.jpg)
t;.jpg)
Uncle Steve, the family banker with his new depositor - Niece Stella! Stella playing with Ellie!
===
Jeb has a strategy which is to focus on the future and not relive the past but you cannot have a future that is dismissive of the past because,in the case of Islamist Terror,it will, most assuredly, shape the future.
He plans on talking about foreign policy shortly. Stay tuned. (See 1 below.)
===
Elitists,who did not understand Reagan and were proved wrong while they were telling the
world Reagan was wrong, have now decided Gov.Walker is another simpleton who did not graduate from college.
Intuitively they know Walker is a threat because he has proved them wrong time and again but they only know how to react in their usual illogical and blind fashion.
Reagan understood the illogical argument why Communism was superior to Capitalism and Democracy. Walker understands the stupidity of allowing unions to control the market place and run the nation and their members. Walker understands why governments must pay their bills and not run deficits. Walker lacks charisma and that is a plus because the common man can relate to him as they did Truman.
Walker may not become the Republican candidate but he possesses many of the basic ingredients. Time will tell if Walker is another Reagan, without the glamour and humor as time passes. I would not count him out. (See 2 below.)
It is called media hazing. (See 2a below.)
===
Dore Gold is a brilliant diplomat and he analyzes a bad Iranian Deal. (See 3 below.)
===
Just saw Kevin Kostner's 'Black or White." Great, poignant movie that touches on a wonderful story and told in a very enduring manner. Very good movie and urge you go.
===
Dick
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)Florida Governor Jeb Bush said Friday that he has little interest in discussing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which started while his brother was president, as he aims to run a joyful campaign focused on outing a positive vision of the future.
"I won't talk about the past," Bush said in response to a reporter's question about his foreign policy speech planned for next week in Chicago. "I'll talk about the future. If I'm in the process of considering the possibility of running, it's not about re-litigating anything in the past. It's about trying to create a set of ideas and principles that will help us move forward."
Bush also declined to answer a question about how he would combat the Islamic State militant group, saying he'd talk more about foreign policy next week. The answers will help increase anticipation around his talk on Wednesday at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. A governor from 1999 to 2007, Bush is better known for views on domestic issues, such as his advocacy for charter schools and support for easing immigration laws.
Bush spoke on Friday during a news conference in Bonita Springs, Florida, for the Barbara Bush Foundation for Family Literacy's annual Celebration of Reading event.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2)Best summary of Reagan’s Cold War Win By Souza.
Reagan is now often viewed as one of America’s three best presidents. Yet his foreign policy ratings are in the low 40s. The press went crazy over Iran-Contra arms trades. How does that compare to ending the Soviet Union threat? He was also criticized for not believing in Henry Kissinger’s policy of détente – or peaceful coexistence with and attempts at mere containment of the Soviet Union. Detente was ended by Reagan with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. Reagan was also criticized when running for President that he had no foreign policy experience.
Facts on Ronald Reagan. He was the 40th president of the United States. He was born in Illinois in 1911. He attended Eureka College on an athletic scholarship, and received a job as a sports announcer for a radio station in Iowa. Reagan joined Warner Brothers Studios in 1937 under a seven year contract. He appeared in more than 50 movies, and he also served as a Screen Actors Guild president for several years. As an actor he is considered to have had a good career among B-list movies. As he aged and became interested in politics, Reagan became increasingly more conservative. In 1966, Reagan ran as the Republican candidate for governor of California, and the won the election. He was re-elected in 1970 and served a second term.
Reagan was not successful in winning the Republican nomination in the elections of 1968 or 1976, but he was successful in 1980. He defeated Jimmy Carter in the election, and at the age of 69, became the oldest elected president. In 1981, an assassination attempt was made by John Hinckley, Jr., but Reagan survived the attempt. During his first term, Reagan was kept busy with the Cold War, and created the Strategic Defense Initiative to develop weapons based in space to protect the United States against Soviet attacks. He also took a strong stance against labor unions as well as ordered the Granada invasion. Reagan ran for re-election in 1984 and beat Walter Mondale. He is often seen pictured with his dogs as well as his horses in casual settings. Reagan died in 2004.
President Ronald Reagan: Winning the Cold War, By Dinesh D’Souza
Twenty years ago, Ronald Reagan ordered American troops to invade Grenada and liberate the island from its ruling Marxist dictator. By itself this would have been an insignificant military action: Grenada is a tiny island of little geopolitical significance. But in reality the liberation of Grenada was a historic event, because it signaled the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine and inaugurated a sequence of events that brought down the Soviet empire itself.
The Brezhnev Doctrine stated simply that once a country went Communist, it would stay Communist. In other words, the Soviet empire would continue to advance and gain territory, but it would never lose any to the capitalist West. In 1980, when Reagan was elected president, the Brezhnev Doctrine was a frightening reality. Between 1974 and 1980, while the United States wallowed in post-Vietnam angst, 10 countries had fallen into the Soviet orbit: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, South Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Grenada and Afghanistan. Never had the Soviets lost an inch of real estate to the West.
The liberation of Grenada changed that. For the first time, a Communist country had ceased to be Communist. Surely the Politburo in Moscow took notice of that. The Soviet leadership, we now know from later accounts, also noted that in Ronald Reagan the Americans had elected a new kind of president, one who had resolved not merely to ‘contain’ but actually to ‘roll back’ the Soviet empire.
Containment. Rollback. These sound like words from a very different era, and in a sense they are. With the sudden and spectacular collapse of the Soviet Union, we find ourselves in a new world. But how we got from there to here is still poorly understood. Oddly there is very little debate, even among historians, about how the Soviet empire collapsed so suddenly and unexpectedly. One reason for this, perhaps, is that many of the experts were embarrassingly wrong in their analysis and predictions about the future of the Soviet empire.
