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Another Rant. (See 1 below.)
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First government was in debt and still is and then government got heavily involved in education. Then government decided it would be instructive if students went into debt. Now students are so in debt they have turned the tables on government and are seeking to be bailed out by taxpayers.
Warren is gaining in the polls because she has a brilliant idea which is for tax payers to bail students out and if that comes to pass, colleges and universities will be able to continue to increase their bureaucratic staffing which has grown like Topsy. Allan Bloom was prophetic when he wrote: "The Closing Of America's Mind."
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What do populism and my desire to drive versus fly have in common, if anything?
Even for an avowed Capitalist this thesis can be a stretch but I will try.
Now that I have time I have the opportunity to indulge some of my choices that I did not have when I worked.
In essence, my desire to drive versus fly is a recognition that , in some ways, capitalism has failed. Flying today is not a pleasure. It is a hassle and I also resent the fact that radical Islam has made my life more costly, miserable and dangerous. Airlines no longer think in terms of comfort and, of late, even Boeing seems to have ignored safety. The airlines are driven by profit, which is totally understandable and pleasure has been inched out by crammed seating. Consequently, when it comes to flying, capitalism has responded in a way that I reject just as politicians and liberal elitism have failed society. No wonder populism is gaining
Liberalism , in my view, versus conservatism, actively seeks to make life better and is politically pro-active. Liberals promise and mostly fail because their precepts embody stupidity and reject common sense. They are mainly based on false premises.
Conservative politics is more re-active and, it too, also often fails but mainly when it tries to construct a version of "go it one better" liberalism. Conservatism tends not to make promises about "externalism" but relies upon self and does not reject the beauty of failure. In fact, conservatism embraces failure and believes failure is the foundation upon which one is tested, learns and builds.
Yes, Trump bankrupted several times.
At present, populism is rising, per the article posted below, but it too will eventually bring disappointment because, though it recognizes and rejects failed liberalism it also believes in fairy tales that suggest one can have what they want without paying a price. Populism contains elements of fraud and it is little wonder the likes of "Bernie" and "Pocahontas" are pushing it down our throats just as Obama did with "racial divide" born out of his brand of anti-Americanism.,.
In essence, populism is a way of doubling down on the failures of radical progressive liberalism just as flying is failed capitalism. Also, when you fly you cannot stop, as we recently did on an earlier bus-man trip to experience art in museums, a Russian Restaurant in, of all places, Tennessee. You do not see the economic recovery taking place in America as towns are coming alive, new structures are being built and "help wanted"and "employing now" signs are beginning to sprout. This you cannot see and feel from 30,000 feet and this is what my friend, Salena Zito, is going to talk about when she comes here in October. Salena is an investigative reporter of "the soil" just as my friend Kim Strassel. They both dig in the dirt!
This is what "cocoon" members of the mass media miss as they hop in planes and ignore the guts of what America is still about and why Trump, the " billionaire commoner," has captured and what blind and hating liberal elites do not understand.
So, in a few hours, when my wife awakes, we will get in our car and get on the road to meet Max, our new grandson but we will be taking the "expressway's" and not the "blue highway's" because time is a partial factor and leisure is not an option and Father's Day hearkens.
To recap - flying reminds me of "failed capitalism" "Blue Highway's" populism. Populism is a do it yourself, take control of your own life, be independent "Frank Sinatra" approach to life. Flying is tolerating what you find distasteful and subjecting yourself to herding at a high cost. Flying is pressure whereas, driving is leisure. Flying is giving in to "big brother," whereas, driving is rejecting dependency.
Flying reminds me of the abominable stupidity of liberalism in that we screen in order to board yet, refuse to build barriers to protect our borders. Protecting elitism's desire for power drives the political decision along with hatred of losing to an "inferior."
Call me nuts because I cannot separate politics from everyday experiences and choices that drive my life. My independent and conservative ways will not allow me the luxury of being dependent when I still have the freedom of choice
Lynn is up and away we go .(See 2 below.)
