Going in The Wrong Direction- Speed No Help!

Barry Rubin's article reminds me of what Sen. Phil Gramm used to say. "When going in the wrong direction speeding up will still not get you there." (See 1 below.)

Sec. Rice heads for the Middle East again and the squeeze on both the U.S. and Israel will increase. the Saudis are pressing the U.S. to recognize Abbas' Unity Government as a quid pro quo for helping stabilize the situation in Iraq. The Saudis expect the U.S. to pressure Israel to begin negotiations for a final settlement. The Saudis, in return, have committed the Arab world to recognize Israel. The Saudis have stated that Hamas has bent by agreeing to honor past agreements which, the Saudis say, is tantamount to recognition of Israel. The initial demands called for by TRM would thus be finessed.

Olmert finds himself, or will shortly, on the horns of a dilemma because balking leaves the U.S. in a difficult position and agreeing leaves Israel vulnerable to further terrorist attacks and a less defensible position militarily.

As I pointed out several days ago, the complete destruction of Israel would not serve "moderate" Arab interests because Israel has been a convenient whipping boy. However,an Israel incapable of defending itself, against a surreptitious nuclear attack by radical Islamists, would no longer be deemed a threat.

Norway has already made contact with the Unity Government.

Tiny nations, dependent upon larger ones, have little leverage when their larger allies are, themselves, in deep "doo doo" as the current administration finds itself. Even moral commitments have a way of fading.

Perhaps I am too pessimistic but the West has a history of caving in to Arabs and is on the edge of doing so again. Score another one for Hamas and the terrorists.

Even Assad has joined in by casting aspersions on the U.S. by calling it the cog in the wheel to peace in the region. Assad is no fool and knows by blaming us we have no defenders. The fact that he and his thugs go around assassinating Lebanese somehow will escape our Alies.(See 2 below.)

But then, the Unity Government could fall apart because unity is a term foreign to Arabs. (See 3 and 4 below.)

Seems like an overreach to me. (See 5 below.)

Dick




1) The Region: Putting the impossible first
By BARRY RUBIN


Whether or not the Middle East is beyond redemption, it certainly seems to be beyond satire. The attempt to turn radicals into moderates, terrorism into resistance, serial political murderers into negotiating partners, and situations of total anarchy into great opportunities for diplomatic progress never ends.
But here is one of my favorites in this genre, quoted from Newsweek, where it was published without any hint of irony:

"'The Supreme Leader [of Iran, Sayyid Ali Khamenei] was deeply suspicious of the American government,' says a Khameini aide whose position does not allow him to be named. 'But [he] was repulsed by these terrorist acts [of September 11] and was truly sad about the loss of the civilian lives in America. For two weeks, worshipers at Friday prayers even stopped chanting 'Death to America.'"

Two whole weeks! Is that holding out the hand of friendship, or what?

At any rate, this reveals one of the main problems of the Middle East, at least as far as Western involvement is concerned. Far too much of the quality time of leaders, policymakers, and diplomats is spent on the impossible - or at least highly improbable.

HERE ARE the four things which, aside from Iraq, take up the most time on the agenda of Western leaders regarding the Middle East. All of them are doomed to fail, which makes one wonder about this set of priorities and manner of thinking:

Making friends with Iran while trying to persuade it, through relatively mild measures, to stop working on nuclear weapons.

The fact is that Iran is not going to abandon its drive to get atomic bombs and the missiles to deliver them on target, certainly not unless subjected to the toughest possible diplomacy. Everyone should know this by now. Yet the pretense is that watered-down diplomatic wrist-slaps are going to make some difference.

This doesn't mean that someone needs to attack Iran - though the threat of attack, even as a bluff, is a key pressure - but it does mean Teheran's leaders have to conclude that the cost of proceeding is too high and too dangerous. And that is a long way from happening yet.

As for reconciling Iran, the nature of the regime - not just of the president, but of the whole ruling establishment - is just not going to make that possible. On the one hand, there is ideology. Iran's leaders believe what they say and have their own goals of regional hegemony. On the other hand, reinforcing this strategy is what the regime needs to do to survive, which requires having the US, the West and Israel as scapegoats for failures and justifications for repression.

Making friends with Syria to get it to stop using terrorism to take over Lebanon, and terrorism against Iraq and Israel.

As with Iran, however, the regime in Damascus is not just a blank slate or a government asking for the redress of reasonable grievances. Here, too, there is a whole set of other problems: the nature of the dictatorship as well as its ideology, ambitions and requirements for survival.

Consider the tale of the night-vision goggles.
US forces in Iraq discovered that Syria had given the terrorist insurgents there night-vision goggles. Israeli forces in Lebanon found that Syria had given Hizbullah night-vision goggles. European governments are now considering Syrian requests for even more night-vision goggles, supposedly to be used to block arms-smuggling to its own clients - smuggling which the Syrian government itself is doing.