It is important to note that the doves or appeasers (the forerunners of today’s antiwar movement) were wrong on every point. They showed a very poor understanding of the nature of communism. For example, when Reagan in 1983 called the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire,’ columnist Anthony Lewis of The New York Times became so indignant at Reagan’s formulation that he searched through his repertoire for the appropriate adjective:’simplistic,”
Writing during the mid-1980s, Strobe Talbott, then a journalist at Time and later an official in the Clinton State Department, faulted officials in the Reagan administration for espousing ‘the early fifties goal of rolling back Soviet domination of Eastern Europe,’ an objective he considered unrealistic and dangerous. ‘Reagan is counting on American technological and economic predominance to prevail in the end,’ Talbott scoffed, adding that if the Soviet economy was in a crisis of any kind ‘it is a permanent, institutionalized crisis with which the U.S.S.R. has learned to live.’
Historian Barbara Tuchman argued that instead of employing a policy of confrontation, the West should ingratiate itself with the Soviet Union by pursuing ‘the stuffed-goose option — that is, providing them with all the grain and consumer goods they need.’ If Reagan had taken this advice when it was offered in 1982, the Soviet empire would probably still be around today.
The hawks or anti-Communists had a much better understanding of totalitarianism, and understood the necessity of an arms buildup to deter Soviet aggression. But they too were decidedly mistaken in their belief that Soviet communism was a permanent and virtually indestructible adversary. This Spenglerian gloom is conveyed by Whittaker Chambers’ famous remark to the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1948 that in abandoning communism he was ‘leaving the winning side for the losing side.’
The hawks were also mistaken about what steps were needed in the final stage to bring about the dismantling of the Soviet empire. During Reagan’s second term, when he supported Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform efforts and pursued arms reduction agreements with him, many conservatives denounced his apparent change of heart. William F. Buckley urged Reagan to reconsider his positive assessment of the Gorbachev regime: ‘To greet it as if it were no longer evil is on the order of changing our entire position toward Adolf Hitler.’ George Will mourned that ‘Reagan has accelerated the moral disarmament of the West by elevating wishful thinking to the status of political philosophy.’
No one, and least of all an intellectual, likes to be proved wrong. Consequently there has been in the past decade a determined effort to rewrite the history of the Cold War. This revisionist view has now entered the textbooks, and is being pressed on a new generation that did not live through the Soviet collapse. There is no mystery about the end of the Soviet Union, the revisionists say, explaining that it suffered from chronic economic problems and collapsed of its own weight.
This argument is not persuasive. True, the Soviet Union during the 1980s suffered from debilitating economic problems. But these were hardly new: The Soviet regime had endured economic strains for decades, on account of its unworkable Socialist system. Moreover, why would economic woes in themselves bring about the end of the political regime? Historically, it is common for nations to experience poor economic performance, but never have food shortages or technological backwardness caused the destruction of a large empire. The Roman and Ottoman empires survived internal stresses for centuries before they were destroyed from the outside through military conflict.
Another dubious claim is that Mikhail Gorbachev was the designer and architect of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Gorbachev was undoubtedly a reformer and a new kind of Soviet leader, but he did not wish to lead the party, and the regime, over the precipice. In his 1987 book Perestroika, Gorbachev presented himself as the preserver, not the destroyer, of socialism. Consequently, when the Soviet Union collapsed, no one was more surprised than Gorbachev.
The man who got things right from the start was, at first glance, an unlikely statesman. He became the leader of the Free World with no experience in foreign policy. Some people thought he was a dangerous warmonger; others considered him a nice fellow but a bit of a bungler. Nevertheless, this California lightweight turned out to have as deep an understanding of communism as Alexander Solzhenitsyn. This rank amateur developed a complex, often counterintuitive strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union, which hardly anyone on his staff fully endorsed or even understood. Through a combination of vision, tenacity, patience and improvisational skill, he produced what Henry Kissinger termed ‘the most stunning diplomatic feat of the modern era.’ Or as Margaret Thatcher put it, ‘Reagan won the cold war without firing a shot.’
Reagan had a much more sophisticated understanding of communism than either the hawks or the doves. In 1981 he told an audience at the University of Notre Dame: ‘The West won’t contain communism. It will transcend communism. It will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.’ The next year, speaking to the British House of Commons, Reagan predicted that if the Western alliance remained strong it would produce a ‘march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history.’
These prophetic assertions — dismissed as wishful rhetoric at the time — raise the question: How did Reagan know that Soviet communism faced impending collapse when the most perceptive minds of his time had no inkling of what was to come? To answer this question, the best approach is to begin with Reagan’s jokes, which contain a profound analysis of the working of socialism. Over the years Reagan had developed an extensive collection of stories that he attributed to the Soviet people themselves.
One of Reagan’s favorite stories concerned a man who goes to the Soviet bureau of transportation to order an automobile. He is informed that he will have to put down his money now, but there is a 10-year wait. The man fills out all the various forms, has them processed through the various agencies, and finally he gets to the last agency. He pays them his money and they say, ‘Come back in 10 years and get your car.’ He asks, ‘Morning or afternoon?’ The man in the agency says, ‘We’re talking about 10 years from now. What difference does it make?’ He replies, ‘The plumber is coming in the morning.’
Reagan could go on in this vein for hours. What is striking, however, is that his jokes were not about the evil of communism so much as they were about its incompetence. Reagan agreed with the hawks that the Soviet experiment, which sought to transform human nature and create a ‘new man,’ was immoral. At the same time, he saw that it was also basically foolish. Reagan did not need a Ph.D. in economics to recognize that any economy based upon centralized planners dictating how much factories should produce, how much people should consume and how social rewards should be distributed was doomed to disastrous failure. For Reagan the Soviet Union was a’sick bear,’ and the question was not whether it would collapse, but when.
Sick bears, however, can be very dangerous. They tend to lash out. What resources they cannot find at home, they seek elsewhere. Moreover, since we are not discussing animals but people, there is also the question of pride. The leaders of an internally weak empire are not likely to acquiesce to an erosion of their power. They typically turn to their primary source of strength: the military.
