An article forwarded by another friend suggesting Shakespeare was correct - There is something rotten in Denmark. (See 2 below.)
Daniel Pipes see the Israeli conflict with the Palestinians as I do and as I have been saying in memo after memo.
When you defeat an enemy you have leverage. Since the world no longer tolerates unabashed victory there can hardly be conflict resolutions. Enemies succumb when they suffer pain and not when they know their chestnuts, however burned, will be prematurely pulled out of the fire.
Second, Palestinians do not accept Israel and until they do Israel is stupid to negotiate its existence.
Obama seems incapable of accomplishing anything substantive short of speech-making and television show appearances seems to be his presidential sine qua non.
Have America's jet set intellectual elitists decided humans, past a certain age, are no better than jetsam and flotsam and like pollution should be disposed of but at least in a sanitary manner so as not to contaminate anything other than our sinking morality.
The mere fact that there is a debate equating ending ones life with the economic cost of prolonging life shows the depth of our moral depravity . Whose next? Cripples! Oh how rude of me. Political correctness demands we refer to these 'worthless beings' as 'physically challenged.' (See 4 and 4a below.)
Flippin and floppin on what Obama, all along, considered the most important war - Afghanistan. Now he seems to have buckled since more and more Americans are beginning to associate him with it.
Fire the damn general who brings bad news.(See 5 below.)
Aluf Benn suggests Obama and Americans have different time schedules and ways of diplomacy and negotiating and that Obama has been true to his word and plan.
ButNahum Barnea believes Obama must be judged according to results and he sees little because 'being cool' ain't enough. You decide. (See 6 and 6a below.)
Propaganda and hypocrisy trump truth in today's environment. Why? Because the U.N. sets the moral tone.
During the McCarthy Era, the 'big lie' became popular. It was created out of thin air and thus was hard to attack and/or deny. It was as if you were fighting with fluff. So it is with the Goldstone Report. (See 7 below.)
Out of his element? (See 8 below.)
Dick
1)It's becoming increasingly clear that the real purpose of Obama's health care program is to create union jobs. These would be government bureaucrats who work in the new "public option" bureaucracy created by Obama and beholden to him and the Democrats. Note that the union reaction to Baucus's "bipartisan" bill is to pan it. First, it leaves out the public option and thus the new bureaucracy. Second, it taxes "gold plated" health plans like the ones that the top unions have. Obama cannot drop the public option because he loses new union jobs and thus union support. Note how Pelosi says she will not accept a bill without the public option. I think this is is not about health care, it is about politics. Surprise!
2)Susan MacAllen is a contributing editor for (Family Security Matters. org) Salute the Danish Flag - it's a Symbol of Western Freedom
By Susan MacAllen
In 1978-9 I was living and studying in Denmark. But in 1978 - even in Copenhagen, one didn't see Muslim immigrants. The Danish population embraced visitors, celebrated the exotic, went out of its way to protect each of its citizens. It was proud of its new brand of socialist liberalism one in development since the conservatives had lost power in 1929 - a system where no worker had to struggle to survive, where one ultimately could count upon the state as in, perhaps, no other western nation at the time.
The rest of Europe saw the Scandinavians as free-thinking, progressive and infinitely generous in their welfare policies. Denmark boasted low crime rates, devotion to the environment, a superior educational system and a history of humanitarianism. Denmark was also most generous in its immigration policies - it offered the best welcome in Europe to the new immigrant: generous welfare payments from first arrival plus additional perks in transportation, housing and education. It was determined to set a world example for inclusiveness and multiculturalism. How could it have predicted that one day in 2005 a series of political cartoons in a newspaper would spark violence that would leave dozens dead in the streets -all because its commitment to multiculturalism would come back to bite? By the 1990's the growing urban Muslim population was obvious - and its unwillingness to integrate into Danish society was obvious.
Years of immigrants had settled into Muslim-exclusive enclaves. As the Muslim leadership became more vocal about what they considered the decadence of Denmark 's liberal way of life, the Danes - once so welcoming - began to feel slighted. Many Danes had begun to see Islam as incompatible with their long-standing values: belief in personal liberty and free speech, in equality for women, in tolerance for other ethnic groups, and a deep pride in Danish heritage and history.
An article by Daniel Pipes and Lars Hedegaard, in which they forecasted, accurately, that the growing immigrant problem in Denmark would explode. In the article they reported: 'Muslim immigrants constitute 5 percent of the population but consume upwards of 40 percent of the welfare spending.'
'Muslims are only 4 percent of Denmark's 5.4 million people but make up a majority of the country's convicted rapists, an especially combustible issue given that practically all the female victims are non-Muslim. Similar, if lesser, disproportions are found in other crimes.' 'Over time, as Muslim immigrants increase in numbers, they wish less to mix with the indigenous population.
A recent survey finds that only 5 percent of young Muslim immigrants would readily marry a Dane.' Forced marriages - promising a newborn daughter in Denmark to a male cousin in the home country, then compelling her to marry him, sometimes on pain of death - are one problem' 'Muslim leaders openly declare their goal of introducing Islamic law once Denmark's Muslim population grows large enough - a not-that-remote prospect. If present trends persist, one sociologist estimates, every third inhabitant of Denmark in 40 years will be Muslim.' It is easy to understand why a growing number of Danes would feel that Muslim immigrants show little respect for Danish values and laws. An example is the phenomenon common to other European countries and Canada: some Muslims in Denmark who opted to leave the Muslim faith have been murdered in the name of Islam, while others hide in fear for their lives. Jews are also threatened and harassed openly by Muslim leaders in Denmark, a country where once Christian citizens worked to smuggle out nearly all of their 7,000 Jews by night to Sweden - before the Nazis could invade. I think of my Danish friend Elsa - who. as a teenager. had dreaded crossing the street to the bakery every morning under the eyes of occupying Nazi soldiers - and I wonder what she would say today.
In 2001, Denmark elected the most conservative government in some 70 years - one that had some decidedly non-generous ideas about liberal unfettered immigration. Today Denmark has the strictest immigration policies in Europe . ( Its effort to protect itself has been met with accusations of 'racism' by liberal media across Europe - even as other governments struggle to right the social problems wrought by years of too-lax immigration...)
If you wish to become Danish, you must attend three years of language classes. You must pass a test on Denmark 's history, culture, and a Danish language test .
You must live in Denmark for 7 years before applying for citizenship.
You must demonstrate an intent to work, and have a job waiting. If you wish to bring a spouse into Denmark , you must both be over 24 years of age, and you won't find it so easy anymore to move you r friends and family to Denmark with you.
You will not be allowed to build a mosque in Copenhagen . Although your children have a choice of some 30 Arabic culture and language schools in Denmark, they will be strongly encouraged to assimilate to Danish society in ways that past immigrants weren't.
In 2006, the Danish minister for employment, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, spoke publicly of the burden of Muslim immigrants on the Danish welfare system, and it was horrifying: the government's welfare committee had calculated that if immigration from Third World countries were blocked, 75 percent of the cuts needed to sustain the huge welfare system in coming decades would be unnecessary. In other words, the welfare system, as it existed, was being exploited by immigrants to the point of eventually bankrupting the government. 'We are simply forced to adopt a new policy on immigration'.
'The calculations of the welfare committee ar e terrifying and show how unsuccessful the integration of immigrants has been up to now,' he said.
A large thorn in the side of Denmark's imams is the Minister of Immigration and Integration, Rikke Hvilshoj. She makes no bones about the new policy toward immigration, 'The number of foreigners coming to the country makes a difference,' Hvilsh says, 'There is an inverse correlation between how many come here and how well we can receive the foreigners that come.' And on Muslim immigrants needing to demonstrate a willingness to blend in, 'In my view, Denmark should be a country with room for different cultures and religions. Some values, however, are more important than others. We refuse to question democracy, equal rights, and freedom of speech.'
Hvilshoj has paid a price for her show of backbone. Perhaps to test her resolve, the leading radical imam in Denmark, Ahmed Abdel Rahman Abu Laban, demanded that the government pay blood money to the family of a Muslim who was murdered in a suburb of Copenhagen, stating that the family'sA 0 thirst for revenge could be thwarted for money. When Hvilshoj dismissed his demand, he argued that in Muslim culture the payment of retribution money was common, to which Hvilshoj replied that what is done in a Muslim country is not necessarily what is done in Denmark.
