Churchill and His Paraprosdokians! Hahvahd Heaves Over Obamacare! Market Talk! Ten Commandments!

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Churchill had a marvelous sense of humor but it had an edge and loved "paraprosdokians" signifying how truly brilliant he was:

1. Where there's a will, I want to be in it.

 

2. The last thing I want to do is hurt you, but it's still on my list.

 

3. Since light travels faster than sound, some people appear bright until you hear them speak.

 

4. If I agreed with you, we'd both be wrong.

 

5. War does not determine who is right - only who is left.

 

6. Knowledge is knowing a tomato is a fruit. Wisdom is not putting it in a fruit salad.

 

7. They begin the evening news with 'Good Evening,' then proceed to tell you why it isn't.

 

8. To steal ideas from one person is plagiarism. To steal from many is research.

 

9. I thought I wanted a career. Turns out, I just wanted pay checks.

 

10. In filling out an application, where it says, 'In case of emergency, notify:' I put "DOCTOR."

 

11. I didn't say it was your fault, I said I was blaming you.

 

12. Women will never be equal to men until they can walk down the street...with a bald head and a beer gut, and still think they are sexy.

 

13. Behind every successful man is his woman.

Behind the fall of a successful man is usually another woman.

 

14. A clear conscience is the sign of a fuzzy memory.

 

15. You do not need a parachute to skydive .  You only need a parachute to skydive twice.

 16. I used to be indecisive. Now I'm not so sure.

 

17. You're never too old to learn something stupid.

 

18. To be sure of hitting the target, shoot first and call whatever you hit the target.

 

19. Nostalgia isn't what it used to be.

 

20. Change is inevitable, except from a vending machine.

 

21. Going to church doesn't make you a Christian any more than standing in a garage makes you a car.

 

Finally:

 

24. I'm supposed to respect my elders, but now it’s getting harder and harder for me to find one.

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This was sent to me by a friend and fellow memo reader in response to my previous memo in which I discussed religion and a world without god:

INTRODUCTION TO THE TEN COMMANDMENTS WITH DAVID PRAGER......

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_profilepage&v=TK57RiMqTdk

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HAHVAHD Professors upset over cost raise in their health care.  Other HAVAHD Professors assisted in structuring the increase.  OH MY! (See 1 below.)
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Stratfor analyst points out challenges the Saudis face.

Meanwhile, oil continues to drop in price and Saudi King speaks but says little.

The market is reflecting more serious problems than just oil demand. I believe, as I wrote earlier , the economic decline world wide is of growing concern and could impact our own recovery.  Texas' growth surge is also being threatened by energy price declines.

The market should remain unsettled for a bit further until evidence of a bottom in oil becomes more evident.  Though energy bullishness is developing still seems premature.

A well informed friend of mine believes trend following "hedgies" who are notoriously  sheep like in their responses,  are contributing to the oil decline. (See 2 and 2a below.)

Has pressure on Qatar caused them to expel the head of Hamas?

". According to Turkish media reports picked up by the Jerusalem Post, Qatar is going to expel Hamas chie,f Khaled Mashaal, who will relocate to Turkey."
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The Republican Congress appears ready to take harsh measure against Iran and the Palestinians. Will they carry through?  Stay tuned. (See 3 below.)
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Sowell concludes as I have, seeking to eradicate inequality is commendable but unrealistic, raises false hopes and eventually is dangerous and divisive. (See 4 below.)
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Rumored, John Bolton considering run for the presidency and leaving FOX to do so.  Stay at FOX, John and seek the position of Sec. of State in a Republican Administration  That is where you would best serve the nation.

You cannot raise the necessary funds!
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Regime change in Iran should be pursued according to this op ed writer. (See 5 below.)
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More fairness garbage from the Democrats! (See 6 below.)
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Correction re tax increase posted in prior memo:

"Top Medicare tax went from 1.45% to 2.35%   This additional .9% only applies to salaries and earned income above 200K for a single person and 250K for married filing joint, and it came into place 1/1/13.

Top Income tax bracket went from 35% to 39.6%  This only applies to taxable income above      for married filing joint and also came into play on 1/1/13
Top Income payroll tax went from 37.4% to 52.2%  Don’t know about this. The payroll tax rate is 6.2% on the first 118,500 for 2015. The Medicare tax is 1.45% on all wages. 

Capital Gains tax went from 15% to 28%  Again, false. The capital gain rate is 0% if you are in the 5 or 15% tax bracket, 15% if you are in the 25, 31, or 36% tax bracket and 20% if your AGI is in excess of 400K for a single person or 450K married filing joint. 

Dividends tax went from 15% to 39.6%  False. Same treated as capital gains above.
Estate tax went from 0% to 55%  False. There is a 5.43 Million dollar exemption from estate tax, 10.86M for a married couple. After that, the estate tax rate is 40%/ "

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Dick

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1)Harvard Professors Hit by Obamacare They Touted

By Drew MacKenzie 

Harvard professors are up in arms after learning they will have to pay more towards their healthcare costs under Obamacare which many of them have championed, The New York Times reports.