Appeasement, Reagan was convinced, would only increase the bear’s appetite and invite further aggression. Thus he agreed with the anti-Communist strategy for dealing firmly with the Soviets. But he was more confident than most hawks in his belief that Americans were up to the challenge. ‘We must realize,’ he said in his first inaugural address, ‘that…no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.’ What was most visionary about Reagan’s view was that it rejected the assumption of Soviet immutability. At a time when no one else could, Reagan dared to imagine a world in which the Communist regime in the Soviet Union did not exist.
It is one thing to envision this happy state, and quite another to bring it about. The Soviet bear was in a ravenous mood when Reagan entered the White House. In the 1970s the Soviets had made rapid advances in Asia, Africa and South America, culminating with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Moreover, the Soviet Union had built the most formidable nuclear arsenal in the world. The Warsaw Pact also had overwhelming superiority over NATO in its conventional forces. Finally, Moscow had recently deployed a new generation of intermediate-range missiles, the giant SS-20s, targeted at European cities.
Reagan did not merely react to these alarming events; he developed a broad counteroffensive strategy. He initiated a $1.5 trillion military buildup, the largest in American peacetime history, which was aimed at drawing the Soviets into an arms race he was convinced they could not win. He was also determined to lead the Western alliance in deploying 108 Pershing II and 464 Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe to counter the SS-20s. At the same time, Reagan did not eschew arms control negotiations. Indeed, he suggested that for the first time the two superpowers drastically reduce their nuclear stockpiles. If the Soviets would withdraw their SS-20s, the United States would not proceed with the Pershing and Tomahawk deployments. This was called the ‘zero option.’
Then there was the Reagan Doctrine, which involved military and material support for indigenous resistance movements struggling to overthrow Soviet-sponsored tyrannies. The administration supported such guerrillas in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua. In addition, it worked with the Vatican and the international wing of the AFL-CIO to keep alive the Polish trade union Solidarity, despite a ruthless crackdown by General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s regime. In 1983, U.S. troops invaded Grenada, ousting the Marxist government and holding free elections. Finally, in March 1983 Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a new program to research and eventually deploy missile defenses that offered the promise, in Reagan’s words, of ‘making nuclear weapons obsolete.’
At every stage Reagan’s counteroffensive strategy was denounced by the doves. The ‘nuclear freeze’ movement became a potent political force in the early 1980s by exploiting public fears that Reagan’s military buildup was leading the world closer to nuclear war. Reagan’s zero option was dismissed by Strobe Talbott, who said it was ‘highly unrealistic’ and offered ‘more to score propaganda points…than to win concessions from the Soviets.’ With the exception of support for the Afghan mujahedin, a cause that enjoyed bipartisan support, every other effort to aid anti-Communist rebels fighting to liberate their countries from Marxist, Soviet-backed regimes was resisted by doves in Congress and the media. SDI was denounced, in the words of The New York Times, as ‘a projection of fantasy into policy.’
The Soviet Union was equally hostile to the Reagan counteroffensive, but its understanding of Reagan’s objectives was far more perceptive than that of the doves. Commenting on the Reagan arms buildup, the Soviet journal Izvestiya protested, ‘They want to impose on us an even more ruinous arms race.’ General Secretary Yuri Andropov alleged that Reagan’s missile defense program was ‘a bid to disarm the Soviet Union.’ The seasoned diplomat Andrei Gromyko charged that ‘behind all this lies the clear calculation that the USSR will exhaust its material resources…and therefore will be forced to surrender.’ These reactions are important because they establish the context for Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to power in early 1985. Gorbachev was indeed a new breed of Soviet general secretary, utterly unlike any of his predecessors, but few have asked why he was appointed by the Old Guard. The main reason is that the Politburo had come to recognize the failure of past Soviet strategies.
The Soviet leadership, which initially dismissed Reagan’s promise of rearmament as mere saber-rattling rhetoric, seems to have been stunned by the scale and pace of the Reagan military buildup. The Pershing and Tomahawk deployments were, to the Soviets, an unnerving demonstration of the unity and resolve of the Western alliance. Through the Reagan Doctrine, the United States had completely halted Soviet advances in the Third World — since Reagan assumed office, no more territory had fallen into Moscow’s hands. Indeed, one small nation, Grenada, had moved back into the democratic camp. Thanks to Stinger missiles supplied by the United States, Afghanistan was rapidly becoming what the Soviets would themselves later call a ‘bleeding wound.’ Then there was Reagan’s SDI program, which invited the Soviets into a new kind of arms race that they could scarcely afford, and one that they would probably lose. Clearly the Politburo saw that the momentum in the Cold War had dramatically shifted. After 1985, the Soviets seem to have decided to try something different.
It was Reagan, in other words, who seems to have been largely responsible for inducing a loss of nerve that caused Moscow to seek a new approach. Gorbachev’s assignment was not merely to find a new way to deal with the country’s economic problems but also to figure out how to cope with the empire’s reversals abroad. For this reason, Ilya Zaslavsky, who served in the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, said later that the true originator of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) was not Mikhail Gorbachev but Ronald Reagan.
Gorbachev was widely admired by Western intellectuals and pundits because the new Soviet leader was attempting to achieve the great 20th-century hope of the Western intelligentsia: communism with a human face! A socialism that worked! Yet as Gorbachev discovered, and the rest of us now know, it could not be done. The vices Gorbachev sought to eradicate from the system turned out to be essential features of the system. If Reagan was the Great Communicator, then Gorbachev turned out to be, as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, the Grand Miscalculator. The hard-liners in the Kremlin who warned Gorbachev that his reforms would cause the entire system to blow up were right.
But Gorbachev had one redeeming quality: He was a decent and relatively open-minded fellow. Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader who came from the post-Stalin generation, the first to admit openly that the promises of Lenin were not being fulfilled. Reagan, like Margaret Thatcher, was quick to recognize that Gorbachev was different.
Even so, as they sat across the table in Geneva in November 1985, Reagan knew that Gorbachev would be a tough negotiator. Setting aside State Department briefing books full of diplomatic language, Reagan confronted Gorbachev directly. ‘What you are doing in Afghanistan in burning villages and killing children,’ he said. ‘It’s genocide, and you are the one who has to stop it.’ At this point, according to aide Kenneth Adelman, who was present, Gorbachev looked at Reagan with a stunned expression, apparently because no one had talked to him this way before.
