HAPPY THANKSGIVING! Who's The Turkey - Obama or The 'Stupids?' Ferguson Should Build A Zoo!

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Obama now proposes altering his strategy in Afghanistan from  training to an offensive one. Another lie?  Perhaps not.  Perhaps it highlight's Obama's inability to tell the truth all at once because fear of the political back wash he might get.

Obama did warn the 'stupids' they must expect a long war.  Every president leaves some
unfinished mess for his successor and Obama is going to leave some of the worst and most dangerous, ie. a strong and expanding ISIS, a failed two state solution between Palestinians and Israelis because, again for political reasons, Obama began it prematurely and without adequate preparation and an Iran with nuclear capability.  These did not have to be  but Obama was too busy blaming G.W, lacked executive experience, is driven solely by political considerations and was consumed by conceit.

Why do I believe this? Because  Obama has  re-introduced troops he precipitously withdrew from Iraq for political reasons, he disregarded red lines he drew n the sand, self deception that he had defeated terrorism and, most importantly of all, his apology for American arrogance sent the wrong message which emboldened democracies' enemies.

On the domestic scene ,Obama stirred racial tensions appointing administrators who were  incompetent, biased and outright liars.

Economically, Obama felt compelled to pay off Greens which slowed energy independence and resulted in billions of pay off waste in pursuit of renewable failures and implementation of bureaucratic red tape policies and tax penalties that sent jobs overseas.

If this is not enough we have a myriad of no 'smidgin' scandals which have racked this nation  from lies about illegal weapons, to constitutional deprivations on conservatives etc.

And finally, we now have Obama's unilateral massive immigration  actions which have poisoned the well of the incoming Congress controlled by the opposition.

Yes, Obama promised to bring change.  It is a shame the change Obama wrought is not what the 'stupids' sought or believed he would deliver.

Happy Thanksgiving but who's the turkey?  Obama or the 'stupids?"
===
Abbas condemns for show. (See 1 below.)

Meanwhile, Obama showboats as well. as he and Kerry are willing to break their backs bending backwards to obtain the appearance of a believable deal vis a vis Iran's nuclear ambitions.  (See 1a, 1b and 1c below.)

Will Israel become the fly in Obama's ointment?  (See 1d below.)
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Sec. Hagel resigns under pressure.  Someone had to be blamed so Obama canned him!

Hagel should be relieved! (See 2 and 2a below.)
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Hamas - Rebuild what Israel destroyed because we attacked them or we will attack them again! (See 3 below.)
===
A courageous grand jury convened in Ferguson and concluded the accused policeman Darren Wilson acted in good faith and in defense of his own self and, as expected, those who believed he was guilty began committing crimes because they do not comprehend or care  how our system works and prefer rioting and destructive acts of anarchy as a means of assuaging  their anger.

Atty. Gen Holder , Sharpton and all the trouble makers are busy having  their day, not in court, but in the streets.  The good citizens of Ferguson should build a zoo to house these rioting and trouble making  animals.
===
Obama's third Sec, of Defense has now left or been pushed out with Hagel's resignation.

Meanwhile, ISIS continues  reshaping the Middle East while Obama dithers.

We are in this pickle mostly because Obama  rejected advice from those who know more. (Obama is an expert at knowing more than anyone else who knows more.)

America's down hill slide began when  Obama went to Egypt and apologized for American arrogance.

Then Obama arrogantly played politics by blaming GW, disregarding the progress we finally made in Iraq as "The Surge" quelled al Qaeda terrorists. (Meanwhile, ISIS subsequently  filled the vacuum Obama's precipitous act created..)

Finally, Obama  dithers because he has no plan and cannot act convincingly. He  has perfected the ability to draw lines,  make empty  threats, wimp out from enforcing them, as he is doing again vis a vis Iran,  and, above all , blame others  for his own failings.

What a tragic mess this  immature amateur has gotten America into as he transforms and weakens our nation.  (See 5 below.)
===
Arrogance or a practical response caused/perpetrated by Palestinian recent and continuing acts of  terror? (See 6 below.)
===
Dick
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1)-Fatah MP: For diplomatic reasons

Abbas condemned synagogue massacre

By Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik

 A Fatah MP is the latest Palestinian official to explain that Mahmoud Abbas' condemnation of the terror attack that killed 5 in a Jerusalem synagogue was for diplomatic purposes. She explained that Abbas' movement Fatah "justified the statements of the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, who condemned the Jerusalem operation. Fatah member of PA Parliament Najat Abu-Bakr said that those statements were made within a diplomatic context.... [he] is forced to speak this way to the world." [Quds Net News Agency, Nov.19, 2014]

This follows Fatah's posting on its Facebook page a video of Yasser Arafat's bodyguard saying that Arafat lied when he condemned terror but was forced to for diplomatic reasons. Fatah wrote that watching that video - which was taken from the Palestinian Media Watch website and included the PMW subtitles - explains why Abbas condemned the synagogue massacre.

Another senior Palestinian official from Abbas' party, Fatah Central Committee member Tawfiq Tirawi, likewise explained that Abbas condemned only for diplomatic reasons, when interviewed on Lebanese TV:

Al-Mayadeen TV host:

"Was it [diplomatic] pressure that forced the Palestinian President and the PA to take his position condemning the operation (i.e., the Jerusalem synagogue terror attack)?"

Fatah Central Committee member Tawfiq Tirawi:

"First of all, I represent Fatah, not the PA. Brother Mahmoud Abbas is the President of the PA, and he speaks diplomatically with diplomats, presidents and leaders, and this is the position of the PA. When I speak, I express Fatah's position, which in part agrees with the PA's position, and in part may disagree with it, since Fatah is a mass movement. Its task is to unite the masses, and to be present among the masses... I want to say that our brothers in the Palestinian leadership - brother Mahmoud Abbas most of all - are not acting to satisfy Israel or anyone else...First of all, we want to satisfy our people. First our God then our people. There are diplomatic issues international relations and relations with heads of state. These are the things Mahmoud Abbas is talking about."

[Al-Mayadeen TV (Lebanon), Nov. 18, 2014]
 

The following is the statement of PA Parliament Najat Abu-Bakr (Fatah) explaining that Abbas' condemnation was for diplomatic reasons.

