Not only do they want to massacre people they massacre truth but then truth seems to escape them because they are sooooo pious.
https://www.youtube.com/
===
Obama could have a strategy , he could have a multitude of them. The Pentagon plans for all kind of contingencies. Obama's strategy is to set the stage for blaming others and to avoid making a decision that could cause him to be wrong and to protect our nation. (See 1 below.)
Maybe Obama's strategy is to be enraged at Israel for defending itself and not caving ? (See 1a below.)
Silence can be golden but apparently Obama would rather hear the sound of his own ineptitude. (See 1b below.)
More lip service from two Congressmen but it is important that Israel have support from Congress, which reflects the attitude of Americans, because they will get little from Obama. (See 1c below.)
Putin has a strategy - let Obama sink America (See 1d below.)
===
Is it possible voters have learned nothing from their disastrous decision to elect Obama and then re-elect him? (See 2 below.)
===
Time will tell if the Republican election strategy is stalling.
In addition to what author Robinson writes, I believe the Republican strategy, if it is failing, is because they are not:
a) unified in offering something that Americans believe addresses their collective concerns
and
b) Republicans are always hesitant to be aggressive in defending themselves against attacks that are basically false but when repeated often enough become accepted as factual.
A party out of power is also at a disadvantage without a strong and skillful leader and Boehner is anything but. (See 3 below.)
===
This from a friend who tracks football.
It appears these selections are a reflection of our culture and judgement and, if so, we are in deep doo doo! (See 4 below.)
I read all kind of reports how Europe wants to boycott Israeli products and now have added chickens.
I read all kind of reports about the rise in anti-Semitism in Europe and elsewhere.
I also read all kind of reports about how Obama has turned on the same Israel whose back he is protecting
These reports got to me to thinking. Perhaps had Israel failed as a nation the various anti-Israel nations would feel better because the world loves a victim and the weak. When you support a victim you feel good about yourself but when you support someone who is strong and can stand on their own feet you feel useless. You might even become vulnerable to attacks concerning your own motives. After all ,why support someone who does not need you and particularly when they are besting their adversary. Maybe the adversary needs sympathy because they are the real victim. But why are they considered a victim if they keep starting confrontations they always lose and fight in a way that is amoral..
In order to believe Hamas and Palestinians are victims of their own ineptitude, hatred and aggression maybe it is world opinion and The U.N. which has lost any moral basis for their stance unless reality is ignored.
If Israel has a right to protect itself and if their antagonists purposely create a situation where they use their own people to cause an increase in the casualty rate in order to gain status as a victim,I submit anyone who embraces this position is without scruples, has no moral leg on which to stand. That is why I have always questioned Obama's words and actions when it comes to " having Israel's back."
The fact that Netanyahu has chosen to defend Israelis means he must ignore Obama and his Sec. of State who expect Israel to accept missiles and attacks from tunnels. When Netanyahu refuses to do so, Obama clamps down on supplying Israel with needed military goods and becomes "enraged" according to Brett Stephens, recent op ed piece in The Wall Street Journal.
And all of this from a president who has Israel's back. What for? To stab it?
Meanwhile, facts get distorted by lazy reporting who do not know their history and when it is allowed to go unchallenged by those who do not call their hand its repetition morphs into an acceptable fact.
What makes it even more pernicious is, in far too many cases, the press and media distortions are purposeful and have become a strategy to create anti-Israel attitudes. (See 5, 5a, 5b and 5c below.)
===
Dick
Obama could have a strategy , he could have a multitude of them. The Pentagon plans for all kind of contingencies. Obama's strategy is to set the stage for blaming others and to avoid making a decision that could cause him to be wrong and to protect our nation. (See 1 below.)
Maybe Obama's strategy is to be enraged at Israel for defending itself and not caving ? (See 1a below.)
Silence can be golden but apparently Obama would rather hear the sound of his own ineptitude. (See 1b below.)
More lip service from two Congressmen but it is important that Israel have support from Congress, which reflects the attitude of Americans, because they will get little from Obama. (See 1c below.)
Putin has a strategy - let Obama sink America (See 1d below.)
===
Is it possible voters have learned nothing from their disastrous decision to elect Obama and then re-elect him? (See 2 below.)
===
Time will tell if the Republican election strategy is stalling.
In addition to what author Robinson writes, I believe the Republican strategy, if it is failing, is because they are not:
a) unified in offering something that Americans believe addresses their collective concerns
and
b) Republicans are always hesitant to be aggressive in defending themselves against attacks that are basically false but when repeated often enough become accepted as factual.
A party out of power is also at a disadvantage without a strong and skillful leader and Boehner is anything but. (See 3 below.)
===
This from a friend who tracks football.
It appears these selections are a reflection of our culture and judgement and, if so, we are in deep doo doo! (See 4 below.)
===
The St. Louis County Police will be helicoptering over Ferguson, Missouri
dropping job applications, as a means of dispersing the crowds.
I read all kind of reports how Europe wants to boycott Israeli products and now have added chickens.
I read all kind of reports about the rise in anti-Semitism in Europe and elsewhere.
I also read all kind of reports about how Obama has turned on the same Israel whose back he is protecting
These reports got to me to thinking. Perhaps had Israel failed as a nation the various anti-Israel nations would feel better because the world loves a victim and the weak. When you support a victim you feel good about yourself but when you support someone who is strong and can stand on their own feet you feel useless. You might even become vulnerable to attacks concerning your own motives. After all ,why support someone who does not need you and particularly when they are besting their adversary. Maybe the adversary needs sympathy because they are the real victim. But why are they considered a victim if they keep starting confrontations they always lose and fight in a way that is amoral..
In order to believe Hamas and Palestinians are victims of their own ineptitude, hatred and aggression maybe it is world opinion and The U.N. which has lost any moral basis for their stance unless reality is ignored.
If Israel has a right to protect itself and if their antagonists purposely create a situation where they use their own people to cause an increase in the casualty rate in order to gain status as a victim,I submit anyone who embraces this position is without scruples, has no moral leg on which to stand. That is why I have always questioned Obama's words and actions when it comes to " having Israel's back."
The fact that Netanyahu has chosen to defend Israelis means he must ignore Obama and his Sec. of State who expect Israel to accept missiles and attacks from tunnels. When Netanyahu refuses to do so, Obama clamps down on supplying Israel with needed military goods and becomes "enraged" according to Brett Stephens, recent op ed piece in The Wall Street Journal.
And all of this from a president who has Israel's back. What for? To stab it?
Meanwhile, facts get distorted by lazy reporting who do not know their history and when it is allowed to go unchallenged by those who do not call their hand its repetition morphs into an acceptable fact.
What makes it even more pernicious is, in far too many cases, the press and media distortions are purposeful and have become a strategy to create anti-Israel attitudes. (See 5, 5a, 5b and 5c below.)
===
Dick
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)-Obama’s Miserable Failure
It was always obvious what Obama’s supporters wanted. They weren’t willing to settle for a Hillary, just another politician who would punch the clock, deliver tepid speeches and push their leftist agenda.
1a) Obama's Curious Rage
told them:
"We’re closely following the events on the Golan Heights where al-Nusra
terrorists have kidnapped UN peacekeepers. What we see is that al-Nusra,
Hamas, Hezbollah – backed by Iran, al-Qaeda and these other terrorists
groups are basically defying all international norms, breaking them whether
in Lebanon, in Syria or in Gaza.
And I think the UN would do itself a great favour if instead of the
automatic Israel bashing, they actually turn their attention and their
investigative committees against these terrorists who trample every norm on
which the UN was founded.
I think this is a common effort that all of us have to make against these
Islamist terrorist groups that threaten our societies and our civilization.
I know that this is part of your common position and I welcome it. It helps
that Israel, the United States and the other civilized countries stand
together against this grave threat to our future.
And in that spirit, I welcome you here, as friends and as allies in a common
battle."
US Rep. Rohrabacher replied
"Mr. Prime Minister, we recognize that Israel is the one force for stability
and one force for a long term peace for this region. The rest of the region
is awash in tyranny and injustice and gangsterism and terrorism that’s
coming from the top, from these people that are running the various
organizations, radical Islamic organizations. They are not just a threat to
you, they are a threat to the peace of the world and the security of the
United States.
So we are very, very proud of this tough stand that you have taken and you
can count on us."
US Rep. Meeks added:
"Let me just add that you are our friend as we are your friend, and we will
stand together.
And I will tell you, though sometimes in Congress we have our differences,
but if there’s one thing that we concur on, whether we be Democrats or
Republicans – and we are a bi-partisan delegation – we come together in
support with our friends, our only true friend in the Middle East, and that’s
Israel. And we want to make sure that you know we will always stand side by
side, because we understand that what affects you affects us.
And in that spirit, we come in cooperation to say we’re looking to continue
with that great relationship moving forward and working together as friends
and as brothers, and sisters, actually."
1d) Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy
By Thomas Sowell
The latest Gallup poll indicates that 14 percent of the people "moderately disapprove" of Barack Obama's performance as president and 39 percent "strongly disapprove."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4) 2014 COLLEGE FOOTBALL SCOUTING REPORT
QUlNTlLlOUS JENKlNS
6' 3", 220 lbs. Running Back. Set state scoring record out of Triton
High School , Dunn , N.C. Also led the state in burglaries, but has
only 9 convictions. He has been clocked at 4.2 seconds in the 40 yard dash
with a 19" TV under each arm. Signed with Mississippi State .