Reagan also threatened Gorbachev. ‘We won’t stand by and let you maintain weapon superiority over us,’ he told him. ‘We can agree to reduce arms, or we can continue the arms race, which I think you know you can’t win.’ The extent to which Gorbachev took Reagan’s remarks to heart became obvious at the October 1986 Reykjavik summit. There Gorbachev astounded the arms control establishment in the West by accepting Reagan’s zero option.
Yet Gorbachev had one condition, which he unveiled at the very end: The United States must agree not to deploy missile defenses. Reagan refused. The press immediately went on the attack. ‘Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Talks Collapse as Deadlock on SDI Wipes Out Other Gains,’ read the banner headline in The Washington Post. ‘Sunk by Star Wars,’ Time‘s cover declared. To Reagan, however, SDI was more than a bargaining chip; it was a moral issue. In a televised statement from Reykjavik he said, ‘There was no way I could tell our people that their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction.’ Polls showed that most Americans supported him.
Reykjavik, Margaret Thatcher said, was the turning point in the Cold War. Finally Gorbachev realized that he had a choice: Continue a no-win arms race, which would utterly cripple the Soviet economy, or give up the struggle for global hegemony, establish peaceful relations with the West, and work to enable the Soviet economy to become prosperous like the Western economies. After Reykjavik, Gorbachev seemed to have settled on this latter course.
In December 1987, Gorbachev abandoned his previous ‘non-negotiable’ demand that Reagan give up SDI and visited Washington, D.C., to sign the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. For the first time in history the two superpowers agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons.
The hawks were suspicious from the outset. Gorbachev was a masterful chess player, they said; he might sacrifice a pawn, but only to gain an overall advantage. Howard Phillips of the Conservative Caucus even charged Reagan with ‘fronting as a useful idiot for Soviet propaganda.’ Yet these criticisms missed the larger current of events. Gorbachev wasn’t sacrificing a pawn, he was giving up his bishops and his queen. The INF Treaty was in fact the first stage of Gorbachev’s surrender in the Cold War.
Reagan knew that the Cold War was over when Gorbachev came to Washington. Gorbachev was a media celebrity in the United States, and the crowds cheered when he jumped out of his limousine and shook hands with people on the street. Reagan was out of the limelight, and it didn’t seem to bother him. Asked by a reporter whether he felt overshadowed by Gorbachev, Reagan replied: ‘I don’t resent his popularity. Good Lord, I once co-starred with Errol Flynn.’
To appreciate Reagan’s diplomatic acumen during this period, it is important to recall that he was pursuing his own distinctive course. Against the advice of the hawks, Reagan supported Gorbachev and his reforms. And when doves in the State Department implored Reagan to ‘reward’ Gorbachev with economic concessions and trade benefits for announcing that Soviet troops would pull out of Afghanistan, Reagan refused. He did not want to restore the health of the sick bear. Rather, Reagan’s goal was, as Gorbachev himself once joked, to lead the Soviet Union to the edge of the abyss and then induce it to take ‘one step forward.’
This was the significance of Reagan’s trip to the Brandenburg Gate on June 12, 1987, in which he demanded that Gorbachev prove that he was serious about openness by taking down the Berlin Wall. And in May 1988 Reagan stood beneath a giant white bust of Lenin at Moscow State University, where, in front of an audience of Russian students, he gave the most ringing defense of a free society ever offered in the Soviet Union. At the U.S. ambassador’s residence, he assured a group of dissidents and ‘refuseniks’ that the day of freedom was near. All of these measures were calibrated to force Gorbachev’s hand.
First Gorbachev agreed to deep unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces in Europe. Starting in May 1988, Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan, the first time the Soviets had voluntarily withdrawn from a puppet regime. Before long, Soviet and satellite troops were pulling out of Angola, Ethiopia and Cambodia. The race toward freedom began in Eastern Europe, and the Berlin Wall was indeed torn down.
During this period of ferment, Gorbachev’s great achievement, for which he will be credited by history, was to abstain from the use of force. Force had been the response of his predecessors to popular uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. By now not only were Gorbachev and his team permitting the empire to disintegrate, but they even adopted Reagan’s way of talking. In October 1989, Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov announced that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the internal affairs of Eastern Bloc nations. ‘The Brezhnev Doctrine is dead,’ Gerasimov said. When reporters asked him what would take its place, he replied, ‘You know the Frank Sinatra song ‘My Way’? Hungary and Poland are doing it their way. We now have the Sinatra Doctrine.’ The Gipper could not have said it better himself.
Finally the revolution made its way into the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, who had completely lost control of events, found himself ousted from power. The Soviet Union voted to abolish itself. Leningrad changed its name back to St. Petersburg. Republics such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine gained their independence.
Even some who had previously been skeptical of Reagan were forced to admit that his policies had been thoroughly vindicated. Reagan’s old nemesis, Henry Kissinger, observed that while it was George H.W. Bush who presided over the final disintegration of the Soviet empire, ‘it was Ronald Reagan’s presidency which marked the turning point.’
We are now living in a new world, in which Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism may be replacing Soviet communism as the main challenge facing America and the West. Even as we face our new challenges, however, we should reserve a measure of admiration and gratitude for Reagan, the grand old warrior who led the United States to victory in the Cold War.
2a) The Media Questionator and My ISIS Airlift Strategy
I really am just an amateur inventor. I admit at the outset I am not an engineer or math major. Unlike Brian Williams, Walter Cronkite, John Chancellor, Carl Bernstein, William Safire, and Nina Totenberg, however, I am not a college dropout. In fact, I even have an advanced degree. I can hear you now: that’s the news business you say -- anyone can succeed as a newsie provided you have no shame in dissembling and pick the right side -- that is the left side -- of the political fence to promote. I anticipate you’ll say that you really need to be an engineer or math major to create a useful new device, but you’d be as wrong as suggesting artists, businessmen or journalists need one to succeed.
