https://1funny.com/the-
And then:
https://www.youtube.com/embed/
Finally:
Good cop or bad cop? https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-national-security-adviser-iran-seeking-nuclear-arms/ US national
security adviser: Iran seeking nuclear arms In region, Bolton
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
America's next war, can we win? (See 1 below.)
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
If it wasn't Xi Jinping it would be someone other Chinese Communist Leader. (See 2 below.)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The hypocrisy of the mass media revealed. Unless it is about Trump and his alleged transgressions they are not interested in Democrat's ethical behaviour.
No wonder they have lost all respect. (See 3 below.)
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Peggy finally got one right. She portrays the current scene in accord with my thinking. (See 4 below.)
The NYT's scurrilous release of Trump's old alleged tax returns reveal he was down but not out and before being elected president recovered and was a billionaire.
The NYT's never loses an opportunity to demean Trump but I found it very revealing that he is a fighter, hung in and recovered in a glorious fashion.
I like those qualities and am glad he is president because he is a fighter.
As for the NYT's, their financial results reflect, by any historical metric, they have been suffering for years and owe some of their recovery to Trump and the fact that constantly bashing him produces increased readership.
The Ochs family seem to believe goring the Trump Ox is a way to prosperity. That may be the case but in doing so they have lost all respect and credibility for honest reporting.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
What say about Putin? (See 5 below.)
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
As you can tell we are now back from our 20 day bus man's holiday to see some of our kids and grand kids. I did all the 1400 mile driving and will review in stand alone memo when I have the time. Right now am inundated with mail, bills etc.
This is some thing Lynn wrote and is why we like blue highway and off interstate road travel.
Well, we’ve left the last of our major stops and loved every minute of time with family and friends...now on our journey home...you know we love to travel the “blue” highways and explore America...it’s been close to 4 1/2 hrs and we’ve traveled about 120 miles...may take us 3 days to get home at this rate, haha! Our 1st stop was in Accident, MD( can’t believe we were in MD!) but it was certainly no accident! Firefly Farms, a gourmet shop with handmade cheese, etc was awesome! We bought “pick up” items of fresh cheese, homemade baguette, anchovy stuffed olives, sopresetta and ginger beer and picnicked outside in their lovely garden area( would have loved a glass of wine with the yummies!) ...just pristine and the weather was perfect...chatted with the owners and they love Savannah and drive through every year on their way to FL! Passed Deep Creek Lake, MD...a massive recreational lake with many home rentals, restaurants, summer boating, wake boarding and winter skiing activities! Looks awesome! Then on to the Simon Pearce glassblowing and factory outlet...proceeding back to route have traveled through beautiful America...windmill farms all over! Who would have thought! We’re now into WVA and cell coverage is spotty so won’t be able to find any more neat stops for now! Miss you all already! Love, us
Some of this memo was written before I left and some posted today.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Dick
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1)HOW TO WIN
America's
NEXT WAR/ Can We?
The United States faces great-power enemies. It needs
a military focused on fighting them.
BY ELBRIDGE COLBY
The era of untrammeled U.S. military superiority is over. If the United States delays implementing a new approach, it risks losing a war to China or Russia—or backing
down in a crisis because it fears it would—with devastating consequences for
America’s interests.
The U.S. Defense Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy initiated a needed
course correction to address this challenge. As then-Defense Secretary James
Mattis put it in January that year, great-power competition—not terrorism—is now
the Pentagon’s priority. But while the strategy’s summary provides a clear vision, it
leaves much to be fleshed out. What should this shift toward great-power
competition entail for the U.S. military?
makes sure that no state dominates these critical areas.
Russia and especially China are the only countries that could plausibly take over
and hold the territory of Washington’s allies and partners in the face of U.S.
resistance. If they did so—or even if they merely convinced their neighbors that they
could and then used that fear to suborn them—they could unravel U.S. alliances
and shift in their favor the balances of power in Europe and Asia. If China did so in
the Western Pacific, it could dominate the world’s largest and most economically
dynamic region. If Russia did so, it could fracture NATO and open Eastern Europe
to Russian dominance.
Beijing and Moscow must therefore not be given such an opening, which is why
Washington must focus not on abstract metrics of its military superiority—such as
how many carriers it puts to sea or how much it spends in comparison to other
countries—but on its and its allies’ clear ability to defeat major aggression in
specific, plausible scenarios against a vulnerable ally or established partner such as
Taiwan.
In other words, the United States must prepare to fight and achieve its political
aims in a war with a great power. Doing so will not be easy. The last time the
United States prepared for such a conflict was in the 1980s, and the last time it
fought one was in the 1940s. But that’s all the more reason why Washington must
immediately start readying itself if it wants to deter another great-power battle now.
U.S. Military Infrastructure Around the World
A lily pad is a small military installation that is worth less than $10 million or that covers less than 10 acres of land.
