunity presented by the Korean War to launch a simultaneous assault on Europe, Moscow let China fight, undermining the potential for any Sino-U.S. relations and tying China closer into the Soviet sphere of influence.

But by the late 1960s, tensions between Beijing and Moscow had risen to a fevered level, and significant border clashes broke out in 1969. Three years later, the mutually perceived threat from the Soviet Union brought U.S. President Richard Nixon to China to meet with Mao Zedong. The United States and China embarked on a new strategic relationship based on balancing the Soviet threat. This lasted until shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when China began seeking to expand its influence in East Asia and looked as though it were getting much more serious about war with Taiwan. In the late 1990s, China even flirted with the idea of establishing a strategic partnership with Russia to block the unipolar power of the United States, but never quite trusted its northern neighbor (and, for a while, Moscow had little to offer anyway aside from arms sales, which were already taking place). When 2001 rolled around, Beijing found new opportunities to deal directly with Washington.

But Russia has begun reasserting its influence around its periphery, and Cold War rhetoric is flowing from Moscow. On the surface, that would seem ideal for China, except that Beijing has been looking at Central Asia as a critical piece of its energy security puzzle, since Central Asian energy supplies never need to move by sea to China. As Moscow seeks to reclaim influence and control in its near abroad, China sees its potential role in Central Asia diminishing and its energy supplies challenged by the resurgent Russia. Add in Russian talk of reinvigorating the Russian presence in the Pacific, and China sees its energy and economic security once again challenged by its neighbor.

This could provide the impetus for a Beijing move closer to Washington -- to keep the United States focused on Russian threats rather than Chinese concerns. Beijing already has experience working with the United States to counter Russian influence, and keeping the current and former superpowers eyeing each other leaves China a less visible threat, and thus capable of continuing to deal with its own internal issues while facing minimal pressure from outside. As Beijing sees it, if a true multipolar world cannot be established any time soon, the hints of a return to a bipolar world order -- with Russia facing off against the United States -- could keep China out of the crosshairs and constrain U.S. actions. With the SED already in place, China has another pathway through which to shape its own image as cooperative, and perhaps drop a few hints of its concerns about Russia.

3)Nine US military ships enter Persian Gulf Wednesday, assembling off Iran’s coast in largest American naval move since 2003.



They sailed through the Strait of Hormuz by day - according to US Navy officials for training exercises. The vessels carry around 17,000 combat and marine personnel. They include the two aircraft carriers, USS Nimitz and USS Stennis, as well as the USS Bonhomme Richard LHD 6 Group, the world’s biggest amphibious strike force. Iran was not notified of the planned arrival.

These maneuvers take place less than two weeks after Vice President Dick Cheney visited the region and informed Saudi King Abdullah and fellow Gulf rulers that President George W. Bush has determined that if Iran refuses to waive a nuclear weapon capability, the US will attack its nuclear, military and economic infrastructure before he leaves the White House in Jan. 2009.



Our sources also note that the US armada sailed into the Gulf on the day the latest UN Security Council ultimatum expired for Iran to give up uranium enrichment or face a fresh set of sanctions.

Its presence backs up Cheney’s pledge and tells the region and Iran that Washington may not be satisfied with sanctions and the military option is alive. Washington is also stiffening its posture ahead of its first direct talks with Tehran on Monday, May 28, when US and Iraqi ambassadors meet in Baghdad. The message to Iran and its ally Syria is that if the Baghdad talks fail, and they refuse to suspend their backing for Iraq’s insurgents and al Qaeda, the US stands ready with a military option.

4) Hamas threatens new attacks after IDF arrests 33 top Hamas officials


Hamas threatened new attacks Thursday after Israel Defense Forces troops arrested 33 senior officials in the organization - including legislators, mayors and one cabinet minister.

"Our strikes against the enemy will continue, we have freed the hand of all our cells to strike the enemy everywhere in Palestine," Hamas' armed wing said in a statement.