We all know the story of Steve Jobs, who dropped out of Reed College. Since the days of Henry Ford and Thomas Edison, many business leaders got their starts without the benefit of degrees, including Larry Ellison of Oracle, Bill Gates and Paul Allen of Microsoft, Mark Zuckerberg and Dustin Moskovitz of Facebook, Michael Dell of Dell Computers, Brian Dunn of Best Buy, Anna Wintour of Vogue, Barry Diller of IAC, John Mackey of Whole Foods, David Geffen, Ralph Lauren and Ted Turner.[snip]
- Scott Walker, the governor of Wisconsin, dropped out of Marquette University. He is joined by Gov. Jan Brewer of Arizona, Gov. Gary Herbert of Utah, U.S. Sen. Mark Begich of Alaska and 33 members of the U.S. House of Representatives.
- Maya Angelou has received many honorary doctorates but never attended college to learn her craft. She's in good company with many other great American writers, such as Gore Vidal, August Wilson, Mark Twain, William Faulkner, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Robert Frost, Joseph Brodsky and Harper Lee.
-- Woody Allen is loved by intellectuals for his philosophical films, but he did not gain his style on a campus, having flunked out of City College of New York. Other Oscar winners without degrees include Clint Eastwood, James Cameron, Robert Redford, Michael Moore, Sidney Pollack, George Clooney, Hillary Swank, Tom Hanks, Julia Roberts and Steven Spielberg (who completed a degree in 2002)
-- Oprah Winfrey left Tennessee State University in 1976 to begin her career in media (completing her degree in 1986). Top talkers without degrees include Larry King, Ellen DeGeneres, Jimmy Kimmel, Joy Behar, Rosie O'Donnell and conservative talkers Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck and Sean Hannity.
And then there are credentialed and uncredentialed politicians. Was Woodrow Wilson (PhD) a better president than Harry S. Truman who had no degree? Is (Sheila Jackson Lee, B.A. Yale, J.D. U Va) the dummy who among other things labored under the misimpression we’d landed men on Mars, a more capable leader than Scott Walker because of her credentials?
Of course not. But as the media’s digs at Walker’s lack of a degree (he left Marquette in his senior year in perfectly good standing to take a job) fall flat and as he correctly refuses to answer whether he believes in the theory of evolution because it is irrelevant to the presidency, I’ve decided to help them out by creating a Questionator -- spin it Left for Democrat candidates and Right for Republicans and they have their work done! Then they can spend even more time on the important part of their craft -- haircuts, wardrobe and makeup.
I’ll give you a sneak preview so you can watch it at work:
Spin Left -- Dem candidate: What’s it like to be a parent/grandparent?
Spin Right -- Do you believe in micro- or macro-evolution and why?
Spin left -- Boxers or briefs?
Spin right -- Do you believe in global warming (machine coughs) I mean climate change?
Spin left -- Do you prefer peace or war?
Spin right -- What’s the name of the deputy assistant minister for sewage disposal in Upper Volta?
Well, you get the idea. I might be out of business if the Republicans wise up to the game, though.
This week, James Taranto explains why the hazing question to Walker was asked and why it was nonsensical:
[T] he evolution question -- with which the AP story leads -- is a silly one. To “believe in” a scientific theory is a contradiction in terms: A theory is not a doctrine to be accepted on faith, but a hypothesis to be tested empirically.[Snip] The Federalist’s Sean Davis tweeted at Fournier: “Since you ‘believe in science,’ . . . can you please square the Cambrian explosion w/ Darwinian gradualism?” -- a serious question posed with facetious intent. It’s a very safe bet that Fournier’s knowledge of evolutionary science does not extend far beyond the textbook capsule summary of the theory, as evidenced by Fournier’s failure to answer Davis’s tweet (one of many directed at what Twitchy.com calls “self-righteous journos”).
Declarations like “I believe in evolution” or “evolution is fact” are not serious thoughts but badges of identity. As David Freddoso of the Washington Examiner observes in a tweet: “I’d rather see Walker say yes, he believes in evolution. But the Q as posed to a POTUS candidate is just a white-gentry-liberal dog whistle.” He elaborates: “For a certain kind of person -- white, northeastern, high-income, college degree or more -- it tells you whether someone is ‘our people.’
When a reporter asks the question, it’s more a hazing ritual than a serious query. (Walker is being put through other forms of hazing as well; see today’s Washington Post story on “questions” that “linger” about his “college exit.” The answer, deep in the piece, is that Walker was “in good standing” when he left Marquette University.)To this sort of question, the correct answer is one that demonstrates not one’s knowledge but one’s political acumen. Walker has little chance of winning votes from people whose identity is tied up with a “belief” in evolution. But he needs to avoid losing votes from those on the opposite side of that divide as well as from those who find self-righteous fundamentalism off-putting whether it is in the name of religion or science.
Lots of writers offered their opinions on how such questions should be answered. I like Ben Shapiro’s advice best:
The next time Scott Walker is asked about evolution, he should answer that punctuated equilibrium is supported by the scientific record, then ask whether Hillary Clinton believes in the science of ultrasounds -- and if so, why she would have been willing to allow Chelsea to abort her grandchild at nine months. The next time Hillary Clinton gives an answer about her support for science with regards to global warming, someone should ask her why she wanted to waste taxpayer dollars to investigate junk science about vaccines and autism.The left seeks to seize the moral high ground regarding science versus religion -- and the media hope to help them along. Republicans should fight back with both science and morality
In the meantime, as journalists -- credentialed or not -- make fools of themselves with such partisan ploys, we are forced to abandon our embassy in Yemen surrounded by Iranian-backed thugs, our troops in Anbar are in jeopardy and jihadis are continuing to slaughter in horrifying ways what our obviously anti-Jewish president calls “random folks”. Worse, we are allowing Iran to move ever closer to creating nuclear weapons under a well-credentialed president and secretary of state who seem to believe irrationally in some ambiguous fatwa to the effect that Islam does not permit the mullahs to develop nuclear weapons.