The Faculty of Arts and Sciences, the center of the venerable institution, has voted overwhelmingly to fight changes that would force them, along with thousands of other Harvard employees, to pay more for their health benefits.

“Harvard is a microcosm of what’s happening in healthcare in the country,” said David Cutler, a health economist at the university who was an adviser during President Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign.

Until the changes, Harvard professors have managed to escape the added costs that other employers have passed on to their employees, the Times reported, while noting that this is why the protest has been all the more unusual.

“Harvard was and remains a very generous employer.” Cutler said of the 378-year-old private Ivy League university in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Richard Thomas, a Harvard professor of classics and a leading authority worldwide on Virgil, slammed the higher costs, saying they are “deplorable, deeply regressive, a sign of the corporatization of the university.”

Mary Lewis, a professor specializing in modern French history, has been one of the leaders at the arts and sciences faculty opposing the changes in benefits, which she called the equivalent of a salary reduction.

“This pay cut will be timed to come at precisely the moment when you are sick, stressed or facing the challenges of being a new parent,” Lewis said.

And Mary Waters, a professor of sociology, said, “It seems that Harvard is trying to save money by shifting costs to sick people. I don’t understand why a university with Harvard’s incredible resources would do this. What is the crisis?”

Harvard President Drew Gilpin Faust explained in a letter to the faculty that the shift in healthcare benefits had been recommended by some of the university’s own health policy experts.

However, Gilpin admitted that the changes have been “causing distress” and had “generated anxiety” around campus, according to the Times.

But she insisted that the move was vital because the university’s health benefit costs were growing faster than operating revenues and staff salaries, and they were threatening the funding of such priorities as teaching, research and student aid.

Dr. Barbara McNeil, the head of the health care policy department at Harvard Medical School and a member of the benefits committee, also defended the changes, saying, “Harvard employees want access to everything. They don’t want to be restricted in what institutions they can get care from.

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2)-Saudi Arabia's Coming Challenges

By Michael Nayebi-Oskoui

The Middle East is one of the most volatile regions in the world — it is no stranger to upheaval. The 2009 uprisings in Iran and the brinksmanship of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government were followed by the chaos of the Arab Spring, the spillover of the Syrian conflict into Iraq and a potential realignment of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Unlike recent years, however, 2015 is likely to see regional Sunni Arab interests realign toward a broader acceptance of moderate political Islam. The region is emerging from the uncertainty of the past half-decade, and the foundations of its future are taking shape. This process will not be neat or orderly, but changes are clearly taking place surrounding the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, as well as the region's anticipation of a strengthened Iran.

The Middle East enters 2015 facing several crises. Libyan instability remains a threat to North African security, and the Levant and Persian Gulf must figure out how to adjust course in the wake of the U.S.-Iranian negotiations, the Sunni-Shiite proxy war in Syria and Iraq, and the power vacuum created by a Turkish state bogged down by internal concerns that prevent it from assuming a larger role throughout the region. Further undermining the region is the sharp decline in global oil prices. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will be able to use considerable cash reserves to ride out the slump, the rest of the Middle East's oil-exporting economies face dire consequences.

For decades, long-ruling autocratic leaders in countries such as Algeria and Yemen helped keep militancy in check, loosely following the model of military-backed Arab nationalism championed by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Arab monarchs were able to limit domestic dissent or calls for democracy through a combination of social spending and repression. The United States not only partnered with many of these nations to fight terrorism — especially after September 2001 — but also saw the Gulf states as a reliable bulwark against Iranian expansion and a dangerous Iraq led by Saddam Hussein. Levantine instability was largely contained to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, while Israel's other neighbors largely abided by a tacit agreement to limit threats emanating from their territories.

Today, Saddam's iron grip on Iraq has been broken, replaced by a fractious democracy that is as threatened by the Islamic State as it is by its own political processes. Gone are the long-time leaders of states like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Meanwhile, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Oman are facing uncertain transitions that could well take place by year's end. The United States' serious dialogue with Iran over the latter's nuclear program, once a nearly unthinkable scenario for many in the Gulf, has precipitated some of the biggest shifts in regional dynamics, especially as Saudi Arabia and its allies work to lessen their reliance on Washington's protection.

The Push for Sunni Hegemony

Riyadh begins this year under considerably more duress than it faced 12 months ago. Not only is King Abdullah gravely ill (a bout of pneumonia forced the 90-year-old ruler to ring in the new year in the hospital and on a ventilator), but the world's largest oil-producing country has also entered into a price war with American shale producers. Because Saudi Arabia and its principal regional allies, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, boast more than a trillion dollars in cash reserves between them, they will be able to keep production levels constant for the foreseeable future.

However, other OPEC producers have not been able to weather the storm as easily. The resulting 40 percent plunge in oil prices is placing greater financial pressure on Iran and the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq, Saudi Arabia's largest sectarian and energy rivals. Riyadh's careful planning and building of reserves means the Saudi kingdom's economic security is unlikely to come under threat in the next one to three years. The country will instead continue to focus on not only countering Iran but also rebuilding relationships with regional Sunni actors weakened in previous years.

