ISIS on The March, America In Retreat! Off To Louisville and Pittsburgh!

Midst the serious, I always find time to post humor.

A very dear Christian friend, fellow memo reader and Marine responded to a recent memo as follows: "Thanks, Dick, for the humor. God knows we need it these days. There is so much to worry about; high on the list for me are the prospects for Israel and for the Jews of Europe...
I hope all is well with you and yours. S--"


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A new book describes ISIS plans for taking over Rome by 2020.

Sounds outlandish?  Time will tell.(See 1 below.)
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Has Putin accomplished his goal of being able to use Cyprus port?

Putin moves knowing the West will do nothing? (See 2 below.)
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I have repeatedly written about Professor Ellen Cannon's message delivered to a small audience on the campus of Rollins College in Winter Park, Florida, over 10 years ago, in which she outlined how Islamists would burrow into our society.  http://youtu.be/vFCAXdYKxrs.

Her message is more true today than when she made it.  (See 3 below.)
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What to look for post Netanyahu's address to Congress and the world. (See 4 below.)
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Friedman on Netanyahu. (See 5 below.)
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Off to Louisville where son in law being honored for his civic work and then to Pittsburgh for son's birthday and to take Stella to Disney on Ice - Brrr!  Back late Monday.

Have a great weekend and listen to Bibi's speech and make up you own mind is the world better off with Iran going nuclear and do you trust Obama and Kerry to truly live up to their pledge?
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Dick
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1) ISLAMIC STATE: PRO-PALESTINIANS IN EUROPE ACTUALLY SLEEPER ISLAMIC STATE CELLS
Author: Robert S[pencer

“There were small armies of the Islamic State within every country of Europe by late 2014, and the intelligence agencies didn’t even know about it!” Inconceivable! Everyone knows that European intelligence agencies are 100% on top of jihad activity! They can’t name it as what it is, and they refuse to acknowledge what it is derived from, but…they’re on it!

“ISIS: Pro-Palestinians in Europe Actually Sleeper ISIS Cells,” by Tova Dvorin, Arutz Sheva, February 27, 2015 (thanks to The Religion of Peace):

Pro-Palestinian rallies and groups are being used to aid the rise of Islamic State (ISIS) in Europe, according to a book the group released this month – united under the front of “bringing down Zionism [sic].”

The book, Black Flags from Rome, encourages European Muslims to rise up and aid ISIS from within, according to a report on the PJ Media website – and notes that terror cells have already been formed.

“There were small armies of the Islamic State within every country of Europe by late 2014, and the intelligence agencies didn’t even know about it!” the book exclaims.

“If you have ever been at a pro-Palestine/anti-Israel protest, you will see many activists who are not even Muslims who are supportive of what Muslims are calling for (the fall of Zionism),” it continues. “It is most likely here that connections between Muslims and Left-wing activists will be made, and a portion from them will realize that protests are not effective, and that armed combat is the alternative.”

Such “recruits” being lured to ISIS due to frustration over their lives “will give intelligence, share weapons and do undercover work for the Muslims to pave the way for the conquest of Rome,” the book also predicts.

The text also gives detailed instructions on building Molotov cocktails, beginning local “turf wars” to aid in the process of Islamist land-grabbing, and consolidating extremist groups to build armies.

The point, it says, is to lead to an armed takeover of Europe – and it presents a highly intricate plan that includes battling local mob bosses to storm Rome, with the aid of such widely available planning tools as Google Earth. It predicts a defeat of a Russia-Iran alliance and the Italian army for an ISIS takeover of Italy by 2020….

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2)-- PUTIN'S CYPRUS DEAL GIVES RUSSIA A FOOTHOLD IN THE EU: BRITISH MPS BLAST ISLAND'S DECISION TO LET MOSCOW'S NAVY USE ITS PORTS

Author:  Ian Drury, Home Affairs Correspondent 

Growing reach: Russia has gained a foothold in Europe after President Vladimir Putin, pictured, signed a deal with Cyprus to dock warships there

Russia has gained a military foothold in Europe after Vladimir Putin signed a controversial deal with Cyprus to dock warships there.

British MPs said Nicosia’s decision to let the Russian navy, including heavily armed frigates, use its ports for counter-terrorism and anti-piracy was ‘worrying and disappointing’.

Cyprus, an EU member, thrashed out the agreement despite already hosting two British military bases and 3,200 troops. President Putin insisted the deal 'should not cause worries anywhere'.

But Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades, who was visiting Moscow, hinted Russian warplanes could also be allowed to use a military airbase in Paphos, on the south-west coast of the island.

The deal raised eyebrows as tensions between the West and Moscow over the crisis in Ukraine continue to rise.

It will be watched warily by the UK, which has led calls for a string of punishing economic sanctions against Moscow for arming pro-Kremlin separatists who have taken over huge swathes of territory.

On Tuesday, Britain announced it would deploy 75 troops to Ukraine as trainers – a move certain to have infuriated Putin. Russian bombers have recently buzzed UK airspace in a show of strength.

The latest agreement fuelled speculation that the Kremlin had engineered the deal by putting together a multibillion-pound package to bail out debt-ridden Cyprus.

The two countries, which have long had close economic ties, signed protocols including fresh financial deals between Cyprus and the Central Bank of Russia.

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4)-The Real Crisis in U.S.-Israel Relations Lies Ahead

by Steven J. Rosen: The Washington Times

The brouhaha over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's March 3 speech to Congress is diverting attention from more important U.S.-Israel controversies that will escalate soon after this comparatively minor contretemps fizzles out.

At the U.N., the Palestinians and Europeans will press forward after the March 17 Israeli election, submitting draft United Nations Security Council resolutions that they postponed at the request of Secretary of State John F. Kerry. They are pressuring the administration to join this effort to impose terms on Israel, and not to veto.

In the Iran talks, there either will or won't be a framework agreement by theMarch 31 target date, and either way there will be a clash between friends of Israel and the Obama administration — either about the terms of the agreement, or about intensified sanctions in the absence of an agreement.

After March 17, President Obama will be making a series of fateful decisions affecting Israel.

At the International Criminal Court (ICC), the "State of Palestine" will achieve full membership on April 1, opening the way for potential war crimes complaints against Israel. By June, the total VAT and clearance revenues that the government of Israel is withholding from the Palestinian Authority will approach $1 billion. The United States and other patrons of the PA will argue that the resulting debt and unpaid salaries to civil servants and security forces are bringing the PA to the point of collapse. Yet, at the same time, the Obama Administration will be required by law to suspend $400 million in U.S. budgetary assistance to the PA.

And the deadlock between the PA and Hamas that has impeded reconstruction of Gaza is likely to bring the enclave to a boiling point in about the same time frame. Some will blame Israel. After the Israeli election, a new package of sanctions against settlement products will be announced by the European Union.

Israel will not have a fully functioning government for some weeks after the voting takes place on March 17, because, based on past experience, assembling a multiparty coalition to empower a viable government is not likely to be completed until about May 15. Most polls indicate that the next government will be headed by Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud, but there is uncertainty whether he will head a narrow government of the right and religious or a wider coalition including elements of the center-left. A deadlock is also possible, resulting in greater delays before control of the key ministries and the guidelines of the new government are decided.

In Washington, shortly after March 17, President Obama will be making a series of fateful decisions affecting Israel, while the Jewish state is absorbed in sorting out its internal decision-making structure. Mr. Obama and Mr. Kerry are likely to press Israel to turn over to the PA hundreds of millions in escrowed clearance revenues, at the very moment that the PA is seeking prosecution of Israel at the ICC and going to the Security Council in an effort to impose Arab demands on Israel.

Mr. Obama may sign an accord that leaves Iran with 6,500 centrifuges, against the opposition of his most important Mideast allies in Israel and the Gulf states, even if a majority in Congress opposes the agreement. If there is no Iran agreement, Mr. Obama may still veto the Kirk-Menendez Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, arguing that it will impede his "Plan B" policy of keeping the Joint Plan of Action as a de facto long term interim arrangement

At the United Nations, France plans to submit a resolution in cooperation with Germany and the U.K., because, in the words of Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, "pressure is required from the international community to help both sides ... take the ultimate step." It will propose "clear parameters for resolving the conflict adopted by the international community in advance" and a firm timetable to "provide the basis for future negotiations." France is looking for a compromise resolution "which everyone can get behind" because the Americans have already said that they will veto the Arab draft.