Here is what Dina Ezzat, a reporter from the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram who investigated the issue, concluded about what Israel would get if it gave the Golan Heights, and the West gave Lebanon, to Syria.

Their first alleged reward would be "the stability of the regime" in Damascus. In other words, they would get the pleasure of having President Bashar Assad still in power. Second, Damascus would be willing to curtail "its facilitation of the arming of Hizbullah, while decreasing its assistance and accommodation of Palestinian and Iraqi militant resistance groups." Third, it would be willing to reduce "its intelligence cooperation with Iran."
That's it. Not real peace, just a 20-percent reduction in covert war.

Trying to moderate Hamas. Like Syria and Iran, Hamas does not want to be moderate. Unlike them, it hardly pretends otherwise. It continues to make clear its virulent anti-Semitism and goal of destroying Israel. To their credit, the Europeans are by and large holding the line. But again, a huge amount of time and energy is going into this dead-end effort at moderating Hamas.

Suddenly, at the worst possible moment in history for success, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become the top priority for many governments. Fatah has collapsed; Hamas is extremist and believes time is on its side, and every Israeli concession has inspired escalation by the Palestinians and others.

EVERY LESSON of the last 14 years has pointed at the intractability of the conflict. True, efforts can be justified by saying, "We have to try," or the belief that pretending to do so will make Arabs and Muslims happy. Yet now Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is pinning her reputation on making progress. Why tie your future to an inevitable failure?

I could add two other points: thinking it possible to "solve" the internal situation in Iraq, and expecting that radical Islamists can be reconciled to Western interests.

What do all these things have in common? Not looking at how the interests and ideas of extremists direct them; wishful thinking that concessions and empathy can resolve real conflicts, and so on.

Now ask yourself this question: With so much effort going into guaranteed failures, is it surprising that there are so few successes?

2) Report: Assad says expects little progress in peace talks in next two years


Syrian President Bashar Assad said in an interview published Monday that he does not expect movement on the peace process in the next two years, calling the United States the main obstacle to a Middle East peace.

Assad's remarks dampen hopes that a summit of Arab leaders set for March 28-29 in the Saudi capital can build momentum for reviving the peace process between Israel and Arab nations.

The summit is expected to relaunch a Saudi peace plan adopted by the Arab League in 2002. At the same time, Arab countries are pushing Washington to deal with a new Palestinian Authority unity government that includes the Hamas movement.

In an interview with the Saudi newspaper Al-Jazira, Assad said "the main obstacle, in my opinion, regarding the peace process, is the ... American administration's rejection of the peace process."

"There's an American administration without a vision, and the U.S. administration, unfortunately, is central to all peace processes in the region," he said, according to the paper.

Assad said that international envoys have shuttled between Syria and Israel, carrying each country's point of view regarding peace to the other. But he said nothing concrete has happened on the ground especially since "the current Israeli government is the weakest in Israel's history."

"They [envoys] openly said, quoting [Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert, that the decision is in Washington," said Assad, according to the newspaper.

Assad said he hasn't lost hope that peace would prevail, but he said prospects for that in the next two years do not look rosy.

"The issue of peace in at least the next two years doesn't call for optimism unless there are unexpected changes," said Assad, warning that delay in resolving the conflict would increase tensions and tensions will increase extremism.

U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan have increasingly warned Washington that militancy in the Middle East will grow unless progress is made in the peace process.

Israel suggested earlier this month that it could accept the 2002 Arab peace initiative if some changes were made in it, particularly over its call for the return of Palestinian refugees. That has sparked a debate among Arab governments over whether to amend the peace plan, though change appears unlikely.

The initiative is a set of principles that offers Israel full recognition and peace with all Arabs in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 boundaries and an agreed, just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948.

3) Hamas slams Abbas' decision to appoint Dahlan as security chief


Hamas, in its first public rift with Fatah since forming a Palestinian unity government, accused Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas on Monday of illegally appointing one of the Islamist group's long-time foes as his national security adviser.

"Hamas sees the step by President Mahmoud Abbas to appoint
Mohammed Dahlan, a lawmaker, as his adviser for the national security as a violation of Palestinian law," Hamas said in a statement. "We urge President Abbas to go back to the law and to examine the decision accordingly."

Dahlan was appointed to lead the newly re-established Palestinian National Security Council, which is intended in theory to oversee all security services in the Palestinian territories.

Abbas' decision to create the PNSC and appoint Dahlan as national security adviser are seen as an attempt by the PA chair to tighten his control over the various Palestinian security forces.