Riyadh's regional strategy has traditionally been to support primarily Sunni Arab groups with a conservative, Salafist religious ideology. Salafist groups traditionally kept out of politics, and their conservative Sunni ideology was useful in Saudi Arabia's competition against Iran and its own Shiite proxies. Promoting Salafism also served as a tool to limit the reach of more ideologically moderate Sunni political Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, groups Riyadh sees as a threat because of their success in organizing grassroots support and fighting for democratic reforms.

With rise of external regional pressures, however, Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia are re-evaluating their relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood. Internal threats posed by Salafist jihadists and a desire to limit future gains by regional opponents are pushing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to try to forge a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood to limit the risks posed by rival groups in the region.

Restoring relations with the Muslim Brotherhood will also have effects on diplomatic relations. Qatar has long been a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fact that has strained its relations with other countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates even went so far as to close their embassies in Qatar. However, the continuation of the United States' rapprochement with Iran and Riyadh's own discomfort with the rise of Salafist jihadist groups has made it reconsider its stance on political Islamism. Riyadh, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi's agreement to resume diplomatic ties with Doha, and the latter's consideration of changing its relationships with Egypt and Libya, points to a shift in how the bloc's engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood has the potential to streamline the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) efforts in the region.

The Gulf monarchies' attempt at reconciling with political Islamists can potentially benefit the GCC. For its part, Qatar has engaged with the staunchly anti-Islamist Libyan government in Tobruk, and it appears tensions with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's government in Egypt have calmed. Both scenarios point to the likelihood of the GCC moving closer to adopting a more unified regional stance beginning in 2015, one more in line with Riyadh's wishes to preserve the framework of the council.

This improvement in relations comes at a critical moment. With the United States and Iran undergoing a rapprochement of their own, the Gulf monarchies will try to secure their own interests by becoming directly involved in Libya, Syria and potentially Yemen. This military action will also aim to project strength to Iran while also filling the strategic void left by the absence of Turkish leadership in the region, especially in the Levant.

However, Qatar has been opposed to this course of action in the past. Despite its small size, the country has used its wealth and domestic stability to back a wide array of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia and rebel groups in Syria. Tensions between Qatar and regional allies came to a head in 2014 in the aftermath of Saudi and Emirati support for the July 2013 uprising that ousted the Doha-backed Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. The tension threatened the stability of the GCC and caused rebel infighting in Syria. This disconnect in Gulf policy has had wide regional repercussions, including the success of Islamic State militants against Gulf-backed rebel groups in Syria and the Islamic States' expansion into Iraq.

Without foreign military intervention on behalf of the rebels, no faction participating in the Syrian civil war will be able to declare a decisive military victory. As the prospects of a clear-cut outcome become less realistic, Bashar al Assad's Russian and Iranian backers are increasing diplomatic efforts to negotiate a settlement in Syria, especially as both are eager to refocus on domestic woes exacerbated by the current drop in global energy prices. Kuwait's recent decision to allow the Syrian regime to reopen its embassy to assist Syrian expats living within its borders points to a likelihood that the Gulf states are coming to terms with the reality that al Assad is unlikely to be ousted by force, and Sunni Arab stakeholders in the Syrian conflict are gradually giving in to the prospect of a negotiated settlement. A resolution to the Syrian crisis will not come in 2015, but regional actors will continue looking for a solution to the crisis outside of the battlefield.

Any negotiated settlement will see the Sunni principals in the region — led by the GCC and Turkey — work to implement a competent Sunni political organization that limits the authority of a remnant Alawite government in Damascus and future inroads by traditional backers in Tehran. Muslim Brotherhood-style political Islam represents one of the potential Sunni solutions within this framework, and with Saudi opposition to the group potentially fading, it remains a possible alternative to the variety of Salafist options that could exist — to include jihadists. Such a solution ultimately relies on a broader democratic framework to be implemented, a scenario that will likely remain elusive in Syria for years to come.

North Africa's Long Road to Stability

North African affairs have traditionally followed a trajectory distinct from that of the Levant and Persian Gulf, a reality shaped as much by geography as by political differences between the Nasser-inspired secular governments and the monarchies of the Gulf. Egypt, Saudi Arabia's traditional rival for leadership of the Sunni Arab world, has become cripplingly dependent on the financial backing of its former Gulf rivals. The GCC was able to use its relative stability and oil wealth to take advantage of opportunities to secure its members' interests in North Africa following the Arab Spring. As a result, Cairo has become a launching pad for Gulf intentions, particularly UAE airstrikes against Islamist militants in Libya and joint Egyptian-Gulf backing of renegade Gen. Khalifa Hifter's Operation Dignity campaign.

Like Syria, Libya represents a battleground for competing regional Sunni ambitions. Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, backed Libya's powerful Islamist political and militia groups led by the re-instated General National Congress in Tripoli after the international community recognized the arguably anti-Islamist House of Representatives in Tobruk. Islamist-aligned political and militia forces control Libya's three largest cities, and Egyptian- and Gulf-backed proxies are making little headway against opponents in battles to gain control of Tripoli and Benghazi, prompting more direct action by Cairo and Abu Dhabi.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are primarily concerned with the possibility of Libya, an oil-rich state bordering Egypt, becoming a wealthy backer of political Islam. Coastal-based infighting has left much of Libya's vast desert territories available for regional jihadists as well as a host of smuggling and trafficking activities, posing a significant security risk not just for regional states but Western interests as well. Egyptian and Gulf attempts to shape outcomes on the ground in Libya have proved largely ineffective, and Western plans for reconciliation talks favor regional powers such as Algeria — a traditional rival to Egyptian and Gulf interests in North Africa — that are more comfortable working with political actors across a wide spectrum of political ideologies to include Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamism.

