Rolland Golden, my artist friend's paintings from his "Katrina Series!" Roland will be having a show at the Morris Museum in Augusta in August.
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Katrina/Chamberlain are still with us. (See 1,1a and 1b below.)
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Friedman and the Turkish dilemma. (See 2 below.)
and Semper Fi (See 2a below.)
Finally, our Commander in Chief, who has shown open contempt for our military, decided flags should be lowered at The White House to honor the fallen Marines and Sailor.
This president calls athletes right away, displays empathy for radical Islamists but cannot bring himself to recognize those who lose their lives in defense of our nation.
Why must this CIC be pushed into responding as an American? How pathetic!
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Dick
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1)1938 and 2015: Only the Names Are Different
By Dennis Prager
We say that evil is dark. But this metaphor is imprecise. Evil is actually intensely bright, so painfully bright that people look away from it. Many even deny its existence.
Why? Because once people acknowledge evil's existence, they know they have to confront it. And most people prefer not to confront evil.
That is what led to World War II. Many in the West denied the darkness of Nazism. They looked the other way when that evil could have been stopped and then appeased it as it became stronger.
We are reliving 1938. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain went to Munich to negotiate with Adolf Hitler. He left believing Hitler's promises of peace in exchange for Germany being allowed to annex large parts of Czechoslovakia. Upon returning to England, Chamberlain announced, "Peace for our time."
The American and European negotiations with Iran have so precisely mirrored 1938 that you have to wonder how anyone could not see it.
The Nazi regime's great hatred was Jews. Iran's great hatred is the Jewish state. The Nazis' greatest aim was to exterminate the Jews of Europe. Iran's greatest aim is to exterminate the Jewish state. Nazi Germany hated the West and its freedoms. The Islamic Republic of Iran hates the West and its freedoms. Germany sought to dominate Europe. Iran seeks to dominate the Middle East and the Muslim world.
And exactly as Britain and France appeased Nazi Germany, the same two countries along with the United States have chosen to appease Iran.
Today, people mock Chamberlain. But just change the names, and you realize that we are living through a repetition of Munich. Substitute the Islamic Republic of Iran for Nazi Germany, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for Hitler, Barack Obama and John Kerry for Chamberlain, Israel for Czechoslovakia and for Europe's Jews, and the increasingly unsafe world of 2015 for the increasingly unsafe world of 1938.
In fact, there is considerably less defense for the Iran agreement — which awards Iran $150 billion in currently frozen assets and the right to keep its nuclear program — than there was for the Munich agreement. Prior to 1938, Hitler had not publicly proclaimed his aim to annihilate Europe's Jews. Yet, Iran has been proclaiming its intention to annihilate the Jewish state for decades. There were no massive "Death to America" demonstrations in Germany as there regularly are in Iran. In 1938, Germany had not been responsible for terror around the world as Iran is now. Nor was Germany responsible for the death of more than a thousand Americans as Iran has been.
Iran has been responsible for more American deaths in the past quarter-century than any other group or country. Col. Richard Kemp, the former commander of British troops in Afghanistan, and Major Chris Driver-Williams of British special forces, summarized it this way: "Iranian military action, often working through proxies using terrorist tactics, has led to the deaths of well over a thousand American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade and a half."
The Neville Chamberlains of 2015 defend the agreement with Iran on two grounds: that the only alternative is war, and that this agreement has the capacity to bring Iran into "the community of nations."
The first is a falsehood for three reasons.
First, the alternative to this agreement was continuing and tightening the sanctions that were weakening the Iranian regime and greatly diminishing its ability to fund terror groups around the world. Second, because the agreement so strengthens Iran, it makes war far more likely. When evil, expansionist regimes get richer, they don't spend their wealth on building new hospitals. Third, we have been at war with Iran for decades — but only one side has been fighting.
And whoever believes that the agreement will bring Iran into "the community of nations" betrays a breathtaking ignorance about the Iranian regime.
The Iranian regime is composed of religious fanatics who are morally indistinguishable from ISIS, al-Qaida, Boko Haram and all the other mass-murdering Islamist movements.
The Iranian regime has executed more people than any country except China (and probably North Korea, for which data are unavailable).