The Muslim reply came soon after: her house was torched while she, her husband and children slept. All managed to escape unharmed, but she and her family were moved to a secret location and she and other ministers were assigned bodyguards for the first time - in a country where such murderous violence was once so scarce. Her government has slid to the right, and her borders have tightened. Many believe that what happens in the next decade will determine whether Denmark survives as a bastion of good living, humane thinking and social responsibility, or whether it becomes a nation at civil war with supporters of Sharia law.
3)Peace Process or War Process?
by Daniel
When Barack Obama announced in June 2009 about Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, "I'm confident that if we stick with it, having started early, that we can make some serious progress this year," he displayed a touching, if naïve optimism.
Indeed, his determination fits a well-established pattern of determination by politicians to "solve" the Arab-Israeli conflict; there were fourteen U.S. government initiatives just during the two George W. Bush administrations. Might this time be different? Will trying harder or being more clever end the conflict?
No, there is no chance whatever of this effort working.
Without looking at the specifics of the Obama approach — which are in themselves problematic — I shall argue three points: that past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have failed; that their failure resulted from an Israeli illusion about avoiding war; and that Washington should urge Jerusalem to forego negotiations and return instead to its earlier and more successful policy of fighting for victory.
Without looking at the specifics of the Obama approach — which are in themselves problematic — I shall argue three points: that past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have failed; that their failure resulted from an Israeli illusion about avoiding war; and that Washington should urge Jerusalem to forego negotiations and return instead to its earlier and more successful policy of fighting for victory.
I. Reviewing the "Peace Process"
The two hands of September 1993, when Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat shook hands with President Clinton watching.
It is embarrassing to recall the elation and expectations that accompanied the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993 when Israel's prime minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands on the White House lawn with Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader. For some years afterward, "The Handshake" (as it was then capitalized) served as the symbol of brilliant diplomacy, whereby each side achieved what it most wanted: dignity and autonomy for the Palestinians, recognition and security for the Israelis.
President Bill Clinton hosted the ceremony and lauded the deal as a "great occasion of history." Secretary of State Warren Christopher concluded that "the impossible is within our reach." Yasir Arafat called the signing an "historic event, inaugurating a new epoch." Israel's foreign minister Shimon Peres said one could see in it "the outline of peace in the Middle East."
President Bill Clinton hosted the ceremony and lauded the deal as a "great occasion of history." Secretary of State Warren Christopher concluded that "the impossible is within our reach." Yasir Arafat called the signing an "historic event, inaugurating a new epoch." Israel's foreign minister Shimon Peres said one could see in it "the outline of peace in the Middle East."
The press displayed similar expectations. Anthony Lewis, a New York Times columnist, deemed the agreement "stunning" and "ingeniously built." Time magazine made Arafat and Rabin two of its "men of the year" for 1993. To cap it off, Arafat, Rabin, and Peres jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize for 1994.
As the accords led to a deterioration of conditions for Palestinians and Israelis, rather than the expected improvement, these heady anticipations quickly dissipated.
When Palestinians still lived under Israeli control, pre-Oslo accords, they had benefited from the rule of law and a growing economy, independent of international welfare. They enjoyed functioning schools and hospitals; they traveled without checkpoints and had free access to Israeli territory. They even founded several universities. Terrorism declined as acceptance of Israel increased. Oslo then brought Palestinians not peace and prosperity, but tyranny, failed institutions, poverty, corruption, a death cult, suicide factories, and Islamist radicalization. Yasir Arafat had promised to build his new dominion into a Middle Eastern Singapore, but the reality he ruled became a nightmare of dependence, inhumanity, and loathing, more akin to Liberia or the Congo.
The two hands of October 2000, when a young Palestinian showed off his bloody hands after lynching two Israeli reservists.
As for Israelis, they watched as Palestinian rage spiraled upward, inflicting unprecedented violence on them; the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that more Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorists in the five years after the Oslo accords than in the fifteen years preceding it. If the two hands in the Rabin-Arafat handshake symbolized Oslo's early hopes, the two bloody hands of a young Palestinian male who had just lynched Israeli reservists in Ramallah in October 2000 represented its dismal end. In addition, Oslo did great damage to Israel's standing internationally, resurrecting questions about the very existence of a sovereign Jewish state, especially on the Left, and spawning moral perversions such as the U.N. World Conference against Racism in Durban. From Israel's perspective, the seven years of Oslo diplomacy, 1993-2000, largely undid forty-five years of success in warfare.
Palestinians and Israelis agree on little, but with a near universality they concur that the Oslo accords failed. What is called the "peace process" should rather be called the "war process."
II. The False Hope of Finessing War
Why did things go so badly wrong? Where lay the flaws in so promising an agreement.
Yitzhak Rabin's understanding that "One does not make peace with one's friends. One makes peace with one's enemy" led Arab-Israeli diplomacy fundamentally astray.
Of a multiplicity of errors, the ultimate mistake lay in Yitzhak Rabin's misunderstanding of how war ends, as revealed by his catch-phrase, "One does not make peace with one's friends. One makes peace with one's enemy." The Israeli prime minister expected war to be concluded through goodwill, conciliation, mediation, flexibility, restraint, generosity, and compromise, topped off with signatures on official documents. In this spirit, his government and those of his three successors — Shimon Peres, Binyamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak — initiated an array of concessions, hoping and expecting the Palestinians to reciprocate.
They did not. In fact, Israeli concessions inflamed Palestinian hostility. Palestinians interpreted Israeli efforts to "make peace" as signals of demoralization and weakness. "Painful concessions" reduced the Palestinian awe of Israel, made the Jewish state appear vulnerable, and incited irredentist dreams of annihilation. Each Oslo-negotiated gesture by Israel further exhilarated, radicalized, and mobilized the Palestinian body politic to war. The quiet hope of 1993 to eliminate Israel gained traction, becoming a deafening demand by 2000. Venomous speech and violent actions soared. Polls and votes in recent years suggest that a mere 20 percent of Palestinians accept the existence of a Jewish state.
Rabin's mistake was simple and profound: One cannot "make peace with one's enemy," as he imagined. Rather, one makes peace with one's former enemy. Peace nearly always requires one side in a conflict to be defeated and thus give up its goals.
Wars end not through goodwill but through victory. "Let your great object [in war] be victory" observed Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist. "War is an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfill our will," wrote his nineteenth-century Prussian successor, Karl von Clausewitz in 1832. Douglas MacArthur observed in 1951 that in "war, there is no substitute for victory."
Technological advancement has not altered this insight. Fighting either continues or potentially can resume so long as both sides hope to achieve their war goals. Victory consists of imposing one's will on the enemy, compelling him to give up his war ambitions. Wars typically end when one side gives up hope, when its will to fight has been crushed.
Defeat, one might think, usually follows on devastating battlefield losses, as was the case of the Axis in 1945. But that has rarely occurred during the past sixty years. Battlefield losses by the Arab states to Israel in 1948-82, by North Korea in 1953, by Saddam Hussein in 1991, and by Iraqi Sunnis in 2003 did not translate into despair and surrender. Morale and will matter more these days. Although they out-manned and out-gunned their foes, the French gave up in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Cold War ended, notably, with barely a fatality. Crushing the enemy's will to fight, then, does not necessarily mean crushing the enemy.
Arabs and Israelis since 1948 have pursued static and opposite goals: Arabs fought to eliminate Israel; Israelis fought to win their neighbors' acceptance. Details have varied over the decades with multiple ideologies, strategies, and leading actors, but the twin goals have remained in place and unbridgeable. If the conflict is to end, one side must lose and one side win. Either there will be no more Zionist state or it will be accepted by its neighbors. Those are the only two scenarios for ending the conflict. Anything else is unstable and a premise for further warfare.