WAYFRON P. JACKSON
6' 6", 215 lbs. Wide Receiver. Hottest prospect from Texas in the last ten
years. Currently holds world record for the most "you knows"
during an interview (62 in one minute). Wayfron can print his complete
name. Signed with Tennessee .
ROOSEVELT "DUDE" DANSELL
6' 1", 195 lbs. Running Back. From Tyler , Texas . Has processed hair and
imitates Billy Dee Williams very well. Listed his church preference as "red
brick". Signed with the University of Houston .
WOODROW LEE WASHINGTON
6' 8", 310 lbs. Tackle. From a 4th generation welfare family. At 19 he's
the oldest of 21 children. Mother claims Woodrow and child No. 9 have same
father. He has a manslaughter trial pending, but feels he will be found
innocent because: "The dude said sumpin' bad 'bout my Momma". On his
entrance form, he listed his IQ as 20/20. Signed with the University of
Texas .
WlLLIE "NIGHT TRAIN" JONES
6' 4", 225 lbs. Quarterback. Born on an Amtrak train. Birth certificate
indicates he is 24 years old. Thinks the "N" on Nebraska 's helmets stands
for "Nowledge" but still meets this school's stringent entrance
requirements. Signed with the University of Oregon .
TYRONE "PYTHON" PEOPLES
6' 10", 228 lbs. Wide Receiver. Has a pending paternity suit and two rape
trials, but hopes none of his other 9 victims will file charges.
Thinks Taco Bell is the Mexican Telephone Company. Signed with University
of Miami .
ABDUL HASHEEN ABBA ALI
6' 10", 305 lbs. Guard. Played high school ball under the name Fro'
Leester Ja' Charles Jones until he discovered religion. Abdul thinks
Sherlock Holmes is a housing project in Jacksonville , FL. Signed
with the University of Florida .
1)-Obama’s Miserable Failure
Daniel Greenfield, a Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Freedom Center, is a New York writer focusing on radical Islam. He is completing a book on the international challenges America faces in the 21st century
It was always obvious what Obama’s supporters wanted. They weren’t willing to settle for a Hillary, just another politician who would punch the clock, deliver tepid speeches and push their leftist agenda.
They seem intimidating in the way that the actions of tyrants are, but tyranny can be undone with tyranny. What Obama failed to do was build a consensus. He didn’t change the course of American history. He didn’t win the hearts and minds of Americans. Now he’s reduced to vandalizing America.They wanted someone larger than life. A head made for Mount Rushmore and a body that would be cast in statues across the country. Speeches meant to be studied in classrooms for the next hundred years.They compared him to JFK and Reagan. He was treated as the icon that his backers wanted him to be. His election was supposed to be a watershed moment in American history.Instead it ends in miserable failure.At home, Obama is caught in a desperate tug of war with Republicans. He won the budget battle by sending park rangers to shut down national monuments. His last ditch gamble for holding on to the Senate is using racial tensions in Ferguson to promote black voter turnout.And if he wins, all he’ll have is what he has now.This is how shoddy and tawdry the reality of Hope and Change has become. Trapped in a corner, Obama is dragging out the dirtiest Chicago politics. He’s trying to hold off the inevitable by using the same types of tactics that the crooked mayor of his hometown would.There’s no inspiration here. No words that will resound across time. Just dirty rats on a sinking ship.Blame Congress has become the new Blame Bush. ObamaCare is a slow motion disaster that requires constant course corrections to keep it from coming apart. It’s not the new Social Security or Medicare. It’s the new HMO; a clumsy construction that most Americans are unhappy with.Obama’s only power comes from his abuse of his authority, but what one man does, another man can undo. Instead of creating a lasting legislative legacy, Obama’s executive orders and legislation by administration are a house of cards that his successor can topple with the same pen and phone.
Obama said that Putin’s actions in Ukraine weren’t a sign of strength, but a sign of weakness. There is some truth to that. Putin’s economic policies have failed and he was unpopular at home. But the Obama tyrannical reign of phone and pen also isn’t a sign of strength. It’s a sign of weakness.Like Putin, Obama has run out of options.Unpopular with voters, shunned by his own party in battleground states, he rules by executive order and parties with influential executives while ignoring his responsibilities.That’s not Reagan. It’s not JFK. It’s not even LBJ.Stumbling to the microphone in a tan suit, he admits that he has no strategy for ISIS. Why should he? A few months ago he was calling a force that controls much of Iraq and Syria a junior varsity team while claiming credit for defeating Al Qaeda. Now his spokesman insists that the US is not at war with ISIS.What Obama says has no relationship to reality. It’s always been that way. It’s only becoming obvious to those talking heads inside his media bubble now.Obama’s foreign policy consisted of a flowchart of how things were supposed to work. There was an arrow from “Outreach” to “Reconciliation” to “New Middle East”. Instead Iraq is on fire. Libya is on fire. Syria is on fire. Everyone else is either mocking him or begging for his help without seriously expecting him to do anything useful.And the flowchart doesn’t mention any of it.ISIS was supposed to be a JV team. Iraqis are supposed to reconcile. ISIS isn’t supposed to be at war with the United States. Like most ideologues, Obama confuses what his reading of the inevitable forces of history says should happen with what is actually happening. Political Islam was supposed to stabilize the Middle East. Instead the future will be defined by a clash between national armies and Islamist militias.Removing US troops from Iraq was supposed to fix the problem. The best anti-colonialist scholarship said it would. Instead combined with the Arab Spring, it let Al Qaeda take over much of the country.But what else was an ideological fanatic big on theory and short on life experience going to do?Obama is Fareed Zakaria. He’s Thomas Friedman. He’s Paul Krugman. He read all the books and he talks a good game so that it’s easy to miss the fact that his ideas don’t have much to do with real life.Friedman babbling about the flattening world, Krugman pretending that money is infinite and Zakaria jumping from one ridiculous globalist idea to another sound good in a lecture hall or a column.But only an idiot would actually listen to them.Obama’s speeches sounded good, but only idiots would elect a man with no life experience, no executive experience and no meaningful experience of any kind for speaking well, instead of doing well.Of course Obama doesn’t have a strategy for ISIS. Why would he?ISIS wasn’t supposed to happen. His schedule, in between golfing and fundraising, had amnesty and Global Warming unilateral orders penciled in. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine also wasn’t on the schedule. Killing missile defense and being incredibly flexible were supposed to fix that.As a last resort, sanctions, the universal failure of global diplomacy, were supposed to keep this from happening. But like everything else that Obama tried, they didn’t work.Obama doesn’t live in the world of “What is” but the world of “What should be”. Inspiration does come from the world of “What should be”, but when it isn’t grounded in the world of “What is” then it manifests as insanity or leads to miserable failures.The difference between the brilliant architect and the lunatic on the street corner is that while both of them know “What should be”, only one of them knows “What is”.Obama’s inspiration came from “What should be”. He never did understand “What is”. His followers thought and think that “What is” can be waved away, ignored or beaten down as a last resort. That is what he is doing now with his executive orders and his unilateral rule. He is trying to salvage his miserable failure as a leader by forcing his way on the whole country.It hasn’t made him popular. It hasn’t made his way into the American Way. It has isolated him. The American people have rejected him in poll after poll. Now the media is slowly accepting their verdict.And no, he doesn’t have a strategy for that.
1a) Obama's Curious Rage
Calm when it comes to Putin, ISIS and Hamas, but furious with Israel.
By Bret Stephens
Barack Obama "has become 'enraged' at the Israeli government, both for its actions and for its treatment of his chief diplomat, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. " So reports the Jerusalem Post, based on the testimony of Martin Indyk, until recently a special Middle East envoy for the president. The war in Gaza, Mr. Indyk adds, has had "a very negative impact" on Jerusalem's relations with Washington.
Think about this. Enraged. Not "alarmed" or "concerned" or "irritated" or even "angered." Anger is a feeling. Rage is a frenzy. Anger passes. Rage feeds on itself. Anger is specific. Rage is obsessional, neurotic.
And Mr. Obama—No Drama Obama, the president who prides himself on his cool, a man whose emotional detachment is said to explain his intellectual strength—is enraged. With Israel. Which has just been hit by several thousand unguided rockets and 30-odd terror tunnels, a 50-day war, the forced closure of its one major airport, accusations of "genocide" by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, anti-Semitic protests throughout Europe, general condemnation across the world. This is the country that is the object of the president's rage.
Think about this some more. In the summer in which Mr. Obama became "enraged" with Israel, Islamic State terrorists seized Mosul and massacred Shiite soldiers in open pits, Russian separatists shot down a civilian jetliner, Hamas executed 18 "collaborators" in broad daylight, Bashar Assad's forces in Syria came close to encircling Aleppo with the aim of starving the city into submission, a brave American journalist had his throat slit on YouTube by a British jihadist, Russian troops openly invaded Ukraine, and Chinese jets harassed U.S. surveillance planes over international waters.
Mr. Obama or his administration responded to these events with varying degrees of concern, censure and indignation. But rage?