SOURCE: DAVID VINE, LIST OF U.S. MILITARY BASES ABROAD, 2018. NOTE: POINTS ON MAP DO NOT REPRESENT EXACT GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS. MAP DOES NOT INCLUDE THE U.S.-FUNDED HOST NATION BASES THAT HAVE NO KNOWN FACILITIES SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED FOR U.S. USE. LILY PAD FIGURE EXCLUDES ADDITIONAL LIKELY LILY PADS IN AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER WAR ZONES. NOT SHOWN: GREENLAND BASE AND ANTARCTICA LILY PAD.
The U.S. military will need to undergo dramatic change to prepare for possible
attacks from China or Russia. For a generation, the Pentagon operated on what
might be called the Desert Storm model, under which the United States exploited
the enormous technical advantages it had developed starting in the 1970s to build a
military capable of dominating any opponent in the 1990s and 2000s, a time when
it lacked a peer competitor.
This approach was exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. After Iraq
seized Kuwait late in the summer of 1990, the United States first deployed forces to
protect Saudi Arabia. Over the ensuing six months, Washington assembled a broad
coalition and built an iron mountain of aircraft, tanks, warships, ammunition, and
every other expression of military might. Once the United States was good and
ready, it launched a withering air campaign that pummeled the Iraqi military and
quickly established total dominance of Kuwaiti and Iraqi airspace. The subsequent
ground invasion rapidly expelled the Iraqis from Kuwait, after which the United
States quickly ended the war on its preferred terms.
The Gulf War operation was a stunning success—but the victory was owed in great
part to the fact that the nature of the conflict was perfectly suited to the United
States’ advantages. Iraq had a formidable military, but it was well behind that of the
United States and incapable of striking accurately beyond territory it owned or
occupied. Meanwhile, the desert provided an optimal environment for U.S.
surveillance and precision strikes, and Baghdad had no nuclear weapons to deter
Washington from launching such a pulverizing assault.
The world took note of the awesome power of the U.S. military. Until today, no
other country has dared to assault a U.S. ally. The point was only magnified by the
prowess the United States showed in its wars against Serbia, the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and Iraq in 2003.
The problem today, however, is the approach that worked so well against these so-
called rogue state adversaries will fail against China or Russia. That is because they
have spent the last 10 to 20 years specifically figuring out how to undermine it.
Victory, as the old saying goes, is never final, and it breeds its own frustration.
Today that takes the form of two militaries that, while different, pose serious and
intensifying threats to U.S. allies and established partners in Eastern Europe and
the Western Pacific.
THE APPROACH THAT WORKED SO WELL AGAINST THESE SO-CALLED ROGUE STATE ADVERSARIES WILL FAIL AGAINST CHINA OR RUSSIA.
The core of both countries’ challenge to the U.S. military lies in what are commonly
called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems: in more colloquial terms, a wide
variety of missiles, air defenses, and electronic capabilities that could destroy or
neutralize U.S. and allied bases, surface vessels, ground forces, satellites, and key
logistics nodes within their reach. Both China and Russia have also developed
rapidly deployable and fearsomely armed conventional forces that can exploit the
openings that their A2/AD systems could create.
Despite these advances, both China and Russia still know that, for now, they would
be defeated if their attacks triggered a full response by the United States. The key
for them is to attack and fight in a way that Washington restrains itself enough for
them to secure their gains. This means ensuring that the war is fought on limited
terms such that the United States will not see fit to bring to bear its full weight.
Focused attacks designed to pick off vulnerable members of Washington’s alliance
network are the ideal offensive strategy in the nuclear age, in which no one can
countenance the consequences of total war.
The most pointed form of such a limited war strategy is the fait accompli. Such an
approach involves an attacker seizing territory before the defender and its patron
can react sufficiently and then making sure that the counterattack needed to eject
it would be so risky, costly, and aggressive that the United States would balk at
mounting it—not least because its allies might see it as unjustified and refuse to
support it. Such a war plan, if skillfully carried out in the Baltics or Taiwan, could
checkmate the United States.
China’s Growing Power
An estimate of the expanding reach and capacity of Beijing’s conventionally armed ballistic cruise missiles.
SOURCE: “THE U.S.-CHINA MILITARY SCORECARD: FORCES, GEOGRAPHY, AND THE EVOLVING BALANCE OF POWER, 1996-2017,” RAND CORP.
To sustain what Mattis calls Washington’s constellation of alliances and
partnerships, the U.S. armed forces need to adapt to deal with a potential great-
power threat. This will require making significant changes in the way the U.S.
military is sized, shaped, postured, employed, and developed—a change from a
Desert Storm model to one designed to defeat contemporary Chinese and Russian
theories of victory.