The Arabs have pursued their war aims with patience, determination, and purpose; the exceptions to this pattern (e.g., the Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties) have been operationally insignificant because they have not tamped hostility to Israel's existence. In response, Israelis sustained a formidable record of strategic vision and tactical brilliance in the period 1948-93. Over time, however, as Israel developed into a wealthy country, its populace grew impatient with the humiliating, slow, boring, bitter, and expensive task of convincing Arabs to accept their political existence. By now, few in Israel still see victory as the goal; almost no major political figure on the scene today calls for victory in war. Uzi Landau, currently minister of national infrastructure, who argues that "when you're in a war you want to win the war," is the rare exception.
The Hard Work of Winning
In place of victory, Israelis developed an imaginative array of approaches to manage the conflict:
Territorial compromise: Yitzhak Rabin (and the Oslo process).
Develop the Palestinian economy: Shimon Peres (and the Oslo process).
Unilateralism (build a wall, withdraw from Gaza): Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and the Kadima party.
Lease the land under Israeli towns on the West Bank for 99 years: Amir Peretz and the Labor Party.
Encourage the Palestinians to develop good government: Natan Sharansky (and George W. Bush).
Territorial retreat: Israel's Left.
Exclude disloyal Palestinians from Israeli citizenship: Avigdor Lieberman.
Offer Jordan as Palestine: elements of Israel's Right.
Offer Jordan as Palestine: elements of Israel's Right.
Expel Palestinians from lands controlled by Israel: Meir Kahane.
Contradictory in spirit and mutually exclusive as they are, these approaches all aim to finesse war rather than win it. Not one of them addresses the need to break the Palestinian will to fight. Just as the Oslo negotiations failed, I predict that so too will every Israeli scheme that avoids the hard work of winning.
Ehud Olmert speaking for the Israel Policy Forum in June 2005, where he announced that Israelis "are tired of fighting, we are tired of being courageous, we are tired of winning, we are tired of defeating our enemies."
Since 1993, in brief, the Arabs have sought victory while Israelis sought compromise. In this spirit, Israelis openly announced their fatigue with warfare. Shortly before becoming prime minister, Ehud Olmert said on behalf of his countrymen: "We are tired of fighting; we are tired of being courageous; we are tired of winning; we are tired of defeating our enemies." After becoming prime minister, Olmert proclaimed: "Peace is achieved through concessions. We all know that." Such defeatist statements prompted Yoram Hazony of the Shalem Center to characterize Israelis as "an exhausted people, confused and without direction."
But who does not win, loses. To survive, Israelis eventually must return to their pre-1993 policy of establishing that Israel is strong, tough, and permanent. That is achieved through deterrence — the tedious task of convincing Palestinians and others that the Jewish state will endure and that dreams of elimination must fail.
But who does not win, loses. To survive, Israelis eventually must return to their pre-1993 policy of establishing that Israel is strong, tough, and permanent. That is achieved through deterrence — the tedious task of convincing Palestinians and others that the Jewish state will endure and that dreams of elimination must fail.
This will not be easy or quick. Due to missteps during the Oslo years and after (especially the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza of 2005 and the Lebanon war of 2006), Palestinians perceive Israel as economically and militarily strong but morally and politically weak. In the pungent words of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Israel is "weaker than a spider's web." Such scorn will likely require decades of hard work to reverse. Nor will it be pretty: Defeat in war typically entails that the loser experience deprivation, failure, and despair.
Israel does enjoy one piece of good fortune: It need only deter the Palestinians, not the whole Arab and Muslim populations. Moroccans, Iranians, Malaysians, and others take their cues from the Palestinians and with time will follow their lead. Israel's ultimate enemy, the one whose will it needs to crush, is roughly the same demographic size as itself.
This process may be seen through a simple prism. Any development that encourages Palestinians to think they can eliminate Israel is negative, any that encourages them to give up that goal is positive.
The Palestinians' defeat will be recognizable when, over a protracted period and with complete consistency, they prove that they have accepted Israel. This does not mean loving Zion, but it does mean permanently accepting it — overhauling the educational system to take out the demonization of Jews and Israel, telling the truth about Jewish ties to Jerusalem, and accepting normal commercial, cultural, and human relations with Israelis.
Palestinian démarches and letters to the editor are acceptable but violence is not. The quiet that follows must be consistent and enduring. Symbolically, one can conclude that Palestinians have accepted Israel and the war is over when Jews living in Hebron (on the West Bank) have no more need for security than Arabs living in Nazareth (in Israel).
III. U.S. Policy
Like all outsiders to the conflict, Americans face a stark choice: Endorse the Palestinian goal of eliminating Israel or endorse Israel's goal of winning its neighbors' acceptance.
To state the choice makes clear that there is no choice — the first is barbaric, the second civilized. No decent person can endorse the Palestinians' genocidal goal of eliminating their neighbor. Following every president since Harry S Truman, and every congressional resolution and vote since then, the U.S. government must stand with Israel in its drive to win acceptance.
Not only is this an obvious moral choice, but Israel's win, ironically, would be the best thing that ever happened to the Palestinians. Compelling them finally to give up on their irredentist dream would liberate them to focus on their own polity, economy, society, and culture. Palestinians need to experience the crucible of defeat to become a normal people — one whose parents stop celebrating their children becoming suicide terrorists, whose obsession with Zionist rejectionism collapses. There is no shortcut.
This analysis implies a radically different approach for the U.S. government from the current one. On the negative side, it puts Palestinians on notice that benefits will flow to them only after they prove their acceptance of Israel. Until then — no diplomacy, no discussion of final status, no recognition as a state, and certainly no financial aid or weapons.
On the positive side, the U. S. administration should work with Israel, the Arab states, and others to induce the Palestinians to accept Israel's existence by convincing them that they have lost. This means impressing on the Israeli government the need not just to defend itself but to take steps to demonstrate to Palestinians the hopelessness of their cause. That requires not episodic shows of force (such as the 2008-09 war against Hamas in Gaza) but a sustained and systematic effort to deflate a bellicose mentality.
Israel's victory also directly helps its U.S. ally, for some of its enemies — Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran — are also America's. Tougher Israeli tactics would help Washington in smaller ways, too. Washington should encourage Jerusalem not to engage in prisoner exchanges with terrorist groups, not to allow Hezbollah to re-arm in southern Lebanon or Fatah or Hamas in Gaza, and not to withdraw unilaterally from the West Bank (which would effectively turn over the region to Hamas terrorists and threaten Hashemite rule in Jordan).
Diplomacy aiming to shut down the Arab-Israeli conflict is premature until Palestinians give up their anti-Zionism. When that happy moment arrives, negotiations can re-open and take up anew the Oslo issues — borders, resources, armaments, sanctities, residential rights. But that is years or decades away. In the meantime, an ally needs to win.
A virulent moral blindness has seized hold of a substantial slice of America's educated elite. Convinced they know better, they argue for a shallow, illogical, and horrifying vision of people as disposable.I was wrong last week when I declared that Newsweek's cover showing a baby next to a headline declaring that we're all born racist was evidence that the mainstream media had hit bottom and destroyed itself. It was intellectual arrogance on my part that led me to underestimate the determination of Newsweek's editors to find new deeper bottoms to hit.
This week's Newsweek cover exceeds the sheer breathtaking ugliness of last week's cover: "The Case for Killing Granny." Alongside a photo of an electrical plug. The cover story is penned by Evan Thomas, (Andover, Harvard, Virginia Law), currently teaching at Princeton, alongside Peter Singer, who believes newborn infants can be killed because they lack "rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness" and thus don't qualify for personhood.
There is also an opinion piece declaring that America's "character" is less than the "character" of those countries that have government-provided ("universal") health care. It's by Washington Post columnist T.R. Reid (classics, Princeton, who coincidentally is the author of a new book pushing for "fairer" health care).
A third "thumb-sucker" piece titled "I Was a Teenage Death Panelist" (yuk, yuk) argues that we all need to be "more comfortable" with death. It also attacks "right-wing opponents" of ObamaCare for the "lie" that ObamaCare will include "death panels." The author Jon Meacham, Newsweek's editor (summa cum laude, English, University of the South), doesn't explain why that is a "lie," and is content to only say that the idea of death panels arose from the "sensible and humane" idea that families should discuss end-of-life options.