The E-3 draft calls for a comprehensive agreement "no later than 24 months after ... this resolution" instead of the 12 months in the Arab draft. It calls for "full phased withdrawal of Israeli security forces" from the West Bank and Gaza, but deletes the Arab draft's demand that this be completed by the end of 2017. It "looks forward to welcoming Palestine as a full member of the United Nations," but deletes the Arab draft's conclusion that this must occur by the end of 2017. While the Arab draft demands a resolution of the refugee question "on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative and resolution 194," the E-3 draft requires only a "fair and realistic" solution. And the French draft recalls that General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 called for a "Jewish state," while the Arab draft studiously avoids this phrase.

Mr. Obama may allow the French E-3 draft to pass at the UN Security Council, or even vote for it.

The administration has not commented publicly about the French E-3 draft. But some observers believe that Mr. Obama may allow it to pass or even vote for it, possibly using the U.S. vote as bait for American changes.

But even with changes, the French draft endorses principles that will be problematic for the government of Israel: e.g., that borders should be "based on 4 June 1967 with mutually agreed limited equivalent land swaps"; that Israeli communities in eastern Jerusalem and the hills of Judea and Samaria "have no legal validity" and that Jerusalem should be the "shared" capital of two states.

Most importantly, allowing a decision on this issue at the United Nations Security Council would be a victory for those who want the Great Powers to decide the outcome instead of leaving it to bilateral direct negotiations, a longstanding demand of the Arabs consistently opposed by Israel and, until now, by the United States.

The bottom line: Mr. Obama has more opportunity to inflame U.S.-Israel relations on core issues in the next few months, than in any previous period since his ascent to the presidency.

Steven J. Rosen, previously the director of foreign policy issues at AIPAC, is the director of The Washington Project at the Middle East Forum.

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5)--- Netanyahu, Obama and the Geopolitics of Speeches

By George Friedman

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is visiting the United States this week to speak to Congress on March 3. The Obama administration is upset that Speaker of the House John Boehner invited Netanyahu without consulting with the White House and charged Boehner with political grandstanding. Netanyahu said he was coming to warn the United States of the threat of Iran. Israeli critics of Netanyahu charged that this was a play for public approval to improve his position in Israel's general election next year. Boehner denied any political intent beyond getting to hear Netanyahu's views. The Obama administration claimed that the speech threatens the fabric of U.S.-Israeli relations.

Let us begin with the obvious. First, this is a speech, and it is unlikely that Netanyahu could say anything new on the subject of Iran, given that he never stops talking about it. Second, everyone involved is grandstanding. They are politicians, and that's what they do. Third, the idea that U.S.-Israeli relations can be shredded by a grandstanding speech is preposterous. If that's all it takes, relations are already shredded.

Speeches aside, there is no question that U.S.-Israeli relations have been changing substantially since the end of the Cold War, and that change, arrested for a while after 9/11, has created distance and tension between the countries. Netanyahu's speech is merely a symptom of the underlying reality. There are theatrics, there are personal animosities, but presidents and prime ministers come and go. What is important are the interests that bind or separate nations, and the interests of Israel and the United States have to some extent diverged. It is the divergence of interests we must focus on, particularly because there is a great deal of mythology around the U.S.-Israeli relationship created by advocates of a close relationship, opponents of the relationship, and foreign enemies of one or both countries.

Building the U.S.-Israeli Relationship

It is important to begin by understanding that the United States and Israel did not always have a close relationship. While the United States recognized Israel from the beginning, its relationship was cool until after the Six-Day War in 1967. When Israel, along with Britain and France, invaded Egypt in 1956, the United States demanded Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza, and the Israelis complied. The United States provided no aid for Israel except for food aid given through a U.N. program that served many nations. The United States was not hostile to Israel, nor did it regard its relationship as crucial.

This began to change before the 1967 conflict, after pro-Soviet coups in Syria and Iraq by Baathist parties. Responding to this threat, the United States created a belt of surface-to-air missiles stretching from Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Israel in 1965. This was the first military aid given to Israel, and it was intended to be part of a system to block Soviet power. Until 1967, Israel's weapons came primarily from France. Again, the United States had no objection to this relationship, nor was it a critical issue to Washington.

The Six-Day War changed this. After the conflict, the French, wanting to improve relations with the Arabs, cut off weapons sales to Israel. The United States saw Egypt become a Soviet naval and air base, along with Syria. This threatened the U.S. Sixth Fleet and other interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In particular, the United States was concerned about Turkey because the Bosporus in Soviet hands would open the door to a significant Soviet challenge in the Mediterranean and Southern Europe. Turkey was now threatened not only from the north but also from the south by Syria and Iraq. The Iranians, then U.S. allies, forced the Iraqis to face east rather than north. The Israelis forced the Syrians to focus south. Once the French pulled out of their relationship with Israel and the Soviets consolidated their positions in Egypt and Syria in the wake of the Six-Day War, the United States was forced into a different relationship with Israel.