Here, for instance, is the president in early August, talking to the New York Times's Tom Friedman about Russia and Ukraine:
"Finding an off-ramp for [ Vladimir Putin ] becomes more challenging. Having said that I think it is still possible for us, because of the effective organization that we have done with the Europeans around Ukraine, and the genuine bite that the sanctions have had on the Russian economy, for us to arrive at a fair accommodation in which Ukrainian sovereignty and independence is still recognized but there is also recognition that Ukraine does have historic ties to Russia, the majority of their trade goes to Russia, huge portions of the population are Russian speaking, and so they are not going to be severed from Russia. And if we do that a deal should be possible."
This isn't even condemnation. It's an apology. For Mr. Putin. Benjamin Netanyahu should be so lucky.
Now think about what, specifically, has enraged the president about Israel's behavior. "Its actions and its treatment of his chief diplomat."
Actions? Hamas began firing rockets at Israel in June, thereby breaking the cease-fire it had agreed to at the end of the last war, in November 2012. The latest war began in earnest on July 7 when Hamas fired some 80 rockets at Israel. "No country can accept rocket fire aimed at civilians," White House spokesman Josh Earnest said the next day, "and we support Israel's right to defend itself against these vicious attacks."
On July 15 Israel accepted the terms of a cease-fire crafted by Egypt. Hamas violated it by firing 50 rockets at Israel. On July 17 Israel accepted a five-hour humanitarian cease-fire. Hamas violated it again. On July 20 Israel allowed a two-hour medical window in the neighborhood of Shujaiyeh. Hamas violated it. On July 26 Hamas announced a daylong cease-fire. It then broke its own cease-fire. On July 28 Israel agreed to a cease-fire for the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. The rocket attacks continued. On Aug. 1 Israel accepted a 72-hour cease-fire proposed by the U.S. Hamas violated it within 90 minutes. On Aug. 5 Israel agreed to Egypt's terms for another three-day cease-fire. Hamas violated it several hours before it was set to expire, after Israel announced it would agree to an extension.
If Hamas had honored any of these cease-fires it could have saved Palestinian lives. It didn't. Mr. Obama is enraged—but not with Hamas.
As for Israel's supposed ill-treatment of Mr. Kerry, the president should read Ben Birnbaum's and Amir Tibon's account of his secretary's Mideast misadventures in the July 20 issue of the New Republic. It's a portrait of a diplomat with the skills and style, but not the success, of Inspector Clouseau. Mr. Obama might also read Haaretz columnist Ari Shavit's assessment of Mr. Kerry's diplomacy: "The Obama administration," he wrote in July, "proved once again that it is the best friend of its enemies, and the biggest enemy of its friends."
Both Haaretz and the New Republic are left-wing publications, sympathetic to Mr. Obama's intentions, if not his methods.
Still, the president is enraged. At Israel. What a guy.
1b) Don’t Give Press Conferences When You Don’t Have Something to Say
It may have been the most perplexing moment of the Obama presidency: The president’s press conference on Thursday when he declared “we don’t have a strategy yet” on ramping up military action against ISIS. The best that people inclined to give Obama the benefit of the doubt could do was say he was speaking with refreshing candor; the rest of us reacted with varying degrees of dismay.
1b) Don’t Give Press Conferences When You Don’t Have Something to Say
It may have been the most perplexing moment of the Obama presidency: The president’s press conference on Thursday when he declared “we don’t have a strategy yet” on ramping up military action against ISIS. The best that people inclined to give Obama the benefit of the doubt could do was say he was speaking with refreshing candor; the rest of us reacted with varying degrees of dismay.
Four days of news stories since have centered on inside-the-administration conflicts when it comes to ISIS, on the damage the president might have done to international efforts to build an anti-ISIS coalition, and the wound he might have inflicted on his own party in the run-up to the election by sounding so irresolute.
After a few days of head-scratching, I think what happened here is pretty simple: The president should not have given that press conference at all since he didn’t know what to say about ISIS. He didn’t have to. He could have stayed silent. It is perfectly acceptable for the administration to find itself in a quandary about how to handle ISIS. This is a very complicated problem, and a fluid one. The purpose of presidential statements, especially when it comes to foreign and military issues, is to establish American policy. The words the president uses are closely parsed by American observers, but that’s nothing next to what happens outside our borders, where the president’s utterances are studied as though they were Talmud by non-Americans for whom the United States doth bestride the narrow world like a Colossus.
The president should only speak when he knows what to say.
1c) Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, today (Monday, 1 September 2014), met
with US Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) and US Rep. Gregory W. Meeks (D-NY) and told them:
"We’re closely following the events on the Golan Heights where al-Nusra
terrorists have kidnapped UN peacekeepers. What we see is that al-Nusra,
Hamas, Hezbollah – backed by Iran, al-Qaeda and these other terrorists
groups are basically defying all international norms, breaking them whether
in Lebanon, in Syria or in Gaza.
And I think the UN would do itself a great favour if instead of the
automatic Israel bashing, they actually turn their attention and their
investigative committees against these terrorists who trample every norm on
which the UN was founded.
I think this is a common effort that all of us have to make against these
Islamist terrorist groups that threaten our societies and our civilization.
I know that this is part of your common position and I welcome it. It helps
that Israel, the United States and the other civilized countries stand
together against this grave threat to our future.
And in that spirit, I welcome you here, as friends and as allies in a common
battle."
US Rep. Rohrabacher replied
"Mr. Prime Minister, we recognize that Israel is the one force for stability
and one force for a long term peace for this region. The rest of the region
is awash in tyranny and injustice and gangsterism and terrorism that’s
coming from the top, from these people that are running the various
organizations, radical Islamic organizations. They are not just a threat to
you, they are a threat to the peace of the world and the security of the
United States.
So we are very, very proud of this tough stand that you have taken and you
can count on us."
US Rep. Meeks added:
"Let me just add that you are our friend as we are your friend, and we will
stand together.
And I will tell you, though sometimes in Congress we have our differences,
but if there’s one thing that we concur on, whether we be Democrats or
Republicans – and we are a bi-partisan delegation – we come together in
support with our friends, our only true friend in the Middle East, and that’s
Israel. And we want to make sure that you know we will always stand side by
side, because we understand that what affects you affects us.
And in that spirit, we come in cooperation to say we’re looking to continue
with that great relationship moving forward and working together as friends
and as brothers, and sisters, actually."
1d) Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy
The United States is, at the moment, off balance. It faces challenges in the Syria-Iraq theater as well as challenges in Ukraine. It does not have a clear response to either. It does not know what success in either theater would look like, what resources it is prepared to devote to either, nor whether the consequences of defeat would be manageable.
A dilemma of this sort is not unusual for a global power. Its very breadth of interests and the extent of power create opportunities for unexpected events, and these events, particularly simultaneous challenges in different areas, create uncertainty and confusion. U.S. geography and power permit a degree of uncertainty without leading to disaster, but generating a coherent and integrated strategy is necessary, even if that strategy is simply to walk away and let events run their course. I am not suggesting the latter strategy but arguing that at a certain point, confusion must run its course and clear intentions must emerge. When they do, the result will be the coherence of a new strategic map that encompasses both conflicts.
The most critical issue for the United States is to create a single integrated plan that takes into account the most pressing challenges. Such a plan must begin by defining a theater of operations sufficiently coherent geographically as to permit integrated political maneuvering and military planning. U.S. military doctrine has moved explicitly away from a two-war strategy. Operationally, it might not be possible to engage all adversaries simultaneously, but conceptually, it is essential to think in terms of a coherent center of gravity of operations. For me, it is increasingly clear that that center is the Black Sea.
In most senses, there is no connection between these two theaters. Yes, the Russians have an ongoing problem in the high Caucasus and there are reports of Chechen advisers working with the Islamic State. In this sense, the Russians are far from comfortable with what is happening in Syria and Iraq. At the same time, anything that diverts U.S. attention from Ukraine is beneficial to the Russians. For its part, the Islamic State must oppose Russia in the long run. Its immediate problem, however, is U.S. power, so anything that distracts the United States is beneficial to the Islamic State.
But the Ukrainian crisis has a very different political dynamic from the Iraq-Syria crisis. Russian and Islamic State military forces are not coordinated in any way, and in the end, victory for either would challenge the interests of the other. But for the United States, which must allocate its attention, political will and military power carefully, the two crises must be thought of together. The Russians and the Islamic State have the luxury of focusing on one crisis. The United States must concern itself with both and reconcile them.
The United States has been in the process of limiting its involvement in the Middle East while attempting to deal with the Ukrainian crisis. The Obama administration wants to create an integrated Iraq devoid of jihadists and have Russia accept a pro-Western Ukraine. It also does not want to devote substantial military forces to either theater. Its dilemma is how to achieve its goals without risk. If it can't do this, what risk will it accept or must it accept?
Strategies that minimize risk and create maximum influence are rational and should be a founding principle of any country. By this logic, the U.S. strategy ought to be to maintain the balance of power in a region using proxies and provide material support to those proxies but avoid direct military involvement until there is no other option. The most important thing is to provide the support that obviates the need for intervention.