The administration has asked Congress to approve an AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force) which in essence says despite the title that the administration is authorized to take no effective steps against ISIS as it limits the use of ground forces. In effect, it seeks Congressional imprimatur on the administration’s military paralysis.
I agree with the proposition that this proposal should be rejected.
Indeed, a congressional rebuke of Obama on the grounds that his proposal does not go far enough is more likely to make him rethink his approach than bipartisan passage or an extended period of debate and modification and attempts to “improve” his language. And even if such a rethinking does not occur, if Obama goes ahead with his strategy based on his current authorities, the Republicans would pay no price. Say that Obama is not looking to distract the Congress with his war authorization but to win congressional buy-in for his policy through the end of his presidency. How is the country made more secure, how is the American interest furthered, by Republican authorization of a flawed strategy? Would the Democrats have gone along with Bush or participated in earnest and collegial discussions with his administration if he had asked Congress to authorize his surge of troops to Iraq in 2007? You can stop laughing.There is no cause to assent to the president’s demand for a war authority he does not want, does not need, and probably will not use. I also cannot help thinking that the presidential request is little more than a trap, a bone thrown in the direction of the cloakroom to distract from the collapse of America’s position in the Middle East and the approaching deadline for nuclear talks with Iran.
It was unanimous opposition to the war in Iraq that helped the Democrats win the Congress in 2006 and the White House in 2008. And it was the resurgence of the national security issue after the border crisis, ISIS beheadings of Americans, and the outbreak of Ebola on American soil that helped Republicans retake the Senate in 2014. For the GOP now to throw away its critical stance by adopting or seeking to improve the president’s authorization for the use of force would be political folly (and therefore entirely consistent with the party’s history). Far better for us all if the Congress refused the president precisely because he is unserious and untrustworthy with the security of the United States and the world, and spent the remaining two years of his presidency making the case publicly and robustly for the roll back of ISIS and the removal of Assad, an end to the Iranian nuclear program, a military buildup, and a renewal of the alliance system and of American support for Western principles of liberal democracy. That way the voters will be absolutely certain next year that there is a substantive and consequential choice to be made about the future of American foreign policy and security. They will see the results of Obama’s policy of retreat and appeasement throughout the world. And Hillary Clinton won’t be able to say, well, the Republican Congress supported the president, so why don’t you?
The AUMF deserves to be mocked and it has been beautifully satirized here.
Fear not, though. Just as I have invented the questionator, I have plotted a brilliant strategy for defeating ISIS. It seems, certainly to the envy of our progressive nannies, ISIS has decided to behead anyone caught smoking. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-islamic-state-smoking-ban-20150212-story.html Instead of passing this cockamamie AUMF, why not just authorize the use of giant cargo planes to parachute in over ISIS-held territory thousands of cartons of cigarettes? It’s a win-win. We defeat ISIS with butts, not boots, on the ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3)Anatomy of a Bad Iran Deal: A Preliminary Assessment
Dore Gold
The lead editorial of the Washington Post on February 5, 2015, expressed the
growing concern in elite circles with the contours of the emerging nuclear
accord between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France
and Germany).1 Part of the concern emanates from the change in the goals of
Western negotiators: rather than eliminate Iran’s potential to build nuclear
weapons, they now want to restrict Iranian capabilities, which would leave
Tehran in a position to break out of any restrictions in the future.2
The best way to evaluate the impending nuclear agreement is to look at the
statements of high-levels officials who have been involved in the
negotiations. While not all of the details of the agreement have been made
public, elements have been disclosed in the international media that are
deeply worrying.
For example, there is the issue of the number of centrifuges that Iran will
be allowed to retain. A centrifuge is a machine that separates uranium gas
into two isotopes: U-238, which does not release nuclear energy, and U-235,
which, when split, can release the energy for either a nuclear reactor or an
atomic bomb. The enrichment process involves producing uranium with
increasing percentages of U-235. At 90 percent purity, the uranium is
characterized as weapons-grade.
Iran currently has 19,000 centrifuges, 9,000 of which are running and 10,000
that are installed but not operating. Israel's position is that Iran should
have zero centrifuges. The reason is that if Iran truly needs enriched
uranium for civilian purposes, it could import enriched uranium as do
roughly 15 other countries, such as Canada, Mexico, and Spain. The Israeli
position is in line with six UN Security Council resolutions that were
adopted between 2006 and 2010, with the support of Russia and China. If Iran
eliminated all of its centrifuges and then chose to build new centrifuges,
the process would take four to five years. There would be ample time to
detect Iran's efforts to enrich uranium beyond what is needed for civilian
purposes and to organize an international response.
According to Gary Samore, President Obama’s former non-proliferation
adviser, at the beginning of the current round of negotiations, the United
States was demanding that Iran significantly reduce its stock of centrifuges
to 1,500, but in doing so dropped the longstanding U.S. policy that Iran
eliminate its centrifuges completely.3
The numbers are important. In a scenario of "breakout,” in which the
Iranians race to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for their first atomic
bomb, the number of centrifuges largely determines the amount of time the
Iranians will need to accomplish this goal.
In addition to the number of centrifuges that Iran has, there is also the
issue of the amount of enriched uranium that Iran has already stockpiled.
With enough low-enriched uranium, Iran can make a final push to
weapons-grade uranium for an atomic bomb. Robert Einhorn, the former special
advisor for nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama
administration, has calculated that if Iran uses 1,500 kilograms of
low-enriched uranium and inserts it into 2,000 centrifuges, Iran will have
one bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium in 12 to 14 months.4
But from what we know today about the impending nuclear deal, Iran will need
much less time to "breakout" to a bomb. According to multiple press reports,
Western negotiators have raised the ceiling for the number of centrifuges
that Iran will be allowed to have: they have gone from 1,500 to 4,500, and
they now appear to be ready to let the Iranians have 6,000 centrifuges.5
According to Einhorn’s calculations mentioned above, with 1,500 kilograms of
enriched uranium and 6,000 centrifuges, Iran can produce enough
weapons-grade uranium for an atomic bomb in six months.6
David Albright, formerly with the International Atomic Energy Agency, has
estimated that with just 2,000-4,000 centrifuges Iran could achieve
"breakout" in six months.7 Others suggest that the breakout timeline is even
less than six months. For example, Congressman Ed Royce, Chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, has warned that on the basis of expert
testimony given to his committee, should Iran be permitted to keep just
4,000 centrifuges, it would have a breakout time of only three months.8
There are other factors that can shorten this breakout time even more. Iran
has second-generation IR-2 centrifuges that are more sophisticated and
powerful which have not been activated yet. The IR-5, with an even higher
rate of enrichment, is in advanced stages of research and was already tested
last fall.9 If these advanced centrifuges are activated, the Iranian
breakout time will be cut precipitously.