Dahlan said Sunday that the move was aimed at achieving a united force that would carry out the strategy set by the council. He hinted that there are no plans to dismantle the Executive Force Hamas created in Gaza. "We will start with the most pressing issues," Dahlan said. "As long as the Executive Force is not acting illegally, we will examine our priorities."

As Gaza security chief in the 1990s, Dahlan led a crackdown on Islamists. In recent months, Hamas activists accused him of trying to assassinate Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and of unofficially commanding pro-Fatah forces in the factional fighting.

4) Hamas: We didn’t sell out
by Ali Waked

After establishing unity government with Fatah, Hamas launches campaign to clarify that group is not surrendering hard-line principles; ‘Any Hamas leader who ever recognizes Israel will be kicked out,’ declares Hamas lawmaker




While Israel and most of the international community refuse to recognize the new Palestinian coalition, Hamas is planning a massive public relations campaign to clarify that the group is not capitulating its principles despites its cooperation with Fatah.


Hamas stressed that the basic doctrine of the new Hamas-Fatah Palestinian government, which was sworn in Saturday, does not constitute a retreat from the movement's historical principles.
Terror Attack
Officials: Karni shooting shows Hamas’ true colors / Ronny Sofer
Senior diplomatic officials say Monday’s shooting attack which Hamas claimed responsibility for is ‘Hamas’ answer to those who think we should talk to new Palestinian unity government'
Full Story



The Palestinian press, however, is reporting serious disagreements within the group regarding the new government ’s basic doctrine.



Outgoing Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar launched an assault on the new government’s principles during a speech Monday calling them weak and insufficient.



'No fissures'

Hamas faction member Mushir al-Masri however insisted that there were no disagreements or fissures within the party. He said Hamas’ principles had not changed in any way.



The government’s platform, he explained, constitutes common basic principles that are meant to unite all the Palestinian factions but do not necessarily express all aspects of Hamas’ stance.


“There isn’t a chance any Hamas leader will ever recognize Israel,” said outgoing Interior Minister Said Siam. “We will not betray our values and we will not betray our land. We will leave this world as shahids (martyrs) without recognizing Israel.”


Siam further noted that if any Hamas member dared recognize Israel, he would be swiftly ejected from the movement. Siam did not deny, however, that considering Hamas’ values the current unity government was not ideal. However, the deadly intra-Palestinian conflicts necessitated certain concessions, he noted.


Hamas spokesperson Dr. Ismail Radwan also declared that Hamas’ values had not changed. Hamas considers resistance operations to be a strategic option to respond to the enemy’s crimes, Radwan declared.



Unity not for everyone

The comments by senior Hamas leaders indicate that there was indeed resistance within the movement during the process of establishing the unity government, especially regarding signing basic principles which do not entirely reflect their views.


Many militant Islamic groups severely criticized Hamas for “selling out their principles.”


Al-Qaeda second-in-command Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri slammed Hamas on numerous occasions, including in a tape broadcast on al-Jazzeera in which he consoles the Muslim world for the death of Hamas as a fighting Islamic group. Hamas sold out their principles for a few seats in the Palestinian government, al-Zawahiri charged.



Meanwhile, in an official statement Hamas denied reports that the appointment of Mahammad Dahlan as national security advisor was in cooperation with PA President Mahmoud Abbas.



Hamas criticized the appointment Monday morning saying Dahlan was not a unifying figure and his appointment was steeped in controversy. Fatah however said Hamas’ statement was not justified as the appointment was made with the agreement of both sides.

5)Bush and Ahmadinejad's Game of Chicken
By Ian Bremmer & Willis Sparks

At first glance, George W. Bush and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad couldn't be more different.

Bush is the Ivy League-educated son of a former president. Ahmadinejad, the son of a blacksmith, rose to power from relative obscurity following a brief stint as Tehran's mayor. For many around the world, Bush is the living symbol of American military might. Ahmadinejad relishes his role as underdog president of an underdog nation.

But they also have a lot in common. Similarities in their temperaments and domestic political positions reveal why the standoff over Iran's nuclear program may eventually lead to military action.
<A HREF="http://a.tribalfusion.com/h.click/aSmMQg4dnZdQV7A2AYZcoHXNTHZbcYrQkYrj60TeMSUUHTrYSWtYXmbBnPUrqYqvt3aFa5av2na7AXU3gWHrWoAUBmVvwoWfB2TBl5tep56vZbprMKYVMRXGF20cnwnqfQ5FU2VUFAVPQ1PEvRPVnM3EJZcrDJ6mO/http://clk.atdmt.com/NFX/go/trblfnfx0060000678nfx/direct/01/" TARGET="_blank"><IMG SRC=http://cdn5.tribalfusion.com/media/775086/0505_008_rft_300250_A_75k.gif WIDTH=300 HEIGHT=250 BORDER=0></A>

Each president now faces considerable heat at home. Bush has taken hits over the war in Iraq from some who believe it should never have been waged and others who insist that poor planning cost him an opportunity to remake the politics of the Middle East. The botched federal response to Hurricane Katrina, a growing federal budget deficit, and doubts over the administration's credibility and competence have added to his headaches. Bush hasn't enjoyed majority public approval in more than two years, the longest such stretch for any U.S. president in more than half a century. Can he live with a legacy that includes a nuclear Iran?