In the Syria-Iraq theater, the United States moved from a strategy of seeking a unified state under secular pro-Western forces to one seeking a balance of power between the Alawites and jihadists. In Iraq, the United States pursued a unified government under Baghdad and is now trying to contain the Islamic State using minimal U.S. forces and Kurdish, Shiite and some Sunni proxies. If that fails, the U.S. strategy in Iraq will devolve into the strategy in Syria, namely, seeking a balance of power between factions. It is not clear that another strategy exists. The U.S. occupation of Iraq that began in 2003 did not result in a military solution, and it is not clear that a repeat of 2003 would succeed either. Any military action must be taken with a clear outcome in mind and a reasonable expectation that the allocation of forces will achieve that outcome; wishful thinking is not permitted. Realistically, air power and special operations forces on the ground are unlikely to force the Islamic State to capitulate or to result in its dissolution.
Ukraine, of course, has a different dynamic. The United States saw the events in Ukraine as either an opportunity for moral posturing or as a strategic blow to Russian national security. Either way, it had the same result: It created a challenge to fundamental Russian interests and placed Russian President Vladimir Putin in a dangerous position. His intelligence services completely failed to forecast or manage events in Kiev or to generate a broad rising in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukrainians were defeating their supporters (with the distinction between supporters and Russian troops becoming increasingly meaningless with each passing day). But it was obvious that the Russians were not simply going to let the Ukrainian reality become a fait accompli. They would counterattack. But even so, they would still have moved from once shaping Ukrainian policy to losing all but a small fragment of Ukraine. They will therefore maintain a permanently aggressive posture in a bid to recoup what has been lost.
U.S. strategy in Ukraine tracks its strategy in Syria-Iraq. First, Washington uses proxies; second, it provides material support; and third, it avoids direct military involvement. Both strategies assume that the main adversary -- the Islamic State in Syria-Iraq and Russia in Ukraine -- is incapable of mounting a decisive offensive, or that any offensive it mounts can be blunted with air power. But to be successful, U.S. strategy assumes there will be coherent Ukrainian and Iraqi resistance to Russia and the Islamic State, respectively. If that doesn't materialize or dissolves, so does the strategy.
The United States is betting on risky allies. And the outcome matters in the long run. U.S. strategy prior to world wars I and II was to limit involvement until the situation could be handled only with a massive American deployment. During the Cold War, the United States changed its strategy to a pre-commitment of at least some forces; this had a better outcome. The United States is not invulnerable to foreign threats, although those foreign threats must evolve dramatically. The earlier intervention was less costly than intervention at the last possible minute. Neither the Islamic State nor Russia poses such a threat to the United States, and it is very likely that the respective regional balance of power can contain them. But if they can't, the crises could evolve into a more direct threat to the United States. And shaping the regional balance of power requires exertion and taking at least some risks.
The issue the United States faces is how to structure such support, physically and conceptually. There appear to be two distinct and unconnected theaters, and American power is limited. The situation would seem to preclude persuasive guarantees. But U.S. strategic conception must evolve away from seeing these as distinct theaters into seeing them as different aspects of the same theater: the Black Sea.
When we look at a map, we note that the Black Sea is the geographic organizing principle of these areas. The sea is the southern frontier of Ukraine and European Russia and the Caucasus, where Russian, jihadist and Iranian power converge on the Black Sea. Northern Syria and Iraq are fewer than 650 kilometers (400 miles) from the Black Sea.
The United States has had a North Atlantic strategy. It has had a Caribbean strategy, a Western Pacific strategy and so on. This did not simply mean a naval strategy. Rather, it was understood as a combined arms system of power projection that depended on naval power to provide strategic supply, delivery of troops and air power. It also placed its forces in such a configuration that the one force, or at least command structure, could provide support in multiple directions.
The United States has a strategic problem that can be addressed either as two or more unrelated problems requiring redundant resources or a single integrated solution. It is true that the Russians and the Islamic State do not see themselves as part of a single theater. But opponents don't define theaters of operation for the United States. The first step in crafting a strategy is to define the map in a way that allows the strategist to think in terms of unity of forces rather than separation, and unity of support rather than division. It also allows the strategist to think of his regional relationships as part of an integrated strategy.
Assume for the moment that the Russians chose to intervene in the Caucasus again, that jihadists moved out of Chechnya and Dagestan into Georgia and Azerbaijan, or that Iran chose to move north. The outcome of events in the Caucasus would matter greatly to the United States. Under the current strategic structure, where U.S. decision-makers seem incapable of conceptualizing the two present strategic problems, such a third crisis would overwhelm them. But thinking in terms of securing what I'll call the Greater Black Sea Basin would provide a framework for addressing the current thought exercise. A Black Sea strategy would define the significance of Georgia, the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Even more important, it would elevate Azerbaijan to the level of importance it should have in U.S. strategy. Without Azerbaijan, Georgia has little weight. With Azerbaijan, there is a counter to jihadists in the high Caucasus, or at least a buffer, since Azerbaijan is logically the eastern anchor of the Greater Black Sea strategy.
A Black Sea strategy would also force definition of two key relationships for the United States. The first is Turkey. Russia aside, Turkey is the major native Black Sea power. It has interests throughout the Greater Black Sea Basin, namely, in Syria, Iraq, the Caucasus, Russia and Ukraine. Thinking in terms of a Black Sea strategy, Turkey becomes one of the indispensible allies since its interests touch American interests. Aligning U.S. and Turkish strategy would be a precondition for such a strategy, meaning both nations would have to make serious policy shifts. An explicit Black Sea-centered strategy would put U.S.-Turkish relations at the forefront, and a failure to align would tell both countries that they need to re-examine their strategic relationship. At this point, U.S.-Turkish relations seem to be based on a systematic avoidance of confronting realities. With the Black Sea as a centerpiece, evasion, which is rarely useful in creating realistic strategies, would be difficult.
I have written frequently on the emergence -- and the inevitability of the emergence -- of an alliance based on the notion of the Intermarium, the land between the seas. It would stretch between the Baltic and Black seas and would be an alliance designed to contain a newly assertive Russia. I have envisioned this alliance stretching west to the Caspian, taking in Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Poland-to-Romania line is already emerging. It seems obvious that given events on both sides of the Black Sea, the rest of this line will emerge.
The United States ought to adopt the policy of the Cold War. That consisted of four parts. First, allies were expected to provide the geographical foundation of defense and substantial forces to respond to threats. Second, the United States was to provide military and economic aid as necessary to support this structure. Third, the United States was to pre-position some forces as guarantors of U.S. commitment and as immediate support. And fourth, Washington was to guarantee the total commitment of all U.S. forces to defending allies, although the need to fulfill the last guarantee never arose.
The United States has an uncertain alliance structure in the Greater Black Sea Basin that is neither mutually supportive nor permits the United States a coherent power in the region given the conceptual division of the region into distinct theaters. The United States is providing aid, but again on an inconsistent basis. Some U.S. forces are involved, but their mission is unclear, it is unclear that they are in the right places, and it is unclear what the regional policy is.
Thus, U.S. policy for the moment is incoherent. A Black Sea strategy is merely a name, but sometimes a name is sufficient to focus strategic thinking. So long as the United States thinks in terms of Ukraine and Syria and Iraq as if they were on different planets, the economy of forces that coherent strategy requires will never be achieved. Thinking in terms of the Black Sea as a pivot of a single diverse and diffuse region can anchor U.S. thinking. Merely anchoring strategic concepts does not win wars, nor prevent them. But anything that provides coherence to American strategy has value.
The Greater Black Sea Basin, as broadly defined, is already the object of U.S. military and political involvement. It is just not perceived that way in military, political or even public and media calculations. It should be. For that will bring perception in line with fast-emerging reality.
2) Irresponsible ChoicesA dilemma of this sort is not unusual for a global power. Its very breadth of interests and the extent of power create opportunities for unexpected events, and these events, particularly simultaneous challenges in different areas, create uncertainty and confusion. U.S. geography and power permit a degree of uncertainty without leading to disaster, but generating a coherent and integrated strategy is necessary, even if that strategy is simply to walk away and let events run their course. I am not suggesting the latter strategy but arguing that at a certain point, confusion must run its course and clear intentions must emerge. When they do, the result will be the coherence of a new strategic map that encompasses both conflicts.
The most critical issue for the United States is to create a single integrated plan that takes into account the most pressing challenges. Such a plan must begin by defining a theater of operations sufficiently coherent geographically as to permit integrated political maneuvering and military planning. U.S. military doctrine has moved explicitly away from a two-war strategy. Operationally, it might not be possible to engage all adversaries simultaneously, but conceptually, it is essential to think in terms of a coherent center of gravity of operations. For me, it is increasingly clear that that center is the Black Sea.
Ukraine and Syria-Iraq
There are currently two active theaters of military action with broad potential significance. One is Ukraine, where the Russians have launched a counteroffensive toward Crimea. The other is in the Syria-Iraq region, where the forces of the Islamic State have launched an offensive designed at a minimum to control regions in both countries -- and at most dominate the area between the Levant and Iran.In most senses, there is no connection between these two theaters. Yes, the Russians have an ongoing problem in the high Caucasus and there are reports of Chechen advisers working with the Islamic State. In this sense, the Russians are far from comfortable with what is happening in Syria and Iraq. At the same time, anything that diverts U.S. attention from Ukraine is beneficial to the Russians. For its part, the Islamic State must oppose Russia in the long run. Its immediate problem, however, is U.S. power, so anything that distracts the United States is beneficial to the Islamic State.