The U.S. military must shift from one that surges to battlefields well after the
enemy has moved to one that can delay, degrade, and ideally deny an adversary’s
attempt to establish a fait accompli from the very beginning of hostilities and then
defeat its invasion. This will require a military that, instead of methodically
establishing overwhelming dominance in an active theater before pushing the
enemy back, can immediately blunt the enemy’s attacks and then defeat its strategy
even without such dominance.
In doing so, the United States must demonstrate that its fight is reasonable and
proportionate, leaving the terrible burden of major escalation on the opponent.
Once their invasion has been blunted and then stopped, Beijing or Moscow will be
forced to choose whether to escalate the war in ways that strengthen U.S. resolve
and bring others to its side—or settle for a real, albeit limited, defeat.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon’s force planning construct—the
guidelines that determine how many and what kinds of forces it needs—has focused
on the ability to fight two simultaneous wars against so-called rogue states. This
standard has produced a force emphasizing the deployment of large numbers of
troops optimized for beating the likes of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—exactly the
kind of force to which China and Russia have adapted.
In the near term, then, the Pentagon will need to make its existing forces more
lethal, for instance by equipping U.S. aircraft and ships with more long-range
missiles designed to sink enemy invasion ships. In the longer term, the military will
need to go further, using artificial intelligence and autonomous systems in ways
that can repel intense attacks by a China exploiting the same technologies.
But the U.S. military, even supplied with the best technology, can’t expect to
succeed against major powers unless it rethinks its posture. The model of the last
generation was a surge-based force that, when needed to eject an opponent from
allied territory, would gradually and securely flow from the United States to a small
number of fixed hub bases that were essentially immune to enemy attack and then
launch an overwhelming assault from there. Improvements in military technology
have now made these logistic tracks and bases vulnerable to enemy attack at every
step.
The new force needs to fight from the immediate outset of hostilities to blunt the
enemy’s attack and, together with arriving follow-on forces, deny the fait accompli.
To make this strategy work will require a force posture that is much more lethal,
agile, and ready. To get there, the U.S. military must make its bases and operating
locations more defensible and resilient as well as more geographically dispersed.
Nor can these efforts be confined to U.S. bases. The entire apparatus of the U.S.
military—including its logistics network and communications systems—must shift
from assuming invulnerability to expecting to be under consistent attack or
disruption while still performing effectively. No longer can U.S. forces rely on
exquisite systems operating with little margin for failure.
Realizing these goals will also necessitate a new approach to the way the armed
forces are employed. The National Defense Strategy provides an effective model,
one that seeks to orient U.S. and allied forces toward denying China or Russia the
ability to rapidly seize territory and then harden its gains in a fait accompli. The
model calls, first, for small contingents of U.S. forces to work closer toward
potential front lines alongside local partners in a so-called contact layer to build
relationships, deny adversaries the ability to manipulate information, and set
conditions for potential battle.
Second, a resilient and lethal blunt layer of U.S. and allied forces should be present
in or near vulnerable allies or partners to delay, degrade, or deny enemy advances,
thus frustrating the fait accompli. Their task will be to buy time and space for surge
layer reinforcements coming from farther away that are trained to arrive, pick up
their gear, integrate with friendly forces already in the field, and get quickly to the
fight. Key forces that cannot quickly be deployed, such as air defense units and
armored vehicles, would be based close to the potential fields of battle, while more
flexible force elements—such as infantry and tactical aircraft—would be trained to
arrive and engage the enemy before it can seal the fait accompli.
Russia’s Missile Range
SOURCE: MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT, "MISSILES OF RUSSIA," MISSILE THREAT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JUNE 14, 2018.
For the United States to focus its military on readying for great-power conflict, it
needs to use it far less for secondary missions. Over the last generation and
especially since 9/11, the operations tempo of the U.S. military has risen markedly.
Not only have U.S. forces been continuously committed in the Middle East, Central
Asia, and Africa, but even many of those units that are not directly engaged in
those wars have been constantly participating in operations such as ship cruises
and exercises designed to deter adversaries and assure allies. These factors have
significantly eroded the force’s readiness for a high-end conflict. This must change.
Beijing’s or Moscow’s calculations of whether to attack or precipitate crises over
Washington’s allies are going to be based on an assessment of how a war would
likely unfold—and especially whether their theory of victory would pan out—not on
the mere presence of U.S. ships. Moreover, assuring allies is not an end in itself—
deterrence of attack is the proper aim. Allies should be sufficiently assured to
prevent defeatism or buckling, but too much reassurance encourages free riding,
which Washington can no longer afford to ignore.
As a result, much of the U.S. military is not as ready as it should be to fight Russia
over the Baltics or China over Taiwan. To rectify this problem, Air Force and Navy
pilots should spend more time at high-end exercises and training schools and less
time in air patrols over the Middle East, and Army units should practice fighting
Russians and spend less time on counterinsurgency operations. Exercises with
European allies should focus more on honing their ability to defend NATO than
political symbolism.