"Fatah, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, justified the statements of the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, who condemned the Jerusalem operation (i.e. the Jerusalem Synagogue massacre) yesterday. Fatah member of PA Parliament Najat Abu-Bakr said that those statements were made within a diplomatic context.

She said that President Abbas' behavior at this time is the height of diplomacy, since he is not required to speak like everyone else, because he is responsible for the entire Palestinian people.

Abu-Bakr said today, Wednesday [Nov. 19, 2014], in an interview to Al-Quds Radio: 'The Palestinian President is forced to speak this way to the world, (i.e. to condemn murder of four rabbis and one policeman in the Jerusalem synagogue) and these statements result from [his] responsibility for the Palestinian People.'" [Quds Net News Agency, Nov.19, 2014]

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1a)-Iran's ultimatum to the West: All or nothing

Analysis: Real reason for deadlock in nuclear talks that Iranians don't trust Americans in general and President Obama in particular. 
By Alex Fishman

There is an almost zero chance that Iran and the world powers will sign a historic agreement on Monday, but the reason for that has nothing to do with the details of the negotiations: Not with the number of centrifuges, not with the number of inspection years and not even with the West's insistence to get its hands on the Iranian military nuclear project.

The real reason for the deadlock is that the Iranians don't trust the Americans in general and US President Barack Obama in particular.

So on the eve of concluding the negotiations – after 18 months of talks, during which the Iranians realized that the Americans have a vital interest in reaching an agreement and are willing to pay a lot for it – they raised the ultimate demand, which even the eager Obama administration could not accept: Lifting the sanctions immediately upon signing the agreement.

Obama wants to lift the sanctions gradually, over a few years, both due to the need to examine how serious the Iranians really are and because the Congress will not approve an overall removal of the sanctions.

But the Iranians are holding a mirror to his face and saying: You are demanding that we freeze the situation and accept tight supervision for 10 years – but in three years' time, when we demand a further ease of the sanctions, you'll have a different president who might not fulfill the commitment you are giving us today.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani promised spiritual leader Ali Khamenei and his people a dramatic change in the country's economy following the removal of the sanctions, but the Iranians don't believe that the current agreement will lead to an immediate improvement in their situation, and are therefore setting an ultimatum to the West: All or nothing.

During the negotiations, the Americans agreed to everything. There is not a single intelligence agency in the West today which thinks the Iranians don’t have a nuclear military project, but the Americans dropped the demand to receive information and supervise the project.

The Americans also agreed that the Iranians would continue to produce enriched uranium through centrifuges. The only disagreement was over the number: At first, the US agreed to only 1,500 centrifuges, and then went up to 4,500, but the Iranians insisted on keeping everything they had already built – all the 9,000 centrifuges they have.

Then the Americans began inventing patents such as "leave the centrifuges, but just cut off the electricity supply so that we'll see they are not working." The Iranians wouldn't even agree to that.

In order to square the circle, the Americans sent up trial balloons in the form of reports that the Russians or anyone else would produce the fuel rods for the Iranians, but the Iranians thwarted the initiative by turning down the idea.

Washington's explanation of its generosity towards Tehran was that even an imperfect diplomatic achievement is preferable to a military conflict with harsh results.

The US admits that Iran is just around the corner from producing a nuclear weapon, and that within a year and a half it will be able to arm a nuclear bomb as soon as it decides. But according to the Americans, if this situation can be frozen for at least 10 years through tight supervision – it will be enough. They will rack our brains later as to what to do next. The important thing today is to recruit Iran for the sake of regional stability.

In light of the poor relations between Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel has almost zero influence on the US on the Iranian issue. The Americans update the Israelis, and opinions are exchanged, but when there is no trust on the political echelon it means nothing.

Israel, however, can see a certain accomplishment in the fact that a permanent agreement has not been achieved, as this has postponed the inevitable conflict between Jerusalem and Washington.

And so once again it has been proven that the American administration has no decisive influence over processes in the region. The Americans will avoid another resounding failure in their foreign policy at any cost, and will therefore make every effort to continue the talks for at least three more months. By then, the Iranian may lower the price. The problem is that the US has nothing left to sell after selling almost everything.

1b)  Iran: Obama’s Biggest Failure Fails Again

By Roger L Simon.

Among the many lies and failures of Barack Obama, ultimately the most dangerous, the most lethal for humanity, is his meretricious and pathetic pursuit of a nuclear deal with Iran. In negotiation, Obama and his minions have been treating the mullahs as if they were the leaders of Denmark, even to the point of sending fawning multiple mailings to Ayatollah Khamenei, as absurd an approach as it is asinine.

If Obama really wanted a deal, he would have gone about it in a very different manner, strengthening sanctions rather than weakening them, treating the mullahs as the autocratic religious fanatics that they are.  What Obama seems to want instead is the appearance that he seeks to deprive Iran of the bomb, not the actual result. (He may even want the reverse, unconsciously or even semi-consciously.  That would be more in line with his anti-imperialist views.)

Sunday evening, a day in advance of the conclusion of this round of talks, the AP is already reporting the “shocking” news that U.S. negotiators are floating yet another extension to the Iranians.  TheWall Street Journal similarly posted “No Iran Deal Seen by Monday” later in the evening.  This is such a predictable end to the hapless negotiations I imagine London bookmakers wouldn’t even have offered a hundred-to-one against it, maybe not a thousand to one.  Betting on the West would have been like betting on a horse with two broken legs and heart condition. It is clear the Iranian leadership is getting precisely what they wanted yet again — more time to build a bomb and improve their nuclear delivery capabilities, including ICBMs, which have no other use other than for nuclear attack. (Note for those who still think this is all about Israel.  The Iranians do not need ICBMs to reach Israel.  They would be for other purposes.) Meanwhile,  the Iranians continue their work on the plutonium-producing Arak facility and on stockpiling low-enriched uranium in oxide form.  Undoubtedly, they are up to a whole lot more than that we don’t know about.  They allow the IAEA to see exactly what they permit and nothing more.  Everything is under their control — or at least the ayatollah’s control.