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Dick
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1) There have been some recent indexes which suggest an economic slowdown, all of which are likely correct. Slowing factory activity, slower hiring, flat cap ex spend, flat business confidence. All of this suggests a high level of uncertainty over China, and generally lack of clarity where the economy is headed. That leads to reluctance to spend on cap ex and reluctance to hire until the fog clears. I assume that all the socialist rhetoric by the Dem candidates is not helping companies planning long term investments to get the courage to make those investments on the chance Trump is not reelected. If any of the Dems were to be president, there is no way to know what absurd things they might actually do like raise corporate taxes and reinstitute massive regulation, all of which would cripple the economy and touch of a major recession from which we would not recover for years. Under Dodd Frank, the Fed is specifically forbidden to step in with bail outs. The whole reason the Fed was created was to provide bailouts, especially for lenders. Congress in its normal stupidity has not forbidden that so when the economy cracks and shadow lenders, which now account for over 50% of all commercial lending, all crash at once as repo and credit lines are pulled overnight. The Fed will be powerless to step in and provide them liquidity. A disaster will follow. Incredibly stupid, but SOP for Congress that thought it was politically great to end bailouts even though they were clearly told what will happen, and not to pass that in Dodd.
On the flip side of the economy, jobs are still very strong. U 1, which is people unemployed more than 15 weeks, is a more accurate measure than U 3 and U6. U 1 is a more pure measure as it does not include incarcerated, drug out, people who are not actively looking for work, nor part timers, and people who might be simply have taken another job but took two weeks off in between. U1 is 1.6%, which suggests most people who are able to actually show p every day and who had a job and want a job, are still unemployed. Given the current shortage of people to fill jobs, if someone is unemployed for 15 weeks, very possibly they have no skills, live in some Midwest or southern town where is not much work, or possibly have some family or other issue which inhibits them from taking a job right away. Part of the reason for 75,000 jobs last month was around 20,000 shortfall was due to nobody was left with the ability to do the work was left to hire, retail is laying off accounts for 20,000, and trade issues for another 20,000. June may be poor as well as the uncertainty is affecting a lot of companies confidence, and all the press about trade just reinforces that concern.
Bottom line, it is going to come down to the G 20 meeting with Xi. I am guessing they will agree to keep talking and defer tariffs for 60 or 90 days. Trump is playing the negotiation just right by saying he is in no hurry to do a deal and holding the tariffs as a certainty if there is no agreement. However, that sends bad signals to business who don’t know what will happen, so they are holding back on new investment and hiring. I am sure there are some sort of behind the scene talks going on, and that G 20 meeting will not be the first contact the two sides are having. If they come away with nothing at all it will kill the stock market and business confidence. China is seeing one company after another move out and banks having more bad loans. Exports are headed down. Many US retailers have already brought in holiday inventory, or soon will be to the point that there is no more warehouse space available in LA and Long Beach. It is likely Wal Mart, Target and others have already stocked their own warehouses. So whatever happens, export by China as the year goes on will drop further and be made worse by all the move outs. China needs to do a deal, or the move outs will accelerate. The need on both sides has reached a point where Trump and Xi need to agree to some sort of restart or they are both in trouble. If Trump can do a deal he is reelected. It is that simple. China may sign a deal but it will all be in the enforcement and Chinese legislative covenants that really matter because the Chinese do not know how not to cheat. It is embedded in their culture. That is the real issue to get to a deal. For china, add on Hong Kong riots. They could morph into a real problem for Xi, and there might be increased protests inside China as the economy slows materially. Bottom line, both sides need a deal of some sort.
It is questionable that oil prices will spike much for long unless the shooting starts- in which case it will not last long. Maybe the US Navy will start to sink a few Iranian small fast boats who are placing the mines, but then if Iran tries something it is likely we sink a lot more of their boats and subs. The big thing is the US now can produce close to 13 million barrels a day plus has the strategic reserve, all as demand is slackening, so we can manage the situation very differently than in the past. It seems the Iranians are trying to intimidate shipping, but that failed the last time they tried, and Trump is not Obama. Either the Iranians stop this or Trump will launch an attack of some sort. He can’t let this pass or they will do it again to test him. The fact that they rudely rebuffed Abe attempt to moderate, and then attacked a Japanese ship while he was sitting there, was really stupid, and is a sure way to really piss off Abe and other Asians. Pompeo did not call out the Iranians publicly, and then intend to do nothing and look weak. Standby -something will happen.
B of A just released a study showing around 50% of young adults are worried about their finances to the point it is affecting their mental and physical health. Good thing the snowflakes did not experience all of the things we all experienced at their age of real recessions, rampant inflation. job insecurity and all the rest. Young people never had it so good as they do today. Plentiful jobs, rising incomes, no inflation, and a much better quality of life with all their smartphones and other gadgets, and easy access to the job market thru LinkedIn and other sites, and to dates thru all those internet sites. This is what has happened due to all the coddling on campus. They just cannot handle any stress, and they have no idea how to handle money, or save and invest for the future. What will they do when things do get soft in the economy and they actually have to deal with adversity the way all of us did.