The raid was the latest strike against the Islamic militant group, in the wake of Hamas rocket fire from Gaza on Israeli border towns.

According to Israel Radio, the security cabinet approved the arrests five days ago, and instructed the Shin Bet security service and Attorney General Menachem Mazuz to collect and examine evidence against the officials.

The most prominent Hamas politician to be arrested was Education Minister Nasser Shaer. His wife, Huda, said soldiers knocked on the door of their home in the West Bank city of Nablus and took him away. Troops also seized Shaer's computer, she said.

It was the second time Shaer was arrested in a roundup of Hamas members in the past year.

Soldiers also arrested former cabinet minister Abdel Rahman Zeidan, legislators Hamed Bitawi and Daoud Abu Ser, the mayors of the towns of Nablus, Qalqiliya and Beita - Adli Yaish, Wajih Qawas and Arab Shurafa - as well as the head of the main Islamic charity in Nablus, Fayad al-Arba.

Troops also searched for Ahmed Haj Ali, a Hamas legislator in Nablus, but didn't find him at home, neighbors said.

Speaking to Army Radio, Defense Minister Amir Peretz defended action. "Arrests are better than shooting," he told Israeli Army Radio. "The arrest of these Hamas leaders sends a message to the armed organizations that we demand that this firing [of rockets] stop."

Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' office condemned the arrests, saying they would only serve to heighten tensions in the area, Israel Radio reported.

Palestinian government spokesman Ghazi Hamad said the arrests displayed "a scale of escalation and Israeli arrogance" and called for those arrested to be released.

"Through this ... aggression the Israeli government is once again pushing the region into a cycle of violence and it bears the full responsibility for the consequences resulting from such irresponsible actions," Hamad said.

Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri said the arrests rendered any efforts to restore the cease-fire along the Gaza Strip "worthless."

David Baker, an official in the Prime Minister's Office, added: "Israel is making it crystal clear that it is adamant about stopping the Hamas terror directed against us both in the Gaza Strip via the continuous Qassam rocket attacks and in the West Bank where the terror cells continue to flourish."

The IDF said in a statement: "The Hamas terror organization is currently involved in enhancing the terror infrastructure in the (West Bank) region, based on the model used in the Gaza Strip. The organization exploits governmental institutions to encourage and support terrorist activity."

Last summer, Israel arrested scores of senior Hamas members in retaliation for the capture of an IDF soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas-allied militants, who has not yet been released.


Tuesday, May 21, a senior US officer in Baghdad accused Iran of orchestrating a summer offensive against US troops in Iraq “linking al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents to its Shiite militia allies.” Our sources add that Iran with Syrian support has also embarked on a summer offensive in other parts of the Middle East, including Lebanon and the Gaza Strip

Rear Admiral Kevin Quinn said maneuvers beginning now are part of a long-planned effort to reassure nearby countries of America’s commitment to regional security. He told reporters before crossing: “There is always the threat of any state or non-state actor deciding to close one of the international straits, and the biggest one is the Strait of Hormuz.

5) Report: US sabotaging Iran nukes


Intelligence operatives in the US and its allied nations have sold Iran flawed technological components in an attempt to sabotage the country's nuclear enrichment program, CBS News revealed Wednesday evening.

In January 2007, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency, Vice-President Gholamreza Aghazadeh, said after an explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility (the first Iranian plant to attempt enrichment) that some of the equipment had been "manipulated."

The explosion destroyed 50 of the plant's centrifuges.

Other evidence has indicated that sabotage was the reason for some of the technical problems Iran has encountered in its enrichment enterprise. Sources told CBS intelligence agencies have altered technical data, making it "useless."

"Industrial sabotage is a way to stop the program, without military action, without fingerprints on the operation, and really, it is ideal, if it works," says Mark Fitzpatrick, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation and now Senior Fellow in Non-Proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

According to CBS, the fact that Iran purchases the requisite information and equipment on the black market, rather than legally, places it at risk for industrial sabotage. Some prohibited components, the report said, had been shipped to Iran in diplomatic bags by Iranian agents in Frankfurt.

