Wednesday, July 18, 2007

Does Confusion reign? Can Political Parties function?

Friedman discusses the NIE Report, the seeming confusion regarding the make-up of al Qaeda and other matters pertaining to Iran, withdrawal and the general threat from terrorists.

One of GW's problem of waning U.S. support against his efforts to combat terrorism is that he has been successful in protecting our own nation from harm. When the wolf leaves the door for a long period those inside feel safe and drop their guard. An attack on this nation would have two consequences:

a) It would put Democrats in a terrible position.

b) The media would attack GW for being unprepared. (See 1 and 3 below.)

An investment manager recites history and gives a warning but acknowledges he has been wrong near term as I have as well. (See 2 below).

Has GW had the rug pulled out from him before his new initiative regarding Abbas and Fatah even begun? (See 4 and 9 below.)

New flap reaches Livni over handling of matters regarding Lebanese War. Olmert cannot avoid the fallout either. (See 5 and 8 below.)

Benziman writes Olmert's obituary. (See 6 below.)

Is Hamas about to be blamed for the consequences of its actions in Gaza as the economy nears collapse? (See 7 below.)

Daniel Pipes discusses the Red Mosque Rebellion. (See 8 below.)

In future memos I hope to address the nature of our current political party structure and what impact the internet may be having as Congress, under the Democrats, continues to implode.

Michael Oren maintains Bush has not wavered in terms of his demands upon both Israel and the Palestinians.. (See 9 below.)

Dick



1) Week out of Focus: Washington, Iraq and Al Qaeda
By George Friedman

Last week, the United States focused on the state of the war -- not just the one in Iraq, but the broader war against al Qaeda. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released asserting that al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in Pakistan and is either at or near its previous capabilities. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said his gut told him there is an increased risk of an al Qaeda attack in the United States this summer. President George W. Bush said at a press conference that the July 15 status report on Iraq would show that progress is being made in the war. When the report actually was released, it revealed a somewhat more pessimistic picture in some areas. Meanwhile, the Republican Party was showing signs of internal strain over the war, while the Democrats were unable to formulate their own collective position. So, it was a week in which everyone focused on the war, but not one that made a whole lot of sense -- at least on the surface.

In some ways, the most startling assertion made was that al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in Pakistan. What is startling is that it appears to acknowledge that the primary U.S. mission in the war -- the destruction of al Qaeda -- not only has failed to achieve its goal, but also has done little more than force al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan. Chertoff's statement that there is a high threat of an attack this summer merely reinforces the idea that the administration is conceding the failure of its covert war against al Qaeda.

This is not an impossible idea. A recent book by Pulitzer Prize-winning author Tim Weiner, "Legacy of Ashes," provides an extraordinary chronicle of the CIA's progressive inability to carry out its mission. So the NIE claim might well have been an admission of failure. But it was an odd admission and was not couched as a failure.

What made this odd is that the administration is not known to concede failure lightly. During the same week, it continued to assert the more dubious proposition that it is making progress in Iraq. Why, therefore, was it releasing such pessimistic reports on al Qaeda, and why was Chertoff saying his gut tells him an attack this summer is possible? Why make the best-case scenario for Iraq and the worst-case scenario for al Qaeda?

There is nothing absurd about a gut call in intelligence, and much of the ridicule of Chertoff was absurd. Intelligence analysis -- particularly good intelligence analysis -- depends on gut calls. Analysts live in a world of incomplete and shifting intelligence, compelled to reach conclusions under the pressure of time and events. Intuition of experienced and gifted analysts is the bridge between leaving decision-makers without an analysis and providing the best guess available. The issue, as always, is how good the gut is.

We would assume that Chertoff was keying off of two things: the NIE's assertion that al Qaeda is back and the attacks possibly linked to al Qaeda in the United Kingdom. His gut told him that increased capabilities in Pakistan, coupled with what he saw in England and Scotland, would likely indicate a threat to the United States.

One question needs to be asked: What should be made of the NIE report and the events in the United Kingdom? It also is necessary to evaluate not only Chertoff's gut but also the gut intuitions of U.S. intelligence collectively. The NIE call is the most perplexing, partly because the day it appeared Stratfor issued a report downplaying al Qaeda's threat. But part of that could well be semantics. Precisely what do we mean when we say al Qaeda?

When U.S. forces talk about al Qaeda, they talk about large training camps that move thousands of trainees through them. Those are not the people we talk about when we discuss al Qaeda. The people who go through the camps generally are relatively uneducated young men being trained as paramilitaries. They learn to shoot. They learn to devise simple explosives. They learn infantry tactics. They are called al Qaeda but they are more like Taliban fighters. They are not trained in the covert arts of moving to the United States, surviving without detection while being trained in flying airliners, and then carrying out complex missions effectively. They are al Qaeda in name and, inside Afghanistan or Pakistan, they might be able to do well in a firefight, but they are nothing like the men who struck on 9/11, nor are they trained to be. When the U.S. government speaks about thousands of al Qaeda fighters, the vision is that the camps are filled with these thousands of men with the skill level of the 9/11 attackers. It is a scary vision, which the administration has pushed since 9/11, but it isn't true. These guys are local troops for the endless wars of the region.

When we think of al Qaeda, we think of the tiny group of skilled operatives who gathered around Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef in the 1990s. That group was capable of planning attacks across continents, moving money and men around the world -- and doing so without being detected. Those people have been the target of U.S. intelligence. The goal has been to capture, kill or bottle up those men in inaccessible places in order to prevent another attack like 9/11 or worse.

If the NIE report meant to say this group has reconstituted itself, it would be startling news. One of the ways this group survived is that it did not recruit new members directly into the core organization. One of the ways Palestinian terrorist organizations have been destroyed is by allowing new personnel into the core. This allowed intelligence agencies to vector agents into the core, map them out and destroy them. Al Qaeda was not going to make the same mistake, so it was extremely reluctant to expand. This has limited its operations. It could not replace losses and therefore weakened as it was assaulted. But it did protect itself from penetration, which is why capturing surviving leaders has been so difficult.

If the NIE report is true, then the NIE is saying al Qaeda not only has been recruiting members into the core group, but also that it has been doing so for some time. If that is true then there have been excellent opportunities to penetrate and destroy what is left of it. But we don't think that is true, because al-Zawahiri and others, possibly bin Laden, are still on the loose. Therefore, we think the NIE is saying that the broad paramilitaries are active again and are now located in Pakistan.

Strange Week in Washington

Alternatively, the NIE is saying that a parallel covert group has been created in Pakistan, is using al Qaeda's name and is mounting new attacks. The attacks in the United Kingdom might have been part of its efforts, though they are an example of why we have always argued that terrorism is technically much more difficult to carry out than it might seem. Those attacks were botched from beginning to end. Unlike strikes by al Qaeda prime -- the core group -- these attacks, if they represent an effort by a new al Qaeda, should be a comfort. It was the gang that couldn't shoot straight operating globally. If Chertoff's gut is speaking about a secondary group in Pakistan carrying out attacks similar to those in the United Kingdom, then certainly there is cause for concern, but nothing like the concern that should be felt if al Qaeda prime is active again. But then we don't think it can be, unless it has recruited new members. And if it has been recruiting new members and U.S. intelligence hasn't slipped someone inside during the process, then that would be not only a shame but also the admission of a major intelligence fiasco. We don't think that is what the NIE is discussing. It is a warning that a group calling itself al Qaeda is operating in Pakistan. That can be called a revived al Qaeda, but only if one is careless with terminology.

It should also be remembered that the United States is placing heavy pressure on the Pakistanis. A report leaked early last week by the New York Times confirmed what Stratfor said as early as January 2004, that a major incursion into northwestern Pakistan had been planned by the United States but was called off at the last minute over fear of destabilizing President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Or, more precisely, it was called off after Musharraf promised to carry out the operation himself. He did so, but ineffectively and half-heartedly, so that al Qaeda prime was not rooted out.

By leaking the report of the planned incursion, the United States was reminding Musharraf of his guarantee. By issuing the NIE report, it was increasing pressure on Musharraf to do something decisive about militant Islamists in Pakistan -- or the United States would have to do something. Already heavily pressured by domestic forces, Musharraf ordered the raid on the Red Mosque last week, demonstrating his commitment to contain radical Islamism in Pakistan and root out al Qaeda -- or at least that part of al Qaeda that is not part of the isolated primary group. Between the implicit threat of invasion and the explicit report that Pakistan is the center of a new al Qaeda, Pakistan got the message. Whether Islamabad will be able to act on it is another question.

So the NIE report was meant to pressure Pakistan, even if it looked like an admission of the total failure of the intelligence community's mission. Chertoff's warning of attacks this summer was partly an attempt to warn that there might be attacks like those that happened in the United Kingdom -- to which the answer is that one can only hope that they would be exactly like those. Even had they been successful, they would not have risen to the level of 9/11 or even close. And they failed.

The fact is that, in a simple empirical sense, the one thing that has been successful in this war is that there has not been a single follow-on attack to 9/11 in the United States. The reason might be because al Qaeda either doesn't want to attack or lacks the resources. Another answer might be that it has been stopped by effective U.S. counterterrorism activities. This is a subject that needs analysis. In our view, it is the latter. But the simple fact is that the one mission achieved by the administration is that no attacks have occurred.