The Dems have out done themselves in New York with stupidity. They just passed a new rent control law which is so tenant oriented that NYC apartments will now go into decline and disrepair, no more will get built, and the lower income people will end up in crappy housing, and be worse off. Landlords are now not going to be able to raise rents on vacancy, nor if they renovate, they are limited to $15,000 per unit, and a rate of rent increase which makes no economic sense at all. In addition, it is already very hard to evict, and now the new law will make it nearly impossible, so people will not pay rents knowing they cannot be evicted for maybe years, if ever. We had this sort of laws years ago and the housing stock deteriorated badly, leading to much more landlord friendly rules and huge new development and a lot of renovations. That is now ended. So now they reinstituted those same old rules, only much worse. Welcome to how Democrats want to run the country. It is like the calls for socialism. Despite the well-known failures of socialism and rent control they never learned and want to repeat these disasters. The Dems are all for it, and a segment of voters think these are wonderful ideas. Free is the word, except we all know there is no free lunch.
As if you needed more proof that polls are meaningless these days, just look at Quinnipiac. They have four avowed socialists, including Pocahontas, beating Trump buy a wide margin, but the exact same poll had 75% saying they did not want socialism. So which is it. Ignore the polls. One thing I learned in statistics class at Wharton was, tell me the answer you want and I will devise a poll to get that answer. Keep in mind the election models who got it right the last few elections have Trump reelected so long as the economy holds and jobs and wages remain good. Biden has already made so many mistakes and gaffs he is already toast.
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2)
Europe’s Populists Are Here to Stay
New parties are finding success by addressing the concerns of voters who feel neglected and disdained by liberal elites.
By Matthew Goodwin
“Only five years ago the newspapers were talking about the League being extinct. Now we are the biggest party in the north and the south [of Italy].” This was the triumphant statement of Matteo Salvini, Italy’s deputy prime minister, after his national populist party, the League, finished first among Italian voters in last month’s election for the European Parliament.
“It is not only the League that is the first party,” continued Mr. Salvini, the de facto head of Europe’s growing national populist family. “Marine Le Pen is the biggest party in France. Nigel Farage has the biggest party in Great Britain. It is a sign of a Europe that has changed.”
Mr. Salvini and his allies have reason to feel confident. The percentage of seats in the European Parliament now held by populists of all stripes—whether left populists, right populists or others that aren’t easily defined, like the 5 Star Movement in Italy or Britain’s new Brexit Party—hit an all-time high of 29%. But it is the national populists who are most successful. From the League in Italy to National Rally in France, Vox in Spain and the Sweden Democrats, this party family has a record 16% of seats in the European Parliament. They are nowhere near a majority, but they have consolidated and are now a more disruptive force.
National populist parties share a common approach and program. They seek to advance what they see as the interests and culture of their country’s ethno-cultural majority; they present themselves as giving voice to people who feel neglected, even held in contempt, by distant, self-serving liberal elites.
And their arguments are resonating. Aside from more seats in the European Parliament, these parties govern Hungary, Italy, Poland and, until recently, Austria. They have broken through in democracies that were once thought to be immune to populism because of the stigma of past dictatorships, as in Germany and Spain, or because of a long tradition of democratic rule and tolerance, as in Britain and Sweden.
But the roots of the populist revolt are widely misunderstood. These parties are routinely portrayed as little more than a refuge for bigots, Rust Belt rejects, victims of the Great Recession and angry old white men. Some discern in them the return of fascism, pointing to the dark history of several of the national populist parties and their willingness to overlook the hateful views of their most extreme supporters. Others see them as an ephemeral expression of protest politics.
Such narratives may be comforting to some, but they are misleading. The picture is far more complex. National populism isn’t going away anytime soon, because it is anchored in deeper currents that have been swirling beneath Western democracies over many decades and still have a long way to run. It is a movement that is just getting started.
One piece of conventional wisdom holds that this disruption is powered by the unemployed and people struggling with low incomes or poverty. The European left cherishes this reboot of “It’s the economy, stupid” because it shifts attention away from issues that discomfit the left but which voters want to talk about: national identity, security, belonging and community.
Economic insecurity, though often an ingredient of populist success, isn’t the core driver.