One of the more interesting passages of the WSJ report is as follows:

U.S., European and Iranian officials said they have made progress over the past year in negotiations that have crisscrossed the world from Oman to New York. But Obama administration officials increasingly are questioning whether Iran’s most powerful political player, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has empowered Mr. Zarif and other negotiators to make the necessary concessions for a deal. Mr. Zarif has repeatedly said he’s empowered to negotiate but that Mr. Khamenei is the ultimate decision maker.

Just now they are questioning this?  It would have seemed elementary from the outset to anyone paying the slightest attention to how  the Islamic Republic of Iran works and  always has since 1979 without interruption.  Only a narcissist like Obama could think otherwise, think that his force of personality could overcome Khomeinist Shiite ideology.

Didn’t we learn from the nuclear negotiations with North Korea? Fool me once, shame on you.  Fool me twice, shame on me.  Fool me 38 times… I’m an imbecile.    Somehow this doesn’t appear to deter Obama, Kerry, Wendy Sherman & co. although all countries, not just the crazy NORKS,  have built their nuclear weapons in secret, including notably the U.S.  To expect Iran to do otherwise is sheer folly.  And the Iranians almost never deal transparently with the West in the first place.  Their religion almost requires deception towards us, again something Obama would never examine or admit.

Needless to say, the P5+1 are making noises they are seeking assurances before this new extension (how many have there been — I forget) that the Iranians “aren’t just talking for the sake of winning time.” That’s almost a joke at this point, albeit about as dark a one as  you could find.  At this writing, the Iranian press is already announcing an extension for one year, though the West denies it.

The invaluable Omri Ceren of The Israel Project explains just how badly the West has done in these negotiations, calling it “win-win” for Iran.

It created a situation where Iranian leverage constantly increased while Western leverage constantly decreased.  The Iranians were allowed to stockpile uranium and build up their plutonium infrastructure, giving them more to trade away, while the West sanctions regime eroded due to financial relief, leaving us with less to trade with.

Ceren further points out that even with this easy regime the Iranians were already, shall we say, pushing the envelope.  He continues: “The argument in that context is that Iran is cheating on its obligations while we still have sanctions, so imagine what they’ll do once the sanctions are lifted.”

Imagine, indeed.  Or look out below.

So what can be done?  As one prominent politician recently said, “Elections have consequences.”  (Well, yes, that prominent politician doesn’t tell the truth much.  But, as with a stopped clock…)  That being the case, it’s up to the new Republican Congress to enact sanctions so onerous even the mad mullahs will flinch.  That should be one of the first things on the agenda in January. And if they don’t flinch — enact more until they do.  And if they still don’t flinch — up to you, Mr. Netanyahu.  (We know that prominent politician is not going to do anything.)

One last thing:  Remember how Obama turned away from the democracy demonstrators in the streets of Tehran several years ago?  That seemed reprehensible then.  Now it is morally disgusting beyond words.


1c) Iran Cheats, Obama Whitewashes

The administration thinks a nuclear Iran is inevitable—but lacks the courage to say it

By

BRET STEPHENS

Does it matter what sort of deal—or further extension, or non-deal—ultimately emerges from the endless parleys over Iran’s nuclear program? Probably not. Iran came to the table cheating on its nuclear commitments. It continued to cheat on them throughout the interim agreement it agreed to last year. And it will cheat on any undertakings it signs.

We knew this, know it and will come to know it all over again. But what’s at stake in these negotiations isn’t their outcome, assuming there ever is an outcome. It’s the extent to which the outcome facilitates, or obstructs, our willingness to continue to fool ourselves about the consequences of an Iran with a nuclear weapon.

The latest confirmation of the obvious comes to us courtesy of a Nov. 17 report from David Albright and his team at the scrupulously nonpartisan Institute for Science and International Security. The ISIS study, based on findings from the International Atomic Energy Agency, concluded that Iran was stonewalling U.N. inspectors on the military dimensions of its program. It noted that Tehran had tested a model for an advanced centrifuge, in violation of the 2013 interim agreement. And it cited Iran for trying to conceal evidence of nuclear-weapons development at a military facility called Parchin.

“By failing to address the IAEA’s concerns, Iran is complicating, and even threatening, the achievement of a long term nuclear deal,” the report notes dryly.

These are only Iran’s most recent evasions, piled atop two decades of documented nuclear deception. Nothing new there. But what are we to make of an American administration that is intent on providing cover for Iran’s coverups? “The IAEA has verified that Iran has complied with its commitments,” Wendy Sherman, the top U.S. nuclear negotiator, testified in July to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “It has done what it promised to do.” John Kerry went one better, telling reporters Monday that “Iran has lived up” to its commitments.

The statement is false: Yukiya Amano, the director general of the IAEA, complained last week that Iran had “not provided any explanations that enable the Agency to clarify the outstanding practical measures” related to suspected work on weaponization. Since when did trust but verify become whitewash and hornswoggle?

That’s a question someone ought to ask Mr. Kerry or Ms. Sherman at their next committee appearance, especially since it has become clear that the administration has a record of arms-control dissembling. To wit, the State Department under Hillary Clinton had reason to know that Russia—with which the U.S. was then in “reset” mode—was violating the 1987 treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. Yet it didn’t disclose this in arms-control reports to Congress, nor did it mention the fact prior to the Senate’s 2010 ratification of the New Start treaty on strategic weapons.

“We’re not going to pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate if our colleagues [in the administration] are sitting up there knowing somebody is cheating.” That was then-Sen. John Kerry in November 2012, complaining about the coverup. The administration only came clean about the Kremlin’s breaches last summer, presumably after it had finally given up hopes for its Russian reset.

Why the spin and dishonesty? Partly it’s the old Platonic conceit of the Noble Lie—public bamboozlement in the service of the greater good—that propels so much contemporary liberal policy-making (cf. Gruber, Jonathan: transparency, lack of). So long as the higher goal is a health-care bill, or arms control with Russia, or a nuclear deal with Iran, why should the low truth of facts and figures interfere with the high truth of hopes and ideals?