Libya will likely find itself as the proving ground for the quid pro quo happening between the participants of the intra-Sunni rift over political Islam. In exchange for Saudi Arabia and its partners reducing their pressure on Muslim Brotherhood-style groups in Egypt and Syria, Qatar and Turkey are likely to work more visibly with Tobruk in 2015 in addition to pushing Islamist proxies into a Western-backed national dialogue. Libya's overall security situation will not be settled through mediation, but Libyan Islamists are more likely to re-enter a coalition with the political rivals now that both sides' Gulf backers are working toward settling differences themselves.

Regional Impact

Dysfunction and infighting have marred attempts by the region's Sunni actors to formulate a cohesive strategy in Syria. This has enabled Iran to remain entrenched in the Levant — albeit while facing pressure — and to continue expending resources competing in arenas such as Libya and Egypt. The next year will likely see an evolving framework where Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and to a lesser extent Turkey, will reach a delicate understanding on the role of political Islam in the region. 2014 saw a serious reversal in the fortunes of Muslim Brotherhood-style groups, which inadvertently favored even more far-right and extremist groups such as the Islamic State as the Gulf's various Sunni proxies were focused on competing with one another.

Iran's slow but steady push toward a successful negotiation with the United States, as well as the threats posed by militant Islam throughout the Levant, Iraq and North Africa, is necessitating a realignment of relationships within the Middle East's diverse Sunni interests. Less divisive Sunni leadership will be instrumental in coordinating efforts to resolve the conflicts in both Libya and Syria, although resolution in both conflicts will remain out of reach in 2015 and some time beyond.

A more robust Sunni Arab position, especially in Syria and the Levant, will likely put more pressure on Iran to reach a negotiated settlement with the United States by the end of the year. While a settlement may seem harmful to Gulf interests, the GCC is shifting toward a pragmatic acceptance of an agreement, similar to Riyadh's begrudging accommodation of a future role for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. The GCC's new goal is to limit Tehran's opportunities for success rather than outright denying it. Part of this will be achieved through an ongoing, aggressive energy strategy. The rest will come from internal negotiations between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey.

The next year will see the Sunni presence in Syria attempt to coalesce behind rebels acceptable to Western governments that are eager to see negotiations begin and greater local pushback against the Islamic State. More cohesive Gulf leadership will also present a more effective bulwark against Iranian and Alawite interests in the Levant. Most important, however, is the opportunity for regional Sunnis, led by Saudi Arabia, to present a more mature and capable response to mounting pressures. Whether through more assertive military moves in the region or by working with states such as Qatar to steer the Muslim Brotherhood rather than embolden the Islamist opposition, 2015 will likely see a shift in Sunni Arab strategies that have long shaped the region

2a)Brent falls more, Saudi Arabian king issues speech

BY LIBBY GEORGE

(Reuters) - Oil prices fell to fresh 5-1/2 year lows on Tuesday, extending losses after a 5 percent plunge in the previous session as worries over a global supply glut intensified.

Brent crude fell close to $51 a barrel, its lowest since 2009, with cuts to Saudi Arabia's official selling prices to Europe this week adding more pressure to the 55 percent price rout since June.

Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah said in a speech read for him on Tuesday the country would deal with the challenge posed by lower oil prices "with a firm will" but gave no sign the world's top exporter was considering changing its policy of maintaining production in the face of fast-growing U.S. shale supplies.

"We would need an indication that Saudi Arabia is considering output cuts," said Carsten Fritsch, a commodities analyst with Commerzbank.

The Saudi official price cuts on Monday added to bearish data over the weekend showing that Russia's 2014 oil output hit a post-Soviet-era high and December exports from Iraq, OPEC's second-largest producer, reached their highest since 1980.

Brent crude LCOc1 fell as low as $51.23 a barrel on Tuesday, its lowest level since May 2009. It recovered slightly to $51.95 at 1310 GMT (0810 ET), down $1.16 on the day.

U.S. crude CLc1 was at $48.94, down $1.10, after falling to $48.47, its lowest since April 2009.

Fritsch at Commerzbank said other countries including Iraq, Iran and Kuwait are likely to cut their official selling prices in the coming days. The United Arab Emirate cut its prices on Tuesday.

Jitters over political uncertainty in Greece, and a downward revision on Tuesday to Europe's December Composite Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI), raised questions about energy demand in Europe and compounded the bearish sentiment.

A slew of factors was keeping up the downward pressure on prices, analysts said, pointing to concerns about the Greek economy, high oil output from Russia, Iraq and the United States, and a stronger dollar. [GLOB/MKT]

"The weak euro should be one of the reasons," said Tamas Varga of PVM oil brokerage in London. "When the Saudis are cutting prices, the markets are not going to go higher."