But the Ukrainian crisis has a very different political dynamic from the Iraq-Syria crisis. Russian and Islamic State military forces are not coordinated in any way, and in the end, victory for either would challenge the interests of the other. But for the United States, which must allocate its attention, political will and military power carefully, the two crises must be thought of together. The Russians and the Islamic State have the luxury of focusing on one crisis. The United States must concern itself with both and reconcile them.
The United States has been in the process of limiting its involvement in the Middle East while attempting to deal with the Ukrainian crisis. The Obama administration wants to create an integrated Iraq devoid of jihadists and have Russia accept a pro-Western Ukraine. It also does not want to devote substantial military forces to either theater. Its dilemma is how to achieve its goals without risk. If it can't do this, what risk will it accept or must it accept?
Strategies that minimize risk and create maximum influence are rational and should be a founding principle of any country. By this logic, the U.S. strategy ought to be to maintain the balance of power in a region using proxies and provide material support to those proxies but avoid direct military involvement until there is no other option. The most important thing is to provide the support that obviates the need for intervention.
In the Syria-Iraq theater, the United States moved from a strategy of seeking a unified state under secular pro-Western forces to one seeking a balance of power between the Alawites and jihadists. In Iraq, the United States pursued a unified government under Baghdad and is now trying to contain the Islamic State using minimal U.S. forces and Kurdish, Shiite and some Sunni proxies. If that fails, the U.S. strategy in Iraq will devolve into the strategy in Syria, namely, seeking a balance of power between factions. It is not clear that another strategy exists. The U.S. occupation of Iraq that began in 2003 did not result in a military solution, and it is not clear that a repeat of 2003 would succeed either. Any military action must be taken with a clear outcome in mind and a reasonable expectation that the allocation of forces will achieve that outcome; wishful thinking is not permitted. Realistically, air power and special operations forces on the ground are unlikely to force the Islamic State to capitulate or to result in its dissolution.
Ukraine, of course, has a different dynamic. The United States saw the events in Ukraine as either an opportunity for moral posturing or as a strategic blow to Russian national security. Either way, it had the same result: It created a challenge to fundamental Russian interests and placed Russian President Vladimir Putin in a dangerous position. His intelligence services completely failed to forecast or manage events in Kiev or to generate a broad rising in eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukrainians were defeating their supporters (with the distinction between supporters and Russian troops becoming increasingly meaningless with each passing day). But it was obvious that the Russians were not simply going to let the Ukrainian reality become a fait accompli. They would counterattack. But even so, they would still have moved from once shaping Ukrainian policy to losing all but a small fragment of Ukraine. They will therefore maintain a permanently aggressive posture in a bid to recoup what has been lost.
U.S. strategy in Ukraine tracks its strategy in Syria-Iraq. First, Washington uses proxies; second, it provides material support; and third, it avoids direct military involvement. Both strategies assume that the main adversary -- the Islamic State in Syria-Iraq and Russia in Ukraine -- is incapable of mounting a decisive offensive, or that any offensive it mounts can be blunted with air power. But to be successful, U.S. strategy assumes there will be coherent Ukrainian and Iraqi resistance to Russia and the Islamic State, respectively. If that doesn't materialize or dissolves, so does the strategy.
The United States is betting on risky allies. And the outcome matters in the long run. U.S. strategy prior to world wars I and II was to limit involvement until the situation could be handled only with a massive American deployment. During the Cold War, the United States changed its strategy to a pre-commitment of at least some forces; this had a better outcome. The United States is not invulnerable to foreign threats, although those foreign threats must evolve dramatically. The earlier intervention was less costly than intervention at the last possible minute. Neither the Islamic State nor Russia poses such a threat to the United States, and it is very likely that the respective regional balance of power can contain them. But if they can't, the crises could evolve into a more direct threat to the United States. And shaping the regional balance of power requires exertion and taking at least some risks.
Regional Balances of Power and the Black Sea
The rational move for countries like Romania, Hungary or Poland is to accommodate Russia unless they have significant guarantees from the outside. Whether fair or not, only the United States can deliver those guarantees. The same can be said about the Shia and the Kurds, both of whom the United States has abandoned in recent years, assuming that they could manage on their own.The issue the United States faces is how to structure such support, physically and conceptually. There appear to be two distinct and unconnected theaters, and American power is limited. The situation would seem to preclude persuasive guarantees. But U.S. strategic conception must evolve away from seeing these as distinct theaters into seeing them as different aspects of the same theater: the Black Sea.
When we look at a map, we note that the Black Sea is the geographic organizing principle of these areas. The sea is the southern frontier of Ukraine and European Russia and the Caucasus, where Russian, jihadist and Iranian power converge on the Black Sea. Northern Syria and Iraq are fewer than 650 kilometers (400 miles) from the Black Sea.
The United States has had a North Atlantic strategy. It has had a Caribbean strategy, a Western Pacific strategy and so on. This did not simply mean a naval strategy. Rather, it was understood as a combined arms system of power projection that depended on naval power to provide strategic supply, delivery of troops and air power. It also placed its forces in such a configuration that the one force, or at least command structure, could provide support in multiple directions.
The United States has a strategic problem that can be addressed either as two or more unrelated problems requiring redundant resources or a single integrated solution. It is true that the Russians and the Islamic State do not see themselves as part of a single theater. But opponents don't define theaters of operation for the United States. The first step in crafting a strategy is to define the map in a way that allows the strategist to think in terms of unity of forces rather than separation, and unity of support rather than division. It also allows the strategist to think of his regional relationships as part of an integrated strategy.
Assume for the moment that the Russians chose to intervene in the Caucasus again, that jihadists moved out of Chechnya and Dagestan into Georgia and Azerbaijan, or that Iran chose to move north. The outcome of events in the Caucasus would matter greatly to the United States. Under the current strategic structure, where U.S. decision-makers seem incapable of conceptualizing the two present strategic problems, such a third crisis would overwhelm them. But thinking in terms of securing what I'll call the Greater Black Sea Basin would provide a framework for addressing the current thought exercise. A Black Sea strategy would define the significance of Georgia, the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Even more important, it would elevate Azerbaijan to the level of importance it should have in U.S. strategy. Without Azerbaijan, Georgia has little weight. With Azerbaijan, there is a counter to jihadists in the high Caucasus, or at least a buffer, since Azerbaijan is logically the eastern anchor of the Greater Black Sea strategy.
A Black Sea strategy would also force definition of two key relationships for the United States. The first is Turkey. Russia aside, Turkey is the major native Black Sea power. It has interests throughout the Greater Black Sea Basin, namely, in Syria, Iraq, the Caucasus, Russia and Ukraine. Thinking in terms of a Black Sea strategy, Turkey becomes one of the indispensible allies since its interests touch American interests. Aligning U.S. and Turkish strategy would be a precondition for such a strategy, meaning both nations would have to make serious policy shifts. An explicit Black Sea-centered strategy would put U.S.-Turkish relations at the forefront, and a failure to align would tell both countries that they need to re-examine their strategic relationship. At this point, U.S.-Turkish relations seem to be based on a systematic avoidance of confronting realities. With the Black Sea as a centerpiece, evasion, which is rarely useful in creating realistic strategies, would be difficult.
The Centrality of Romania
The second critical country is Romania. The Montreux Convention prohibits the unlimited transit of a naval force into the Black Sea through the Bosporus, controlled by Turkey. Romania, however, is a Black Sea nation, and no limitations apply to it, although its naval combat power is centered on a few aging frigates backed up by a half-dozen corvettes. Apart from being a potential base for aircraft for operations in the region, particularly in Ukraine, supporting Romania in building a significant naval force in the Black Sea -- potentially including amphibious ships -- would provide a deterrent force against the Russians and also shape affairs in the Black Sea that might motivate Turkey to cooperate with Romania and thereby work with the United States. The traditional NATO structure can survive this evolution, even though most of NATO is irrelevant to the problems facing the Black Sea Basin. Regardless of how the Syria-Iraq drama ends, it is secondary to the future of Russia's relationship with Ukraine and the European Peninsula. Poland anchors the North European Plain, but the action for now is in the Black Sea, and that makes Romania the critical partner in the European Peninsula. It will feel the first pressure if Russia regains its position in Ukraine.I have written frequently on the emergence -- and the inevitability of the emergence -- of an alliance based on the notion of the Intermarium, the land between the seas. It would stretch between the Baltic and Black seas and would be an alliance designed to contain a newly assertive Russia. I have envisioned this alliance stretching west to the Caspian, taking in Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Poland-to-Romania line is already emerging. It seems obvious that given events on both sides of the Black Sea, the rest of this line will emerge.
The United States ought to adopt the policy of the Cold War. That consisted of four parts. First, allies were expected to provide the geographical foundation of defense and substantial forces to respond to threats. Second, the United States was to provide military and economic aid as necessary to support this structure. Third, the United States was to pre-position some forces as guarantors of U.S. commitment and as immediate support. And fourth, Washington was to guarantee the total commitment of all U.S. forces to defending allies, although the need to fulfill the last guarantee never arose.