But this lets the administration off too easily. The real problem is cowardice. As a matter of politics it cannot acknowledge what, privately, it believes: that a nuclear Iran is undesirable but probably inevitable and hardly catastrophic. As a matter of strategy, it refuses to commit to the only realistic course of action that could accomplish the goal it professes to seek: The elimination of Iran’s nuclear capabilities by a combination of genuinely crippling sanctions and targeted military strikes.

And so—because the administration lacks the political courage of its real convictions or the martial courage of its fake ones—we are wedded to this sham process of negotiation. “They pretend to pay us; we pretend to work,” went the old joke about labor in the Soviet Union. Just so with these talks. Iranians pretend not to cheat; we pretend not to notice. All that’s left to do is stand back and wait for something to happen.

Eventually, something will happen. Perhaps Iran will simply walk away from the talks, daring this feckless administration to act. Perhaps we will discover another undeclared Iranian nuclear facility, possibly not in Iran itself. Perhaps the Israelis really will act. Perhaps the Saudis will.

All of this may suit the president’s psychological yearning to turn himself into a bystander—innocent, in his own eyes—in the Iranian nuclear crisis. But it’s also a useful reminder that, in the contest between hard-won experience and disappointed idealism, the latter always wins in the liberal mind.

1d) Report: Israel Considering Military Action Against Iran

By Greg Richter

As the deadline for nuclear talks between the P5+1 powers and Iran looms on Monday, Israel is warning it might use military power if a deal doesn't meet with its approval, The Jerusalem Post reports.

"Current proposals guarantee the perpetuation of a crisis, backing Israel into a corner from which military force against Iran provides the only logical exit," the Post quoted Israeli government sources as saying.

The current proposal would restrict Iran's nuclear program for 10 years and cap its ability to produce weapons-grade material, the Post reported. The agreement would require Iran to give its material to Russia to be converted to peaceful use and would call for stringent inspections.

But Israel is wary of the proposal, with an Israeli official noting, "our intelligence agencies are not perfect."

The official pointed out that Iran's nuclear facilities in Natanz and Qom were not known of for years.

"And inspection regimes are certainly not perfect," the official said. "They weren't in the case in North Korea, and it isn't the case now – Iran's been giving the [International Atomic Energy Agency] the run around for years about its past activities."

Critics of the deal in the United States also have pointed to Iran's past broken promises.

The Post said that members of P5+1 have indicated they may be willing to forgo a requirement that Iran fully disclose secret weapons work. The P5+1 is made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany.

Israel's biggest issue with the deal is its "sunset clause," the Post reported.

"You've not dismantled the infrastructure, you've basically tried to put limits that you think are going to be monitored by inspectors and intelligence," the Israeli official told the Post. "And then after this period of time, Iran is basically free to do whatever it wants."

The Obama administration denies that charge, telling the Post by email, "following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] – with an emphasis on non-nuclear weapon."

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened military force against Iran multiple times since 2009, and even sought authorization from his cabinet in 2011, the Post reported.

Israel has bombed suspected nuclear facilities in the past. In 1981, an Israeli airstrike took out a nuclear facility being built near Baghdad, Iraq, and in 2007 another airstrike hit a suspected nuclear site in Syria.

Netanyahu, in an interview Sunday on ABC's "This Week," reiterated his warning that Iran is working on an intercontinental ballistic missile. He has said in the past that the West should be just as concerned as Israel because Iran would not need an ICBM to hit Israel – only Europe or the United States.

"If for any reason the United States and the other powers agree to leave Iran with that capacity to break out, I think that would be a historic mistake," Netanyahu told ABC.

Meanwhile, The Associated Press reports that the United States is asking to extend the talks as Monday's deadline is approaching with little hope for a deal.
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2) Hagel Resigning as Defense Secretary
By Mark Ralston


Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced Monday he is stepping down, leaving under pressure following a rocky tenure in which he has struggled to break through the White House's insular team of national security advisers.

During a White House ceremony Monday, Obama said he and Hagel had determined it was an "appropriate time for him to complete his service."

Hagel is the first senior Obama adviser to leave the administration following the sweeping losses for the president's party in the midterm elections. It also comes as the president's national security team has been battered by crises including the rise of Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria and Russia's provocations in Ukraine.

The president praised Hagel, a Republican who grew close to Obama while they both served in the Senate, as an "exemplary defense secretary" who forged a strong bond with troops stationed around the world. Hagel, who served in the Vietnam War, is the first enlisted combat veteran to serve as defense secretary.

"Chuck Hagel has devoted himself to our national security and our men and women in uniform across six decades," Obama said.

While Obama has sought to consolidate foreign policy decision-making within the White House, advisers have privately criticized Hagel for not being more proactive and engaged in Cabinet meetings and other national security discussions. Hagel also angered White House officials with a recent letter to national security adviser Susan Rice in which he said Obama needed to articulate a clearer view on the administration's approach to dealing with Syrian President Bashar Assad.A senior defense official said that Hagel submitted his resignation letter to Obama on Monday morning and the president accepted it. Hagel, 68, agreed to remain in office until his successor is confirmed by the Senate, the official said.

The official said both Hagel and Obama "determined that it was time for new leadership in the Pentagon," adding that they had been discussing the matter over a period of several weeks.
Obama was to announce Hagel's resignation Monday. The president is not expected to nominate a new Pentagon chief Monday, according to a second official.

The officials insisted on anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the matter by name ahead of Obama's official announcement.

Among the leading contenders to replace Hagel is Michele Flournoy, who served as the Pentagon's policy chief for the first three years of Obama's first term. Flournoy, who would be the first woman to head the Pentagon, is now chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security, a think tank that she co-founded.

Hagel is a Republican who served as senator from Nebraska and became a critic of U.S. involvement in Iraq. After Obama nominated him to succeed Leon Panetta as Defense Secretary in his second term, Hagel struggled through a disastrous confirmation hearing that raised early concerns about him within the White House.

Recent questions about Hagel's future at the Pentagon were prompted in part by his decision to postpone a long-planned trip this month to Vietnam. At the time, officials said he needed to remain in Washington for congressional consultations, but that did not stop speculation that the White House might be looking for a replacement for the final two years of Obama's term.
Just last week Hagel was asked about the speculation during an interview on the Charlie Rose show. He was asked whether he's concerned by the speculation.