It has been said that the 1967 war and later U.S. support for Israel triggered Arab anti-Americanism. It undoubtedly deepened anti-American sentiment among the Arabs, but it was not the trigger. Egypt became pro-Soviet in 1956 despite the U.S. intervention against Israel, while Syria and Iraq became pro-Soviet before the United States began sending military aid to Israel. But after 1967, the United States locked into a strategic relationship with Israel and became its primary source of military assistance. This support surged during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, with U.S. assistance rising from roughly 5 percent of Israeli gross domestic product to more than 20 percent a year later.

The United States was strategically dependent on Israel to maintain a balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. But even during this period, the United States had competing strategic interests. For example, as part of encouraging a strategic reversal into the U.S. camp after the 1973 war, the United States negotiated an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai that the Israelis were extremely reluctant to do but could not avoid under U.S. pressure. Similarly, U.S. President Ronald Reagan opposed an Israeli invasion of Lebanon that reached Beirut, and the initial U.S. intervention in Lebanon was not against Arab elements but intended to block Israel. There was a strategic dependence on Israel, but it was never a simple relationship.

The Israelis' national security requirements have always outstripped their resources. They had to have an outside patron. First it was the Soviets via Czechoslovakia, then France, then the United States. They could not afford to alienate the United States — the essential foundation of their national security — but neither could they simply comply with American wishes. For the United States, Israel was an important asset. It was far from the only important asset. The United States had to reconcile its support of Israel with its support of Saudi Arabia, as an example. Israel and the Saudis were part of an anti-Soviet coalition, but they had competing interests, shown when the United States sold airborne warning and control systems to the Saudis. The Israelis both needed the United States and chafed under the limitations Washington placed on them.

Post-Soviet Relations

The collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the strategic foundation for the U.S.-Israeli relationship. There was no pressing reason to end it, but it began to evolve and diverge. The fall of the Soviet Union left Syria and Iraq without a patron. Egypt's U.S.-equipped army, separated from Israel by a demilitarized Sinai and token American peacekeepers, posed no threat. Jordan was a key ally of Israel. The United States began seeing the Mediterranean and Middle East in totally different ways. Israel, for the first time since its founding, didn't face any direct threat of attack. In addition, Israel's economy surged, and U.S. aid, although it remained steady, became far less important to Israel than it was. In 2012, U.S. assistance ($2.9 billion) accounted for just more than 1 percent of Israel's GDP.

Both countries had more room to maneuver than they'd had previously. They were no longer locked into a relationship with each other, and their relationship continued as much out of habit as out of interest. The United States had no interest in Israel creating settlements in the West Bank, but it wasn't interested enough in stopping them to risk rupturing the relationship. The Israelis were no longer so dependent on the United States that they couldn't risk its disapproval.

The United States and Israel drew together initially after 9/11. From the Israeli perspective, the attacks proved that the United States and Israel had a common interest against the Islamic world. The U.S. response evolved into a much more complex form, particularly as it became apparent that U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq were not going to pacify either country. The United States needed a strategy that would prevent jihadist attacks on the homeland, and that meant intelligence cooperation not only with the Israelis but also with Islamic countries hostile to Israel. This was the old problem. Israel wanted the United States focused on Israel as its main partner, but the United States had much wider and more complex relations to deal with in the region that required a more nuanced approach.

This is the root of the divergence on Iran. From Israel's point of view, the Iranians pose an inherent threat regardless of how far along they are — or are not — with their nuclear program. Israel wants the United States aligned against Iran. Now, how close Tehran is to a nuclear weapon is an important question, but to Israel, however small the nuclear risk, it cannot be tolerated because Iran's ideology makes it an existential threat.

The Iran Problem

From the American perspective, the main question about Iran is, assuming it is a threat, can it be destroyed militarily? The Iranians are not fools. They observed the ease with which the Israelis destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. They buried theirs deep underground. It is therefore not clear, regardless of how far along it is or what its purpose is, that the United States could destroy Iran's nuclear program from the air. It would require, at the very least, special operations on the ground, and failing that, military action beyond U.S. capabilities. Aside from the use of nuclear weapons, it is unclear that an attack on multiple hardened sites would work.