In the face of official price cuts, markets shrugged off news about rising hostilities and lower oil production in Libya, as well as data showing the number of rigs drilling for oil in the United States fell for a fourth straight week.

U.S. commercial crude oil and products stockpiles were forecast to have risen in the week ending Jan. 2, a preliminary Reuters survey showed on Monday. [EIA/S]

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3)

Congress returns with punishing plans for Iran and the Palestinians

By MICHAEL WILNER

Congress has suspended Palestinian aid in the past, but coupled with Israeli actions, officials in Ramallah now warn the organization will likely dissolve without the funds.

WASHINGTON – Punishments appear to be in store for Iran and the Palestinian Authority this month, as Republicans take the reins of Congress. Unlike a host of domestic initiatives that will divide the House and Senate – and likely the Republican Party itself – policy toward Iran and the PA will likely unify the legislature, requiring its immediate attention as negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program lurch toward a March deadline and Palestinian leaders begin action against Israel at the International Criminal Court. Discussions are now under way as to whether the PA has violated US appropriations law guaranteeing the flow of nearly $400 million in aid. That aid, coupled with the transfer of Israeli tax revenue, keeps the struggling PA afloat. Israel suspended the flow of those tax shekels over the weekend, responding to a policy shift from the PA as President Mahmoud Abbas signed the Rome Statute of the international court on New Year’s Eve. Current US law requires the PA to refrain from taking “actions” in the Hague against Israel. To Republicans on Capitol Hill, Palestinian affiliation with the ICC will likely qualify as a violation, Senate aides told The Jerusalem Post. Congress has suspended Palestinian aid in the past, but coupled with Israeli actions, officials in Ramallah now warn the organization will likely dissolve without the funds. Iran is a greater strategic concern to US lawmakers and is more likely to cause political tension between Congress and the White House. While administration officials may ultimately agree to a suspension of Palestinian aid, President Barack Obama has made clear he will not accept new sanctions legislation against Iran as negotiations continue over its nuclear program. Those talks have been extended twice since beginning in 2013, and now face two deadlines: one for a political agreement by March and a second for a comprehensive accord by June. Intent on influencing the process – and angered by a lack of visibility into it – new leadership in the Senate banking and foreign relations committees are already drafting legislation that will trigger new sanctions should Iran be found in violation of a preliminary agreement, or should talks break down. Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) has already indicated he will allow a vote on the measure, which sources familiar with its drafting expect will have a minimum of 65 co-sponsors. That would guarantee its passage and a showdown with the president, who has threatened to veto previous iterations of the bill. An interim agreement reached last fall between world powers and Iran, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action, prohibits the enforcement of new “nuclear-related” sanctions during the negotiations process. Republicans say their new bill would not implement any new measures, but instead prepares for their immediate implementation should they become necessary. Republicans may also choose to pass sanctions not related to Iran’s nuclear program, instead further punishing the state for its human rights abuses, or its funding of US-listed terrorist organizations. In the past, senior Iranian officials have said the US would be in violation of the JPOA if such a law were to pass. Furthermore, any deal reached in Vienna over the program is now guaranteed to trigger Senate hearings under the supervision of Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) of the Foreign Relations Committee. Corker drafted legislation last year that, if passed, would have required an up or down vote in Congress approving of any deal with Iran. Such a vote would not have legal binding. A deal with Iran over its nuclear program will not be classified as a treaty, which is the only form of foreign policy agreement requiring congressional approval. International agreements are otherwise at the discretion of the executive. Ultimately, Congress will have to vote to lift sanctions on Iran as part of any comprehensive deal ending concerns with its nuclear work. Republicans in Congress are so far unimpressed by what they have seen from the negotiating table, and are unlikely to change should a deal be reached. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4)The 'Equality' Racket By Thomas Sowell  Some time ago, burglars in England scrawled a message on the wall of a home they had looted: "RICH BASTARDS." Those two words captured the spirit of the politicized vision of equality -- that it was a grievance when someone was better off than themselves. That, of course, is not the only meaning of equality, but it is the predominant political meaning in practice, where economic "disparities" and "gaps" are automatically treated as "inequities." If one racial or ethnic group has a lower income than another, that is automatically called "discrimination" by many people in politics, the media and academia. It doesn't matter how much evidence there is that some groups work harder in school, perform better and spend more postgraduate years studying to acquire valuable skills in medicine, science or engineering. If the economic end results are unequal, that is treated as a grievance against those with better outcomes, and a sign of an "unfair" society. The rhetoric of clever people often confuses the undeniable fact that life is unfair with the claim that a given institution or society is unfair. Children born into families that raise them with love and with care to see that they acquire knowledge, values and discipline that will make them valuable members of society have far more chances of economic and other success in adulthood than children raised in families that lack these qualities. Studies show that children whose parents have professional careers speak nearly twice as many words per hour to them as children with working class parents -- and several times as many words per hour as children in families on welfare. There is no way that children from these different backgrounds are going to have equal chances of economic or other success in adulthood. The fatal fallacy, however, is in collecting statistics on employees at a particular business or other institution, and treating differences in the hiring, pay or promotion of people from different groups as showing that their employer has been discriminating. Too many gullible people buy the implicit assumption that the unfairness originated where the statistics were collected, which would be an incredible coincidence if it were true. Worse yet, some people buy the idea that politicians can correct the unfairness of life by cracking down on employers. But, by the time children raised in very different ways reach an employer, the damage has already been done. What is a problem for children raised in families and communities that do not prepare them for productive lives can be a bonanza for politicians, lawyers and assorted social messiahs who are ready to lead fierce crusades, if the price is right. Many