There have been numerous warnings of potential attacks. Such warnings are always interesting. They imply that the United States has sufficient intelligence to know that attacks are being planned but insufficient intelligence to block them. The usual basis of these warnings is an attack elsewhere. The second is access to a fragmentary bit of intelligence, human or electronic, indicating in a nonspecific way that an attack is possible. But such warnings usually are untrue because an effective terrorist group does not leak information. That is its primary defense. So chatter about attacks rarely indicates a serious one is imminent. Or, and this happens, a potential attack was aborted by the announcement and by increased security. We have no idea what Chertoff saw to lead him to make his announcement. But the fact is that there have been no attacks in six years -- and should there be a strategic attack now, it would represent not a continuation of the war but a new phase.

All of this neatly intersected with Bush's discussion of Iraq. He does not want to withdraw or announce a time line for withdrawal. His reason should be that a withdrawal from Iraq would open the door to Iranian domination of Iraq and a revolution in the geopolitics of the Arabian Peninsula. Bush has not stated that, but it is the best reason to oppose a withdrawal. Not announcing a timetable for withdrawal also makes sense because it would be tantamount to announcing a withdrawal. It tells Iran to simply sit tight and that, in due course, good things will come to it.

The primary U.S. hope for a solution to Iraq is an understanding with Iran. The administration both hates the idea and needs it. A withdrawal would make any such understanding unnecessary from the Iranian point of view and end any chance that Iran will reach an agreement. In our view, Iran appears to have decided not to continue the negotiating process it began precisely because it thinks the United States is leaving anyway. Therefore, Bush must try to convince the Iranians that this isn't so.

Bush has not given a straightforward justification for his concerns from the beginning, and he is not starting now, although the thought of an Iran-dominated Iraq should give anyone pause. But in arguing that the war in Iraq is a war against al Qaeda, and that al Qaeda is getting stronger, he justifies the continuation of the war. In fact, Bush explicitly said that the people who attacked the United States on 9/11 are the same ones bombing American troops in Iraq today. Therefore, the NIE report and Chertoff's warning of attacks are part of the administration's effort to build support for continuing the fight.

Bush's problem is that the idea that Iraq is linked to al Qaeda rests on semantic confusion -- many things are called al Qaeda, but they are different things. Something called al Qaeda is in Iraq, but it has little to do with the al Qaeda that attacked the United States on 9/11. They share little but the name.

U.S. policy on Iraq and the war is at a turning point. There would normally be a focusing down to core strategic issues, such as a withdrawal's consequences for the strategic balance of power. That not only is not happening, but Bush, for whom this is the strongest argument against withdrawing, also seems incapable of making the argument. As a result, the week saw an almost incoherent series of reports from the administration that, if examined carefully, amounted to saying that if you think the war in Iraq is going badly, you should take a look at the war against al Qaeda -- that is a total failure.

We simply don't think that is true. Of course, you can never prove a negative, and you cannot possibly prove there will be no more attacks against the United States by the original al Qaeda. Also, you can claim anything you want on a gut call and if it doesn't happen, people forget.

The intellectual chaos is intensifying -- and with it, the casualties on the ground.

2)This week's was an especially
good read. He spelled out a little market history comparing the current state of the market to past, similar periods:

* December 1961 (followed by 28% market loss over 6 months)

* January 1973 (followed by a 48% collapse over the following 20
months)

* August 1987 (followed by a 34% plunge over the following 3 months)

* July 1998 (followed abruptly by an 18% loss over the following 3
months)

* July 1999 (followed by a 12% loss over the following 3 months)

* December 1999 (followed by a 9% loss over the following 2 months)

* March 2000 (followed by a 49% collapse in the S&P over the following
30
months)

According to Hussman those periods all share the following with today:

* The price/peak-earnings multiple is above 18.

* The S&P 500 index (on a weekly closing basis), is at a 4-year high.

* The S&P 500 is 8% or more above its 52-week moving average
(exponential).


* Treasury and corporate bond yields are rising.

Hussman is quick to point out that he is not trying to make a prediction but
it trying to create a context for current market events.

This is an important distinction. The market can go in any direction, at any
time, for any reason, or no reason, at all. The general tone of Hussman's
article ties in with what he has been writing for a while, but the bullet
points sum it up nicely.

Clearly these sorts of obstacles can exist for a long, long time without
hurting the market. This is an argument for not making big bets to get out
of the market for fear of a correction, bear market, crash or whatever else.
I continue to be bearish (have been for a while and have been incorrect),
but am so without missing the market. My trigger point for taking action is
simple (a breach of the 200 DMA by the S&P 500), and this has not been
violated, so I ride along skeptically thinking a turn will come soon.

Bear markets come so infrequently that guessing about the next one in a
meaningful way is likely to be the wrong trade. Hussman creates a great
background of what stocks must continue to overcome in order to go higher.
The things Hussman cites, perhaps subprime, the dollar, or even something
else will cause the next bear market at some point, but time devoted to
trying to nail the top is probably not productive.

3)Juval Aviv - was Golda Meir's bodyguard and she appointed him to track down and bring to justice.

Palestinian terrorists who took the Israeli athletes hostage and

killed them during the Munich Olympic Games. Aviv recently shared

information EVERY American needs to know but our government has

not shared His bio is below, his book is "Staying Safe."



Juval Aviv allegedly gave intelligence (via what he had gathered in Israel and

the Middle East ) to the Bush Administration about 9/11 a month before

it occured His report specifically said they would use planes as

bombs and target high profile buildings and monuments. Again allegedly the

Administration ridiculed him and refused to respond (Congress has

since hired him as a security consultant - but still the

Administration does not listen to him).



Aviv didn't agree with going into Iraq - said it didn't make sense if

we wanted terrorists responsible for 9/11 (and also he believes in Golda

Meir's approach which was to bring justice to the terrorists but do

not take down civilians - killing civilians only creates more

terrorists - but similar to Bush , Israel 's subsequent leaders were

not as insightful as Golda Meir) - however, when we did decide to

invade Iraq we should have learned from Israel 's past mistakes. He

very articulately stated that Israel 's greatest mistake against their

war on terror was to invade the West Bank and Gaza and stay there...

He said they should have done the proven anti-terrorist strategy

which was "Hit and Leave" instead of "Hit and Stay." Now we are

stuck in Iraq and it is worse than Vietnam - Iraq is the U.S. 's West Bank /

Gaza . He doesn't think we will ever be able to truly leave because

even when we are able to pull our troops back we will still have to

go back regularly which will keep us quagmired. We should have hit hard

and left immediately - or actually, we shouldn't have gone in at

all...



He predicts the next attack on the U.S. is coming within the next few months. Forget

hijacking airplanes because he says terrorists will NEVER try and hijack a plane

again as the people on the plane will not go down quietly.

Aviv believes our airport security is a joke- we are being

reactionary versus looking at strategies that are effective.

1) our machines are outdated. They look for metal and the new

explosives are made of plastic

2) He talks about how some idiot tried to light his shoe on fire -

we now have to take off our shoes, a group of idiots tried to bring

aboard liquid explosives - now we can't bring liquids on board. He

is waiting for some suicidal maniac to pour liquid explosive on their

underwear and light up in a plane or in the terminal and then we will

all have to travel naked!

3) We only focus on security when people are heading to the gates, he

says that if a terrorist attack targets airports in the future, they

will target busy times and on the front end when people are checking

in. It would be easy for someone to take two suitcases of

explosives, walk up to a busy check-in line, ask a person next to them to watch

their bags for a minute while they run to the restroom or get a

drink (and I have done that for people myself) and then detonate the bags

BEFORE security even gets involved. Israel checks bags before people

can enter the airport.



He says the next attack will come in

the next few months and will involve suicide bombers and non-suicide

bombers in places that people congregate: Disneyland, Las Vegas , Big

Cities (NY, SF, Chicago , etc...) and there it will be shopping

malls, subways in rush hour, train stations, casinos, etc.. as well as rural

America ( Wyoming , Montana , etc...). The attack will be simultaneous

detonations around the country (they like big impact) 5-8 cities

including rural areas. They won't need to use suicide bombers

because at largely populated places like the MGM Grand in Vegas - they can

simply valet park!



He says this is well known in intelligence circles but our government

does not want to alarm Americans. However, he also said that Bush

will attack Iran and Syria before he leaves office (we are being

prepared for that! and I have to wonder if we are not hearing about

this impending attack so America will support attacking Iran and

Syria ?). In addition, since we don't have enough troops Bush will

likely use small, strategic nuclear weapons regardless that the

headlines the next day will read "US Nukes Islamic World" and the

world will be a different place to such an extent that global warming

will be irrevelant.



These are not conspiracy theories or crazy rantings. This is the man

(and we have all heard/read that the Bush Administration was warned

about 9/11 prior to it happening) who did the warning. He travels

regularly to the Middle East and he knows his stuff.

On a good note - he says we don't have to worry about being nuked -

he says the terrorists who want to destroy America will not use

sophisticated weapons - they like suicide as the frontline approach.

He also says the next level of terrorists will not be coming from

abroad, but will be homegrown - having attended our schools and

universities - but will have traveled frequently back and forth to

the Middle East . They will know and understand Americans but we

won't understand them - we still only have a handful of Arabic and Farsi

speaking people in our intelligence networks and we need that to

change he said...What can we do? From an intelligence perspective he says the U.S.

needs to stop relying on satellites and technology for intelligence

but follow Israel , Ireland and England 's example of human

intelligence both from an infiltration perspective as well as trust citizens to

help. We need to engage and educate ourselves as citizens but our

government treats us like babies and thinks we can't handle it and

will panic.