"No. First of all, I serve at the pleasure of the president," Hagel said. "I'm immensely grateful for the opportunity I've had the last two years to work every day for the country and for the men and women who serve this country. I don't get up in the morning and worry about my job. It's not unusual by the way, to change teams at different times."

Hagel was the first enlisted military member to become secretary of defense. He served in the

Vietnam War and received two Purple Hearts.
Hagel forged a strong personal relationship with Obama in the Senate, including overseas trips they took together. He carved out a reputation as an independent thinker and blunt speaker, and Obama said he came to admire his courage and willingness to speak his mind.

When Obama nominated Hagel, he said he was sending the U.S. military "one of its own." Hagel was the first enlisted military member to become secretary of defense.
He was an Army infantry sergeant who risked his life to pull his younger brother to safety while both were serving in Vietnam.

Wounded himself in Vietnam, Hagel initially backed the invasion of Iraq, but later became a credible critic of the wars, making routine trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. He opposed President George W. Bush's plan to send an additional 30,000 troops into Iraq — a move that has been credited with stabilizing the chaotic country — as "the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam, if it's carried out."

While Hagel supported the Afghanistan war resolution, over time he has become more critical of the decade-plus conflict, with its complex nation-building effort.


2a)  OBAMA FINDS MIDTERM SCAPEGOAT IN HAGEL
By Chris Stirewalt
  
In another strong sign of President Obama’s hard tack left in the wake of a midterm drubbing, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel is heading for the exits. First reported by the NYT, the cashiering of the Pentagon boss comes after “the two men mutually agreed” that it was time for the only Republican in Obama’s cabinet to go. But given the fact that the White House was the one pushing out the story, it seems more likely that the president had grown tired of the ongoing pressure from Hagel and members of the top brass to take a more aggressive stance on national security threats abroad. The conflict went public back in August when Hagel openly contradicted White House talking points on the threat posed by Islamist militants in Iraq and Syria. While Obama succumbed to the pressure, Hagel’s ouster shows the president seeking to reassert control over his foundering foreign policy.

[Who will replace? - NYT: “At the top of the list are Michele Flournoy, the former undersecretary of defense; Senator Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island and a former officer with the Army’s 82nd Airborne; and Ashton Carter, a former deputy secretary of defense.”]

Fault finding - Democrats blame disaffection among base voters for the party’s historic defeat earlier this month. And, to be sure, there has not been much for liberals to cheer in Obama’s foreign policy of late. Not only has the president begrudgingly escalated the war against Islamists, the administration has quietly accepted defeat in the president’s bid to get all fighting forces out of Afghanistan. The “endless war” foreign policy combined with stunning revelations about Obama’s expansion of domestic surveillance sent the president’s approval ratings on national security – once stratospheric after the killing of Usama bin Laden – to a series of new lows. And among no group was the decline more evident than with Democrats. Given the centrality of Obama’s dovish foreign policy to the building of his coalition, even the reluctant, half-hearted hawkishness of 2014 might be seen as a key culprit by Democrats in the party’s losses.

[The good times - Obama often touted his friendship with Hagel as evidence of bipartisan bent, with the right kind of Republican.]

That was then - Hagel, who became a hero to Democrats for his relentless criticism of fellow Republican President George W. Bush during the Iraq war, apparently still proved too hawkish for the president and his supporters. That Hagel’s team was recently expressing confidence that he would serve through the end of the president’s term suggests that this reordering came as something of a surprise. Given the harsh critiques of Obama’s other top foreign policy advisers, Hagel’s replacement will be a fraught business. And with the ongoing struggles of Obama’s foreign policy, the debate could further divide Democrats on the most volatile issue for the party and its hawkish 2016 front runner.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3)  HAMAS: REBUILD GAZA OR WE'LL ATTACK ISRAEL
Author:  Khaled Abu Toameh 

Hamas is once again threatening to attack Israel, this time over the failure of the international community and the Palestinian Authority to fulfill their promises to rebuild the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge.

Hamas leaders are particularly angry with the Palestinian Authority [PA] and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, whom they accuse of hindering efforts to rebuild hundreds of destroyed homes in the Gaza Strip.

A destroyed building in Gaza.
(Image source: UNRWA/Shareef Sarhan)

Hamas is also angry with the Egyptians for closing the Rafah border crossing after a terror attack in Sinai in which 32 Egyptian soldiers were killed.

Moreover, Hamas has rejected the United Nations plan to reconstruct the Gaza Strip on the pretext that it “sidelines” the Islamist movement and allows Israel to decide who would benefit from the work. “The UN plan is unacceptable and ineffective,” said Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri.

According to the UN plan, which was announced in September, the PA government will be responsible for repairing damaged homes and public sector projects, while the UN will focus on schools, clinics and “basic utilities.'”

The construction materials intended for the Gaza Strip, according to the plan, would have to be approved by Israeli authorities.

Hamas is opposed to the UN plan mainly because it denies the Islamist organization any role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Hamas is also worried that the involvement of the Palestinian Authority in the reconstruction effort would undermine Hamas's control over the Gaza Strip, and allow Abbas and his Fatah faction to take credit for helping the Palestinians living there.

Last month, a donor conference in Cairo pledged $5.4 billion for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

However, Hamas maintains that since then, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have not seen any of the promised funds. Hamas has also strongly denied claims by some PA officials that it had asked for 20% of the funds for itself.

The Palestinian Authority envoy to Egypt, Barakat al-Farra, accused Hamas of obstructing the reconstruction drive; he added that the movement was seeking to lay its hands on 20% of the funds earmarked for the Gaza Strip. Hamas, for its part, claims that the PA is seeking to lay its hands on more than half the funds promised by the Cairo donor conference.

Rising tensions between Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority are the real reason why the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip has still not started. These tensions reached their peak with the recent bombings that targeted the homes and vehicles of 15 senior Abbas loyalists in the Gaza Strip. Abbas has held Hamas responsible for the attacks — a charge that the Islamist movement has strongly denied.

Egypt's decision to close the Rafah border crossing with the Gaza Strip is also responsible for the delay in implementing the reconstruction plan.