in the media and among the intelligentsia are all too ready to go along, in the name of seeking equality. But equality of what? Equality before the law is a fundamental value in a decent society. But equality of treatment in no way guarantees equality of outcomes. On the contrary, equality of treatment makes equality of outcomes unlikely, since virtually nobody is equal to somebody else in the whole range of skills and capabilities required in real life. When it comes to performance, the same man may not even be equal to himself on different days, much less at different periods of his life. What may be a spontaneous confusion among the public at large about the very different meanings of the word "equality" can be a carefully cultivated confusion by politicians, lawyers and others skilled in rhetoric, who can exploit that confusion for their own benefit. Regardless of the actual causes of different capabilities and rewards in different individuals and groups, political crusades require a villain to attack -- a villain far removed from the voter or the voter's family or community. Lawyers must likewise have a villain to sue. The media and the intelligentsia are also attracted to crusades against the forces of evil. But whether as a crusade or a racket, a confused conception of equality is a formula for never-ending strife that can tear a whole society apart -- and has already done so in many countries. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5) It’s Time to Pursue Regime Change in Iran ·      BY JOHN HANNAH ·        ·      John Hannah is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on U.S. strategy. During the presidency of George W. Bush, he served for eight years on the staff of Vice President Cheney, including as the vice president's national security advisor. ·       JANUARY 5, 2015 There are lots of reasons to be skeptical that 2015 will see a diplomatic breakthrough in efforts to end Iran’s nuclear weapons bid. But one of the more compelling is that there’s virtually nothing in the historical record to suggest that the Obama administration’s current negotiating strategy can succeed. Though rarely referenced, the United States actually has substantial experience in successfully curbing the nuclear ambitions of states, like Iran, that to varying degrees can be described as authoritarian, anti-American, and rogue. The number of cases isn’t huge, but there’s certainly enough to offer policymakers useful food for thought on what has worked in the past. Currently out of favor in many circles, regime change has a proven track record in helping put a number of bad actors out of the nuclear weapons business.  In Latin America in the 1980s, the crucial factor that terminated bomb-making programs in Brazil and Argentina was democratization and the transition from military dictatorship to civilian rule. In South Africa, the looming collapse of apartheid provided the government of F.W. de Klerk with the necessary incentive to dismantle the country’s small nuclear arsenal. So, too, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, fledgling new states in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus saw it as in their best interests to rid themselves of large nuclear stockpiles that they’d inherited. Also rarely acknowledged in polite foreign policy circles is the success that military action has enjoyed in keeping at bay the nuclear ambitions of some of the world’s worst states. Israel’s 1981 attack on the Osirak reactor short-circuited Saddam Hussein’s plutonium pathway to a bomb, and 10 years later, the American military’s overwhelming victory in the first Gulf War paved the way for the dismantling of Iraq’s crash program to enrich uranium. And heresy though it may be, I’ll say it anyway: For all the subsequent problems that may have flowed from Operation Iraqi Freedom, the removal of Saddam’s regime put to rest forever the legitimate fear that the “Butcher of Baghdad” would one day find a way of getting his hands on the world’s most dangerous weapons. Of course, we also have the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to thank for sparing us the nightmare of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad with nuclear bombs. As you contemplate the all-too real horrors of the Syrian conflict to date, just think for a moment about that particular danger averted. The 2007 strike on the Al-Kibar reactor — undertaken, it’s worth reminding, against U.S. advice — should, in retrospect, be viewed as one of history’s great counter-proliferation successes. Finally, short of an actual military attack, a credible threat to use force laced with the prospect of regime change has also produced important results in denuclearizing rogue states, with Libya being the prime example. Opponents of the Iraq war may hate to admit it, but rest assured that the confluence of a bedraggled Saddam Hussein being pulled out of his spider hole and Moammar Gadhafi’s ultimate decision to pack up his nuclear weapons infrastructure lock, stock, and barrel and ship it off to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee was no mere accident. Libya wasn’t alone in taking note of America’s crushing 2003 defeat of the Iraqi military. Iran noticed, too. Less than 3 weeks after the start of the campaign, U.S. tanks were sitting in downtown Baghdad, and Saddam’s regime was on history’s ash heap — something Iranian forces hadn’t come close to achieving in more than eight years of bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s. The Iranians took seriously their place on President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” and acted smartly to lay low and limit their exposure — publicly, by agreeing temporarily to suspend their enrichment of uranium, and more covertly, we now know, by mothballing aspects of their nuclear program most flagrantly aimed at weaponization. Of course, Iran’s decision to put the brakes on its nuclear program didn’t last. Truth be told, among the other serious lapses in the Bush administration’s Iraq war planning, you can add the failure to give serious thought to how the presence of a victorious American military on Iran’s doorstep might be exploited to advance U.S. strategic goals vis-à-vis the mullahs, particularly with respect to nukes. Before too long it became clear that the U.S. would have its hands full fighting the Iraqi insurgency and that any inclination that might have existed to engage in coercive diplomacy with the Iranians had largely vanished. The moment passed, the pressure eased, and Iran’s centrifuges eventually started spinning again. Nevertheless, the 2003 experience with Iran is still suggestive. First, it was entirely in keeping with the historical pattern indicating that dictatorial, rogue regimes are only likely to be moved off their nuclear agendas when confronted with a very powerful stick — whether regime change, military attack, or an acute form of pressure that is perceived to put regime’s survival at risk, preferably including a highly credible threat of force. Second, Iran’s behavior in 2003 was also consistent with the Islamic Republic’s own pattern of decision-making, and with the limited information available about the circumstances that have triggered other important shifts in Tehran’s policies. Most recently, in 2013, crippling Western sanctions brought the Iranian economy to its knees, spurring a dramatic revamping both in Iran’s politics (calling President Hassan Rouhani) as well as its willingness to engage Washington and its partners in nuclear negotiations. Hardly a coincidence that this strategy to stave off regime instability by blunting escalating pressure