Albright concluded that a six-month breakout time would be the minimum
needed to allow for an effective international response – presumably
U.S.-led – to an Iranian violation. Thus, the 6,000 centrifuge limit that
the P5+1 negotiators are presently proposing will not allow sufficient time
to respond to an Iranian breakout.
However, if the Obama administration decides to proceed, countries in the
Middle East are likely to conclude that under these conditions, the United
States has reached a bad agreement with Iran. The evaluation here is largely
based on the number of centrifuges the agreement allows.
There are other dimensions to the nuclear deal with Iran that are no less
important. Dennis Ross, who also served in the Obama administration and
worked on the Iran file, co-authored an article on Jan. 23 expressing
similar concerns. "During the course of the nuclear negotiations over the
past year, Iran has been the beneficiary of a generous catalogue of
concessions from the West," Ross wrote. "The 5-plus-1 has conceded to
Iranian enrichment, agreed that Tehran need not scale back the number of its
centrifuges significantly or dismantle any facilities and could have an
industrial-size program after passage of a period of time."10
Undoubtedly, other countries in the Middle East will react to these
concessions by accelerating their own nuclear programs. It was not
surprising to see the news report on Feb. 10 that Egypt was to procure a new
nuclear reactor from Russia.11 Nuclear proliferation is likely to spread to
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and others. A multipolar Middle East, which
is currently facing a radical Islamist wave, will have none of the stability
of the East-West balance during the Cold War. A bad agreement with Iran, in
short, will leave the world a much more dangerous place.
* * *
Notes
1 "The Emerging Iran Nuclear Deal Raises Major Concerns,” Washington Post,
Editorial, Feb. 5, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-emerging-iran-nuclear-deal-raises-major-concerns-in-co
ngress-and-beyond/2015/02/05/4b80fd92-abda-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html
Dore Gold
The lead editorial of the Washington Post on February 5, 2015, expressed the
growing concern in elite circles with the contours of the emerging nuclear
accord between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France
and Germany).1 Part of the concern emanates from the change in the goals of
Western negotiators: rather than eliminate Iran’s potential to build nuclear
weapons, they now want to restrict Iranian capabilities, which would leave
Tehran in a position to break out of any restrictions in the future.2
The best way to evaluate the impending nuclear agreement is to look at the
statements of high-levels officials who have been involved in the
negotiations. While not all of the details of the agreement have been made
public, elements have been disclosed in the international media that are
deeply worrying.
For example, there is the issue of the number of centrifuges that Iran will
be allowed to retain. A centrifuge is a machine that separates uranium gas
into two isotopes: U-238, which does not release nuclear energy, and U-235,
which, when split, can release the energy for either a nuclear reactor or an
atomic bomb. The enrichment process involves producing uranium with
increasing percentages of U-235. At 90 percent purity, the uranium is
characterized as weapons-grade.
Iran currently has 19,000 centrifuges, 9,000 of which are running and 10,000
that are installed but not operating. Israel's position is that Iran should
have zero centrifuges. The reason is that if Iran truly needs enriched
uranium for civilian purposes, it could import enriched uranium as do
roughly 15 other countries, such as Canada, Mexico, and Spain. The Israeli
position is in line with six UN Security Council resolutions that were
adopted between 2006 and 2010, with the support of Russia and China. If Iran
eliminated all of its centrifuges and then chose to build new centrifuges,
the process would take four to five years. There would be ample time to
detect Iran's efforts to enrich uranium beyond what is needed for civilian
purposes and to organize an international response.
According to Gary Samore, President Obama’s former non-proliferation
adviser, at the beginning of the current round of negotiations, the United
States was demanding that Iran significantly reduce its stock of centrifuges
to 1,500, but in doing so dropped the longstanding U.S. policy that Iran
eliminate its centrifuges completely.3
The numbers are important. In a scenario of "breakout,” in which the
Iranians race to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for their first atomic
bomb, the number of centrifuges largely determines the amount of time the
Iranians will need to accomplish this goal.
In addition to the number of centrifuges that Iran has, there is also the
issue of the amount of enriched uranium that Iran has already stockpiled.
With enough low-enriched uranium, Iran can make a final push to
weapons-grade uranium for an atomic bomb. Robert Einhorn, the former special
advisor for nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama
administration, has calculated that if Iran uses 1,500 kilograms of
low-enriched uranium and inserts it into 2,000 centrifuges, Iran will have
one bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium in 12 to 14 months.4
But from what we know today about the impending nuclear deal, Iran will need
much less time to "breakout" to a bomb. According to multiple press reports,
Western negotiators have raised the ceiling for the number of centrifuges
that Iran will be allowed to have: they have gone from 1,500 to 4,500, and
they now appear to be ready to let the Iranians have 6,000 centrifuges.5
According to Einhorn’s calculations mentioned above, with 1,500 kilograms of
enriched uranium and 6,000 centrifuges, Iran can produce enough
weapons-grade uranium for an atomic bomb in six months.6
David Albright, formerly with the International Atomic Energy Agency, has
estimated that with just 2,000-4,000 centrifuges Iran could achieve
"breakout" in six months.7 Others suggest that the breakout timeline is even
less than six months. For example, Congressman Ed Royce, Chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, has warned that on the basis of expert
testimony given to his committee, should Iran be permitted to keep just
4,000 centrifuges, it would have a breakout time of only three months.8
There are other factors that can shorten this breakout time even more. Iran
has second-generation IR-2 centrifuges that are more sophisticated and
powerful which have not been activated yet. The IR-5, with an even higher
rate of enrichment, is in advanced stages of research and was already tested
last fall.9 If these advanced centrifuges are activated, the Iranian
breakout time will be cut precipitously.