He did a test for Congress recently putting an empty briefcase in 5

major spots in 5 US cities and not one person called 911 or sought a

policeman to check it out. In fact, in Chicago - someone tried to

steal it! In Israel an unattended bag or package would be reported

in seconds with a citizen shouting "Unattended Bag" and the area cleared

slowly, calmly and immediately by the people themselves.

Unfortunately, we haven't hurt enough yet for us to be that

concerned....



He also discussed how many children were in preschool and

kindergarten after 9/11 without parents to pick them up and the schools did not

have a plan. Do you have a plan with your kids, schools and families

if you cannot reach each other by phone? If you cannot return to

your house? If you cannot get to your child's school - do they know what

to do? We should all have a plan.



He said that our government's plan after the next attack is to

immediately cut-off EVERYONE's abiltity to use their telephone, cell

phone, blackberry because they don't want terrorists to be able to

talk to one another - do you have a plan if you cannot communicate

directly with those that you love?



Juval Aviv holds an M.A. in Business from Tel Aviv University and is

President and CEO of Interfor, Inc., an international corporate

intelligence and investigations firm.



Juval Aviv is President and CEO of Interfor, Inc. Based in New York

with offices around the world, founded in 1979, Interfor provides

foreign and domestic intelligence services to the legal, corporate

and financial communities and conducts investigations around the world.

In addition, Mr. Aviv serves as a special consultant to the U.S.

Congress and other policy makers on issues of terrorism, fraud and money

laundering.



A leading authority on terrorist networks, Mr. Aviv served as lead

investigator for Pan Am Airways into the Pan Am 103-Lockerbie

terrorist bombing. He was featured in the recent film, Munich , as

the leader of the Israeli team that tracked down the terrorists who

kidnapped the Israeli Olympic team. Interfor's services encompass

white-collar crime investigations, asset search and recovery,

corporate due diligence, litigation support, fraud investigations,

internal compliance investigations, security and vulnerability

assessments. Since its inception, Interfors asset investigation

services have recovered over $2 billion worldwide for its clients.



Before founding Interfor, Mr. Aviv served as an officer in the Israel

Defense Force (Major, retired) leading an elite Commando/Intelligence

Unit, and was later selected by the Israeli Secret Service (Mossad)

to participate in a number of intelligence and special operations in

many countries in the late 1960s and 1970s. While working as a consultant with El Al, Mr. Aviv surveyed the

existing security measures in place and updated El Als security

program, making El Al the safest airline in business today.



Most recently, Mr. Aviv wrote Staying Safe: The Complete Guide to

Protecting Yourself, Your Family, and Your Business,(2004,HarperResource).



He has been a guest on ABC Nightline, FOX News, CNN, BBC

Newsnight, ZDF (German National Television) and RAI (Italian

National Television) and has been featured in numerous articles in

major magazines and newspapers worldwide.

4) Bush’s Middle East peace conference plan peters out after telephone conversation with Saudi King Abdullah



Washington sources report the White House tried to play down the importance of the proposal put forward by President George W. Bush Monday, July 16, after Saudi King Abdullah said he would not attend. White House spokesman Tony Snow said it was too early to say where or when the conference for discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would take place. "I think a lot of people are inclined to try to treat this as a big peace conference" said. "It's not."

The president could have known before he unveiled his conference plan that not only the Saudi ruler but also Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, both key regional players, would not be coming.

Neither goes along with Bush’s boycott of Hamas. Washington’s total rejection of the Islamist terrorists who seized the Gaza Strip was highlighted in his speech. That morning, Egyptian intelligence minister Gen. Omar Suleiman arrived in Washington to try and persuade White House advisers to rewrite some changes into the speech. No chance, he was told.

Middle East sources note that the Bush Middle East statement had the effect of accentuating the gaps dividing the very Arab rulers most needed to back peacemaking. Three opposing camps emerged more clearly than ever:

One. The US, Israel and Jordan, are convinced an uncompromising boycott of Hamas will bring down its Gaza government and restore the rule of Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah.

Two. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and most of the Gulf emirates object to this boycott and advocate power-sharing between Hamas and Fatah because they are convinced the latter will never recoup its military strength either in Gaza or the West Bank.

Three. Iran and Co. - Syria, Yemen and Hizballah, whose solid backing for the Palestinian Islamists is expressed in cash, arms, advisers and combat training.

By concretizing these gaps, the Bush speech has motivated the three camps to prove its path is the correct one. Therefore, Camp One while backing Abbas all the way will find it harder than ever before to isolate Hamas. So long as the extremist rulers of Gaza benefit from the support of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Syria, the massive US-Israeli cornucopia of cash, benefits and concessions showered on the Salam Fayyad government in Ramallah will lend Fatah rule not much more than a limited and artificial lease of life.

5) Livni: PM does not need to resign over Comptroller's report
By Amos Harel and Barak Ravid

Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said Wednesday that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert does not need to resign in the wake of State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss' scathing report on Olmert and the Israel Defense Forces' handling of the home front during the Second Lebanon War.

"The government's job is to correct the mistakes revealed in the report, and we have begun doing so," said Livni, during a press conference with visiting EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. "The Defense Ministry has taken responsibility for the issue and that is the government's job now."

Livni, who did call on the prime minister to resign following the publication of the Winograd Committee's partial report on the war in late April, added that the government must "stick together as part of the correction of the failures that are presented in the report." Livni said she had yet to read the full report.


MKs across the political spectrum called on Olmert to step down over the reports findings, and both Likud and National Union-National Religious Party submitted no-confidence motions Wednesday afternoon.

Likud faction whip Gideon Sa'ar said the prime minister's response to the report, in which he issued a harsh personal attack on Lindenstrauss, was "embarrassing and humiliating," adding that "this government of failure is not able to rectify [problems] and learn lessons."

National Union-NRP faction whip Uri Ariel said "a government that abandoned millions of civilians in wartime cannot continue to function, regardless of the prime minister's multiple cover-up attempts.

Meretz faction whip Zahava Gal-On said the reports findings paint the picture of a "reckless prime minister, who gambled not just with IDF soldiers' lives, but also with the lives of the residents of the North."

"Instead of accepting responsibility for the failures and correcting the mistakes, he attacks the comptroller," she continued. "He should draw the obvious conclusions today, and resign."

PMO blasts comptroller report as 'biased and superficial'
The Prime Minister's Office launched a personal attack on State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss on Tuesday, following the publication of a damning report on the political and military handling of the home front during the Second Lebanon War.

The criticism from the PMO was levelled at Lindenstrauss himself, and distinguished him from the State Comptroller's Office.

"The state comptroller, as is his way, chooses attractive targets and shoots from every direction in order to get big headlines and public attention," said a written response from the PMO.

Senior officers in the Israel Defense Forces General Staff have also in recent days launched attacks on the comptroller in the media, harshly criticizing his choice of language in the report.

The response referred to an "unfathomable and unbridgeable gap" between the 582-page report as a whole, assembled by the office of the comptroller, and the chapter summing up the entire report, written by the comptroller himself.

It called the former and "impressive professional report" while blasting the chapter written by the comptroller himself as "biased and superficial... reflecting the personal and private positions of the State Comptroller regarding several people, the prime minister among them."

The attack on the comptroller also targeted his language use.

"To our surprise, the term 'eclipse of reason,' which is repeated three times in the ten pages of the summary, is not found once in the 600 pages of the report."

The PMO also said that the comptroller blamed decades-old problems with the home front on the Olmert government.

"The comptroller chose to direct his poisonous arrows at the government, which had only been in existence for two months. Was there really an expectation that within two months, the government would solve all of the problems on the home front that had accompanied Israel for a generation?"

The government also responded to a claim in the report according to which it decided to go war without considering the risk to the home front, and did not deal with the matter of the home front during the course of the war.

The response said that the matter was discussed at the outset of the war on July 12, and again in meetings on July 30 and August 6.

In response to the criticism in the report that the government did not hold hearings on evacuating civilians from the north of the country, the PMO response said that its policy on "selective evacuation" was the right one, because, it said, a "mass evacuation would have meant more ghost towns in the north."

IDF top brass: Report unfairly critical of home front chief
Senior IDF General Staff officers have in recent days joined the PMO in criticizing the comptroller's report, saying he was unfairly critical of GOC Home Front Command Yitzhak (Gerry) Gershon.

Chief of Staff Gaby Ashkenazi, while announcing that the IDF is studying the report, nonetheless issued a statement expressing full support for Gershon.

According to the senior officers, both the comptroller and the media often fail to differentiate properly between the home front and the Home Front Command, placing too much emphasis on the Home Front Commands responsibility for addressing the problems that arise in war.

The officers said that the neglect of the home front was "the responsibility of all governments past and present. For years, they failed to resolve legal problems and did not provide the resources necessary for cope with threats. You can't now put the whole story on Gerry."

The officers added that the report itself points out that in areas where the Home Front Command operated during the war, the civilian population received improved assistance. "Show us one local authority that says we didn't help it during the war," they said.

The officers also rejected the report's claims that Gershon ignored wartime defense minister Amir Peretz's orders, specifically regarding a broader call-up of reserve troops. "The problem is that the minister made the comments during situation assessments, and did not issue them as explicit orders," they said, adding that a more extensive call-up would not have helped the communities under attack.

6) How will Olmert be remembered?
By Uzi Benziman

Ehud Olmert's response to George Bush's speech on Monday demonstrates his manner of thinking and how he perceives his own role: His people rushed to explain that the American president's statements were fully coordinated with the prime minister, that he was very satisfied with them, that they reflected a strong loathing for Hamas and that they placed the burden of proof on Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. There was a follow-up to the verbal reaction: Olmert announced that Vice Premier Haim Ramon would head a ministerial committee charged with discussing the implementation of the report on the West Bank outposts issued over two years ago by attorney Talia Sasson.