The central idea behind each of these three pieces is that we spend too much money on people during their last six months of life. We all should be more willing to die, say these writers. And, we should all be more willing to "let" other people die (by withholding medical treatment, water, food, air, etc.) Newsweek seeks to make us more comfortable with the idea of killing our parents and grandparents. The ObamaCare deal they want us buy is that only if more old people die, will there be better medical treatment for everyone else. That is, you and me.
It's a sucker's deal. Because not only will more "old" people die with ObamaCare, but more of everyone else will die too. Because the quality of care for everyone will deteriorate for a long list of behavioral and economic reasons. Clearly, all of us would be at the end-of-life way station much, much earlier in life if we didn't get medical care we need. The same is as true for a person over 65 as it is for a person who is 25 -- only more so. Not just rationing for Granny and Gramps, but rationing for Mommy and Daddy and Dick and Jane, too.
The dishonesty of the we-spend-too-much-money-on-the-last-six-months crowd is a result of their inability to think clearly. In the course of their elite educations, they came to think of themselves as a lot smarter than they really are. They mistake verbal and written analytical skills with wisdom. Surrounding themselves with like-minded people, they don't question their own choice of perspectives and premises.
Consider the 65-year-old individual who needs an expensive medicine. If the government decides that a person over 65 shouldn't get that medicine, then almost every one of those people are in their last six months of life.
If, however, they get that medicine, their lives may be extended another 10 years.
Consider the 65-year-old individual who needs an expensive medicine. If the government decides that a person over 65 shouldn't get that medicine, then almost every one of those people are in their last six months of life.
If, however, they get that medicine, their lives may be extended another 10 years.
Which category do we count such people in?
T. R. Reid, while saying that the US is morally inferior to countries with socialized medicine, doesn't get around to postulating what it says about the "character" of those countries deprive older citizens of life-extending medicines and treatments.
I'll take a crack at it, though. I think that we (society, you, me, us) owe the oldest among us the most. The world we live in, our affluence, our civil rights, our drugs and life-extending technology, all exist because of their work. The America that we (and the entire world) benefit from would not exist but for the work and sacrifices of those people over 65, over 75, over 85.
All the medicines and all the health care technology that we have we owe to them. They already "bought" them by making their discovery and invention possible.
What kind of country would we be if we withheld the fruits of their labors so we can have them all for ourselves?
I am nauseated by the arrogance and moral blindness I see on display here. When elites start regarding certain classes of people an inconvenience worth eliminating, a terrifying slippery slope is in prospect.
4a)Death talk for seniors
First, the bad news. For the first time since 1975, Social Security recipients are being told they won't be receiving an annual cost of living increase in their monthly benefits. At the same time, their Medicare premiums will go up, so monthly checks will actually shrink next year. Not to worry, though. Here's the good news. Seniors may not have to live on such meager funds for long because the government is going to help them plan how they want to die.
This benevolent plan is in Section 1233 (p. 424) of the health care reform bill known as "America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009" (HR 3200). It didn't just show up on the doorstep of health care reform, but was packaged and delivered by Compassion & Choices (C & C), the assisted-suicide advocacy group previously known as the Hemlock Society.
Under Section 1233, a doctor would be paid for having an "advance care planning consultation" with a patient. The consultation wouldn't be mandatory, at least for now. But if the doctor wants to get paid for it, the consultation's contents are very specifically prescribed. For example, each consultation "shall include" an explanation of legal documents such as living wills and durable powers of attorney, and information about the "continuum of end-of-life services." Patients need not be ill but, because they are over a certain age, their doctors will suggest that it's time to talk about death.
So, if George, a healthy 70-year-old marathon runner, goes to the doctor because of tendonitis, his doctor will have the all-important discussion with him, reminding him that he's not getting any younger and that it's time to decide how he'll die. Sure, George may or may not be adversely affected by this. But consider Clara, an 84-year-old widow who needs a hip replacement. If the doctor tells her that the government health plan won't pay for her surgery but will pay for pain pills, and then tells her it's really time to discuss her end-of-life options, what message is she getting? Isn't it likely that Clara will acquiesce, if her doctor suggests that she "choose" to forgo treatment for any future illnesses so she won't be a burden on her family?
To hear proponents of Section 1233 talk about it, one would think that people have no access now to information about advance directives. But for years, federal law has required that patients be provided with general information about advance directives.
In 1992, Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act. It requires every health care organization receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds to do the following: at the time of admission, provide a written summary of a patient's rights under state law to make health care decisions, including the right to have an advance directive; ask all adults entering for treatment whether they have an existing advance directive; and document the existence of an advance directive in the patient's medical record.
Cheerleaders for more advance care planning claim that physicians won't tell their patients about options regarding available treatments and the right to accept or reject them unless they receive reimbursement for doing so. But physicians already have a responsibility to provide that information to patients so they can give or withhold consent to available treatments. This is known as informed consent.
Yet there are calls for more details about end-of-life planning. Perhaps those who are advocating this are unaware that, beginning in 2009, doctors have been required to discuss end-of-life planning, including advance directives, with all Medicare patients at their initial "Welcome to Medicare" physical exam.
With all of these current requirements, isn't paying doctors to have another talk with grandma just a bit of, shall we say, overkill? Is foisting yet another death planning chat with her really necessary? And what would be part of the compulsory "end-of-life continuum" discussion?
In most states that continuum would culminate in such services as palliative care and hospice. However, in Oregon and Washington the continuum extends to the provision of a prescription for a lethal dose of drugs under those states' "Death with Dignity" laws. This should be of concern to all.The background of Section 1233 sheds some light on its inclusion in the health care reform bill.
In most states that continuum would culminate in such services as palliative care and hospice. However, in Oregon and Washington the continuum extends to the provision of a prescription for a lethal dose of drugs under those states' "Death with Dignity" laws. This should be of concern to all.The background of Section 1233 sheds some light on its inclusion in the health care reform bill.
According to C & C's newsletter, the organization has worked long and hard for such language, which is "part of a great advance in end-of-life care, building upon several years of thoughtful and strategic groundwork." C & C proudly acknowledges its leadership role in placing Section 1233 in the bill: "Compassion & Choices and its supporters have worked tirelessly with supportive members of Congress to include in proposed reform legislation a provision requiring Medicare to cover patient consultation with their doctors about end-of-life choice (section 1233 of House Bill 3200)." And it plans to continue leading the charge:
"As Congress debates health insurance reform, Compassion & Choices is leading the charge to make end-of-life choice a centerpiece of any program that emerges. We are working hard to reach our goal to make end-of-life choice a centerpiece of national health insurance reform."
C & C has worked hand in hand with Oregon Congressman Earl Blumenauer who it describes as a "long-time supporter of individual choice." Indeed, Blumenauer has been an outspoken supporter of Oregon's assisted-suicide law, the "Death with Dignity Act." During a floor speech in 1998, he stated:
C & C has worked hand in hand with Oregon Congressman Earl Blumenauer who it describes as a "long-time supporter of individual choice." Indeed, Blumenauer has been an outspoken supporter of Oregon's assisted-suicide law, the "Death with Dignity Act." During a floor speech in 1998, he stated:
"In Oregon, our legislation, Death with Dignity, is still a work in progress, but the fact is the preliminary evidence suggests that this option may actually reduce the incidence of violent suicide while easing the burden on both the individual and their family....
"As we age as a society, exponentially, with the increase of the elderly population, and just the growth in our population, this will become more serious....The evidence suggests that Americans support the principles of Death with Dignity."
In a 2004 press release, he applauded a court ruling that upheld the assisted-suicide law. "This is a great victory for the people of Oregon who decided not once, but twice that people should have the right to make personal end-of-life decisions without federal interference," he said. (Blumenauer seems to ignore the fact that, also in 2004, he said the government shouldn't meddle in personal end-of-life decisions. Yet, now he's attempting to dictate the content of communication between patients and their doctors.)
He continued, "Every day people across the country struggle with these end-of-life decisions but Oregon is the only state that has protections and safeguards in place." (Note that he, like other assisted-suicide activists, refers to assisted suicide as an "end-of-life decision.")