The Iranian regime has killed more than 6,000 gays for being homosexual.
No woman in Iran is allowed to leave the country or even to work outside her home without the permission of her husband. As Zahra Eshraghi, a granddaughter of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has testified: "As a woman, if I want to get a passport to leave the country, have surgery, even to breathe almost, I must have permission from my husband."
The Iranian regime repeatedly calls for the extermination of Israel. No other country in the world is committed to annihilating another country.
Iran is the world's greatest funder of terror organizations.
The late Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman indicted Iran for establishing terrorist networks throughout Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Colombia, among other countries.
Iran funds and directs the Lebanese terror organization Hezbollah, the most powerful military organization in Lebanon.
Iran is the major funder of Hamas.
Iran has been responsible for terror bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, eight to 10 of the 9/11 hijackers passed through Iran, and an American judge ruled that Iran bears legal responsibility for providing "material support" to the 9/11 hijackers.
Members of Congress who vote to uphold this agreement will be viewed as Chamberlain is viewed. The Left likes to talk about being on "the right side" of history. Enabling Iran to keep its nuclear facilities while gaining access to hundreds of billions of dollars is to be on the wrong side of history.
Question: Would any member of Congress vote for this agreement if Iran were situated at the American border?
Very few people have a chance to do something about the greatest evil of their time. Members of the U.S. Congress have that chance. That should trump loyalty to Obama and his appeasement of the greatest evil of our time.
1a)
Iran’s Attention-Span Advantage
Tehran’s goals haven’t wavered since 1979. The U.S. couldn’t even keep track of its concessions.
by L. Gordon Crovitz
Dealing effectively with Iran requires understanding the differences between an Islamic theocracy and a democracy. One is a gap in attention spans: The mullahs since their 1979 revolution have patiently built a formidable terrorist state. Their negotiating partners are from an American political culture that has a hard time keeping straight from week to week what the negotiations were supposed to be about.
When the nuclear talks began, President Obama said the goal was to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons without the U.S. or Israel having to use military force. Now Mr. Obama can’t imagine anyone opposing a deal that creates a calendar for Iran getting nuclear weapons and meanwhile provides a road map for Tehran to continue evading inspections.
Mr. Obama last year told the New Yorker, “I don’t really even needGeorge Kennan right now.” He rejects long-term strategic thinking represented by Kennan’s plan to contain the Soviet Union. Instead of a sustained strategy, Mr. Obama has hope that Iran will change, despite the most recent assessment by the State Department: “Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism worldwide remained undiminished.”
A realistic view starts by recognizing Iran’s consistency in word and deed since the 1979 revolution. Tehran has never wavered in its goals of getting a nuclear bomb and exporting its Islamic revolution through groups such as Hezbollah. Its decades of achievements range from the 1983 bombing of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut to killing more than 1,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and now keeping Bashar Assad in power in Syria with the help of chemical weapons used against civilians.
Unlike most nuclear arms-control agreements, this one does not include a baseline of how much progress Iranians have made because they refuse to disclose it. The deal says if there is evidence of further cheating, a committee of countries—including Iran—will decide if an inspection is justified. If so, Iran gets 24 days’ notice, during which it can hide the evidence.
Ben Rhodes, Mr. Obama’s deputy national security adviser, defended the deal last week by claiming: “We never sought in this negotiation the capacity for so-called ‘anytime, anywhere’ where you could basically go anywhere in the country.” In April Mr. Rhodes said: “Under this deal, you will have anywhere, anytime 24/7 access as it relates to the facilities that Iran has.”
Mr. Obama was indignant at his news conference last week when a reporter asked why he didn’t insist that Iran free four American hostages. He said hostages were a separate topic from nuclear arms. But the U.S. gave in to many Iranian demands that have nothing to do with centrifuges. Top among these is that the deal ends the embargo on sales of conventional weapons to Iran. That concession came despite the Senate testimony of Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.” Gen. Dempsey said that July 7. The deal was announced July 14.
U.S. negotiators couldn’t keep track of all the Iranian demands they caved in on. Secretary of State John Kerry at first denied the deal took Iran’s Gen. Qasem Soleimani off the sanctions list, but his name is in the annex to the agreement lifting sanctions. Gen. Soleimani runs the Quds Force, Iran’s global paramilitary and covert operations group. He is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American troops in Iraq.