Olmert's response is mainly spin: He wants to be viewed as having developed an exceptionally close relationship with Bush and as being completely undisturbed by the American president's expectations of Israel.

The demands of Olmert's government set forth by Bush in his speech - the dismantling of unauthorized outposts, an end to West Bank settlement expansion and a reduced presence in the territories - are being presented by officials in Jerusalem as negligible in comparison with Bush's demands of the Palestinians.

In any event, Olmert is acting the part of someone who is genuinely prepared to do his part in realizing the vision outlined by Bush: He replaced the justice minister with his vice premier as head of the committee that is ostensibly dealing with the removal of the illegal outposts. For anyone needing a reminder, a month after becoming acting prime minister, only one outpost (Amona) was evacuated, and only partially; since his election, the government has been deterred from evacuating even the disputed building in Hebron.

The time has come for Olmert to ask himself how he wants to go down in history. Each of his 11 predecessors stamped his or her mark in office: David Ben-Gurion earned the title of principal founding father and shaper of the state. Moshe Sharett will be remembered as representing the conciliatory line vis-a-vis the Arabs. Levi Eshkol is remembered as the great reconciler between the Labor and the Revisionist movements, and for not standing in Dayan's way in the Six-Day War. Golda Meir is considered to hold supreme responsibility for the Yom Kippur War. Menachem Begin is the person who brought peace with Egypt and set the precedent of withdrawing from territories occupied in the Six-Day War. Yitzhak Rabin (in his second term) and Shimon Peres created the Oslo Accords, and Benjamin Netanyahu neutered them. Ehud Barak is etched into the national consciousness as the person who pulled the Israel Defense Forces out of Lebanon and offered Yasser Arafat a peace agreement based on a near-total withdrawal from the territories, including East Jerusalem. The overriding feature of Ariel Sharon's tenure was the implementation of the Gaza Strip disengagement plan.

And what will Olmert leave behind? So far, his name is connected only with the defeat in the Second Lebanon War.

He did make some new noises when he placed his convergence plan on the public agenda, and he did appear to be genuine in his recognition that to maintain the state's Zionist character it must get rid of the lion's share of the territories - but his performance last summer foiled his good intentions. Now he is busy jockeying for survival and bogged down in schemes to save himself from the judgment of the Winograd Committee. Hovering above is the question of why he is so determined to stay in office. Is it just to lick the wounds of his injured pride?

Olmert's ability to change the verdict of history regarding his term in office depends, first and foremost, on his courage.

He talks as if he has come to the realization that the key to saving Israel from its existential problems is a willingness to withdraw from the West Bank. He must translate that awareness into action. Even if he does not have much time left in his term, he should take advantage of it to bring about a sea change in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.

The outline sketched by President Bush on Monday is a serviceable vessel in which to pour an Israeli push to end the conflict with the Palestinians. This is a national goal of the first order, and there can be no more appropriate personal enterprise for which to be recorded in the chronicles of the state.

7) Gaza's economy on verge of collapse


Gaza's economy could collapse within weeks unless Israel reopens crucial commercial trade crossings, UN officials and Gazan businessmen warned Wednesday.

More than 68,000 workers have lost their jobs since Gaza's borders were closed in mid-June, following fierce factional battles in which Hamas expelled the forces of the rival Fatah faction, said Nasser el-Helu, a prominent Gaza businessman.

The closings added to the already high unemployment rate in the narrow coastal strip.

Israeli officials say they cannot open the main commercial crossing point at Karni, citing security concerns, though they have promised to maintain the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

In recent weeks, some border points were opened to transfer humanitarian supplies. But no industrial material has entered Gaza, bringing construction activity and manufacturing to a halt, including $93 million (€67.5 million) worth of UN-funded projects employing 121,000 people, according to the United Nations.

More than 70 percent of Gaza's factories have stopped production, says Gisha, an Israeli human rights group.

The appeal came a day before the so-called Quartet of Mideast mediators, the US, the UN, the European Union and Russia, meet in Portugal with their newly appointed emissary, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

"We are asking them (the Quartet) to take consideration of what is happening here. They must take political decisions to open all the crossings, and then the operational solutions will be found," said John Ging, director of the United Nations Relief Works Agency in Gaza.

The UN provides food aid to 80% of Gaza's 1.4 million people.

"Please lift the siege of Gaza," el-Helu said. "Mr. Blair, the siege is destroying our economy, our community."

El-Helu said Israeli business partners had begun canceling contracts because Palestinian factories were unable to meet deadlines.

He said if the borders remained closed, Gaza's economy would collapse "in one or two weeks maximum."

8) Red Mosque in Rebellion
by Daniel Pipes


Imagine that an Islamist central command exists — and that you are its chief strategist, with a mandate to spread full application of Shariah, or Islamic law, through all means available, with the ultimate goal of a worldwide caliphate. What advice would you offer your comrades in the aftermath of the eight-day Red Mosque rebellion in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan?

Probably, you would review the past six decades of Islamist efforts and conclude that you have three main options: overthrowing the government, working through the system, or a combination of the two.

Islamists can use several catalysts to seize power. (I draw here on "Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop: How Inevitable is an Islamist Future?" by Cameron Brown.)

* Revolution, meaning a wide-scale social revolt: Successful only in Iran, in 1978–79, because it requires special circumstances.
* Coup d'état: Successful only in Sudan, in 1989, because rulers generally know how to protect themselves.
* Civil war: Successful only in Afghanistan, in 1996, because dominant, cruel states generally put down insurrections (as in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria).
* Terrorism: Never successful, nor is it ever likely to be. It can cause huge damage, but without changing regimes. Can one really imagine a people raising the white flag and succumbing to terrorist threats? This did not happen after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1981, or after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in America, or even after the Madrid bombings of 2004.

A clever strategist should conclude from this survey that overthrowing the government rarely leads to victory. In contrast, recent events show that working through the system offers better odds — note the Islamist electoral successes in Algeria (1992), Bangladesh (2001), Turkey (2002), and Iraq (2005). But working within the system, these cases also suggest, has its limitations. Best is a combination of softening up the enemy through lawful means, then seizing power. The Palestinian Authority (2006) offers a case of this one-two punch succeeding, with Hamas winning the elections, then staging an insurrection. Another, quite different example of this combination just occurred in Pakistan.



The Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) complex sits at the heart of official Islamabad, the capital city of Pakistan, amid the country's ruling institutions.

The vast Red Mosque complex, also known as the Lal Masjid, geographically in the midst of Pakistan's ruling institutions, boasts long-standing connections to the regime's elite, and includes huge male and female madrassas. But, turning on its benefactors, Kalashnikov-toting burqa-clad students confronted the police in January 2007 to prevent them from demolishing an illegally constructed building.

In April, the mega-mosque's deputy imam, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, announced the imposition of Shariah "in the areas in our control" and established an Islamic court that issued decrees and judgments, rivaling those of the government.

The mosque then sent some of its thousands of madrassa students to serve as a morals police force in Islamabad, to enforce a Taliban-style regime locally with the ultimate goal of spreading it countrywide. Students closed barbershops, occupied a children's library, pillaged music and video stores, attacked alleged brothels and tortured the alleged madams. They even kidnapped police officers.

The Red Mosque leadership threatened suicide bombings if the government of Pervez Musharraf attempted to rein in its bid for quasi-sovereignty. Security forces duly stayed away. The six-month standoff culminated on July 3, when students from the mosque, some masked and armed, rushed a police checkpoint, ransacked nearby government ministries, and set cars on fire, leaving 16 dead.

This confrontation with the government aimed at nothing less than overthrowing it, the mosque's deputy imam proclaimed on July 7: "We have firm belief in God that our blood will lead to a[n Islamic] revolution." Threatened, the government attacked the mega-mosque early on July 10. The 36-hour raid turned up a stockpiled arsenal of suicide vests, machine guns, gasoline bombs, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-tank mines — and letters of instruction from Al-Qaeda's leadership.

Mr. Musharraf termed the madrassa "a fortress for war." In all, the revolt directly caused more than 100 deaths.

Mosques have been used as places for inciting violence, planning operations, and storing weapons, but deploying one as a base to overthrow the government creates a precedent. The Red Mosque model offers Islamists a bold tactic, one they likely will try again, especially if the recent episode, which has shaken the country, succeeds in pushing Mr. Musharraf out of office.

Our imaginary Islamist strategist, in short, can now deploy another tactic to attain power.

9) 'Media spin can't mask government failures'
by Amnon Meranda
Political arena rages following state comptroller's war report. Movement for Quality Government calls on Olmert to resign immediately




"No media spin aimed at discrediting the state comptroller can disguise the grave failures of the government, or spare the prime minister from the need to take responsibility and draw personal conclusions," head of the Knesset State Control Committee MK Zevulun Orlev said Wednesday.


Orlev said that the state comptroller's report on the government's handling of the home front during the Second Lebanon War was "one of the most severe reports in the history of the State of Israel.

War Report
Comptroller faults government over home front handling / Yoav Friedman
State comptroller's report on last summer's war points to government's and army's failure in protecting civilian population, says years of budget cuts dealt a blow to local authority's preparedness for emergencies
Full story


"The findings unequivocally confirm the government's failure to treat the home front and its abandoning of the north's residents," he added.