Blumenauer's "end-of-life" terminology is part and parcel of Section 1233. Clearly expressing his ownership of the section, he described an incident that took place when he was presiding over House proceedings. Writing about Section 1233 in the Huffington Post, Blumenauer stated, "Actually, I know a little bit about this section because it's a bill that I wrote which was incorporated into the overall legislation."
His earlier incorporated bill is HR 2911, called the "Advance Planning and Compassionate Care Act." In fact, a portion of that bill, (Sec. 211, p. 50) makes up almost the entirety of Section 1233.
Although Blumenauer and other defenders of Section 1233 vociferously deny that it could have anything to do with assisted suicide, his earlier bill acknowledged that assisted suicide would be included in such consultations. Since federal law currently prohibits federal funding from being used for "items and services" related to assisted suicide,
Blumenauer inserted language into HR 2911 (Sec. 111, p. 19) stating that advance care planning "shall not be construed to violate the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997." That exception did not make its way into HR 3200, probably because any reference to assisted suicide would raise red flags. Also, not contained in HR 3200 is a provision from Blumenauer's earlier bill (Sec. 121, p. 31) to "encourage providers to discuss advance care planning with their patients of all ages."
Blumenauer is not the only lawmaker to propose advance care planning consultations. Senator Mark Warner (D-VA) introduced a similar bill, curiously called the "Senior Navigation and Planning Act of 2009" (SB 1251). Warner told Medical Futility that he submitted the legislation because Congress is considering health care reform and he would like to see some of his ideas incorporated into that legislation. His bill (Sec. 6, p. 14) would force doctors to provide information on advance directives and other end-of-life planning tools in "a form and manner, and at a time, determined to be appropriate by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]." The consequence for not doing so would be severe. No payment would be made to physicians for any items and services furnished after January 1, 2014, unless they agreed (under a process established by the Secretary) to provide individuals with information on advance directives and other end-of-life planning tools.
Technically, a patient would not be forced to have an advance care planning consultation. However, physicians would be unlikely to treat them unless they agreed to do so since doctors who didn't provide the end-of-life talk would not be paid for any other services.
Could coercion like this be avoided by deleting the advance care planning consultation from HR 3200? Clearly, the answer is "No." If a particular intervention is not mentioned in HR 3200, it can easily be reinserted when the details of covered benefits are determined by one of the myriad of committees that would be charged with formulating the particulars through the rule-making process. In the final analysis, any "benefit" that is not explicitly prohibited in a health care reform bill could become a covered benefit.
Would the actual provision of assisted-suicide drugs be covered? That would certainly be cost effective, since dead patients don't consume Medicare dollars. But coverage of the actual lethal prescription wouldn't be necessary. As Oregon's suicidal approach to health care has demonstrated, a government health plan could deny wanted and needed treatment and then suggest assisted suicide as an alternative. Initially, an organization like C & C could pay for the oh-so-inexpensive lethal prescription.
Such assistance by C & C would undoubtedly be touted as compassionate, would advance the organization's agenda and could, eventually, lead to the repeal of the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act. C & C has many powerful friends on Capitol Hill, including Senator Dianne Feinstein (D -CA). Feinstein, who is the honorary co-chair for a November 5 fund-raiser for C & C, is on record endorsing a failed proposal for an Oregon-style assisted-suicide law in California. So it is not beyond the realm of possibility that, if HR 3200 passes, assisted suicide could eventually be an included benefit in any qualified health benefit program.
However, passage of the bill is far from assured, thanks to seniors across the country. They have read Section 1233. They are making it clear that they want no part of government-designed death talk. They are savvy. They are informed. They are not angry mobs. They are intelligent citizens who have been expressing their strong opinions. For now, they are successfully fending off the soft smothering cushion of deadly governmental paternalism. But they cannot stop now.
Only by continuing to speak up and speak out will seniors be spared the subtle and not so subtle pressure to die and get out of the way.
Rita L. Marker is an attorney and executive director of the International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide.
Rita L. Marker is an attorney and executive director of the International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide.
5)US Afghanistan commander demands extra US troops to save Afghan mission
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the Afghanistan war, leaked to the US media, that without extra troops within the next year on top of the 66,000 already fighting there, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in mission failure."
The White House confirmed Monday, Sept. 21 that the president has seen the general's report but has not received a formal request for more forces.
In the 66-page assessment he sent to defense secretary Robert Gates on Aug. 30, Gen. McChrystal said emphatically: "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) - while Afghan security capacity matures - risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."
Therefore, according to Washington sources, if President Barack Obama fails to approve the manpower increment and revised tactics the general is demanding, he might as well start working on an early withdrawal strategy and accept the curtailment of the conflict dubbed "Obama's War" to distinguish it from "Bush's War" in Iraq.
The general, who took over his command two months ago, lists half a dozen reasons for his blunt assessment:
1. The insurgents control a significant portion of the country. Our sources report a Taliban presence in central, eastern and northern Afghanistan.
2. Increased strength alone will not defeat the Taliban. Both American and other countries need to reassess their war strategy, misconceived from the 2001 invasion. NATO forces should spend as "little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases." They need to focus on engaging and destroying to Taliban to ensure the Afghanistan population feels safe and secure.
3. "Muddled NATO tactics" and corruption in high places in Kabul leave Afghans "reluctant to align with us against the insurgents."
4. Corruption has spread to the Afghan army and other security forces ranks. There is a crisis of confidence among Afghans, both in their government and the international community, which "undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents."
5. US and its NATO partners "do not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, powerbrokers and criminals all combine to affect the Afghan population," says the US general.
His central conclusion is that failure to add troops "…risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs and, ultimately, a critical loss of political support."
Already now, about 58 percent of Americans oppose the Afghan war compared with 38 percent who support it - a trend reflected in Obama's Democratic Party and some Republicans. The McChrystal report was leaked on the day Italy laid six soldiers killed in Afghanistan to rest, prompting Rome's decision to withdraw the Italian contingent from Afghanistan as soon as possible.
In the UK, support for the war has declined steeply.
Obama faces two hard options: Boost the US military in Afghanistan by tens of thousands of additional US troops, or else engage the Taliban insurgents in negotiations for a timetable for NATO forces to exit the country.
Obama faces two hard options: Boost the US military in Afghanistan by tens of thousands of additional US troops, or else engage the Taliban insurgents in negotiations for a timetable for NATO forces to exit the country.
The second course presents the major hazards of Kabul's reversion to Taliban rule coupled with an assault on the stability of the Pakistani government. They would combined to generate a slump in US positions in Southwest Asia.
Secondly, the US military's withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq in the same 2010-2013 timeframe - during which Iran will follow North Korea in acquiring nuclear weapons - will look to the Middle East and Europe like the crackup of US positions in key world arenas.
President Obama might dodge both dim prospects, according to military experts, by pulling US troops out of Afghanistan while keeping them close: A ring of US special bases would be installed in neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, or Kyrgyzstan, poised for rapid in-and-out strikes against any strongholds al Qaeda might rebuild in Afghanistan under the wing of a radical Kabul regime.
6) Aluf Benn / Israel should learn from U.S. how to pace diplomacy
By Aluf Benn
By Aluf Benn
Most Israelis like the United States, but cannot connect to the American character.
Here we improvise and don't wait in line - there friends arrange to meet far in advance and read the instruction manual before operating electrical appliances.
So too in diplomacy. In Israel war is declared after a two-hour debate, and daring peace plans are concocted without deliberations or consultations. In America months are devoted to preparing every diplomatic or military move. The tripartite summit meeting to be convened in New York Tuesday by U.S. President Barack Obama with his Israeli and Palestinian counterparts underscores the discrepancies between the mentalities of Jerusalem and Washington.
Israelis expected (some hopefully and others fearfully) that Obama would reveal a peace plan, and push Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas into working out the nitty-gritty.
When it became clear these expectations were overblown, they were replaced by dismissal, and so-called "officials in Jerusalem" belittled the three-party summit as an unnecessary event.
But Americans work at a different pace than Israelis. Obama didn't promise to present a quick solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He promised he would be more involved than George W. Bush, and work toward reviving the peace process.
Making good
Obama has thus far made good on his promises: He appointed George Mitchell special envoy to the Mideast, and Tuesday will meet with leaders on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide for the first time since Netanyahu returned to power.