The mullahs have a track record of sticking to their plans, no matter what pieces of paper they sign, but with this agreement they win even if they abide by its terms. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, last week urged a focus on “the risk of what will happen if Iran does comply with the agreement.” When it expires in 15 years, there will be nothing to stop Iran from activating multiple nuclear weapons.
In the short term, Iran will use the $150 billion it receives under the deal to continue its mission, including buying new weapons to threaten U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf and adding to its support of terrorists around the world.
We’ll now see if Congress can close the attention-span gap in the 60 days it has to create a veto-proof majority. Lawmakers should take a long-term view of the result of legitimizing Iran as a nuclear state. History will judge their reputations in addition to Mr. Obama’s.
1b) An Historic Catastrophe
By Thomas Sowell
Distinguished scientist Freeman Dyson has called the 1433 decision of the emperor of China to discontinue his country's exploration of the outside world the "worst political blunder in the history of civilization."
The United States seems at this moment about to break the record for the worst political blunder of all time, with its Obama administration deal that will make a nuclear Iran virtually inevitable.
Already the years-long negotiations, with their numerous "deadlines" that have been extended again and again, have reduced the chances that Israel can destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities, which have been multiplied and placed in scattered underground sites during the years when all this was going on.
Israel is the only country even likely to try to destroy those facilities, since Iran has explicitly and repeatedly declared its intention to wipe Israel off the face of the earth.
How did we get to this point -- and what, if anything, can we do now? Tragically, these are questions that few Americans seem to be asking. We are too preoccupied with our electronic devices, the antics of celebrities and politics as usual.
During the years when we confronted a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, we at least realized that we had to "think the unthinkable," as intellectual giant Herman Kahn put it. Today it seems almost as if we don't want to think about it at all.
Our politicians have kicked the can down the road -- and it is the biggest, most annihilating explosive can of all, that will be left for our children and grandchildren to try to cope with.
Back in the days of our nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union, some of the more weak-kneed intelligentsia posed the choice as whether we wanted to be "red or dead." Fortunately, there were others, especially President Ronald Reagan, who saw it differently. He persevered in a course that critics said would lead to nuclear war. But instead it led to the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War.
President Barack Obama has been following opposite policies, and they are likely to lead to opposite results. The choices left after Iran gets nuclear bombs -- and intercontinental missiles that can deliver them far beyond Israel -- may be worse than being red or dead.
Bad as life was under the communists, it can be worse under nuclear-armed fanatics, who have already demonstrated their willingness to die -- and their utter barbarism toward those who fall under their power.
Americans today who say that the only alternative to the Obama administration's pretense of controlling Iran's continued movement toward nuclear bombs is war ignore the fact that Israel bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear facilities, and Iraq did not declare war. To do so would have risked annihilation.
Early on, that same situation would have faced Iran. But Obama's years-long negotiations with Iran allowed the Iranian leaders time to multiply, disperse and fortify their nuclear facilities.
The Obama administration's leaking of Israel's secret agreement with Azerbaijan to allow Israeli warplanes to refuel there, during attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities, was a painfully clear sabotage of any Israeli attempt to destroy those Iranian facilities.
But the media's usual practice to hear no evil, see no evil and speak no evil in the Obama administration buried this news, and allowed Obama to continue to pose as Israel's friend, just as he continued to assure Americans that, if they liked their doctor they could keep their doctor.
Some commentators have attributed Barack Obama's many foreign policy disasters to incompetence. But he has been politically savvy enough to repeatedly outmaneuver his opponents in America. For example, the Constitution makes it necessary for the President to get a two-thirds majority in the Senate to make any treaty valid. Yet he has maneuvered the Republican-controlled Congress into a position where they will need a two-thirds majority in both Houses to prevent his unilaterally negotiated agreement from going into effect -- just by not calling it a treaty.
If he is that savvy at home, why is he so apparently incompetent abroad? Answering that question may indeed require us to "think the unthinkable," that we have elected a man for whom America's best interests are not his top priority.