Although Hamas has openly accused the PA, UN and Egypt of obstructing the reconstruction scheme, it is now threatening to resume its terror attacks on Israel.

Hamas cannot launch terror attacks against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank thanks to the presence of the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] there. Hamas will also refrain from doing so to avoid being accused by Palestinians of “destroying national unity.” Hamas does not want to be held responsible for Palestinian civil war.

Hamas is equally careful not to engage in a confrontation with Egypt, which has been waging a massive military campaign against terror groups in Sinai.

Relations between Hamas and Egypt appear to be at an all-time low; many Egyptians view the movement as a threat to their national security. Any Hamas attack on Egypt will undoubtedly draw a very strong response from the Egyptian army — one that would surely deal a deadly blow to Hamas and its supporters in the Gaza Strip.

And Hamas is not going to initiate a crisis with the UN out of fear that such a move would rally the world against the movement and end the international organizations' services and relief work in the Gaza Strip.

The only option Hamas faces, therefore, is to attack Israel again as a way of ridding itself of the severe crisis in the Gaza Strip and the growing frustration among Palestinians living there.

Hamas's biggest fear is that this frustration will be translated into disillusionment with its regime. That is why Hamas is now seeking to direct the anger on the Palestinian street toward Israel.

Recent statements by several Hamas representatives show that the Islamist movement does not rule out the possibility of waging another war against Israel, using as an excuse the failed promises to reconstruct the Gaza Strip.

Hamas is now talking about an imminent “explosion” against Israel if the promises to rebuild Gaza are not fulfilled. Some Hamas representatives even have the audacity to hold Israel fully responsible for hindering the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

Hamas's threats against Israel should be taken seriously, especially in light of reports that the movement is continuing to prepare for another war. Hamas not only continues to dig tunnels under the border with Israel; it has also been test-firing rockets into the Mediterranean Sea.

Hamas does not have much left to lose in another military confrontation with Israel.

The killing of a few hundred more Palestinians in the Gaza Strip will allow Hamas to shift attention from its failure to rebuild the Gaza Strip to blaming Israel for “waging another war” on the Palestinians. Hamas is also hoping that another war will further increase anti-Israel sentiment around the world and earn the Palestinians even more sympathy.

Abbas also stands to benefit from another war in the Gaza Strip. Renewed fighting would absolve him of his responsibility toward the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Additionally, of course, there is always the possibility that Israel would “do the job for him” and get rid of Hamas. And like Hamas, Abbas too would seek to take advantage of the fighting to wage another campaign of incitement against Israel in the international arena.

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4) The Islamic State Reshapes the Middle East

By George Friedman

Nuclear talks with Iran have failed to yield an agreement, but the deadline for a deal has been extended without a hitch. What would have been a significant crisis a year ago, replete with threats and anxiety, has been handled without drama or difficulty. This new response to yet another failure to reach an accord marks a shift in the relationship between the United States and Iran, a shift that can’t be understood without first considering the massive geopolitical shifts that have taken place in the Middle East, redefining the urgency of the nuclear issue.

These shifts are rooted in the emergence of the Islamic State. Ideologically, there is little difference between the Islamic State and other radical Islamic jihadist movements. But in terms of geographical presence, the Islamic State has set itself apart from the rest. While al Qaeda might have longed to take control of a significant nation-state, it primarily remained a sparse, if widespread, terrorist organization. It held no significant territory permanently; it was a movement, not a place. But the Islamic State, as its name suggests, is different. It sees itself as the kernel from which a transnational Islamic state should grow, and it has established itself in Syria and Iraq as a geographical entity. The group controls a roughly defined region in the two countries, and it has something of a conventional military designed to defend and expand the state’s control. Thus far, whatever advances and reversals it has seen, the Islamic State has retained this character. While the group certainly funnels a substantial portion of its power into dispersed guerrilla formations and retains a significant regional terrorist apparatus, it remains something rather new for the region — an Islamist movement acting as a regional state.

It is unclear whether the Islamic State can survive. It is under attack by American aircraft, and the United States is attempting to create a coalition force that will attack and conquer it. It is also unclear whether the group can expand. The Islamic State appears to have reached its limits in Kurdistan, and the Iraqi army (which was badly defeated in the first stage of the Islamic State's emergence) is showing some signs of being able to launch counteroffensives. 

A New Territorial Threat

The Islamic State has created a vortex that has drawn in regional and global powers, redefining how they behave. The group's presence is both novel and impossible to ignore because it is a territorial entity. Nations have been forced to readjust their policies and relations with each other as a result. We see this inside of Syria and Iraq. Damascus and Baghdad are not the only ones that need to deal with the Islamic State; other regional powers — Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia chief among them —need to recalculate their positions as well. A terrorist organization can inflict pain and cause turmoil, but it survives by remaining dispersed. The Islamic State has a terrorism element, but it is also a concentrated force that could potentially expand its territory. The group behaves geopolitically, and as long as it survives it poses a geopolitical challenge. 

Within Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State represents elements of the Sunni Arab population. It has imposed itself on the Sunni Arab regions of Iraq, and although resistance to Islamic State power certainly exists among Sunnis, some resistance to any emergent state is inevitable. The Islamic State has managed to cope with this resistance so far. But the group also has pressed against the boundaries of the Kurdish and Shiite regions, and it has sought to create a geographical link with its forces in Syria, changing Iraq's internal dynamic considerably. Where the Sunnis were once weak and dispersed, the Islamic State has now become a substantial force in the region north and west of Baghdad, posing a possible threat to Kurdish oil production and Iraqi governance. The group has had an even more complex effect in Syria, as it has weakened other groups resisting the government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, thereby strengthening al Assad's position while increasing its own power. This dynamic illustrates the geopolitical complexity of the Islamic State's presence.

Countering with a Coalition

The United States withdrew from Iraq hoping that Baghdad, even if unable to govern its territory with a consistent level of authority, would nevertheless develop a balance of power in Iraq in which various degrees of autonomy, formal and informal, would be granted. It was an ambiguous goal, though not unattainable. But the emergence of the Islamic State upset the balance in Iraq dramatically, and initial weaknesses in Iraqi and Kurdish forces facing Islamic State fighters forced the United States to weigh the possibility of the group dominating large parts of Iraq and Syria. This situation posed a challenge that the United States could neither decline nor fully engage. Washington's solution was to send aircraft and minimal ground forces to attack the Islamic State, while seeking to build a regional coalition that would act.