was orchestrated by Rouhani and now-Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif — both of whom were key architects of Iran’s nuclear gambit in 2003. But perhaps the most striking instance of Iran undertaking a policy reversal of truly strategic proportions came in 1988. After waging holy war against Iraq for eight years, vowing to achieve total victory, the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was suddenly forced to drink from what he termed the “poisoned chalice” and at long last accede to a ceasefire that he had always rejected. Political, economic, and military threats had mounted throughout 1988, putting the Islamic Republic’s survival in growing peril. But the final straw almost certainly came in early July when a U.S. Navy ship accidentally shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, killing all 290 people on board. Convinced that the incident signaled that the United States was on the verge of openly entering the war on Iraq’s side, Khomeini, in less than two weeks, made his decision to sue for peace. All of which brings us to the Obama administration’s current efforts to secure a comprehensive agreement that truly ends (rather than merely postpones) Iran’s decade-long quest for nuclear weapons. If history strongly suggests that rogue states in general, and Iran specifically, are highly unlikely to take such fateful decisions in the absence of intense, escalating pressure that puts the regime in fear for its survival, Obama and his team today appear to be following the opposite strategy. Having successfully wielded harsh sanctions to coerce Iran back to the negotiating table, it’s hard not to conclude that the administration has subsequently played into Rouhani’s hands by relenting too soon. The fact is that at least since the signing of the interim deal known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in November 2013, the U.S. has been steadily easing pressure on Iran across the board. Politically, Iran’s international isolation has all but lifted.  High-level politicians, diplomats, and businessmen from around the globe are flocking to Tehran. Rouhani and Zarif are welcomed with open arms in world capitals and hailed as cooperative and courageous partners by their counterparts. Economically, times may still be tough in Iran, but compared to eighteen months ago things are definitely looking up. From a severe contraction of almost seven percent in 2013, Iran’s GDP began expanding at a modest one to two percent rate in 2014 — thanks in no small part to limited sanctions relief and growing market confidence that Iran’s economic future is brightening. Finally, militarily, the prospect of an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is today virtually non-existent. For their part, U.S. officials have been somewhat pathetically lining up to reassure the Iranians that we mean no ill will toward their Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad, lest the mullahs take offense and make life difficult for our forces in Iraq. Given that spectacle, just how worried can they can be right now about a possible U.S. attack on Iran itself? As for the Israelis, whose military threat against Iran was always taken more seriously than Obama’s, well, the administration has also done its level best to denude an IDF strike of all credibility — exhibit one being the recent boast of a senior U.S. official that the administration had successfully cowed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from using force, and that, now, “It’s too late for him to do anything.” If history is any guide, none of this can be good. There simply is no precedent to suggest that a state like Iran can be disabused of its nuclear weapons aspirations in an environment where the political, economic, and military threats arrayed against it are all steadily declining, rather than intensifying. It’s a relentlessly tightening noose, not a gradually loosening one, that has in the past proven the critical ingredient if nuclear diplomacy with a brutal dictatorial regime is to stand any chance of succeeding. The story of the Iran negotiations since the signing of the JPOA 13 months ago only bears this conclusion out. On the one hand, there has been a growing list of U.S. concessions on a whole host of core issues, including Iran’s right to enrich uranium, its research and development efforts on advanced centrifuges, its work to develop long-range ballistic missiles, and the urgency of coming clean on its past weaponization activities. On the other hand, Iran’s demands have been escalating, including the brazen insistence that, in relatively short order, it be permitted to build an industrial-size centrifuge program that could expand its capacity to enrich uranium by a factor of 10 to 20. Unable to secure a comprehensive agreement, the talks have already been extended twice. Increasingly, it looks as if the United States has maneuvered itself into the untenable position of either being forced to accept a bad deal or continuing to kick the can down the road indefinitely through further extensions of the JPOA that de facto consecrate Iran’s standing as a threshold nuclear weapons state — slowly but surely strengthening its international standing and economy, while maintaining the option to break out or sneak out to a nuclear bomb at a time of its choosing. And the United States continued losing leverage. Whether or not this dynamic can be broken at this late date is in serious question. An awful lot appears to have been given away already, which the Iranians will no doubt insist on pocketing even as they demand more. It remains to be seen whether a new, more hawkish Congress will be able to resurrect its role as a major force for good in the standoff with Iran — a role it played so effectively in 2011 by convincing a reluctant Obama to go along with the crippling sanctions that proved so essential in getting Iran to the table in the first place. The odds would be much higher, of course, if Obama was actually committed to meeting Congress half way to help shape a joint strategy aimed not at blowing up the negotiations, but at strengthening U.S. leverage, bringing along key allies, and bolstering the prospects for coercive diplomacy. Unfortunately, there is little sign of that happening. Nor is there much chance of the White House taking any of the myriad of other steps that could significantly ratchet up the pressure on Iran, from direct action to bring down the Assad regime, to interdicting Iranian weapons shipments to its terrorist proxies, to bolstering Israel’s attack options through the supply of America’s most powerful bunker busters and the planes to deliver them. Rather than seeing such moves as essential elements in a comprehensive strategy to maximize U.S. leverage and the chances for diplomatic success, the administration instead appears to view them all as reckless provocations aimed at destroying diplomacy’s chances. As a result, all it has been left with is a toolkit filled with political reassurances, more negotiating concessions, promises of economic sweeteners, and private supplications of friendship from the President of the United States to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Is that really the most likely means of convincing a revolutionary theocracy that has been at war with America for 35 years to give up its nuclear ambitions and hegemonic designs? History suggests no. Obama says yes. 2015 should be the year we find out who’s right. The stakes are high. Place your bets. Game on -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6) The Insiders: Income inequality — the issue the Democrats want