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2) The Turkish Enigma
In my "Net Assessment of the World," I argued that four major segments of the European and Asian landmass were in crisis: Europe, Russia, the Middle East (from the Levant to Iran) and China. Each crisis was different; each was at a different stage of development. Collectively the crises threatened to destabilize the Eurasian landmass, the Eastern Hemisphere, and potentially generate a global crisis. They do not have to merge into a single crisis to be dangerous. Four simultaneous crises in the center of humanity's geopolitical gravity would be destabilizing by itself. However, if they began to merge and interact, the risks would multiply. Containing each crisis by itself would be a daunting task. Managing crises that were interlocked would press the limits of manageability and even push beyond.
These four crises are already interacting to some extent. The crisis of the European Union intersects with the parallel issue of Ukraine and Europe's relation to Russia. The crisis in the Middle East intersects with the European concern over managing immigration as well as balancing relations with Europe's Muslim community. The Russians have been involved in Syria, and appear to have played a significant role in the recent negotiations with Iran. In addition there is a potential intersection in Chechnya and Dagestan. The Russians and Chinese have been advancing discussions about military and economic cooperation. None of these interactions threaten to break down regional boundaries. Indeed, none are particularly serious. Nor is some sort of inter-regional crisis unimaginable.
Sitting at the center of these crisis zones is a country that until a few years ago maintained a policy of having no problems with its neighbors. Today, however, Turkey's entire periphery is on fire. There is fighting in Syria and Iraq to the south, fighting to the north in Ukraine and an increasingly tense situation in the Black Sea. To the west, Greece is in deep crisis (along with the EU) and is a historic antagonist of Turkey. The Mediterranean has quieted down, but the Cyprus situation has not been fully resolved and tension with Israel has subsided but not disappeared. Anywhere Turkey looks there are problems. As important, there are three regions of Eurasia that Turkey touches: Europe, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.
I have argued two things in the past. The first was that Turkey was an emerging regional power that would ultimately be the major power in its locale. The second was that this is a region that, ever since the decline and fall of the Ottomans in the first quarter of the 20th century, has been kept stable by outside powers. The decision of the United States to take a secondary role after the destabilization that began with the 2003 invasion of Iraq has left a vacuum Turkey will eventually be forced to fill. But Turkey is not ready to fill that vacuum. That has created a situation in which there is a balancing of power underway, particularly between Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
A Proximate Danger
The most violent and the most immediate crisis for Ankara is the area stretching from the Mediterranean to Iran, and from Turkey to Yemen. The main problem for Turkey is that Syria and Iraq have become contiguous battlegrounds featuring a range of forces, including Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish elements. These battles take place in a cauldron formed by four regional powers: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. This quadrangle emerged logically from the mayhem caught between them.
Each major power has differing strategic interests. Iran's primary interest is the survival of the establishment and in assuring that an aggressive Sunni polity does not arise in Iraq to replicate the situation Tehran faced with Saddam Hussein. Iran's strategy is to support anti-Sunni forces in the region. This support ranges from bolstering Hezbollah in Lebanon, propping up the minority Alawite establishment in Syria led — for the moment — by Bashar al Assad, and assisting the Iraqi army, itself controlled by Shiites and Iraq's Shiite militias. The United States sees Iran as aligned with American interests for the moment, since both countries oppose the Islamic State and Tehran isimportant when it comes to containing the militant group. The reality on the ground has made this the most important issue between Iran and the United States, which frames the recent accord on nuclear weapons.
Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its primary enemy. Riyadh also views the Islamic State as a threat but at the same time fears that an Iraq and Syria dominated by Iran could present an existential threat to the House of Saud. The Saudis consider events in Yemen from a similar perspective. Also in this context, Riyadh perceives a common interest with Israel in containing Iranian militant proxies as well as the Islamic State. Who exactly the Saudis are supporting in Syria and Iraq is somewhat murky, but the kingdom has no choice but to play a tactical and opportunistic game.