But the evidence is thin for a populist revolt of the economically downtrodden. There is little evidence that the likes of Mr. Salvini—whose party hails from Italy’s more prosperous north, not the impoverished south—are fueled by those at the bottom of the economic ladder. Economic insecurity, though often an ingredient of populist success, isn’t the core driver.
Consider how widely national populists have cast their net. In Britain, where the vote for Brexit took place as unemployment neared its lowest rate since the 1970s, Nigel Farage and his Brexit Party draw the bulk of their support from a diverse alliance of skilled workers, middle-class Conservatives, affluent pensioners and the self-employed. Switzerland’s People’s Party, arguably the most successful national populist party of all time, has prospered amid some of the highest living standards on the planet.
Nor is national populism simply a backlash against the 2008 financial crisis or the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The economic fallout of these events has certainly cultivated additional support for the outsider parties, but their rise in most countries long preceded the collapse of Lehman Brothers, often by
In Britain, many trace the vote for Brexit to austerity imposed by a post-2010 Conservative government. But Mr. Farage enjoyed his first breakthrough in 2004, after 48 consecutive quarters of economic growth. In France, Ms. Le Pen garnered global attention after reaching the second round of the presidential election in 2017, before being defeated by Emmanuel Macron. But in this she merely emulated her father’s feat of 2002. Certainly, there are much more recent arrivals, like Vox in Spain and the Sweden Democrats, but they are the outliers. Most national populist parties were on their way long ago, which helps to explain why they have proven to be more durable than many predicted.
In Britain, many trace the vote for Brexit to austerity imposed by a post-2010 Conservative government. But Mr. Farage enjoyed his first breakthrough in 2004, after 48 consecutive quarters of economic growth. In France, Ms. Le Pen garnered global attention after reaching the second round of the presidential election in 2017, before being defeated by Emmanuel Macron. But in this she merely emulated her father’s feat of 2002. Certainly, there are much more recent arrivals, like Vox in Spain and the Sweden Democrats, but they are the outliers. Most national populist parties were on their way long ago, which helps to explain why they have proven to be more durable than many predicted.
To make sense of what’s really going on in the rise of national populism, we must consider several wider currents now colliding in European politics. Four are key, each one beginning with a D.
The first is distrust, generated by political institutions that have become less representative of the groups that are most likely to cast a vote for national populists: people without degrees and the working class. There are more women and ethnic minorities in our legislatures than ever before, which should be celebrated, but there have never been fewer nongraduates and people from blue-collar backgrounds.
The rise of a highly educated and thus typically socially liberal political elite, or what some scholars in Europe call “diploma democracy,” hasn’t only put greater distance between the rulers and the ruled. It is also fueling widespread feelings of voicelessness. Many voters have concluded that they are simply excluded from the conversation. Among Brits who felt they were being listened to, the vote for Brexit was only 37%; but among those who felt that politicians “do not listen to people like me” it spiraled to 58%.
These voters have good reason to feel left behind and left out. In Britain, only 3% of lawmakers have experience of working-class occupations, while 18% have only ever worked in politics. Meanwhile, as London prospers, the declining coastal and industrial areas that were so strongly supportive of Brexit suffer from a continued lack of inward investment.
A second key current is destruction: widespread fears that national identities, cultures and ways of life are slipping away. When eight in 10 Trump voters support building a wall on the southern border, or three in four Brexit voters, worried about how immigration is changing Britain, voted to “take back control,” they knew what they were supporting.Such voters aren’t giving up on democracy, as some commentators argue. Overwhelming majorities say that they want to live in a representative democracy. But a battle is taking place between whether people want to live in a “liberal” conception of democracy, which gives priority to individual rights for all, or a “direct” conception, which focuses on the preferences of the majority. Many people simply want more of a say over the decisions that affect their nations and their daily lives.
For three decades now, almost every major study in Europe has found that wanting to reduce immigration is, by far, the strongest predictor of whether or not somebody will vote national populist. Most of those who are racist vote for these parties, but not all of those who do so are racist. Many are simply expressing worries about the pace and scale of immigration, and they feel that their concerns have gone unaddressed. Denouncing them as fascists and shouting down their anxiety hasn’t helped matters.
Studies show that Americans who felt they couldn't talk about issues of national identity were far more likely to vote for Trump. In Britain, Brexit polled strongest among Leavers who felt that London could no longer control inward migration from the EU (which it couldn’t). Remainers talked endlessly about economic risks while leavers wanted to talk about identity. Leavers wanted a conversation about culture; remainers ignored them and talked about GDP.