The final piece of U.S. defense strategy that needs to change is the relationship with
allies and partners. Unlike in the post-Cold War era, the United States needs its
allies to help blunt Russian or Chinese invasions but also respond to crises and
manage secondary threats around the world. U.S. forces are simply not large
enough to do all this themselves—and, given the necessity for the Pentagon to focus
on competing with Beijing and Moscow, the U.S. military’s future focus must be on
quality rather than size.
Washington should encourage different allies to focus on different roles, depending
on their military situation and development level. Front-line allies and partners
such as Japan, Poland, Taiwan, and the Baltic states should concentrate on their
ability to blunt Chinese or Russian attacks on their territory and to restrict Beijing’s
or Moscow’s ability to maneuver through adjoining airspace and waterways by
building their own A2/AD capabilities.
Higher-end allies farther from potential battlefields, such as Australia and Germany
, should work on contributing, both through their forces and basing, to defeating
Chinese or Russian aggression against nearby allies. Partners such as France, Italy,
and Spain with established interests in places such as North Africa should allocate
more forces to handling secondary threats there.
The strategy outlined in this essay is an ambitious one. But it is feasible at current
spending levels—if the Pentagon and Congress make the hard choices needed. A
serious strategy in challenging times should provide clarity on what is more
important and what is less so and thus what to do and buy and what not to.
Strategies that promiscuously enumerate threats, and call for equivalent vigilance
between great powers that can change the world and rogue states and terrorists
that cannot, will diffuse and squander Washington’s scarce attention and resources.
Such strategies call to mind the remark about ordinary critics, who, striving for
balance, search for truth in the middle, between the extremes of right and wrong.
Certain threats are simply more consequential than others and thus demand more
attention.
A clarity in priority means hard choices but does not mean ignoring other threats to
America’s interests, including terrorists, North Korea, and Iran. It does, however,
mean right-sizing the U.S. approach to these threats. The United States cannot
afford to transform recalcitrant Middle Eastern societies or pursue an eliminationist
vision of counterterrorism—but it does not need to. It needs to defend itself from a
North Korean nuclear attack and help South Korea defend itself from invasion by
Pyongyang. But it does not need to be able to invade and occupy the North. The
United States needs to relentlessly pursue terrorists who can directly threaten it and
its allies, but it does not need to strike at every extremist with a taste for violence
or remake the societies in which they live. The United States needs to check Iran’s
aspirations for regional hegemony but not overthrow the Islamic Republic.
Moreover, the United States does not need F-22s to attack terrorist havens nor
whole brigade combat teams to advise Middle Eastern militaries; cheaper drones
and tailored advise-and-assist units will do.
To quote Carl von Clausewitz’s immortal line, “Nothing is more important … than
finding the right standpoint for seeing and judging events, and then adhering to it.”
The United States has found the right standpoint with the National Defense
Strategy. Now it is a matter of realizing it.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2) Our real problem with China:
Xi Jinping
At the last minute the Chinese Communist Party chief Xi Jinping vetoed the
trade deal with the United States, after his representatives had negotiated and
agreed to it. Xi claimed that he will take the responsibility for ‘all possible
consequences.’ This left President Trump no choice but to impose higher tariffs on
some Chinese imports.
2) Our real problem with China:
Xi Jinping
He is the global leader of opposition to the US position in international politics
At the last minute the Chinese Communist Party chief Xi Jinping vetoed the
trade deal with the United States, after his representatives had negotiated and
agreed to it. Xi claimed that he will take the responsibility for ‘all possible
consequences.’ This left President Trump no choice but to impose higher tariffs on
some Chinese imports.
This battle over trade marks only the early rounds of the US struggle with China.
China’s economic success was achieved in large measure by taking advantage of
the working people of both China and the US. It was made possible because the
US allowed it to enter the world’s free trade system.
Because China entered the West’s economic ecosystem a generation ago, it has
flourished. In the past 30 years, China has snatched an astronomical $4.4 trillion
from the US. Additionally, there is $200 to $600 billion annual loss due to China’s
theft, and several million highly paid US manufacturing jobs that have been lost.
The Chinese working people have also paid and continue to pay the price for the
regime’s ambition: wages are artificially low, and labor conditions are Dickensian.
Once a worker leaves the factory, there are other dangers for workers’ health due
to chronic air and water pollution in all of China’s cities.
The Chinese could not have done this on their own. The US contributed to the
creation of its most powerful enemy by giving the PRC access to markets, capitals, technologies, higher educational systems, and talent. All of this permitted China to build its economic might, which, in turn, allowed it to create a formidable military with an
increasing capability to project its power globally.