The Israelis are in a similar position to the Saudis. They oppose the Iranians, but their main concern must be to make certain that the Hashemites in Jordan don't lose control of the country, opening the door to an Islamic State move on the Jordan River. Jordan appears stable for the moment and Israel and the Saudis see this as a main point of their collaboration. In the meantime, Israel is playing a wait-and-see game with Syria. Assad is no friend to the Israelis, but a weak Assad is better than a strong Islamic State rule. The current situation in Syria suits Israel because a civil war limits immediate threats. But the conflict is itself out of control and the risk is that someone will win. Israel must favor Assad and that aligns them on some level with Iran, even as Israel works with Sunni players like Saudi Arabia to contain Iranian militant proxies. Ironies abound.
It is in this context that the Turks have refused to make a clear commitment, either to traditional allies in the West or to the new potential allies that are yet emerging. Partly this is because no one's commitments — except the Iranians' — are clear and irrevocable, and partly because the Turks don't have to commit unless they want to. They are deeply opposed to the Assad regime in Syria, and logic would have it that they are supporting the Islamic State, which also opposes the Syrian regime. As I have said before, there are endless rumors in the region that the Turks are favoring and aiding the Islamic State. These are rumors that Turkey has responded to by visibly and seriously cracking down on the Islamic State in recent weeks with significant border activity and widespread raids. The Turks know that the militants, no matter what the currently confrontational relationship might be, could transition from being a primarily Arab platform to being a threat to Turkey. There are some who say that the Turks see the Islamic State as creating the justification for a Turkish intervention in Syria. The weakness of this argument is that there has been ample justification that Ankara has declined, even as its posture toward the Islamic State becomes more aggressive.
This shows in Turkey's complex relations with the United States, still formally its major ally. In 2003 the Turks refused to allow U.S. forces to invade Iraq from Turkey. Since then the relationship with the United States has been complex and troubled. The Turks have made U.S. assistance in defeating Assad a condition for extensive cooperation in Syria. Washington, concerned about an Islamic State government in Syria, and with little confidence in the non-Islamic State militancy as a long-term alternative, has refused to accept this. Therefore, while the Turks are now allowing some use of the NATO air base at Incirlik for operations against the Islamic State, they have not made a general commitment. Nor have they cooperated comprehensively with Sunni Saudi Arabia.
The Turkish problem is this: There are no low-risk moves. While Ankara has a large army on paper, it is untried in battle outside of Turkey's 30-year insurgency in its southeast. Turkey has also observed the outcome of U.S. conventional forces intervening in the region and doesn't want to run the same risk. There are domestic considerations as well. Turkey is divided between secular and Islamist factions. The secularists suspect the Islamists of being secretly aligned with radical Islam — and are the source of many of the rumors floating about. The ruling Sunni-dominated Justice and Development Party, better known by its Turkish acronym, AKP, was seriously weakened in the last election. Its ability to launch the only attack it wants — an attack to topple Assad, would appear to be a religious war to the secularists and would not be welcomed by the party's base, setting in motion rifts that could bring down the AKP. An attack on the Sunnis, however radical, complicates relations with the rebel factions in northern Syria that Turkey is already sponsoring. It also would risk the backlash of reviving anti-Turkish feelings in an adjacent Arab country that remembers Turkish rule only a century ago.
Therefore Turkey, while incrementally changing — as evidenced by the recent accord to allow U.S. Predator drones to fly from Incirlik — is constrained if not paralyzed. From a strategic point of view, there appears to be more risk than reward. Its position resembles Israel's: watch, wait and hopefully avoid needing to do anything. From the political point of view, there is no firm base of support for either intervening directly or providing support for American airstrikes.
The problem is that the worst-case scenario for Turkey is the creation of an independent Kurdish republic in Syria or Iraq. That would risk lighting a touchpaper among Kurds in southeastern Turkey, and regardless of current agreements, could destabilize everything. This is the one thing that would force Turkey's hand. However, the United States has historically had some measure of influence among the Kurds in Iraq and also in Syria. While this influence can be overstated, and while Washington is dependent on the Kurdish peshmerga militias for ground support as it battles the Islamic State from the air, it is an important factor. If the situation grew out of control, Ankara would expect the United States to control the situation. If Washington could and would, the price would be Turkish support for U.S. operations in the region. The Turks would have to pay that price or risk intervention. That is the lever that would get Ankara involved.