Analysts say that while Iran has established front companies in various Gulf nations to handle the purchase of nuclear enrichment components, the country still needs some European-made parts - either because of their quality, or because it need parts that are compatible with European-manufactured equipment.

Fitzpatrick said that it was impossible to know if, and to what extent, Iran - described as "highly suspicious" - has discovered any industrial sabotage.

"Any technical problems that Iran experiences in its program, some of which were the result of its own speed-up effort, Iran may attribute to foreign espionage," he said.

6) America's thankless commitment to peace
By Youssef M. Ibrahim

It's been some week in Gaza — the Palestinian Arab civil war has become an all-out action movie.


Hamas fighters lob mortars at the compound where the Palestinian Arab president, Mahmoud Abbas, hides. Egypt sends freshly armed Fatah fighters across its borders to kill other Palestinians. The interior minister of the Palestinian Authority resigns, saying he has no authority. Meanwhile, most of Gaza's 1 million residents are holed up in their homes as men with black ski masks stake out positions on rooftops and derelict streets.


The escalation coincided with the 59th commemoration of what the Palestinian Arabs call "Al Naqba," on Tuesday. The word means "catastrophe" in Arabic, a reference to the creation of Israel in 1948. At the moment, however, the phrase Al Naqba more accurately portrays the current Palestinian conditions.


Yet amazingly, the kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, along with the president of Egypt, felt this was the right moment to warn a visiting Vice President Cheney that unless America helps put out the Palestinian Arab fires, it cannot begin to stabilize Iraq, win the war on terror, or halt Iran's race for a nuclear bomb.


This formulaic Arab request is shorthand for asking America to "force" Israel to give up the West Bank and the Golan Heights and to deliver an independent Palestinian Arab state that could take in millions of Palestinian refugees. For special effect, the Jordanian monarch, King Abdullah, added that time was "running out" for America to get its act together on Arab-Israeli issues.


If this sounds like a broken record mixed with a touch of blackmail and delusion, it is. Never mind that, even as Gaza burns, in the territories all around Abdullah's kingdom, Shiites and Sunnis are butchering each other in Iraq, jihadists are challenging the current governments, and Iran is looming ever larger.


All drama aside, America has undertaken all the peacemaking opportunities available and done so at a huge cost in both treasury and good will. In the 1970s and '80s, America accomplished two Herculean tasks, landing peace treaties between Israel and Jordan, and between Israel and Egypt. The bill came in at more than $140 billion — and counting — and garnered few thank-you notes.


When compared to what it did for Europe after World War II, the breadth of America's commitment to the Middle East is breathtaking. According to a president of the George C. Marshall Foundation, Albert Beveridge III, postwar expenditures "to reduce hunger, homelessness, sickness, unemployment, and political restlessness" for 270 million


Europeans living in 16 nations totaled a modest $13.3 billion — about $88.2 billion in today's dollars. The Marshall Plan aid lasted just four years.


By contrast, America has been actively working on peace in the Middle East for 28 years, during which it has paid Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Arabs more than $150 billion to kiss and make up. America's aid funding in the region is so head and shoulders above that in Africa, the former Soviet republics, and other truly poor countries of the world, it is absurd.


And what has been the result? Since the Israel-Jordan peace treaty was penned on October 26, 1994, American taxpayers have supported Jordan's 6 million people — half of whom are Palestinian Arabs — to the tune of $350 million a year, a total of $4.5 billion to date. Still, Jordanian public opinion is fiercely hostile to America.


Since Egypt and Israel signed on the dotted line on March 26, 1979, Israel has received some $80 billion, and Egypt has collected $60 billion, according to congressional statistics. If American spending on Egypt is far from over, so are the insults heaped on it daily in the Egyptian press.