The United States has an uncertain alliance structure in the Greater Black Sea Basin that is neither mutually supportive nor permits the United States a coherent power in the region given the conceptual division of the region into distinct theaters. The United States is providing aid, but again on an inconsistent basis. Some U.S. forces are involved, but their mission is unclear, it is unclear that they are in the right places, and it is unclear what the regional policy is.
Thus, U.S. policy for the moment is incoherent. A Black Sea strategy is merely a name, but sometimes a name is sufficient to focus strategic thinking. So long as the United States thinks in terms of Ukraine and Syria and Iraq as if they were on different planets, the economy of forces that coherent strategy requires will never be achieved. Thinking in terms of the Black Sea as a pivot of a single diverse and diffuse region can anchor U.S. thinking. Merely anchoring strategic concepts does not win wars, nor prevent them. But anything that provides coherence to American strategy has value.
The Greater Black Sea Basin, as broadly defined, is already the object of U.S. military and political involvement. It is just not perceived that way in military, political or even public and media calculations. It should be. For that will bring perception in line with fast-emerging reality.
By Thomas Sowell
The latest Gallup poll indicates that 14 percent of the people "moderately disapprove" of Barack Obama's performance as president and 39 percent "strongly disapprove."
Since Obama won two presidential elections, chances are that some of those who now "strongly disapprove" of what he has done voted to put him in office. We all make mistakes, but the real question is whether we learn from them.
With many people now acting as if it is time for "a woman" to become president, apparently they have learned absolutely nothing from the disastrous results of the irresponsible self-indulgence of choosing a President of the United States on the basis of demographic characteristics, instead of individual qualifications.
It would not matter to me if the next five presidents in a row were all women, if these happened to be the best individuals available at the time. But to say that we should now elect "a woman" president in 2016 is to say that we are willfully blind to the dangers of putting life and death decisions in the hands of someone chosen for symbolic reasons.
If we were to choose just "a woman" as our next president, would that mean that any criticism of that president would be considered to be a sign of being against women?
No public official should be considered to be above criticism -- and the higher up that official is, the more important it is to hold his or her feet to the fire when it comes to carrying out duties involving the life and death of individuals and the fate of the nation.
We have not yet had a Jewish president. If and when we do, does that mean that any criticism of that individual should be stigmatized and dismissed as anti-Semitism? What of our first Italian American president, our first Asian American president?
Human beings of every background are imperfect creatures. When they are in a position high enough for their imperfections to bring disasters to more than 300 million Americans, the last thing we need is to stifle criticism of what they do.
It is by no means guaranteed that this country will survive the long-run consequences of the disastrous decisions already made by Barack Obama, especially his pretense of stopping Iran's becoming a nuclear power. Obama may no longer be in office when those chickens come home to roost.
If we wake up some morning and find some American city in radioactive ruins, will we connect the dots and see this as a consequence of voting to elect an unknown and untried man, for the sake of racial symbolism?
Among those who look around for someone to blame, how many will look in the mirror?
Presidents already have too much insulation from criticism -- and from reality.
When President Calvin Coolidge caught everyone by surprise in 1928, by announcing that he would not run for reelection, despite a prosperous economy and his own personal popularity, he simply said, "I do not choose to run." Coolidge was a man of very few words, despite his knowledge of multiple languages. Someone once said that Coolidge could be silent in five different languages.
But, when he later wrote a small autobiography, Coolidge explained the inherent dangers in the office of President of the United States, especially when one person remains in the White House too long.
"It is difficult for men in high office to avoid the malady of self-delusion. They are always surrounded by worshippers. They are constantly, and for the most part sincerely, assured of their greatness.
"They live in an artificial atmosphere of adulation and exaltation which sooner or later impairs their judgment. They are in grave danger of becoming careless and arrogant."
Of presidents who served eight years in office, he said, "in almost every instance" the last years of their terms show little "constructive accomplishments" and those years are often "clouded with grave disappointments."
Another president chosen for demographic representation (whether by race, sex or whatever), and further insulated from criticism and from reality, is the last thing we need.
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3) The Wave Has Failed to Materialize
Meanwhile, back at the ranch -- as foreign events hog the spotlight -- why haven't Republicans sealed the deal on the coming election?
When summer began, the conventional wisdom was that the GOP sorta kinda probably maybe would take control of the Senate in November. As summer ends -- and it hasn't been great for President Obama, which means it also hasn't been anything for the Democratic Party to write home about -- that same equivocal assessment still holds.
The Real Clear Politics website, which aggregates polls, rates nine Senate races as tossups. If incumbents Kay Hagan of North Carolina, Mary Landrieu of Louisiana and Mark Pryor of Arkansas manage to scrape out wins, the website calculates, Democrats will retain a 51-49 edge and Harry Reid gets to keep his job as majority leader.
Let's say that one of those Democrats falters -- or even two. It seems entirely possible that Bruce Braley could defeat Republican Joni Ernst in an Iowa race that polls show as a dead heat. Democrat Michelle Nunn may be gaining ground on David Perdue in Georgia, although a recent poll showing Nunn in the lead is probably an outlier. And the man who wants Reid's job, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, is in a surprisingly tough race against Democrat Alison Lundergan Grimes.
All in all, you still have to give the edge to the GOP. But it is a surprisingly narrow and tenuous advantage in a year when some analysts were predicting a wave election in favor of Republicans.
So far, just ripples. Why could that be?
This time, the GOP managed not to nominate candidates whose views are so extreme -- or so wacky -- that they might effectively concede what ought to be safe seats. The party establishment made ideological concessions to the tea party wing, but managed to insist on nominees who have a chance of being elected. No Republican candidate has spoken of solving problems with "Second Amendment remedies," as Sharron Angle did in 2010, or run a television ad to declare "I'm not a witch" a la Christine O'Donnell that same year.
The candidates may be plausible, but they're running on the wrong issues. Rather, the wrong issue: the Affordable Care Act.
"Repeal Obamacare" remains a rallying cry for the GOP's activist base -- perhaps less for the law itself than the president for whom it is named. But for independent voters, undoing health care reform is not the sure-fire issue Republicans hoped it would be.
The program is in effect. Some people who previously could not obtain health insurance now have it. Most people are unaffected. Despite all the dire GOP predictions, the sky has not fallen.
Yet Republican candidates say otherwise, describing a dystopian breakdown of the nation's health care system that simply has not occurred. And they go all tongue-tied when asked how they could manage to repeal Obamacare in the face of a certain veto by Obama -- or, more tellingly, just what they would put in place if they somehow succeeded.
Much of the news dominating the headlines this summer has been taking place overseas -- Russia's slow-motion invasion of Ukraine, the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, whatever it is that seems to be happening in Libya. Blasting Obama for failed leadership is a guaranteed applause line, but GOP candidates are not even trying to articulate what the president should be doing differently. Airstrikes in Syria? Ground troops back to Iraq? Anybody want to speak up?
Nor has the party developed an economic message that goes beyond the familiar standbys: tax cuts, spending cuts, deregulation. The public is clearly not thrilled with the state of the economy -- as reflected in Obama's low approval ratings -- but growth is up and unemployment is down. The claim that Democratic policies inevitably lead to ruin rings hollow.
Still, Democrats have an uphill fight, even if it's not nearly as steep as the GOP hoped. To hold the Senate, segments of the Democratic coalition who often skip midterm elections -- African-Americans, Latinos, younger voters -- will have to turn out. And polls show that Republicans maintain an edge in enthusiasm.
Which brings me to the wild card: immigration.
Obama is considering executive action that could give legal status to thousands or even millions of undocumented immigrants. Would that inflame conservatives and drive Republican turnout through the roof? Would it excite the Democratic faithful, especially Latinos, giving them a reason to vote?
This thing is unpredictable. And that's a surprise.
4) 2014 COLLEGE FOOTBALL SCOUTING REPORT
QUlNTlLlOUS JENKlNS
6' 3", 220 lbs. Running Back. Set state scoring record out of Triton
High School , Dunn , N.C. Also led the state in burglaries, but has
only 9 convictions. He has been clocked at 4.2 seconds in the 40 yard dash
with a 19" TV under each arm. Signed with Mississippi State .
WAYFRON P. JACKSON
6' 6", 215 lbs. Wide Receiver. Hottest prospect from Texas in the last ten
years. Currently holds world record for the most "you knows"
during an interview (62 in one minute). Wayfron can print his complete
name. Signed with Tennessee .
ROOSEVELT "DUDE" DANSELL
6' 1", 195 lbs. Running Back. From Tyler , Texas . Has processed hair and
imitates Billy Dee Williams very well. Listed his church preference as "red
brick". Signed with the University of Houston .
WOODROW LEE WASHINGTON
6' 8", 310 lbs. Tackle. From a 4th generation welfare family. At 19 he's
the oldest of 21 children. Mother claims Woodrow and child No. 9 have same
father. He has a manslaughter trial pending, but feels he will be found
innocent because: "The dude said sumpin' bad 'bout my Momma". On his
entrance form, he listed his IQ as 20/20. Signed with the University of
Texas .
WlLLIE "NIGHT TRAIN" JONES
6' 4", 225 lbs. Quarterback. Born on an Amtrak train. Birth certificate
indicates he is 24 years old. Thinks the "N" on Nebraska 's helmets stands
for "Nowledge" but still meets this school's stringent entrance
requirements. Signed with the University of Oregon .