Added Complications
The Turks are far less entangled in the Russian crisis than in the Middle East, but they are still involved, and potentially in a way that can pyramid. There are three dimensions to this. The first is the Black Sea and Turkey's role in it. The second is the Bosporus and the third is allowing the United States to operate from its air base in Incirlik in the event of increased Russian military involvement in Ukraine.
The crisis in Ukraine necessarily involves the Black Sea. Crimea's Sevastopol is a Russian Base on the Black Sea. In this potential conflict, the Black Sea becomes a vital theater of operations. First, in any movement westward by the Russians, the Black Sea is their right flank. Second, the Black Sea is a vital corridor for trade by the Russians, and an attempt by its enemies to shut down that corridor would have to be addressed by Russian naval forces. Finally, the U.S./NATO strategy in addressing the Ukrainian crisis has been to increase cooperation with Romania. Romania is on the Black Sea and the United States has indicated that it intends to work with Bucharest in strengthening its Black Sea capabilities. Therefore, events in the Black Sea can rapidly escalate under certain circumstances, posing threats to Turkish interests that Ankara cannot ignore.
The Black Sea issue is compounded by the question of the Bosporus, which is a narrow strait that, along with the Dardanelles, connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. The Bosporus is the only passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. For the Russians, this is a critical trade route and the only means for Russian ships passing into the Mediterranean. In the event of a conflict, the United States and NATO would likely want to send naval forces into the Black Sea to support operations around its perimeter.
Under the Montreaux Convention, an agreement signed in 1936, the Bosporus is under Turkish control. However the convention also places certain restrictions on traffic in the Bosporus. Access is guaranteed to all commercial traffic, however, Ankara is authorized to refuse transit to countries at war with Turkey. All countries with coasts on the Black Sea are free to operate militarily in the Black Sea. Non-Black Sea nations, however, suffer restrictions. Only warships under 15,000 tones may be sent, and no more than nine at any one time, with a total tonnage of 30,000 tons. And then they are only permitted to stay for 21 days or less.
This limits the ability of the United States to project forces into the Black Sea — American carrier battle groups, key components of U.S. naval power, are unable to pass through. Turkey is, under international law, the guarantor of the convention and it has over time expressed a desire to be freed from it so Ankara can exercise complete sovereignty over the Bosporus Straits. But it has also been comforted by knowing that refusal to allow warships to pass can be referred to international law, instead of being Turkish responsibility.
However, in the event of a conflict with Russia, that can no longer be discounted: Turkey is a member of NATO. If NATO were to formally participate in such a conflict, Ankara would have to choose whether the Montreaux Convention or its alliance obligations take precedence. The same can be said of air operations out of Incirlik. Does Turkey's relationship with NATO and the United States take precedence or will Ankara use the convention to control conflict in the Black Sea? Even prior to its own involvement in any conflict with Russia, there would be a potentially dangerous diplomatic crisis.
To complicate matters, Turkey receives a great deal of oil and natural gas from Russia through the Black Sea. Energy relations shift. There are economic circumstances on which the seller is primarily dependent on the sale, and circumstances on which the buyer is dependent. It depends on the room for maneuver. While oil prices were over $100, Russia had the financial option to stop shipping energy. Under current pricing, Russia's ability to do this has decreased dramatically. During the Ukrainian crisis, using energy cut-offs in Europe would have been a rational response to sanctions. The Russians did not do it because they could not afford the cost. The prior obsession with the fragility of the flow of energy from Russia is no longer there, and Turkey, a major consumer, has reduced its vulnerability, at least during the diplomatic phase.
The United States is constructing an alliance system that includes the Baltics, Poland and Romania that is designed to contain any potential Russian advance westward. Turkey is the logical southern anchor for this alliance structure. The Turks have been more involved than is already visible — conducting exercises with the Romanians and Americans in the Black Sea. But as in the Middle East, Ankara has carefully avoided any commitment to the alliance and has remained unclear on its Black Sea Strategy. While the Middle East is more enigmatic, the Russian situation is potentially more dangerous, though Turkish ambiguity remains identical.