But that is not all. China’s economic growth fueled China’s aggressiveness and
global ambition. Spectacular economic prosperity legitimized China’s flawed
political system, and thus made it possible for a dictator like Xi to rise to power.
The drama over trade negotiations highlights our real problem with China: Xi
Jinping. Once the US understands Xi’s objectives and ruthlessness, it can
recognize the clear threat he presents to the US national security interests and to
international stability.
Before Xi Jinping took power, many in the West hailed him as China’s Gorbachev. Unfortunately, he is far closer to the tyrannical Mao Zedong. Within China, Xi
Jinping has become the most repressive ruler since the disastrous Great Cultural
Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. In the realm of foreign affairs, his policies are
dangerous, as he pursues China’s dominance by disrupting the existing
international order.
Domestically, Xi calls for strengthening the Communist Party’s leadership over
law, explicitly rejecting ‘constitutionalism,’ ‘separation of powers,’ and ‘judicial independence,’ the pillars of the rule of law in the West. Not only has he jailed
many human rights lawyers and activists, speciously charging them with
subverting state power, but in a shocking fact that still has yet to resonate in
Western media, he has imprisoned many ethnic minority Uighurs and Kazakhs in concentration camps.
Xi also suppressed dissent from within the Communist Party of China (CCP).
There were academics and officials within the Chinese Communist system who
attempted to reason with him, urging him not to repeat Mao’s ruinous mistakes,
such as creating a personality cult. In addition, appeals have been made to release
Chinese Muslims from the concentration camps. Sadly, but characteristically of
Xi’s China, many of the individuals who have made these entreaties have been
charged or threatened for speaking out. Xi does not trust anyone, including his
own party.
Internationally, he has ordered China’s aggressive expansion in South China Sea,
threatened the use of force to seize and occupy Taiwan, deployed internet
censorship surveillance and spyware globally, backed authoritarian regimes from
Russia to Venezuela and Zimbabwe; and expanded China’s influence and control
over less developed states through the Belt and Road Initiative. He is the global
leader of opposition to the US position in international politics and the present
liberal international order which has kept peace for a generation and provided
prosperity to billions, including within China.
Xi’s vision of global politics is one where China is supreme and the international
order is decidedly illiberal. From Xi’s speeches since he took power, particularly
his lengthy speech at the 19th Party Congress, his intent of defeating the US to
dominate world affairs is transparent, as is his desire to replace the dominance of
Western values with those of the CCP. Behind the ‘national rejuvenation’ and anti-
corruption rhetoric, he is determined to take China down the course of other failed
supremacist ideologies. Xi is a clear danger to the Chinese people due to his
repression and to the world order as a result of his determination to destroy it.
To change this situation Washington needs to labor to delegitimize Xi’s
government in two major ways. First, Washington needs to reaffirm its
commitment to Western values and principles that stand in a positive light when
compared to China’s oppressive government. To advance this goal, the US can
deny him a trade deal, using the occasion to call attention to Xi’s dangerous nature
, as well as the futility of trade policies that unfairly benefit China, which only
strengthens the regime and augments Xi’s legitimacy. The Chinese will never keep
their promises on trade reform, particularly concerning reciprocity and internet
freedom.
Second, the Chinese people must be supported in their effort to avoid a return to
past — rule by a megalomaniac leader. Democratic forces both within and outside
the system must stand up against Xi’s dictatorship.
The global community should also send a strong signal to the Chinese people
about its preference for a stable and peaceful leader to lead that great nation. For
millennia, Chinese civilization was unrivaled in its historical elegance, stability,
and sophistication. The Chinese people should be led by leader who is the equal of
that greatness rather than a despot.
Bradley A. Thayer is the co-author of How China Sees the World: Han-Centrism
and the Balance of Power in International Politics. Lianchao Han is a human
rights activist, Vice President of Initiatives for China, and Visiting Fellow at the
Hudson Institute.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3)How Virginia’s Top
Democrats Survived a Storm
of Scandal
The media lost interest in the Northam blackface brouhaha when it realized the GOP could benefit.
By Mark Hemingway
Drive around Northern Virginia, and you’ll see no sign that only three months ago, the state was
the epicenter of one of the most embarrassing and horrifying political scandals in recent memory
In the populous suburbs west of Washington, plenty of cars still sport bumper stickers
proclaiming support for Gov. Ralph Northam, Lt. Gov. Justin Fairfax and Attorney General Mark
Herring—Democrats all.
It’s hard to believe that a scandal involving abortion, multiple instances of politicians wearing
blackface, and sexual assault allegations hasn’t resulted in a single resignation. The question on
many minds now is: What, if anything, is the state GOP going to do about it?