Neither Netanyahu nor Abbas will be overawed by what Obama says, but they also won't be able to refuse him.
The time that has passed before the summit was not wasted, but was used to improve conditions in the West Bank, remove checkpoints and bolster security coordination between the Israel Defense Forces, the Shin Bet security service and Palestinian security services.
Obama's diplomatic timetable is different from those of Netanyahu or Abbas.
The U.S. president's term is confined to four years, at the end of which he may be reelected.
He is not dependent on a coalition in which the majority of members oppose diplomatic steps, as is Netanyahu, or in legalistic tricks keeping him in power after his term has ended, as is Abbas.
That leaves Obama time to work determinedly, yet gradually.
This is also Mitchell's style: another meeting, another discussion, another preparation, all aimed primarily at building trust and bringing both sides closer to the bigger decisions to be made later.
The Americans absorbed the barbs traded between Israel and the Palestinians on missed opportunities and the failure of the peace process, and simply continued in their work.
That's why we must view the New York summit as a step which could lead to renewed negotiations, and not as a dramatic event that will determine once and for all whether peace will ever come.
6a)Joke at Obama’s expense: Abbas-Netanyahu summit meeting in New York a meaningless photo op
This isn’t a meeting; not even half a meeting. The session to take place in New York Tuesday is a joke at the expense of an American president who tried to get involved in Mideast politics and was stung.
Over the weekend, some of the best minds in Washington were preoccupied with the question of who’s responsible for the screw-up; is it the president and his people or special envoy George Mitchell? Yet one thing remained undisputed: The end result.
Barack Obama is a promising president; there’s no doubt about that. The question that hangs above him is whether he is also a president who delivers on what he promised. The trouble in our region can be used as a fable reflecting the other troubles maligning his administration.
At the outset of his term in office, Obama promised that resolving the Mideastern conflict will be one of his major targets during his tenure. Within two years, the Israelis and Palestinians will finalize an agreement, with other Muslim countries joining the peace celebration. A special envoy was appointed – an esteemed and experienced man – the right speeches were delivered, the proper messages were conveyed, and now all that was left was to get the show on the road.
Just like with the sad story about Uzi Dayan’s father, who screamed “follow me” in the army and only later discovered that he is running alone, Obama’s “follow me” was also not endorsed by others.
It started with Obama’s visit to Saudi Arabia. He asked King Abdullah to order modest trust-building gestures that would accompany the resumption of talks between Israel and Abbas. The Saudis refused. They said they will not do anything before Israel withdraws from the entire territories.
Their refusal made it more difficult to convince oil sheikdoms and other Arab states. The gestures lost their significance: Israel’s public opinion nay have been willing to pay a price in exchange for ties with Saudi Arabia, but an interest office in Qatar doesn’t get it excited.
Being cool isn’t enough
It continued with the futile effort to force Netanyahu to commit to an absolute construction freeze in the settlements. The demand for a freeze was logical: It was meant to make it easier for Abbas and his colleagues in the Arab world. The moment Mitchell entered detailed negotiations regarding what will be built and what will not be built, he got stuck in a dead-end.
Netanyahu could not appear to be capitulating; meanwhile, Abbas could not appear to reconcile himself to continued construction. These were the chronicles of a failure foretold.
In the absence of a deal on opening positions and continuation scenarios, the meeting will be no more than a photo opportunity. It does not even mark the beginning of the beginning of a process.
The Americans discovered that they want an Israeli-Palestinian agreement more than the leaders of both sides desire one. This is the tragedy of both peoples: Both Netanyahu and Obama prefer to make do with what’s available now, rather than taking a risk with decisions that will exact a heavy political price. None of them is a Ben-Gurion, or a Begin, or a Rabin.
When an American president encounters such wall, he faces two possibilities: Either distancing himself from the source of trouble (that’s what President Bush did throughout most of his term in office) or attempting to force his view (this is what Carter did and what Clinton tried to do.)
Obama chose neither option A nor option B. He could have let Netanyahu and the Arab rulers, including Abbas, sweat. Everyone depends on America, its money, its military aid, and its moves vis-à-vis Iran. Yet instead of letting them sweat, the one sweating was Mitchell.
Obama also did not attempt to force his views. He read the polls that show the drastic decline in Israelis’ and American Jews’ trust in him. He could have addressed Israel’s public opinion above Netanyahu’s head. Repeated discussions about it were held at the White House, but no decision was taken.
Israelis, who for 16 years were pampered by loving presidents in the White House, did not get from Obama the love they became addicted to. Yes, he conveyed his well-wishes on the occasion of Rosh Hashana. But he also sent similar well-wishes to the Iranians.
He is cool. His coolness, his self control, and his sense of comfort in any environment hold great charm. Yet the US president is not Brad Pitt or George Clooney. He’s supposed to bring results.
Over the weekend, some of the best minds in Washington were preoccupied with the question of who’s responsible for the screw-up; is it the president and his people or special envoy George Mitchell? Yet one thing remained undisputed: The end result.
Barack Obama is a promising president; there’s no doubt about that. The question that hangs above him is whether he is also a president who delivers on what he promised. The trouble in our region can be used as a fable reflecting the other troubles maligning his administration.
At the outset of his term in office, Obama promised that resolving the Mideastern conflict will be one of his major targets during his tenure. Within two years, the Israelis and Palestinians will finalize an agreement, with other Muslim countries joining the peace celebration. A special envoy was appointed – an esteemed and experienced man – the right speeches were delivered, the proper messages were conveyed, and now all that was left was to get the show on the road.
Just like with the sad story about Uzi Dayan’s father, who screamed “follow me” in the army and only later discovered that he is running alone, Obama’s “follow me” was also not endorsed by others.
It started with Obama’s visit to Saudi Arabia. He asked King Abdullah to order modest trust-building gestures that would accompany the resumption of talks between Israel and Abbas. The Saudis refused. They said they will not do anything before Israel withdraws from the entire territories.
Their refusal made it more difficult to convince oil sheikdoms and other Arab states. The gestures lost their significance: Israel’s public opinion nay have been willing to pay a price in exchange for ties with Saudi Arabia, but an interest office in Qatar doesn’t get it excited.
Being cool isn’t enough
It continued with the futile effort to force Netanyahu to commit to an absolute construction freeze in the settlements. The demand for a freeze was logical: It was meant to make it easier for Abbas and his colleagues in the Arab world. The moment Mitchell entered detailed negotiations regarding what will be built and what will not be built, he got stuck in a dead-end.
Netanyahu could not appear to be capitulating; meanwhile, Abbas could not appear to reconcile himself to continued construction. These were the chronicles of a failure foretold.
In the absence of a deal on opening positions and continuation scenarios, the meeting will be no more than a photo opportunity. It does not even mark the beginning of the beginning of a process.
The Americans discovered that they want an Israeli-Palestinian agreement more than the leaders of both sides desire one. This is the tragedy of both peoples: Both Netanyahu and Obama prefer to make do with what’s available now, rather than taking a risk with decisions that will exact a heavy political price. None of them is a Ben-Gurion, or a Begin, or a Rabin.
When an American president encounters such wall, he faces two possibilities: Either distancing himself from the source of trouble (that’s what President Bush did throughout most of his term in office) or attempting to force his view (this is what Carter did and what Clinton tried to do.)
Obama chose neither option A nor option B. He could have let Netanyahu and the Arab rulers, including Abbas, sweat. Everyone depends on America, its money, its military aid, and its moves vis-à-vis Iran. Yet instead of letting them sweat, the one sweating was Mitchell.
Obama also did not attempt to force his views. He read the polls that show the drastic decline in Israelis’ and American Jews’ trust in him. He could have addressed Israel’s public opinion above Netanyahu’s head. Repeated discussions about it were held at the White House, but no decision was taken.
Israelis, who for 16 years were pampered by loving presidents in the White House, did not get from Obama the love they became addicted to. Yes, he conveyed his well-wishes on the occasion of Rosh Hashana. But he also sent similar well-wishes to the Iranians.
He is cool. His coolness, his self control, and his sense of comfort in any environment hold great charm. Yet the US president is not Brad Pitt or George Clooney. He’s supposed to bring results.