Similarly, Turkey has long demanded membership in the European Union. Yet Ankara's economic performance over the last 10 years indicates that Turkey has benefitted from not being a member. Nevertheless, the secularists in particular have been adamant about membership because they felt that joining the union would guarantee the secular nature of Turkish society. The AKP has been more ambiguous. The party continues to ask for membership, but it has been quite content to remain outside. It did not want the EU strictures secularists wanted, nor did it want to share in the European economic crisis.
Turkey is nevertheless drawn in two directions. First, Ankara has inevitable economic ties in Europe that are effected by crises, ironically focused on its erstwhile enemy Greece. More important at the moment is the immigration and Islamic terrorism crisis in Europe. Many of the Muslims living in Germany, for example, are Turks and the treatment of overseas Turks is a significant political issue in Turkey. While Ankara has wanted to be part of Europe, neither economic reality nor the treatment of Turks and other Muslims in Europe argue for that relationship.
There is a growing breach with Europe in an attempt to avoid absorption of economic problems. However in southeastern Europe discussions of Turkish investments and trade are commonplace. Put into perspective, as Europe fragments, Turkey — a long-term economic power, understanding of what the short-term problems are — draws southeastern Europe into its economic center of gravity. In a way it becomes another force of fragmentation, simply by being an alternate economic benefactor for the poorer countries in the southeast.
The potential interaction of Turkey in the Middle East is an immediate question. The mid-term involvement with Russia is a longer question. Its relation to Europe is the longest question. And its relationship with the United States is the single question that intersects all of these. For all these concerns, Turkey has no clear answer. It is following a strategy designed to avoid involvement and maintain maximum options. Ankara relies on a multi-level strategy in which it is formally allied with some powers and quietly open to relations with powers hostile to its allies. This multi-hued doctrine is designed to avoid premature involvement; premature meaning before having achieved a level of strategic maturity and capability that allows it to define itself, with attendant risks.
In one sense, Turkish policy parallels American policy. U.S. policies in all three regions are designed to allow the regional balance of power to maintain itself, with Washington involving itself selectively and with limited force. The Turks are paralleling the United States in principle, and with even less exposure. The problem the Turks have is that geography binds them to the role of pivot for three regions. For the United States this role is optional. The Turks cannot make coherent decisions, but they must. So Ankara's strategy is to be consistently ambiguous, an enigma. This will work until outside powers make it impossible to work
2a)
How every single Marine feels right now:Congratulations, ISIS ... You wanted attention, and you got it. Only, you chose the wrong people to seek that attention from.
You didn’t get the attention of our weak President. He tweeted his support for your medieval holiday following your cowardly attack.You did not get the attention of our useless and corrupt Congress. They are too busy lining their pockets.
When you attacked those four Marines, you got the attention of every one of our 186,800 active duty Marines, along with every Marine veteran.
You just stirred up hate, discontent, and malice within a group of people who relish the idea of engaging the enemy.
There is something you obviously don't yet know about Marines...
The brotherhood we share is stronger than the challenges we face, the weapons we master, or the enemies we destroy. You will learn that soon though.
You attacked a group of men who bond over the smell of gunpowder and misery...and enjoy it. You didn't attack America's leaders, you attacked America's Marines, and that is a battle you are not prepared for.
You see, we won't play by the rules you're accustomed to. When you play in our backyard, we don't have to answer to any chain of command. We will not follow ridiculous ROEs crafted by a spineless bureaucrat to appease some goat-herding tribal leader. And we won't be wearing uniforms so that you can easily ambush us.
Nope. None of that shit.
When you think you're walking into a target-rich environment, you're really walking into an ambush.
That pudgy, middle-aged guy wearing khakis in the mall, who unbeknownst to you is a former 0311 and armed, will dump your sorry ass before you have a chance to scream "allah snackbar.”And that soccer mom pushing a stroller, she's got a Glock and will happily leave you gasping in a pool of your own blood before she lets you hurt her children.
We are here and we still have the training and experience to wage war, whether here or abroad. And wage war we will.Every one of us is willing to fight and die to protect our Marine Corps brothers and sisters, our families and friends, and our way of life.
And we will win, because while you fight to destroy what you hate, we fight to protect what we love.
Semper Fi, Do or Die!!
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