By Ed Rogers 

It is interesting to watch the Democrats work to fashion “income inequality” into an issue they think they can use. Some Democrats bemoan income inequality as the paramount issue of our time, as if they have been chained, mute, helpless witnesses to policy development for the past six years. It takes a lot of gall for them to pretend that they had nothing to do with what they see as this great evil that has somehow been allowed to infect society.

The Democrats are completely uninhibited by the truth. Under even mild scrutiny, their claims that they are foes of income inequality are revealed as hollow at best and are loaded with hypocrisy. Do the Democrats really want to get rid of income inequality? Or do they see it as actually in their political interest to perpetuate the political forces that amplify it? The fact is, in crass political terms, income inequality is working for them.

After all, a Democratic theory of politics — most recently exposed by Obamacare architect Jonathan Gruber’s moments of honesty — is to say one thing, do another and count on the voters being too dumb to notice. While the Democrats are lamenting income inequality, they are pushing the very policies that create it. They give lip service to job creation and helping the middle class, but what they really do is increase energy costs, impose punitive regulations on businesses, demand higher labor costs, call for more taxes and make anti-free-market accommodations for labor unions. In the Democrats’ economy, the rich get richer and the poor get more promises — and it is the mega-rich and the very poor who form the bookends of the Democrats’ winning presidential coalition. The middle class is left in an economic dead zone — a zone that used to be populated with jobs in industries that melt steel, gather, consume and fashion raw materials or otherwise produce heat and emissions the Democrats find offensive.

What exactly is “income inequality”?  Well, the U.S. Census Bureau regularly measures it by calculating the “Gini coefficient” for each state. And, as shown in a chart compiled by the New York Times, New York, Connecticut, California and Massachusetts — states where Democrats have an overwhelming advantage in presidential elections — have become increasingly unequal since 1980. In fact, New York and Connecticut actually top the list of the most unequal states, as measured by the Census Bureau, and California and Massachusetts are also in the top 10. Together, these four states had a total of 102 electoral votes in the 2012 elections — all of which went to Barack Obama. It looks like the Democrats’ electoral college base is anchored by the very states where income inequality has exploded under their rule.

Income inequality is the first step toward dependency — and as dependency has grown, the Democratic share of the vote in presidential elections has grown as well. But in 2016, can the Democrats really get away with railing against income inequality when, in fact, it serves them so well?

In politics generally and in campaigns specifically, it is important to start from an honest place. Over time, the parties and candidates can drift into a world of their own making, but if they don’t at least start with an honest proposition, they are almost certainly doomed to fail. The Democrats’ attempts to rally their base around the false notion that the Democratic Party is the answer to income inequality should be a non-starter for 2016. If the Democrats can bring themselves to be detached and honest about who they are and what they believe, they might be able to stop themselves before they go too far. The 2016 campaign needs to start with discussions about real challenges and real policy solutions; otherwise, the campaign will just be about personal attacks and phony assertions that don’t address our nation’s problems and that will only continue the deterioration of political participation in America.

Ed Rogers is a contributor to the PostPartisan blog, a political consultant and a veteran of the White House and several national campaigns. He is the chairman of the lobbying and communications firm BGR Group, which he founded with former Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour in 1991.

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