The young are usually more liberal than the old, but many of them are receptive to national populists.
Nor is this simply about old white men. In Britain, a senior liberal politician recently traced the vote for Brexit to people who yearned for a world where “faces were white” and the map of the world was colored “imperial pink.” Liberals are fond of these arguments about old white people and newly ascendant majorities because reducing politics to a demographic conveyor belt allows them to ignore the underlying grievances. They just need to wait for the awkward groups to die and the favored groups to rise.
The problem is that many exaggerate the pace and scale of generational change. The young are usually more liberal than the old, but many of them are receptive to national populists. In Britain, more than 40% of 18-24-year-olds, and 58% of the slightly older 25-49-year-olds, recently said that immigration is “too high.” This helps to explain why Brexit was endorsed not simply by old white men but by one in two women, one in two 35-44-year-olds, and one in three black and ethnic minority voters.
There is certainly more gasoline in the tank. Mr. Salvini attracts votes from across the generations in Italy; the Alternative for Germany appeals most strongly not to pensioners with closer links to the Nazi era but to 25-50-year-olds; while in France, Ms. Le Pen has made big inroads among 18-34-year-olds and young women, and was recently revealed to be the most popular choice among LGBT communities, presumably because of worries about the socially conservative views of Muslim immigrants.
Third, national populists are tapping into worries over deprivation—not objective economic loss, but relative deprivation. Tens of millions in Europe feel that their ethno-cultural group is being left behind relative to others, while liberal politicians, media and celebrities devote far more attention and status to favored migrants, minorities and other newcomers. This is fused with a profound sense of pessimism about the future, a firm belief that things will get worse, that their group will fall further behind and their children will have a worse life than their own.
In the U.S., white voters who supported Mr. Trump felt especially anxious about “white vulnerability”—the perception that whites are losing ground to others—but similar sentiments could also be found among the third of Hispanic/Latino voters who voted for him. This isn’t unique to the U.S. In Britain, one in three black and ethnic minority voters endorsed Brexit, as did large swaths of the white working class. All shared a fear that others were being given priority, whether migrants from Eastern Europe or the liberal middle class.
Relative deprivation acts as the bridge between culture and economics: Those who feel they are being left behind economically are more likely to feel threatened by others. But recent research also shows that if you feel more threatened by others, you become more likely to feel economically left behind. Breaking this loop is the key to breaking populism.
The final factor in the national populist upsurge is dealignment. Historic tribal loyalties to the older parties are breaking down across much of the West. Europe’s classic era of strong partisan identification, in the mid-to-late 20th century, is today quickly making way for new alignments and electorates that are more fluid and volatile and thus less predictable.
Populists are unlikely to stage a complete takeover, but they will become a permanent and more disruptive fixture on the landscape.
Britain, the quintessential two-party system, is now rapidly fragmenting as resurgent liberals and populist Brexiteers take on Labor and the Conservatives, and the same phenomenon is evident in Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Dealignment underpins the trend, as more and more voters become less and less committed to the old guard. Populists on all sides are finding it much easier to break through. The future contains more new parties like 5 Star in Italy and the Brexit Party, and fewer stories about families that have voted the same way over many generations.
Populists are unlikely to stage a complete takeover, but they will become a permanent and more disruptive fixture on the landscape. Europe is aging, North Africa is unstable, migration will remain high, Islamist terror looks unlikely to fade and there may yet be another financial crisis. In facing these problems, many of the established parties simply look lost. An alliance of liberals and Greens is attempting to provide an alternative, and they now share the political stage with the populists. It will be a long, drawn-out war, not a fleeting battle, and further losses for the mainstream parties lie ahead.
What does all of this mean for Europe and the U.S.? For one thing, Europe is unlikely to get the strong, stable and ideologically coherent governments that are needed to navigate choppy financial and political waters. Political fragmentation and polarization look to be the specials of the day. Investors have good reason to feel downbeat about the eurozone, while a leadership vacuum is likely to make Washington question how reliable Europe is as an economic and diplomatic partner. That said, the populist revolt on the continent is just the topic of the moment. In 2020, all eyes will turn away from a divided Europe to a divided America.
Mr. Goodwin is professor of politics at the University of Kent and senior visiting fellow at Chatham House. He is the co-author, with Roger Eatwell, of “National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy” (Penguin).
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