Knesset Speaker Dalia Itzik said she didn't think the report was tainted by personal motives, as suggested by the Prime Minister's Office: "I don't think the comptroller is 'out to get' the prime minister… you can't expect a two-month old administration to take on deficiencies that had been building up for years…we are all at fault."


MK Avshalom Vilan (Meretz) said that "the prime minister and the government must stop shirking responsibility… and start correcting the mistakes."



Direct responsibility for failures
The Movement for Quality Government called on the prime minister to resign following the report's publication.


"Olmert bears direct responsibility for the deep failures exposed by the comptroller, which join the errors made during the war and revealed by the Winograd Commission," the movement stated.


MK Amy Ayalon (Labor), who headed the sub-committee in charge of looking into the government's handling of the home front during the war, slammed the way in which the various government authorities applied the lessons of war.


"Our report may not have been so blunt, but its essence was the same – the decision-making process was lacking to begin with… the government was completely unaware of the war's realities."


Chairman of the Likud faction MK Gideon Sa'ar said the government's failure was common knowledge, adding that "the worst thing is that nothing has been done over the past year to rectify the situation…the government is simply unable to learn any lessons."


"The prime minister and his government have failed miserably," said MK Arieh Eldad (National Union). "Olmert is nothing more than an accident-ridden driver on Israel's road in history. The sooner we revoke his license the sooner we will be on our way to recovery."

Former MK Yossi Sarid, who headed a committee nominated by various social organizations to investigate the government treatment of the home front during the war, called Olmert "an impertinent brat that insists on damaging things further instead of accepting responsibility and stepping down."


The Legal Forum for the Land of Israel called Prime Minister Olmert's reaction to the report "hazardous to the government" adding that he was "slamming the comptroller's motives in order to distract the public from the report itself."


Aviram Zino and Attila Somfalvi contributed to this report

9)The Bush Doctrine Lives
The president isn't selling out Israel or relaxing his call for Palestinian democracy.
BY MICHAEL B. OREN

Newspapers in Israel yesterday were full of stories about President Bush's call on Monday for the creation of a Palestinian state and an international peace conference. While Israeli officials were quoted expressing satisfaction with the fact that "there were no changes in Bush's policies," commentators questioned whether the Saudis would participate in such a gathering and whether Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, with his single-digit approval ratings, could uproot Israeli settlers from the West Bank.

But all the focus on the conference misses the point. Mr. Bush has not backtracked an inch from his revolutionary Middle East policy. Never before has any American president placed the onus of demonstrating a commitment to peace so emphatically on Palestinian shoulders. Though Mr. Bush insisted that Israel refrain from further settlement expansion and remove unauthorized outposts, the bulk of his demands were directed at the Palestinians.

"The Palestinian people must decide that they want a future of decency and hope," he said, "not a future of terror and death. They must match their words denouncing terror with action to combat terror."

According to Mr. Bush, the Palestinians can only achieve statehood by first stopping all attacks against Israel, freeing captured Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and ridding the Palestinian Authority of corruption. They must also detach themselves from the invidious influence of Syria and Iran: "Nothing less is acceptable."

In addition to the prerequisites stipulated for the Palestinians, Mr. Bush set unprecedented conditions for Arab participation in peace efforts. He exhorted Arab leaders to emulate "peacemakers like Anwar Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan" by ending anti-Semitic incitement in their media and dropping the fiction of Israel's non-existence. More dramatically, Mr. Bush called on those Arab governments that have yet to establish relations with Israel to recognize its right to exist and to authorize ministerial missions to the Jewish state.

Accordingly, Saudi Arabia, which has offered such recognition but only in return for a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, will have to accept Israel prior to any territorial concessions. Mr. Bush also urged Arab states to wage an uncompromising battle against Islamic extremism and, in the case of Egypt and Jordan, to open their borders to Palestinian trade.

If the Israeli media largely overlooked the diplomatic innovations of Mr. Bush's speech, they completely missed its dynamic territorial and demographic dimensions. The president pledged to create a "contiguous" Palestinian state--code for assuring unbroken Palestinian sovereignty over most of the West Bank and possibly designating a West Bank-Gaza corridor. On the other hand, the president committed to seek a peace agreement based on "mutually agreed borders" and "current realities," which is a euphemism for Israel's retention of West Bank settlement blocks and no return to the 1967 lines.

Most momentous, however, was Mr. Bush's affirmation that "the United States will never abandon . . . the security of Israel as a Jewish state and homeland for the Jewish people." This means nothing less than the rejection of the Palestinians' immutable demand for the resettlement of millions of refugees and their descendents in Israel. America is now officially dedicated to upholding Israel's Jewish majority and preventing its transformation into a de facto Palestinian state.

Beyond these elements, the centerpiece of Mr. Bush's vision was the international conference. The Israeli press hastened to interpret this as a framework for expediting the advent of Palestinian statehood, yet it is clear that the conference is not intended to produce a state but rather to monitor the Palestinians' progress in building viable civic and democratic institutions. The goal, Mr. Bush said, will be to "help the Palestinians establish . . . a strong and lasting society" with "effective governing structures, a sound financial system, and the rule of law."

Specifically, the conference will assist in reforming the Palestinian Authority, strengthening its security forces, and encouraging young Palestinians to participate in politics. Ultimate responsibility for laying these sovereign foundations, however, rests not with the international community but solely with the Palestinians themselves: "By following this path, Palestinians can reclaim their dignity and their future . . . [and] answer their people's desire to live in peace."

Unfortunately, many of these pioneering components in Mr. Bush's speech were either implicitly or obliquely stated, and one might have wished for a more unequivocal message, such as that conveyed in his June 2002 speech on the Middle East. Still, there can be no underrating the sea change in America's policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brought about by this administration. If, under U.N. Resolution 242, Israelis were expected to relinquish territory and only then receive peace, now the Arabs will have to cede many aspects of peace--non-belligerency and recognition--well in advance of receiving territory.

Similarly, Mr. Bush's commitment to maintain Israel's Jewish majority signals the total rescinding of American support for Resolution 194, which provided for refugee return. Moreover, by insisting that the Palestinians first construct durable and transparent institutions before attaining independence, Mr. Bush effectively reversed the process, set out in the 1993 Oslo Accords, whereby the Palestinians would obtain statehood immediately and only later engage in institution building. Peace-for-land, preserving the demographic status quo, and building a civil society prior to achieving statehood--these are the pillars of Mr. Bush's doctrine on peace.

But will it work? Given the Palestinians' historical inability to sustain sovereign structures and their repeated (1938, 1947, 1979, 2000) rejection of offers of a state, the chances hardly seem sanguine.

Much of the administration's hope for a breakthrough rests on the Palestinians' newly appointed prime minister, Salaam Fayyad, who is purportedly incorruptible. Nevertheless, one righteous man is unlikely to succeed in purging the Palestinian Authority of embezzlement and graft and uniting its multiple militias.

The Saudis will probably balk at the notion of recognizing Israel before it exits the West Bank and Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees throughout the region will certainly resist any attempt to prevent them from regaining their former homes. Iran and Syria and their Hamas proxies can be counted on to undermine the process at every stage, often with violence.

Yet, despite the scant likelihood of success, Mr. Bush is to be credited for delineating clear and equitable criteria for pursuing Palestinian independence and for drafting a principled blueprint for peace. This alone represents a bold response to Hamas and its backers in Damascus and Tehran. The Palestinians have been given their diplomatic horizon and the choice between "chaos, suffering, and the endless perpetuation of grievance," and "security and a better life."

So, too, the president is to be commended for not taking the easy route of railroading the Palestinians to self-governance under a regime that would almost certainly implode. Now his paramount task is to stand by the benchmarks his administration has established, and to hold both Palestinians and Israelis accountable for any failure to meet them.

Mr. Oren is a fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem and the author of "Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present" (Norton, 2007).

Wednesday, July 11, 2007

Reporters get paid big bucks to ask vapid questions!

The media, having nothing better to do after the episode involving Miss New Jersey, are now entranced over al Qaeda. The press went over the same questions regarding GW's views this morning and he gave them the same answers. These reporters get page huge dollars to be stupid in front of millions of people. Amazing. (See 1 below.)

One of GW's biggest problems is that he did not move seriously enough against the Iraq rebels when he had the opportunity. By fighting the war along politically correct lines he has cost more casualties, spent more dollars, taken longer and thus, in the process, lost the support of the American people, By doing so he has given the nay-Sayers more time to cut the rug out from under him. Democracies, and American's in particular, are action oriented and time becomes an enemy when engaged in war.

James Woolsey, in a recent Op Ed piece in the WSJ; "What About Muslim Moderates" pointed out Britain seems to doing what is correct in terms of reaching moderate Muslims in Britain whereas the Bush Administration seems to be following the wrong path by appeasing radical Muslims and Muslim Organizations mistakenly believing this will gain their co-operation.

Israel has allowed Hezballah to re-arm and again given the advantage to the enemy. Why? Because PC'ism dictates Israel's ability as well as incompetent leadership. Bad combination for victory against one's sworn enemy. (See 2 below.)

Does a Livni interview suggest she differs with her boss, regarding Olmert's willingness to talk with talks with Syria? (See 3 below.)

Daniel Pipes offers his prescription regarding Iran. (See 4 below.)

Netanyahu appears to be a shoo-in for leading Likud and he visits the Lebanese Front and makes some critical observations. (See 5 below.)

Victor David Hanson takes on "Jimmy" and cites an Egyptian reformer. (See 6 below.)