TYRONE "PYTHON" PEOPLES
6' 10", 228 lbs. Wide Receiver. Has a pending paternity suit and two rape
trials, but hopes none of his other 9 victims will file charges.
Thinks Taco Bell is the Mexican Telephone Company. Signed with University
of Miami .
ABDUL HASHEEN ABBA ALI
6' 10", 305 lbs. Guard. Played high school ball under the name Fro'
Leester Ja' Charles Jones until he discovered religion. Abdul thinks
Sherlock Holmes is a housing project in Jacksonville , FL. Signed
with the University of Florida .
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5)
Arbitrarily Created Countries
Fifty-one member countries – the entire League of Nations – unanimously declared on July 24, 1922:
“Whereas recognition has been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.”
Unlike nation-states in Europe, modern Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi nationalities did not evolve. They were arbitrarily created by colonial powers.
In 1919, in the wake of World War I, England and France as Mandatory (e.g., official administrators and mentors) carved up the former Ottoman Empire, which had collapsed a year earlier, into geographic spheres of influence. This divided the Mideast into new political entities with new names and frontiers.
Territory was divided along map meridians without regard for traditional frontiers (i.e., geographic logic and sustainability) or the ethnic composition of indigenous populations.
The prevailing rationale behind these artificially created states was how they served the imperial and commercial needs of their colonial masters. Iraq and Jordan, for instance, were created as emirates to reward the noble Hashemite family from Saudi Arabia for its loyalty to the British against the Ottoman Turks during World War I, under the leadership of Lawrence of Arabia. Iraq was given to Faisal bin Hussein, son of the sheriff of Mecca, in 1918. To reward his brother Abdullah with an emirate, Britain cut away 77 percent of its mandate over Palestine earmarked for the Jews and gave it to Abdullah in 1922, creating the new country of Trans-Jordan or Jordan, as it was later named.
The Arabs’ hatred of the Jewish State has never been strong enough to prevent the bloody rivalries that repeatedly rock the Middle East. These conflicts were evident in the civil wars in Yemen and Lebanon, as well as in the war between Iraq and Iran, in the gassing of countless Kurds in Iraq, and in the killing of Iraqis by Iraqis, Syrian by Syrians as well as the killing of Egyptians by Egyptians.
The manner in which European colonial powers carved out political entities with little regard to their ethnic composition not only led to this inter-ethnic violence, but it also encouraged dictatorial rule as the only force capable of holding such entities together.
The exception was Palestine, or Eretz-Israel – the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, where:
“The Mandatory [Great Britain] shall be responsible for placing the country [Palestine] under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.”
5a)
The Frontlines of the NGO War against Israel
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Mainstream Western media coverage of Israel is laced with expressions intentionally crafted to delegitimize the Jewish State. The good news is that these terms weren’t written in stone 3,300 years ago, but are post-Israel independence creations. By forfeiting this language, we forfeit our history. Here are 13 phrases we must stop repeating.
#1 – “West Bank:” Claims that “Judea and Samaria” is simply the “biblical name for the West Bank” stands history on its head. The Hebrew-origin terms “Judea” and “Samaria” were used through 1950, when invading [Trans]Jordan renamed them the “West Bank” in order to disassociate these areas of the Jewish homeland from Jews. The UN’s own 1947 partition resolution referred not to “West Bank,” but to “the hill country of Samaria and Judea.” This term is not shorthand for “Judea and Samaria.” Under this formulation, Jordan is the “East Bank” of the original Palestine Mandate, which was designated as the homeland for the Jewish People.
#2 – “East” Jerusalem or “traditionally Arab East” Jerusalem: From the city’s second millennium BCE origins until 1947 CE, there was no such place as “East” Jerusalem. The 19 years between when invading Jordan captured part of the city in 1948 and was ousted by Israel in 1967 was the only time in history, except between 638 and 1099, when Arabs ruled any part of Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs have not ruled an inch of it for one day in history. In the past three millennia, Jerusalem has been the capital of three native states – Judah, Judaea, and modern Israel – and has had a renewed Jewish majority since 19th century Turkish rule. Eastern Jerusalem is a neighborhood of the city that Israel reunified in 1967.
#3 – “The UN sought to create Jewish and Palestinian States:” It did not. Partitioning Palestine between “Palestinians” and Jews is like partitioning Pennsylvania between Pennsylvanians and Jews. Over and over in its 1947 partition resolution, the UN referenced “the Jewish State” and “the Arab” [not “Palestinian”] State.
#4 – 1948 was the “Creation” and “Founding” of Israel: Israel wasn’t “created” and “founded” in 1948 artificially and out-of-the-blue. Israel attained independence that year as the natural fruition into renewed statehood of a people that had twice before been independent in that land, and after centuries of hard work to re-establish a Jewish State in this historic homeland.
#5 – “The War that Followed Israel’s Creation:” Israeli did not choose this war; it was hoisted on Israel by almost every Arab state, which rejected the UN partition and tried to push the Jews of Israel into the sea. And it was a homeland Jewish army, Haganah, which became the IDF, that threw back that multi-nation foreign invasion.
#6– “Palestinian Refugees of the War that Followed Israel’s Creation,” or the “Palestinian Refugee Issue:” It was the invading Arab nations bent on Israel’s destruction that both encouraged and caused the bulk of the Arabs to flee Israel. And a greater number of media constantly ignore the indigenous Middle Eastern Jews who were expelled from vast Arab and other Muslim lands in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War. Their number is greater than the amount of Arabs that fled tiny Israel. That Israel absorbed the bulk of these Jews, while Arab “hosts,”including in Palestine itself, isolate the Arab refugees’ descendants in Western-supported “refugee camps” does not convert the Arab-Israeli conflict’s two-sided refugee issue into a “Palestinian” refugee issue. Had the Palestinian Arabs accepted the UN partition plan, they would also have been celebrating their 66th anniversary.
#7 – Israel “Seized”Arab Lands in 1967: It did not. The 1967 war, like its predecessors, was a defensive war forced upon Israel. Israel’s neighbors did not want to compromise; they simply wanted to destroy the Jewish State. The new Israeli territory was meant to provide a security barrier and ensure this could never happen. Moreover, these were not “Arab Lands.”
#8 – Israel’s “1967 Borders:” The 1949 Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement expressly declared the “green line” it drew between the two sides’ ceasefire positions as a military ceasefire line only, without prejudice to either side’s political border claims.The post-’67 war UN resolution 242 pointedly did not demand Israel retreat from these lines.
#9 – “Israeli-Occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem:” That the media insistently calls Israeli presence in the heart of Jerusalem and in Judea and Samaria “Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories” does not make it so. “Occupation” is an international law term referencing foreign presence in the sovereign territory of another state. The land of Israel’s last sovereign native state before modern Israel was Jewish Judaea. The land ratio of Arab lands to Israel is 625-1, 23 states to one.
#10 – “Jewish Settlers and Settlements” vs. “Palestinian Residents of Neighborhoods and Villages:” A favorite media news article contrast is referencing in the same sentence “Jewish settlers” in “settlements” and “Palestinian residents” of nearby “neighborhoods” and “villages.” Jews are not alien“ settlers” in a Jerusalem that’s had a Jewish majority since 19th century times or in the Judea-Samaria Jewish historical heartland.
#11 – Israel’s “Jewish State” recognition is “a new stumbling block”: New since Moses’ time. The Jewish homeland of Israel, including continuous homeland-claiming Jewish presence, has always been central to Jewish peoplehood. In 1947, British Foreign Secretary Bevin told Parliament that the Jews’ “essential point of principle” was Jewish Palestine sovereignty.
#12 – “Palestinians accept and Israel rejects a Two-State Solution:” Wrong on both counts. Both the U.S. and Israel define ‘Two States’ as two states for two peoples – Jews and Arabs. Many on the Arab side insistently rejects two states for two peoples. Many Israelis, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, support that plan – conditioned on an end to Palestinian terror. The Arabs continuously and consistently deny Israel’s right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish People, no matter where its borders are drawn.
#13 – “The Palestinians:” The United Nations’ 1947 partition resolution called Palestine’s Arabs and Jews “the two Palestinian peoples.” Nothing is more self-delegitimizing and counter-productive to achieving peace based on Arab recognition of Jews’ right to be there, than that Jews should go around calling Palestinian Arabs “The Palestinians.” They have no distinguishing language, religion, or culture from neighboring Arabs, and have never been sovereign in Palestine, whereas the Jews, with a presence stretching back three millennia, have had three states there, all Jerusalem-based. Most Palestinian Arabs cannot trace their own lineage to the land back more than 4 generations.
5c) Hamas was Defeated, Until the Next Time. WHEN YOU DON’T DESTROY TERRORIST YOU END UP MOWING THE “GRASS” AGAIN AND AGAIN.....
by Efraim Inbar
BESA Center Perspectives
Executive Summary: During Operation Protective Edge, Hamas was clearly defeated, but not destroyed. Israel was successful in significantly degrading the military capabilities of Hamas and forced it to accept the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire unconditionally. Despite criticism of Israel's "disproportionate" response and over seventy Israeli casualties, the operation was supported by many key international actors and the fighting caused little damage to Israel. As there is no political solution to the conflict in sight, Israel may be forced to "mow the grass" again and more vigorously so.