Gov. Northam, a pediatrician, was asked during a Jan. 30 radio interview to defend state
Democrats’ proposed legislation loosening restrictions on late-term abortion. In response, he
appeared to endorse infanticide as an option when a child is born during a botched abortion. On
Feb. 1, medical-school classmates offended by Mr. Northam’s comment released a photo from
the governor’s 1984 yearbook page, showing a young man in blackface next to someone in a
KKK outfit. Mr. Northam first acknowledged then denied being one of the men in the photo.
It emerged that Lt. Gov. Fairfax, who would take over following a Northam resignation, had
been accused of sexual assault by a college professor and the Washington Post had been
investigating the story for months. (Mr. Fairfax has since been accused by a second woman. He
denies the allegations and says the encounters were consensual.) Then Mr. Herring, who had
initially called for Mr. Northam to step down, announced that he, too, had been photographed in
blackface. Suddenly it dawned on Virginia’s political establishment that the fourth in line for the
governorship is the Republican speaker of the House of Delegates. Democrats stopped
demanding that Messrs. Northam and Fairfax resign.
Republicans don’t appear to have benefited much from the scandal—at least not yet. Virginia is
still considered a swing state, and the state GOP narrowly controls both chambers of the General
Assembly, but the party hasn’t won a statewide election since 2009, despite some very close
races. The Republican Party has also been beset by infighting between moderate and conservative
factions, typified by House Majority Leader Rep. Eric Cantor’s stunning 2014 primary loss to
tea-party candidate Dave Brat, who was unseated by a Democrat last year.
Former Republican Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, who lost the 2013 governor’s race by
56,000 votes, says that the party’s initial response to the scandals was “aggressive and appropriate
.” The big obstacle, Mr. Cuccinelli says, is that the “media is cooperatively ignoring as much of
the foibles of the Democrat leadership in Virginia as they possibly can.”
Blaming the media for liberal bias may be old hat, but Mr. Cuccinelli has a point about the Post,
which is the state’s most influential newspaper. In 2006, incumbent Republican Sen. George
Allen claimed he made the word up, but endless speculation it could be a racial slur drove the
Washington Post to write approximately 100 articles and editorials about the incident from mid-
August through October. Mr. Allen lost. More recently, the sexual-assault claims against Mr.
Fairfax were unearthed by a small conservative website, Big League Politics, even as the Post
worked on the story.
It will be hard for the media to continue ignoring the racial and sexual scandals once ads start
flying in General Assembly elections later this year. So many Democrats went on record calling
for resignations, hypocrisy will be an issue. And while the racial angles got most of the attention
—the NAACP protested at a fundraiser in April where Mr. Northam was set to appear, leading
him to drop out of the event—the abortion extremism is proving to be a sleeper issue.
Much of the rural Democratic base in Virginia is socially conservative, and prominent state
Democrats seem worried. Sen. Tim Kaine and former Gov. Terry MacAuliffe were vocal in
condemning Mr. Northam and the state’s late-term abortion bill.
Victoria Cobb, president of the Virginia Family Foundation, is pleasantly surprised Republicans
are already highlighting the issue. “It has never been the case that abortion in any way has been a
chosen campaign issue for most candidates in the Republican Party,” she says. “But they are
choosing to highlight the differences between the parties on this because of the extreme nature of
where Gov. Northam has led his party.”
Whether the state GOP can capitalize on the Democrats’ woes is an open question. Pete Snyder,
a former lieutenant governor candidate and chairman of Republican Ed Gillespie’s unsuccessful
2017 gubernatorial bid against Mr. Northam, says the party is uniting. “This is as peaceful as I’ve
seen the Republican party in a long time,” he says. And Mr. Cuccinelli sounds enthusiastic: “The
scandal both motivates Republicans and demotivates Democrats.”
What Messrs. Northam and Herring have admitted to would normally end a politician’s career. In
the #MeToo era, not many public figures survive accusations like the ones against Mr. Fairfax.
If none of it ends up harming Virginia Democrats at the polls, the state GOP’s woes could be a
bad omen for the national Republican Party.
Mr. Hemingway is a writer for RealClearInvestigations.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4)
I am watching Washington and thinking this: We have reached a new crisis point in Donald
Trump vs. the Democrats. They are speaking of contempt citations, subpoenas, executive
privilege, hearings. It’s a daily barrage. The Democrats are inching closer to impeachment, at
least rhetorically, perhaps actually. We’ll see how well Speaker Nancy Pelosi can dance right up
to the edge to appease some in her caucus, and not over it.
4)
The Missing Order in American Politics
I grow wistful as I watch the congressional chaos while reading Kissinger’s
forthcoming oral history.
By Peggy Noonan
I am watching Washington and thinking this: We have reached a new crisis point in Donald
Trump vs. the Democrats. They are speaking of contempt citations, subpoenas, executive
privilege, hearings. It’s a daily barrage. The Democrats are inching closer to impeachment, at
least rhetorically, perhaps actually. We’ll see how well Speaker Nancy Pelosi can dance right up
to the edge to appease some in her caucus, and not over it.