Dick





1) The July 4 Al-Zawahiri Video: Protesting Too Much
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

On July 4, As-Sahab productions released a video to jihadist Web sites that featured al Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The 90-minute production differs from other videos featuring al-Zawahiri in that it uses a number of short audio and video cameos of other people to underscore the points al-Zawahiri is attempting to make. In some ways, the video is almost like a jihadist version of "The Daily Show," with al-Zawahiri as the host using audio and video footage to emphasize his points.

The cameo appearances in the video include jihadist hero Abdullah Azzam, Al-Quds Al-Arabi Editor-in-Chief Abdul Bari Atwan, 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas Kean, Saudi National Security Council Secretary-General Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Kuwaiti academic and Islamist writer Abdullah al-Nafisi and Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia leader Saad al-Faqih, among others.

The tone with which al-Zawahiri addresses Hamas and the larger Palestinian situation seems to indicate the video was recorded prior to Hamas' mid-June offensive that consolidated the group's control over Gaza. That would mean the video was recorded before al-Zawahiri's audio message released June 25, which noted the Hamas victory in Gaza and called on Hamas to establish a government in Gaza based on Islamic law.

The video was followed by the July 10 release of another recording from al-Zawahiri in which he threatens the United Kingdom for knighting author Salman Rushdie. Like his June 25 recording, it is a video comprising an audio recording and a still picture of al-Zawahiri. The flurry of recent recordings has been similar to the media blitz of last summer, except that Osama bin Laden was in the mix last time.

The July 4 video is clearly defensive in nature, though al-Zawahiri attempts to adopt a positive tone. It is an attempt to shore up the crumbling jihadist facade in Iraq, counter the fatwas and other statements from clerics condemning al Qaeda and jihadist ideology and, in a larger sense, assert al Qaeda's power. However, a careful review of the video reveals the places in which al Qaeda is feeling pressured and is attempting to push back. Furthermore, al-Zawahiri's need to have others proclaim al Qaeda's accomplishments -- a need a truly powerful entity would not have -- leaves viewers with the feeling that, to paraphrase The Bard, the jihadist doth protest too much.

Pressure Points: Unity in Iraq

The first obvious pressure point for al-Zawahiri and al Qaeda's core leadership is Iraq. Momentum has shifted in Iraq, and things are not going well for al Qaeda there. Tactically, al Qaeda's Iraqi node can still kill people -- but strategically, the group's hopes of establishing a caliphate there under the mantle of the Islamic State of Iraq are rapidly fading. These dashed hopes have caused the group to lash out against former allies, which has worsened al Qaeda's position.

One of the reasons for this state of affairs is, according to al-Zawahiri, lack of unity. The controversy over the legitimacy of the Islamic State of Iraq is one source of that disunity. Some Islamic scholars and Iraqi tribal leaders say the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq was proclaimed prematurely, and that such a political entity can only be legitimately formed after the jihadists have been empowered. Al-Zawahiri says that many of the people who call the Islamic State of Iraq premature supported the formation of a similar government in Peshawar while the Soviets still controlled Afghanistan. Of course, al-Zawahiri fails to mention that, unlike Iraq, all the groups involved in Afghanistan were united in their opposition to the Marxist government in Kabul and its Red Army backers.

Al-Zawahiri also says the Islamic State of Iraq is more empowered and independent than the Hamas-led government in the Palestinian territories and has a larger army, but that the Palestinian government is considered legitimate while the Islamic State of Iraq is not.

During the video, al-Zawahiri not only calls for unity among the jihadists and nationalists in Iraq, he also tries to reach out to the Palestinians, Shia, Arab nationalists and Kurdish nationalists. This outreach to the Shia and failure to criticize Iran when discussing the situation in Iraq is a marked contrast to the July 8 statement from Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, in which he threatened the Shia and the Iranian government. Al-Baghdadi's group has also attacked scores of Shiite targets -- a strategy the group began under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's leadership, and one that al-Zawahiri counseled against.

Al-Zawahiri calls on the jihadists to "strengthen one another, and guide one another, and advise and instruct our brothers, even if we differ with them, and that we must study how to close gaps between us, in order to make use of and benefit from every achievement achieved by our mujahideen brothers." He also says this must be done "even where there are shortcomings or something less than perfection" -- a reference to the Islamic State of Iraq.

Al-Zawahiri posits that al Qaeda's efforts at fostering unity have set an example for others to follow. He says that because of al Qaeda's promotion of unity, Allah blessed its attacks against the U.S. embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole, along with the 9/11 attacks, and has protected al Qaeda's leaders from their enemies. He seems to forget the way his own ideological shift from the near to the far enemy, and his alignment with bin Laden, inflamed divisions in the already fractious Egyptian militant community.

Al-Zawahiri says al Qaeda is constantly striving to "unite the ranks of the mujahideen" and indicates that other independent jihadist groups have recently agreed to join the al Qaeda umbrella group. He says al Qaeda will soon announce the addition of some groups to its coalition, but that other groups prefer their union with al Qaeda be kept quiet right now. Al-Zawahiri did not provide any clues as to which groups have joined, but it is not illogical to conclude that, based on recent events, he could have been referring to Palestinian, Lebanese and Kashmiri groups.

However, even this assertion that more groups are in al Qaeda's ideological orbit is telling. If al Qaeda's ideology had momentum, if the Ummah were rising up in response to al Qaeda's call, there would be no reason to hide the affiliation. If, on the other hand, the United States and its allies have begun systematically dismantling al Qaeda's local nodes, then it makes sense that some of the weaker groups would want to avoid bringing that kind of pressure on themselves. Thus, a statement that al-Zawahiri intended to be an expression of strength is, in effect, a concession of weakness.

Ideological Assaults

Al-Zawahiri notes that the battles of the "crusaders and their slaves" (referring to the Muslims who cooperate with the United States and its Western allies) have expanded to the "doctrinal and moral fronts." He also says the "Ummah is currently facing a deceptive propaganda war from the Americans and their agents." These are references to the ideological war Stratfor has discussed as the only way jihadism can ultimately be defeated.

Clearly, al Qaeda also sees the attacks against its ideology as a significant threat. In fact, al-Zawahiri says, "I would like to remind everyone that the most dangerous weapons in the Saudi-American system are not buying of loyalties, spying on behalf of the Americans or providing facilities to them. No, the most dangerous weapons of that system are those who outwardly profess advice, guidance and instruction …" In other words, al Qaeda fears fatwas more than 500-pound bombs or cruise missiles. Bombs can kill people; fatwas can kill the ideology that lies at the root of the problem.

Al-Zawahiri also laments specific fatwas issued by clerics declaring that the jihad in Iraq is not obligatory and who forbid young Muslim men from going to Iraq. To counter these fatwas, al-Zawahiri plays an audiotape of Azzam (while a photo of Azzam is shown), in which Azzam comments on how jihad is the individual duty of every Muslim. Al-Zawahiri then urges Muslims to ignore such fatwas and scholars: "O youth of Islam, don't listen to them, and I convey to you the mujahideen's commanders' mobilization of you, so hurry to Afghanistan, hurry to Iraq, hurry to Somalia, hurry to Palestine and hurry to the towering Atlas Mountains." He also rails against the "religion traders in Iraq and Afghanistan to deem as haram (forbidden) the jihad against the invaders."

One reason the al Qaeda leadership is so threatened by these ideological attacks is that neither bin Laden nor al-Zawahiri has any Islamic scholarly credentials. Many Muslims do not believe they possess the training and authority to issue a fatwa.

Attacks Against the House of Saud

A significant amount of this video is devoted to an attempt to undermine the Saudi government as personified by the Saudi royal family. Though the tape also briefly mentions the other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Saudi regime receives a prolonged treatment, and the video clips of al-Faqih, Prince Bandar, al-Nafisi and others are used to vilify the House of Saud. Of course, verbal attacks against the Saudi regime are nothing new for al Qaeda. In bin Laden's August 1996 fatwa, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," he spends more ink condemning the Saudis than he does condemning the Americans the fatwa was reputedly authored against.

These attacks against the Saudis are meant to not only undermine the Saudi clerics' authority to issue fatwas, they also attempt to thwart Saudi efforts to halt the violence in Iraq. Such a settlement would effectively put al Qaeda's Iraq node out of business and hasten the demise of the Islamic State of Iraq. To this end, al-Zawahiri warns the divided jihadist and nationalist militant groups in Iraq that, "If the agents of the Saudi state were to take control of government in Iraq, or the regions of the people of the Sunnah, the Iraqis would then suffer the same repression and humiliation which the people suffer under Saudi rule." Elsewhere he says, "If Saudi influence were to spread in Iraq, it would impose on the people of Iraq a ruling clique which would own what is above the ground and beneath it, and would sell Iraq in its entirety to the Americans." He clearly wants to keep Iraq's tribal leaders off the Saudi bandwagon.

Egyptian Statements

Over the past several months, former Egyptian militants have issued a string of statements renouncing violence and al Qaeda. These statements, some of which have come from al-Zawahiri's friends and family members, appear to be another pressure point for him. He denounces the statements as the "blackmailing of the tortured and mutilated captives … who have been stripped of their thoughts and beliefs, and had their convictions removed for them to declare their remorse, regret and retractions ..."

Elsewhere he says, "I read a ridiculous bit of humor in Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, which claimed that it received a communique from one of the backtrackers, who faxed it from prison. I laughed inside and asked myself, 'Do the prison cells of Egypt now have fax machines? And I wonder, are these fax machines connected to the same line as the electric shock machines, or do they have a separate line?'