Today, the key to this coalition is Turkey. Ankara has become a substantial regional power. It has the largest economy and military in the region, and it is the most vulnerable to events in Syria and Iraq, which run along Turkey's southern border. Ankara's strategy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been to avoid conflicts with its neighbors, which it has been able to do successfully so far. The United States now wants Turkey to provide forces — particularly ground troops — to resist the Islamic State. Ankara has an interest in doing so, since Iraqi oil would help diversify its sources of energy and because it wants to keep the conflict from spilling into Turkey. The Turkish government has worked hard to keep the Syrian conflict outside its borders and to limit its own direct involvement in the civil war. Ankara also does not want the Islamic State to create pressure on Iraqi Kurds that could eventually spread to Turkish Kurds. 

Turkey is in a difficult situation. If it intervenes against the Islamic State alongside the United States, its army will be tested in a way that it has not been tested since the Korean War, and the quality of its performance is uncertain. The risks are real, and victory is far from guaranteed. Turkey would be resuming the role it played in the Arab world during the Ottoman Empire, attempting to shape Arab politics in ways that it finds satisfactory. The United States did not do this well in Iraq, and there is no guarantee that Turkey would succeed either. In fact, Ankara could be drawn into a conflict with the Arab states from which it would not be able to withdraw as neatly as Washington did.

At the same time, instability to Turkey's south and the emergence of a new territorial power in Syria and Iraq represent fundamental threats to Ankara. There are claims that the Turks secretly support the Islamic State, but I doubt this greatly. The Turks may be favorably inclined toward other Islamist groups, but the Islamic State is both dangerous and likely to draw pressure from the United States against any of its supporters. Still, the Turks will not simply do America's bidding; Ankara has interests in Syria that do not mesh with those of the United States. 

Turkey wants to see the al Assad regime toppled, but the United States is reluctant to do so for fear of opening the door to a Sunni jihadist regime (or at the very least, jihadist anarchy) that, with the Islamic State operational, would be impossible to shape. To some extent, the Turks are floating the al Assad issue as an excuse not to engage in the conflict. But Ankara wants al Assad gone and a pro-Turkey Sunni regime in his place. If the United States refuses to cede to this demand, Turkey has a basis for refusing to intervene; if the United States agrees, Turkey gets the outcome it wants in Syria, but at greater risk to Iraq. Thus the Islamic State has become the focal point of U.S.-Turkish ties, replacing prior issues such as Turkey's relationship with Israel. 

Iran's Changing Regional Role

The emergence of the Islamic State has similarly redefined Iran's posture in the region. Tehran sees a pro-Iranian, Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad as critical to its interests, just as it sees its domination of southern Iraq as crucial. Iran fought a war with a Sunni-dominated Iraq in the 1980s, with devastating casualties; avoiding another such war is fundamental to Iranian national security policy. From Tehran's point of view, the Islamic State has the ability to cripple the government in Baghdad and potentially unravel Iran’s position in Iraq. Though this is not the most likely outcome, it is a potential threat that Iran must counter.

Small Iranian formations have already formed in eastern Kurdistan, and Iranian personnel have piloted Iraqi aircraft in attacks on Islamic State positions. The mere possibility of the Islamic State dominating even parts of Iraq is unacceptable to Tehran, which aligns its interests with those of the United States. Both countries want the Islamic State broken. Both want the government in Baghdad to function. The Americans have no problem with Iran guaranteeing security in the south, and the Iranians have no objection to a pro-American Kurdistan so long as they continue to dominate southern oil flows.  

Because of the Islamic State — as well as greater long-term trends — the United States and Iran have been drawn together by their common interests. There have been numerous reports of U.S.-Iranian military cooperation against the Islamic State, while the major issue dividing them (Iran's nuclear program) has been marginalized. Monday's announcement that no settlement had been reached in nuclear talks was followed by a calm extension of the deadline for agreement, and neither side threatened the other or gave any indication that the failure changed the general accommodation that has been reached. In our view, as we have always said, achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon is far more difficult than enriching uranium, and Iran is not an imminent nuclear power. That appears to have become the American position. Neither Washington nor Tehran wants to strain relations over the nuclear issue, which has been put on the back burner for now because of the Islamic State's rise.

This new entente between the United States and Iran naturally alarms Saudi Arabia, the third major power in the region if only for its wealth and ability to finance political movements. Riyadh sees Tehran as a rival in the Persian Gulf that could potentially destabilize Saudi Arabia via its Shiite population. The Saudis also see the United States as the ultimate guarantor of their national security, even though they have been acting without Washington's buy-in since the Arab Spring. Frightened by Iran’s warming relationship with the United States, Riyadh is also becoming increasingly concerned by America’s growing self-sufficiency in energy, which has dramatically reduced Saudi Arabia's political importance to the United States. 

There has been speculation that the Islamic State is being funded by Arabian powers, but it would be irrational for Riyadh to be funding the group. The stronger the Islamic State is, the firmer the ties between the United States and Iran become. Washington cannot live with a transnational caliphate that might become regionally powerful someday. The more of a threat the Islamic State becomes, the more Iran and the United States need each other, which runs completely counter to the Saudis' security interests. Riyadh needs the tensions between the United States and Iran. Regardless of religious or ideological impulse, Tehran's alliance with Washington forms an overwhelming force that threatens the Saudi regime's survival. And the Islamic State has no love for the Saudi royal family. The caliphate can expand in Saudi Arabia's direction, too, and we've already seen grassroots activity related to the Islamic State taking place inside the kingdom. Riyadh has been engaged in Iraq, and it must now try to strengthen Sunni forces other than the Islamic State quickly, so that the forces pushing Washington and Tehran together subside. 