7)Analysis: Blocking the truth behind the Gaza war
By JONATHAN D. HALEVI
By JONATHAN D. HALEVI
On September 15, 2009, the UN investigating commission known as the Goldstone Commission published its conclusions regarding Israel's Gaza operation (December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009), accusing Israel of violating both international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions, and committing war crimes.
In response, the Israel Foreign Ministry issued an official statement accusing the commission of bias and one-sidedness, and of ignoring the thousands of Hamas rocket attacks on Israeli civilians which, Israel claimed, made the military operation an absolute necessity. "The one-sided mandate of the Gaza Fact-Finding Mission, and the resolution that established it, gave serious reasons for concern.... At the same time the report all but ignores the deliberate strategy of Hamas of operating within and behind the civilian population and turning densely populated areas into an arena of battle," said the ministry.
Was the UN commission's approach one-sided against Israel, or unbiased and objective as commission chairman Richard Goldstone contended?
The commission never asked about Palestinian war crimes
The commission never asked about Palestinian war crimes
Statements of Palestinians recorded by the commission and posted on the UN Web site provide reliable evidence of the commission's methodology and raise serious questions about its intentions to discover the truth. Commission members did not ask the interviewed Palestinians questions about the activities of Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip which could be classified as war crimes or that were potentially dangerous to innocent Palestinians. They never asked about:
1. Launching rockets at Israeli towns and villages from within residential dwellings.
2. Firing mortar shells into Palestinian neighborhoods when IDF soldiers were operating in or near the area.
3. Firing anti-tank missiles, rifles and machine guns at Palestinian buildings in Gaza suspected of having been entered by the IDF despite the presence of Palestinian civilians in the area.
4. Seizing private homes from which to ambush IDF units.
5. Booby-trapping houses before and during the war and detonating the bombs.
6. Planting various types of anti-personnel and improvised anti-vehicular bombs near houses and detonating them;
7. Sniping and firing heavy machine guns at Israeli soldiers within residential areas.
None of the statements taken by the commission (as posted on the UN Web site) reported even a single instance of the presence of armed Palestinians, or of Palestinians firing rockets at Israel or shooting at IDF soldiers operating in the Gaza Strip.
There was no serious consideration of Palestinian "friendly fire" incidents, which occur with the most disciplined armies. We can only guess how many Palestinian civilians were killed or wounded by Palestinian fire. In fact, the statements reported that throughout the entire three weeks of fighting there was no significant Palestinian resistance.
The commission did not press the witnesses in order to elicit more information and did not confront them with the reports issued by the terrorist organizations themselves, which detailed the fighting in a way that often contradicted the Palestinian witnesses. It did not adequately examine Palestinian rules of engagement - or the lack of any such rules. In addition, the witnesses hid vital information from the commission regarding the presence of armed terrorists or exchanges of fire in their vicinity, casting doubt on their reliability.
On June 28 and 29, 2009, the Goldstone Commission recorded Palestinian statements at the UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City, and posted the questions and answers on the commission's website. The following is an analysis of the four main statements, the way the commission interpreted them, and reports from other Palestinian sources which contradict the testimony presented to the commission:
Statements from the Silawi family
Three members of the Silawi family were interviewed by the commission: Moussa al-Silawi (91, blind), Sabah al-Silawi (Moussa's wife) and Mouteeh al-Silawi, a Hamas official.
The most detailed statement was that of Mouteeh al-Silawi, deputy director of the Hamas administration's Muslim Religious Endowments Ministry for the northern Gaza Strip, who said he was giving a sermon when the mosque was attacked on January 3.
He claimed that there was no military activity in the Ibrahim al-Maqadma Mosque or around it during the attack. Worshipers came to the mosque seeking a safe haven on the assumption that it was a secure place. The evening and night prayers were said one after another to prevent unnecessary movement of worshipers outside the mosque. Israel committed a war crime in violation of international law by attacking civilians in a mosque, the witness said.
The commission members did not ask about armed men in the mosque, whether it was used for military purposes or incited worshipers to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. They did not ask if there were weapons in the mosque, if armed men were operating near the mosque, whether Hamas and its Izzadin Kassam Brigades controlled the mosque and used it to recruit operatives, or the identity of the casualties and their organizational affiliation (including members of the Silawi family).
An examination of freely accessible Palestinian sources shows that the casualties in this incident were terrorists and included members of the Silawi family, who were represented to the commission as innocent civilians. Among them: Ibrahim Moussa Issa al-Silawi; Omar Abd al-Hafez Moussa al-Silawi; Sayid Salah Sayid Batah; Ahmed Hamad Hassan Abu Ita; Muhamad Ibrahim al-Tanani; Rajah Nahad Rajah Ziyyada and Ahmed Assad Diyab Tabil.
Statement of Muhammad Fuoad Abu Askar
Muhammad Fuoad Abu Askar represented himself to the commission as the director-general of Hamas's Ministry of Muslim Religious Endowments. He said he had been detained in Israel in 1992 for belonging to Hamas.
He told the commission that his house was "unjustly" blown up by the IDF. He said he had received a telephone call warning him to evacuate the house from someone who identified himself as an IDF representative and that 20 minutes later his house was struck from the air.
Askar said a short time later the area around the Fakhura school was also bombed. The school served as a shelter for many Palestinians from Beit Lahiya, al-Salatin and al-Atatra, who regarded it as a safe haven because it was located in the middle of the refugee camp and it was flying the UNRWA flag. He said he saw three bombs hit the school region and he heard more. Two hit the house of the Diyab family, killing 11 people. Dozens of people were killed near the school and most of the casualties were children, Abu Askar said. There were no armed men in the area, as opposed to Israeli claims, he said. Two of his children, Khaled and Imad, were killed, as was his bother Raafat, all of them, according to Askar, innocent civilians.
Although Muhammad Fuoad Abu Askar admitted being a Hamas operative and having been detained by Israel, the commission did not think to ask whether he was connected with Izzadin Kassam. They did not ask him whether those killed near the school belonged to any organization or were military-terrorist operatives.
An examination of freely accessible Palestinian sources shows that contrary to his claims, he and his sons were directly and closely linked to Izzadin Kassam, a connection that included providing terrorists with weapons and ammunition, and that there were a number of terrorists in the Fakhura school area, including Mohammad Fuoad Abu Askar himself and Khaled Mohammed Fuoad Abu Askar, Mohammad's son. Another son, Ahmed, was killed on July 7, 2006, when he tried to launch an anti-tank missile at an IDF unit, and yet another son Osama was critically wounded fighting the IDF on October 13, 2004.
Others terrorist operatives killed in the same Fakhura school incident included: Bilal Hamzah Obeid, an Izzadin Kassam operative; Raafat Abu Askar, a military-terrorist operative in the security services with the rank of warrant officer; Osama Jemal Obeid, an Izzadin Kassam operative; Iyad Jaber Aman, an Izzadin Kassam operative; Abd Muhammad Abd Qudas, a Fatah operative active in Palestinian Military Intelligence; and Atia Hassan al-Madhoun and his son, Ziyad al-Madhoun, operatives in the Brigades of National Resistance, the military-terrorist wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Statements of Wail and Salah al-Samouni
Wail and Salah al-Samouni described the shelling of Wail's house, where the extended Samouni family had sought shelter and where more than 20 people were killed.
They told the commission: At about 5:30 a.m. on January 5, Wail left the house with other men to bring wood for a fire. As soon as they left the house a helicopter filed a missile at them and then a number of missiles at the house. After the house was hit the wounded proceeded toward Salah a-Din Street and were refused medical attention by IDF soldiers. Salah claimed that the soldiers fired shots over their heads to frighten them and make them leave more quickly. They said there was no activity of armed Palestinians around the house. Salah al-Samouni said that "everyone is a farmer, I swear to Allah that everyone is a farmer," and rejected the possibility that they were armed or wanted.
The commission did not ask about the identity of the dead Palestinians and about the possibility that some of them were terrorists. It did not challenge their claim that there were no armed Palestinians in the area, despite reports by both Palestinian terrorist organizations and the IDF about exchanges of fire in the area.