Ahmadinejad faces sharp criticism for his handling of Iran's rusting economy. The relative unknown swept to victory in June 2005 on promises to create jobs, lift millions from poverty and curb inflation. More than a year and half later, unemployment and the gap between rich and poor remain steady. Inflation has actually risen. Conservative pragmatists charge that Ahmadinejad's incendiary rhetoric allows foreigners to portray Iran's government as irrational and dangerous. His heavy-handed social policies invite derision from reformists. But resolute support for the nuclear program buoys his domestic popularity and helps him change the political subject.

Iran's ruling clerics, not the president, have ultimate responsibility for the country's foreign policy. But Ahmadinejad is now the public face of Iran's determination to join the nuclear club. The mullahs may not always approve of his belligerence, but pushing aside an elected president would come at a political cost.

Both presidents held relatively strong domestic political positions before their allies took heavy losses in recent elections. In November, Bush's party lost majority control of both houses of the U.S. Congress. Many fellow Republicans have distanced themselves from their president, particularly over the war in Iraq.

In December, divisions among Iranian hardliners ensured that Ahmadinejad's allies took a stunning beating in municipal elections, the first national balloting since Ahmadinejad won the presidency.

But the most crucial similarity between the two men is that, when it comes to foreign policy, both are temperamentally ill-suited to play anything but offense. Anyone who thought Bush would interpret the Republican election defeat and growing turmoil in Iraq as signs he should shy from a head-on fight with Tehran are surely startled that he has turned up the rhetorical heat on Iran's involvement in Iraq and its nuclear ambitions.

Iranian media coverage of Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, increasingly includes criticism of his handling of both the economy and foreign policy. An influential adviser to Iran's parliament has publicly charged that the president spends Iran's oil revenues "unreservedly and without much consideration."

Conservative official newspapers accuse him of pursuing an unnecessarily belligerent and reckless approach to relations with the West. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly did not meet with Ahmadinejad for more than two months late last year. All this in a country where the elite likes to keep its political disputes behind closed doors.

But those who expected a chastened Iranian president as the deadline approached for Iran's compliance with the latest U.N. Security Council resolution have ignored his history. Instead of calls for consultation and hints of compromise -- even if only to strengthen Iran's diplomatic hand -- Ahmadinejad offered only more defiance. Nuclear development in Iran "has no brakes," he has insisted. "The Iranian people ... will defend their rights. . . . They will resist the oppressors and will not concede one iota," he has added for emphasis.

On the nuclear issue, both men have raised the political cost of backing down. If Iran is the "world's primary state sponsor of terror," as Bush says, how can he allow the country to go nuclear? He promises to seek a diplomatic solution, but his insistence that a nuclear Iran is "unacceptable" leaves U.S. negotiators with little to offer. If Iran will not concede one iota to its "oppressors," as Ahmadinejad has pledged, why should his government ever accept an internationally brokered compromise?

Politicians, even those as strong-willed as Bush and Ahmadinejad, sometimes reverse themselves. But the importance each has publicly attached to this issue ensures that he who blinks first will forfeit plenty of precious political capital.

In addition, both presidents have antagonized the very international actors, Russia and China, that might help forge a deal. The Bush administration has asked both countries to support coercive diplomacy aimed at forcing Iran to back down after ignoring their objections to war with Iraq and pointedly criticizing their foreign and domestic policies.

Ahmadinejad continues to provoke Israel and the United States, making it more difficult for Russia, China and others to defend Iran's right to a nuclear program. Why, Russian and Chinese diplomats must wonder, won't Ahmadinejad keep quiet and make their work a little easier?

We're left with a game of chicken. Bush and Ahmadinejad continue to drive toward a collision. Bush places his hands on the windshield to show the world he has no intention of turning. Ahmadinejad throws his steering wheel out the window.

The U.S. Congress may try to restrain Bush's drive toward confrontation, but its ability to prevent him from ordering air strikes is clearly limited. Iran's mullahs may eventually sideline Ahmadinejad, unless they calculate that a U.S. or Israeli air attack would rally Iranians to their government just as a sinking economy threatens the country's entire ruling class.

The best defense is a good offense? Not when offense is all you play.

And not when the international stakes are so high. Both men will give their diplomats time to work, but only to strengthen their positions for the moment when push may finally come to shove.