"Thus, I caution my Muslim brothers everywhere against the statements and retractions of the graduates and guests of the prisons, on the peninsula and in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Indonesia and all lands of Islam. They are either those who have been coerced and before whose eyes the memories of the torture, lashing, suspension and shocks play like a film, or are those who are disheartened and fallen and looking for a way out of prison and a little comfort. Neither type is to be listened to or relied upon in his statements and opinions …"

Despite his joke about the fax machine and the advice not to listen to these statements, al-Zawahiri is clearly bothered and issues a challenge: "Thus, I tell these enemies: This is not a noble fight, to be alone with an isolated prisoner and squeeze him physically and psychologically until he agrees with you for you, then to applaud that. If you are real men, then compete with us by yourselves, in the arenas of ideology, invitation and information, which are the arenas in which you yourselves have admitted your defeat."

Now, if the enemies of al Qaeda have admitted defeat in the area of ideology, how can al-Zawahiri call ideological attacks the most dangerous weapon facing al Qaeda? These ideological attacks clearly concern him greatly.

The End Strategy

Al-Zawahiri ends the video by mapping out a two-part strategy. The short-term plan involves targeting "Crusader-Jewish interests … in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia and everywhere we are able to strike their interests." The long-term plan is to change the "corrupt and corrupting" regimes in the Muslim world once the crusaders and Jews have been defeated and can no longer support these regimes.

The video contains some clips of Atwan and al-Nafisi talking about how al Qaeda has masterfully played its strategic hand, and trumpeting the organization's strength, but when taken in light of the only criterion that really matters -- successful attacks -- these proclamations ring hollow. Had al Qaeda recently conducted spectacular attacks, there would have been no need for the inclusion of video and audio footage of people informing the public of the jihadists' power. Their actions would have spoken for themselves.

Upon reflection, perhaps their actions have.

2)Hizballah Has the highly mobile Rapier 2 anti-air missile for Downing Israeli Warplanes One Year after Lebanon War


One year ago to the day, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist Hizballah sent a unit across the border into Israel and ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing eight of its members and kidnapping two. The raid, followed by a Katyusha rocket attack on northern Israel sparked the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and a 34-day war.

Military sources report that Hizballah is in better military shape than ever before. its sponsors, Iran and Syria, have not only replenished the rocket stocks depleted by daily barrages against Israeli towns and villages, but topped them up by 50%. Whereas Hizballah started the 2006 war with 12,000 rockets of different types, today the Lebanese Shiite terror group has accumulated 18,000 in its arsenal.

Drawing lessons of that war, Hizballah has doubled the number of teams trained to launch rockets and given them a fleet of all-terrain vehicles and motorbikes for speedy movement between firing locations.

Hizballah’s long-range rocket force, designated “Planning Unit,” is stationed in northern Lebanon in the Hermel district. Most of the new rocket supplies, including hundreds of Zilzal-2, Zilzal-3, and Fatah-110, which has a range of 250 km (reaching Tel Aviv and points south), are stored in large emergency depots on the Syrian side of the border with Lebanon to keep them out of sight of UN peacekeepers and out of the way of the Israeli Air Force in a flare-up of hostilities.

Hizballah plans to delay hauling the rockets into Lebanon until the last moment before they are fired.

Hizballah’s short-range rocket unit, designated the “Nasr Unit”, is stationed in the Tyre region of the South and its command center in the village of Maarub. They are positioned for striking the northern Israeli towns of Haifa, Kiryat Shemona, Tiberias, Safed, Acre and Nahariya.

To stay out of sight of UN peacekeepers policing in the South, this brigade keeps a low profile, reactivating only very few of the bunkers which served them in the war. the bulk have been cleared out, restocked with ammunition and combat rations, prepared for military use and kept closed.

This enables the Lebanese government and, less willingly, the Israel high command, to maintain that a lot has changed for the better since the war and Hizballah is no longer deployed right up to the border but at a distance.

This is only a half-truth. The fact is that the Shiite terrorists are back in the South, albeit well hidden in the Shiite villages. Consequently, Israeli policy-makers can continue to spin illusions, like those the Olmert government fed the public and the media before the last war.

Hizballah has tripled its shore-to-sea C-802 missiles, one of which crippled an Israeli missile ship in July, 2006. With 25-30 of these weapons, the Shiite militia is capable of menacing any of the warships cruising Mediterranean waters opposite the Lebanese coast, be they Israeli missile boats, the American Sixth Fleet or the European flotilla attached to UNIFIL.

Several dozen more are concealed across the Syrian border, ready for transfer at short notice.

Hidden there too is double the number of anti-tank missiles in service with the Hizballah in 2006, of types which caused heavy damage and casualties to Israeli tank crews. Syria has upgraded this stock with a large supply of “Third Generation” missiles bought in Russia with Iranian funding.

Another major difference between then and now is that Hizballah has established its first air defense unit armed with ground-to-air shoulder-borne Strela-7 missiles and the mobile Rapier 2s.

Last year, Hizballah fielded 1,600 well-trained commandos, the backbone of its fighting force, and lost 750 in combat with the Israeli army. Since then, 1,200 fresh fighters have been recruited and are undergoing commando training at a special facility near Tehran.

Each course of three to four months has an intake of 300 to 400 Hizballah recruits. The third course went into training in July. By the end of the year, Hizballah will have some 2,000 elite troops, 400-500 more than its number at the outset of the last war.

Hizballah’s secretary-general, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, presents a charismatic, powerful image. However, since the war, Iran and the movement’s leadership have reduced his mandate to internal Lebanese politics in opposition to prime minister Fouad Siniora and the rest of Lebanon’s anti-Syrian political bloc, headed by Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt.

The militia’s present war chief, special operations planner and liaison with Iran, Syria and al Qaeda, is the veteran Hizballah super-terrorist and kidnapper, Imad Mughniyeh.

Serving under him as chief of staff is Ibrahim Aqil.

Number 3 in the movement’s military hierarchy is Hajj Khalil Harb, commander of Unit No. 1800, which kidnapped the Israeli soldiers Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev in its cross-border raid of July 12, 2006, and is responsible for special operations in Israel, the Palestinian territories and Iraq.

Members of this elite unit are deployed in the Gaza Strip in support of Hamas.

In Iraq, they cooperate with Sunni and Shiite terrorists fighting US troops.

Unit No. 1800 has a permanent complement of 5,000 trained men and a partially-trained reserve force of 9,000 on standby.

The militia’s fighting manpower, including its special intelligence and security agencies, totals between 15,000 and 16,000.

3) FM Livni: Israel should not enter talks with Syria


Israel should not talk to Syria, and the region as a whole should deal with the country, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said in an interview with French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur quoted by Israel Radio Thursday afternoon.

"The rumors regarding the renewal of talks between Israel and Syria are baseless," Livni was quoted as telling the magazine.

"Syria continues playing a dangerous game. It supports Hizbullah, inflicts damage to the independence of Lebanon and keeps a dangerous partnership with Iran," Livni said.

On a different topic, Livni rejected the notion of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, saying such a move would lead to a civil "war between the Palestinian similar to the one in Gaza," referring to Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip following several days of fighting between the Islamist organization and the secular Fatah faction.

Earlier Thursday Reuters reported that Syria has signalled to the UN's Middle East envoy a willingness to change its relationship with Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas if progress were made towards a peace deal with Israel.

UN special envoy Michael Williams told Reuters in an interview that he has conveyed to top Israeli officials his "impressions" from talks with Syrian leaders in recent months, but acknowledged deep-rooted suspicions on both sides would make reviving the peace process difficult.

Williams said Syrian officials had made clear to him during his recent visits to Damascus that they believed negotiations that collapsed in 2000 had largely set the parameters for a deal.

"The Syrian side has basically said, 'Look, the work is done. It's here in the drawer. The big issues like water, security and access were all looked at then, were pretty much thrashed out. So if negotiations were resumed, then maybe we could make real progress,' " Williams said.

A Syrian Foreign Ministry official recently said Israel and Syria had solved some 85 percent of the problem in past negotiations.

US President George W. Bush, however, has shown little enthusiasm for an Israeli-Syrian peace track, casting doubt on the chances of progress.

Williams said he believed that Syria's assessment that a deal was "in the drawer" was "somewhat exaggerated."

"It is difficult. There's awkwardness on both sides that stems from the history of their relationship over 60 years. It's very difficult to remove the suspicions and antipathies that have resulted from that," Williams said.

Williams said he briefed Prime Minister Ehud Olmert last month on his talks in Damascus.

Williams said he believed Israel was genuinely interested in "testing the waters" for a resumption of talks, and that he was using his role as a go-between to try to "clarify for each what I perceived to be the other's view".

"I think both sides find it quite difficult making an assessment of each other," Williams said.

Olmert has said he was willing to hold direct talks with Damascus provided it was willing to sever ties with Iran, Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas.

Asked by Reuters if Syria had shown a willingness to sever those relations, Williams said: "The impression I got from my visit to Damascus was that if there was progress in terms of establishing a peace track, then we would see some changes in Syrian behavior on the three issues, Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas."

Williams did not offer specifics about how those signals were conveyed and how seriously he took them.

4) Unleash the Iranian Opposition:[the Mujahedeen-e Khalq]
by Daniel Pipes


Navigating the fractious currents of émigré politics is never easy, and especially for the Iranian opposition group known as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq or the People's Mujahedeen of Iran. Simply put, the rogue oil state regime it opposes terrifies one half the West and tempts the other, and the MEK is itself accused of being a superannuated Marxist-Islamist terrorist cult.