The Israelis are quite aware of these difficulties. Had it been possible to attack, and had the Israelis believed what they were saying, the Israelis would have attacked. The distances are great, but there are indications that countries closer to Iran and also interested in destroying Iran's nuclear program would have allowed the use of their territories. Yet the Israelis did not attack.

The American position is that, lacking a viable military option and uncertain as to the status of Iran's program, the only option is to induce Iran to curtail the program. Simply maintaining permanent sanctions does not end whatever program there is. Only an agreement with Iran trading the program for an end of sanctions would work. From the American point of view, the lack of a military option requires a negotiation. The Israeli position is that Iran cannot be trusted. The American position is that in that case, there are no options.

Behind this is a much deeper issue. Israel of course understands the American argument. What really frightens the Israelis is an emerging American strategy. Having failed to pacify Afghanistan or Iraq, the United States has come to the conclusion that wars of occupation are beyond American capacity. It is prepared to use air power and very limited ground forces in Iraq, for example. However, the United States does not see itself as having the option of bringing decisive force to bear.

An Intricate U.S. Strategy

Therefore, the United States has a double strategy emerging. The first layer is to keep its distance from major flare-ups in the region, providing support but making clear it will not be the one to take primary responsibility. As the situation on the ground deteriorates, the United States expects these conflicts to eventually compel regional powers to take responsibility. In the case of Syria and Iraq, for example, the chaos is on the border of Turkey. Let Turkey live with it, or let Turkey send its own troops in. If that happens, the United States will use limited force to support them. A similar dynamic is playing out with Jordan and the Gulf Cooperation Council states as Saudi Arabia tries to assume responsibility for Sunni Arab interests in the face of a U.S-Iranian entente. Importantly, thisrapprochement with Iran is already happening against the Islamic State, which is an enemy of both the United States and Iran. I am not sure we would call what is happening collaboration, but there is certainly parallel play between Iran and the United States.

The second layer of this strategy is creating a balance of power. The United States wants regional powers to deal with issues that threaten their interests more than American interests. At the same time, the United States does not want any one country to dominate the region. Therefore, it is in the American interest to have multiple powers balancing each other. There are four such powers: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some collaborate, some are hostile, and some shift over time. The United States wants to get rid of Iran's weapons, but it does not want to shatter the country. It is part of a pattern of regional responsibility and balance.

This is the heart of Israel's problem. It has always been a pawn in U.S. strategy, but a vital pawn. In this emerging strategy, with multiple players balancing each other and the United States taking the minimum possible action to maintain the equilibrium, Israel finds itself in a complex relationship with three countries that it cannot be sure of managing by itself. By including Iran in this mix, the United States includes what Israel regards as an unpredictable element not solely because of the nuclear issue but because Iran's influence stretches to Syria and Lebanon and imposes costs and threats Israel wants to avoid.

This has nothing to do with the personalities of Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu. The United States has shown it cannot pacify countries with available forces. The definition of insanity is doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting a different outcome. If the United States is not involved on the ground in a conflict, then it becomes a problem for regional powers to handle. If the regional powers take the roles they must, they should balance against each other without a single regional hegemon emerging.

Israel does not want to be considered by the United States as one power among many. It is focused on the issue of a nuclear Iran, but it knows that there is no certainty that Iran's nuclear facilities can be destroyed or that sanctions will cause the Iranians to abandon the nuclear program. What Israel fears is an entente between the United States and Iran and a system of relations in which U.S. support will not be automatic.

So a speech will be made. Obama and Netanyahu are supposed to dislike each other. Politicians are going to be elected and jockey for power. All of this is true, and none of it matters. What does matter is that the United States, regardless of who is president, has to develop a new strategy in the region. This is the only option other than trying to occupy Syria and Iraq. Israel, regardless of who is prime minister, does not want to be left as part of this system while the United States maintains ties with all the other players along with Israel. Israel doesn't have the weight to block this strategy, and the United States has no alternative but to pursue it.

This isn't about Netanyahu and Obama, and both know it. It is about the reconfiguration of a region the United States cannot subdue and cannot leave. It is the essence of great power strategy: creating a balance of power in which the balancers are trapped into playing a role they don't want. It is not a perfect strategy, but it is the only one the United States has. Israel is not alone in not wanting this. Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia don't want it, either. But geopolitics is indifferent to wishes. It understands only imperatives and constraints.

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