Albright concluded that a six-month breakout time would be the minimum
needed to allow for an effective international response – presumably
U.S.-led – to an Iranian violation. Thus, the 6,000 centrifuge limit that
the P5+1 negotiators are presently proposing will not allow sufficient time
to respond to an Iranian breakout.
However, if the Obama administration decides to proceed, countries in the
Middle East are likely to conclude that under these conditions, the United
States has reached a bad agreement with Iran. The evaluation here is largely
based on the number of centrifuges the agreement allows.
There are other dimensions to the nuclear deal with Iran that are no less
important. Dennis Ross, who also served in the Obama administration and
worked on the Iran file, co-authored an article on Jan. 23 expressing
similar concerns. "During the course of the nuclear negotiations over the
past year, Iran has been the beneficiary of a generous catalogue of
concessions from the West," Ross wrote. "The 5-plus-1 has conceded to
Iranian enrichment, agreed that Tehran need not scale back the number of its
centrifuges significantly or dismantle any facilities and could have an
industrial-size program after passage of a period of time."10
Undoubtedly, other countries in the Middle East will react to these
concessions by accelerating their own nuclear programs. It was not
surprising to see the news report on Feb. 10 that Egypt was to procure a new
nuclear reactor from Russia.11 Nuclear proliferation is likely to spread to
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and others. A multipolar Middle East, which
is currently facing a radical Islamist wave, will have none of the stability
of the East-West balance during the Cold War. A bad agreement with Iran, in
short, will leave the world a much more dangerous place.
* * *
Notes
1 "The Emerging Iran Nuclear Deal Raises Major Concerns,” Washington Post,
Editorial, Feb. 5, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-emerging-iran-nuclear-deal-raises-major-concerns-in-co
ngress-and-beyond/2015/02/05/4b80fd92-abda-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html
2 Ibid.
3 "Can Iran and the United States Make a Meaningful Deal?” Council on
Foreign Relations, Oct. 9, 2014,
http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/can-iran-united-states-make-meaningful-deal/p33588
Foreign Relations, Oct. 9, 2014,
http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/can-iran-united-states-make-meaningful-deal/p33588
4 Robert J. Einhorn, "Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Requirements for a
Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement,” Brookings Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation Series, Paper 10, March 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2014/03/31%20nuclear%20armed%20iran%20einhorn/31%20nuclear%20armed%20iran%20einhorn%20pdf.pdf
Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement,” Brookings Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation Series, Paper 10, March 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2014/03/31%20nuclear%20armed%20iran%20einhorn/31%20nuclear%20armed%20iran%20einhorn%20pdf.pdf
5 Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Lays Out Limits It Seeks in Iran Nuclear Talks,”
New York Times, Nov. 20, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/us-lays-out-limits-it-seeks-in-iran-nuclear-talks.html?_r=0;
and Paul Richter and Ramin Mostaghim, "Iranian Website Reports U.S. Giving
Ground on Nuclear Centrifuges," Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-nuclear-20141104-story.html
New York Times, Nov. 20, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/us-lays-out-limits-it-seeks-in-iran-nuclear-talks.html?_r=0;
and Paul Richter and Ramin Mostaghim, "Iranian Website Reports U.S. Giving
Ground on Nuclear Centrifuges," Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-nuclear-20141104-story.html
6 Ibid.
7 David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Andrea Stricker, "Five Compromises to
Avoid in a Comprehensive Agreement with Iran,” Institute for Science and
International Security, June 3, 2014,
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Five_Bad_Compromises_3June2014-final.pdf
Avoid in a Comprehensive Agreement with Iran,” Institute for Science and
International Security, June 3, 2014,
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Five_Bad_Compromises_3June2014-final.pdf
8 "Assessing a ‘Comprehensive’ Nuclear Agreement with Iran: Five Issues to
Watch,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%20Five%20Key%20Issues.pdf
Watch,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%20Five%20Key%20Issues.pdf
9 Michelle Moghtader and Fredrik Dahl, "Iran Says Centrifuge Testing, but No
Violation of Atom Deal with Powers,” Reuters, Nov. 12, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-iran-nuclear-centrifuges-idUSKCN0IW11O20141112
Violation of Atom Deal with Powers,” Reuters, Nov. 12, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-iran-nuclear-centrifuges-idUSKCN0IW11O20141112
10 Dennis Ross, Eric Edelman and Ray Takeyh, "Time to Take It to Iran: The
Stalemate over Nukes, and Now a Tehran-Backed Coup in Yemen, Show that Obama
Isn’t Tough Enough,” Politico, Jan. 23, 2015,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/iran-yemen-coup-114532.html#.VNyWSU0UG70
Stalemate over Nukes, and Now a Tehran-Backed Coup in Yemen, Show that Obama
Isn’t Tough Enough,” Politico, Jan. 23, 2015,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/iran-yemen-coup-114532.html#.VNyWSU0UG70
11 "Cairo, Moscow to Build 1st Nuclear Plant in Egypt," Al Arabiya, Feb. 10,
2015,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/10/Russia-s-Putin-in-Cairo-for-talks-with-Sisi-.html
The writer, a former Israeli ambassador to the UN, is president of the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and served as an external advisor to the
office of the Prime Minister of Israel. He is the author of the best-selling
books: The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of
the Holy City (Regnery, 2007), and The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran
Defies the West (Regnery, 2009).
2015,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/10/Russia-s-Putin-in-Cairo-for-talks-with-Sisi-.html
The writer, a former Israeli ambassador to the UN, is president of the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and served as an external advisor to the
office of the Prime Minister of Israel. He is the author of the best-selling
books: The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of
the Holy City (Regnery, 2007), and The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran
Defies the West (Regnery, 2009).
No comments:
Post a Comment