These obstacles have not, however, prevented the MEK from trumpeting Islamism as the new global threat, providing important intelligence to the West – for example, about Iran's nuclear program – terrifying the regime in Tehran, and putting on major displays of anti-regime solidarity.

Participants at a Mujahedeen-e Khalq rally outside Paris on June 30 boisterously welcomed Maryam Rajavi.


I witnessed one such display at a vast exposition hall outside Paris last week, where some 20,000 Iranians from around the world met to hear music from the old country, wave flags and banners, and listen to brief speeches by non-Iranian well-wishers – notably U.S. Congressman Bob Filner, Democrat of California, and former Algerian prime minister Sid Ahmad Ghozali. The crowd then settled in for an 85-minute tour d'horizon by the MEK leader, Maryam Rajavi.

The meeting inspired several observations. First, the slick production, with hints of an American political convention – balloons and chaff falling from the rafters, a televised sequence of the leader arriving in cavalcade – was aimed mostly at an audience outside the hall, especially in Iran.

Second, the event had two apparent goals: reminding Iranians that an alternative does exist to today's theocracy, plus pressuring the European Union to remove the MEK from its terror list. For Iranians, the music portion included pretty girls in (for them, daring) Western clothing. For Europeans, it pointedly included "Le chant des partisans," the anthem of the French Resistance during World War II.

Third, Rajavi's in-depth analysis mentioned neither the United States nor Israel, something extremely rare for a major speech about Middle Eastern politics. Nor did she even hint at conspiratorial thinking, a deeply welcome change for Iranian politics.



Young singers at the Mujahedeen-e Khalq rally outside Paris on June 30. Many participants wore vests inscribed with the slogan, "Notre choix, Maryam Rajavi," an allusion to the MEK leader.

Finally, no other opposition group in the world can mount so impressive a display of muscle as does the MEK, with its thousands of supporters, many young, and a slate of dignitaries.

These factors, combined with the mullah's near-phobic reaction toward the MEK, suggest that the organization presents a formidable tool for intimidating Tehran.

Alas, Westerners presently cannot work with the MEK, due to a 1997 decision by the Clinton administration, followed five years later by the European Union, to offer a sop to the mullahs and declare it a terrorist group, putting it officially on a par with the likes of Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hizbullah. A Portuguese member of the European parliament, Paulo Casaca, notes that "Officials on both sides of the Atlantic are on the record as saying that the only reason why the group was put on the U.S. terrorism list in the first place was to send a ‘goodwill gesture' to the Iranian regime."

But the MEK poses no danger to Americans or Europeans, and has not for decades. It does pose a danger to the malign, bellicose theocratic regime in Tehran. The MEK's utility to Western states is reflected in the inconsistent, even contradictory, U.S. government attitude toward it over the past decade. One amusing instance came in October 2003, when Colin Powell, the secretary of state, tartly wrote Donald Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense, to remind him that the 3,800 MEK forces at Camp Ashraf in Iraq were supposed to be treated as captives, not as allies.

But there will be nothing amusing as the American presence in Iraq winds down and thousands of unarmed MEK members are left to the tender mercies of the pro-Tehran regime in Baghdad. Belatedly, the Bush administration needs to take three steps. First, let the MEK members leave Camp Ashraf in a humane and secure manner. Second, delist the organization from the terror rolls, unleashing it to challenge the Islamic Republic of Iran. Third, exploit that regime's inordinate fear of the MEK.

As Patrick Clawson and I suggested over four years ago, "To deter the mullahs from taking hostile steps (supporting terrorism against coalition troops in Iraq, building nuclear weapons), it could prove highly effective to threaten U.S. meetings with the MEK or providing help for its anti-regime publicity campaign."

That remains good advice, but there's not another four years to wait.

5) Netanyahu: We'll give as good as we get

Opposition leader visits north on anniversary for Lebanon War. 'Upcoming Winograd report will change political map' he says



Opposition leader MK Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) visited the Upper Galilee Thursday, marking the first anniversary of the Second Lebanon War.


He was accompanied by MK Haim Katz (Likud) and former head of the Northern Command, major-general (ret.) Yossi Peled.

The three began their tour at border-mark 105, where IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were kidnapped last July.



They continued down to Kiryat Shmona, where Netanyahu commented on what he called the "events leading up to the war".



"There is a direct link between the hasty retreat from Lebanon, through the restrained response we showed to the kidnapping that took place that year, down to the kidnappings last year and the war that followed.



"As I said before – we will give as good as we get… this is a clear equation. If they (Hizbullah) fire Katyushas at us, they can expect a formidable response.



"I've spoken to the kidnapped soldiers' families earlier today," added Netanyahu. "I told them I hope we'll have good news for them soon."



''There's no grand plan'

"I am utterly amazed," said Netanyahu when he visited shelters in Kiryat Shmona and addressed the ongoing debate regarding the uninhabitable state most of them are in.



"Most of these shelters were renovated with contribution funds not with government funds… I don't understand why the government can't find a few dozen million shekels to take care of the shelters throughout the north.



"The separation fence cost us 10 billion shekels, which we had no problem finding at the time, regardless of the budget," he said, adding "I guess that's the way things are when there's no grand plan."


Netanyahu went on to say he believed the next general elections would be held in 2008, and that the upcoming Winograd report would have a profound affect on the political map in Israel.

6) Upside-Down Politics in the Middle East
By Victor Davis Hanson

Jimmy Carter - a self-proclaimed champion of human rights and nonviolence - has called the U.S.'s unwillingness to accept the 2006 Palestinian election of the terrorists of Hamas "criminal."

But unlike Carter, Egyptian reformer Sa'd Al-Din Ibrahim - no friend of the United States - thinks members of Hamas are real criminals.

In an article on the terrorist organization's recent takeover of Gaza, Ibrahim wrote, "The Hamas fighters behaved in a barbaric, bloody manner, while repeatedly (shouting) 'Allahu Akbar' and religious prayers. . . . The victors executed a number of Fatah leaders and fighters, shooting them or throwing them from the roofs of buildings, with no trial - not even a mock trial."

Carter is one among many Western liberals who either ignore or, worse, defend Hamas and other acknowledged enemies of free speech, due process and religious and political tolerance.

After the attempted jihadist bombings last month in London and Glasgow, new British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that his ministers were not to connect Muslims with terrorism. Then he even ordered the nomenclature of a "war against terror" dropped.

But a former British jihadist, Hassan Butt, argued in an op-ed in the Guardian of London concerning the failed plots that Islam is integral to the current epidemic of global terrorism.

"What drove me and many of my peers to plot acts of extreme terror within Britain, our own homeland and abroad," wrote Butt, "was a sense that we were fighting for the creation of a revolutionary state that would eventually bring Islamic justice to the world."

In anger at the Bush administration's refusal to meet with the Assad regime in Syria - which conducts assassinations of Lebanese reformers, aids terrorists in Iraq and funds Hezbollah and Hamas - House Speaker Nancy Pelosi flew to Damascus for direct talks.

Yet some of her critics were liberal Syrians fighting for freedom at great risk to their lives.

"So much of Syria's opposition was against Pelosi's visit, against the EU's talks with the regime," remarked Syrian reformist Akram al-Bunni. "They believe that these offers of friendship strengthen the regime and increase its totalitarian tendencies, and they're angry."

Western liberals seek to downplay the Islamic roots of terrorism and engage in dialogue with authoritarian regimes and movements. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern dissidents find themselves in an odd, if not embarrassing marriage of sorts with the conservative Bush administration on the need to identify and confront the causes and abettors of intolerance and terror.

What explains such strange political alliances?

Modern liberals - fearful of offending non-Westerners - have almost become more like old-time conservatives in their "live and let live" politics and neo-isolationism.

In contrast, some conservatives have gradually drifted away from their past realpolitik and easy detente with illiberal regimes.

Such an about-face did not start with George Bush and his now maligned neo-con advisers. It was evident earlier with Ronald Reagan. He rejected detente with the Soviet Union and instead championed religious and political dissidents, calling for the end of, not tolerance of, the tyranny of the Soviet "evil empire."

Liberals, on the other hand, have embraced multiculturalism often in guilt and as a reaction against past purported Western chauvinism. We are not supposed to judge different religions and foreign cultures by imposing our own arbitrary standards of morality.

But the end result of multiculturalism in the real world is an insidious relativism. So Jimmy Carter turns a blind eye to Hamas' street executions. Gordon Brown fears offending radical Muslims, and Nancy Pelosi flies to embrace Syrian President and terrorist enabler Bashar al-Assad.

Conservatives more often believe in universal absolutes: Some things like authoritarianism are always worse; others like freedom are always better, regardless of cultural differences.

At home in a freewheeling, affluent society, such rigid consistency may seem reactionary, unimaginative and unrealistic. But, abroad, it can translate into something different, as more Western conservatives than liberals have supported such troublemaking champions of individual rights as former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky or the Somali-born former Dutch legislator Ayaan Hirsi Ali.

Finally, there is the matter of tactics. Liberals believe more in universal redemption through nonviolence. Evil is not so much innate as it is a result of poverty, prejudice or some sort of oppression. Its antidote then should be education, understanding, dialogue and diplomacy. So don't give up on an Assad, demonize Islamists or isolate Hamas.

Conservatives are more likely to believe evil is elemental, so combating and isolating it is the necessary first step in protecting the weaker from harm.

Who, then, condemns religious fanaticism, terrorists and their illiberal state supporters in the Middle East? Not necessarily, as we would expect, contemporary liberals. Instead, they now more often rail about the Patriot Act at home than the jailing or killing of innocents in places like Damascus and Gaza.