But there is such a thing as context, and the Democrats seem to be ignoring it. This is a country
divided.
divided.
Almost half the country is for Mr. Trump—truly, madly, deeply. Half is against him—
unequivocally, unchangeably. There is no resolving this. Or rather to the extent it can be resolved,
it will be resolved at the ballot box. The presidential election is 18 months from now, on Nov. 3,
2020.
unequivocally, unchangeably. There is no resolving this. Or rather to the extent it can be resolved,
it will be resolved at the ballot box. The presidential election is 18 months from now, on Nov. 3,
2020.
Until then, people are where they are and hold the views they hold, and don’t push them too hard.
Democrats unveil charges and accusations—the president is a liar, he’s a tax dodger, an
obstructor of justice. But in a way Mr. Trump’s supporters accounted for all this before they
elected him. They are not shocked. They didn’t hire him to be a good man. Their politics are
post-heroic. They sometimes tell reporters he’s a man of high character but mostly to drive the
reporters crazy. I have never talked to a Trump supporter, and my world is thick with them, who
thought he had a high personal character. On the other hand they sincerely believe he has a high political character, in that he pursues the issues he campaigned on. They hired him as an
insult to the political class, as a Hail Mary pass—we’ve tried everything else, maybe this will
work—and because he agreed with them on the issues.
obstructor of justice. But in a way Mr. Trump’s supporters accounted for all this before they
elected him. They are not shocked. They didn’t hire him to be a good man. Their politics are
post-heroic. They sometimes tell reporters he’s a man of high character but mostly to drive the
reporters crazy. I have never talked to a Trump supporter, and my world is thick with them, who
thought he had a high personal character. On the other hand they sincerely believe he has a high political character, in that he pursues the issues he campaigned on. They hired him as an
insult to the political class, as a Hail Mary pass—we’ve tried everything else, maybe this will
work—and because he agreed with them on the issues.
Supporters give him high marks for not looking down on them as they believe most members of
the media, who are always trying to “understand” them, do. Their attitude is: “Don’t try to
understand me, like you’re the anthropologist and we’re the savages. I’m an American, what are
they?” They factor the cultural animosity in. When they jeer the press during rallies at the
president’s direction, they don’t really mean it. They’re having fun and talking back. They’d be
happy if their kids became reporters—an affluent profession, and half of them are famous. The
president doesn’t really hate the press either, he wants their love and admiration. You don’t need
the admiration of people you truly disdain.
the media, who are always trying to “understand” them, do. Their attitude is: “Don’t try to
understand me, like you’re the anthropologist and we’re the savages. I’m an American, what are
they?” They factor the cultural animosity in. When they jeer the press during rallies at the
president’s direction, they don’t really mean it. They’re having fun and talking back. They’d be
happy if their kids became reporters—an affluent profession, and half of them are famous. The
president doesn’t really hate the press either, he wants their love and admiration. You don’t need
the admiration of people you truly disdain.
Trump supporters now are looking around and thinking: Things are looking up. The economy is
gangbusters, everyone can get a job, good people are on the courts. Something good is happening
with China—it’s unclear what, but at least he’s pushing back. As for illegal immigration, he at
least cares about it and means to make it better, though no, it doesn’t seem improved.
gangbusters, everyone can get a job, good people are on the courts. Something good is happening
with China—it’s unclear what, but at least he’s pushing back. As for illegal immigration, he at
least cares about it and means to make it better, though no, it doesn’t seem improved.
To take all Congress’s time right now and devote it to attacking the president, or impeaching him,
will be experienced as a vast, disheartening insult by half the country, and disheartening. It will
simply damage the country and be seen as extreme and destructive. It will keep good things, such
as an infrastructure bill, from happening.
will be experienced as a vast, disheartening insult by half the country, and disheartening. It will
simply damage the country and be seen as extreme and destructive. It will keep good things, such
as an infrastructure bill, from happening.
As a purely political calculation it will do the Democrats no good. Nonstop scandal theater
starring the theatrically indignant will only make people who hate Mr. Trump hate him a little
more, and people who support Mr. Trump hate his foes a little more. It will not move any needle.
starring the theatrically indignant will only make people who hate Mr. Trump hate him a little
more, and people who support Mr. Trump hate his foes a little more. It will not move any needle.
Robert Mueller, often praised in this space, didn’t resolve anything, did he? People wanted
clarity, not subtlety and indirection. So yes, as a last hurrah let him speak. What did hethink his
report was saying and implying? What in his view would be a just outcome to the story of Mr.
Trump and the Russians and 2016?
clarity, not subtlety and indirection. So yes, as a last hurrah let him speak. What did hethink his
report was saying and implying? What in his view would be a just outcome to the story of Mr.