America's Place at the Center of the Middle East

For Washington's part, the Islamic State has show that the idea of the United States simply leaving the region is unrealistic. At the same time, the United States will not engage in multidivisional warfare in Iraq. Washington failed to achieve a pro-American stability there the first time; it is unlikely to achieve it this time. U.S. air power applies significant force against the Islamic State and is a token of America's power and presence — as well as its limits. The U.S. strategy of forming an alliance against the Islamic State is extremely complex, since the Turks do not want to be pulled into the fight without major concessions, the Iranians want reduced pressure on their nuclear programs in exchange for their help, and the Saudis are aware of the dangers posed by Iran. 

What is noteworthy is the effect that the Islamic State has had on relationships in the region. The group's emergence has once again placed the United States at the center of the regional system, and it has forced the three major Middle Eastern powers to redefine their relations with Washington in various ways. It has also revived the deepest fears of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Ankara wants to avoid being drawn back into the late Ottoman nightmare of controlling Arabs, while Iran has been forced to realign itself with the United States to resist the rise of a Sunni Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as the Shah once had to do. Meanwhile, the Islamic State has raised Saudi fears of U.S. abandonment in favor of Iran, and the United States' dread of re-engaging in Iraq has come to define all of its actions.

In the end, it is unlikely that the territorial Islamic State can survive. The truth is that Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia are all waiting for the United States to solve the Islamic State problem with air power and a few ground forces. These actions will not destroy the Islamic State, but they will break the group's territorial coherence and force it to return to guerrilla tactics and terrorism. Indeed, this is already happening. But the group's very existence, however temporary, has stunned the region into realizing that prior assumptions did not take into account current realities. Ankara will not be able to avoid increasing its involvement in the conflict; Tehran will have to live with the United States; and Riyadh will have to seriously consider its vulnerabilities. As for the United States, it can simply go home, even if the region is in chaos. But the others are already at home, and that is the point that the Islamic State has made abundantly clear.

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6)

Defending the Right to a Jewish State

Jonathan S. Tobin | @tobincommentary

11.24.2014 - 8:00 PM

The debate currently roiling Israel’s Cabinet over proposals to pass a law ensuring that it is a “Jewish state” is being roundly denounced by many of the country’s friends as well as its critics. The U.S. government responded in a high-handed manner to the discussion by demanding that Israel protect the rights of non-Jewish Israelis. The Anti-Defamation League says it is well meaning but unnecessary and some of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s coalition allies are threatening to break up the government and send the country to new elections because of their disagreement with it. But as much as one can argue that Israel won’t be any more or less a Jewish state whether or not any such bill passes the Knesset, critics of the measure should understand that the demand for this measure is not frivolous. Those criticizing it are largely missing the point.

As Haviv Rettig Gur explained in an excellent Times of Israel article, the claims by both sides in the argument are largely unfounded. Israel is already a Jewish state, albeit one in which the rights of every citizen to equal treatment under the law are guaranteed. Nor is it true, as Netanyahu’s unhappy coalition partners Tzipi Livni and Yair Lapid charged, that the proposed drafts approved by the Cabinet would elevate the Jewish state concept over that of the democratic nature of that state.

What it would do is to incorporate into the country’s basic laws, which serve as an informal and entirely insufficient constitution, a basic truth about its founding that could actually serve as an important counter-balance to the proposed Palestinian state that peace negotiators seek to create alongside Israel. Though that state will be primarily racial and exclusive—Jews will not be welcomed or allowed to live there, let alone have equality under the law—but where Israel’s flag flies, democracy will prevail even as the rights of the Jewish people to their ancient homeland will be protected. Indeed, as Gur notes in his piece, the origins of the bills under discussion can be traced to efforts to make peace palatable to Israelis, not the fevered imaginations of right-wingers bent on excluding or expelling Arabs.

As Gur writes in reference to the charge that the Cabinet approved an extreme bill that undermined democracy:

But the cabinet decision on which the ministers voted did not “pass” the right-wing bills, as much of the Israeli media reported. It actually voted to subsume them, and thus de facto to replace them, with a larger government bill based on the prime minister’s 14 principles. And in principle 2-D of the decision, one reads, “The State of Israel is a democratic state, established on the foundations of liberty, justice and peace envisioned by the prophets of Israel, and which fulfills the personal rights of all its citizens, under law.”

There is no hedging, no distinction between what Israel simply “is” and what its “form of government” might be.

That said the critics have a point when they say this feeds into the anti-Zionist narrative being increasingly heard in the international media that seeks to falsely brand Israel as an “apartheid” or racist state. If even Israeli Cabinet members are capable of the sort of hyperbole that would brand it as a threat to democracy, you don’t have to have much imagination to realize what anti-Semitic foes of the country will make of it. Seen in that light, the push for the bill can be seen as, at best unnecessary, and a worst a needless provocation that could do harm.

But even if we factor into our thinking the danger posed by these libels, it does Israel no harm to remind the world that it has no intention of giving up its basic identity. Israel has not only a right but a duty to make it clear that as much as it is a democracy, it is also the “nation state of the Jewish people” whose rights must be protected as vigorously as those of any other people or country.

For far too long, those who have spoken up for Israel in international or media forums have downplayed the question of the rights of the Jews in the conflict and instead spoke only of the nation’s security needs. But when placed against Palestinian claims of their rights to the same country—when Hamas talks about resistance to the “occupation” they are referring to Israel within its pre-1967 borders—such talk inevitably seems inadequate. Friends of Israel are right to seek to promote the idea of a nation state for the Jews not so much because Israel’s laws need to be altered but because Zionism is itself under attack and must be vigorously defended.

Lastly, those who consider this some kind of colossal blunder on the part of Netanyahu don’t understand what is going on here. If Livni and Lapid blow up the government and force new elections, it is likely that both of them will lose ground while Netanyahu—who has no viable rival for the role of prime minister—is likely to emerge even stronger in a Knesset where the right-wing parties may be even more dominant and so-called moderates are marginalized.

Livni and Lapid would do well to lower the rhetoric and back down if they want to avoid going into an election having repudiated a measure that is, in the context of a country that is already a Jewish state, an anodyne proposal.

Israel won’t be any more Jewish or less democratic no matter whether or not this bill eventually becomes one of the country’s basic laws. But those casually weighing in on this debate from afar need to understand that at a time when the legitimacy of a Jewish state is increasingly under attack, Israelis are within their rights to make it clear they won’t give up this right.

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