In addition, the commission did not press the witness about his claim that the soldiers did not provide medical attention, in contradiction of a statement given by a female member of the family who told the NGO B'Tselem that the soldiers had given them medical aid.
An examination of freely accessible Palestinian sources shows that Wail and Salah al-Samouni hid important details from the commission that could shed light on the event. An examination of their statements and the statements of other members of the Samouni family to human rights organizations and published in Palestinian newspapers raises questions as to the veracity of their version of what actually happened on January 5.
Members of the family repeatedly claimed that all the people in the house were ordinary civilians. However, at least three were affiliated with Islamic Jihad. Meisa al-Samouni did not tell B'Tselem that her husband, Tawfiq Rashad Hilmi al-Samouni, who was killed on January 5, was an Islamic Jihad terrorist. She and the other members of the extended family, including Wail and Salah (who gave statements to the Goldstone Commission), never mentioned or hinted that other family members in the house at the time were Islamic Jihad operatives, among them Muhammad Ibrahim Hilmi al-Samouni and Walid Rahad Hilmi al-Samouni. A Islamic Jihad flyer noted that Muhammad and Walid al-Samouni were active in fighting against the IDF in the Zeitun neighborhood.
Members of the family repeatedly claimed that all the people in the house were ordinary civilians. However, at least three were affiliated with Islamic Jihad. Meisa al-Samouni did not tell B'Tselem that her husband, Tawfiq Rashad Hilmi al-Samouni, who was killed on January 5, was an Islamic Jihad terrorist. She and the other members of the extended family, including Wail and Salah (who gave statements to the Goldstone Commission), never mentioned or hinted that other family members in the house at the time were Islamic Jihad operatives, among them Muhammad Ibrahim Hilmi al-Samouni and Walid Rahad Hilmi al-Samouni. A Islamic Jihad flyer noted that Muhammad and Walid al-Samouni were active in fighting against the IDF in the Zeitun neighborhood.
An Islamic Jihad poster commemorating Muhammad Ibrahim al-Samouni is captioned: "He [Muhammad], along with the mujaheed Walid Rashad al-Samouni, blew up the tank, causing the deaths of a number of Zionists, as admitted by the enemy, on the first night of the ground invasion during the war south of the Zeitun neighborhood."
Statement of Khaled Muhammad Abd Rabbo
Statement of Khaled Muhammad Abd Rabbo
Khaled Abd Rabbo reported on the deaths of two of his children on January 7, 2009. Khaled lives in Jabalya, in a four-story house. He and his family did not leave it even when the ground fighting began, he said. He claimed he saw no activity of armed Palestinians in the area.
He said that on January 7 an IDF unit entered the area around his house and positioned tanks nearby. The soldiers used a megaphone to call the residents out of the house. They came out holding a white flag, and one of the soldiers got out of a tank and shot at his children for no reason. He said two of his daughters were killed, another was seriously wounded, and his wife was also wounded.
No questions were asked by the members of the commission, not about the events, or whether there was fighting in the area, or whether there were armed Palestinians.
Contrary to the claims made by Khaled Abd Rabbo, Palestinian sources reported on armed Palestinian activity in the area near the incident and on exchanges of fire between Palestinians and the IDF.
At the time Khaled claimed his daughters were shot by IDF soldiers, four other Palestinians were killed nearby: Ibrahim Abd al-Rahim Suleiman, 19, an Izzadin Kassam operative; Shadi Issam Hamad, 33, a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine operative; Muhammad Ali al-Sultan, 55, an Izzadin Kassam operative; and Ahmad Adib Faraj Juneid, 26, another Izzadin Kassam operative.
An Izzadin Kassam report reveals information about the exchange of fire between the IDF and armed Palestinians in the area where Khaled Abu Rabbo's daughters were killed, and its closeness in time to the events he reported. His version and the Izzadin Kassam Web site provided similar descriptions of the advance of IDF armored vehicles into the area at the same time.
However, Abu Rabbo did not tell the UN commission about the exchanges of fire between IDF and Izzadin Kassam. The possibility cannot be ruled out that his children were caught in the crossfire and may have been killed by Palestinians.
AS WE can see from a detailed analysis of freely accessible Palestinian sources (in Arabic), competing explanations exist that counter the claims of the Palestinians who testified before the Goldstone Commission. At the same time, questioning by the members of the commission proved to be superficial and was ill-suited to elicit the truth about events in Gaza.
Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi is the research director for the Orient Research Group and a research fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Halevi previously served as a senior adviser for political planning in the Foreign Ministry and as head of the data and information branch in the IDF Spokesperson's Unit. This article is an edited version of a Jerusalem Issues Brief for the JCPA, written in conjunction with the Global Law Forum sponsored by the Legacy Heritage Fund.
8)President Barack Obama is beginning to look out of his depth
By Edward Lucas
By Edward Lucas
It is lovely to feature in other people's dreams. The problem comes when they wake up. Barack Obama is an eloquent, brainy and likeable man with a fascinating biography. He is not George Bush. Those are great qualities. But they are not enough to lead America, let alone the world.
Admittedly, the presidential to-do list is terrifying. The economy requires his full-time attention. So does health-care reform. And climate change. Indeed, he deserves praise for spending so much time on thankless foreign policy issues. He is tackling all the big problems: restarting Middle East peace talks, defanging Iran and North Korea and a "reset" of relations with Russia. But none of them are working.
Regimes in Moscow, Pyongyang and Tehran simply pocket his concessions and carry on as before. The picture emerging from the White House is a disturbing one, of timidity, clumsiness and short-term calculation. Some say he is the weakest president since Jimmy Carter.
Admittedly, the presidential to-do list is terrifying. The economy requires his full-time attention. So does health-care reform. And climate change. Indeed, he deserves praise for spending so much time on thankless foreign policy issues. He is tackling all the big problems: restarting Middle East peace talks, defanging Iran and North Korea and a "reset" of relations with Russia. But none of them are working.
Regimes in Moscow, Pyongyang and Tehran simply pocket his concessions and carry on as before. The picture emerging from the White House is a disturbing one, of timidity, clumsiness and short-term calculation. Some say he is the weakest president since Jimmy Carter.
The grizzled veterans of the Democratic leadership in Congress have found Mr Obama and his team of bright young advisers a pushover. That has gravely weakened his flagship domestic campaign, for health-care reform, which fails to address the greatest weakness of the American system: its inflated costs. His free trade credentials are increasingly tarnished too. His latest blunder is imposing tariffs on tyre imports from China, in the hope of gaining a little more union support for health care. But at a time when America's leadership in global economic matters has never been more vital, that is a dreadful move, hugely undermining its ability to stop other countries engaging in a ruinous spiral of protectionism.
Even good moves are ruined by bad presentation. Changing Mr Bush's costly and untried missile-defence scheme for something workable was sensible. But offensively casual treatment of east European allies such as Poland made it easy for his critics to portray it as naïve appeasement of the regime in Moscow.
Mr Obama's public image rests increasingly heavily on his extraordinary speechifying abilities. His call in Cairo for a new start in relations with the Muslim world was pitch-perfect. So was his speech in Ghana, decrying Africa's culture of bad government. His appeal to both houses of Congress to support health care was masterly – though the oratory was far more impressive than the mish-mash plan behind it. This morning he is blitzing the airwaves, giving interviews to all America's main television stations.
But for what? Mr Obama has tactics a plenty - calm and patient engagement with unpleasant regimes, finding common interests, appealing to shared values - but where is the strategy? What, exactly, did "Change you can believe in" – the hallmark slogan of his campaign – actually mean?
But for what? Mr Obama has tactics a plenty - calm and patient engagement with unpleasant regimes, finding common interests, appealing to shared values - but where is the strategy? What, exactly, did "Change you can believe in" – the hallmark slogan of his campaign – actually mean?
The President's domestic critics who accuse him of being the sinister wielder of a socialist master-plan are wide of the mark. The man who has run nothing more demanding than the Harvard Law Review is beginning to look out of his depth in the world's top job. His credibility is seeping away, and it will require concrete achievements rather than more soaring oratory to recover it.
Edward Lucas writes for The Economist and is the author of The New Cold War (Bloomsbury, £8.99)