Trump and the Russians and 2016?
Beyond that, enough already. We have to have a greater appreciation for how split we are as a
nation, and how delicate this all is. And we have to remember we’re not only split, we’re
conjoined. We share this country.
We are like Chang and Eng, the 19th century Siamese Twin brothers who worked for P.T.
Barnum. They could not be separated and went through their long lives together, married to
nation, and how delicate this all is. And we have to remember we’re not only split, we’re
conjoined. We share this country.
We are like Chang and Eng, the 19th century Siamese Twin brothers who worked for P.T.
Barnum. They could not be separated and went through their long lives together, married to
different women, living in different houses—a few days a week in this one, a few in another.
It wasn’t easy for them to walk through life together, but they did. We have to, too.
Now I wish to switch subjects. Don’t you?
“How to do it” is the hardest question in life after “what to do.” It’s hard enough to make the
. Then you have to execute. A right decision poorly executed might as well be a wrong one. This
is in a way the subject of a small book called “Kissinger on Kissinger” by Winston Lord. It is
composed of transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s first and only oral history, based on six interviews
conducted by Mr. Lord, President Reagan’s ambassador to China, and K.T. McFarland, who
served as Mr. Trump’s deputy national security adviser.
. Then you have to execute. A right decision poorly executed might as well be a wrong one. This
is in a way the subject of a small book called “Kissinger on Kissinger” by Winston Lord. It is
composed of transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s first and only oral history, based on six interviews
conducted by Mr. Lord, President Reagan’s ambassador to China, and K.T. McFarland, who
served as Mr. Trump’s deputy national security adviser.
“Like all oral histories, this is a brief for my case,” Mr. Kissinger writes in the introduction. “I
did not go out of my way to be self-critical.” He doesn’t. But there is a lot of how-to for
diplomats—how the opening with China occurred and was made to occur, how the Soviets were
handled as that breakthrough became real, what drove Nixon-era Mideast shuttle diplomacy.
did not go out of my way to be self-critical.” He doesn’t. But there is a lot of how-to for
diplomats—how the opening with China occurred and was made to occur, how the Soviets were
handled as that breakthrough became real, what drove Nixon-era Mideast shuttle diplomacy.
I should note here that Mr. Kissinger is always called “deeply controversial” because he is, that
his diplomatic efforts with and under President Nixon were often bold and creative, certainly
deeply consequential, and that one of the most remarkable things about him is that he is 95 and
has, for 50 years, remained a major public figure and retained his status as a major thinker.
Foreign leaders treat him with the gravest respect. Mr. Lord calls this “a remarkable performance
of savvy, stamina and sway.”
his diplomatic efforts with and under President Nixon were often bold and creative, certainly
deeply consequential, and that one of the most remarkable things about him is that he is 95 and
has, for 50 years, remained a major public figure and retained his status as a major thinker.
Foreign leaders treat him with the gravest respect. Mr. Lord calls this “a remarkable performance
of savvy, stamina and sway.”
At his 90th-birthday party, which I attended as a friend, former secretaries of state of both parties
lined up to thank him for his advice, wisdom and encouragement. I admit I cannot see his public
self without thinking of the 16-year-old immigrant who worked in a shaving-brush factory in
New York. The tough Italian-American men he worked with teased the German refugee and took
him to Yankee Stadium to learn to be an American. There he first saw the man who years later on
meeting him struck him dumb: Joe DiMaggio
lined up to thank him for his advice, wisdom and encouragement. I admit I cannot see his public
self without thinking of the 16-year-old immigrant who worked in a shaving-brush factory in
New York. The tough Italian-American men he worked with teased the German refugee and took
him to Yankee Stadium to learn to be an American. There he first saw the man who years later on
meeting him struck him dumb: Joe DiMaggio
But I’ve gotten away from the book.
It has many good things. In the formation of foreign policy successful international negotiations,
“everything depends . . . on some conception of the future.” The bias of bureaucracy is toward
dailiness: there are communiqués to answer, immediate decisions that require response. In this
atmosphere a leader must develop an overall sense of where he wants to go and how to get there.
“everything depends . . . on some conception of the future.” The bias of bureaucracy is toward
dailiness: there are communiqués to answer, immediate decisions that require response. In this
atmosphere a leader must develop an overall sense of where he wants to go and how to get there.
Every diplomatic effort must begin with an articulated intention. He and Nixon “spent hours
together asking ‘What are we trying to do, what are we trying to achieve, what are we trying to
prevent?’ ” The “end state” is the goal, not the process.
together asking ‘What are we trying to do, what are we trying to achieve, what are we trying to
prevent?’ ” The “end state” is the goal, not the process.
In a way it is a tribute to order. Oh, I miss that.
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