Even the quarrelsome Palestinian Arabs who routinely burn American flags have received well over $20 billion in food and humanitarian aid from Uncle Sam.


Whether it is money well spent is arguable. What is certain is that America, while Europe and the Arab countries watched, has done more than its share as a Middle East peacemaker. Now, with the problems of Iraq, the rise of Islamist terror, China's growing might, and a rising Russian challenge, America has other fish to fry.


The status quo in the Middle East does not require American baby-sitting. Israel is too strong, and Arab countries are mired by internal challenges. So what America's attitude should be, to use a version of James Baker's joke, is this: When anyone feels the need to sign a peace treaty, they know the number.

7) Don't fear world's wrath: Drastic measures needed in order to curb rocket attacks on Sderot
By Giora Eiland

Prior to any important discussion regarding our handling of the Qassam rocket fire from Gaza, three key assumptions should be made.



Firstly, the Qassam rocket fire cannot be halted by means of an aerial operation only.



Secondly, without changing the situation along the Philadelphi Route Hamas will continue to boost its military force.



Thirdly, the reality in Sderot is unbearable. This assumption is not as obvious as it may sound. Until recently the Israeli government regarded the continuation of the current situation there as the better option. Apparently, this attitude has changed. If the rocket fire cannot be stopped remotely or from the air, how can it be stopped?



There are two ways of achieving this and both options have a common thread: Exercising a political option prior to a military operation and reaching an understanding with the US regarding the question of the "day after," or "how pressure will be lifted after a military operation and in exchange for what ." Such pressure would not only be painful for the Palestinians.



Option A: Capturing areas in the Gaza Strip, particularly the Philadelphi Route - while not sufficing with capturing the Route, which
מודעה

is too narrow to protect, and widening it. The implication of this would be the destruction of hundreds of homes in Rafah and thousands of homeless people. This will create an international outcry and spark the ire of the Egyptians – which is a good thing! Israel would insist that it would withdraw its troops only if and when a satisfactory security arrangement is hammered out. Such a settlement is possible and Israel should reach an agreement on it with the US prior to an operation.



Similarly, action should be taken in several other areas as well.



Option B: Israel announces that as far as it is concerned Gaza is a political entity (separate from the West Bank,) which is ruled pragmatically and formally by Hamas. As this entity is in a state of war with Israel, Israel would have to take three measures:



* Immediately close off border crossings between Israel and Gaza (as Gaza is open to Egypt, supplies to and from Gaza could be transferred through there.)
* Announce that in several months Israel would cease to supply water, electricity and fuel.
* Since Gaza is an enemy state in a state of war with Israel, every governing institution in Gaza and the infrastructure serving the belligerent effort against us, including roads and bridges, should be targeted



Such Israeli activity would threaten the future of the Palestinian state – and this is positive. The international arena will undoubtedly protest even more strongly and will want to reinstate the old status quo. Israel would agree only if conditions are right, conditions that must be hammered out with the US first.



The continuation of tactical assaults on Hamas rocket launchers is not the solution as it allows Hamas to exploit its relative advantage. This doesn't mean that that the entire Gaza Strip must be taken. One of the drastic measures, as outlined here, can be adopted. And yes, there is no choice but to take a political risk, to anger several players and to force them to take action as well.



The world isn't perturbed by what's going on in Sderot and as long as this situation persists, we shall be called upon to "exercise restraint," and the problems will remain ours alone.

8) Regardless of where you stand on the issue of the U.S. involvement in
Iraq , here's a sobering statistic:



There has been a monthly average of 160,000 troops in the Iraq theatre
of operations during the last 22 months, and a total of 2,112 deaths.
That gives a firearm death rate of 60 per 100,000 soldiers.



The firearm death rate in Washington D.C. is 80.6 per 100,000 persons
for the same period.



That means that you are about 25% more likely to be shot and killed in
the U.S. Capital than you are in Iraq .



CONCLUSION:
The U.S. should pull out of Washington