Hamas was clearly defeated by Israel in "Operation Protective Edge,' but not destroyed. Its destruction was not a goal of Israel's military campaign. What Israel wanted was a weakened Hamas to continue to rule Gaza. The separation between Gaza and the West Bank serves Israel's interest in weakening the Palestinian national movement, which has been and remains a mortal enemy (not a peace partner), at least for the foreseeable future.
Israel decided to once again "mow the grass" in Gaza under the assumption that it is engaged in a protracted intractable conflict where a patient strategy of attrition is needed to significantly degrade the capabilities of Hamas to harm Israel. This was achieved. About one third of Hamas' missile arsenal and most of its missile production infrastructure was destroyed. Most of the attack tunnels (32) were probably demolished, and almost one thousand Hamas fighters and a few of its leaders were eliminated. More targeted killings and an earlier removal of some of the self-imposed constraints on the use of airpower might have speeded Hamas' acceptance of a ceasefire and might have spared Gaza much destruction.
The Hamas defeat is clear, because it finally capitulated to the Egyptian cease-fire proposal that Hamas had been rejected since July 15. The unlimited ceasefire, as Egypt and Israel demanded, constituted the precondition for future negotiations, and it had no input from Qatar and Turkey, both Hamas supporters. All crossings into Gaza will continue to be controlled by Israel and Egypt, making sure that the rearmament of Hamas will not be easy. Egypt even forced Hamas to swallow a bitter pill such as the presence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) at the Rafah crossing. The Hamas "victory speeches" cannot erase the fact that Hamas eventually gave in unconditionally to Egyptian-Israeli pressure.
Despite much criticism abroad of Israel's "disproportionate" use of force, Israel was allowed for 50 days to pulverize Hamas installations and their surroundings. It was clear that a large number of Arab states tacitly supported the Israeli endeavor to administer a heavy blow on Hamas. Important international actors, such as India, China and Russia, were rather mute on the Gaza issue for their own reasons. Moreover, the US, the EU and parts of the international community demanded demilitarization of Gaza too. This is of course not attainable without collecting Hamas weaponry by force, but it delegitimizes Hamas violence, while lending legitimacy to Israel's defensive measures.
Any assessment of "Protective Edge" must also calculate the cost to Israel of this offensive. The "Iron Dome" system neutralized almost all rockets fired at Israel's population centers. Most of the country was little affected by the Gaza war, although the sound of sirens probably had a negative psychological effect. Disciplined behavior on part of the civilian public minimized the loss of lives. But the death toll was 72 (over sixty soldiers) and hundreds of wounded. Limited damage was caused primarily to property in the proximity of the Gaza. Direct and indirect costs of the war that amount to several billions of dollars are bearable for the strong Israeli economy.
The caution and the reluctance to use ground forces displayed by Israel were useful in garnering domestic and international legitimacy, but might have a corrosive effect on Israel's deterrence. Such qualities, commendable in a democracy, do not enhance Israel's deterrence in the Middle East. Eagerness to fight, determination and ruthlessness are the prerequisites for building deterrence.
Unfortunately, the military campaign against Hamas underscored tensions in US-Israel relations. The ambiguous attitudes and actions toward Israel on part of the US administration signal less willingness to back its Middle East ally. Moreover, the US was largely irrelevant in the Gaza outcome, as it foolishly tried to involve Turkey and Qatar in management of the crisis and it failed to perceive the centrality of Egypt in the Gaza equation. The Gaza war was another example of the confused Obama administration foreign policy towards the Middle East. The American misfortune is also an Israeli loss as Jerusalem needs and prefers a strong and relevant America.
"Protective Edge" left Gaza in Hamas hands. There is a widespread feeling of unease among Israelis with this outcome. The frustration is understandable, but not warranted. It is beyond Israel's abilities to impose its preferred leaders on its Arab neighbors. But it is not easy to come to terms with the thought that there is no resolution to the conflict in sight and with the realization that another round of violence is around the corner. Nevertheless, polls have shown for some time that most Israelis understand this predicament, and during the war Israeli society displayed tremendous resilience and solidarity. Indeed, routinization of protracted conflict remains a main challenge for Israeli society.
The domestic political impact of the Gaza war will depend upon the length of the period of calm to be achieved. The longer calm will prevail, the more Prime Minister Netanyahu will be its main beneficiary. The next scheduled election is in November 2017, which is plenty of time for Netanyahu to recover, if the calm holds. If deterrence does not hold and Hamas decides to challenge Netanyahu by firing into Israel over the next three years, the Prime Minister may be forced to "mow the grass" again and more vigorously.
Prof. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, and a Shillman/Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum.
5d) By
The Palestinian cause has attracted international sympathy for decades, so why do Palestinians still suffer so grievously? The burdens of Israeli occupation aren't the full story. Palestinians also suffer from bad leaders and bad friends who do them more harm than good. In newsrooms, universities and governments world-wide, supporters of Palestine are more like enablers choosing to ignore the terrorism and tyranny that have wrecked Palestinian politics.
This custom is common from major publications and pundits. In July the Economist wrote that "the catastrophe befalling Gaza stems from the refusal of Israel to negotiate in good faith." In 2012 Fareed Zakaria wrote in the Washington Post: "Peace between the Palestinians and Israelis will come only when Israel decides that it wants to make peace."
Some professors go further in denying and distorting Palestinian politics. In 1994, when Hamas was already perfecting bus bombings, John Esposito, professor of international affairs and Islamic studies at Georgetown University, assured National Public Radio listeners that Hamas was distinguished by concern for "community social services" and "small business ventures," including honey production, cheese-making and clothing manufacture. The peace activist Judith Butler, who teaches rhetoric and comparative literature at the University of California, Berkeley, told students in 2006 that "understanding Hamas [and] Hezbollah as social movements that are progressive, that are on the left, that are part of a global left, is extremely important."
Diplomats consistently ignore the violent and anti-Semitic statements that Palestinian leaders make to their own people in Arabic, as long as those leaders speak soothingly in English to foreign audiences. Veterans of the "peace process" seek to legitimize Hamas with invitations to the international bargaining table, despite the group's clearly stated mission of eliminating Israel and Jews.Some professors go further in denying and distorting Palestinian politics. In 1994, when Hamas was already perfecting bus bombings, John Esposito, professor of international affairs and Islamic studies at Georgetown University, assured National Public Radio listeners that Hamas was distinguished by concern for "community social services" and "small business ventures," including honey production, cheese-making and clothing manufacture. The peace activist Judith Butler, who teaches rhetoric and comparative literature at the University of California, Berkeley, told students in 2006 that "understanding Hamas [and] Hezbollah as social movements that are progressive, that are on the left, that are part of a global left, is extremely important."
Such Western enablers emphasize many of the genuine tragedies of Palestinian life, but they elide whatever facts contradict their pro-Palestinian articles of faith. They insist that Israel won't compromise and a powerful Israel lobby steers U.S. policy, overlooking that Palestinian leaders rejected Israeli offers of statehood in 2000 and 2008. Their idea of progressivism means admiring the Palestinian "resistance"—and remaining silent about the illiberal horrors facing Palestinian women, religious minorities, gays and political dissidents.
This approach isn't simply a whitewash. Rather it portrays Palestinian leaders in purposefully limited fashion, as victims and pawns forever being acted upon by Israel and other outsiders, and not as decision makers choosing how to act toward Israel and their own people. This denies Palestinians' agency, treating them as if they have no responsibility for tyrannizing other Palestinians or terrorizing Israelis.
There is a term for describing the Middle East in a cartoonishly inaccurate but politically self-serving manner that reduces local populations to passive actors in a morality play meant to reinforce prejudices: "Orientalism." The coinage belongs to the late Columbia professor and pro-Palestinian activist Edward Said, who believed that modern Western commentary on the East was simplistic and racist. "Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Moslem life," he wrote in 1980, "has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world."
So it is today, but not in the way that Said identified. The custom now is a pro-Palestinian neo-Orientalism that glosses over the real conditions of Palestinian life, focusing instead on condemning Israel. Yet the effect of this neo-Orientalism isn't pro-Palestinian. By ignoring the pathologies of Palestinian politics, it condemns Palestinians to live under leaders who would rather impoverish and endanger their own people than compromise with Israel.
Whatever their intent, neo-Orientalists provide cover for a political structure in Palestine that they would never accept for themselves—which is a form of bigotry. Countless articles are written about intricate details of Israeli coalition politics, typically with hand-wringing conclusions about the election of this or that hard-liner. Seldom do you read about Palestinian politics, where hard-liners throw their rivals from rooftops or shoot them in the street. Perhaps journalists consider such savagery the unremarkable fate of Palestinians who aren't entitled to politics as Westerners are. Textbook Orientalism.
Neo-Orientalist thinking treats both Israelis and Palestinians unfairly. A better approach would expose and reject the terrorist thugs claiming the mantle of a nationalist movement that deserves accountability and sobriety from its leaders. Then popular discussion of the Middle East may regain some humane sense of right and wrong—and the Palestinians may finally achieve security, prosperity and statehood.
Mr. Feith is a Journal editorial-page writer based in Hong Kong.
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